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(2024) A Critical Moment: Haiti's Gang Crisis and International Responses (February 2024)

(2024) A Critical Moment: Haiti's Gang Crisis and International Responses (February 2024)

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) 2024 50 pages
Summary — GI-TOC policy report, published in February 2024 ahead of the planned Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support deployment, analyzing how Haiti's roughly 200 gangs evolved from patronage-dependent groups into professionalized violent entrepreneurs exercising territorial and criminal governance over about 80 percent of Port-au-Prince and expanding into rural Artibonite. Based on 36 interviews and fieldwork in November 2023, it assesses the two main international tools, the UN sanctions regime and the MSS mission, and proposes ways to align them against Haiti's criminal ecosystem.
Key Findings
Full Description
Written by Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, Ana Paula Oliveira and Matt Herbert, this report examines Haiti's security collapse through 2023 and early 2024 and the design of the international response. UN figures for 2023 record over 4 789 murders, 1 698 injured and 2 490 kidnapped, with a homicide rate of 40.9 per 100 000, more than double the 2022 rate. The report documents the professionalization of the gangs: an estimated 200 groups, the largest grown from 50-100 members in the MINUSTAH era to 1 500-2 500, organized into the rival G9 and G-Pep coalitions, run by 'young veterans' with hierarchical structures, division of labour, recruitment processes, tactical training by ex-soldiers, ex-police and deportees, and arsenals of trafficked AK-47, AR-15 and Galil rifles. It traces gang expansion from urban Port-au-Prince, roughly 80 percent of which is under gang control or influence, into the rural Artibonite, where farmland invasions cut cultivated land from 5 800 hectares in 2018 to 2 400 in 2022, and analyzes the wider ecosystem of violence, including the Bwa Kale vigilante movement and more than 600 lynchings registered since April 2023. The second half assesses the UN sanctions regime created in October 2022 and the non-UN MSS mission authorized in October 2023, arguing they represent a conceptual shift in UN treatment of profit-driven criminal actors as primary conflict actors. Recommendations, based on 36 interviews conducted in November 2023, include coordinated planning between the MSS, the Sanctions Committee and the Panel of Experts, targeting the broader criminal ecosystem including white-collar enablers, expedited sanctions designations, continuous mapping of criminal networks, centering human rights and communities, and consistent strategic messaging.
Topics
SecurityGovernanceJustice & SecurityAgriculture
Geography
National, Ouest, Artibonite
Time Coverage
2022 — 2024
Keywords
gangs, criminal governance, Multinational Security Support mission, UN sanctions, G9, G-Pep, arms trafficking, Bwa Kale, vigilantes, Artibonite, extortion, kidnapping, MINUSTAH, international intervention
Entities
GI-TOC, Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, Ana Paula Oliveira, Matt Herbert, G9 Fanmi e Alye, G-Pep, Jimmy Chérizier (Barbecue), Johnson André (Izo), Renel Destina (Ti Lapli), Ti Gabriel, Gran Grif, Kokorat San Ras, 400 Mawozo, Haitian National Police, MSS mission, UN Security Council, BINUH, MINUSTAH, Kenya, Bwa Kale, Village de Dieu, Galil Gang
Full Document Text

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ww A CRITICAL MOMENT HAITI’S GANG CRISIS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES ROMAIN LE COUR GRANDMAISON | ANA PAULA OLIVEIRA | MATT HERBERT FEBRUARY 2024 Maur © 2024 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Global Initiative. Cover photo: Ricardo Arduengo/AFP via Getty Images Cartography: Rudi de Lange Please direct inquiries to: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Avenue de France 23 Geneva, CH-1202 Switzerland www.globalinitiative.net ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank the people in Haiti who made this investigation possible. Although for security reasons their names cannot appear in the report, their support and openness has been crucial to this work. The authors would also like to thank Mark Shaw for his comments, the editor and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s Publications team for their support in reviewing and developing the report. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Romain Le Cour Grandmaison is a senior exper t at the GI-TOC. His work focuses on criminal organizations, the state and violence in Haiti, Mexico and Central America. He has a PhD in political science from Sorbonne University. Ana Paula Oliveira is a senior analyst in the GI-TOC’s Global Policy team. She provides analysis on a range of international policy issues, including the impact of organized crime on human rights law and policy, human rights responses to transnational organized crime, cybercrime and organized crime violence in the context of illicit economies. Ana Paula has an LL.M. cum laude in international law from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. Matt Herbert is the head of research for North Africa and the Sahel at the GI-TOC, overseeing applied field research and analysis on the political economy of organized crime in the two regions. He also co-leads the GI-TOC initiative on the use of targeted sanctions as tools to counter transnational organized crime and corruption. He has a PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts Universit y, with a sub-specialization in securit y studies, and law and development. FROM VISION TO ACTION: A DECADE OF ANALYSIS, DISRUPTION AND RESILIENCE The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime was founded in 2013. Its vision was to mobilize a global strategic approach to tackling organized crime by strengthening political commitment to address the challenge, building the analytical evidence base on organized crime, disrupting criminal economies and developing networks of resilience in affected communities. Ten years on, the threat of organized crime is greater than ever before and it is critical that we continue to take action by building a coordinated global response to meet the challenge. CONTENTS Abbreviations and acronyms ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2 Executive summary����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3 Methodology�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5 Haiti’s gangs: from territorial control to criminal governance������������������������������������������������������������������������6 The professionalization of gangs �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6 Firearms proliferation and tactical training: The new reality �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������12 Gangs, vigilantes and strongmen: The new ecosystem of violence ������������������������������������������������������������������������������13 The new logics of territorial control and rent extraction �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������17 The international response to gangs in Haiti�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������22 Sanctions: Developing the regime to buttress the deployment������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24 The Multinational Security Support mission: A new model of international intervention against organized crime������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������29 Potential risks and challenges for the mission��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������33 Conclusion and recommendations���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������38 Coordination and planning between the MSS mission, Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts����������������� 38 Target criminal ecosystems to counter gangs���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������39 Expedite sanctions designations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������39 Continually map criminal ecosystems�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������40 Human rights and community at the centre�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������40 Fine-tune and repeat messaging��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������40 Notes�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������41 2 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS BINUH United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti BSAP Brigade de Sécurité des Aires Protégées (Protected Areas Security Brigade) EU European Union G9 G9 Fanmi e Alye (G9 Family and Allies), criminal federation of gangs G-Pèp G-People, criminal federation of gangs HNP Haitian National Police MINUJUSTH United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti MSS Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSG United Nations Secretary General 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY O ver the course of 2023 and early 2024, security has continued to deteriorate alarmingly in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and in rural areas in the centre and south of the country. 1 Criminal gangs, the main drivers of this degradation, have grown in strength and capacity, enabling them to supplant in part or in full the control of government forces. 2 The gangs’ domination of critical infrastructure, such as commercial and oil port terminals, major roads, and population centres has heightened their influence over Haiti’s economy and political system. The gangs have also imposed governance on major parts of Port-au-Prince, leading both to rising criminal predation and human rights violations, including gender-based violence. 3 Moreover, 2023 saw the development of particularly strong vigilante movements while the first weeks of 2024 witnessed the rise of violent political leaders, adding to an already disastrous security situation. As one United Nations (UN) report bluntly noted: ‘The situation is unravelling.’ 4 The Haitian crisis worsened critically in 2023. UN reports indicate that in 2023, over 4 789 people were murdered, 1 698 injured and 2 490 kidnapped, with a 2023 homicide rate of 40.9 per 100 000, more than double the 2022 rate. 5 Besides these figures, the nature of the criminal actors has been profoundly transformed, posing a series of challenges to international intervention. Over the past five years, gangs have undergone a radical evolution, going from rather unstructured actors dependent on resources provided by public or private patronage to violent entrepreneurs who have been able to convert their territorial power into governance capabilities. This shift has been fuelled by the gangs’ unprecedented access to firearms and the Haitian state’s inability to halt their expansion, profession- alization and propensity to impose their rule over ever larger territories, as well as by ongoing collusion by elements of the country’s political and economic elites. In October 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution authorizing a non-UN multinational security support (MSS) mission to Haiti. After long negotiations, the Kenyan government agreed to lead the deployment, aimed at supporting the Haitian National Police (HNP) in addressing gang violence and re-establishing security, 6 although the planned operation is currently being challenged in the Kenyan courts. 7 This resolution came after the UNSC agreed a sanctions regime for Haiti in October 2022, and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on key gang leaders, businessmen and politicians. The UN sanctions have been supplemented by unilateral designations issued by Canada, the US, and the European Union (EU). Further UN sanctions were levied on gang leaders in December 2023, as the preparations accelerated for the MSS deployment. 4 Intervention by the UN in Haiti is not new, with the embryonic MSS mission representing the third initiative in as many decades. However, the proposed international mission stands out, both for Haiti and more broadly for international responses to organized criminal violence. Historically, the UN has become involved in Haiti in response to political crises, worsening insecurity and repeated natural disasters. 8 While the 2004-2017 United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) engaged in counter-gang operations, largely in and around Por t-au-Prince, this came after the force had been on the ground for several years and was generally intermittent. 9 In contrast, the prospective 2024 intervention will be conducted outside the auspices of the UN and has been motivated by, and focuses on, criminal gangs as the main threat to peace and security. This reflects the substantial change in gangs’ power, structure and capacity for territorial governance since the MINUSTAH era. These entities are nowadays far more economically autonomous and territorially power ful, making them less controllable. As one Haitian entrepreneur described the contemporar y evolution of the gangs: ‘We saw a lion being born, we fed it and watched it grow, we tried to domesticate it, but the animal eventually escaped from the cage, and here we are.’ 10 Nonetheless, the focus by the UNSC on profit-oriented criminal entities as primary conflict actors in their own right, in both the resolutions setting up the sanctions regime and the MSS mission, is a substantial conceptual shift for the UN. 11 Given the growth of transnational organized crime, and expansion of instabilit y and violence linked to such crime, situations like the present one in Haiti are likely to become more common. The UN’s current initiatives on Haiti potentially augur a new international approach to how organized crime actors can be tackled both from a security and human rights perspective. Ensuring international tools are effective in mitigating harm caused by gangs in Haiti is therefore vitally important for the people of the country, and for the international community. FIGURE 1 Violence, crime and drivers of insecurity in Haiti, 2023. SOURCE: BINUH report (S/2024/62), 15 January 2024 146 584 internally displaced persons Homicide rate 40.9 per 100 000 (more than double the 2022 rate of 18.1 per 100 000) Kidnappings 2 490 victims (+83% compared to 2022) 48 police officers have been killed and 75 injured More than 4.35 million people (more than 40% of the population), are facing acute food insecurity. Detainees in prison 11 822 (rate occupancy of 307%) Homicides 4 789, including 465 women, 93 boys and 48 girls (+119.4% compared to 2022) 5 The situation presents an extremely difficult test. Haitian armed groups today are more militarily powerful, networked, and resilient than those during the MINUSTAH intervention. It is therefore essential that the various international tools be tailored to the rapidly evolving criminal and violence dynamics on the ground, and be implemented in a strategically coordinated fashion. Meetings between Kenyan and Haitian police teams have taken place, as well as trainings, and vetting processes prior to deployment. However, the proposed mission, the UNSC and the Haitian government have yet to present a public plan and strategy for the intervention, either for short-term engagement on the ground or for a long-term political solution. 12 This policy report is intended to further efforts to tailor both the MSS mission and the sanctions regime to the current operational challenges in Haiti, support Haitian and international decision-makers in their mission, and provide strategic backing to the country’s civil society. It begins by detailing the current situation on the ground, including gangs and other violent groups’ operations, governance and territorial domination. The next section details the mandate and oper- ations of the two primary international tools, the sanctions regime and the MSS mission. The third section flags key issues which need to be considered for both the sanctions regime and the interna- tional force, and presents opportunities to align the two more comprehensively, to strengthen public security responses and public policy initiatives so as to resolve the crisis. This report is the first of several planned publications on the political economy of violence in Haiti and the international cooperation that seeks to uproot it. It follows a 2022 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) report on gang evolution and a 2023 GI-TOC report on gender-based violence in the country. 13 Methodology The methodology for this report is primarily qualitative, combining fieldwork observation and inter- views conducted in Haiti in November 2023, and desk research. It is based on 36 interviews with UN officials, Haitian civil society members, public and private sector actors, politicians, police forces, humanitarian actors, diplomats and other locals, and the wider international community. It also draws on UN Security Council resolutions, reports by UN agencies and the Haiti Panel of Experts, and research conducted by think tanks and academics on gang dynamics and instability. Finally, the study also draws on broader research and analysis conducted by the GI-TOC on organized crime in Haiti, UN action against organized crime, and the use of sanctions to address transnational organized crime. All interviews and fieldwork activities were conducted by GI-TOC teams. For security reasons, the names of the interviewees are not given. 6 HAITI’S GANGS: FROM TERRITORIAL CONTROL TO CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE G angs in Haiti are a longstanding phenomenon. 14 They link to a tradition of non-state armed groups that stretches back to the 1950s, with the development of the Tonton Macoutes by President François (Papa Doc) Duvalier. 15 However, the nature of Haiti’s gangs has changed drastically in recent years. Writing during the MINUSTAH era, in 2008, analysts flagged that ‘Haitian gangs proved to be collections of individuals who formed around brutal and charismatic leaders, unlike the hierarchical, tightly organized turf-based institutions found in the United States.’ 16 This framing of weak, disarticulated gangs is no longer accurate. Although a vast number of Haiti’s gangs remain small organizations, the major ones – those which control substantial territory and are responsible for most current instability – are well-structured, well-armed and operationally competent entities. 17 While links to politicians and businesspeople remain, the relationship is more even, with the growing capacity of gangs allowing them to self-fund and put a considerable amount of pressure on the political and economic system. As a result, the international community and MSS planners confront a very different and, in many ways, far more difficult situation than existed under MINUSTAH. This subsection maps out key ground dynamics, delving first into gang evolution, then gang operations, before finally touching on the formal and informal Haitian actors arrayed against gangs. The professionalization of gangs Gangs have grown significantly in size and diversity in comparison to the 2000s and 2010s. As of early 2024, estimates peg the number of gangs in Haiti at around 20 0, 18 and they operate mainly in the metro- politan area of Port-au-Prince, including the communes of Port-au-Prince, Delmas, Cité Soleil, Tabarre, Carrefour and Pétion-Ville. Their size ranges substantially, from a dozen men to several thousands. 7 Jacmel Hinche Jérémie Gonaïves Les Cayes Cap-Haïtien Fort-Liberté Port-De-Paix PORT-AU-PRINCE Les Cayes Sud Sud Nord Ouest Ouest Nippes Centre Nord-Est Nord-Ouest Nord-Ouest Grand'Anse Grand'Anse L'Artibonite Sud-Est HAITI CUBA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 0 60 km N Port-au-Prince Bay Caribbean Sea HAITI Some gangs that had 50 or 100 active members during the MINUSTAH period now stretch to 1 500 to 2 500 members. 19 The most powerful gangs of today did not even exist a decade ago, while new cliques emerge every week. Gang leaders are well known in Haiti. These men combine extensive experience as gang members and access to political and economic networks that provide them with patronage and funding, contacts within the police and justice system, and connections capable of trafficking high-calibre weapons or drugs. In many cases, leaders have served in Haiti’s security forces or in political parties or movements. For example, Jimmy Chérizier (aka Barbecue), head of the G9 Fanmi e Alye (G9 Family and Allies or G-9) coalition, is a former police officer, while Chery Christ-Rois (aka Krisla), head of Ti Bwa Gang, is a former political activist. Increasingly, however, Haiti’s gang leaders have begun to emerge via hierarchic advancement within the gangs themselves, either to control established entities or leveraging their experience to found splinter groups. Leaders such as Johnson André (aka Izo or Izo 5 Segond), head of the Village de Dieu – 5 Segond Gang, or Renel Destina (aka Ti Lapli), who leads the Gran Ravine Gang, have been ‘gang soldiers’ for most of their lives. FIGURE 2 Haiti. 8 These ‘young veterans’, as one interviewee called them, have learned from mistakes made by their former bosses, and thus run much more sophisticated organizations than their predecessors. They resemble – in their ability to administer territories, extract resources, conduct well-designed mili- tary-type operations, and organize, deploy and pay hundreds of men – relatively sophisticated drug cartels, militias, or paramilitary groups, rather than the low-capacity gangs that operated in Haiti in the 2000s and early 2010s. Our contacts indicate that across the board, criminal structures in Haiti are much more hierarchical and strict than before. 20 The larger gangs operate with a leadership team and exploit an organized division of labour – from soldiers to financial officers and political advisors – while maintaining com- mand and control structures in field areas. 21 Further, for large and well-known gangs in Port-au-Prince, recruitment processes have been developed and entail discrete taskings and tests, making it more difficult to join gangs’ ranks, parallel to forced recruitment. Members who have sought to leave gangs, including children, risk being killed. 22PORT-AU-PRINCE Tabarre Cit