Implementation Completion and Results Report - Community Driven Development Project

Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00002956 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H1810 IDA-H4450 IDA-H5850) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 25.6 MILLION (USD 38.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) AND AN ADDITIONAL FINANCING GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF USD 8.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT AND A SECOND ADDITIONAL FINANCING GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF USD 15.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT TO THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI FOR A COMMUNITY DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT December 18 , 2013 Sustainable Development Department Haiti Country Management Unit Latin America and Caribbean Region Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized ii CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2013) Currency Unit = Haitian Gourdes HT Gourdes 1.00 = USD 0.0238 USD 1.00 = HT Gourdes 42 FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AF BMPAD Additional Financing Bureau de Monétisation pour l’Aide au Développement Office for the Monetization of Development Aid CADEC Conseil d’Appui au Développement Communautaire Council supporting Community Development (at the municipal level) CASEC Administrative Council of the Communal Section CCI/ICF Cadre Intérimaire de Coopération Interim Cooperation Framework CBO Community-based Organization CDB Caribbean Development Bank CDD Community-Driven Development CECI Canadian Center for International Cooperation COPRODEP Conseil du Projet de Développement Participatif Project Development Council EA Environmental Assessment EMP Environmental Management Plan FAES Fond d’Assistance Économique et Sociale Haiti Social Fund GOH HH Government of Haiti Households IDA International Development Association KPI Key Performance Indicator IADB Inter-American Development Bank LICUS Low-income Country under Stress M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MARNDR Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development MDOD Maîtres D´Ouvrage Délégués Non-Government Organization in charge of project implementation MIS Management Information System MPCE Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation MTR Mid-term Review OED Operations Evaluation Department (World Bank) O&M Operation and Maintenance PADF Pan American Development Foundation PCF Post-Conflict Fund iii PCU/UCP Unité de Coordination du Projet Project Coordination Unit PRODEP Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif Participatory Community Development Project PRODEPUR Community Participation Development Project in Urban Areas SCI Social Capital Index SMART Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timely SP Subproject TGOH Transitional Government of Haiti TSS Transitional Support Strategy UNDP United Nations Development Program USAID United States Agency for International Development USD United States Dollar Vice President: Hasan A. Tuluy Country Director: Mary Barton-Dock Sector Manager: Laurent Msellati Project Team Leader: Pierre Olivier Colleye ICR Team Leader: Eli Weiss iv COUNTRY: HAITI Project Name: COMMUNITY DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 4 3. Assessment of Outcomes ............................................................................................ 9 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 19 5. Assessment of Bank and Recipient Performance ..................................................... 19 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 22 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Recipient/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 23 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 24 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 27 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 38 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 41 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results and Summary of Reviews ................................. 43 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 54 Annex 7. Summary of Recipient's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 55 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 60 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 61 MAP i A. Basic Information Country: Haiti Project Name: Haiti Community Driven Development (CDD) Project / PRODEP Project ID: P093640 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H1810,IDA- H4450,IDA-H5850 ICR Date: 12/30/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: REPUBLIC OF HAITI Original Total Commitment: XDR 25.60M Disbursed Amount: XDR 40.77M Revised Amount: XDR 40.77M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Finance Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) Caribbean Development Bank B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 02/03/2005 Effectiveness: 12/08/2005 12/08/2005 Appraisal: 05/23/2005 Restructuring(s): 01/26/2009 05/10/2010 Approval: 07/28/2005 Mid-term Review: 06/13/2008 Closing: 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory ii Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): No Quality of Supervision (QSA): None DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Moderately Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 2 20 General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 70 40 General education sector 5 20 Health 3 10 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 20 10 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Managing for development results 14 70 Municipal governance and institution building 14 20 Participation and civic engagement 29 5 Poverty strategy, analysis and monitoring 14 3 Rural services and infrastructure 29 2 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Hasan A. Tuluy Pamela Cox Country Director: Mary A. Barton-Dock Caroline D. Anstey Sector Manager: Laurent Msellati John Redwood Project Team Leader: Pierre Olivier Colleye Garry Charlier ICR Team Leader: Eli Weiss ICR Primary Author: Pierre Werbrouck iii F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) Building on the successful experience of the PCF-funded CDD pilot, the objectives of the Project were to scale-up the direct transfer of public resources to local community organizations in poor rural and peri-urban communities, by: (i) improving their access to basic social and economic infrastructure and support income-generating activities by financing small-scale investments proposed, implemented and managed by community organizations; and (ii) improving governance and building social capital of communities by increasing citizen participation and transparency in open decision-making processes.. Key indicators for the project were: (i) Number of communes (municipalities) successfully managing direct transfers to community-based organizations (CBOs) for community subprojects (SPs); (ii) Cost effectiveness/efficiency of direct transfers to CBOs vis a vis traditional service provision; (iii) Percentage rural/peri-urban poor with access to basic social and economic infrastructure (water supply, feeder roads, schools, health posts); (iv) Percentage change in household assets, per capita incomes among project beneficiaries; (v) Number of CBOs officially constituted and participating in project development councils (COPRODEPs); (vi) Number of households expressing awareness of PRODEP (participatory community development project) and its objectives/activities/means of access; and (vii) Percentage change in Social Capital Indices reflecting greater citizen participation in resource allocation decisions. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The statement of PDO was not revised but Key Performance Indicators were changed and/or adjusted by two Board-approved Additional Financing operations. For the sake of clarity and consistency with the ICR Guidelines, Appendix B as well as Section 3.2 of the Main Text, Section (a) below presents results of the original PDO indicators as per the PAD Results Framework in the third column. This is followed separately by the revised indicators from the Restructuring in January 26, 2009 (1st Additional Financing, AF1) further revised by the 2nd Additional Financing approved in May 2010 (AF2) as shown in "Formally-Revised Target Values" (fourth) column. Final actual values achieved for the original project use the AF1 Board approval date of January 26, 2009 (actual results data are from March 31, 2009, the closest data set available at that time). Assessment of outcome for the post-Restructuring period uses the AF2 revisions as the final version of indicators/targets. Annex 2, Appendix 1 shows the evolution of the Results Framework from 2005 to 2013. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Indicator 1 : Original Project (as per PAD Results Framework): Number of communes (municipalities) successfully managing direct transfer to CBOs for community subprojects (SPs) iv Value quantitative or Qualitative) 2 Between 55 and 65 (60 in Results Framework) 59 Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved: US$9.8 m were transferred directly by BMPAD through MDODs to 728 CBOs for 728 SPs in 59 Muns.; 131 selected SPs were at design phase (implemented in post-Restructuring period). Indicator 2 : Cost effectiveness/efficiency of direct transfers to CBOs vis a vis traditional service provision Value quantitative or Qualitative) Zero No target in PAD Dropped Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Dropped: There is little/no "traditional" service provision of tertiary road spot improvement, water supply and health and education infrastructure repairs. Further, neither GOH nor local authorities finance income generation SPs.Indicator dropped by AF1. Indicator 3 : Percentage of rural/peri-urban poor with access to basic social and economic infrastructure (eg, water supply, feeder roads, schools, health posts) Value quantitative or Qualitative) 18.5% of the poor in the targeted municipalities had access to good quality water, health facilities and schools. 41% of residents in the targeted municipalities had access to potable water less than 15 minutes from their homes No target in PAD Some 763,000 residents (32% of the 2.4 million project municipalities' residents) estimated to have benefited from improved access to infrastructure, productive and social services Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) No target for judging incremental achievement: But, 557,000 poor residents were reached by infrastructure SPs, 55,000 by productive SPs and 151,000 by social SPs. Estimates of access are based on the methodology agreed during 2009 MTR evaluation. Indicator 4 : Percentage change in household assets, per capita incomes among project beneficiaries Value quantitative or Qualitative) Zero 20% Dropped Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Dropped: This indicator was dropped by AF1 as majority (81%) of SPs (infrastructure and social) did not have a direct impact on household income or assets. An estimated 75% of income generating SPs showed varying financial issues at this stage. Indicator 5 : CBOs officially constituted and participating in COPRODEPs Value quantitative or Zero 2,000 4,030 v Qualitative) Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded: 202% The number represents the CBOs participating in COPRODEP meetings and participating in the prioritization and selection of SPs as well as in training and information sessions. Indicator 6 : Number of households expressing awareness of PRODEP and its objectives, activities and means of access. Value quantitative or Qualitative) Zero 300 households (as per PAD) 240,000 households express awareness of PRODEP activities in participating municipalities Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded: MTR survey estimated that over 240,000 households were aware of PRODEP and its activities in communities. Indicator not relevant for measuring social capital. Indicator 7 : Percentage change in Social Capital Indices reflecting greater citizen participation in resource allocation decisions Value quantitative or Qualitative) Zero 20% Not measured by original project Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Inconclusive: Index was not established under Original Project, thus not measured (at that time). MTR beneficiary assessment indicates substantial increase in CBO membership, in solidarity, transparent decision making, dialogue, and gender participation Indicator 8 : Restructured project (AF1) and Additional Financing (AF2): Number of communes successfully managing direct transfers to CBOs for community SPs Value quantitative or Qualitative) 59 57 59 (AF2) 59 Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved 100% Indicator 9 : Residents in project area with access to basic social and economic infrastructure (eg, access to potable water, irrigation, grain mills). Value quantitative or Qualitative) 763,000 residents AF1: 50% AFAF2: 1.2 million residents in 59 Municipalities of the Project area improve their access to basic social and economic infrastructure 1.65 million according to MDOD reports and 1.5 million according to BMPAD final report; but 1.35 million taking into account only SPs in operation vi and/or benefits of productive SPs Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded: 112%. Taking into account SPs in operation, approximately 1.35 million residents improved access to basic socio-economic infrastructure/services by end-project – compared to the 195,000 intended beneficiaries mentioned in PAD. Indicator 10 : 50% of productive/income generating subprojects are operational 3-6 months after completion Value quantitative or Qualitative) 42% AF1: 50% AF2: 75% of productive, income- generating SPs within the 59 municipalities are operational and are being maintained 12 months after completion. 82% operational and maintained 12 months after completion Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded: AF2 target was exceeded by about 7 percent because of better productive SPs strategy and follow-up. Indicator 11 : 3500 CBOs officially constituted and participating in COPRODEPs (includes pre-existing and strengthened, as well as newly-created CBOs). Value quantitative or Qualitative) 4,030 3,500 total 3500 CBOs in the 59 Municipalities are officially constituted and participating in COPRODEPs 3,819 Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded: Target exceeded by about 10 percent. End figure is lower than baseline because of turnover in CBO participation. Indicator 12 : 60% of population in project area express awareness of PRODEP and its objectives, activities and means of access. Value quantitative or Qualitative) 240,000 HH (84% of adult population) 60% 60% of adult population in the 59 Municipalities expresses awareness of PRODEP and Not measured vii its objectives, activities and means of access Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved: End of project percentage not measured under the assumption that by MTR, PRODEP awareness had peaked. Indicator 13 : 80 percent of CBO members express a positive change in terms of their organizational capacity and ability to work together constructively. Value quantitative or Qualitative) Zero 80% 20-point change in Social Capital Indices, reflecting greater citizen participation in resource allocation decisions Three of five social capital sub-indices exceeded: fourth sub-indicator 96% achieved and fifth sub-indicator not measured. Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Substantially Achieved: Also, during MTR beneficiary assessment all participants indicated a positive change. Impact survey also indicates considerable progress in social capital. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Indicator 1 : Original Project - Component 1: Number COPRODEPs following democratic and open meeting procedures as detailed in Project Operational Manual Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Zero 60 59 Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved: 100% as PAD estimated between 55 and 65 participating Municipalities. Indicator 2 : Number of SPs by SP type - infrastructure (potable water, roads); productive (irrigation, food processing); social (health, education). Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Zero 2600 proposed, 1950 approved, 1300 under implementation, 1300 completed 3112 proposed; 909 approved; 728 under implementation; 549 completed viii Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved: 100% (when pro-rated for elapsed time to Jan 26, 2009, date of Restructuring/AF1 approval). Implementation on target and no delays. Results: 46% infrastructure SPs; 37% productive; and 17 social. Indicator 3 : Creation of new community-based organizations (CBO) Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Zero No target in PAD 87 Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved. Creation of CBOs was neither part of the Project description nor of the MDOD contracts, but creation of new CBOs was encouraged. Indicator 4 : 30% of CBO/COPRODEP members are women Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Zero 30% 28% of CBO members and 17% of COPRODEP members Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Partially Achieved: 93% of the CBO indicator and 57% of the COPRODEP indicator Indicator 5 : Number of SPs with adequate O&M arrangements Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Zero 75% 40% of SPs with adequate O&M arrangements Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Partially achieved: adequate maintenance is not part of the culture, however in the course of the project 40% of the SPs reported adequate O&M arrangements which is remarkable given the starting point. Indicator 6 : Original Project -Component 2: Number of training events for CBOs Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Zero 360 774 Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded: Target exceeded by over 100% Indicator 7 : Pace of SP execution by CBOs (3 months) Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Zero Suggested 3 months 37 percent of SPs were completed in 3 months Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Partially achieved: This is not seen as a negative, since the target was artificial and rapid implementation can jeopardize SP quality. The average time was actually 4.9 months. Indicator 8 : Percentage of prioritized and approved subprojects financed ix Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Zero 100% 100% Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved: Indicator dropped by AF1. It is assumed this indicator would always be 100% as no SPs were approved without corresponding financing availability. Indicator 9 : Original Project - Component 3: SP unit costs (per beneficiary family, type of SP) Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Zero No target in PAD Actual: USD19,250 per SP (all types) and USD114 per family Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Inconclusive: No target established thus not possible to conclude whether target achieved/not. This indicator was dropped by the AF1 because de facto, Project support did not exceed USD17,500 per SP, with the additional SP costs financed by communities. Indicator 10 : Geographical distribution of SP Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Zero 10 Departments 10 departments Date achieved 07/28/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved: 100% This indicator was dropped by AF1 Indicator 11 : Flow of project funds Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Zero No target in PAD US$ 20.3 million spent Date achieved 07/26/2005 06/30/2010 01/26/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved: putting in place such a structure was a major challenge and consumed the first few years of implementation to ensure the disbursement and tracking system was adequate for acceptable governance framework. Indicator 12 : Restructured Project (AF1) and Additional Financing (AF2): Component 1 57 CADECs following democratic and open meeting procedures as detailed in Project Operational Manual Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 59 57 59 59 Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved: 100% Democratic and open meeting procedures confirmed by audits and evaluations. Indicator 13 : # SPs proposed,approved, start implementation and completed Value (quantitative 3,112 proposed; 909 approved; 728 under 3,200 proposed; 2,250 approved; 4,050 proposed; 10,202 proposed; 1,750 approved; x or Qualitative) implementation and 549 completed. 1,450 started; 1450 completed. 2,900 approved; 2,020 started; 2,010 completed 1,687 started and completed. Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Substantially Achieved: 93%. 765 infrastructure, 552 productive and 370 social SPs. High, revised AF2 target numbers were established based on calculation error which over-estimated the number of SPs possible with available funds (see para 3.2.9) Indicator 14 : CBOs created as a result of the project Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 87 40 100 238 Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded: Target exceeded by more than 100 percent. Indicator 15 : 30% of CBOs and 15% of CADEC members are women Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 28% of CBO are women 30% and 15% 30% of CBO and 15% of CADEC members of the executive committee are women 39% of CBO are women and 18% of COPRODEP/ CADEC executive committee are women Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded: Target exceeded by about 40 percent because of affirmative gender policies introduced by the project. Indicator 16 : Restructured Project - Component 2: Training events for CBOs and CADECs Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 774 100 400 4,030 Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded: Target substantially exceeded because of AF2 USD2.0 million dedicated training program Indicator 17 : # CBO members who have attended at least one training event Value (quantitative or Qualitative) No data available 75% CBO members, 90% CADEC members 75% CBO members - at least one training event 90% CADEC members - at least 2 training events 89% of CBO members - at least one training event 100% CADEC members - at least 2 training events xi Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded: Target substantially exceeded because of AF2 USD2.0 million training program Indicator 18 : Percentage of SPs implemented within 6 months Value (quantitative or Qualitative) PW: Any data as at Jan or March 2009 80% 65% Date achieved 01/26/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Substantially Achieved: 80% Speedy implementation has trade off with SP quality. AF2 financed larger municipal SPs which took longer to implement. Indicator 19 : CADECs allocating funds from other development programs Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Zero 10 0 Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Not achieved: There was insufficient time to train and prepare CADECs for fund-raising/leveraging activities although some CBOs received co-financing from other sources. Indicator 20 : Restructured Project - Component 3: MIS provides complete quarterly reports within 30 days after the end of each quarter Value (quantitative or Qualitative) Zero 30 days 0 Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Not achieved: PRODEP MIS was only operational at final stage of project. Monitoring was done using quarterly MDOD reports. Indicator 21 : Amount of project funds disbursed within the project time-frame Value (quantitative or Qualitative) USD20.3 million spent USD46.0 million USD61.0 million USD62.6 million Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2010 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded: Target exceeded because of exchange rate gains Indicator 22 : Management cost of transferring USD 1.00 to CBOs is less than USD 0.50 cents Value (quantitative or Qualitative) USD 51 cents USD 50 cents USD 58 cents Date achieved 03/31/2009 06/30/2013 06/30/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) Not achieved: increase due to a relative increase in MDOD and BMPAD management costs xii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements (USD millions) 1 01/04/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.69 2 05/02/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.69 3 10/04/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.18 4 01/06/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.40 5 05/21/2007 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.60 6 11/19/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.73 7 06/02/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 15.92 8 07/29/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 17.15 9 02/10/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 22.65 10 04/17/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 24.66 11 07/29/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 27.42 12 10/27/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 30.95 13 01/12/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 36.64 14 06/16/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 41.92 15 02/07/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 45.74 16 07/27/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 48.10 17 01/31/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 52.12 18 06/06/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 56.26 19 01/10/2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 60.76 20 06/26/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 62.60 H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP 01/26/2009 Y S S 22.65 Additional Financing 1 supported continuation of activities in 32 municipalities, and represented Bank's response to hurricane disaster. Changes: added USD8.0 million; increased numbers of SPs and beneficiaries financed in those municipalities; and changed Key Performance Indicators. 05/10/2010 N S MS 38.01 Additional Financing 2 viewed as response to 2010 earthquake and return of large numbers xiii Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP urban residents to rural areas. Changes: added USD15.0 million; intensified activity in the 59 municipalities; re- designed SP selection methodology; new methodology for financing productive SPs; extended closing date; incorporated lessons learned. If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving body) enter ratings below: Outcome Ratings Against Original PDO/Targets Moderately Satisfactory Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets Moderately Satisfactory Overall (weighted) rating Moderately Satisfactory I. Disbursement Profile 1 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1.1.1 Country and Sector Background. For several decades, Haiti struggled to emerge from a cycle of chronic political instability and internal conflicts that devastated its economy, weakened state and local institutions, exacerbated social tension and polarization, multiplied poor governance practices and maintained or deepened poverty. By 2003, Haiti’s political and financial situation had become very uncertain. There was political upheaval and the security situation was severely deteriorating in urban and rural areas. Because of declining economic governance, external aid dried up and the economy went into a downturn. The World Bank and many other donor agencies withdrew their support. Armed opposition forces entered from the Dominican Republic to remove President Aristide from power. He left the country on February 29, 2004 and a transitional government took office in a fragile state environment that prompted the mobilization of a UN peace-keeping force that is still operating in the country until this date. 1.1.2 Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF). The Transitional Government (TGOH) led the donor community in putting together an Interim Cooperation Framework seeking to increase political and social stability and jump-start the economy. The ICF presented the broad themes of TGOH’s strategy: (i) strengthening political governance and promoting national dialogue; (ii) strengthening economic governance and contributing to institutional development; (iii) promoting economic recovery; and (iv) improving access to basic services. 1.1.3 Rationale for Bank Involvement. In order to provide some assistance to Haiti, the World Bank (WB) financed in 2003 a USD1.0 million Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) grant for a rural Community Driven Development (CDD) pilot project contracted to the Pan-American Development Foundation (PADF) 1 in two rural border areas. The grant enabled the Bank to maintain minimal activities in Haiti, while preparing for an eventual reengagement. The grant also tested the CDD methodology developed in northeast Brazil. 1.1.4 In 2004, the Bank renewed its official relations with Haiti. To initiate activities rapidly on the ground, the Bank provided a USD1.0 million Low-Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) grant in 2005 to finance a Labor-Intensive and Basic Infrastructure Rehabilitation Pilot Project. This grant strengthened the national capacity (government and community-based organizations-CBO) to manage and implement 23 community-driven small-scale infrastructure subprojects (SPs) in six rural municipalities and to provide short-term income generation opportunities. 1.1.5 The successful PCF grant demonstrated that CBOs could manage public funds and implement small SPs and prompted the Bank to propose a scaled-up USD38.0 million CDD project (PRODEP). The intention was to use CDD mechanisms to repair the social fabric, strengthen local organizations and provide the poor with the means/funds to address pressing local investment needs, thereby breaking the cycle of their exclusion. The CDD approach was expected to increase transparency in the allocation of investment resources and the likelihood that these resources would respond to local demand. The democratic selection of SPs was aimed at re-generating social cohesion within a population that was strongly divided politically. The goal was to promote community empowerment and social trust and “restore hope” in a fragile country that had gone through significant political and economic crises. 1 PADF is an offshoot of the Organization of American States. The WB provided the PCF grant directly to PADF. 2 1.1.6 The Project would contribute to three of the four ICF pillars by: (i) improving local economic governance through sound management of common resources and establish transparent processes for selecting SPs and the suppliers of goods and services; (ii) creating local economic opportunities; and (iii) financing SPs that created or improved basic services such as education, health and sanitation. 1.1.7 PRODEP’s linkage to the Bank’s IDA Transitional Support Strategy (TSS). In January 2005, the Bank’s Board of Directors endorsed a Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) for Haiti, which included up to USD150 million in credit commitments (grants) over a two-year period. A key feature of the TSS was poverty alleviation through improved access of communities to basic services and infrastructure. PRODEP was closely aligned to the TSS whose two-year strategy supported: (i) basic services provision; (ii) job creation; (iii) rehabilitation of areas devastated by floods in 2004; and (iv) community initiatives in local development. The TSS was also intended to strengthen governance and institutions, thereby improving transparency, and promoting inclusion and consensus building on development priorities. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 1.2.1 Building on the successful experience of the PCF-funded CDD pilot, the objectives of the project were to scale-up the direct transfer of public resources to local community organizations in poor rural and peri-urban communities, by: (i) improving their access to basic social and economic infrastructure and support income-generating activities by financing small-scale investments proposed, implemented and managed by community organizations; and (ii) improving governance and building social capital of communities by increasing citizen participation and transparency in open decision-making processes. 1.2.2 The Project (PRODEP) represented the first stage of a planned ten to fifteen-year engagement with Haiti on CDD, the end-goal of which would be to mainstream CDD as a mechanism for the transfer of public resources to the local level within government budgetary and planning processes. The proposed project was a significant first step in fostering critical elements that, over time, could evolve into a decentralized approach for funding local CDD initiatives. 1.2.3 Original Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for the project were as follows: (i) 60 communes (municipalities) successfully managing direct transfers to community-based organizations (CBOs) for community SPs; (ii) cost-effectiveness/efficiency of direct transfers to CBOs vis-à-vis traditional service provision; (iii) percentage of rural/peri-urban poor with access to basic social and economic infrastructure (e.g., water supply, feeder roads, school, health posts); (iv) 20% change in household assets, per-capita incomes among project beneficiaries; (v) 20% change in Social Capital Indices reflecting greater citizen participation in resource allocation decisions; (vi) 2,000 CBOs officially constituted and participating in COPRODEPs; and (vii) 300 households expressing awareness of PRODEP and its objectives/ activities/means of access. 2 1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 1.3.1 The PDO were not changed. Several original PDO indicators (KPI), however, were dropped or revised at approval of both the first and second Additional Financing grants (AF1 and AF2) because they were unclear, not relevant or impossible to measure. The second indicator intended to compare the efficiency/effectiveness of the CDD approach with traditional government services was dropped at Board approval of AF1 because similar government services were not provided in Haiti. The fourth indicator was dropped at AF1 - most SPs were unlikely to 2 This number was likely a typing error which remained uncorrected. 3 have any direct impact on household monetary income or assets – and substituted by an indicator of productive SP sustainability. The fifth indicator was revised at AF1 then reintroduced at AF2 in its original form. Other minor adjustments were made including to targets. Annex 2, Appendix 1 shows the evolution of the results framework over time. 1.3.2 AF2 Board approval saw further changes to KPIs. The following became the final versions to be measured at closing: (i) in 59 municipalities, CBOs have successfully managed direct transfers for community SPs; (ii) 1.2 million residents in 59 Municipalities of the Project area improved their access to basic social and economic infrastructure and/or benefits of productive SPs;(iii) 75% of productive/income generating SPs within the 59 Municipalities are operational and are being maintained 12 months after completion; (iv) 3500 CBOs in the 59 Municipalities are officially constituted and participating in CADECs; (v) 60% of the adult population in the 59 Municipalities express awareness of PRODEP and its objectives/means of access; and (vi) 20-point change in Social Capital Indices, reflecting greater citizen participation in resource allocation decisions. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 1.4.1 Targeted beneficiaries were 195,000 poor residents of 59 municipalities (of the 140) in all Departments of Haiti. The municipalities were selected based on poverty criteria contained in the GOH 2004 poverty map and geographical and operational criteria (such as proximity to other communes, road access). The project’s baseline study estimated an average annual household income of USD750 equivalent and only 18.5% of the residents in the selected municipalities were estimated to have easy access to quality water supply, health facilities and schools. 1.5 Original Components (as approved) 1.5.1 Component 1: Community SP funds, management and support (USD34.0 million – IDA USD 31.7 million) was to finance in 55-65 communes of rural and peri-urban Haiti an estimated 1,816 demand-driven SPs costing on average not more than USD 20,000 (of which the project would provide some USD17,500 and direct beneficiaries the rest, mostly in kind). The SPs would be identified by CBOs and later prioritized in representative Project Development Councils (COPRODEPs). SPs included basic socio-economic, small-scale infrastructure, productive and social investments covering a wide spectrum: roads, water supply, energy, soil conservation, public amenities, livestock, grain mills, community stores, agro-processing, markets, irrigation, schools, health facilities, community centers, cyber cafes, community radio broadcasting and other investments (see Annex 2). 1.5.2 The component also financed non-governmental service providers (Maitres D´Ouvrage Délégués – MDODs) mobilizing CBOs to participate in the project, and providing training and technical assistance to CBOs and COPRODEPs to fulfill their roles in financing, implementing, operating and maintaining the SPs. It also financed a campaign to inform potential project beneficiaries of the project’s objectives and avenues for participation. 1.5.3 Component 2: Capacity-building and technical assistance (USD3.6 million – IDA 3.6 million) was to be implemented by the Project Coordination Unit (PCU). The component included training for COPRODEPs, municipal governments and regional representatives of central government ministries, MDOD staff, BMPAD staff and consultant services. 1.5.3 Component 3: Project administration, supervision, monitoring and evaluation (USD 2.7 million – IDA 2.7 million) financed the incremental costs associated with project implementation by the PCU including the establishment of a Management Information System (MIS), technical and financial audits and impact evaluation studies. 4 1.6 Revised Components (N/A) 1.7 Other significant changes 1.7.1 Natural disasters and Additional Financing grants: Four hurricanes and tropical storms devastated the country in 2008. As part of the recovery efforts, Haiti received in 2009 a first IDA Additional Financing grant of USD 8.0 million (AF1) 3 . The additional funding was to finance investments in 32 municipalities many of which had suffered severe flood damage. 1.7.2 Following the January 2010 earthquake, Haiti received a second AF of USD15.0 million (AF2) to help cope with the return of thousands of residents from earthquake struck Port-au- Prince to rural areas. Parallel grants from other programs included: (i) the Japan Social Development Fund’s “Cash for Work” grant of USD3.0 million in urban areas; and (ii) the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) approved in 2011 a USD10 million grant to finance 180 SPs in 32 municipalities, using the PRODEP methodology. 1.7.3 Implementation changes: AF2 (approved in May 2010) introduced implementation changes based on lessons learned from the preceding implementation period: (i) COPRODEPs were converted into CADECs (Community Development Councils) to reflect a broader civil society role in the municipality; (ii) productive SPs were subjected to a more rigorous screening and follow-up methodology; (iii) more attention was paid to SP quality and maintenance; and (iv) municipal SPs became eligible for financing of up to USD55,000 per SP. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 2.1.1 Background analysis. The Bank prepared the project in the short period of four months (from February to June 2005), driven by emergency post-conflict needs. The preparation team focused on the institutional arrangements and the operational project implementation mechanisms included in the project manual. The social analysis was based on the PCF pilot project experience and beneficiary assessments. The Government conducted an environmental assessment with public consultation and the Bank did a cost-benefit analysis of four productive SPs, a procurement assessment and a financial management review. The preparation team relied on the experience of the PCF grant pilot operation which had developed the SP selection and implementation methodology as well as the financial management procedures. The project also benefited from Bank experience gained in the long-standing engagement in the northeast Brazil and several members of the Bank’s Brazil team participated in project preparation. 2.1.2 The initial goal was to have a swift implementation start-up and provide the rural areas with “hope”, as stated explicitly in the Bank’s TSS. Project preparation had weaknesses in two key aspects: (i) design of the capacity-building component 2 was left to be developed during project implementation; and (ii) the financial analysis might have emphasized the complexity and riskiness of productive SPs, as well as the conditions needed for their success. 2.1.3 Project Objectives and Indicators: The PDOs were realistic and reachable, important for the country, and aligned with the ICF and TSS. They responded to the country’s circumstances and development priorities, and focused on the outcomes for which the operation could reasonably be held accountable. The Project’s end goal could have been better-formulated so as to ensure a participatory role for civil society in decisions affecting local development. The 3 In June 2008, the World Bank approved a USD16.0 million grant for PRODEPUR, a similar operation in urban areas. In 2010 PRODEPUR also received USD30.0 million in additional financing. 5 results framework presented some weaknesses: several monitoring indicators were not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, results-based and time-bound), while others had no quantitative targets. Since the project was demand driven, the project team struggled estimating targets. 2.1.4 Institutional arrangements: Finding the Project’s appropriate institutional location was challenging. At the time, FAES (the Haitian Social Investment Fund) was over-burdened and going through its own leadership and institutional crisis as was the case for most state and local institutions. No government Ministry was set up to house a multi-sector project focusing on civil society community organizations, and local institutions, some of which had still to be created. The Project came to be located in the PL-480 Management Office under the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation. The office was an autonomous public institution to: (i) receive and monetize food aid from international donors; and, (ii) identify and fund government development projects with relevant institutions and/or agencies in areas such as road construction, agriculture, education, health and commerce. It was converted in 2007 into the Bureau de Monétisation de l’Aide au Développement – BMPAD – Office for the Monetization of Development Aid, under the Ministry of Finance. A small PRODEP PCU was established. Because of BMPAD’s lack of experience in managing small-scale rural investments, field operations were contracted to NGOs. 2.1.5 Project design: The basic project design was solid and no major changes or project design restructurings were needed during implementation, apart from incorporating lessons learned. The design incorporated the PCF pilot experience, lessons learned from the Northeast Brazil program and widely-accepted CDD methodologies. The decision to delegate project field implementation to two prominent NGOs was influenced by the general weakness of public institutions in Haiti. To garner greater government ownership, it would have been prudent to get input from local (albeit weak) agencies of line Ministries, and to assign more weight to municipal priorities. A project Steering Committee that included relevant line ministries (e.g., Public Works, Agriculture) was proposed for preparation and implementation, but was not operational. To encourage more municipal buy-in, AF2 included financing for larger SPs backed by municipalities. This improved the relationship between COPRODEPs/CADECs and local authorities and increased the chances of longer-term SP sustainability. 2.1.6 Project design faced a trade-off on two issues: (i) Subproject size – and resulting impact – was limited by both the ceiling of USD20,000 (of which USD17,500 project support), and weak capacity of inexperienced CBOs to efficiently manage SPs at greater scale. Demonstrating burgeoning social capital, CBOs quickly circumvented the size problem by banding together to implement larger SPs, i.e., the combination of joint collaboration between several CBOs, a higher aggregate investment budget and increasing SP scale, strengthened impact. Subprojects amenable to this approach were primarily infrastructure – road rehabilitation and buildings (e.g., community centers and classrooms); and, (ii) As with CDD projects in many countries and for similar reasons – weak ministries, lack of a decentralization policy framework and thus few viable alternatives for channeling funds to poor communities - the Project supported a civil society structure (COPRODEPs) parallel to local authorities, a conscious choice to make the project responsive to urgent community needs, but challenging to sustain in the long run. 2.1.7 Adequacy of Government commitment: GOH authorities focused heavily on restoring political democracy and social stability after the upheavals of 2003/4 and relied on Bank experience in CDD to prepare the project. The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation and the Office of PL-480 strongly supported the project but did not have the resources to participate fully in preparation. 6 2.1.8 Risk assessment: The preparation team identified the project’s main risks. The project was qualified as a high risk-high reward project with adequate risk mitigation measures. Many of the identified risks never materialized. Instead, natural disasters disrupted project implementation. 2.1.9 Quality at Entry: No Quality at Entry evaluation was carried out. 2.2 Factors which influenced project implementation: 2.2.1 External factors: Public sector weakness, lack of a decentralization framework, political instability, hurricanes and the 2010 earthquake in and around Port-au-Prince had important external impacts on the project.  Public sector weakness: Haiti has a weak public sector management capacity. Many public sector institutions depend on external assistance to carry out basic functions. Institutional capacity is increasingly concentrated in the NGO service sector attracting more qualified staff and paying higher salaries. As a result, the Project contracted two NGOs that successfully carried out all fieldwork.  The lack of an adequate legal framework for decentralization: This negatively affected the sustainability of PRODEP’s institutional objectives. TGOH created decentralization decrees that would have allowed the project to flourish under municipal governments with some authority and budgets, but never published them. As a result, the project lacked the financial partnership/dialogue with municipal governments that constitutes an important factor in the longer-term sustainability of CDD mechanisms.  Political and climatic instability: The period from 2004 to the elections of 2006 was politically unstable with important security problems. The food price riots of 2008 with the corresponding fuel shortages was another difficult period. On top of this, Haiti had to cope with the floods from hurricane Noel (2007) and four hurricanes in 2008. The floods diverted the focus of GOH, BMPAD, PRODEP and MDOD to support for short-term disaster solutions in project areas. The Bank reacted with AF1 which was allocated to 32 municipalities many of which showed flood damage. Many AF1 SPs involved rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure, demonstrating the effectiveness and flexibility of CDD for decentralized post-disaster recovery.  Disruptions and delays caused by the 2010 earthquake: Government operations almost completely collapsed but BMPAD and MDOD provided substantial support. The Bank entrusted BMPAD with AF2-USD15.0 million and additional programs (such as housing reconstruction–USD29.0 million). BMPAD struggled to absorb these additional funds and its sudden business growth made an organizational restructuring necessary. 2.2.2 Internal factors. MDOD performance, PRODEP’s initial focus, BMPAD organization and management and the fiduciary procurement and financial management requirements were four important internal factors which influenced project execution.  MDOD capacity: PRODEP’s strong achievements are mainly the result of the MDODs’ performance and delivery capacity: Both MDODs are responsible entities with long- standing experience in Haiti and in this type of SP design and implementation. The MDODs carried out their contract in a professional and competent manner without close field supervision from BMPAD. PRODEP’s initial focus was on democratic and transparent SP selection and speedy implementation: The audits and evaluation studies were adamant that this was successful and one of the Project’s strongest points. 7  BMPAD’s limited experience with rural projects: BMPAD was created to convert in- kind development aid into cash for the Treasury and had limited understanding of PRODEP’s supervision and monitoring needs. Initial misunderstandings about project management functions created tensions between the PCU and BMPAD’s general management, which were reduced after the 2011 management restructuring.  The Bank’s fiduciary procurement and financial management requirements were applied to communities with little or no experience in administrative matters: MDOD’s focus and resources were partially absorbed into administrative matters 4 assisting the CBOs in complying with the Bank’s procedures, and away from SPs’ technical implementation, sustainability and organizational skills development. However, once the systems were in place they could be relied on to deliver at the local level what very few others could in Haiti. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 2.3.1 Design: The monitoring arrangements as described in the PAD were in accordance with generally accepted practices. They included the establishment and operation of a Management Information System (MIS), technical audits, monitoring and evaluation reports. Design of the Results Framework was weak and confusing. As noted earlier, not all indicators were SMART, while some had no target numbers. During the design of AF1 and AF2 the preparation teams adjusted some indicators to improve SMART factors and include targets. 2.3.2 Implementation: M&E development was complicated due to lack of capacity. Reporting depended almost entirely on data collection by the MDODs. BMPAD invested in a MIS, but internet data transmission problems between MDOD field agencies and BMPAD limited its use. A new MIS became operational only in 2012 and is now used for the Bank’s PRODEPUR-Habitat grant and the PRODEP-Caribbean Development Bank follow-up project. 2.3.3 Mid-term Review (MTR): The MTR mission report provided inputs to the redesign of the Results Framework for AF1. The MTR evaluation report, combined with a BMPAD project evaluation workshop (December 2009) presented important recommendations. They were incorporated into AF2 implementation, including inter alia: increased focus on SP technical quality and sustainability, development of a productive SP strategy, improving relations with municipalities, and launching of a training and institutional development program. 2.3.4. Impact Evaluation: The quality of the Project’s impact evaluation report was mixed. The report prepared in 2012 by a French/Haitian consortium includes a good social impact analysis which was a quasi-experimental evaluation conducted through 480 individual surveys of randomly-selected participants, including a comparison group. Other sections of the report reflect the opinions of consultants on 60 randomly-selected SPs. Social aspects of the final evaluation were strong but the end-product was - at least in part - a series of anecdotal opinions. This reflects the difficulties the project had in selecting a good consulting firm. 2.3.5. Utilization: Most conclusions and recommendations of the audits, MTR report and BMPAD’s December 2009 workshop were incorporated into AF2. The 2012 technical audits resulted in a program to upgrade the operational status of some 150 weaker SPs. 4 Although the CBOs received the funds in their account, the Bank and BMPAD held the MDOD responsible for the use of the funds and possible mismanagement by the CBOs, including mis-procurement. 8 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 2.4.1 Safeguards: Safeguard policies applicable to the Project were Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4.01), Pest Management (OP/BP 4.09), and Cultural Property (OP 4.11). The potential adverse impacts from PRODEP investments were generally minimal. BMPAD focused on: (i) upstream screening of all SPs to weed out those with serious environmental impacts, and (ii) awareness-raising among the communities and MDODs. Given the large portfolio of SPs and the small size of BMPAD’s safeguards team, supervision was challenging. BMPAD sought to alleviate this supervision gap by employing interns to audit impacts and safeguards implications across the portfolio, an activity that led to a more targeted oversight. No pest management issues arose as few SPs concerned agriculture involving pesticides. No cultural property issues were identified. 2.4.2 The supervision missions rated Safeguards as Satisfactory in 17 of the 20 ISRs. In 2010, Bank supervision identified some potential environmental issues in a limited number of SPs and a Bank environmental specialist visited Haiti in 2011, recommending a strengthening of BMPAD’s environmental unit. BMPAD added staff to the unit and introduced stricter screening procedures. Due to issues raised above the rating dipped to MU in 2012 but was upgraded to MS by the final supervision based on BMPAD’s improved performance with regard to staffing and screening. 2.4.3 Procurement: The six ex-post procurement reviews did not identify any significant procurement issues, only some teething problems at the outset. BMPAD employed a procurement specialist and BMPAD and the CBOs complied with the procurement requirements of the Operational Manual. The first MDOD contracts covering 32 municipalities were awarded on a sole source basis; the second MDOD contracts for 27 municipalities were awarded through an 18 months-long quality and cost-based selection procedure. Further contracts for AF1 and AF2 were considered extensions of the second contracts. The CBO procured all items through price comparison procedures (shopping) after training by MDOD and under MDOD supervision. Procurement is rated Satisfactory. 2.4.4 Financial Management (FM) and audit: From 2009 through 2013, FM showed some strains. Submission of financial audits was late and action plans addressing audit conclusions were slow to be developed and implemented. Financial management is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory primarily because of: (i) delays in the submission of financial audit reports; and (ii) misunderstandings in the Ministry of Finance about requesting a reallocation of funds (Level 2 restructuring) in the final project stages. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 2.5.1 The Bank’s original objective was to finance a sequence of follow-up projects that would make CDD a major development policy instrument in Haiti. CDD is very appropriate for a fragile country like Haiti; the success of PRODEP in rural and PRODEPUR in urban areas (particularly after the earthquake) shows the potential and effectiveness of the CDD methodology in such contexts. 2.5.2. A follow-up CDD operation in rural areas is not in the current Interim Strategy Note. The reasons for this discontinuation lie in: (i) changed Government priorities after the 2010 earthquake focusing on reconstruction ; (ii) lack of a clear vision on how to proceed with decentralization (or de-concentration) within the Government as well as an absence of policy dialogue on decentralization and on the integration of CDD into local development policies between Government and partners which hampers; and (iii) BMPAD did not proactively communicate the project’s achievements to the new Government. Further analytical work is being launched out to take stock of local development policies and underpin their integration with 9 potential new CDD operations. The absence of an immediate follow-up operation does not preclude a long-term Bank engagement with rural CDD in Haiti. CDB is taking over a part of the program (US$10 million) in more limited geographical area, successfully applying many of the lessons learned from PRODEP. On the basis of these same lessons, preparation is also ongoing to channel additional resources to urban communities through PRODEPUR (PRODEP’s urban equivalent), including for cities outside of Port au Prince. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 3.1.1 Relevance of PDO. Transferring public resources to CBOs to improve their access to basic social and economic infrastructure and support income-generating activities (while improving governance and building social capital) was relevant from the onset of the Project and remains relevant to date. At the time of appraisal, the public sector was disorganized due to acute governance problems and an impending rebellion. The Bank recommends CDD approaches in post-conflict and fragile situations 5 because they have the potential to address urgent community needs and to serve as a catalyst for building healthier social and political dynamics. Moreover, the Project supported three pillars of the TGOH’s Interim Cooperation Framework. As explained below, the PDO remain relevant because of the lack of decentralization in Haiti. 3.1.2 Relevance of design and implementation: CDD remains a relevant instrument for regional development and for the implementation of the current IDA strategy. The earthquake imposed new government priorities reflected in the 2010 Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti with emphasis on reconstruction. More recently, the government of President Martelly developed the “Five E's” strategy: economy and employment; environment; energy; and, improvements in education, human & social development. IDA’s Interim Strategy Note 2 states (para. 43) that GOH’s approach consists of providing planned infrastructure and related investments combined with locally identified and community-managed investments. 3.1.3 The project’s methodology remains relevant. As GOH has still not published the decentralization decrees, developed in 2006 by TGOH, there are de facto few alternative ways to channel resources to rural areas for this type of community investment while guaranteeing strong community participation. Municipalities still do not have the authority and budget to finance or operate local investments and thus CDD remains the primary, tested instrument. 3.1.4 The design and its adaptation from the northeast Brazil experience (in particular the SP selection process) have provided positive results reflected in the number of SPs as well as in greater community participation, transparency and accountability. The parts of the design and implementation open to discussion are: (i) the employment of international NGOs as primary project operators; and (ii) the creation of a parallel structure (COPRODEP/CADEC) to the municipal authorities. 3.1.5 Although the capacity of central government institutions has improved somewhat the contracting of private service providers for project implementation remains relevant. The central Government is not set up to implement development programs in rural areas, and municipalities have neither the authority nor funding. Contracting international NGOs, however, is onerous: they need to establish offices and employ staff, and they incur significant overheads. Other donor projects contract local (but institutionally weaker) NGOs or set up agencies closely linked to the 5 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTCDD/0,contentMDK: 23006650~menuPK:549351~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430161,00.html 10 municipalities. In 2008, PRODEP required MDOD to associate with local NGOs, but the resulting associations brought little value-added to the project and created some FM challenges. 3.1.6 The project’s parallel institutional/implementation structure fulfilled certain urgent local needs and remains relevant as a strategic response to community needs and a valuable instrument for strengthening local governance, when integrated within local government or national programs. Initially, there was insufficient coordination with local and central government agencies and line ministries, but AF2 required increased cooperation with the municipalities and relevant government agencies. Some municipal priorities were project-financed through a specific selection process and ensured that all investments were incorporated into the local programs of the central agencies. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 3.2.1 The Project achievement of its PDO is rated Moderately Satisfactory. This assessment is based on (i) an analysis of the achievement of original PDO indicators (KPI) before the AF1 restructuring in the first quarter of 2009 - the data for this analysis (March 31, 2009) are available in the Project’s June 29, 2009 MTR evaluation report 6 ; and (ii) an analysis of the revised PDO indicators after the AF1 and AF2 restructurings - the data for this second analysis are from technical audits, the impact evaluation, MDOD and BMPAD reports as well as the ICR mission. The AF1 restructuring did not imply any changes in the project’s stated objectives, approach nor methodology. Only the grant amount and key performance indicators were changed because of measurement difficulties and relevance issues. AF2 introduced several changes based on lessons learned: municipal SPs became eligible, productive SPs underwent tougher screening and received more training and technical assistance, COPRODEPs were transformed into CADECs (civil society representative organizations) and a USD2.0 million training program for CBOs and CADECs was introduced. Certain KPIs were also adjusted. PDO achievement in the period before AF1 restructuring (2005-2009) 3.2.2 Over-riding Development Objective was to scale-up the direct transfer of public resources to local community organizations in poor rural and peri-urban communities. The PAD estimated this would involve between 55 and 65 municipalities 7 . This indicator measures the degree to which the direct transfer of funds to CBOs resulted in the implementation of SPs prioritized through a democratic and transparent process. 3.2.3 Results: (i) by March 31, 2009, BMPAD through the MDODs had already transferred USD9.8 million (or 50% of the amount allocated) to 728 CBOs for 728 SPs (56% of the project target) in 59 municipalities. The portfolio was composed of 47% infrastructure SPs, 19% productive and 34% social SPs. Another 131 SPs were in the design phase; (ii) the four initial technical audits and the MTR evaluation report indicate that the democratic selection and implementation process worked extremely well, with important spill-over effects on the restoration of the local social fabric after a divisive period of civil unrest; (iii) CBOs implemented the funded SPs and there was no evidence of funds mismanagement or mis-procurement. Hence, the over-riding PDO was already demonstrating significant and satisfactory achievement at the time of Restructuring and is rated Satisfactory. 3.2.4 PDO Objective 2: To improve the access of communities to basic social and economic infrastructure and support income-generating activities by financing small-scale investments 6 For a summary of the MTR conclusions see Annex 5, para 29-38 7 The indicator is not precisely-worded as the municipalities were not supposed to transfer the funds to CBOs; the central government (BMPAD through the MDODs) was to do the transfer to CBOs 11 proposed, implemented and managed by said community organizations. This objective had three indicators: (i) cost-effectiveness/efficiency of direct transfers to CBO vis-à-vis traditional service provision measuring the Project’s cost effectiveness compared to “traditional central Government service provision”; (ii) percentage of rural/peri-urban poor with access to basic social and economic infrastructure was to measure the increase in access to basic services; and, (iii) percent change in household assets, per-capita incomes among project beneficiaries sought to measure such changes resulting from the Project (target of 20%). 3.2.5. Results: (i) the first indicator was not measurable because “traditional services” comparable to the subprojects financed under the Project were not provided by central or local government at that time. This indicator was subsequently dropped at AF1 approval; (ii) the second indicator had no quantitative target in the PAD. The baseline study (2006-7) concluded that barely 18.5% of residents in the targeted municipalities had easy access to good quality water, health services and schools. The MTR developed a methodology to estimate project beneficiaries and concluded that by March 31, 2009 already 763,000 residents (or about 32% of the population in those municipalities-Annex 2) had improved their access to infrastructure, productive and social services, such as: increased availability of agricultural inputs and basic necessities, increases in livestock herds, water supply, better transport communication between villages, increased access to electricity, renovated class rooms, internet access and rehabilitated health clinics. The beneficiaries of infrastructure improvements were estimated at 556,000, those of revenue generating SPs at 55,000 and of social SPs at 152,000. In a MTR beneficiary assessment exercise, however, participants expressed some doubts about the sustainability of some SPs and complained about the short duration of the training provided; (iii) the third indicator could not achieve its 20% increase in asset/income-generation target as only 19% of the SPs implemented were income-generating or productive SPs. Moreover, an MTR study revealed that about 75 percent of productive SPs were under financial stress. The indicator was subsequently dropped and replaced with a sustainability indicator of productive SPs. Although quantitatively the second PDO may have been reached, the project focused insufficiently on the quality and sustainability of the SPs and the achievement of the second PDO by Restructuring is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. 3.2.6 PDO Objective 3: The third Project Objective was to improve governance and build social capital in the communities. This objective had three indicators: (i) 2000 CBOs officially constituted and participating in COPRODEPs; (ii) number of households expressing awareness of PRODEP and its objectives/ activities and means of access; and (iii) percentage change in Social Capital Indices reflecting greater citizen participation in resource allocation decisions. 3.2.7 Results: (i) by March 31, 2009, BMPAD estimated that more than 4,000 CBOs were participating in SP prioritization processes, many of them officially constituted in previous years; (ii) the MTR evaluation estimated the number of households aware of PRODEP at 240,000 8. This indicator does, however, not capture changes in social capital or governance; (iii) the intended Social Capital Index had not yet been defined. Nevertheless, the 2009 MTR beneficiary assessment 9 looked at the impact of the Project in communities during its first year, comparing them to non-beneficiary communities. Much higher indicators of social capital were evident among households in those municipalities that benefitted from the first year of the project, compared to households in municipalities that did not benefit (see Annex 5, para 5.4). Other important beneficiary assessment findings on conflict reduction, inclusion of women and youth, 8 The indicator target number (300) in the PAD was probably a typographical error. 9 Étude de l’évolution de certains indicateurs de la ligne de base, ECOSOF, May 2009; MTR Beneficiary Assessment, J. Chery, J. Chesnel Jean et P. Pecos Lundy, Mai/Juin 2009 12 and improved dialogue with community leaders also indicated a strengthening of social capital (see also Annex 5). These findings show that good progress towards the social capital objective had been made and the third objective is rated Satisfactory. 3.2.8 The rating for the pre-Restructuring period is Moderately Satisfactory (Table 2): Table 2: Rating of PDO indicators before AF1 restructuring PDO Indicator Relative Weight Rating* Weighted rating 1 20% 5 1 S 2 40% 3 1.2 MU 3 40% 5 1.6 S Total 100% 4.2 MS *S= 5; MS=4; MU=3; U=2. PDO achievement in the period after AF1 restructuring (2009-2013) 3.2.9 Over-riding PDO: Progress on this PDO continued as planned. At the end of the project, some USD30.6 million had been transferred to CBOs for 1,687 SPs (765 infrastructure, 552 productive and 370 social SPs) in 59 municipalities. The indicator target of 2,010 SPs was an acknowledged mathematical error; total SPs to be financed, based on PAD objectives should have been 1,816 (original project: 1,300 + AF1 300 + AF2: 216). Hence, the target was 93% achieved and the over-riding PDO is rated Satisfactory. 3.2.10 PDO Objective 2: The second objective in this period was measured by two indicators: (i) 1.2 million residents in the project area with access to basic social and economic infrastructure (transportation, health, education, energy and other services) – the AF2 target number was based on the methodology in Appendix 2, Annex 2; and (ii) 75% of productive/income generating SPs still operational 12 months after completion. 3.2.11 Results: Both revised targets were exceeded. Applying the MTR measurement methodology, the estimated number of residents benefiting from additional access to basic services increased to 1.35 million (for a detailed calculation see Annex 2), while 82% of productive SPs were operational one year after completion. SP quality also improved. To increase SP quality and sustainability (including of those financed pre-restructuring) PRODEP introduced: (i) a productive SP strategy (business plans, management training and MDOD accounting assistance). This confirmed the need in CDD to separate the processing tracks of public and private SPs as the latter require different expertise and selection criteria, entail different risks re sustainability and governance, and have different “owners” responsible for their sustainability; (ii) additional funding for some 150 SPs, making them fully operational; and (iii) recruitment of MDOD engineers to enhance SP quality. Nevertheless not all quality enhancement measures were implemented evenly. The project grappled with a backlog of SPs that had failed (17%) or needed more assistance (and/or funding) to become sustainable (15%). See also Section 4.1. The achievement of the second PDO is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 3.2.12 PDO Objective 3: The achievement of the social capital development and governance objective had three revised indicators: (i) 3,500 CBOs officially constituted and participating in COPRODEPs; (ii) 60% of population in project area express awareness of PRODEP and its objectives, activities and means of access; and (iii) 80% of CBO members express a positive 13 change in terms of their organizational capacity and ability to work together constructively, subsequently revised at AF2 to be a “20-point change in Social Capital Indices (SCI) reflecting greater citizen participation in resource allocation decisions”. 3.2.13 Results: The first indicator was already exceeded by mid-term. The second indicator was not measured at the end of the project because of its lack of relevance to and inability to capture, the social capital objective. Ideally, the third indicator would have been measured as a change index using baseline and ex-post assessments. However, this approach lacked baseline data. Instead, a version of the SCI was measured as part of the final beneficiary survey in the impact evaluation document. Results are as follows: (i) three of the five social capital sub-index targets for greater citizen participation were exceeded, while a fourth was 96% reached (Annex 5). A fifth was not measured correctly in the study; (ii) a common theme during beneficiary consultation workshops was how the project introduced a fundamentally new approach to working collaboratively for the benefit of the entire community, as opposed to the individual and specialized interests of community-based organizations, thus expanding the pool of people involved in taking development decisions and improving relations between CBOs; (iii) the transformation of COPRODEPs (as entities entirely linked to PRODEP) and CADECs (organizations grouping CBOs and representative of civil society within the municipalities) was successful; and, (iv) the CADECs succeeded in supporting the municipalities and establishing lines of cooperation promising for the future if a similar PRODEP operation were to be developed. Lack of a follow-up project, however, put a damper on the success of this recent transformation and the CADECs have not been able to obtain financing from other sources. The training program of CADECs and CBOs (2011-2012) also contributed to the development of social capital and organizational/management skills. However, no evaluations of the acquisition and permanence of these skills have been done. 3.2.14 Considering/balancing the findings of the beneficiary assessment workshops (see also 3.6.2), the results of the impact evaluation’s quasi-experimental survey with comparison groups, the conclusions of the technical audits and the ICR mission field visits, and results as per indicators above, the social capital/governance objective is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 3.2.15 Based on Table 3 below the post-Restructuring period is rated Moderately Satisfactory for efficacy. Table 3: Rating of PDO indicators post-restructuring PDO Indicator Relative Weight Rating* Weighted rating Rating 1 20% 5 1 S 2 40% 4 1.6 MS 3 40% 4 1.6 MS Total 100% 4.2 MS *S= 5; MS=4; MU=3; U=2. 3.2.16 Overall PDO Rating is Moderately Satisfactory: Consistent with ICR Guidelines, Appendix B, separate PDO outcome ratings for the pre- and post-restructuring periods were weighted in proportion to the share of Bank disbursements made in the respective periods: 14 Table 4: PDO Rating – Pre- and Post-Restructuring Item Original PDO Indicators Revised PDO Indicators Overall Rating Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Rating value 4.2 4.2 Weight (% of total available financing disbursed, pre- and post-Restructuring) 36% (USD22.65 million) 64% (USD39.95 million) 100% Weighted value 1.51 2.94 4.45 Final rating - - Moderately Satisfactory 3.3 Efficiency 3.3.1 Considering subproject quality, the relatively high management costs and inconclusive economic returns, PRODEP’s efficiency is rated Moderately Satisfactory. Efficiency refers to the Project’s efficient use of resources and cost effectiveness. The analysis is based on three core questions. First, could the resources transferred to the CBO have been used more efficiently and was there any waste? Second, were the administrative costs reasonable? Third, what would the economic costs and benefits of the SPs be, are the SPs worthwhile in the economic sense and do they provide value for money? 3.3.2 Use of resources by CBOs. Through the democratic and competitive SP selection process amongst CBOs, the wide diversity of SPs addressed community needs. Did the selected SPs reached their objectives of improving the living conditions (water, roads, schools, clinics, community centers) or their income generation objectives? To answer this question there are two sources of information: two technical audits of 2011/2012 analyzing 60 randomly-selected SPs and the 2012 impact evaluation that evaluated another 60 randomly-selected SPs. The three studies evaluated SP performance as a function of their technical implementation, usefulness to the community, and social and environmental criteria. Table 5 shows the following: 58 percent of the SPs in the samples performed in an acceptable or better way, 25 percent needed additional support and 17 percent were no longer operating or maintained. Further details are in Annex 5. Table 5: Performance Evaluation of SPs. Performance Number Good/Acceptable/ Fair Weak/ Insufficient Bad/ Discontinued Technical audits 60 33 18 9 Impact evaluation 60 37 12 11 Total: 120 70 30 20 100% 58% 25% 17% 15 3.3.3 In response to these conclusions, the project launched a Rehabilitation Plan in 2012 (Plan de Redressement) providing complementary funding to 150 SPs to upgrade their operational level. MDODs claim that most of these 150 SPs are now operating adequately. If confirmed, this would bring the good/acceptable/fair group of SPs to approximately 67% of SPs. 10 3.3.4 Data on SPs’ operational efficiency, sustainability and usefulness from comparable CDD programs in other fragile states are hard to come by. The WB Operations Evaluation Department (OED 2005) evaluation of the effectiveness of community-based and community driven development states that: “More success has been achieved with quantitative than qualitative goals 11 ”. However, the report does not examine whether CDD’s physical investments were of good quality, sustainable and value for money (although they were generally more cost-effective than similar sector investments). 3.3.5 PRODEP financed some SPs that were likely to fail from the outset. Experience in Haiti showed that “community-run” businesses are hard to sustain. In addition, contracting NGOs to assist with SP implementation does not guarantee their long-term commitment to follow-up on the SP operations beyond their contract period. Hence, livestock SPs without post-SP technical assistance and community retail stores or cybercafés without adequate business training and long- term technical assistance were likely to fail. To succeed, productive SPs should follow another screening procedure and support system that guarantees business-oriented practices and performance measurement. This was not the case in PRODEP. Reducing the wide diversity of eligible SPs, however, could also have enhanced SP quality. No Haitian development agency has the skills to promote such a wide variety of SPs and the availability of private technical assistance of such diversity is equally scarce. 3.3.6 At the outset, project management (both BMPAD and Bank) was more concerned with ensuring transparency, empowerment, social cohesion and democratic selection of SPs and with introducing a smooth fund transfer mechanism than with SP feasibility. Later on, when the first problem SPs were illustrated in an MTR study 12 , SP quality gained importance. MDODs have since made substantial efforts to rehabilitate many SPs (under AF2 and the Rehabilitation Plan) and the SPs financed under AF2 and CDB financing show significant quality improvements. 3.3.7 Administrative Costs: PRODEP’s cost structure is presented in Table 6. Roughly, the administrative costs are estimated at 29.3 percent of the total project costs, while 17 percent of the project costs went to MDOD for SP preparation, training, follow-up and assistance to CBOs. The structural costs are high because Haitian development programs require a strong support structure (local offices, technical staff and equipment) as local institutional capacity is weak. 10 The 150 rehabilitated subprojects account for some 8.8% of the total number of subprojects which when added to 58% results in 66.8%. Considering the 11 The Effectiveness of World Bank Support for Community-Based and -Driven Development, OED 2005. 12 Évaluation financière d’un échantillon de 16 sous-projets productifs, Claude Phanord et Roosevelt Saint Dic, 2009 16 Table 6: PRODEP cost structure Item Amount (USD million) % 1 SP amount 30.9 50.2% 2 Training and capacity building 2.2 3.5% 3 MDOD costs of SP preparation, technical assistance, training and technical follow-up 10.5 17.0% 4 MDOD management costs 7.5 12.2% 5 MDOD overhead costs 6.5 10.6% 6 BMPAD costs 4.0* 6.5% Total: 61.6 100% Project support per SP USD18, 300 Project support per beneficiary household USD 114 *not taking into account technical audits and impact studies **taking into account municipal subprojects which had $55,000 in SP support 3.3.8 The PAD estimated that 60% of project funds would go to the CBOs, while in fact only 50% of project funds financed SPs. The mid-term review concluded that for every dollar transferred to the CBOs, the intermediary costs were as high as USD1.06. MDOD spent 55 cents in technical training and follow-up and 51 cents was spent on management costs (MDOD and BMPAD). At the end of the project, the overall intermediary costs were reduced from USD 1.06 to 92 cents per USD transferred to CBOs: MDOD spent 34 cents per dollar transferred in technical training and follow-up while 58 cents was spent on management costs (MDOD +BMPAD). The increase of the management costs per dollar transferred from 51 to 58 cents is due to: (i) the stop-and-go nature of AF2 requiring MDODs to remobilize and reorganize with negative cost consequences; (ii) the higher weight of the fixed office and staff costs in relation to a relatively smaller SP investment amount; and (iii) BMPAD costs increased by an annual 12% over the life of the project, mainly through the increase in the number of consultants (staff) and remuneration (25% growth per year) as well as a 17% annual growth in operational costs. 3.3.9 The MDODs contracted under the project were international NGOs: the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) - a member of the Organization of American States (OAS) - and the Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI). These NGOs had significant overhead costs (13-15% of the contract amount), increasing their overall costs far ahead of local NGOs. Working through local NGOs would have been more economical in nominal terms but - depending on their financial and implementation capacity - the administrative cost per dollar invested in SPs is likely to have been even higher. Similarly, the alternative of BMPAD running regional offices might have shown costs similar to the MDODs. 3.3.10 A comparable IFAD-financed Project to Support Productive Initiatives (PAIP -USD28.5 million) carried out by FAES has a similar cost structure: 35% of the funds were invested in productive SPs, 15% in training and 50% were intermediary costs, a mixture of institutional strengthening and management costs (of which 23% were FAES administration and overhead). This means that for every dollar in productive investment and training another dollar went to 17 institutional and administrative support. Although both projects are hard to compare, PRODEP could be considered a little more efficient. 3.3.11 There was room to reduce costs and increase the efficiency of the operation. The opportunities were: (i) concentrating PRODEP in fewer regions; (ii) delegating some technical assistance and training to local NGOs; (iii) financing SPs on the basis of results instead of expenditures; (iv) limiting the menu of eligible SPs to reduce technical supervision costs; and (v) capping BMPAD consultants’ remunerations. The Bank considered several of these measures, but some had also drawbacks and risks that could have increased costs or reduced impact. 3.3.12 Implementation delays: There were some implementation delays at the beginning of the project caused by: the insecure situation (2006), hurricane Noel (2007), the food price riots of 2008, the four hurricanes Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike (2008), fuel shortages (2008-9) and the customary delays in procurement (in particular an 18-month MDOD procurement and contracting procedure) and project funds transfers. Also at the onset of each AF administrative delays arose from the need to re-contract the MDODs. 3.3.13 Economic Evaluation: FAO/CP carried out an economic evaluation of ten SPs chosen randomly from the most representative type of SPs. The evaluation was to provide some idea of the SPs’ economic and financial benefits. The sample is not representative of the SP universe but the analysis gives a sense of the SP’s possible economic and financial benefits (Annex 3). While it is difficult to draw general economic or financial conclusions from this study, it shows however that with the proper design and management, most of the ten reviewed SPs are, or could become, sustainable and financially viable. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating The overall outcome rating of Moderately Satisfactory is justified based on the following:  Relevance: The PDO, design and implementation remain relevant and are rated Satisfactory.  Efficacy: The PDOs, as measured by the original and revised indicators, show Moderately Satisfactory levels of achievement. The overriding objective of transferring funds to CBOs has been achieved; some 50% of the population in the municipalities covered by PRODEP benefited from increased access to some services; social capital improved through strengthened CBOs, CADECs and greater transparency.  Efficiency. PRODEP could have been more efficient if more attention had been paid to SP quality from the outset. In spite of significant improvements during later implementation phases, efficiency is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 3.5.1 Poverty Impact: The project’s aim was to increase access of poor residents to services and productive assets, which could have a positive effect on income. While most SPs had no direct impact on monetary income, they are likely to have had an impact on the living conditions and wellbeing of the poor. 3.5.2 Gender Aspects: PRODEP can be considered as an operation which promoted gender equality. MDODs made a serious effort to promote gender-friendly SPs, and to include women in the management of CBOs and in the COPRODEP/CADECs. Some 39% of CBO members and 18% of the COPRODEP (CADEC) members are women. The 2010 gender assessment is positive that PRODEP promoted women’s empowerment and involvement in decision-making 18 (Annex 6). The last technical audit analyzed the project’s gender aspects. Even so, in spite of strong participation of women in the CADECs, no woman leads a CADEC. However, while only 10% of the SPs are managed by women’s groups, women are the main beneficiaries of at least half of all SPs. 3.5.3 Social Development: The main social development achievements are included in the analysis of the social capital objectives (Section 3.2). This includes CBO strengthening and capacity building. Moreover, the project introduced a new approach to working collaboratively for the benefit of the entire community. PRODEP gave a voice to the project participants and aided in conflict resolution. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 3.5.4 Strengthening of local institutions such as CBOs, COPRODEPs/CADECs and municipal authorities was an important objective and, as stated before, the Project had a discernible impact on social capital and institution building in rural areas. But it missed a chance to do better. There was originally an amount of USD3.6 million foreseen for training, capacity building and institutional strengthening. Up to 2010, almost no activity took place under this component, although the MDOD provided SP-related technical and management training. From 2011 onwards, PRODEP initiated a USD2.0 million training and capacity-building program for CBOs, CADECs and municipal authorities and the CADECs were strengthened with office and transport equipment. The program came a little too late. The 2012 technical audit reviewed 20 courses and concluded that they were short, did not provide materials to the trainees to share with other CBO members and that there was no follow-up to reinforce and repeat what was learned. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 3.5.5. The PRODEP experience demonstrated that CDD can be an effective instrument for post- disaster reconstruction. PRODEP and its sister, urban operation PRODEPUR had the institutional structure and procedures in place to easily absorb additional funding to assist damaged areas. AF1 provided additional funding for 32 municipalities affected by the flooding, while AF2 supported rural areas trying to cope with the influx of urban residents returning home from disaster stricken Port-au-Prince. CDD also provided communities with skills to establish priorities, manage funding and deal with external assistance agencies’ procedures. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 3.6.1 Beneficiary assessments took place at each stage of the project, and informed project design, early implementation, the MTR and completion. These beneficiary assessments employed a variety of methodologies including: interviews with beneficiaries and stakeholders of the pilot project, a social survey of a random sample of households in the intervention zones, participatory evaluation workshops with beneficiary community stakeholders, and a social survey of members of CBOs (beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, i.e., treatment and control groups). 3.6.2 The main beneficiary survey took place in 2012 through interviews of 480 randomly- selected project beneficiaries and a control group of non-beneficiaries. The principal conclusions are: (i) 66% of participants in CADECs had a positive perception of CADEC decision making; (ii) 82% of CBO members surveyed had a positive perception of decision making within the CADEC; (iii) 83% of CBO management committees stated that they better- understood their role in committees; (iv) 46% of this group considered that CADECs contributed positively to CBO capacity building; (v) 86% of CBO members surveyed believe that in the case of major problems being presented by the CADECs, that they would receive help from the community; (vi) 90% of the respondents perceived a reduction of conflicts in the community, and (vii) more than 65% perceived a better dialogue with community leaders. Where the SP was considered good, 84% of 19 respondents had a favorable opinion about the COPRODEP/CADEC decision-making process, but where it failed expectations, only 39% of CBO members had a favorable opinion. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial 4.1.1 Without a follow-up project and technical assistance from MDODs or other NGOs, an estimated 15% of the SPs risk not operating properly, may not be maintained or could lose direction. The challenge will need to be taken up by other ministerial agencies or NGOs. CDD projects worldwide struggle with the same issues 13 . PRODEP gave the CBOs a working experience that increased their skills and improved their performance. Some social capital enhancements, however, are likely to survive: transparency in decision-making, community participation in the selection of local investments (depending on the decentralization laws), procurement methods and financial accountability. The parallel structures, established following the Brazil model, may not survive, although some CADECs are dynamic and will be able to raise funds from other sources and continue to play a role in the community. As a local development learning vehicle, PRODEP is likely to leave behind institutional capacity. 4.1.2 The operation and maintenance (O&M) of many infrastructure and social investments (road rehabilitation, electricity, clinics, schools, water supply) is no longer in the hands of the CBOs that promoted these investments. The owners of many infrastructure investments are the local or central authorities (municipalities, Ministries, Haitian Power Company) and some community investments were handed over to the authorities that are now responsible for O&M. 14 4.1.3 The operation of productive SPs, however, remains with the CBOs or individual CBO members. Certain types of earlier productive SPs (such as community and input stores and cyber cafes) have failed or are dormant. The sustainability of livestock and other agricultural SPs depends mostly on the care of individuals. Some grain mills and other agro-processing investments, mainly if managed by women’s groups, remain operational and their sustainability depends on management skills, the quality of the equipment and its maintenance. The few productive SPs launched during AF2 are likely to be more sustainable as MDODs paid more attention to SP feasibility, business management training and CBO support. 4.1.4 The operation of the Community Development Councils (CADECs) is guaranteed for another year beyond closing in the Departments where the CDB is financing a follow-up project. The fate of the southern CADECs is less defined as no other financing is available. These CADECs have established a federation and are following training in fund raising. Some CADECs will continue operations because of strong and creative leadership. 5. Assessment of Bank and Recipient Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry -- Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 5.1.1 The Bank responded rapidly to acute post-conflict needs and in the interests of expediency, acted as the project’s main promoter. Project design was sound and based on the Bank’s longstanding CDD experience in northeast Brazil, and benefited from the first PCF pilot operation. The project objectives were attainable and addressed the country’s needs. The results 13 The Effectiveness of World Bank Support for Community-Based and -Driven Development, OED 2005, page 36 14 Although AF2 included USD2,500 per SP for maintenance costs, when financial budgets were established in MDOD contracts, the choice was between maintenance provisions or more SPs. All went for the latter. 20 framework was weak and M&E indicators could have been more SMART. The CDD methodology was robust: implemented as designed and no implementation restructurings were needed. The insertion of international MDODs as main project operators had a very positive impact on field implementation including speed and fiduciary management. The establishment of a parallel structure to the municipalities was justified at the time but the local authorities should have been more directly involved in the interests of sustainability 15 . (b) Quality of Supervision -- Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 5.1.2 The supervision team conducted 21 supervision missions over an eight-year project. There were also six procurement ex-post reviews and regular financial management reviews. Bank environmental specialists conducted two full environmental reviews. Supervision focused on: (i) ensuring a steady implementation rhythm; (ii) reviewing the quality of the SPs in the field; (iii) preparing two additional financing operations; (iv) incorporating lessons learned into the two AFs; and (v) promoting the development of an MIS and monitoring system as well as the implementation of training and productive SP strategies. It carried out a timely Mid-term Review and financed an MTR report by an independent consultant. The Bank’s reporting was candid but had limited impact on project implementation quality, as BMPAD was not very responsive to Bank recommendations. The supervision team was also actively (but not always successfully) involved in upgrading the quality of the 2012 impact evaluation, the promotion of timely technical audits and the simplification of administrative procedures. 5.1.3. The Board approval of the two AFs gave the Bank team the opportunity to revise the results framework however this could have been done more forcefully, for instance making the definition of “access to services” more specific. Neither the impact evaluation nor a special commissioned study were able to define access in more detail than the general notions included in the 2009 MTR report (see Annex 2, Appendix 2). 5.1.4 During the final years, the Bank could have put more effort into engaging the Government more consistently in a policy dialogue and strategic conversations on local development in Haiti. The Bank’s focus, however, was primarily on optimal project implementation in a difficult environment and less on building dialogue with Government and other development partners on decentralization policies. 16 (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance -- Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 5.1.5 Considering the short preparation time, project design was solid with exception of the monitoring and evaluation system and indicators. The design worked and delivered close to 1,700 SPs. Projects that work from the outset with timely disbursements are rare in Haiti. Project supervision was intense and pushed for the inclusion of lessons learned into project implementation on a rolling basis. Supervision impact was hampered by the weakness of the implementing agency. The Bank needed to be more consistently involved in local development policy issues/dialogue at a higher level. 15 The municipalities had officially, some 20% of the votes in COPRODEP meetings, but they were not entitled to be allocated 20% of SP funds 16 The European Union and USAID were financing operations preparing municipalities for decentralization and more consistent Bank dialogue building was needed to strengthen the framework at higher levels. 21 5.2 Recipient Performance (a) Government Performance - Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 5.2.1 The Government supported the Project during preparation and implementation. The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation was strongly behind project preparation but did not have the human resources to participate in preparation. During implementation, different administrations provided different levels of support. PRODEP was mainly a Bank effort, introduced during the short transitional government period. GOH delegated the management of the project to BMPAD with the corresponding advantage that there was no political pressure to favor specific SPs. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance -- Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 5.2.2 The performance of the implementing agencies was characterized by the following:  BMPAD: BMPAD’s role was to coordinate project implementation: (i) procurement and financial management; (ii) managing the MDOD contract; (iii) supervising field implementation; and (iv) monitoring the project through a management information system, quarterly reports, bi-annual technical audits and evaluations. BMPAD performed tasks (i) and (ii) in a moderately satisfactory manner. One of the key strengths of BMPAD was its ability to disburse fast since it was relatively independent, yet it did not have the breadth of technical specialties to deliver the range of support for a CDD project. Procurement reviews were satisfactory but financial management was moderately unsatisfactory mainly because of audit delays and lack of budgetary planning. Task (iii) was hampered by BMPAD’s reluctance to allow field supervision by staff. For task (iv) BMPAD did not introduce an operating MIS until very late in the project. Hence, the monitoring was exclusively based on information provided by the MDODs. The initial technical audits were late; from 2009 to 2011 BMPAD did not select qualified technical auditors and no audits were completed. There were two technical audits in 2012, which were of high quality. BMPAD employed specialist staff to design and coordinate a strategy to improve productive SP performance, to oversee training and monitor environmental issues. BMPAD’s performance was rather weak, but acceptable considering the country context. Little was done to implement the agreements contained in Bank mission aide-memoires. Nevertheless, the Bank provided BMPAD with large amounts of additional funds for several projects (including for PRODEPUR and for post- earthquake reconstruction and housing).  MDODs: The MDODs carried out the project’s field activities. As subcontractors, they performed with great competence considering the difficult field conditions and the many natural disasters during the project period. The MDODs moved the program forward, guided the democratic and transparent selection process of SPs, supervised SP implementation, provided technical assistance and advice, monitored the field operations and supervised financial management by the CBOs and COPRODEPs (CADECs). Changes in management at the level of PADF, however, caused implementation delays of several months in 2009-2010, and CECI was slow in finishing some SPs. Both MDODs took financial responsibility for those delays (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Recipient Performance -- Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 5.2.3 Taking into account Haiti’s general weak institutional capacity, and the context of the multiple natural disasters that confronted the project during implementation, the performance of GOH, BMPAD and the MDODs combined is rated Moderately Satisfactory. Through its hands- 22 off approach, the central GOH allowed the project to deliver its outputs on time. The MDODs, as subcontractors, performed professionally within their terms of reference. 6. Lessons Learned 6.1 The following are among the more important lessons from this operation: 6.1.1 Project structures which run parallel to municipal governments to promote local development are a common feature of CDD projects but efforts are needed from the start to link them to municipal government and build cooperation, joint planning and development synergies. The goal should be a strong civil society, community engagement and more transparency in local government over the long run. An imbalance of power between well- funded CDD entities and under-funded municipalities should be avoided. Similar projects should include a strong municipal strengthening component to ensure that municipal institutional capacity develops simultaneously with the capacity of civil society, and that consistent efforts are made throughout project implementation to build dialogue and foster joint policy and planning. 6.1.2 To ensure SP and institutional development sustainability, SP selection should be aligned to the extent possible with central government and local government priorities and plans. This is more likely to increase government ownership of the project as well as cooperation and participation in the maintenance and follow-up of the SPs. Indeed, linkages to and cooperation with line ministries and local authorities increased substantially during project implementation and in particular during AF2. 6.1.3 The quality and size of SPs are important for the sustainability and credibility of the whole program. The need for speedy implementation and small SP size cannot excuse poor SP preparation. SPs should be prepared working with the CBOs, and include plans and budgets. Productive SPs need a simple business plan showing financial sustainability. Infrastructure SPs should present an O&M strategy, including training. In a fragile state, small SP size may be better for early-stage CDD, even if the direct impact is not immediately visible. Depending on performance, flexibility can be introduced later on. 6.1.4 The menu of eligible SPs should reflect national and international development experience and not finance SPs with high probable failure rates (such as community stores). A very diverse SP menu may respond better to community needs, but quality control and appropriate technical assistance are difficult to ensure. Therefore, a constant regular review of field experience may result in the removal of certain SPs from the eligibility menu. 6.1.5 PRODEP’s experience with productive SPs highlighted the lesson to be learned on public vs. private good CDD models. There is a need for separate “streams” of analysis and activity given that they require different expertise and selection/feasibility criteria, and entail different risks re sustainability and governance. The institutional “end-points” also differ: public goods may be taken over from community management by local authorities while private enterprises need invested CBOs to thrive. 6.1.6. Leadership training for women in preparation for community leadership roles should be part of the gender strategy. Although the project did not develop a full-fledged gender strategy, it contributed to women’s empowerment through the SP selection system (ensuring female CBOs’ access to project funds) and the requirement that women be part of COPRODEP/CADEC membership. The additional advantages for women included periodic business training and capacity building. However, many women lack the leadership skills training needed to access decision-making positions in such entities and this needs much closer attention. 23 6.1.7 The Bank’s fiduciary procurement and financial management requirements applied to communities moved the focus away from sound technical implementation and organizational skills development. MDOD’s focus and resources were partially diverted to administrative matters 17 assisting the CBOs in complying with the Bank’s procedures, whereas greater focus on the SPs’ technical implementation, sustainability and organizational skills development could have borne more fruit in higher quality SPs. A more results-oriented procurement and financial management system would be more efficient. 6.1.8. CDD is arguably the best instrument in a centralized state where working through the ministries is difficult and the decentralization agenda has stalled. A second-phase operation empowering local governance to scale up the delivery of socio-economic services and facilities should be a priority in the Bank’s next round of programs with GOH. Further, CDD’s proven, practical utility on the ground - institutionally and physically - for channeling post-disaster reconstruction services, should be a key factor in this decision. PRODEP and PRODEPUR are cases in point. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Recipient/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Recipient/implementing agencies 7.1 The draft ICR was provided to the Recipient for comment and subsequently discussed directly with key GOH counterparts during a Bank mission. Adjustments suggested by the Recipient were incorporated in the text. However, the Recipient did not send the Bank the requested letter. (b) Co-financiers (c) Other partners and stakeholders N/A 17 Although the CBO received the funds in their account, the Bank and BMPAD held the MDOD responsible for the use of the funds and possible mismanagement by the CBO, including mis-procurement. Box 1: PRODEP Lessons incorporated in the CDB Project -SPs are generally twice as large (USD40,000) - SP selection considers past experience, municipal development plans or sector strategies where available -SPs have detailed preparation documents with clear identification of beneficiaries, engineering designs and budgets – sample of preparation documents reviewed by CDB staff for quality control -Productive SPs require business plan and financial feasibility estimates to be submitted to CDB - Quality control of infrastructure SPs done through civil engineers contracted by BMPAD - Greater importance of gender strategy 24 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) 1. Community SP funds, management and support 29.60 58.03 130.0 2.Capacity-building and technical assistance 3.50 0.18 5.0 3.Project administration, supervision, monitoring and evaluation 2.75 4.39 122.0 Unallocated 2.15 0.00 Total Baseline Cost 38.00 62.60 164.7 Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.0 Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.0 Total Project Costs 38.00 0.00 Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 0.0 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 0.0 Total Financing Required 38.0 19 62.60 164.7 18 Total including original credit plus AF1 and AF2. 19 Total cost shown does not include an additional USD2.3 million in beneficiary contributions (estimated at appraisal as 5% of Component 1 amounts) to the cost of SPs. No records were kept of aggregate beneficiary contributions. Components Appraisal Estimate (USD millions) Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions) 18 Percentage of Appraisal 25 (b) Financing Source of Funds Type of Co-financing Appraisal Estimate (USD millions) Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions) Percentage of Appraisal Recipient 2.30 20 na na IDA Grant 38.00 62.60 164.7 20 Appraisal estimate of beneficiary contribution but final amount not known. 26 Appendix 1: Project Costs and Financing: Haiti – Community Driven Development Project (a) Cost by Component 21 (US $ million) Component Original Appraisal Estimate Actual Cost % of Estimate Revised Estimate AF1 Actual Cost % of Estimate Revised Estimate including AF 1&2 Actual Total Cost including AF 1&2 % of Overall Estimate including AF 1&2 1. Community SP funds, mgt. and support 29.60 34.49 116 41.74 42.77 102 53.45 56.03 190 2. Capacity- building and technical assistance 3.50 0.18 5 1.51 0.18 12 3.57 2.18 61 3. Project administration, supervision, monitoring and evaluation 2.75 4.39 160 2.75 4.39 160 3.61 4.39 160 Unallocated 2.15 0.37 0 0 Total Project Cost: 38.00 39.06 97 46.00 47.34 103 61.00 62.60 165  The estimates represent IDA allocations only and do not include beneficiary contributions which were required to be 15% of Component 1 amounts. No records were kept of participant contributions. 21 Cumulative estimated and actual costs including Additional Financing 1 and 2 as shown in PAD Annex 5 27 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component 1: Community SP funds, management and support (USD 54.3 million). 2.1 The project financed a total 1,687 SPs divided by type as follows: Infrastructure Productive Social Pre-restructuring 343 247 138 Post-restructuring 422 305 232 Total 765 552 370 2.2 Types of SPs financed under PRODEP are as shown in the table below. Project support for each SPs is initially USD 17, 500 but several SPs have (with funds from AF1 and the gains on currency exchange) received additional financial support of about USD 6,000 to get them operating properly. For instance, some community centers, schools and health clinics have received extra funding to construct lavatories, fences or for some equipment and furniture. Infrastructure Number Secondary road and street and bridge improvement 292 Water supply systems, wells, cisterns 166 Power generation and distribution 98 Soil conservation and environmental protection 88 Irrigation 43 Public market improvements 21 Water purification stations 20 Public square construction and improvement 15 Construction of local government offices 6 Solid waste (latrines) 4 Slaughterhouse improvements 3 Football field construction 3 Public transport stations 2 28 Street naming and house numbering 2 Other 2 Sub-Total 765 Productive SPs Livestock improvement (beef, goats) – Veterinary pharmacies 128 Grain mills 110 Community stores 110 Input stores and grain storage 101 Agro processing (Fruit, yams, sugarcane) 43 Animal traction 19 Fisheries 10 Chicken farms 8 Agricultural production intensification 6 Other (revolving credit, bakery) 17 Sub-Total 552 Social SPs Community schools construction and improvement 106 Community entertainment centers. cultural centers, 87 Professional Training Centers 48 Cyber cafes 45 Health clinics 37 Community radios 18 Lodging and training centers 11 29 Others 18 Sub-Total 370 TOTAL 1,687 2.3. The MDOD estimated the number of rural residents benefitting from better access to infrastructure, productive and social services following the methodology described in Appendix 2 as follows: Number of beneficiaries Pre-restructuring Post restructuring Total Infrastructure SP 556,571 533,952 1,090,523 Productive SP 54,900 65,875 120,775 Social SP 151,523 282,355 433,878 Total 762,994 882,182 1,645,176 Since this calculation is based on 1,687 subprojects and an estimated 17% of subprojects have been discontinued, one can reasonably adjust the total number of residents with increased access to some 1.35 million (83% of 1.645 million). 2.3 The information and awareness campaigns financed under the component included: Activities Number Hours of radio programs on PRODEP broadcasted 140 Launching workshops organized 118 Posters distributed 20,704 T-shirts and hats distributed 8,069 Banners suspended 206 Information folders distributed 69,482 Announcement panels installed 1,411 30 Meetings and workshops organized 14,007 Participants in the meetings and workshops 415,224 Female participants in meetings and workshops 144,736 The SP selection process involved the following activities: Number SPs presented by CBO to COPRODEP/CADEC after prioritization in municipal section units 4,967 Prioritization assemblies taken place 385 SPs selected and approved by BMPAD 1,686 SPs promoted by women accepted 285 Number of SPs started and completed 1,687 2.4 Capacity building and technical assistance by MDOD to CBO and COPRODEP/CADEC under Component 1 Activities Number CBOs assisted in their organization and formal structuring 1,667 Hours of training to CBOs and COPRODEP/CADECs provided 10,956 Training sessions 2,070 Participants trained 73,693 Women participating in training 16,987 Component 2: Capacity-building and technical assistance (USD 3.3 million) 2.5 Capacity building and technical assistance has been provided in three ways: (i) by the MDOD under Component 1 (see paragraph 5 above); (ii) by BMPAD/DCP and (iii) from 2011 to 2012 by the MDODs with funds from Component 2. 2.6 The training organized by BMPAD/DCP included the following: 31 Activities Participants Training of trainers course One course for MDOD and staff Environmental management One course for MDOD and staff Accountability, networking, community structures and environmental sustainability Two workshops for COPRODEP Management of Productive SPs Four sessions for CBO with productive SPs Project management One training for CADEC leaders and MDOD staff Community radio training One session for leaders of community radio SPs 2.7 The training sessions and follow-up organized by MDOD under Component 2 included: (i) a participatory diagnosis of the training needs of CBOs and CADECs; (ii) the development of a support plan to structure and formalize the CBOs; and (iii) the development and implementation of a training program based on the training needs diagnosis. Key outputs Number CBO structured and formalized 1,667 Hours of training 10,956 Training sessions 2,070 Trainees 73,693 Female trainees 16,987 2.8 The training was focused on the following: Target groups Training subjects Follow-up actions CADEC/COPRODEP  Participatory development Establishment of bye-laws and statutes, archive management, 32 Target groups Training subjects Follow-up actions  SP management and supervision  Infrastructure management and maintenance  Communications, conflict resolution through dialogue  Community security and crime prevention  Meeting management  Gender issues  Environmental norms formalizing inter-institutional relations Environmental mitigation in SPs Gender (Women)  Participatory development,  Productive projects  Leadership,  Entrepreneurship Increase their access to the decision-making ranks of CBO Supporting a specific gender action plan CBO – leaders, SP management committees and maintenance committees  Project cycle and results focus  Infrastructure management and maintenance  Creation and management of rural micro- enterprises  Establishment and management of agro-processing units  Financial management and simple accounting techniques  Information technology and maintenance of IT equipment  School management Implementation of accounting techniques; infrastructure maintenance; support to SP management and business management in agro-processing units. 2.9 Training and capacity building also covered the following aspects: a. Promotion of civil society organizations and community leadership; b. Social conflict resolution; c. Dialogue between civil society and local authorities; d. Local governance: (i) principles of transparency and accountability in the management of CBO; and (ii) support of local authorities in the exercise of their functions; 33 e. Gender equality and implications for CBO and CADEC organization and management; and f. Environmental mitigation and management 2.10 CADEC institutional strengthening. The project also financed some $900,000 of equipment for CADEC. This included transport equipment (motorcycles), computers and office furniture. Component 3: Project administration, supervision, monitoring and evaluation (USD 4.1 million) 2.11 BMPAD financed the following studies. Title Period Number Baseline study 2006 1 Technical audits 2006-2009 and 2012 7 Financial audits 2006-2013 13 Productive SP evaluation 2009 1 Beneficiary assessment 2009 1 PRODEP Impact study 2012 1 Final report 2013 1 2.12 A first version of Management Information System (MIS) software was developed in 2007 but was not used for technical reasons. A second version MIS software was developed in 2012 and contains most of the PRODEP information. Nevertheless, the second MIS arrived too late to be useful. 2.13 One communication folder and quarterly reports were prepared. No supervision reports by DCP/BMPAD are available. - 34 - Annex 2, Appendix 1: Evolution of Results Frameworks 2005-2013 Project Development Objective Original Project Outcome Indicators AF 1 Indicators AF2 Indicators To scale-up the direct transfer of public resources to local community organizations in poor rural and peri- urban communities, by: (i) To improve their access to basic social and economic infrastructure and support income-generating activities by financing small-scale investments proposed, implemented and managed by community organizations; and (ii) To improve community governance and build social capital of communities through an increase in citizen participation and transparency in open decision-making processes. 60 communes successfully managing direct transfers to CBOs for community SPs 57 22 communes successfully managing direct transfers to CBOs for community SPs In 59 Municipalities CBO have successfully managed the direct transfers for community SPs. Cost-effectiveness/ efficiency of direct transfers to CBOs vis-à-vis traditional service provision. Dropped: considering data collection and capacity constraint, this indicator is not realistic. In most cases, there is no prior ‘traditional’ service provision, which makes a comparison challenging--- Percent rural/peri-urban poor with access to basic social and economic infrastructure (e.g., water supply, feeder roads, school, health posts) 50 percent of residents in project area with access to basic social and economic infrastructure (e.g. access to potable water, irrigation, grain mills) 1.2 million residents in 59 Municipalities of the Project area improved their access to basic social and economic infrastructure and/or benefits of productive SPs. 20 percent change in household assets, per-capita incomes among project beneficiaries. Dropped, replaced by: 50 percent of productive/ income-generating SPs are operational 3-6 months after completion 75% of productive/ income-generating SPs within the 59 Municipalities are operational and are being maintained 12 months after completion. . 22 The original target of the project was to reach 55-65 communes, therefore the indicator was set at the average of 60. - 35 - 2,000 CBOs officially constituted and participating in COPRODEPs 3,500 23 CBOs officially constituted and participating in COPRODEPs (includes pre- existing and strengthened, as well as newly- created CBOs) 3500 CBOs in the 59 Municipalities are officially constituted and participating in COPRODEPs. 300 households expressing awareness of PRODEP and its objectives/ activities/means of access. 60 percent of population in project area expressing awareness of PRODEP and its objectives/activities/ means of access. 60% of the adult population in the 59 Municipalities expresses to be aware of PRODEP and its objectives/activities/ means of access. 20 percent change in Social Capital Indices reflecting greater citizen participation in resource allocation decisions 80 percent of CBO members express a positive change in terms of their organizational capacity and ability to work together constructively 20-point change in Social Capital Indices, reflecting greater citizen participation in resource allocation decisions Intermediate Results One per Component Results Indicators for Each Component AF1 Results Indicators Component One: Rural/peri-urban community organizations (CBOs) in poor communes select, manage funds, implement and maintain SPs in basic small-scale infrastructure, education, health and other productive investments. Component One: 60 COPRODEPs following democratic and open meeting procedures as detailed in the Project Operational Manual. # of SPs: (a) 2,600 proposed, (b) 1,950 approved, (c)1,300 under implementation, and (d) 1,300 completed, by SP type e.g., infrastructure (potable water, roads), productive (irrigation, food processing) and social (health, education); Creation of new community organizations Component One: 57 COPRODEPs following democratic and open meeting procedures as detailed in the Project Operational Manual. # of SPs: (a) 3,200 proposed, (b) 2,250 approved, (c) 1,450 under implementation, and (d) 1,450 completed, by SP type e.g., infrastructure (potable water, roads), productive (irrigation, food processing) and social (health, education); Component 1: 59 CADECs following democratic and open meeting procedures as detailed in the Project Operational Manual. # of SPs: (a) 4050 proposed, (b) 2900 approved, (c) 2020 start implementation, and (d) 2010 completed. 23 This target is based on the number of CBOs already participating plus the estimated number of CBOs to join under the AF. - 36 - (CBOs) 30 percent of CBO/COPRODEP members which are women 75 percent of SPs with adequate O&M arrangements. 100 new CBOs created as a result of the project. 30 percent of CBO/COPRODEP members which are women 75 percent of SPs with adequate O&M arrangements. 100 new CBOs created as a result of the Project. 30% of CBO and 15% of CADEC members of the executive committee are women. 75% of SPs with adequate O&M arrangements implemented. Component Two: Build and strengthen capacity of CBOs and COPRODEPs in SP execution, roles and responsibilities as described in the project operational manual, environmental and social dimensions of the project. Component Two : 360 training events for CBOs, COPRODEPs Pace of SP execution by CBOs (e.g., 3 months) Percent prioritized and approved SPs which are financed. Component Two: 360 training events for CBOs, COPRODEPs 75 percent of CBO members have attended at least one training event 90 percent of COPRODEP members who have attended at least one training event. 80 percent of SPs are implemented within 4 months Dropped Dropped --- Component 2: 460 training events for CBOs, CADECs. 75% of CBO members have attended at least one training event. 90% of CADEC members have attended at least two training events. 80% of SPs are implemented within 6 months. 10 CADECs allocating funds from other development programs. Component Three: MIS tracks and monitors SP implementation, and overall physical and financial performance of PRODEP. Component Three: SP unit costs (per beneficiary family, type of SP) Geographic distribution of SPs (10 departments) Flow of project funds Component Three: Average SP cost Geographic distribution of SPs within all 10 departments. Amount of project funds disbursed by the Bank Component 3: MIS provides complete quarterly reports within 30 days after the end of the quarter. Amount of Project funds disbursed within the Project timeframe. - 37 - Annex 2, Appendix 2 Methodology to estimate the number of beneficiaries Type Beneficiaries Observations Productive SP Agricultural processing The CBO members plus an estimation of the number of clients who are not CBO members Agricultural input stores, community stores and storage facilities The CBO members plus an estimation of the number of clients who are not CBO members Agricultural and livestock SP The families that directly benefit from the SP Multiply by 5 to convert the number of families into number of beneficiaries Social Schools/ Professional training The number of students Community centers The CBO members plus an estimation of the number of regular visitors The persons participating only in festivities such as wedding parties are not to be included Documentation centers, cybercafés The CBO members plus an estimation of the number of clients who are not CBO members Health centers The CBO members plus an estimation of the number of clients who are not CBO members Infrastructure Eau Potable/ Electrification The families that directly benefit from the SP’s water and energy supply Multiply by 5 to convert the number of families into number of beneficiaries Roads, street paving and sewage drains, improvement of public places, green space Population of the municipal section Irrigation, conservation de sols, The families that directly benefit from the SP Slaughter houses The CBO members plus an estimation of the number of clients who are not CBO members 38 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis) 3.1 The original PAD included a financial analysis of four SPs financed under the PCF grant as an illustration of the possible financial gains that productive SPs could generate. Since those four SPs were into the first year of implementation, the results were only indicative. 3.2 A financial analysis of 16 productive SPs was carried out in 2009. This analysis was a wake-up call that productive SPs had a sustainability problem as many of them showed signs of financial strain or were on the verge of failure. 3.3 As part of the ICR the Bank invited FAO/CP to carry out a financial and economic analysis of 10 SPs to indicate whether those SPs were economically and/or financially viable propositions. The SPs were chosen on the basis of the following criteria: a. The SPs were to belong to the category of SPs most financed; b. The SPs were to be financed in 2011-2012 (although there are 2 exceptions in the sample); c. Half of the SPs were to be accompanied by CECI and half by PADF; and, d. The SPs were to be close to a traveling route allowing the FAO/CP staff member to cover the SPs in a short time. 3.4 Hence, the SPs were not chosen at random and are not a representative sample. Their treatment is somewhat superficial and the conclusions are an attempt to estimate whether the SPs presented “value for money”. The diversity of SPs and the social and public nature of many make it difficult to carry out an economic analysis without introducing assumptions that forfeit the quality and purpose of the analysis. 3.5 The following table provides a summary of the conclusions of the analysis. The IRR of each SP is a rough estimate of the potential economic return and should not be used as a reference for other documents. Nevertheless, the analysis shows the following: a. Education and health SPs need to fit within the strategies of the respective Ministries and this should occur before the investment is undertaken. b. Management and leadership are necessary ingredients for viability and sustainability; even community centers can become financially viable if the CBO applies proper management. c. Apart from the solar street lighting SP which lacks proper management and resources for maintenance, all SPs represent value for money and will be viable and sustainable under certain conditions the project can no longer control. Of course, most of these SPs came on board in 2011 and 2012 and benefit from past experience. 39 Municipality Corail Grand Vincent-Roseau Pestel Fonds-Verettes Fond Cheval Description Improvement of 700 meters of the 15 km road Corail- Carrefour Lacombe- Souma Purchase of 18 heads of cattle to diversify sources of income 26 solar-powered street lights Agricultural input store Grain mill Cost (USD) 16,700 19, 200 53,500 18,100 16,400 Year 2011 2012 2011 2012 2008 Number of beneficiaries (users) 1738 families live in the area 15 families at present with possibility of 15 more each year 5,600 people live in the center of the village and 12,500 in the surroundings 150 farmers live in the area (up to 9 km from the store) 800 families live within 5 km from the mill Management No management Every CBO that received an animal takes care of it No management CBO committee CBO committee Economic benefits 20% reduction in transport fares 50% reduction in transport time (from 1.5 to 0.75 hours) Reduced vehicle maintenance costs Reduced isolation of the agricultural production area Increased access to health services for 1738 families Increased milk consumption and sales – availability of dairy proteins Sale of animals Income diversification from coffee crop Additional evening commercial activity by 20 street hawkers and 10 businesses Students may gather and study below the street lights More evening entertainment More evening ferry trips Jeremie-Pestel Sales of fertilizers, tools and seeds Increase in production by150 farmers, clients of the store Daily grain processing during the harvest season and lower activities in the off-season Prices 20% lower than in adjacent towns Risks Substantial: Weak maintenance arrangements Moderate: Animal diseases and conflicts in CBO Frequent break downs and municipality has little funding for repairs Lack of liquidity during peak periods Humidity in storage room Profits are used for lending credit to CBO members Viability Sustainable if maintenance would be performed Viable and sustainable if technical assistance by Ministry of Agriculture or NGO is further available Economically sustainable only if municipality receives additional funding for repairs Sustainable and financially viable with good management Sustainable and financially viable as initial equipment purchase was a grant Economic IRR * 62% 15% Negative Financial IRR 13% (not including agricultural production increase) 7% * Based on FAO/CP calculations 40 Municipality Madame Cyr Coupe Mardi Gras Gros Morne Desdunes Dessalines Description Community (entertainment) center Construction of a health center (replacement) Rehabilitation of the national school Water supply extension Electrification of Boudette Petit Place Cost (USD) 63,500 63,500 58,800 18,300 19,475 Year 2008 2012 2012 2011 2012 Number of beneficiaries (users) 900 families live in the area 3300 people live in the area 860 students 750 families benefit from this extension 90 families and 60 more have applied for power connections Management Community Association AJDEM (young adults) Departmental Health Ministry (in future) Ministry of Education Young farmers associations (AJPCD) with the support of DINEPA COGEL (Electricity cooperative) Economic/social benefits Organization of community events and parties Rental for weddings, communions and other private events Meeting and training space Cultural role for celebrations and funerals More sustainability as other clinic was financed by NGO Increase in the possibility to treat more patients Access to a health center remains within 2 hours walking distance Potential higher quality care and lower child mortality Availability of a room where patients can stay under observation by nurses. Better learning conditions for 860 students Cheaper education costs for the poorest people Better access to education, less drop-outs and hopefully less criminal activity by adolescents. 750 families have access to running water close to their homes which reduces the time to collect water at the water kiosks Potential for improvement in health (cholera epidemic caused 200 deaths in area) Improvement in the management capacity of the CBO Lower costs for charging batteries of cell phones, laptop computers Additional evening commerce by hawkers and businesses Less electricity generation costs for five families Cost reduction for water pumping to the purification station Increased security from 12 street lights Higher food hygiene because of refrigeration More school study time Internet access Risks Possible disagreements within AJDEM Health Ministry has not yet accepted officially to pay for the operations NGO (World Vision) funds running out in October 2013 Financing of operational costs by Ministry of Education may see some delays Breakdowns (because of below grade PVC pipes) Lack of water in dry periods Illicit connections Weak cost recovery by COGEL that may jeopardize relations with EDH Viability Sustainable and financially viable as initial investment was a grant Only sustainable if Ministry of Health takes charge of the health center Only sustainable if Ministry of Education is fully in charge of the school Sustainable if DINEPA remains present Sustainable if risks can be timely mitigated Economic IRR * Financial IRR: 4% Not applicable Not applicable 52% 12% 41 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty Lending Garry Charlier Snr Rural Development Specialist LCSER Task Team Leader Edward William Bresnyan Rural Development Specialist LCSER Rural Development Ahmadou Moustapha Ndiaye Snr. FMS Specialist LCOAA Financial Mgt. Ann Jeannette Glauber Environmental Specialist LCSEN Safeguards Gillette Hall Social Protection Specialist LCSHS Social Protection Jean-Claude Balcet Agricultural Economist LCSER Agriculture Jhong Zhong Agricultural Economist LCSER Agriculture Joelle Dehasse Country Officer LCC3C Patricia E. Macgowan Procurement Specialist LCOPR Procurement Marie-Louise Ah-Kee Procurement Analyst AFTS3 Procurement Ramon Anria Program Assistant LCSES Solange A. Alliali Senior Counsel LEGLA Legal Ulrich Cedric Myboto Consultant Alberto Costa Social Specialist Consultant Supervision/ICR Pierre Olivier Colleye Senior Micro-finance Specialist LCSAR Task Team Leader Paul Altidor Consultant CLAAS Edward William Bresnyan Senior Rural Development Spec. SASDA Maria E. Castro-Munoz Consultant LCSHH Garry Charlier Senior Rural Development Spec. MNSWA Nina Chee Senior Environmental Spec. MNAOS Pierre Werbrouck Consultant LCSAR Ayat Soliman Sr. Rural Development Specialist LCSAR Task Team Leader Eli Weiss Rural Development Economist LCSAR Lorena M. Cohan Consultant LCSSO Peter Cohen Consultant AFTOS Mathurin Gbetibouo Consultant LCCHT Alessandra Heinemann Junior Professional Associate LCSSO Valerie Hickey Biodiversity Spec. AES Patricia E. Macgowan Consultant LCSPT Joseph Kizito Mubiru Sr Financial Management Spec. LCSFM Rachel Hannah Nadelman Consultant LCSAR Ahmadou Moustapha Ndiaye Country Manager AFMUG Navid Rahimi E T Consultant SASDC Fily Sissoko Manager, Financial Management SARFM Fily Bouare Sissoko Senior Operations Officer AFCW3 Zhong Tong Consultant EASER 42 Nko Etesin Umoren Resource Management Analyst AFTRM Ricardo A. Vargas Gomez Communications Assistant LCREA Christina Ariani Wartenberg Junior Professional Associate LCSAR Yao Wottor Senior Procurement Specialist LCSPT Diego Arias Snr. Agricultural Economist LCSAR Task Team Leader Anna Roumani Consultant LCSAR (b) Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs) Lending FY05 53.86 292.50 FY06 0.15 5.05 Total: 54.01 297.55 Supervision/ICR FY06 25.01 115.84 FY07 27.16 121.81 FY08 36.04 151.01 FY09 27.36 136.64 FY10 35.38 147.90 FY11 19.29 124.00 FY12 14.03 84.62 FY13 32.14 144.53 Total: 216.41 1,026.35 43 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results and Summary of Findings: Technical Audits, Impact Evaluation Study and Gender Assessment and Mid-Term Review 5.1 This Annex has an initial focus on PRODEP beneficiary assessments per se, then summarizes key finding and recommendations of the Impact Evaluation Study (AGILIS-IKESOL, 2012), Technical Audits (ECOSOF, 2007-09 and Berut, 2012), the Gender Assessment (Nadelman, 2010) and the Mid-term Review (2009). Beneficiary Assessments: 5.2 Beneficiary assessments took place at each stage of the project, and informed project design, early implementation, mid-term review, and completion. These beneficiary assessments employed a variety of methodologies including interviews with beneficiaries and stakeholders of the pilot project, a social survey of a random sample of households in the intervention zones, participatory evaluation workshops with beneficiary community stakeholders, and a social survey of members of CBOs (who both benefited and did not benefit from the project). While the preparation of the project did not include a formal social analysis or stakeholder consultation, it did benefit from the evaluation of the pilot project financed by the Peace and Conflict Fund. This evaluation was prepared in 2004, and included many of the characteristics of a preparatory stage social analysis and stakeholder consultation, including a social survey of 350 beneficiary households, and consultative focus groups with CBO members in each of the pilot communes. In comparison to a formal social assessment, this evaluation had the added advantage of identifying lessons learned from practical experience of applying the project methodology on a pilot basis. This was especially relevant to the participatory approach adopted by the project, which was found to be especially applicable and relevant to the Haitian context. 5.3 While the project was approved in 2005, it was not possible to recruit a firm to conduct a baseline study until 2007. This study involved a social survey of 2400 randomly selected households among the 32 communes chosen for the first phase of project intervention, the 28 communes selected for the future intervention, as well as 20 communes that would not benefit, who were chosen as a control group. The delay in initiating the baseline study provided an opportunity to assess the early effectiveness of PRODEP, with important differences being observed in key social capital indicators between phase one communes that received support, control communes that received no support and those identified for future support in the second phase. 5.4 For example, the percentage households participating in agricultural organizations was much higher in phase one communes (27%), than in control (12%) or second phase communes (14%); while the percent participating in other organizations and solidarity networks was somewhat higher in phase one communes (15%) than control communes (12%) or second phase communes. In addition, the percent of households aware of the municipality’s role in the commune was much higher in phase one communes (68%) than in control (52%) or second phase communes (62%). Furthermore, the percent of households that regularly participate in community affairs was much higher in phase one communes (26%) compared to control (19%) and second phase for intervention (16%). Other indicators of social capital measured as part of this survey include household awareness of community social and economic activities, their 44 engagement in these activities, their awareness of key community assets, their access to these assets, along with awareness of community problems and community leadership. In terms of household awareness of community activities, at least 10% more households in phase one communes were aware, than in control or second phase communes. The same differences were true for household engagement in these activities, and the use and access of community resources. There was little difference between phase one, control and second phase in terms of their awareness of community problems and knowledge of community leadership. Even though there was no baseline for comparison, the fact that stronger outcomes of social capital indicators were evident at such an early stage in communities that benefited from the project, compared to those that did not, is indicative of the important role of the project in strengthening this critical community asset. 5.5 Subsequently, the same firm responsible for the first beneficiary assessment was recruited to conduct a follow-up mid-term assessment in 2009. This exercise involved a social survey of 1,500 hundred households randomly selected from the zones of intervention for PRODEP. Theobjective of the study was to measure public awareness of PRODEP and the SPs. The study concluded that the project had been effectively established in the zone of intervention with high levels of public awareness. There was also evidence that indicators of community organizational development, knowledge of community affairs, participation in community decision-making, and access to information was higher in communities where PRODEP was in operation longer. 5.6 Another assessment completed in 2009, was the participatory evaluation of the project. This evaluation involved stakeholder consultations (with BMPAD and MDODs), and stakeholder workshops conducted in six different communes that had benefitted from the project. The key issues addressed in these meetings included the project intervention model and its results, its role in building organizational capacity and community confidence, the perception of women involved in the project, the impact of the project on transparency and governance within beneficiary organizations. 5.7 A final beneficiary assessment was conducted in 2012, which covered the 2005 – 2010 period of project implementation. The objective of this assessment was to identify the results of the project along with potential lessons learned for future projects. The methodology used included a review of project and SP files, interviews with project stakeholders (BMPAD, MDOD), as well as semi-structured interviews with 480 CADEC and CBO members (including a sub- group of those belonging to CBOs that did not implement projects). The primary focus of the CBO member interviews was to assess the success of the project in strengthening social capital within the CBOs and the CADECs using an index constructed by the Bank task team and the client as part of the second additional finance. This measure was originally conceived as a change-index requiring a baseline and ex-post measurement, which proved impossible to implement due to time constraints. Instead, the following table summarizes the results of the final beneficiary survey’s attempt to measure the components of this index in the final years of the project. The table below shows that three of the five indicators measured surpassed targets specified in the AF. 45 Original Target (AF 2 Social Capital Index) End-2012 Result 70% of a sample of CBO members participating in CADECs have a positive perception of the way decisions are made at the level of the CBO 66% of CBO members surveyed who participated in CADECs positively perceived CADEC decision making (*) 70% of a sample of CBO members participating in CADECs have a positive perception of the way decisions are made at the level of the CADEC 82% of CBO members surveyed had a positive perception of decision making within the CADECs 70% of the CBO management committees declare to better understand their role in the committees. 83% of CBO management committees stated that they better understood their role in committees. 70% of a sample of CBO members participating in CADECs declare that the CADECs fulfill their role well 46% of this group considers that CADEC contributed positively to CBO capacity building 70 % of a sample of CBO members participating in CADECs declare that in case of a big misfortune they will receive help from the community 86% of CBO members surveyed believe that in the case of major problems being presented by the CADEC, that they would receive help from the community *The results are not exactly comparable to the index indicator. 5.8 Other important indicators of the project’s impact on building social capital included the finding that 90 percent of the respondents perceived a reduction of conflicts in the community, and more than 65 percent perceived a better dialogue with the community leaders. Positive perceptions of improvements in social capital and community decision making were strongly related to the performance of SPs. For example, where the SP was considered good, 84 percent of the respondents had a favorable opinion about the decision making process, but where they did not reach the expectations, only 39 percent of the CBO members had a favorable opinion. 5.9 One additional specialized assessment conducted in 2010 focused on the success of the project in incorporating gender equity. This study was designed to assess lessons learned during PRODEP’s implementation related to (a) strategies to facilitate women’s inclusion (b) women’s participation and leadership in SP decision-making, design and execution and (c) structural obstacles to women’s participation. This assessment included beneficiary consultations with 90 community-based organizations participating in the project. 5.10 Some of the recommendations coming out of this assessment included the need to: (i) adapt a gender equity strategy (ii) develop new indicators to track the qualitative aspects of women’s participation (iii) incorporate gender sensitization training workshops into the capacity building program (iv) provide additional training and coaching support to women leaders, and (v) support networking among women groups. 46 Summary of Findings: Technical Audits, Impact Evaluation Study and Gender Assessment Technical audits: 5.11 The Project financed six technical audits, a financial analysis of 16 productive SPs at mid-term, an impact evaluation study, a gender assessment, and a beneficiary assessment conducted for the Mid-term Review. 5.12 The technical audits are divided into two parts: (i) audits conducted before the Mid-term Review which were constantly late but contain important information on the quality of the process; and (ii) technical audits of 2012 that are more focused on technical quality of the SPs and training. 5.13 Conclusions of the technical audits 2007-2009: The technical audits concluded that PCU and MDOD followed the established procedures and that the project was reaching its objectives of social capital building, participation in decision-making and transparency. The audits suggested improvement was needed in the technical quality of the SP preparation studies and to increase the involvement of community members in those studies. At the management level, the auditors recommended improving BMDAP’s data collection and monitoring system. The audits provided only scant information on SP technical quality. 5.14 Conclusions of the technical audits 2012. The first technical audit of 2012 analyzed 40 SPs of the period 2008-2010 and a second technical audit covered 20 SPs and 20 training programs over the period 2011-2012. The audits showed:  Confirmation of PRODEP’s social acceptance, transparency and other social capital achievements;  Ample female participation at the SP level but little at the decision-making level;  Much stronger coordination with local authorities;  Confirmation of sustainability issues in productive and additionally some social SPs;  Need to address SP maintenance and some environmental issues; and,  Confirmation of important weaknesses in training and capacity building programs. 5.15 The ICR team classified the SPs as a function of their performance evaluated by the last two technical audits. The table below shows that about 15% of the SPs have failed and that 30% need additional support to enhance their performance. After the first of these audits, BMPAD, the Bank and the MDOD drew up rehabilitation plans for those 30 percent to bring their performance up to standard. There was however, not enough funding for all those SPs and only 150 SPs received additional funding for performance upgrading. Table 1: SP performance evaluation as per last two technical audits (2012) Type of SP Number audited Good/ Acceptable Performance Weak performance Operation halted/ maintenance discontinued Livestock, ruminants 6 2 3 1 Soil conservation 4 1 1 2 47 Agro-processing (mills) 4 4 Community store 1 1 Grain storage 1 1 Draft animals 1 1 Credit union 1 1 Road/street rehabilitation 12 10 2 Electricity 5 3 1 1 Water supply 8 2 4 2 Schools/ training centers 9 6 3 Community radio 2 2 Cyber cafes 3 1 1 1 Health center 1 1 Municipal infrastructure 2 1 1 Total 60 33 18 9 100% 55% 30% 15% 5.18 The technical and financial evaluation of sixteen productive SPs at mid-term such as input stores, grain mills, livestock SPs, irrigation and internet points of presence showed the challenges in keeping productive SPs operating in a sustainable manner. To various degrees, most productive SPs experienced technical difficulties, struggled with market-related issues (prices, marketing), had a very high cost structure and would not be financially sustainable without radical management changes, technical assistance and close follow-up. To preserve its social capital gains and to achieve sustainable income opportunities, PRODEP needed to increase its support to the operations of the productive SPs. 5.19 The Mid-term Review report by an external consultant concluded that the sustainability issues at the institutional and the SP level need to be addressed up front and some in the very short term. This meant, in practice, that:  BMPAD needed to carry out an independent evaluation of the technical and maintenance aspects of the infrastructure and social investments and implement its recommendations;  BMPAD and MDOD should develop new strategies to improve the sustainability of existing and new productive projects (such as introducing specific conditions for their financing and/or higher community participation levels);  BMDAP needed to set up a technical assistance, training and follow-up program for productive and other maintenance-sensitive SPs with the help of qualified technicians and business-oriented staff or consultants; and,  There was room for a larger involvement of women in the Project. This could be done through promoting specific female-oriented SPs such as incentives for collective and individual “savings” programs; and,  GOH through BMPAD and with the assistance of the World Bank should obtain funds for a follow-up project that would incorporate the sustainability of the model (in particular COPRODEPs/CADECs?) and its SP investments as one of its main project objectives. 48 5.20 General conclusions of the impact evaluation study in 2012. The report reflects the opinions of a team of consultants who had visited 60 SPs and carried out a survey of 480 members of CBOs and CADECs. 5.21 The conclusions of the visits to 60 SPs of the period 2007-2009 are the following:  The 60 SPs were evaluated based on several criteria such as their present use, ability to be used, benefits to the community, sustainability, socio-economic impact, member participation, and environmental care. The consultants evaluated 37 SPs (62 %) to be "very good, good or fair" and 23 (38%) were not well implemented (insufficient) or did not have any positive impact (bad) 24 . Table 2: SP Evaluation by Impact Evaluation Study Infrastructure Productive Social Total % Very good 1 1 2% Good 10 7 2 19 32% Fair 9 3 5 17 28% Insufficient 5 4 3 12 20% Bad 4 6 1 11 18% Total 29 20 11 60 100%  The report mentions the following positive results: much improved road accessibility of communities, improved access to potable water and electricity and very positive evaluation of the soil conservation SPs. As far as the productive SPs are concerned: cattle breeding SPs have been fruitful and grain mills have had a positive impact on women’s lives. Community radios and (to a more modest extent) the community centers have a social impact. The report mentions negative points: lack of community maintenance capacity in the electrical power sector; the operation of grain mills depends on the CBO’s management capacity which in half of the cases is insufficient; loss of direction in many productive SPs such as ruminant raising; community stores (input and other) and fruit processing have failed; and educational and cultural SPs have only been partially effective and are under-utilized. Social Impact Survey: 5.22 The social impact survey of 480 members of CBO and COPRODEP showed the following results:  Among CBO and COPRODEP members , 83% believed that COPRODEPs had contributed positively to the CBO organization and understanding of their role. Some 46% of this group considered that they contributed positively to the formation of capacity within the CBO. 24 The consultants expressed some reservations about these figures and the evaluation reflects the opinion of the consultants who visited the SP. The report does not contain any reliable data on how the evaluation criteria are applied and the conclusions cannot withstand close scrutiny. The first 2012 technical audit by a team of two auditors visiting the SPs comes up with about the same relationship: 60% of the SPs were working while 20 % were no longer operating, and 20% needed additional assistance. 49  In 86% of cases, this same group of respondents considered that if there were a problem in the community, COPRODEP would provide and receive support.  With regard to CBO management, a majority of the members thought that decision- making was participatory. Some 82% of COPRODEP members had a favorable opinion of the decision-making process at the COPRODEP level while only 65% of the CBO members thought likewise.  Local authorities were implicated in the decision-making process at the COPRODEP level. According to 72% of the CBO members, the local authorities were in favor of the CBO activities and in 67% of the cases they actively participated in SP implementation.  About 75% of the people surveyed found that the community had positively evolved in the fields of local authority dialogue, neighborhood relationships and the involvement of the middle-class in CBO. The sample showed increased involvement of women and their leadership in SP management. In the COPRODEPs surveyed: 18% of the members of the SP executive committees were/are women. 5.23 Sustainability of the SPs. The report stated that the sustainability of the SPs and PRODEP depended on two factors:  The capacity of the CBOs and CADECs to attract capable people acting in the interest of the common good.  The willingness of the local authorities and in particular of the Mayor to support the SPs; this willingness is particularly present when the infrastructure SPs fit within a local development plan. The development of such plans would be very favorable to PRODEP’s impact. 5.24 Poverty focus. The report concluded that the CBO member beneficiaries? of the PRODEP SPs were generally poorer than the members of the control group. 5.25 Environment. The impact study mentioned that the long-term effects of some SPs were not favorable to the environment. They included the storage of agro-chemicals in input stores, air pollution through power generation, water supply systems without water source protection and solid waste management at community leisure centers and cyber cafes. 5.26. The main recommendations of the impact evaluation were:  The participatory approach must remain the pillar of any new phase of PRODEP. Participation had shown its potential and had not led to a duplication of the competencies of local authorities. At the same time, there should be greater involvement of elected official (s) and local authorities;  The intervention strategy must be based on development opportunities and promising value chains and less on the artificial classification of infrastructure, productive and social SPs. During preparation, more emphasis should be put on the post implementation phase including the challenge how to make the SPs profitable in the social and financial sense and the introduction of a follow-up mechanism;  The preparation of the SPs should be more realistic, avoiding over-sized SPs that remain unfinished and works that are not used.  There is an urgent need to introduce a follow-up of the SPs and their maintenance;  Several types of SPs should be avoided: (i) the cybercafés have not shown their usefulness; (ii) electric power generation SPs are not recommended for reasons of maintenance problems and cost recovery – instead, SPs introducing renewable energy and energy savings should be promoted; (iii) animal production SPs should be tested first to avoid high animal mortality; (iv) community stores pose serious management problems as well as grain mills in remote areas with difficult access to spare parts and repair technicians; 50  Preparation and selection of SPs should include a feasibility test including a demonstrated capacity of the CBO in business management;  For infrastructure SPs, there should be an agreement between the promoters and those in charge of SP maintenance;  The MDOD have to commit to a more effective SP follow-up in particular for the more remote CBOs. Moreover, they have to provide more information to help CBOs make the right choices in SP selection;  PRODEP should encourage the CADEC-COPRODEPs to carry out evaluations of their own SPs so that they learn from past experience about what works and what doesn’t ;  The CBOs and CADECs-COPRODEPs need training in (i) simple bookkeeping with financial statements; (ii) business management; and (iii) the correct implementation of the functions of the CBO and management committees;  An ombudsperson should be introduced to mediate in conflicts; and  The overall project budget should be adjusted to reflect the need for additional follow-up after SP implementation. Gender Assessment (2010): 5.27 This assessment found the following:  PRODEP’s inclusion of gender-based performance indicators and a gender - disaggregated M&E system supported an operational structure through which women’s participation could be/was tracked and progress could be/was monitored.  The Project did not provide an explicit guiding gender strategy or operational procedures/guidelines. MDOD follow their own principles for engaging women, which resulted in divergent programs and results.  Women’s participation in COPRODEP assemblies and executive committees varied significantly across communities. There was a correlation between communities for whom PRODEP was implemented with gender inclusion approaches and higher participation results.  There was found to be a correlation between the ratio of women to men in PRODEP decision-making structures and women participants’ satisfaction with and confidence in these mechanisms.  Support for the strengthening of existing women’s organizations and the creation of new women-only CBOs had directly contributed to women’s representation in PRODEP’s decision-making bodies.  Representing women and women’s SP priorities through women-only CBOs can ensure greater project responsiveness to women’s needs, but may marginalize women in mixed- group processes.  There is a correlation between communities for which PRODEP was carried out with specific gender inclusion requirements and higher proportions of women-only CBOs selected to manage community development SPs.  When disaggregated by women-only and mixed CBOs there are noteworthy differences in the proportions of productive, infrastructure and social SPs. This divergence between the categories of SPs implemented by women-only and mixed CBOs may reveal that women’s community development priorities are not well represented through mixed CBO-managed SPs.  PRODEP is providing benefits that have supported women to overcome fundamental structural obstacles that hinder their political, economic and social participation.  PRODEP has contributed to women’s empowerment and changing their social status at the household and societal levels. 51 5.28 The recommendations of the gender assessment are:  Adapt a gender equity strategy to promote women’s inclusion as the Project level;  Develop new indicators to track the quality in addition to quantity of women’s participation;  Agree upon a strategy upstream:  Consider adopting inclusion of gender sensitization training workshops as a core part of capacity building programming.  Include additional support and training for potential women leaders to build their confidence and increase their leadership capacity.  Design support for women with awareness of the different vehicles through which they participate – women-only and mixed CBOs.  Support women’s groups to federate and create local networks.  Female facilitators are role models, especially for women, and can give women the confidence to follow in their footsteps and take on challenging positions.  Local innovation in the inclusion of women should be encouraged and rewarded. Mid-Term Review Evaluation of the Project Achievements 5.29 The project financed several evaluation studies including three technical audits, a mid- term beneficiary assessment and an analysis of sixteen income generating subprojects. The audits and beneficiary assessment provide in general positive feedback on the project and contain series of recommendations to improve project performance. The analysis of the income generating (productive) subprojects shows the tremendous challenges of programs financing income generating community-sponsored subprojects. 5.30 The technical audits concluded that PRODEP management and MDOD followed the established procedures and that the project reached its objectives of social capital building, participation in decision-making and transparency. The audits suggested improvements were needed in the technical quality of the subproject preparation studies and to increase the involvement of community members in the subproject preparation studies. At the management level, the auditors recommended improving BMDAP’s data collection and monitoring system. The audits provided only scant information on the subproject technical quality. 5.31 The beneficiary assessments also showed very positive feedback to the project25. The participants in the six assessment workshops were unanimous that PRODEP’s objectives and methodology remained pertinent. They stated that: (i) the decisions of resource allocation in COPRODEP were being taken democratically with great transparency; (ii) the CBOs had increased their membership and their management capacity; and (iii) the project had also generated more cohesion within the population as well as a large degree of self-confidence within communities. Hence, the project had generated a considerable amount of social capital. 25 It is unfortunate that the participants in the beneficiary assessment workshops were not selected at random as was requested under the consultant’s terms of reference. 52 5.32 The participants considered the amount of PRODEP’s contribution (US$17,500 per subproject) to be insufficient. The training and capacity building given to the OCB was considered useful, but participants found this type of training was too short. 5.33 The technical and financial evaluation of sixteen productive subprojects such as input stores, grain mills, livestock subprojects, irrigation and internet points of presence showed the challenges in keeping productive subprojects operating in a sustainable manner. To various degrees, most productive subprojects experienced technical difficulties, struggled with market- related issues (prices, marketing), had a very high cost structure and were not likely to be financially sustainable without radical management changes, technical assistance and close follow-up. To preserve its social capital gains and to achieve income durable income opportunities, PRODEP needed to increase its support to the operations of the productive subprojects. (Footnote 26) 5.34 Efficiency. Project efficiency was measured in terms of the cost of transferring funds to communities. To transfer one US dollar to the communities, PRODEP spent 55 cents in subproject preparation, technical assistance and field monitoring, as well as 51 cents in management support (MDOD and BMDAP). Hence, the management costs remained within 25 percent of total project costs. This percentage was/is quite high but still within international norms. 5.35 Impact on Rural Institutions. PRODEP’s main institutional innovation was the creation of a COPRODEP in each municipality. This council was in charge of allocating project funds to communities in a participative and transparent manner. A long-term goal was to mainstream COPRODEP as a mechanism for transferring public funds to local communities. A re-activation of some CBOs and a general increase in their membership was another positive institutional impact of the project. 5.36 Sustainability. Project sustainability has been evaluated at the institutional and the subproject levels. The main conclusion is that there are considerable risks that many project achievements will not be sustainable over time if the PRODEP experience would end with this particular project. CDD projects need follow-on operations sustaining a culture of participative fund allocation and increasing the sustainability of their community investments through specific management and maintenance schemes as well as technical assistance. 5.37 Although operational sustainability of the subprojects was not an explicit, primary project objective, the project was intended to be evaluated on whether it has made a sustainable impact and has increased income generating opportunities for the poor in a sustainable manner. (Footnote 27 . ) 5.38 Recommendations for the Second Half of the Project  The sustainability issues at the institutional and the subproject level mentioned in the report needed to be addressed up front and some in the very short term. 26 As the evaluation studies did not cover the maintenance of the infrastructure and social investments, and the technical audits are silent on this matter, it would be worthwhile to carry out a similar evaluation of the sustainability of the infrastructure and social subprojects. 27 A parallel can be made with a previous Haiti Employment Generation Project in the 1990’s which had as its only objective to create temporary employment after a crisis situation. During the final ex-post project evaluation workshop in Port-au-Prince, the main topic was not the number of jobs created but the probable lack of sustainability of some works constructed by temporary workers. 53  This meant, in practice, that:  BMPAD needed to carry out an independent evaluation of the technical and maintenance aspects of the infrastructure and social investments and implements its recommendations;  BMPAD and MDOD needed to develop new strategies to improve the sustainability of existing and new productive projects (such as introducing specific conditions for their financing and/or higher community participation levels (paragraphs 106-108);  BMDAP (with funds from the existing IDA grant or other source) needed to set up a technical assistance, training and follow-up program for productive and other maintenance-sensitive subprojects with the help of qualified technicians and business oriented staff or consultants;  GOH through BMPAD and with the assistance of World Bank needed to obtain funds for a follow-up project that would incorporate the sustainability of the model (in particular COPRODEP) and its subproject investments as one of the main project objectives.  There was room for a larger involvement of women in the project. It was suggested that this could be done through promoting specific female-oriented subprojects such as incentives for collective and individual “savings” programs.  Last but not least, considering the delays the project had incurred and the subproject quality issues that had arisen, it was considered useful for the Government to request a project extension. 54 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results 6.1 A participatory evaluation of the project in 2009 involved stakeholder consultations (with BMPAD and MDODs), and stakeholder workshops conducted in six different communes that had benefitted from the project. The key issues addressed in these meetings included the project intervention model and its results, its role in building organizational capacity and community confidence, the perception of women involved in the project, and the project’s impact on transparency and governance within beneficiary organizations. 6.2 Beneficiary assessment workshops conducted during the Mid-term Review showed very positive feedback to the Project 28 . The participants in the six assessment workshops were unanimous that PRODEP’s objectives and methodology remained pertinent. They stated that: (i) the decisions regarding resource allocation in COPRODEPs were being taken democratically with great transparency; (ii) the CBOs had increased their membership and their management capacity; and (iii) the Project had also generated more cohesion within the population as well as a large degree of self-confidence within communities. Hence, the Project had generated a considerable amount of social capital. 6.3 The participants also considered that the amount of PRODEP’s contribution (USD 17,500 per SP) was insufficient. Further, the training and capacity building given to the CBOs was believed useful, but participants were finding that this type of training was too short. 28 Contra to the Bank’s request under the consultant’s terms of reference, the participants in the beneficiary assessment workshops were not randomly- selected. 55 Annex 7. Summary of Recipient's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR A: Summary of Recipient’s Completion Report: 7.1 Financé à hauteur de dons de l'IDA de soixante deux millions de dollars environ, le projet PRODEP visait d’augmenter les transferts directs des ressources publiques aux Organisations Communautaires de Base (OCB) dans les communautés pauvres rurales et périurbaines du pays dans le but (i) d’améliorer l’accès de ces populations aux infrastructures économiques et sociales de base et de promouvoir les activités génératrices de revenus en finançant des investissements à petite échelle proposés, mis en œuvre et gérés par les OCB ; (ii) de renforcer la cohésion sociale et le capital social des communautés locales bénéficiaires afin qu’elles s’organisent pour mieux répondre à leurs besoins propres ; (iii) d’améliorer la gouvernance locale par le biais d’une plus grande participation citoyenne à un processus décisionnel transparent, démocratique et inclusif. Démarré officiellement en novembre 2005, le PRODEP est arrivé à terme au 30 juin 2013. Ce rapport présente, le bilan des activités réalisées, les résultats atteints, les principales contraintes rencontrées et des solutions apportées, l'approche méthodologique les différentes parties prenantes du PRODEP, enfin les leçons apprises et des recommandations pour un nouveau PRODEP. 7.2 Au total, le PRODEP a financé 1687 sous-projets répartis en 765 projets d'infrastructure, 370 sous-projets à caractère social et 532 de type productif. Ces sous-projets sont distribués dans 238 sections communales et 59 villes/bourg du projet. Les sous-projets sont des investissements de l'ordre de USD17,500 en moyenne identifiés, mis en œuvre et gérés par les OCB. 7.3 A part les bénéficiaires directs (membres d’OCB), les sous-projets ont contribué à l’amélioration des conditions de vie de près d'un million et demi (1.5 millions) de personnes dont environ 48% de femmes touchées dans les communautés les plus pauvres par un meilleur accès à l’eau potable, la proximité actuelle des intrants agricoles et des services de transformation de produits agricoles, l’amélioration des conditions d’apprentissage dans des salles de classes devenues plus adéquates, à des centres de santé devenus modernes et fonctionnels et à des espaces de loisirs. Le PRODEP introduit une certaine décentralisation des fonds publics au profit des communautés rurales les plus reculées et les plus nécessiteuses. 7.4 Grâce au PRODEP, on peut affirmer qu’il existe maintenant une meilleure cohésion sociale dans les communautés, manifestée par une meilleure capacité de vivre et de faire ensemble à la fois des citoyens et des citoyennes et des organisations locales. 7.5 Le PRODEP a apporté une contribution non négligeable à la gouvernance locale par l’introduction et l’appropriation par les acteurs et actrices de meilleures pratiques de participation, de négociation, de concertation, de dialogue et de reddition des comptes dans les communautés et entre les communautés, de reddition de compte et l’application du principe de subsidiarité. On a dénoté une meilleure relation entre les communautés et les autorités locales. Dans certains cas, les autorités recherchaient activement et obtenaient des financements additionnels pour les sous projets communautaires. 7.6 Les trois objectifs du PRODEP n’auraient pu être approchés ou atteints sans un effort constant et important en matière de renforcement des capacités des individus et un effort de structuration des organisations – OCB et COPRODEP confondus. Le renforcement des capacités locales n’était pas un objectif en soi mais un des résultats recherchés au niveau du PRODEP pour en maximiser l’impact sur les communautés et assurer la durabilité des résultats. 7.7 Le PRODEP a permis le renforcement de la participation effective des femmes dans les instances décisionnelles et de leur pouvoir de négociation dans les foyers, mais il reste des efforts considérables à déployer pour consolider et étendre ce résultat à un plus grand nombre de femmes. 56 7.8 Au-delà de la réalisation de sous-projets, le projet a considérablement contribué à la construction du capital social caractérisée par le réseautage communautaire et la mise en commun des ressources tant financières qu’intellectuelles pour solutionner collectivement des problèmes communs. Le regroupement des OCB en fédération de COPRODEP, puis CADEC (FECADEC par la suite) au niveau départemental et en confédération (regroupant plusieurs départements) en est un exemple frappant. Le PRODEP a contribué à mettre en place le plus grand mouvement de société civile au niveau du pays grâce notamment à l'accompagnement fourni dans la transformation des COPRODEP en CADEC. Les CADEC se sont regroupés par département en fédération (FECADEC) puis au niveau régionale en Confédération de FECADEC. 7.9 La mise en œuvre du PRODEP s'est articulée sur un processus ouvert, transparent, démocratique, et participatif. La stratégie s’est appuyée sur une vision globale et a prévu une démarche participative, inclusive et transparente d’une part; la responsabilisation des acteurs et la collaboration inter-acteurs, d’autre part. Le renforcement de capacités a été le corollaire de la participation des partenaires (OCB,COPRODEP). Après une campagne intensive de formation et d'information, les OCB étaient appelés à identifier leurs besoins au niveau de la section communale et à faire un travail de pré-priorisation. Au niveau communal les COPRODEP assuraient la priorisation des sous-projets dans un processus démocratique et transparent. Les collectivités locales faisaient aussi parti du processus. Puis la non objection une fois obtenue, les fonds des sous-projets étaient directement transférés aux OCB qui en firent la gestion et préparèrent, selon le cas, un plan de maintenance et d'entretien. Les OCB ont apporté une contribution , en nature, supérieure dans la majorité des cas à $2,000 américains. 7.10 Différents acteurs étaient impliqués dans la mise en œuvre du PRODEP; la Banque Mondiale (IDA) qui a fait le don au gouvernement d'Haïti, a supervisé la gestion des fonds et renforcé les capacités de l'unité de coordination du projet. L'Etat haïtien a choisi le BMPAD qui s'est doté d'une Unité de coordination du Projet. L'UCP a assuré le bon fonctionnement du système de suivi et évaluation, notamment le fonctionnement des outils installés, la mise à jour cohérente et régulière des données de suivi, le transfert correct des données entre les responsables des projets et des Système d’information de suivi. L'UCP a géré directement les composantes 2 et 3 du projet. Très efficiente lors du tremblement de terre le BMPAD a procédé à la réformation de l'UCP en DPC. Des Maitres d'ouvrages délégués (MDOD) ont été choisis en fonction de leurs capacités et de leurs expériences pour la mise en œuvre de la composante 1 du PRODEP liées aux sous-projets et au renforcement des capacités. Les COPRODEP qui ont regroupé au niveau de la commune des représentants des OCB (pour un minimum de 80 % de la composition totale), ainsi que de l’administration locale et de la société civile (20 % des membres) étaient les principales entités chargées de cibler les OCB et d’allouer les fonds au niveau communal. Ils ont joué un rôle fondamental dans la mobilisation des communautés et dans la promotion de leur participation aux décisions locales. Les OCB ont été la fondation de toutes les opérations du projet et ont été aussi les représentants légitimes des bénéficiaires avant les COPRODEP, l’Etat et tout autre type d’organisation. 7.11 Des contraintes majeures ont significativement touché la marche et la gestion du PRODEP durant ces sept (7) années d’exécution. Elles étaient liées à la conception du projet, à l’environnement sociopolitique assez turbulent au cours des dernières années, aux différentes catastrophes naturelles qui avaient frappé le pays, et à la stratégie d’implantation. Mais des solutions correctes ont été apportées en temps et lieu par les différentes parties prenantes. 7.12 Le PRODEP a eu 17 indicateurs et sur les 17 indicateurs 15 ont été atteints ou dépassés. Pour les deux indicateurs qui n'ont pas été atteints voire même rapprochés selon l'évaluation à mi- parcours, l'un a été que l'indicateur a été largement sous-estimé lors de l'étude de base. Quant à l'autre, c'est dû d'une part à un manque de capacité de gestion financière des leaders d’OCB, capacité qui certes a suivi un processus de renforcement, cependant graduel dans le temps mais 57 aussi à la dispersion des structures de gestion du PRODEP, en l’occurrence les OCB, dans des zones très difficile d'accès rendant la tâche de contrôle énorme et exténuant. 7.13 Recommandations: En tenant compte des leçons apprises, nous formulons un ensemble de recommandations qui doivent être prises en compte dans le nouveau PRODEP. I. Par rapport à l'approche CDD a) L’approche participative a été à la base du succès du projet. Elle doit rester le pilier de toute nouvelle phase du PRODEP. Elle a contribué à la cohésion sociale, la conscientisation des OCB de leurs capacités à prendre en charge leur propre développement. La prise en charge du développement local, le renforcement des capacités des OCB et leurs structures doivent être présents dans toutes les activités du PRODEP. En même temps, il faudrait assurer une plus grande implication des élu(e)s et autorités locales dans le PRODEP. La participation des collectivités locales dès le départ peut faciliter une meilleure prise en charge des sous-projets une fois leur mise en œuvre terminée. b) La société civile doit rester le partenaire principal du PRODEP. Toutefois, le PRODEP doit être plus proactif pour rechercher les consensus nécessaires et pour clarifier le partage des rôles et des responsabilités entre les autorités locales qui ont le rôle d’animer le processus de développement local et les structures émergentes de cette société civile telles les COPRODEP ou les CADEC. II. Par rapport à la priorisation des sous-projets a) être plus flexible à une meilleure orientation des choix de sous-projets sur la base d’opportunités de développement et l’identification de filières porteuses. b) Définir et accorder un quota aux OCB de femmes c) Promouvoir la participation active des élus locaux (Députés, Maires, DV, ASEC, CASEC,) et des délégués des conseils municipaux) aux activités de priorisation des sous- projets. d) Prévoir un montant plus élevé que 17,500 dollars américains pour des sous-projets d'envergure communale. III. Par rapport à la mise en œuvre des sous-projets a) Diminuer le nombre de sous-projets à livrer et augmenter la durée des sous-projets à 5 ou 6 mois. b) Prévoir un montant équivalant à 15% des sous-projets pour la maintenance et l'atténuation des effets sur l'environnement. c) Bien fixer les rôles et les responsabilités respectives des OCB, des COPRODEP-CADEC et des BTC dans la préparation des projets d) Renforcer, augmenter les bilans internes des comités de gestion des sous-projets aux membres réguliers des OCB et aux autres OCB des unités d’intervention. e) Faire fonctionner les forums au-delà de la priorisation des sous-projets et encourager les échanges entre les CADEC et FECADEC f) Augmenter des sous-projets d’envergure communale nécessitant des ressources financières plus importantes g) Aider fortement les OCB à utiliser les COPRODEP/CADEC comme structure effective pour développer de sous-projets avec d’autres bailleurs de fonds. IV. Par rapport au renforcement des capacités 58 a) Les besoins en matière de renforcement des capacités sont importants ; la durabilité des résultats de l’intervention du PRODEP en est tributaire. Nous recommandons que toute phase future du PRODEP considère le volet renforcement des capacités comme un élément-clé du succès du projet et non comme une activité d’accompagnement. En effet le renforcement des capacités permet non seulement de stimuler et de soutenir le développement durable et la prospérité des communautés mais encore et surtout de soutenir l’engagement des citoyens et citoyennes au développement de leur communauté. b) Le renforcement des capacités devra être mieux adapté aux spécificités locales et aux besoins des communautés et soumis à une procédure d'évaluation et de suivi. c) Le BMPAD et les MDOD ont le devoir, en tant qu’agents du développement, d’appuyer la transformation des communautés pour en faire des sociétés plus démocratiques et plus équitables. A ce titre l'Équité Femmes-Hommes doit faire partie intégrante du renforcement des capacités tout en prévoyant toutes les ressources nécessaires à l'accroissement des capacités des femmes dans les domaines économiques pour une meilleure participation à la prise de décision. d) La nécessité de poursuivre le renforcement des capacités de l’ensemble des acteurs au- delà de la durée du projet en vue rendre possible et effective la mise en œuvre et garantir des résultats durables du PRODEP. V. Par rapport à la gestion des sous-projets a) La préparation et sélection des sous-projets par les OCB et validés par les CADEC devraient comprendre un test de faisabilité, que l’OCB intéressée ne peut passer qu’en montrant ses engagements et capacités pour gérer la structure dans la phase opérationnelle, bien sûr avec l’appui du MDOD. b) La continuité des services mis en place par un sous-projet doit être une préoccupation dès la phase d'identification/ priorisation. c) Renforcer les relations de partenariat entre les CADEC et les Mairies non seulement dans le cadre de la construction du capital social, mais aussi dans la perspective d’une gestion administrative plus efficiente du PRODEP ; VI. Par rapport à la durabilité des sous-projets a) Les sous-projets de type productif visaient surtout à créer dans les communautés des services qui n'existaient pas. En tenant compte des spécificités propres à la culture haïtienne, il est recommandé à ce que le PRODEP cofinance des investisseurs locaux potentiels et intéressés à vendre et à rendre disponibles les services au lieu de laisser ces types de projet à des OCB. Les sous-projets productifs auraient dans ce cas une gestion individuelle garante de la durabilité du service à la communauté. Le mode de cofinancement doit être, dans ce cas, bien défini. b) Les sous-projets d'infrastructure doivent être exécutés avec l'aval et la pleine participation des élus locaux qui se chargeront, comme élus, de veiller à leur entretien et à leur maintenance. VII. Appropriation du PRODEP par l'État Haïtien a) Il est de toute importance que l'État s'approprie le projet qui pourra donc inclure des activités de renforcement au bénéfice des élus locaux (Maires, Délégués de ville, CASEC, ASEC, Assemblée municipale) qui en ont un grand besoin. Ceci est de nature à conduire vers un certain équilibre en termes de capacités et faciliterait un meilleur atterrissage du PRODEP dans l'ensemble du pays. b) Il est recommandé d'avoir une agence technique locale (ATL) liée directement aux mairies en lieu et place des BTC. Une telle structure présenterait l'avantage d'être plus proche de la population que les BTC et continuerait d’exister au-delà du projet. 59 c) Il est recommandé une concertation entre la banque et l'Etat afin de favoriser l’appropriation de ce projet de développement communautaire participatif si important en se rappelant qu'un projet partagé vaut mieux qu’un projet décrété aussi performant soit-il. Conclusions 7.14 En conclusion, le PRODEP est devenu à fur et à mesure de sa mise en œuvre un grand projet qui a fait ses preuves, mais il y a encore du travail à faire. Un PRODEP II est plus que souhaitable et souhaité par les différents bénéficiaires et surtout par les différentes structures mises en place, (les OCB, les CADEC, leur fédération et confédération surtout), car leur futur et devenir en dépendent grandement. B: Recipient’s Letter commenting on the Bank’s draft ICR 7.15 See Section 7, Main Text. The Recipient did not provide the requested letter commenting on the Bank’s draft ICR. 60 Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N/A 61 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Project Appraisal Document, Report No: 32634 – HT, July 6, 2005 AF1 Project Paper, Report No: 46669 –HA, December 22, 2008 AF2 Project Paper Report No: 53073-HA, May 10, 2010 Legal Agreements Mid-Term Review Evaluation Report, P. Werbrouck and N. Rahimi, June 29, 2009 Haiti- PRODEP Gender Assessment, R. Nadelman, January 25, 2010 Baseline Study, ECOSOF, January 2008 Étude de l’évolution de certains indicateurs de la ligne de base, ECOSOF, May 2009 MTR Beneficiary Assessment, J. Chery, J. Chesnel Jean et P. Pecos Lundy, Mai/Juin 2009 Évaluation financière d’un échantillon de 16 sous-projets productifs du PRODEP, Claude Phanord et Roosevelt Saint Dic, June 2009 Technical Audits 1, 2, 3 and 4, ECOSOF, 2008-2009 Technical Audits 5 and 6, Cécile Bérut, 2011-2012 Project Impact Evaluation Study (draft), AGILIS-IKESOL Consultants, France, August 2012 BMPAD Rapport Final, June 2013 BMPAD Quarterly Reports Financial Audits 2006-2013 GRANDE- ANSE NIPPES SUD SUD - EST OUEST CENTRE ARTIBONITE NORD- EST NORD NORD-OUEST Marceline Sudre Carrefour Baraderes Gebeau La Cahouane Marche Léon Vieux Bourg d'Aquin Carrefour Charles Source Chaude Crrf. Joute Plaisance Morne Occo Crrf. Des Ruisseaux Blockauss St. Antoine Trouin Montrouis Pont Sondé Delegram Shada Delmas Trianon Carrefour Dufort Sta. Terrienne Sentard Les Poteaux Hasco Croix des Missions Bon Repos Ville Bonheur PORT-AU-PRINCE Pont Miragoâne Fonds Jean Noel Bodane Croix Fer Roysec Casse Baptiste Crrf. Mace Fond Parisien St. Etienne Barrage 73º30' 73º00' 72º30' 72º00' 20º00' 19º30' 19º00' 18º30' 20º00' 19º30' 19º00' 18º30' 74º30' 74º00' 72º00'72º30'73º00'73º30'74º00'74º30' To Santiago To Barahana DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Port-Margot Limbé Bas Limbé Plaine du Nord Milot Dondon Pignon St. Raphael La Victoire Plaisance Grd. Riv. du Nord Acul du Nord CAP-HAÏTIEN Quartier Morin Limonade Coracol Pilate Le Borgne Bombardopolis Jean-Rabel PORT-DE-PAIX Bassin-Bleu St. Louis Ile de la Tortue Chansolme Gras Morne MÔLE ST. NICOLAS Anse-á-Foleur Baie de Henne Verrettes Pte. Riv. de l'Artibonite St. Marc Grande Saline St. Michel de L'Attalaye GONAÏVES La Chapelle Dessalines L'Estere Desdunes Ennery Marmelade Terre-Neuve Anse-Rouge Trou Du-Nord Ouanaminthe Vallieres Ranquitte Bahan Perches Monbin Crochu Ste. Suzanne Terrier Rouge FORT LIBERTÉ Maïssade Thomonde Boucan Carre HINCHE Cerca-la-Source Thomassique Cerca Carvajel MirebalaisSaut d'Eau Lascahobas Belladére Savanette Tiburon Camp-Perrin Port-Salut Roche-á Bateau Les Anglais Maniche Chardonnieres Port-á-Piment Côteaux St. Jean du Sud Cayes Ile a Vache TorbeckArniquet Cavaillon Aquin St. Louis du Sud Dame-Marie Anse d'Hainault Les Irois Petite Trou de Nippes Moron Abricots Bonbon JEREMIE Roseaux Beaumont Chambellan Corail Pestel L'Asile Baraderes Anse-a-Veau Miragoâne Petite Riviere de Nippes BainetCôtes-de Fer JACMEL Cayes-Jacmel Marigot Belle-Anse Grand Gosier Anse a Pitres Thiotte Léogâne Arcahaie Cabare Gressier Cornillon Crois des Bouquets Petion- Ville Carrefour Kenscoff Ganthier Thomazeau Fonds Verrettes Petite Goâve Grand Goâve Canice Mont Organisé Capotille Pointe a Raquette Anse a Galet La Valle Chantal ATLANTIC OCEAN CARIBBEAN SEA Gonâve Channel Saint Marc Channel GONÂVE ISLAND Tortue Island Vache Island Cayemites Islands Cape Rose GrandeAnse Bass Droit V o l d ro g u e Roseaux Point Gravois Cavaillon Grande Nippes Miragoâne Lake C ote s d e Fer Ba in e t G ra n d e J a c m el G o s s e lline Cape Jacmel Momance G r i s e B l a n c h e Saumatre LakeCaimen Lake Port-Au-Prince Bay D o n y e n T o r c e lle Couline Point Lapiere Quinte Bayonnais C o lo m b i e r Hennes Bay Price Point Jean-Rabel G a t i n e t t e M o u s tiq u e L e s T r o i s R i v i e r e s Tortue Channel L i m be Acul Bay Mancenille Bay M a rio n G r e a t N o r t h ern B o u y a h a B el l e C a n o t Font G rass S a r n a n a E s t é r e A R T I B O N I T E T h o m onde B o u c a n C a r r e F e r - a - C h eval Peligre Lake Peligre Dam A rtib o nite JAMAICA HAITI U.S.A. CUBA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Puerto Rico (US) T H E B A H A M A S ATLANTIC OCEAN Caribbean Sea L e s s e r A n t i l l e s 0 1020304050 KILOMETERS HAITI COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT (CDD) PROJECT Areas of PRODEP Intervention PARTICIPATING COMMUNES COMMUNE BOUNDARIES DISTRICT BOUNDARIES ASPHALT ROADS GRAVEL ROADS DIRT ROADS RIVERS COMMUNE HEADQUARTERS SELECTED TOWNS NATIONAL CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY NOVEMBER 2013 IBRD 40518 This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. GSDPM Map Design Unit