Rapport final du Groupe d'experts sur Haïti, S/2026/714
Résumé — Le rapport final du Groupe d'experts sur Haïti au titre de la résolution 2794 (2025), couvrant octobre 2025 à juillet 2026, publié le 8 septembre 2026. Les opérations de sécurité menées depuis décembre 2025 ont stoppé l'expansion des gangs à Port-au-Prince et dégagé une partie de la capitale, mais la coalition Viv Ansanm s'est fracturée dans la violence, une nouvelle vague d'attaques a frappé le bas Artibonite, et les gangs se sont consolidés dans le Centre et ont atteint le Sud-Est. Entre octobre 2025 et avril 2026, 3 165 personnes ont été tuées et 1 551 blessées. Le Groupe fait état de violations régulières de l'embargo sur les armes, de saisies record de cocaïne et de cannabis, et de gels d'avoirs presque inexistants.
Constats Clés
- Les opérations de sécurité depuis décembre 2025 ont stoppé l'expansion des gangs à Port-au-Prince et dégagé une partie de la capitale, mais ces acquis restent fragiles et les routes nationales qui relient la capitale au reste du pays restent sous contrôle des gangs.
- La coalition Viv Ansanm s'est fracturée : 613 morts à Cité Soleil et dans la plaine du Cul-de-Sac entre le 6 mars et le 31 juillet 2026.
- Nouvelles vagues d'attaques dans le bas Artibonite à partir de mars 2026, consolidation dans le Centre et attaques jusque dans le Sud-Est.
- 3 165 tués et 1 551 blessés entre octobre 2025 et avril 2026 ; 65 % des victimes lors d'opérations de sécurité.
- Embargo sur les armes violé de façon régulière par des réseaux transnationaux et des détournements de stocks nationaux.
- Presque aucun avoir gelé : seuls les comptes de deux personnes désignées, aux soldes très faibles.
- Saisies record de stupéfiants : 1 045 kg de cocaïne au large de la Tortue, 1 156 kg à Anvers en provenance du Cap-Haïtien, 1 376 kg de cannabis dans le Nord-Ouest.
Description Complète
Le Groupe d'experts sur Haïti, créé par la résolution 2653 (2022) du Conseil de sécurité, a transmis ce rapport final le 3 septembre 2026, publié sous la cote S/2026/714 le 8 septembre. Il est présenté au titre du paragraphe 13 de la résolution 2794 (2025), couvre la période d'octobre 2025 à juillet 2026 et rend compte des enquêtes menées jusqu'au 10 juillet 2026. Le Groupe s'est rendu en Haïti, à Saint-Domingue et à Miami en octobre 2025, février 2026 et mai 2026. Les annexes sont distribuées dans les langues de soumission, sans mise au point rédactionnelle.
S'agissant du régime de sanctions, le Groupe constate que l'embargo sur les armes est violé de façon régulière. Les autorités haïtiennes ont intercepté plusieurs cargaisons illicites aux points d'entrée, alors qu'elles n'en avaient saisi aucune pendant la période précédente. Presque aucun avoir n'a été gelé : la Banque de la République d'Haïti et les banques commerciales n'ont signalé des comptes gelés que pour deux personnes désignées, aux soldes très faibles, et le Groupe relève l'absence de procédure nationale pour identifier et geler les avoirs visés. Il n'a constaté aucune tentative de violation de l'interdiction de voyager, mais signale une fraude persistante dans la délivrance des passeports. La liste des sanctions compte neuf personnes et deux entités, après l'ajout de Dimitri Hérard et de Kempes Sanon par la résolution 2794.
La partie politique couvre la fin du mandat du Conseil présidentiel de transition le 7 février 2026, date à laquelle le pouvoir exécutif est passé au Conseil des ministres dirigé par le Premier ministre, et le Pacte national pour la stabilité et l'organisation des élections du 23 février, dont les objectifs de sécurité ont tardé à être mis en œuvre. La réponse sécuritaire est fragmentée : le Gouvernement s'appuie sur une société militaire privée étrangère et sur la Force de répression des gangs, entrée en opération en juin, tandis que la population se tourne vers des groupes d'autodéfense, des sociétés de sécurité privées et la Brigade de sécurité des aires protégées. Le Groupe avertit que certains groupes d'autodéfense commettent des exactions et pourraient former la prochaine génération de gangs.
La coalition Viv Ansanm s'est fracturée autour du territoire et des revenus. Les combats à Cité Soleil et dans la plaine du Cul-de-Sac ont fait 613 morts, dont 214 personnes sans lien avec les gangs, entre le 6 mars et le 31 juillet 2026. À partir de mars, les gangs Gran Grif, Kokorat San Ras et Canaan ont attaqué des dizaines de localités du bas Artibonite ; 400 Mawozo et Canaan ont consolidé leur contrôle dans le Centre et sur les routes vers la frontière dominicaine ; et des attaques de gangs ont atteint le Sud-Est. Entre octobre 2025 et avril 2026, 3 165 personnes ont été tuées et 1 551 blessées, 65 % des victimes lors d'opérations de sécurité et 30 % lors d'attaques de gangs. Le nombre de déplacés internes a atteint 1,5 million, environ 12 % de la population, et les violences sexuelles ont fortement augmenté depuis le début de 2026.
Sur les trafics, le Groupe documente l'arrivée d'armes et de munitions aux gangs par des réseaux transnationaux et par détournement des stocks nationaux ; un fusil de 5,56 mm se vend entre 5 000 et 8 000 dollars et une cartouche environ 3 dollars. La police a saisi 356 armes à feu en 2025. Parmi les saisies de stupéfiants figurent 1 045 kg de cocaïne au large de l'île de la Tortue en juillet 2025, 1 156 kg dans un conteneur parti du Cap-Haïtien et saisi à Anvers, et 1 376 kg de cannabis dans le Nord-Ouest en avril 2026. Sur les flux financiers illicites, il traite des rançons d'enlèvement, d'un commerce opaque des civelles et de 428 892 dollars confisqués à des voyageurs vers Haïti qui n'avaient pas déclaré leurs espèces à la frontière des États-Unis. Il recommande que la Force de répression des gangs enregistre et gère le matériel saisi et en informe le Groupe, que les États membres appuient le désarmement, la démobilisation et la réintégration ainsi que la police et les forces armées, et qu'Haïti réglemente le commerce des civelles.
Texte Intégral du Document
Texte extrait du document original pour l'indexation.
S/2026/714
United Nations
Security Council
Distr.: General
8 September 2026
Original: English/French
Letter dated 3 September 2026 from the Panel of Experts on Haiti
established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022)
addressed to the President of the Security Council
The members of the Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to Security
Council resolution 2653 (2022) have the honour to transmit herewith the final report,
submitted in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 2794 (2025).
The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti on 24 July 2026 and was
considered by the Committee on 3 September 2026.
The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and the final report
were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a
document of the Council.
Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 2653 (2022)
26-09652 (E)
021026
*2609652*
S/2026/714
Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant
to resolution 2794 (2025)
[Original: English]
Summary
The reporting period (October 2025–July 2026) began amid significant political
friction between members of the Transitional Presidential Council and the Prime
Minister, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, ahead of the end of the mandate of the Transitional
Presidential Council on 7 February. On that day, executive power was ultimately
transferred to the Council of Ministers, led by the Prime Minister. On 23 February, a
National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections was adopted by a range
of political, civil society and economic actors. However, as of mid-July,
implementation of the Pact – particularly the security objectives – remained slow,
further eroding domestic confidence in the transition. Although some progress was
recorded in electoral preparations, the electoral calendar remained uncertain.
Since December 2025, security operations by the Haitian authorities have
contributed to halting the expansion of gangs in Port-au-Prince and cleared some
areas from gang control, including in downtown, Delmas and surrounding areas. The
absence of a national security strategy, limited resources and persistent ties between
gangs and key stakeholders continued to constrain the overall security response.
The scale of the security challenges, combined with the limited capacity of
national institutions, resulted in a fragmented security response with a proliferation
of armed actors. On the one hand, the Government’s security approach is relying
heavily on international actors, including a foreign private military contractor and the
Gang Suppression Force, which started its operations in June. On the other hand, the
population is increasingly turning to self-defence groups, private security companies
and the Protected Areas Security Brigade to fill the security vacuum. Although self defence groups represent the main buffer against gang attacks in many areas, some
engaged in criminal activities and human rights violations and risk perpetuating the
country’s cycle of violence by contributing to the next generation of gangs.
After holding together for more than two years, there were violent fractures in
the Viv Ansanm gang alliance during the reporting period, driven by competition over
territory and revenue. Infighting in Port-au-Prince, particularly in Cité Soleil and
Croix-des-Bouquets communes between March and July, killed several hundred
people and displaced thousands. During clashes, incidents of sexual violence surged
as a tool of retaliation between rival gangs.
March 2026 also marked the onset of a new wave of violence in the lower
Artibonite Department, with coordinated attacks of an unprecedented intensity by the
Gran Grif, Kokorat San Ras and Canaan gangs across dozens of localities. In the
Centre Department, the 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs continued to consolidate their
control over several towns and to secure key routes to the border with the Dominican
Republic, through which they traffic goods, including arms and ammunition, and
generate significant revenue from road checkpoints. In the South-East Department,
recent gang attacks marked a concerning new development in what had previously
been a relatively safe region.
2/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Despite intensified security operations by the Haitian authorities supported by a
private military contractor, gangs have demonstrated considerable resilience and
adaptability, particularly owing to the support of the ecosystem of actors who have a
stake in gang activities. This includes specific political, economic and security actors
who back gangs when it serves their interests, as well as the intermediaries they use.
Targeting gang leaders without addressing the networks that sustain them will
inevitably fall short. Sanctioning these enabling actors remains key to the
effectiveness of the United Nations sanctions regime.
Between October 2025 and April 2026, 3,165 people were killed and 1,551
injured as a result of armed violence, with 65% of casualties occurring during security
operations and 30% during gang attacks. Gangs led by designated individuals
continued to commit serious human rights abuses, among them killings, sexual and
gender-based violence, kidnapping for ransom, forced recruitment of children,
destruction of property and extortion. Beyond sanctioned individuals, many other
gang leaders continued to engage in actions that meet designation criteria. Sexual
violence has also escalated sharply since early 2026, with the collective rape of
women and girls by armed men constituting one of its most severe manifestations.
Gang violence impeded access to humanitarian assistance and basic services,
including education, and led to the closure of several medical facilities and charitable
organizations.
Successive waves of intense armed violence reflect the continued ability of
gangs and other non-State armed actors to illicitly acquire firearms and, more
critically, ammunition. While authorities in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the
United States of America have taken steps to address trafficking and enforce the arms
embargo, these efforts remain insufficient given the scale of the challenge.
Transnational networks, often displaying unsophisticated methods, have proven to be
resilient and efficient in trafficking firearms and ammunition during the reporting
period. Diversions from national stockpiles – from Haiti and, to a lesser extent, from
the Dominican Republic – continue to replenish the arsenals of gangs and other
non-State armed actors.
Insecurity and the absence of effective governance have created conditions
conducive to the growth of illicit trafficking and transnational organized crime more
broadly. Beyond arms, the Panel investigated record seizures of cocaine and cannabis
during the reporting period, with networks using Haiti and its territorial waters as
corridors to transport narcotics northward through the Caribbean and beyond. The
trade in elvers also raised significant concerns, with a poorly regulated and opaque
commercial sector remaining highly exposed to illicit activity, exploited by one
specific network identified by the Panel.
26-09652
3/94
S/2026/714
Contents
Page
I.
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
A.
Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
B.
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
C.
Implementation of the sanctions regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
D.
Evolution of the political and security context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
Information relevant to the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 2653
(2022) and subsequent resolutions and the potential designation of individuals or entities
who may have engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security or
stability of Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
A.
Gang dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
B.
Acts that violate international human rights law or that constitute human rights abuses,
and challenges to the rule of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16
C.
Arms trafficking and violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
20
D.
Drug trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
E.
Illicit financial flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
28
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34
Annexes* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
36
II.
III.
* Circulated in the languages of submission only and without formal editing.
4/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
I. Introduction
A.
Mandate
1.
On 17 October 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution 2794 (2025), in
which it renewed the sanctions regime on Haiti, consisting of an arms embargo as
well as a travel ban and an asset freeze against individuals and/or entities designated
by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022)
concerning Haiti as being responsible for, complicit in or having engaged in, directly
or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Haiti. Through
resolution 2794 (2025), the Council also designated two additional individuals:
Dimitri Hérard (HTi.008), the former head of the National Palace General Security
Unit, for his support to gangs, and Kempes Sanon (HTi.009), the leader of Les
Argentins gang. Currently, the sanctions list includes the names of nine individuals
and two entities. 1
2.
The Council extended, for a period of 13 months from the date of adoption of
resolution 2794 (2025), the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Haiti, as specified in
paragraph 21 of resolution 2653 (2022), and further decided that this mandate shall
also apply with respect to the measures imposed in resolution 2794 (2025).
3.
This report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 2794 (2025) and
covers investigations conducted up to 10 July 2026.
B.
Methodology
4.
The Panel conducts its investigations in a professional and technical manner,
adhering to the principles of transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence.
The Panel’s working methods are in full conformity with the best practices, as
recommended by the Informal Working Group on General Security Council Sanctions
Issues (see S/2006/997). The Panel placed particular emphasis on transparency and
the use of reliable sources, including documentary evidence, independent verifiable
sources and the opportunity to reply (see annex 1). The Panel takes great care not to
disclose identifying information, when necessary, in order to protect sources given
the extreme levels of insecurity in Haiti.
5.
In October 2025, February 2026, and May 2026, the Panel conducted fact finding missions in Haiti (Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien), in Santo Domingo, and
in Miami, United States of America. The Panel is grateful for the support it received
from the respective national authorities, as well as from the United Nations Integrated
Office in Haiti (BINUH), the United Nations Support Office in Haiti, the United
Nations country team and non-governmental actors on the ground.
6.
During its visits to Haiti, the Panel met with representatives of Haitian State
institutions, including the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior and Territorial
Communities, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of
Economy and Finance. It also engaged with the leadership of the Haitian National
Police and the customs, financial institutions and anti-corruption units, political and
private sector actors, as well as representatives of civil society organizations,
individuals living in gang-controlled areas, and other victims of gang-related
violence, including sexual and gender-based violence. The Panel also met with the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of BINUH, and
other representatives of BINUH, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
__________________
1
26-09652
See the narrative summaries of reasons for listing. Available at https://main.un.org/security
council/en/sanctions/2653/materials/summaries.
5/94
S/2026/714
(UNODC) and United Nations humanitarian agencies and diplomats from various
missions, as well as the Force Commander of the Gang Suppression Force and other
personnel of the Force.
7.
The Panel would like to thank those Member States and other entities that have
responded to the Panel’s official communications (see annex 2). The Panel further
emphasizes the critical importance of Member States’ timely responses to its requests.
C.
Implementation of the sanctions regime
1.
Arms embargo
8.
The arms embargo continues to be violated on a regular basis. While authorities
in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the United States of America have taken steps
to prevent trafficking and prosecute traffickers, they remain largely insufficient given
the scale of the challenge. Precise estimates of flows remain difficult to establish, but
several indicators point to sustained violations. Gangs have maintained their capacity
to fight and replenish their stocks of arms and ammunition (see sect. II.C). Haitia n
authorities intercepted several illicit shipments at ports of entry during the reporting
period, having seized none in the period covered in the previous final report
(S/2025/597, para. 17). United States authorities intercepted firearms and ammunition
destined for Haiti and are investigating and prosecuting a range of trafficking
networks.
9.
Haitian authorities have cooperated with the Panel and shared information on
cases of transnational trafficking. Regarding sources and transit countries, at the time
of drafting, the United States was yet to respond to the Panel’s tracing requests but
provided information about ongoing judicial cases. The Dominican Republic
continued to offer positive support to the Panel’s investigations. Jamaica responded
to the Panel’s request for information and The Bahamas requested an extension. The
Turks and Caicos Islands, through the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, had not responded at the time of drafting.
2.
Asset freeze
10. The Panel notes that very little progress (since that documented in S/2025/597,
paras. 13–16) has been made regarding the freezing of assets for individuals under
United Nations sanctions. The Panel is concerned about the absence of a national
coordinated process to identify and freeze assets of individuals sanctioned by the
United Nations, which erodes the impact of the sanctions regime in Haiti (see
annex 3).
11. The Panel sent written communication to the Bank of the Republic of Haiti and
some commercial banks for an update and was informed that only accounts belonging
to Kempes Sanon (HTi.009) and to Prophane Victor (HTi.006) (see also S/2025/356,
para. 9), both with very meagre amounts, had been frozen (see annex 3). The limited
amount of funds identified and frozen reflects the delayed action of financial
institutions following designations, resulting in sanctioned individuals transferring
their assets or concealing them under the names of third parties .
12. Haitian commercial banks also stated that they had frozen the bank accounts of
several gang leaders following the imposition of either United Nations sanctions or
unilateral sanctions on gang leaders and Viv Ansanm (HTe.002). Banks added that
they had also blacklisted anyone they identified as being associated with or supporting
gang operations.
6/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
13. The Panel contacted several Member States and their territories which were the
most likely to hold assets belonging to Haitian sanctioned individuals (see annex 4).
3.
Travel ban
14. The Panel did not identify nor did receive any information on attempts to violate
the travel ban during the reporting period. However, the Panel is concerned by
persistent fraud in the issuance of Haitian passports in the country. 2 According to
Haitian officials, passports are issued in excessive numbers, often with falsified fiscal
stamps, thereby enabling the embezzlement of fees and bribery from applicants
seeking genuine documents for illicit purposes. Some passports have been i ssued to
foreign nationals and/or under fake names. These shortcomings increase the risk of
sanctioned individuals obtaining multiple passports and travelling under false
identities to circumvent the travel ban.
D.
Evolution of the political and security context
1.
Political transition
15. The current mandate of the Panel began during a politically tense transition
period marked by significant friction between members of the Transitional
Presidential Council and the Prime Minister, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, in the run-up to
7 February 2026, which marked the end of the mandate of the Transitional
Presidential Council (S/2026/241, sect. I.C). Ultimately, full executive power was
transferred to the Council of Ministers led by the Prime Minister, with strong support
from international partners.
16. On 23 February 2026, a National Pact for Stability and the Organization of
Elections was adopted and signed by a range of political, civil society and economic
actors, with the aim of creating the security and governance conditions necessary for
elections. Subsequently, a reshuffled governmental Cabinet was installed in March.
However, five months after its adoption, the implementation of the Pact – particularly
regarding the provisions on the restoration of security – remains very slow, further
weakening domestic confidence in the transition.
17. Some progress has been recorded in electoral preparations, including the
registration of political parties, the adoption of an electoral decree (see para. 18) and
an agreement over the electoral budget. Although the authorities announced an
updated electoral calendar with the first round scheduled for December, political
observers who met with the Panel noted that elections were unlikely to be held in
2026.
Electoral decree
18. On 2 June 2026, the Council of Ministers published a new electoral decree
amending the one issued by the Transitional Presidential Council in December 2025. 3
19. Although the decree introduces new provisions, it maintains the prohibition on
United Nations-sanctioned individuals from running for presidential, legislative
and/or local elections or serving in Provisional Electoral Council -related structures
organizing the elections. The impact of this provision is likely to be very limited, as
__________________
2
Several investigations are currently being conducted by the Central Directorate of the Criminal
Investigation Police (Direction centrale de la police judiciaire – DCPJ). Interviews with Haitian
officials, May 2026.
3
See https://cephaiti.ht/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Decret_electoral_-1e-Decembre-2025.pdf.
26-09652
7/94
S/2026/714
the vast majority of those involved in supporting gangs and destabilizing the country
have yet to be designated.
2.
Security situation
20. After years of instability and given the absence of effective governing
structures, gangs have continued to fill the governance void in parts of the West,
Artibonite and Centre Departments, while trying to extend their influence in other
departments. The intensification of security operations by the Haitian authorities has
resulted in the recovery of some areas from gang control in the capital. However,
gains remain fragile and national roads connecting the capital to the rest of the country
remain under gang control (see sect. II.A.1). The situation in the lower Artibonite also
worsened considerably, as increasingly powerful gangs carried out attacks of
exceptional brutality (see sect. II.A.4).
21. Beyond the impact of security operations, which have resulted in significant
civilian casualties, the population has also suffered severe consequences of gang
attacks and infighting, particularly in the capital and in the Artibonite Department.
After holding together for more than two years, there were violent fractures in the Viv
Ansanm gang alliance during the reporting period (see sect. II.A.2).
22. The scale of security challenges, combined with the limited capacity of national
institutions, has resulted in a fragmented security response with a proliferation of
armed actors. On the one hand, the Government’s security approach is relying heavily
on international actors, including a private security contractor and the Gang
Suppression Force. On the other hand, the population is increasingly turning to self defence groups, Haitian private security companies and the Protected Areas Security
Brigade (S/2024/704, annex 26) to fill the security vacuum. For some of these actors,
the unstable security situation has become a business opportunity.
23. While some of these security actors operate within a recognized legal
framework, others function outside any formal oversight mechanism, with the result
that the absence of accountability contributes to impunity and fails to prevent further
human rights violations (see sect. II.B).
(a)
National security and defence forces
24. The absence of a national security strategy hampers a comprehensive approach
to fighting gangs, the prioritization of objectives and the management of resources.
25. Although security operations appear more coordinated and bolstered by
increased logistical capacities (S/2026/241, para. 17), the Haitian National Police
continues to face the same challenges previously reported by the Panel: an insufficient
number of personnel, limited equipment, human rights abuses and corruption issues
(see annex 5).
26. The reporting period was marked by a shift in the approach to the national armed
forces. The Government committed to rebuilding the Haitian Armed Forces,
following years of limited institutional support since their remobilization in 2017.
Concrete steps being taken include recruitment, procurement of equipment, training
programmes and the project to develop a new military doctrine. 4 Despite slow
progress, the Haitian Armed Forces have become more involved in security
operations in support of the Haitian National Police.
__________________
4
8/94
Interview with representative of Ministry of Defence, May 2026.
26-09652
S/2026/714
(b)
International private contractors
27. The Government has recently extended by a year the contract of the international
private military company in charge of supporting security operations through
helicopter support, drone strikes and ground engagement (S/2025/597, para. 28). 5 The
task force, of which the contractors are part, has expanded its area of operations to
the lower Artibonite since April 2026.
28. The reporting period also saw the privatization of security support extending
beyond the fight against gangs to border control. The Government signed a 10 -year
contract with an international company for border security reinforcement and customs
revenue optimization. 6 The company is remunerated through a percentage of Haitian
customs revenue, which is the country’s second largest source of revenue. The deal
has drawn criticism from many Haitian stakeholders, raising concerns about national
sovereignty and the substantial revenues the company stands to collect during the
contract. Notably, this company and the one mentioned in the paragraph above share
the same leadership.
(c)
Transition from Multinational Security Support Mission to Gang
Suppression Force
29. During the reporting period, the Multinational Security Support Mission
transitioned into the Gang Suppression Force and in April 2026, the Kenyan personnel
of the Multinational Security Support Mission (and subsequently, the Gang
Suppression Force) departed. While the participation of the Multinational Security
Support Mission in Haitian National Police operations and its presence in the lower
Artibonite had some deterrent effects on gang activity, 7 the general security situation
continued to deteriorate, notwithstanding their presence in the country.
30. The new troops of the Gang Suppression Force began their gradual deployment
to Haiti in April 2026, conducting their first operational activities in Port -au-Prince
in June 2026. The Gang Suppression Force made its first arrests in mid -June and
transferred individuals to the Haitian National Police, which created challenges for
the police and the judicial system with respect to absorbing the likely high number of
upcoming cases. The Gang Suppression Force seized several firearms and
ammunition in July (see para. 117).
(d)
Haitian private security companies
31. With more than 100 registered private security companies and many more
operating without a licence, the sector remains poorly regulated. 8 Its governance is
further complicated by the involvement of former and current senior government
officials and officers of the Haitian National Police. The sector represents a major
source of employment for the country. Many companies procure arms and
ammunition illicitly, including of calibres in excess of domestic limits (see
S/2023/674, paras. 110–113, and S/2024/704, para. 41).
(e)
Self-defence groups
32. Self-defence groups have continued to strengthen and multiply throughout the
reporting period. Interviews with local authorities, residents, Haitian National Police
officers and members of these groups themselves suggest that in many areas they are
__________________
5
Interviews with security sources, May and June 2026.
Interview with Haitian official, May 2026, and confidential documents.
7
Interviews with local authorities and residents, May and June 2026.
8
Interviews with a representative of a private security company and officials from the Ministry of
the Interior, 2025. Confidential documents.
6
26-09652
9/94
S/2026/714
the only protection against gang attacks. In the West Department, they are often led
by or include Haitian National Police officers who reside in the communities they
protect; in more rural areas such as the lower Artibonite, several groups have been
coordinating closely with Haitian National Police operations as well as some units of
the Protected Areas Security Brigade. In this area, members of self -defence groups
have particularly suffered from violent retaliation from gangs (see sect. II.A.4). Some
self-defence groups have also been implicated in checkpoint extortion and violations
of human rights.
33. The Ministry of the Interior has started to register so-called Brigadiers de paix
(see annex 11). For the authorities, while formalizing these groups carries risks,
leaving them entirely ungoverned carries greater risks. The registration process also
aims at building knowledge about their equipment, including firearms, most of which
have been obtained illicitly.
II. Information relevant to the implementation of the measures
decided in resolutions 2653 (2022) and subsequent
resolutions and the potential designation of individuals or
entities who may have engaged in, directly or indirectly,
actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti
A.
Gang dynamics
1.
Gang dynamics amid intensified security operations
34. Since late 2025, security efforts by Haitian authorities have contributed to
reducing gang control in areas of the West Department (see annex 5). Estimations
suggest a decline in gangs’ territorial control to about 70% of the Port-au-Prince
metropolitan area, down from 85% (see S/2026/241) (see annex 6). 9
35. Security gains remain fragile. The inability to contain gang leaders is widely
seen as a major setback for security operations. This can be partly explained by the
gangs’ integration into criminal networks that span government and economic sectors,
thereby constraining police operations and investigations. Despite the gangs ’ apparent
autonomy, ties persist between gangs and State and private actors – particularly ahead
of elections, when territorial control and perceptions of stability are critical.
36. Political drivers have triggered violence in the commune of Kenscoff and the
Artibonite Department. They have also shaped gangs’ expansion efforts into southern
Grande-Anse Department, where Guy Philippe – a former senior police officer who
has pursued political ambitions and backed Viv Ansanm ( S/2024/704, paras. 31, 52
and annex 6) – met repeatedly with Jean Misnord (a.k.a “Fado”), the third-incommand of the Simon Pelé gang (see annex 7). 10
37. Certain businessmen, as well as serving Haitian police officers, are exploiting
the unstable security situation, including road blockades (see annex 8), to generate
illicit revenues. Collusion between gangs (e.g., Tokyo, Simon Pelé and Ti Bwa) and
Haitian police officers – who supply weapons and enable gang movements – weakens
security operations, contributing to gang leaders evading capture . 11 Gangs remain
structured and resilient, demonstrating adaptability in the face of increasing security
__________________
9
Interviews with gang analysts, senior police officers and United Nations staff, May and June
2026.
10
Interviews with confidential sources, February and May 2026.
11
Interviews with confidential sources and individuals with first-hand knowledge of gangs, May
and June 2026. Confidential documents, 2024 and 2026.
10/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
operations (see annex 9). In the absence of effective follow -up stabilization efforts,
they have managed to reoccupy areas that had previously been cleared by security
forces, such as Bel-Air, where the Grand Ravine gang is growing in influence 12 (see
annex 10).
38. Some gangs have also relocated to evade pressure and generate new income,
which for instance contributed to heavy infighting within Viv Ansanm in the Cul-deSac plain area (see sect. II.A.2 and annex 12). Operations in downtown Port -au-Prince
have driven gangs to its south-western outskirts (see annex 7), where checkpoints
have proliferated. In Carrefour commune, where a parallel governance syste m
supports the continued functioning of daily life ( S/2025/597, annex 5), gang leaders
and other criminals, including Dimitri Hérard (HTi.008), have continued to enjoy
freedom. Gangs have used bank agencies in Carrefour for transactions, including
ransom payments, amid rising kidnappings. 13 Besides, gang attacks in Seguin, SouthEast Department, have marked a significant development in what had heretofore been
a relatively safe region.
39. Weak State presence enables gang control over strategic axes linking the capital
to the north, the south and to the border with the Dominican Republic, which they use
to secure criminal revenues from illegal taxation and trafficking. In the Centre
Department, the 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs continue to hold sway over strategic
towns (S/2025/597, sect. II.A.3) and a former senator has used armed groups to
pressure authorities into cutting security efforts. 14 In the North Department, local
gangs – some linked with Viv Ansanm – and certain agents of the Protected Areas
Security Brigade (S/2024/704, annex 26), under the leadership of Alex Jean-Pierre,
have been involved in land spoliation. Agents of the Protected Areas Security Brigade
also set up an illegal checkpoint in the locality of Bois d ’Anse, Limonade commune,
to impose transit fees. 15
40. Amid insecurity and limited State capacity, self-defence groups have
proliferated, often supporting the police and the Protected Areas Security Brigade.
The Government has begun registering the so-called Brigadiers de Paix and aims to
establish a mechanism to regulate and integrate citizen participation in security
prevention within an institutional framework (see annex 11). However, many
members are involved in criminal activities, remain illegally armed and funded and
risk perpetuating cycles of violence by contributing to the next generation of gangs.
2.
Fractures within Viv Ansanm alliance
41. Signs of Viv Ansanm fracturing appeared during clashes between gangs in the
Cul-de-Sac plain area (see annex 12), and in the Cité Soleil commune of the West
Department, during which 613 people were killed (including 214 individuals not
associated with gangs) and 375 others were injured (including 139 individuals not
associated with gangs), between 6 March and 31 July 2026. 16
42. Clashes in the Cul-de-Sac Plain were motivated by competition over territory
and revenue control. Despite some shifts, gangs were divided into two camps. Gangs
based in Croix-des-Bouquets – Chen Mechan (led by Claudy Célestin alias “Chen
Mechan”), Canaan (led by Jeff Larose alias “Jeff”) and 400 Mawozo (led by Wilson
Joseph, alias “Lanmò San Jou” – HTi. 004) – alongside the Tokyo gang (led by Ralph
__________________
12
Interviews with gang analysts and with sources with first-hand knowledge of gang dynamics,
May and June 2026, and confidential report, June 2026.
13
Interviews with senior police officer and gang analysts, May 2026.
14
Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026.
15
Interview with representative of transport sector, June 2026.
16
See https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/document-library/flash-report-intensification-of-gangviolence-in-the-plaine-du-cul-de-sac-1.
26-09652
11/94
S/2026/714
Woodmyr Louissaint, alias “Chalè”) – confronted gangs in Cité Soleil, including
Pierre VI (led by Obama) and Terre Noire (led by Jonel Catel), supported by other
gangs such as Boston (led by Mathias Saintil), Belekou (led by James Edmond, a.k.a
“Bendji”) and Wharf Jérémie (led by Monel Felix, alias “Micanor”). 17
43. On 20 May 2026, negotiations for a truce began and on 5 June 2026, an
agreement was signed by the gangs involved in the clashes – mediators included local
businessmen 18 – establishing designated areas of control and a reduction in armed
presence. 19 On 25 May 2026, the new Cité Soleil municipal commission was
established. At least one of the municipal commissioners is an active member of the
Brooklyn gang (led by Gabriel Jean-Pierre, alias “Ti Gabriel”, a key ally of Jeff). The
appointment of Brooklyn gang members to positions within the Cité Soleil municipal
commission exacerbated rivalries with other gangs, particularly the Belekou gang. 20
The Panel is concerned about collusion between some members of local authorities
and gangs within public institutions. These ties aim at consolidating territorial control
and influencing upcoming elections, also building on Ti Gabriel’s long -standing
political connections with a former member of parliament for Cité Soleil. 21
44. A separate development in Cité Soleil further highlighted fractures within Viv
Ansanm. Clashes erupted mid-June between the Wharf Jérémie gang and the Belekou
gang and lasted for several weeks. These resulted in deaths, rape (see para. 77),
disappearances and punitive killings of gang members, including by their own
leaders, underscoring the fragility withing gang leadership structures. On 28 June, at
least three members of the Fort Dimanche gang were killed by Belekou gang members
while attempting to negotiate a truce between the Belekou and Wharf Jérémie gangs.
On 30 June, the Belekou gang leader killed 17 members of his own gang and nine
civilians accused of collaborating with the Wharf Jérémie gang in a plot against him. 22
3.
Political drivers of violence in Kenscoff commune
45. Over a year and a half since the first large-scale attack by Viv Ansanm against
the commune of Kenscoff on 27 January 2025 (S/2025/597, annex 6), the security
environment remains fragile. Despite relative calm in its central area, the situation
remains critical in hard-to-reach areas, where gangs move freely, re-enter cleared
zones, control movement along secondary routes and launch attacks (see annex 13). 23
Between 4 and 9 July 2026, the commune experienced a new wave of violence, as
gang attacks across several localities killed at least 61 residents and displaced at least
5,800 people. 24 At the time of drafting, violence was escalating.
46. Kenscoff is strategically significant for multiple reasons. It overlooks the
commune of Pétion-Ville, where public and commercial institutions, United Nations
offices and embassies are located (see S/2025/597). The commune hosts a critical
telecommunication site, the temporary takeover of which by Viv Ansanm in August
2025 disrupted Internet and air traffic-related systems nationwide. Moreover,
__________________
17
Interview with gang analyst, April 2026.
Interviews with residents and civil society representatives working in gang -affected areas, May
and June 2026.
19
Interview with gang analyst, June 2026.
20
Interviews with civil society representatives, May and June 2026. See also
https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/document-library/flash-report-intensification-of-gang-violencein-the-plaine-du-cul-de-sac-1.
21
Interviews with confidential sources, May and June 2026.
22
Interviews with residents of Cité Soleil and Wharf Jérémie, gang analysts and an international
humanitarian expert, June and July 2026. Confidential note, July 2026.
23
Interview with local authority and residents, 2025 and 2026.
24
Interview with residents and gang analysts, 2026. See also https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haitiemergency-tracking-tool-1001-updates-displacements-following-armed-attacks.
18
12/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Kenscoff’s role as a key agricultural hub for Port-au-Prince, combined with its
location along a strategic corridor to the south, means that violence in the commune
poses a serious risk to food supply and mobility.
47. Political motives have shaped the destabilization of Kenscoff. Earlier attacks in
January 2025 (S/2025/597, annex 6) were intended to expose police difficulties in
securing a major residential area 25 and to deliberately create chaos in order to
influence public opinion in favour of negotiations with gangs. 26 During the reporting
period, Kenscoff remained central to political and financial interests, with influential
actors backing gangs and other armed actors to control the area.
Alfrédo Antoine and Nenel Cassy as gang sponsors
Alfrédo Junior Antoine
48. Since at least 2016, Alfrédo Junior Antoine, a former member of Parliament
elected from the constituency of Kenscoff (2016–2020) 27 has armed and supported
youth groups in the area as a political tool for his agenda. These groups either
subsequently developed into gangs or became affiliated with them. He is also
responsible for the kidnapping and illegal detention of individuals, using gangs and
other armed individuals to intimidate political opponents or illegally seize property (see
annex 14). 28
49. Mr. Antoine was one of the main sponsors of the attack on 27 January 2025 in
Kenscoff, resulting in over 100 killings, multiple cases of rape – including of minors –
robberies and the burning of residential property. 29 Since then, gangs have taken over
areas of the commune, causing severe unrest among residents. Mr. Antoine was
arrested on 4 April 2025 for involvement in conspiracy against State security,
financing criminal organizations, complicity in murder and crimin al association. He
was released on 9 May 2025. 30
50. Mr. Antoine planned attacks with gangs in several neighbourhoods of Kenscoff.
He communicated frequently with members of Viv Ansanm, including Dady Paul,
known as Frantz Valmyr (alias “Didy”), a main gang leader in Kenscoff (see
annex 13), and with other gang members. He was also in regular contact with Magalie
Habitant – a key intermediary between politicians, businessmen and gangs (see
S/2025/597, paras. 78–80 and annex 22) – and had close ties with Vitelhomme
Innocent (HTi.005). Additionally, he was identified as one of the suppliers of
firearms, ammunition and financial resources to Viv Ansanm , using an intermediary.
Several illicit firearms were also found at his residence. 31
51. Mr. Antoine has also been involved in murder, breach of trust, dispossession and
burglary of private homes. He was previously imprisoned for fraud from
14 September 2005 to 25 April 2008 and was arrested for illegally taking control of
property, forgery and the use of forged documents, in July 2015. 32 The Panel
contacted Mr. Antoine, who denied his connections to gangs, in an email. The Panel
shared Mr. Antoine’s message with the Committee and stands by its findings.
__________________
25
Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026. See also: https://binuh.unmissions.org/
sites/default/files/flash_report_20250222_kenscoff-en.pdf.
26
Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026.
27
See https://www.haiti-reference.info/pages/plan/politique/pouvoir-legislatif/50eme-legislature/.
28
Interviews with several victims of Mr. Antoine, 2026.
29
Ibid.
30
Confidential investigation report, May 2025 and interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026.
31
Ibid.
32
Confidential investigation report, May 2025.
26-09652
13/94
S/2026/714
Nenel Cassy
52. Nenel Cassy, a former senator for the Nippes Department (2006–2012 33 and
2016–2020) 34, has supported various armed actors to advance his political agenda and
interests.
53. Mr. Cassy controls the “BLTS” criminal group, 35 operating in Chalon,
Miragoâne commune, Nippes Department, which is specialized in the illegal
possession of firearms, murder, attempted murder, kidnapping for ransom, collective
rape, the hijacking of vehicles and cargo trucks, and armed robbery. 36 He contributed
to the creation of Fantome 509, a violent group of armed individuals, including police
officers, that emerged in 2018. 37 Fantome 509 was involved in the disruption of public
order, arson and the vandalization of public and private property, and the killing of
police officers. 38
54. Nenel Cassy and his associates also perpetrated an attempted kidnapping with
the subsequent assassination of a Haitian diplomat, in February 2021. 39
55. Mr. Cassy sought to foment chaos in Haiti by planning armed attacks against
airport infrastructure in Port-au-Prince, Les Cayes and Cap-Haïtien. He organized
frequent meetings that led to attacks to destabilize Kenscoff in collusion with Viv
Ansanm. 40
56. Two Member States provided information linking Nenel Cassy to Haitian gangs.
These include the distribution of weapons to gangs in Gressier commune, in 2018,
and heading the attack against a former senator ’s home, in late 2022, with the
Ti-Makak gang (dismantled in April 2023, see S/2023/674, paras. 56 and 57 and
annex 13), to which he supplied weapons. Nenel Cassy also supported G-Pèp and
notably the Kraze Barye gang, led by Vitelhomme Innocent (HTi.005). 41
57. The release of Nenel Cassy on 19 August 2025, after his arrest on 2 August 2025
for conspiracy against State security, financing of criminal groups, attempted murder
and association with criminals, 42 prompted civil society organizations and other
stakeholders to denounce the impunity this case represents. 43 Despite official claims
that the case is being re-examined, 44 sources close to the investigation said that the
case had been dropped. 45
58. During his tenure as a senator (2016–2020), Mr. Cassy used his influence to
secure the appointment of the two heads of the Office for the Monetization of
Development Assistance Programmes (Bureau de monétisation des programmes
d’aide au développement), including Patrick Noramé (S/2023/674, annex 47).
__________________
33
See https://lenouvelliste.com/article/101766/benjamin-au-senat-lavalassien-de-coeur.
See https://www.haiti-reference.info/pages/plan/politique/pouvoir-legislatif/senat/.
35
This group is not the counter-narcotics bureau (Bureau de lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants) of
the Haitian National Police.
36
Interviews with confidential sources, February 2026.
37
Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026. See also: https://insightcrime.org/news/
disgruntled-police-unrest-haiti/.
38
Confidential investigation report and confidential sources, 2025 and 2026.
39
Ibid., and interview with police investigator, 2023.
40
Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026.
41
Information from Member States, June and July 2023. Interview with representatives of a
Member State, June 2023.
42
Official Facebook page of the Haitian National Police, 2 August 2025.
43
Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and confidential report, 2025.
44
Interviews with senior government officials, 2026.
45
Interviews with confidential sources, 2026. Confidential report, 2025.
34
14/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Mr. Noramé embezzled and laundered significant amounts of funds, which were
partially illegally diverted to Mr. Cassy. 46
59. Nenel Cassy was sanctioned by Canada in March 2023, along with other
individuals, with the intention to exert pressure on those who have engaged in
significant acts of corruption and have established links to criminal gangs. 47 In April
2023, he was banned from entering the Dominican Republic on the grounds that he
constituted a threat to the country’s national security. 48 In December 2023, the United
States sanctioned Mr. Cassy for abusing his public position by participating in corrupt
activity that undermined the integrity of the Government of Haiti. 49 The Panel wrote
to Mr. Cassy, giving him an opportunity to respond to its findings, but had received
no response at the time of drafting.
4.
Massacre by Viv Ansanm in the lower Artibonite
60. March 2026 marked the onset of a new wave of acute violence in the lower
Artibonite, driven by coordinated Viv Ansanm attacks across dozens of localities.
Between 29 March and 3 April 2026, the gangs of Gran Grif (HTe.001, led by Luckson
Elan, HTi.007), Kokorat San Ras (led by Bendjy) and Canaan (led by Jeff) perpetrated
multiple attacks against Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite, Marchand Dessalines and
Montrouis communes, resulting in at least 95 residents killed and 38 others injured 50
(see annex 15).
61. Kenken (alias “chat 2 pye”), an important member of Gran Grif, was one of the
main coordinators of the attacks. Kenken was previously a member of the Lower
Artibonite Coalition, 51 which regroups close to 30 self-defence groups across the
Artibonite Department in a collective effort to counter gangs. 52 He switched sides to
join the gang in late October 2025. The attacks were intended to eliminate self defence groups, notably the Coalition des révolutionnaires pour sauver l ’Artibonite
(known as the Jean Denis coalition), based in the locality of Jean Denis (Petite Rivière
de l’Artibonite commune) and led by Francky Pierre, alias “Ti Mépri”. 53
62. As the country’s second-largest electoral district, Artibonite’s political
dynamics have contributed to sustaining violence, notably through the historic use of
gangs by Youri Latortue and Prophane Victor (HTi.006). 54 After the launch of security
operations against the Kokorat San Ras stronghold in L’Estère commune in May, its
leader, Bendjy, denounced Youri Latortue as the founder of the gang, which the latter
now seeks to destroy. 55
63. Sources warned that, ahead of elections, these individuals may exploit ties to
gangs to mobilize support, intimidate rivals and undermine stability. 56 They also
__________________
46
Information shared by two Member States and a government official, November 2023 and
January 2026.
47
See https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2023/2023-04-12/html/sor-dors56-eng.html and https://lawslois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2022-226/FullText.html.
48
Official communication from Member State, 4 February 2026. See also
https://presidencia.gob.do/noticias/presidente-abinader-instruye-al-director-de-migracionimpedir-entrada-al-pais-extranjeros.
49
See https://2021-2025.state.gov/leveraging-tools-to-promote-accountability-and-counter-globalcorruption/.
50
Confidential report, April 2026.
51
Interviews with residents in Artibonite, and with gang analyst, April and June 2026.
52
Interviews with individual with direct experience in gang-controlled areas in Artibonite, and
with gang analyst, April 2026.
53
Ibid.
54
Interviews with residents, gang analysts and government official, May 2026.
55
Audio shared with the Panel in May 2026.
56
Interviews with confidential sources, April and May 2026.
26-09652
15/94
S/2026/714
cautioned that self-defence groups linked to local political dynamics could be used as
tools of intimidation, underscoring the need for mechanisms to prevent further
destabilization.
B.
Acts that violate international human rights law or that constitute
human rights abuses, and challenges to the rule of law
64. Between October 2025 and April 2026, 3,165 people were killed and 1,551
injured as a result of armed violence. 57 While 30% of casualties resulted from gang
attacks and 5% from self-defence groups or mob justice, most of them, 65%, occurred
during security operations. The overwhelming majority of casualties were caused by
firearms.
65. Recent waves of gang violence in Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite Department
have brought the number of internally displaced persons in Haiti to 1.5 million,
representing approximately 12% of the population. 58 Displacement, in turn, heightens
vulnerability and increases exposure to human rights violations and abuses. Of equal
concern is the number of Haitian nationals who continue to be forcibly returned from
neighbouring countries, which further deepens the existing humanitarian crisis. 59
1.
Human rights abuses by gangs
66. Designated gangs and gang leaders have continued to commit severe human
rights abuses, including killings, sexual and gender-based violence, kidnapping for
ransom (see sect. II.E), forced recruitment, destruction of property and extortion. The
Panel regularly receives evidence of such abuses in the West, Artibonite and Centre
Departments (see annexes 12, 13 and 15). Beyond sanctioned individuals, many other
gang leaders continue to engage in actions that meet designation criteria.
(a)
West Department
67. In addition to attacks against populations and governmental entities, the Panel
notes a resurgence of serious human rights abuses in the context of gang infighting in
the West Department. As Viv Ansanm gangs clashed, civilian populations in opposing
gang-controlled neighbourhoods, as well as individuals reportedly working for or
linked to rival gangs, have been directly targeted. The burning of homes, kidnappings
and sexual and gender-based violence have been used as weapons of retaliation.
68. For instance, infighting in the Cul-de-Sac plain between March and May 2026
saw two rival gang coalitions clash (see sect. II.A.1 and annex 12). Over the course
of two months, violence killed close to 400 people, including at least 68 civilians, and
injured many more, with properties destroyed and 18,000 people displaced. Cases of
sexual violence surged (see para. 76).
69. In other gang-controlled areas in the West Department, gangs continue to
commit a range of human rights abuses (see sect. II.A), including against members of
their own communities. For instance, in 2026, Christ-Roy Chery, alias Chrisla, the
leader of the Ti Bwa gang, has continued to administer cruel punishment as part of
arbitrary “justice” (S/2025/597, annex 5), shooting individuals in the hands and feet
__________________
57
See United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), quarterly reports on the human rights
situation in Haiti, October–December 2025 and January–March 2026.
58
See https://www.iom.int/news/haitis-displacement-crisis-hits-record-15-million-amidescalating-violence. The Panel visited two sites for internally displaced persons during the
reporting period.
59
More than 270,000 people were forcibly returned in 2025. See also S/2026/325, para. 58.
16/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
on several occasions in Carrefour. 60 On 20 December 2025, members of the Simon
Pelé gang, led by Stevenson Albert, alias “Djouma”, killed one minor, aged 17, and
one 20-year old man for refusing to comply with Djouma’s orders. 61 Since the
massacre he ordered in December 2024, Monel Felix, alias Micanor, the leader of
Wharf Jéremie, has continued to instil terror in his neighbourhood, killing individuals
and preventing wounded local residents from leaving the neighbourhood to seek
medical care. 62
(b)
Artibonite Department
70. The lower Artibonite has experienced an unprecedented level of coordinated
gang violence since late March 2026, with Gran Grif (HTe.001), Kokorat San Ras and
Canaan gangs having killed more than 100 people between 29 March and 13 April
2026 (see sect. II.A.4 and annex 15). Witnesses of the attacks reported to the Panel
how civilians, including children, were indiscriminately fired upon, and houses were
set on fire, leading to significant numbers displaced in very difficult conditions. 63
71. Since the death of his brother, Ferdens Tilus (alias “Meyer”), in July 2025,
Bendjy has taken the lead of the Kokorat San Ras gang. Bendjy, in coordination with
Luckson Elan (HTi.007), the leader of Gran Grif (HTe.001) and Kenken (see
sect. II.A.4), planned and conducted the recent wave of attacks launched in March in
the lower Artibonite.
(c)
Recruitment of children
72. The recruitment of children by gangs in Haiti continued to rise at an alarming
rate during the reporting period. 64 Although the exact number of children within gangs
is difficult to estimate, a severe uptick in recruitment, in both West and Artibonite
Departments, has been reported to the Panel by residents and civil society
representatives working in gang-controlled areas, as well as by officers involved in
security operations.
73. Most United Nations -sanctioned gang leaders have continued to recruit minors.
Casualties among gang members, sustained as a result of security operations during
the reporting period triggered an increase in child recruitment, especially by
5 Segond, led by Johnson André (alias “Izo”) (HTi.002) and Grand Ravine, led by
Renel Destina (alias “Ti Lapli”) (HTi.003). Gang leaders have also used children to
shield themselves from drone attacks. 65
74. Summary executions of children allegedly associated with gangs have been
reported, carried out by security forces and self-defence groups. 66 As security
operations have intensified and the Gang Suppression Force has begun its operations,
the situation of children within gangs is a pressing concern. In May 2026, the National
Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reinsertion – reactivated by the
National Pact in February (see para. 16) – presented its road map focused on
preventing vulnerable children and youth from joining gangs and supporting the
__________________
60
Interviews with two confidential sources, January 2026. Confidential report, 2026.
Interviews with a confidential source and a human rights defender, January 2026.
62
Interviews with a resident of Wharf Jéremie, and with a representative of civil society, June 2026.
63
Interviews with two relatives of victims from the attacks and two representatives of local
authorities who witnessed the attacks, April 2026.
64
See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/EN_CHILDREN%20TRAFFICKED
%20BY%20GANGS%20RETHINKING%20THE%20RESPONSES.pdf.
65
Interviews with security officers and a human right analyst, 2026.
66
Ibid.
61
26-09652
17/94
S/2026/714
reinsertion of those leaving gangs. 67 However, the current lack of meaningful
institutional and financial support means that implementation will be slow and
challenging.
2.
Sexual and gender-based violence
(a)
Sexual and gender-based violence committed by gangs
75. Interviews with human rights specialists and medical staff working in different
health facilities in Port-au-Prince reported that the number of cases of sexual and
gender-based violence had increased since the beginning of 2026. Collective rapes of
women and girls by armed men constitute the majority of sexual violence cases
treated by the staff in medical facilities with whom the Panel spoke. In Port-au-Prince,
Médecins sans frontières treated 2,485 victims of sexual violence from January to
May 2026. Of these, 72% had been raped by armed men, and 64% of total cases were
gang rape. The vast majority of victims were women and girls, with 16% being
minors. 68 Specific cases of children ages 8, 9 and 10 years old were reported.
76. Amid a resurgence of gang infighting during the reporting period, sexual
violence has been used as a weapon of retaliation against women and girls living in
neighbourhoods controlled by rival gangs. Many cases of sexual violence were
reported during hostilities in the Cul-de-Sac plain in March and April 2026 (see annex
12). 69 In particular, members of the gangs of 400 Mawozo, led by Lanmò San Jou
(HTi.004), Canaan, led by Jeff Larose, Chen Mechan and Tokyo, led by Chalè, have
committed series of rapes when invading Duvivier, Sarthe et Terre Noire
neighbourhoods 70 (see also sect. II.A.1).
77. In mid-June 2026, clashes in Cité Soleil between the gangs of Belekou and
Wharf Jéremie resulted in kidnappings by the Belekou gang during which more than
10 women from Wharf Jéremie were subjected to sexual violence. 71
(b)
Sexual exploitation and abuse by members of the Multinational Security
Support Mission
78. According to the report of the Secretary-General on special measures for
protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (A/80/644), in 2025, the United
Nations received four allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, including three
minors, involving Kenyan personnel from the Multinational Security Support Mission
in Haiti. 72 All cases were corroborated by investigations conducted by the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and referred to
the commander of the Gang Suppression Force and the Multinational Security
Support Mission for investigation and remedial measures.
79. The cases occurred in Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite, where Kenyan officers had
been deployed between the end of 2024 and April 2026. The Panel interviewed several
members of local civil society who had met with or supported victims or their
__________________
67
Commission nationale de désarmement, démantèlement et réinsertion, « Stratégie d’intervention »,
mars 2026.
68
See also BINUH, quarterly reports on the human rights situation in Haiti, October –December
2025 and January–March 2026.
69
Interview with human right analyst, June 2026. See https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/documentlibrary/flash-report-intensification-of-gang-violence-in-the-plaine-du-cul-de-sac-1.
70
Interview with human rights analyst and representative of civil society, June 2026.
71
Interview with representative of civil society of Cité Soleil, June 2026. Interview with human
rights analyst, June 2026.
72
See the supplementary information to the report, available at https://www.un.org/preventingsexual-exploitation-and-abuse/sites/www.un.org.preventing-sexual-exploitation-andabuse/files/smr_2026_a-80-644_supplementary_data.pdf.
18/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
families. They confirmed the four cases outlined in the Secretary-General’s report and
also mentioned additional ones. Several cases included transactions in exchange for
money and/or food.
80. Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite has been enduring very high levels of armed
violence. While many residents have left the area, those who remain are among the
most vulnerable. In this context, the deployment of exclusively male battalions in
ordinary residential areas, where civilians have easy access to premises, has fallen
short of providing the necessary safeguards to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse.
81. In July 2026, the Kenyan authorities informed the Panel that following the
allegations, the Multinational Security Support Mission had set up a board of inquiry,
which they sent to Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite in September and November 2025.
Visits to government institutions, including hospitals and a police station, did not
yield information. The board of inquiry concluded that the allegations were
unsubstantiated. In January 2026, the board of inquiry met with non -governmental
organizations and obtained witness statements, which they deemed not sufficiently
supported by evidence. The Kenyan authorities informed the Panel that to address the
gaps identified by the board of inquiry, a formal national investigation team had
recently been established.
3.
Excessive use of force by security actors
82. As previously observed by the Panel (see S/2025/597 and S/2026/241), a
consistent trend persists: approximately 70% of persons killed or injured recorded
during the first quarter of 2026 occurred during security operations. These operations
have included extrajudicial executions involving police personnel. 73
(a)
Use of explosive drones outside a regulatory human rights framework
83. During the reporting period, security operations in densely populated urban
areas continued to be documented involving the use of explosive drones facilitated
by a foreign private military company. In the first quarter of 2026 alone, such
operations resulted in the deaths of 41 civilians, including 3 boys, and injured 28
civilians, including 2 girls. 74 Medical professionals interviewed by the Panel in Portau-Prince also reported civilian victims of drone strikes, including a pregnant
woman. 75 As previously indicated, such use may constitute extrajudicial executions
(S/2025/597, annex 8).
(b)
Extrajudicial executions
84. In 2025, 125 cases of actual or attempted cases of extrajudicial executions were
transmitted by the Human Rights Section of BINUH to the Inspectorate General of
the Haitian National Police, 17 of which have been completed and the rest remaining
under investigation. 76
85. The Panel has been looking into a range of illicit activities conducted by officers
of the Departmental Law Enforcement Unit (Unité départementale de maintien de
l’ordre – UDMO) of the Haitian National Police in the Artibonite Department,
including the diversion of ammunition from Haitian National Police stockpiles,
support for the spoliation of land and collusion with gang members (see annex 19).
The Inspectorate General is currently investigating these reports, as well as the
__________________
73
BINUH, quarterly reports on the human rights situation in Haiti, October –December 2025 and
January–March 2026.
74
See https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR36/0991/2026/es/.
75
Interviews with medical staff, 2026.
76
BINUH, quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, January -March 2026.
26-09652
19/94
S/2026/714
involvement of one officer of the Departmental Law Enforcement Unit (UDMO) in
several extrajudicial killings in Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite. 77 These include the
assassination of several individuals, including a 14-year-old girl, between September
2025 and March 2026. 78
4.
Human cost of armed violence and obstruction of humanitarian access
and assistance
86. In 2025, 5,915 people were killed and 2,708 injured 79 as a result of gang-related
violence, with the human cost of armed violence extending well beyond immediate
casualties. The general increase in firearm calibres on the battlefield (see para. 9 4),
coupled with greater circulation of large-capacity magazines contributed to higher
lethality of armed violence. In addition, injuries require surgery more frequently and
extended hospital stays. 80 Deaths and long-term disabilities remove breadwinners
from households, deepen poverty and further erode the social fabric of vulnerable
communities. 81
87. Beyond the individual toll, the cumulative impact of armed violence on the
health system is significant. Access to care remains deeply challenging due to gang
control of roads and the repeated temporary suspension or definitive closure of many
facilities as a result of violence. Only 10% of health facilities with hospitalization
capacity are fully operational nationwide. 82
5.
Challenges to the rule of law and human rights protection
88. On 27 May 2026, two specialized judicial units – one addressing mass crimes
and sexual violence, the other tackling complex financial crimes – were inaugurated. 83
That development presents an important opportunity to address impunity in these
critical areas.
89. However, several decisions have been undermining the rule of law and
reinforcing impunity (S/2026/241, annex 12). In particular, on 17 December 2025, a
decree created a High Court of Justice with exclusive authority to prosecute and
adjudicate current and former senior State officials for any criminal acts committed
during their time in office. In practice, it removed ordinary courts’ jurisdiction and
introduced complex procedures widely seen as making prosecutions and adjudication
impossible and shielding officials from accountability. In addition, legal experts have
raised concerns over the suspension of many ongoing cases before the judiciary, at a
time when the High Court cannot be operational in the absence of an elected
Parliament. 84
C.
Arms trafficking and violations of the arms embargo
90. Successive waves of intense armed violence over the reporting period reflect
the continued ability and ease of gangs and other non-State armed actors to acquire
firearms and, more critically, ammunition. While Haitian, Dominican and United
__________________
77
Meeting with a representative of the Inspectorate General of the Haitian National Police, May 2026.
Confidential report, 2026.
79
BINUH, quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, October-December 2025.
80
Interview with medical staff and Haitian National Police officers, June 2026.
81
See Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security and others, Pathway
to Policy: Firearms Trafficking and Public Health in the Caribbean (December 2025).
82
See S/2026/325.
83
See https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/06/1167627.
84
Interviews with judicial sources and legal analysts, May and June 2026.
78
20/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
States authorities have taken steps to address trafficking and implement the arms
embargo, these efforts remain insufficient given the scale of the challenge.
91. Most of the trafficking networks operating between the United States and Haiti
investigated by the Panel during the mandate are efficient, but not particularly
sophisticated. Yet they display a striking degree of confidence and take few measures
to cover their tracks. Their operations are characterized by poor concealment
methods, the inclusion of easily detectable contraband, such as cannabis, alongside
the firearms and, in some cases, the presence of documents inside the shipments
clearly identifying the traffickers themselves (see para. 103). Most of the individuals
involved in trafficking from the United States and investigated by the Panel purchased
firearms under their own names from federal firearms licensees, leaving a clear paper
trail of their criminal activities.
92. Taken together, these indicators point to a perception of low risk among
traffickers of the likelihood of interdiction. The Panel is concerned about the
weaknesses and gaps in inspection and enforcement mechanisms in both the United
States and Haiti, as well as the complicity of corrupt Haitian customs and law
enforcement officials in facilitating the movement of illicit shipments by air and sea.
93. Although no violation of the arms embargo was reported by Haitian and
Dominican authorities along the land border during the reporting period, the Panel
received information indicating that Haitian non-State armed actors continue to
procure materiel through cross-border networks. These networks acquire materiel in
the Dominican Republic, with Belladère remaining a particularly vulnerable point.
1.
Trends in trafficking
(a)
Evolution of calibres and types of firearms
94. Since its establishment in October 2022, the Panel has noted a clear shift in the
calibre of firearms used by gangs. Artisanal weapons and revolvers have been
increasingly relegated to rural areas, smaller criminal groups and individuals, while
5.56x45mm semi-automatic rifles have replaced shotguns among gangs and
complemented handguns. Over the past two years, gangs have been procuring
growing quantities of 7.62x39mm rifles and, to a lesser extent, 7.62x51mm calibre
firearms, resulting in higher lethality (see sect. II.B). The most sought-after firearms
are currently .50 calibre rifles, which, while still circulating in limited quantities, are
already present within certain gangs. During the reporting period, privately made
firearms were also documented as part of arms embargo violations, reflecting a
developing trend as previously reported by the Panel ( see annex 17, see also
S/2024/704).
(b)
Sources of illicit ammunition
95. During the reporting period, the Panel documented a sample of 1,200 rounds of
seized ammunition. The ammunition was retrieved from gangs operating in Kenscoff,
Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas 2 and Bel-Air between October 2025 and June 2026.
These include 5.56x45mm (59.5%), .223 Remington (3.2%), 7.62x39mm (6%),
7.62x51mm (27%), .308 Winchester (1.5%), and 12.7x99mm/.50cal (2.8%).
Ammunition was produced by more than 30 different manufacturers across 20
countries, including in Europe, Asia and the Americas, which export for a wide
commercial and military or law enforcement market. A notable portion of seized
ammunition come from national stockpiles, primarily Haitian, but also Dominican
(see annex 18).
26-09652
21/94
S/2026/714
(c)
Prices
96. Arms and ammunition trafficking continue to be a very lucrative business.
Prices on the illicit Haitian market remain high, particularly in Port -au-Prince,
reflecting the sustained demand from non-State armed actors across the country
(S/2025/597, para. 76). Notably, prices in the lower Artibonite region have converged
with those in Port-au-Prince. Basic 9x19mm handguns sell for between $2,000 and
$4,000, while 5.56x45mm semi-automatic rifles fetch between $5,000 and $8,000.
Ammunition prices are equally elevated, with a single 5.56x45mm round selling for
approximately $3. 85
(d)
Use of messaging applications
97. Encrypted messaging applications play a central role in the international
trafficking of arms and ammunition in Haiti, serving both to connect individuals along
the trafficking chain and as marketplaces where traffickers manage communities of
potential buyers. For instance, in 2025 the Panel received information about a
messaging application group entitled “Weapons market”. The group was administered
at the time by an individual with a number registered in France who displayed
firearms for sale, mostly second-hand, including handguns and semi-automatic rifles.
The group administrator claimed the network was able to deliver anywhere.
Telephone numbers of potential buyers were registered in Haiti and the Dominican
Republic, as well as in regional overseas local authorities and departments of France:
Guadeloupe, French Guiana and Martinique. The Panel sent a request for informa tion
to the French authorities in 2025, who responded that the matter was under
investigation.
(e)
Trafficking of firearms from Haiti to Jamaica
98. In July 2026, the Jamaican authorities informed the Panel that the drugs -forguns trade remains one of the primary sources of illicit firearms acquired by criminal
gangs operating in Jamaica (S/2024/704, sects. II.B.1 (a) (iv) and II.B.2 (a) (i)).
Jamaican records indicate a slight reduction in the frequency of trafficking voyages ,
due to sustained operational pressure by regional and Jamaican security agencies, and the
passage of Hurricane Melissa, in late 2025, which damaged the marijuana cultivation area
in Jamaica. Since the previous report of the Panel (S/2025/597, annex 27), the Jamaican
authorities have seized three additional firearms bearing the markings of the Haitian
National Police, bringing the total number of seized Haitian National Police firearms
in Jamaica to date to 51.
2.
Progress and challenges in the enforcement of the arms embargo
(a)
Haiti
99. During the reporting period, Haitian authorities, in compliance with the arms
embargo, have seized several shipments of illegal arms and ammunition concealed in
containers coming from the United States. These include interceptions at ports of
entry in Cap-Haïtien, North Department, and Saint-Marc, Artibonite Department (see
annex 16). While traffickers were arrested and some investigations were launched,
limited resources, pervasive corruption and the absence of effective protection for
officers willing to act, consistently prevent meaningful judicial outcomes.
100. In most cases of violations previously reported by the Panel, suspects have been
released despite overwhelming evidence, investigations have been derailed by
pressure from influential actors, and no prosecutions have ever resulted in any charges
__________________
85
22/94
Interviews with security officers, 2026 and information retrieved from phone exploitation of
arms traffickers, 2026.
26-09652
S/2026/714
(see for instance S/2025/597, para. 83 and para. 101). Against this backdrop,
extradition to the United States of individuals suspected of being involved in arms
trafficking from its territory has emerged as one of the avenues through which
traffickers have faced meaningful consequences. Several cases occurred during the
reporting period (see paras. 103 and 104).
101. The Panel previously reported the arrest in the Dominican Republic in June 2025
of three individuals involved in the procurement of arms, commercial drones 86 and
other items for Haitian gang leaders. Étienne Roudley, Sony Pierre and Sténio Saint Fleur were transferred to the Haitian authorities on 7 June 2025 in Dajabón
(S/2025/597, annex 21). 87 The three were intending to procure a DJI Mavic 3 drone
from a shop in Santo Domingo for Johnson André (alias Izo). The trafficking process
for this item helps illustrate the broader modus operandi. Despite overwhelming
evidence, all three individuals were released by the Haitian authorities. Investigations
indicate that Mr. Roudley had been in regular contact with Izo for two years,
supplying him with various items. Mr. Roudley was in touch with more than 30 senior
members of Viv Ansanm negotiating the purchase of clothing, shoes, drones and
firearms sourced in the Dominican Republic. He has been using Dominican bank
accounts to receive the money.
(b)
United States of America
Interdictions
102. During the reporting period, United States Customs and Border Protection
seized rifles and ammunition destined to Haiti at ports of exit in the United States.
Investigations are ongoing.
Prosecutions of traffickers
103. In December 2025 and January 2026, a series of seizures of handguns, semi automatic rifles and ammunition were made from maritime containers shipped from
the United States in Cap-Haïtien. Clement Mary Junior Thelusma, a dual United
States-Haitian national, was arrested in Cap-Haïtien on 29 December 2025
(S/2026/241, annex 13). One of the intercepted shipments included two of his expired
Haitian passports. Thelusma has a record of purchasing a significant number of
firearms in the United States, regularly shipping small quantities to Haiti and
travelling to Cap-Haïtien to receive the merchandise. During questioning by national
authorities, he stated that he sold to any buyer for commercial purposes, including to
the Jean Denis coalition (see sect. II.A.4). In April 2026, he was extradited to the
United States, where he has since been indicted along with an accomplice who
purchased firearms for him. 88
104. The Panel previously reported on the significant seizure in February 2025, in
the Dominican Republic, of a container shipped from the United States and destined
to Haiti, transporting 23 firearms and 36,000 rounds of ammunition (see S/2025/597,
para. 99 and annex 23). The intended end users were the 400 Mawozo and Canaan
gangs. Several individuals were arrested in Haiti, including Jeff Pierre, Jacques Jerry
Pierre and Francesca Charles, a dual United States-Haitian national. The three
individuals purchased at least 46 firearms between May 2024 and February 2025,
__________________
86
Gangs have continued to try to procure commercial uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) to conduct
surveillance and guide operations. During the reporting period, Haitian customs seized 40 UAVs
at ports of entry as a preventive measure. Source: Haitian customs, 2026. See also S/2025/597,
annex 21.
87
Interviews with Dominican and Haitian law enforcement officers, 2025 and 2026 and
confidential report, 2026.
88
USA v. Emmanes Tarius and Clement Mary Thelusma Jr. indictment, filed 26 March 2026.
26-09652
23/94
S/2026/714
including two .50 calibre anti-materiel rifles, and sent several shipments to Haiti in
violation of the arms embargo. The three individuals were extradited to the United
States in December 2025 and in January 2026, they were indicted for conspiring to
smuggle and unlawfully ship firearms and ammunition from the United States to
Haiti. 89 One of the key actors of the network, Marcadieu Nabon Pierre, alias “Ti
Nana”, the mother of Jeff Pierre and Jacques Jerry Pierre, resides in Haiti and remains
at large.
(c)
Dominican Republic
105. The Dominican Republic has not formally identified any violations of the arms
embargo through its territory during the reporting period.
106. In 2026, the Panel documented several types of ammunition that had been
diverted from Dominican national stockpiles, particularly in use by the 400 Mawozo
gang, established near the Dominican border (see annex 18). The Panel contacted the
authorities, who responded that, in December 2025, a second lieutenant from the
Dominican Army had been arrested in San Juan de la Maguana Province, Dominican
Republic, along with a Haitian national, while transporting 1,516 rounds of
ammunition on a motorbike. 90 The prosecution of the case is ongoing. The Panel
requested additional information on potential other points of diversion.
3.
Arms and ammunition trafficking to non-State armed actors in the
Artibonite Department
107. Given the surge in armed violence in the Artibonite Department during the
reporting period (see sect. II.A.4), the Panel has particularly focused its investigations
on trafficking dynamics affecting this region. This escalation was sustained by the
capacity of non-State armed actors – both self-defence groups and gangs – to procure
arms and ammunition through multiple trafficking channels. Trafficking networks
often operate with commercial objectives, supplying materiel indiscriminately to both
gangs and other actors. Sources of supply include networks procuring materiel f rom
abroad and domestic transfers, including inter-gang transfers and diversions from the
Haitian National Police (see annex 19).
(a)
Acquisition of materiel by self-defence groups
108. Self-defence groups in the lower Artibonite, while considerably less equipped
than the gangs they oppose, have increasingly managed to procure materiel. Financial
contributions from the local population – sometimes collected forcibly at
checkpoints – and from the diaspora are used to purchase arms and ammunition from
traffickers based outside the region, particularly in Cap-Haïtien and the Centre
Department, as well as from abroad (see para. 103). Some groups were also given
ammunition by Haitian National Police officers with whom they collaborate in
operations against gangs as well as some firearms that some Haitian National Police
officers had seized from gangs 91 (see annex 19).
(b)
Acquisition of materiel by gangs
109. The Panel previously provided evidence to the Committee on the backing of
gangs of the Artibonite Department by businessmen and political actors from the
region. While Prophane Victor (HTi.006) had contributed to the rise of Gran Grif,
__________________
89
Information provided by the United States, July 2026. See also https://www.justice.gov/usaomdfl/pr/jacksonville-woman-pleads-guilty-unlawfully-smuggling-firearms-united-states-haiti.
90
Official communication from authorities of the Dominican Republic, March 2026.
91
Interviews with members of self-defence groups and security officers, 2026.
24/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
including through the provision of arms, Youri Latortue had supported the Raboteau
and the Kokorat San Ras gangs, including by providing arms and ammunition.
110. During the reporting period, both Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras gangs have
regularly displayed new materiel, pointing to a combination of direct supply from
traffickers based abroad, inter-gang transfers – particularly from the Canaan gang led
by Jeff Larose – and diversions from Haitian National Police stockpiles. The latter
result from battlefield losses following police casualties, as well as theft by some
corrupt police officers. The Panel investigated a network of officers of the
Departmental Law Enforcement Unit (UDMO) selling ammunition to gangs,
primarily operating out of the Pat-Chawal commissariat, Saint-Marc commune (see
annex 19).
4.
Diversions from national stockpiles through loss or theft
111. Diversions from Haitian National Police stockpiles remain a persistent concern,
as previously reported by the Panel (S/2025/597, annex 25), with ammunition in use
by the police consistently found across gang stockpiles and firearms used by the
police regularly retrieved from gang members. 92 For instance, of the 336 7.62x51mm
rounds documented by the Panel from seizures from Jamesley and Krache Dife gangs
in 2026, 70% had been diverted from the Haitian National Police stockpiles.
112. While some materiel was lost during clashes or following attacks on the Haitian
National Police, other cases point to trafficking. The police arrested several corrupt
officers during the reporting period, including some found to be trafficking arms and
ammunition for Chalè, the leader of the Tokyo gang (see annex 9). Despite these
efforts, diversions continue, with some officers collecting unuse d ammunition and
reselling it to gangs, self-defence groups, private security companies and individuals
seeking protection.
113. The Panel documented boxes and ammunition of 5.56x45mm ammunition used
by gangs and one self-defence group that are consistent with ammunition recently
imported by the Haitian Armed Forces (see S/2026/241). 93 In May 2026, the Panel
raised the issue with the Haitian Ministry of Defence. Although the chain of custody
of the ammunition is unclear, the Panel was informed that a portion of the ammunition
imported by the Haitian Armed Forces had been transferred to the Haitian National
Police.
114. With the intensification of security operations, the Haitian National Police has
been seizing arms and ammunition on a regular basis. In 2025, the police seized 356
firearms, including 132 rifles, 165 pistols (and 9 revolvers), 33 artisanal firearms and
17 shotguns. 94 In the absence of a central process to manage the seizures, many arms
and ammunition are unaccounted for, with some being diverted by corrupt officers.
5.
Management of Multinational Security Support Mission and Gang Suppression
Force arms and ammunition
115. In paragraph 14 of its resolution 2700 (2023), the Security Council called upon
the Multinational Security Support Mission to implement weapons and ammunition
management processes and to report to the Panel any diversion of weapons and
ammunition, including through theft and loss. In this connection, the Panel wrote to
__________________
92
For example, in November 2025, several handguns belonging to the police were retrieved in
Croix-des Bouquets from 400 Mawozo. Source: Haitian National Police, 2026.
93
Following a tracing request sent by the Panel, the Brazilian authorities confirmed that the
ammunition was consistent with that produced by the Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (CBC)
and that the Haitian Armed Forces had signed a contract with the company in 2023 to import
that ammunition.
94
Haitian National Police, 2026.
26-09652
25/94
S/2026/714
the Kenyan authorities to obtain information on any diversion of arms and
ammunition that may have occurred during the deployment in Haiti, including with
regard to a small sample of Kenyan-manufactured ammunition retrieved from gangs
that the Panel documented. The Kenyan authorities provided detailed information
about incidents of diversion, including losses (see annex 20).
116. During its meeting with the Force Commander of the Gang Suppression Force
in May 2026, the Panel discussed the management of arms and ammunition of Force
contingents and the risks of diversion, as well as the management of the materiel that
will be seized during operations. In response, the Force Commander mentioned that
an ordnance and weapons and ammunition management officer would be integrated
into the headquarters staff of the Force.
117. During operations on 6 July 2026, the Gang Suppression Force seized four
12-gauge shotguns, one 9x19mm sub-machine gun and one semi-automatic
5.56x45mm rifle, as well as magazines and 19 rounds of ammunition, in the Tabarre
area of Port-au-Prince, and provided all relevant details to the Panel.
D.
Drug trafficking
118. During the reporting period, the Panel investigated record cases of cocaine and
cannabis seizures, highlighting the scale of trafficking operations transiting through
Haiti. Northern Haiti continues to feature as a corridor in regional drug trafficking
routes, as reported by the Panel (see S/2025/597), with increased participation of
nationals of Jamaica and The Bahamas.
1.
Seizure by Haitian authorities of 1,045 kg of cocaine, near Tortuga Island
119. On 13 July 2025, the Haitian National Police conducted a major maritime
interdiction off Tortuga Island, in the North-West Department, resulting in the seizure
of 1,045 kg of cocaine. The operation led to the arrests of one Jamaican national and
one Bahamian national, who later died, including one in unclear circumstances. Two
other drug traffickers fell into the sea.
120. Information from a Member State indicated that the shipment originated from
the coastal areas of Buritaca, in the Department of Magdalena, in Colombia, where
the criminal group Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada operates. 95
121. The current top leaders of Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada are
Fredy Castillo Carrillo (alias “Pinocho”) and Naín Andrés Pérez Toncel (alias
“Naim”). In 2011, Pinocho was deported to Colombia after serving a sentence in the
United States, where he was extradited to face charges of drug trafficking. Similarly,
in 2022, he was arrested in Spain and later extradited to Colombia to face new
charges, including murder and criminal conspiracy. In June 2023, he was released
after a controversial court ruling, although that decision was later overturned. 96
122. On 28 August 2024, the Government of Colombia suspended the arrest warrants
for key leaders of Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada members,
including Pinocho, to allow them to participate in the peace talks with the national
Government. 97 As for Naim, he is a high-profile target wanted for homicide and major
criminal offences in the Caribbean region. 98 At present, 45 investigations are under
way regarding Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada, involving 584
__________________
95
Information provided by a Member State, April 2026.
See https://insightcrime.org/es/noticias-crimen-organizado-colombia/los-pachenca/.
97
República de Colombia, Presidencia de la República, Resolución número 335, 28 de Agosto de
2024.
98
See https://www.policia.gov.co/contenido/nain-andres-perez-toncel.
96
26/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
suspects across six departments and twenty-four municipalities nationwide, for
offences including targeted killings, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, forced
recruitment, extortion and kidnapping. 99
123. According to the Member State, the criminal organization outsourced specific
parts of the trafficking operation to external criminal groups. This initially involved
launch platforms for go-fast boats fitted with hidden compartments. To ensure the
autonomy of these vessels en route to the United States, the organization used support
boats on the high seas to refuel, resupply and relieve the crew. 100 The authorities also
stated that transnational criminal organizations used distinctive labels bearing
counterfeit logos of luxury brands, such as “Cartier” and “Rolex”, encountered in the
seized shipment, including to indicate the purity and authenticity of the alkaloid to
international buyers. The seized cocaine shipment is estimated to represent a financial
loss of approximately $34 million for the criminal organization, based on market
prices in the United States. 101 According to security sources, the owner of the drug
shipment is believed to be a Bahamian national. 102
124. Investigations by Haitian authorities are ongoing, including the analysis of data
extracted from the seized satellite phone and SIM cards seized from the traffickers.
The Panel sent communications to Jamaica and The Bahamas.
Seizure by Belgian authorities of 1,156.42 kg of cocaine, in the port of Antwerp103
2.
125. On 14 July 2025 – the day after the seizure of 1,045 kg near Tortuga Island – a
container was shipped from Cap-Haïtien, in the North Department, transhipped in
Kingston, Jamaica, and arrived at the Belgian port of Antwerp, on 22 August 2025.
Belgian authorities found 1,156.42 kg of cocaine inside the container, divided into
1,000 packages.
126. According to the Belgian authorities, the drugs were concealed using the “ripoff” method, whereby illicit substances are introduced into legitimate cargo,
frequently without the knowledge of the consignor or consignee, and subsequently
extracted at a later stage in the transportation process. 104
127. Jamaican authorities indicated that the container was unlikely to have been
contaminated in Kingston, particularly emphasizing the security measures in place. 105
128. The seizure on 14 July 2025 was the second seizure in the port of Antwerp
reported to the Panel, following the case on 29 September 2023 in which Belgian
authorities seized 308.7 kg of cocaine in a shipment originating from Port -au-Prince
(S/2024/704, para. 95).
129. Both cases involved the use of the “rip-off” method, with traffickers using
legitimate cocoa export channels of goods from Haiti to traffic drugs to Europe. In
2023, prices at European maritime hubs, such as Belgium, were between $20,540 and
$34,594 per kg of cocaine. 106
3.
Seizure of 1,376 kg of cannabis in the Northwest Department
130. On 30 April 2026, the United States Coast Guard stopped a vessel off Môle
Saint-Nicolas, in Haiti’s North-West Department, resulting in the seizure of
__________________
99
Information provided by a Member State, June 2026.
Information provided by a Member State, April 2026.
101
Information provided by a Member State, April and June 2026.
102
Confidential investigative report, August 2025.
103
Information provided by a Member State, February 2026.
104
Ibid.
105
Information provided by a Member State, 13 March 2026.
106
See https://data.unodc.org/datareport/drug-price.
100
26-09652
27/94
S/2026/714
approximately 1,376 kg of cannabis, worth approximately $3.8 million, and the arrest
of a Jamaican national. The contraband and suspected smuggler were transferred to
Haitian authorities on 3 May 2026.
131. The Jamaican national stated that he was a fisherman and that the vessel carrying
the drugs belonged to another Jamaican national. According to the first Jamaican
national, he was contacted by this second Jamaican national to arrange a trip from
Jamaica to Providenciales, Turks and Caicos Islands, and identified the second
Jamaican national as the owner of the drugs. The first Jamaican national further
reported that he had agreed to carry out the trip for the sum of $10,000. He admitted
that there had been four individuals aboard the vessel; however, they managed to dive
into the sea and escape from the Coast Guard. 107
132. The seizure on 30 April 2026 is the second major interception of cannabis
reported by the Panel, following the 2.7 tons intercepted by Dominican authorities in
May 2025, in Pedernales, located on the Dominican Republic -Haiti border
(S/2025/597, para. 118). Other seizures of smaller quantities were also recorded in
the Dominican border towns of Pedernales, Dajabón and Elías Piña. In addition, in
August 2024, authorities in the Turks and Caicos Islands intercepted multiple vessels
carrying illegal migrants from the northern coast of Haiti, leading to the seizure of
more than $2 million worth of cannabis. 108 The operations reveal a pattern in which
illicit drug trafficking is conducted alongside irregular migration flows along the
Haiti-Turks and Caicos Islands route. The Panel sent an official communication to the
Turks and Caicos Islands authorities, through the United Kingdom, and the response
is pending.
E.
Illicit financial flows
1.
Gangs’ sources of financing
133. Revenue generation remains a key driver of gang-related violence. The larger
the operational territory, the bigger the population to be preyed upon and therefore,
the higher the revenue generated. Sources of revenue include kidnapping, illegal
checkpoints, extortion on businesses and the taxation of households for basic services
(such as electricity and water), which the gangs do not even supply (see S/2023/674,
including annex 23).
134. During the reporting period, gangs in some parts of Port -au-Prince have had to
adapt their modus operandi as a result of security operations (see sect. II.A.1) that are
notably aimed at clearing the roads of gang control and of illegal checkpoints. These
operations have led gangs to conceal their tolling activity on roads ( S/2026/241, paras.
53–57) and relocate some checkpoints. Gangs have also intensified kidnappings,
making it a main source of revenue in order to cover the loss of toll revenue. 109
135. Nonetheless, these changes in approach do not mean that gangs have ceased to
generate revenue in other forms, as reported previously ( S/2026/241, paras. 54–57),
in addition to receiving financial and logistical support from economic and political
actors.
__________________
107
Confidential investigative report, 20 May 2026.
See https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article
291178685.html?utm_.
109
Interview with a gang analyst and with an anti-kidnapping officer; and two confidential reports,
November 2025.
108
28/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Kidnapping for ransom
136. The increase in cases of kidnapping for ransom is more prevalent in the Port au-Prince metropolitan area, the wider West Department and the Artibonite
Department, with some kidnappings linked to errant officers of the Haitian National
Police. Other families decide to negotiate with gangs directly out of fear of retribution
or harm to their kidnapped loved ones, rather than report the kidnapping to the police.
These factors make it difficult to obtain reliable data on the overall situation on
kidnappings.
137. Nevertheless, during the reporting period, available records show an upsurge in
the trend perpetrated mainly by 5 Segond, led by Johnson André (HTi.002); 400
Mawozo, led by Joseph Wilson (HTi.004); and Kraze Barye gang, led by Vitelhomme
Innocent (HTi.005), all members of the Viv Ansanm alliance (HTe.002). Of 143 cases
documented countrywide between January and February, the West Department
accounted for 109 cases, 50% of which occurred in Delmas commune. The Artibonite
Department accounted for 29 of the cases. 110 Gangs use various strategies to kidnap.
138. Among the logistical challenges facing the Anti-Kidnapping Cell of the Haitian
National Police is the lack of phone tracking devices and vehicles for tracking
victims, as well as an insufficient number of trained negotiators. In addition, gangs
continuously change their kidnapping tactics, making it difficult for the specialized
cell to detect and prevent such occurrences. 111 According to several independent
sources, the ransom amounts vary on a case-by-case basis, and in one instance during
the reporting period, an amount of $1.5 million was demanded as ransom. 112 Actual
amounts transferred are however much lower, with the highest transfer disclosed to
the Panel during the reporting period amounting to $153,000. Depending on the
wealth of the victim, the ransom amounts commonly paid often range between $5,000
and $25,000. 113
How gangs kidnap and receive ransom
139. The Panel found that kidnappings take various forms in terms of which potential
victims are targeted (see annex 21) and in which ways the gangs receive ransom,
which is mostly paid either in bulk cash handed to their intermediaries, or by taking
their victims to banks to transact. 114
Bulk cash option
140. This is by far the method preferred by gangs and is the most commonly used.
The process entails sometimes lengthy negotiations between, on the one hand, the
leader of the gang and/or his representative, and on the other, the family, relatives or
friends of victims. 115
In-person bank transactions
141. Whereas most financial institutions have closed their operations in areas
controlled by gangs, several of those based in Carrefour commune remain operational.
Sources, including a former gang member with inside knowledge of gang operations,
described to the Panel the tactics gangs use, including how gangs from various
communes of the West Department take their victims or the victims ’ family members
__________________
110
Confidential sources.
Interview with Anti-Kidnapping Cell, May 2026.
112
Ibid.
113
Interviews with Anti-Kidnapping Cell and confidential report, 2026.
114
Confidential reports and interviews with anti-kidnapping officers, March and May 2026.
115
Interview with two former victims, a gang analyst and a resident of a gang -controlled area,
January and March 2026.
111
26-09652
29/94
S/2026/714
to Carrefour to withdraw money for ransom. They explained why Carrefour commune
has emerged as a safe haven for gang economic activities, with few Government -led
security operations in that area.
142. The Panel wrote to several banks with branches in Carrefour, as well as to the
Bank of the Republic of Haiti, which is the regulator and supervisor of the banking
and financial system in the country. In its response, the Bank stated that it had
received reports of two cases where gang leaders, their members or their associates
accessed banking networks for illicit financial purposes.
143. The Panel investigated a case in which Ralph Woodmyr Louissaint, alias
Chalè, 116 a member of Viv Ansanm (HTe.002) and one of his concubines, Graciani S.
Jean Louis (alias “Smelca”) operated accounts in one of the banks in Carrefour in
early 2025. 117 Two sources 118 and an insider within Chalè’s network described how he
was assigned the task of accompanying Lourdemya Raphael (also a concubine to
Chalè) to a bank in Diquini, in Carrefour commune, for Lourdemya to transfer Chalè’s
bank account into her name. The Panel contacted the bank for further details and
among the responses was a confirmation that in January 2026, Smelca, Chalè ’s
concubine, had granted power of attorney for her account to a third party (see also
annex 9 for more information on Chalè).
2.
Support to gangs by economic actors
The case of Rosemila Petit Frère
144. Financial and logistical support from economic actors continue to be a source
of revenue for gangs in a manner similar to previous cases reported by the Panel, such
as in the case of Rony Célestin (see S/2024/704, paras. 167–171). The Panel’s
investigation into illicit financial activities linked to the financing of gangs found that
Rosemila Petit Frère, a businesswoman and former mayor of Arcahaie commune,
West Department, from 2016 to 2020, has had a long-standing relationship with gang
leaders of Viv Ansanm (HTe.002), and that she has offered them both financial and
logistical support. 119 Ms. Petit Frère also acted as an intermediary between gangs and
other actors. She was a key player in perpetuating the criminal-political-economic
nexus between gangs, political, security and economic actors, including in facilitating
communications and financial transactions. 120 This information was further
corroborated by two Member States.
145. In August 2025, Ms. Petit Frère was arrested when transiting the Dominican
Republic from Canada. 121 Upon investigation, several message trails implicated her
in supporting several Viv Ansanm leaders, including Renel Destina (HTi.003), alias
Ti Lapli, the leader of Grand Ravine gang. 122
146. In the five months preceding the launch of Viv Ansanm in September 2023,
Ms. Petit Frère intensified phone calls with Jean Gardy (alias “Pece Pim Pim”), and
Ti Lapli and in three occasions transmitted confidential operational information to Ti
__________________
116
See https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/haiti-justice-un-dossier-judiciaire-met-en-cause-lechef-de-gang-chale-plusieurs-policiers-et-au-moins-17-personnes-arretees-dans-une-vasteenquete-sur-le-reseau-viv-ansa/.
117
A confidential report, May 2026.
118
An anti-gang operations investigator and gang analyst, May 2026.
119
Interview with an anti-corruption analyst, a gang analyst and two confidential sources, February
and May 2026.
120
A confidential report and interview with a gang analyst, May and June 2026.
121
https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/15/former-arcahaie-mayor-deported-from-dominican-republic/.
122
Two confidential reports and interviews with investigators, November 2025 and May 2026.
30/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Lapli about impending Haitian National Police operations against Grand Ravine and
other gangs that later formed the Viv Ansanm alliance. 123
147. A confidential report and other accounts from investigators showed that
Ms. Petit Frère regularly exchanged information with Prophane Victor (HTi.006), 124
who is sanctioned for supporting and arming gangs, as well as with Magalie Habitant,
a key intermediary between gangs and economic backers and financiers ( S/2025/597,
paras. 78–80 and annex 22). Given her contacts within the police, Ms. Petit Frère
often received sensitive investigation reports from corrupt officers, including those
relating to Mr. Victor and Ms. Habitant, which she shared with them and they
subsequently used in preparing their legal defences. 125 Her corrupt dealings with some
Haitian National Police officers led Petit Frère to be awarded tenders to supply uniforms
to the police, without a competitive tendering process or sufficient oversight. 126
148. Ms. Petit Frère has used her political connections with former government
officials to facilitate people of her choice being appointed to strategic positions in
government, with the aim of those appointees embezzling funds on her behalf. This
was the case with the appointment of a former Director General of the Social
Assistance Fund, whom Ms. Petit Frère put forward for the appointment in 2021. 127
The person was later charged for embezzling funds from the Fund, and the trail led to
Ms. Petit Frère as the main recipient. 128 Ms. Petit Frère transferred part of the funds
to Jean Gardy, the leader of Krache Dife gang, a member of Viv Ansanm, which grew
in strength exponentially, and which has been operating mainly in the Bel -Air and
Delmas neighbourhoods. 129
149. Further tracing of the money flows depicts how she laundered it through her
three commercial entities; Centre Commercial, Groupe Radio Mono 96.3 FM and
Excel Travel, all with their registered offices in Haiti. 130
150. The Panel wrote to Ms. Petit Frère, giving her an opportunity to respond. In her
response, Ms. Petit Frère denied the Panel’s findings. The Panel reviewed the
information shared by Ms. Petit Frère and shared it with the Committee. The Panel
stands by its findings.
3.
Natural resources
151. During the reporting period, the Panel continued investigating the illicit
exploitation and trade of natural resources, particularly elvers 131 (S/2026/241,
paras. 58–66). It also emerged that the Government of Haiti signed a decree in March
that provides guidelines on the awarding of mineral concessions and the royalties
related to various minerals.
__________________
123
Information provided by a Member State, 2026, interview with two investigators, a gang analyst
and a civil society member, January and May 2026.
124
https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/fr/sanctions/2653/materials/summaries.
125
Interview with Haitian National Police officers and confidential reports, May 2026.
126
Interviews with a civil society member and two gang analysts and a confidential report.
February 2026.
127
Two confidential reports and interviews with two economic analysts, November 2025 and May 2026.
128
Interview with an anti-corruption investigator and a gang analyst, Port-au-Prince, February 2026.
129
Interview with a Haitian National Police detective, a human rights activist and an anti -corruption
official. February 2026.
130
Interviews with a financial analyst, an investigator and a gang analyst, and a confidential report.
February and May 2026.
131
“Elvers” are young eels, also known as baby eels, juvenile eels or glass eels, or as “zangi” or
“tizangi” in Haitian Creole. These are baby eels undergoing mass migration upriv er from the
sea. See https://eeldepot.com/elver/.
26-09652
31/94
S/2026/714
(a)
Trade and smuggling of elvers
152. As previously reported, elvers (baby eels) remain one of the most lucrative
natural resources in Haiti, with one kilogram going for between $3,000 and $5,000
on the international market, while domestically, elvers are sourced from fishers at a
mere $0.34–$1.70 per kilogram (see S/2025/597, annex 31, for details of how the
elvers supply chain operates in Haiti).
(b)
Jean-Charles Moïse as the beneficial owner
153. The Panel found that the poorly regulated sector continues to be masked in
secrecy and corruption. This, as pointed out earlier, results from the fact that Haiti is
not a Party to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (S/2026/241, para. 61). The elvers sector is therefore exposed to
illicit activities. 132 The sector is mainly dominated by Jean-Charles Moïse, a
businessman from the North Department and the Secretary-General of the Pitit
Dessalines political party. He is also a former presidential candidate and a former
senator for the North Department. 133 The sector will remain vulnerable until Haiti
accedes to the Convention. In Haiti, the accession to, or ratification of, international
treaties requires signature by the executive branch (President or designated
ministers), followed by legislative approval by the Parliament and finally the formal
issuance of a ratification decree. 134 The current lack of a parliament inhibits this
process.
Control over issuance of export permits and some customs officers
154. Export permits for elvers are issued annually at the beginning of each fishing
season, which lasts from September to March (S/2025/597, para. 132). According to
sources, Mr. Moïse’s network decides who works in the office that issues elvers export
permits. 135 He wields political and economic power over the elvers sector, controlling
the elvers supply chain from exploitation to trade. Mr. Moïse influences the Ministry
of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development through which export
licences are issued, as well as customs officials in charge of overseeing exports, so
that they act in his favour 136 (see S/2025/356, paras. 58–61). Some of his former
associates, to whom he denied permits, became Mr. Moïse’s rivals. 137
155. Similarly, Mr. Moïse puts pressure on some customs officials to give in to his
tax evasion demands – those who fail to comply get transferred elsewhere. 138 Any
refusal to give in to his demands or accept his bribes leads to punishment, as testified
by some of his victims. 139
Smuggling networks linked to transnational organized syndicates
156. Mr. Moïse runs a syndicate of illicit exporters linked to a wider regional network
operating in the Caribbean waters. By doing so, he contributes to the weakening of
Haiti’s economy while abetting smuggling criminal networks that impact the
__________________
132
Interview with two elvers traders and one trade official, May 2026.
See https://www.facebook.com/ jiskobouuuuuuu/?locale=fo_FO .
134
Art. 139 of the Constitution. See https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012.
135
Two confidential sources and a government trade and finance official, May 2026.
136
See https://lemidiinfo.com/haiti-agriculture-accusations-de-favoritisme-dans-lexportation-desanguilles-moise-jean-charles-sous-le-feu-des-critiques/.
137
Interview with a former exporter, two intermediaries, a former minister and a confidential
report, January and May 2026. See also https://haitiens.org/kiko-moise-anguilles-haiti/.
138
Interview with a former member of the Haiti Chamber of Commerce, a former finance minister
and two customs officials, November 2025, February and May 2026.
139
Interview with confidential sources, March and May 2026.
133
32/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
region. 140 The complex details of Mr. Moïse’s smuggling activities became clearer to
the Panel during its investigation of some incidents that occurred during the
2024/2025 elvers season.
157. Sources with inner knowledge of how Mr. Moïse operates, 141 including one of
his former suppliers of elvers, a lessor of boats and an eels trader in the Dominican
Republic, informed the Panel that during the 2024/2025 elvers season, which
coincided with the Federal Aviation Authority’s suspension of flights from Port-auPrince to the United States, 142 Mr. Moïse could not export his elvers as expected.
Undeterred, he activated his smuggling network in the North Department, through
which he channelled the baby eels in a well-coordinated network. This operation
involved some Haitian customs officials, who facilitated Mr. Moise’s tax evasion
activities, and some Dominican owners of private boats, who provided logistics
(boats) to transport the elvers out of Haiti. 143 Some Haitian suppliers of elvers to
Mr. Moïse and Dominican traders explained how Mr. Moïse’s networks permeate
other economic sectors in the North Department, Mr. Moïse’s birthplace, 144 reiterating
that he maintains a closely-guarded regional organized criminal market of elvers.
158. The Panel’s investigation into an incident that occurred on 20 December 2024
in the Fort-Liberté area, North Department, provided more clarity regarding
Mr. Moïse’s transnational organized criminal network. 145 Further investigations in the
region showed that Mr. Moïse runs a criminal network involved in mixing stocks from
illicit suppliers in the region, as well as from Haiti, and exporting them as if they had
been only sourced from Haiti. The information was corroborated by several sources
either involved in the network or investigating it. 146
159. In June 2026, investigations by the customs officials of a Member State
confirmed to the Panel the existence of a smuggling network that sources elvers from
Haiti. They shared two cases of live eel smuggling that occurred between October and
December 2024. Their analysis of the modus operandi led the aforementioned
customs officials to conclude that “… both incidents are linked, both by the
involvement of at least one person in common and by the existence of a single illicit
operational pattern: the attempt to export eels without the legally required
documentation”. The customs officials added that both cases lacked export
documentation and corresponding customs declarations. The Panel investigated
further in Haiti and was informed that the two cases were part of several exports that
Mr. Moïse’s network undertook during the 2024/2025 eel season. 147
(c)
Mineral exploitation and trade
160. According to the mineral resources inventory of the national Bureau of Mines
and Energy, Haiti holds a high mining potential, with minerals spread across most of
the departments 148 . On 30 March 2026, the Government issued a decree in the
Government gazette, Le Moniteur, to regulate the mining sector.
__________________
140
Interview with former senior customs official, an export analyst and a former minister, February
2026.
141
A former member of the Chamber of Commerce, a supplier to Mr. Moïse and a Dominican
trader, May 2026.
142
See https://ht.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-port-au-prince-november-24-2025/.
143
Interview with the captain of a cargo boat operating out of Fort-Liberté in the North Department,
June 2026.
144
Confidential sources, April and May 2026.
145
Communication shared by a Member State’s authorities. Information confirmed through
interviews with two investigators, May and June 2026.
146
A first-hand confidential source, Haitian security agents and two elvers traders, April and May 2026.
147
Two economic crimes investigators and a money laundering expert, March and May 2026.
148
See https://www.bme.gouv.ht/index.php?p=minesetcarrieres.
26-09652
33/94
S/2026/714
(d)
Undeclared movement of cash
161. Haiti remains largely a cash-based economy and remittances from the diaspora
play a major role (see also S/2025/597, para. 136). The federal law of the United
States mandates that when entering or leaving the United States, individuals must
report amounts exceeding $10,000 to Customs and Border Protection. That
requirement applies whether a person is travelling for bus iness, sending money
abroad or bringing savings back to their home country. 149
162. The Panel made a request to the United States under the Freedom of Information
Act and was informed that between 3 July 2025 and 17 May 2026, a total of $428,892
was confiscated from Haitians departing the United States for Haiti because of their
failure to declare the amounts in excess of $10,000 (see annex 22). Money transferred
outside of the formal financial networks carries a high risk of being diverted to gangs
and other criminal networks, without trace, thereby fuelling the country ’s instability.
III. Recommendations
163. The Panel of Experts on Haiti makes the following recommendations to the
Security Council:
(a) In line with paragraph 1 (e) of resolution 2793 (2025), call upon the Gang
Suppression Force to set up a mechanism to register, store and manage arms,
ammunition and other materiel seized during operations and in cases of transferring
the custody of materiel to the Haitian authorities, in order to reinforce Haitian
processes and management capacity;
(b) Call upon the Gang Suppression Force to continue to share information
with the Panel and facilitate access by the Panel to seized arms, ammunition and other
relevant materiel, before transfer or disposal;
(c) In line with paragraph 14 of resolution 2700 (2023), call upon the Gang
Suppression Force to implement an effective mechanism for managing weapons and
ammunition used by the Force’s battalions being deployed in Haiti and to report any
loss of materiel to the Panel.
164. The Panel of Experts on Haiti makes the following recommendations to the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022)
concerning Haiti:
(a) Continue to consider the statements of cases and additional related
information submitted by the Panel in 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026 and update the
entry lists and narrative summaries of individuals and entities designated pursuant to
Security Council resolution 2653 (2022), as necessary;
(b) Invite the relevant representative of the Government of Haiti involved in
the implementation of the sanctions regime to share the progress made in the
implementation of the sanctions regime in Haiti and related challenges;
(c) Encourage Member States to support the Government of Haiti in
advancing the implementation of the 2026 intervention strategy of the National
Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, through technical
and financial support;
(d) Encourage Member States to continue to build the capacity of the Haitian
National Police and Haitian Armed Forces with adequate resources to combat gangs,
__________________
149
34/94
See https://www.cbp.gov/travel/international-visitors/money-monetary-instruments.
26-09652
S/2026/714
including equipment to support investigations (such as related to kidnapping and
illicit trafficking), air and maritime assets, and all-terrain vehicles and motorcycles;
(e) Encourage Member States contributing personnel to the Gang Suppression
Force to ensure that their contingents adhere strictly to international human rights
law, with particular attention to the prevention of and accountability for sexual and
gender-based violence, and to integrate these standards into predeployment training
and rules of engagement;
(f) Encourage the Government of Haiti and relevant Member States to ensure
that all Haitian and foreign private military and security companies operating in Haiti
adhere to international human rights law, the Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
Providers.
165. The Panel of Experts on Haiti makes a recommendation to the Government of
Haiti, that it consider the adoption of a decree regulating the exploitation and trade of
elvers, pending accession to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.
26-09652
35/94
S/2026/714
Annexes
Letter dated 3 September 2026 from the Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to Security
Council resolution 2653 (2022) addressed to the President of the Security Council ............................. 1
Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2794 (2025)................ 2
Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4
I.
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 5
A.
Mandate .......................................................................................................................................... 5
B.
Methodology................................................................................................................................... 5
C.
Implementation of the sanctions regime ....................................................................................... 6
1.
Arms embargo ........................................................................................................................................... 6
2.
Asset freeze............................................................................................................................................... 6
3.
Travel ban ................................................................................................................................................. 7
D.
1.
Evolution of the political and security context ............................................................................... 7
Political transition ..................................................................................................................................... 7
Electoral decree .................................................................................................................................................. 7
2.
Security situation ...................................................................................................................................... 8
(a)
National security and defence forces .................................................................................................... 8
(b)
International private contractors ........................................................................................................... 9
(c)
Transition from Multinational Security Support Mission to Gang Suppression Force........................... 9
(d)
Haitian private security companies ....................................................................................................... 9
(e)
Self-defence groups .............................................................................................................................. 9
II. Information relevant to the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 2653 (2022)
and subsequent resolutions and the potential designation of individuals or entities who may have
engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti ........ 10
A.
Gang dynamics .............................................................................................................................. 10
1.
Gang dynamics amid intensified security operations............................................................................... 10
2.
Fractures within Viv Ansanm alliance ...................................................................................................... 11
3.
Political drivers of violence in Kenscoff commune ................................................................................. 12
Alfrédo Antoine and Nenel Cassy as gang sponsors ......................................................................................... 13
4.
Massacre by Viv Ansanm in the lower Artibonite ................................................................................... 15
B. Acts that violate international human rights law or that constitute human rights abuses, and
challenges to the rule of law ................................................................................................................. 16
1.
Human rights abuses by gangs ................................................................................................................ 16
36/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
(a)
West Department ................................................................................................................................ 16
(b)
Artibonite Department ........................................................................................................................ 17
(c)
Recruitment of children ...................................................................................................................... 17
2.
Sexual and gender-based violence ........................................................................................................... 18
(a)
Sexual and gender-based violence committed by gangs ...................................................................... 18
(b)
Sexual exploitation and abuse by members of the Multinational Security Support Mission ............... 18
3.
Excessive use of force by security actors ................................................................................................ 19
(a)
Use of explosive drones outside a regulatory human rights framework .............................................. 19
(b)
Extrajudicial executions...................................................................................................................... 19
4.
Human cost of armed violence and obstruction of humanitarian access and assistance ........................... 20
5.
Challenges to the rule of law and human rights protection ...................................................................... 20
C.
Arms trafficking and violations of the arms embargo .................................................................. 20
1.
Trends in trafficking ................................................................................................................................ 21
(a)
Evolution of calibres and types of firearms ........................................................................................ 21
(b)
Sources of illicit ammunition .............................................................................................................. 21
(c)
Prices .................................................................................................................................................. 22
(d)
Use of messaging applications ............................................................................................................ 22
(e)
Trafficking of firearms from Haiti to Jamaica ..................................................................................... 22
2.
Progress and challenges in the enforcement of the arms embargo ........................................................... 22
(a)
Haiti .................................................................................................................................................... 22
(b)
United States of America .................................................................................................................... 23
(c)
Dominican Republic ........................................................................................................................... 24
3.
Arms and ammunition trafficking to non-State armed actors in the Artibonite Department .................... 24
(a)
Acquisition of materiel by self-defence groups ................................................................................... 24
(b)
Acquisition of materiel by gangs ........................................................................................................ 24
4.
Diversions from national stockpiles through loss or theft ....................................................................... 25
5.
Management of Multinational Security Support Mission and Gang Suppression Force arms and
ammunition ...................................................................................................................................................... 25
D.
Drug trafficking.............................................................................................................................. 26
1.
Seizure by Haitian authorities of 1,045 kg of cocaine, near Tortuga Island ............................................. 26
2.
Seizure by Belgian authorities of 1,156.42 kg of cocaine, in the port of Antwerp ................................... 27
3.
Seizure of 1,376 kg of cannabis in the Northwest Department ................................................................ 27
E.
Illicit financial flows ....................................................................................................................... 28
1.
Gangs’ sources of financing .................................................................................................................... 28
Kidnapping for ransom ..................................................................................................................................... 29
How gangs kidnap and receive ransom ............................................................................................................. 29
2.
Support to gangs by economic actors ...................................................................................................... 30
The case of Rosemila Petit Frère ...................................................................................................................... 30
26-09652
37/94
S/2026/714
3.
Natural resources .................................................................................................................................... 31
(a)
Trade and smuggling of elvers ............................................................................................................ 32
(b)
Jean-Charles Moïse as the beneficial owner ....................................................................................... 32
(c)
Mineral exploitation and trade ............................................................................................................ 33
(d)
Undeclared movement of cash ............................................................................................................ 34
III.
Recommendations .................................................................................................................... 34
Annexes ................................................................................................................................................. 36
Annex 1: Methodology and Opportunity to Reply ..................................................................... 37
Annex 2: Tables of correspondence sent and received by the Panel from December 2025 to
July 2026 ....................................................................................................................................... 38
Annex 3: The impact of delayed implementation of UN sanctions ........................................... 39
Annex 5 – Relative security gains and advances in gang strongholds ....................................... 41
Annex 6 – Areas under gang control in the West, Centre and Artibonite departments ........... 46
Map of gang-controlled areas in the West, Centre and Artibonite departments, June 2026 ... 46
....................................................................................................................................................... 46
Source: UNDSS / UN Geospatial .................................................................................................... 46
Annex 7 – Gang presence in southern Haiti amid security operations ...................................... 47
Annex 8 - Insecurity as a driver of economic interests: the RN2 blockade................................ 49
Annex 9 – Key challenges hindering effective security operations ............................................ 50
Annex 10 - Gang reorganisation in unstable post-operational settings: the case of Bel-Air .... 52
Annex 11 – Government Support Program to the Peace Brigadiers (Brigadiers de Paix) ......... 53
Annex 12 – Viv Ansanm inter-fighting in Croix-des-Bouquets and Cité Soleil communes ........ 57
Annex 13 – Sustained gang violence in Kenscoff ........................................................................ 61
Annex 14 - Warrant notices for Alfredo Antoine and Nenel Cassy ............................................ 65
Annex 15 - Coordinated attacks by Viv Ansanm across the lower Artibonite: over 100
residents killed ............................................................................................................................. 66
Annex 16: Seizures conducted at Haiti’s ports of entry or on their way to Haiti between the
adoption of resolution 2356 on 22 October 2022 and 1st July 2026 .......................................... 79
Annex 17: The use of privately made firearms by armed actors in Haiti ................................... 81
Annex 18: Dominican ammunition in use by Haitian gangs ....................................................... 83
Annex 19: Arms and ammunition trafficking to armed actors in the Artibonite department .. 86
Annex 20: Loss of materiel from the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) ............... 89
38/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Annex 21: The diverse ways characterizing kidnappings ........................................................... 90
Annex 22: CBP data on bulk cash seized from individuals departing the United States for
Haiti (July 2025 to May 2026). As shown, the bulk of the cash related to outbound
movements. .................................................................................................................................. 91
26-09652
39/94
S/2026/714
Annex 1: Methodology and Opportunity to Reply
The Panel adopted a decision rule of consensus, meaning that all members of the Panel were required to agree on the text,
findings and recommendations of the report. However, if any member of the Panel had a difference of opinion or reservation,
the report could still be adopted by a majority vote of three out of four members.
The Panel reviewed social media and other open sources, but no information was used as evidence unless it could be
corroborated by multiple independent sources. This was done to ensure that the information was reliable and met the highest
achievable standard of proof.
The Panel provides individuals and entities recommended for sanctioning the opportunity to reply. This gives individuals
or entities the opportunity to present an alternative narrative and to provide concrete and specific evidence in their support.
The Panel's methodology for the opportunity to reply is as follows:
1. Providing an individual or entity with an opportunity to reply should be the norm.
2. An individual or entity may not be given the opportunity to reply if the Panel concludes, based on their own assessment,
that there is a risk that by doing so it would:
a) Result in the individual or entity destroying evidence, tampering with a witness or moving assets if they receive
advance notice of a possible recommendation for designation;
b) Restrict the Panel's further access to places or vital sources;
c) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
d) Jeopardise humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field including the United Nations or any other
local or international organizations; or
e) For any reason that is clearly justified by the circumstances.
After an individual or entity is designated by the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee, it is possible to request a
de-listing process through the mechanism established by the Sanctions Committee. 150
__________________
150
See https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653/guidelines and see also
https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/materials/procedures -Delisting
40/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Annex 2: Tables of correspondence sent and received by the Panel from December 2025 to July 2026
Member
State
Number of
letters sent
Info fully
supplied
Info
partially
supplied
No
information
provided
No answer
NA/ visit
accepted
2
Bahamas
Requested
for extension
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
2
1
1
Colombia
Ecuador
2
1
Jamaica
Dominican
Republic
Haiti
Kenya
United
Kingdom
2
7
United States
of America
2
Company
Number
of
letters
sent
1
Info fully
supplied
1
1
1
1
1
1
Banque de la
République
d’Haiti
Haitian bank 1
Air freight
company 1
Haitian bank 2
Logistics
company 1
Air freight
company 2
Haitian bank 3
26-09652
2
1
Requested
for extension
2
1
2
6
1
Accepted
1
1
2
1
1
Requested
for extension
(Turks and
Caicos
Islands)
Postponed
(Visit to
Turks and
Caicos
islands)
2
Info
partially
supplied
No
information
provided
No answer
NA
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
41/94
S/2026/714
Annex 3: The impact of delayed implementation of UN sanctions
The Banque de la République d’Haiti (BRH), which is Haiti’s central bank, informed the Panel that bank accounts belonging
to Kempes Sanon (HTi.009) with an amount of 383,520.99HTG ($2,910.06USD) and to Prophane Victor (HTi.006) with
an amount of 55,486.81HTG ($421.02USD) were frozen (see also S/2025/356, para. 9 for an amount of about $300USD
frozen earlier). Despite this positive effort, the Panel is of the view that the process of implementing sanctions in Haiti
remains slow, impacting the effectiveness of the regime. Two major observations emerge.
Firstly, the meagre amounts of money frozen by banks do not correlate with the wealth accumulated by those individuals.
For instance, the cumulative amount so far frozen for Prophane Victor, a businessman and former influential public figure
is less than $1,000USD. Secondly, none of his fixed assets have been identified and frozen. The hesitancy by Haitian
authorities to take immediate action to freeze bank accounts and seize property of sanctioned individuals and entities leaves
a lacuna in which individuals can move their assets out of reach for sanctions. This is demonstrated in the responses received
by the Panel from the BRH and commercial banks with regard to sanctions implementation, as reflected below.
Below:
Table I - An excerpt of a table shared by the BRH showing the amounts frozen across the board for respective sanctioned
individuals by commercial banks and microfinance institutions in response to the UN sanctions.
Name
and
Surname
Jimmy Chérizier
Johnson André
Renel Destina
Vitelhomme
Innocent
Prophane Victor
Luckson Elan
Dimitri Herard
Kempes Sanon
Amount frozen in
HTG
0
0
0
0
Amount frozen in
USD
0
0
0
0
55 486.81
0
0
383 520.99
-220.72
0
2.63
0
Table II: An excerpt of a table shared by one of the commercial banks with the details of sanctioned individuals
and actions taken.
It is worth noting that only the account belonging to Kempes Sanon (HTi.006) was frozen. The accounts of the other
individuals, also sanctioned by the UN and unilaterally by several Member States, were closed meaning that the
individuals could have withdrawn their monies.
Name and
Surname
HTG
Account
Amount in
HTG
Date of sanction
Account status
Jimmy
Chérizier
xxxx
6,772.15
2l 0ct. 2022
Closed
Dec.
2022
Vitelhomme
Innocent
xxxx
96,981.09
8 Dec. 2023
Closed
Dec.
2022
xxxx
39,975.69
17 Oct. 2025
Closed
March
2025
xxxx
383,520.99
17 Oct. 2025
Frozen
Oct.
2025
Dimitri Herard
Kempes Sanon
42/94
Reason for
closing/freezing
Unilateral
sanction /
US Tresory
Unilateral
sanction /
USA Tresory
Canada
Unilateral
sanction
UN Sanction
26-09652
S/2026/714
Annex 4: Implementation of the assets freeze and the travel ban by regional countries
The Panel contacted several Member States and territories in the region to establish whether any assets belonging to the
sanctioned individuals had been identified and frozen, and if they had traveled to those countries.
The Dominican Republic informed the Panel during the Panel’s official visit in May 2026 that they had not identified any
assets in this regard, and remained watchful regarding any attempts by the sanctioned individuals to enter the country.
The United States stated that, “the nine individuals listed – Jimmy Cherizier, Johnson Andre, Renel Destina, Wilson
Joseph, Vitel’homme Innocent, Prophane Victor, Luckson Elan, Dimitri Herard, and Kempes Sanon – are sanctioned by
the United States in addition to the United Nations. As a result, these individuals are not able to enter or transit through the
United States”.
The United States added that as a result of these designations, “all property and interests in property of the sanctioned
individuals that are in the United States or in the possession or control of United States persons are blocked and must be
reported to Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50
percent or more by one or more blocked persons, are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued
by OFAC, or otherwise exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or
transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.
The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit
of any blocked person or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person”.
At the time of reporting, Turks and Caicos Islands, through the United Kingdom had not yet responded to the Panel’s request
for information.
26-09652
43/94
S/2026/714
Annex 5 – Relative security gains and advances in gang strongholds
Since late 2025, intensified security operations by Haitian authorities supported by an international private contractor, have
been aiming to establish a buffer zone around the Autorité Portuaire Nationale (APN), reopening key logistical corridors
to the city center as well as at restoring traffic along national roads (RN) linking the capital to the north (RN1), south (RN2),
centre and key border crossings (RN3 and RN8) 151.
From late 2025 to February 2026, the HNP - bolstered by increased operational capacity and supported by the Task Force
(consisting of police and army officers, as well as international private contractors) and the GSF 10 - entailed the recovery of
areas stretching from Delmas 30 to Lower Delmas (commune of Delmas), passing through Bel-Air, Nazon and Solino, and
extending to Boulevard La Saline (commune of Port-au-Prince). These localities were under pressure from gangs such as
Les Argentins (led by Kempes Sanon, a.k.a “Kempes”- HTi.009). Tokyo (led by Ralph Woodmyr Louissant, a.k.a “Chalè”),
Krache Dife (led by Jean Gardy, a.k.a “Pece Pim Pim”), Delmas 6 (led by Jimmy Chérizier, a.k.a “Barbeque” - HTi.001)
and La Saline (led by Bout Janjan). While Les Argentins was weakened by Viv Ansanm infighting, the others were
significantly destabilized by the police152 (see Annex 3 of S/2026/241).
Operations also targeted the Simon Pelé gang (led by Stevenson Albert, a.k.a “Djouma”), reasserting control over key areas
between Delmas 19 (in Delmas commune) and Simon Pelé (Cité Soleil commune) and clearing the road to Port-au-Prince
international airport, where the gang was disrupting movement by erecting illegal tolls and ransacking businesses along this
strategic axis153. The reopening, on 7 February 2026, of the Carrefour Aéroport sub police station - attacked and burned by
Viv Ansanm on 4 March 2024 - marked a significant step in regaining control from gangs154. However, the resurgence of
inter-gang fighting from March 2026 in the Cul-de-Sac Plain (Annex 12) significantly deteriorated the security situation
around the international airport155.
The operations however did not result in gangs’ dismantlement, which would include sidelining key leaders and disrupting
their supply lines. While some gangs relocated to other areas, others have maintained a mobile, diffuse and opportunistic
presence in several areas (see Annex 10). In addition, kidnappings have notably increased in Delmas commune, as well as
on key corridors like the airport road and the Panamerican axis, having also spread to Bourdon neighborhood (Port-auPrince commune), as well as to Pétion-Ville and Tabarre communes. As a developing phenomenon, gangs are taking victims
to banks to withdraw or transfer ransoms to accounts used by gangs (see section II.E.1.a of the present report)156.
These challenges hinder the police from consolidating control, particularly in areas cleared of gang presence, and with the
absence of stabilization efforts. Territorial gains remain temporary and do not produce lasting effects unless accompanied
by sustained security presence, territorial consolidation, restoration of public services and community stabilisation 157.
From March 2026, security operations involving the police, the Haitian Armed Forces, and the Task Force, advanced into
the southern part of downtown Port-au-Prince, liberating areas such as Babiole, Pacot and Turgeau (commune of Port-auPrince) up to the stadium Sylvie Castor158. The army’s increased involvement with regular patrols in the area have helped
strengthen control in the city center159.
Advances in gang strongholds long outside state control
In mid-March 2026, security forces advanced in areas which were outside state control for significant time, such as Village
de Dieu and Martissant, strongholds of 5 Segond and Grand Ravine gangs respectively, in the southern part of Port-auPrince. On 18 March 2026, the police reached its former subst
ation in Martissant, abandoned in June 2021 due to gang
__________________
151
Interviews with police officers, an international security provider and gang analysts, 2026.
152
Interviews with gang analysts and individuals living in gang-controlled areas, January and February 2026, and May
2026.
153
Interviews with gang analyst and senior police officer, February and May 2026.
154
Interviews with with gang and human right analysts, police officers and former government official working on anti -gang
operations, February 2026 and with senior police officer, 21 May 2026.
155
Interview with security analysts, May and June 2026
156
Interviews with senior police officer and gang analysts, May 2026.
157
Interviews with police officers and gang analists, May and June 2026.
158
Interviews with gang analysts and senior police officers, May 2026.
159
Interviews with gang analysts, and senior defense government oficial, May and June 2026.
44/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
control. On 1 June 2026, after the deployment of drones by the Task Force, the police re-entered Village de Dieu, marking
a major symbolic return after the failed March 2021 operation in which several police officers were killed 160.
However, according to a civil society representative working in Martissant, the operation was more of an in-and-out armored
incursion rather than a sustained effort to hold the area. According to him, an operation to retake the Martissant police
substation would be highly challenging, given the presence of a checkpoint directly in front and, a few meters away, a
heavily manned gang cell linked to senior Grand Ravine leadership161. Additionally, operations in Village-de-Dieu are also
said to have been driven by considerations beyond purely security objectives - including to secure the release of civil
servants, victims of kidnapping - and both lasted only a few days. A dozen of gang members were killed during the operation
in Village de Dieu162.
As a result of operations in Village de Dieu, the Komite Pwoteksyon Timoun Site Lètènèl (KPTSL), a civil society
organization, reported that at least three children were killed and two others seriously injured, some at risk of amputation.
A further dozen victims were reported by residents. These casualties raise concerns about excessive use of force and the
impact on the population during operations163.
__________________
160
For 2021 operations, see:https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/267892/the-haitian-national-police-returns-to-village-de-dieu
Interview with civil society representative working on gang-affected area, June 2026.
162
Interview with individual with first-hand knowledge on gang dynamics, June 2026.
163
Inteview with civil society representative and gang analyst, June 2026.
161
26-09652
45/94
S/2026/714
Security operations in Village de Dieu neighborhood
Security officer seizing weapon from gang member
Gang members carrying the body of another gang member
Source: Stills from drone images shared with the Panel on 1 June 2026.
46/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Armoured vehicles entering Village de Dieu
Source: Photographs shared on HNP Facebook page, 1 June 2026. See:
https://web.facebook.com/pnh.ht
26-09652
47/94
S/2026/714
Civilian casualties of drone strikes in Village de Dieu – March 2026
Gruesome images
Source: Stills from videos shared with the Panel on 2 July 2026.
48/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Annex 6 – Areas under gang control in the West, Centre and Artibonite departments
Map of gang-controlled areas in the West, Centre and Artibonite departments, June 2026
Source: UNDSS / UN Geospatial
The boundaries and names shown, and the designation used on this map do not imply official endorsement or
acceptance by the United Nations
26-09652
49/94
S/2026/714
Annex 7 – Gang presence in southern Haiti amid security operations
Southwestern outskirts of the capital as a growing hub for gangs
Drone strikes and police operations in areas stretching from downtown Port-au-Prince - including Marché Salomon and the
Bicentenaire - up to Rue Saint-Honoré have driven gangs to the southwestern outskirts of Port-au-Prince.
While the police dismantled many checkpoints in downtown, gangs set up other illegal tolls in the streets of Boulosse
neighborhood (Port-au-Prince commune), in the southern zone of the capital. At least five checkpoints are held by gang
leaders including Izo, and Emmanuel Salomon, a.k.a “Manno” (5 Segond), and Bougoy, Kilik and Ti Lapli (Grand
Ravine)164. Christ-Roi Chery (a.k.a “Chrisla”), head of Ti Bwa has also established at least three checkpoints along the
alternative route connecting Carrefour to Gressier communes, in southwestern edge of the capital. Since movement along
the RN2 - linking Port-au-Prince to the South - has been severely disrupted by insecurity, residents are subject to a 3–6hour mountainous journey, in which motorcycle riders pay $250 HTG at each toll belonging to Chrisla 165. Of note, several
economic actors benefit from the blocking on the RN2 (see Annex 8).
On another note, Carrefour commune continues to be a haven for Viv Ansanm and acolytes such as Dimitri Herard (HTi.008),
where they move freely within the community. Despite the absence of the police, schools, banks, and markets remain
operational. Behind the “apparent normalcy” in the commune lies a parallel system of gang governance which replaced
public authority (see Annex 5 of S/2025/597). For instance, Chrisla and other gang leaders rely on the commercial bank
agencies in Carrefour for transactions linked to kidnappings, extortion, and investment activities (see section II.E.A.1.a)166.
When entering banks, gang members sometimes leave their firearms at the security entrance and proceed inside to access
services167. On 11 May 2026, Chrisla renewed his calls on the government to appoint a close associate of his for a senior
public position in the commune, while threatening to paralyze municipal institutions if his demand was not met 168. Chrisla’s
demand reflects further efforts to entrench influence within formal governance structures and secure political leverage.
Attempts of gang expansion to southern departments
Attacks from 13 April 2026 in the South-East department, in the localities of Kajak (3 rd section Macary) and Seguin (1st
section Fond Jean Noël), in Marigot commune, illustrate the expansion of gang violence beyond traditional gang
strongholds. This also marks one of the first major security crises in a region previously considered relatively safe. Viv
Ansanm gangs carried out coordinated assaults, killing at least five residents and eight members of a self-defense group,
burning the Seguin police substation, destroying two police vehicles and seizing police motorcycles and uniforms 169 .
Reinforced by gang members coming from Kenscoff, Viv Ansanm renewed clashes on 20 April 2026, after security
operations on 16 April 2026. Violence triggered the displacement of approximately 5,656 individuals 170.
Attacks over Seguin marked a significant development. The area sits in a strategic high-altitude area, overlooking key
corridors linking the coastal city of Jacmel (with cultural and economic significance), the mountainous and agricultural
areas of La Vallée and Kenscoff, and Port-au-Prince. In addition, control over Seguin enables and facilitates drug and arms
trafficking activities, through the corridor of Carrefour-Kenscoff-Seguin-Marigot and use of the port of Marigot and the
border cross-point of Anse-à-Pitres171. It is not surprising, therefore, that links between Chrisla (who controls Carrefour
commune), and Izo (involved in drug trafficking) have grown closer. The Panel previously visited Jacmel, as well as the
Dominican town of Pedernales located directly opposite Anse-à-Pitres
in Haiti and witnessed the high vulnerability of the
region to drug trafficking (see section 2.D of S/2025/597).
With the takeover of southern regions, Viv Ansanm would effectively complete a de facto encirclement of the capital, given
its control over key cities and strategic corridors linking the capital to other regions. In order to achieve this, the road
connecting the West (through Kenscoff commune) to the Southeast (Marigot commune) has been kept under the control
__________________
164
Interviews with first-hand knowledge of gang dynamics, May and June 2026.
165
Idem.
166
Idem.
167
Interview with confidential source, May 2026.
168
https://www.tiktok.com/@christprodzmusic0/video/7638664948482084109?_r=1&_t=ZS -96NybjLo2mC
o
169
Interviews with residents and gang analyst, 2026, and Le Nouvelliste, n 42458, 20 et 21 avril 2026.
170
https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-891-updates-displacement-following-armed-attacks-kajak-and
171
Interviews with police officer, residents, and gang analysts, 2026.
50/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
since the initial attacks on Kenscoff more than a year and a half ago. An alternative route has been established which is only
accessible by motorbikes, where gangs have been charging $250 HTG for a roundtrip at their checkpoint located at the level
of Kafou Badjo, Sourçailles communal section of Kenscoff172.
Following the attacks on Seguin, protesters took to the streets of Jacmel to call for urgent government intervention, fearing
that the South would turn into another ‘lost territory’. The police reported the arrest of several gang members, including
women, seeking to plant themselves in the department, including from 5 Segond, Grand Ravine, and Ti Bwa 173.
Gangs have also attempted to infiltrate other departments. On 13 January 2026 in Jérémie, the main city of the Grand'Anse
department, the police arrested Jean Misnord (a.k.a “Fado”), the third chief of Simon Pelé gang, led by Djouma Albert (a.k.a
“Djouma”)174. To reach the Grand’Anse department, an influential actor from the department transported Fado with his boat
from Wharf Jeremie, Cité Soleil commune. Fado then met with Guy Philippe on several occasions in Grand’Anse, the last
time being in January 2026175. The Panel has previously highlighted the risk that Guy Phillipe, who cultivate close ties with
gangs, poses to the country’s stability and peace.
__________________
172
Interview with transport agents, May 2026.
HNP Facebook page, 2026.
174
HNP Facebook page, January 2026.
175
Interviews with confidential sources, February and May 2026.
173
26-09652
51/94
S/2026/714
Annex 8 - Insecurity as a driver of economic interests: the RN2 blockade
For over two years, movement along the National Road #2 (RN2), linking the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and the
southern region - including the departments of Nippes, South, South-East and Grand’Anse - has been completely cut off by
walls erected along the RN2 and by gang violence.
In November 2023, the Mariani district of the Carrefour commune, lying on the main corridor connecting Port-au-Prince to
the southern region of Haiti, fell under the control of the Grand Ravine “Team Asansè” (also known as Team Ascenseur),
led by Beliose Louis Jeune (a.k.a “Bout Ba”). This has hampered the movement of people, goods and services along the
RN2 (see section II.A.2 and annex 8 of S/2024/253).
In May 2024, the Grand Ravine gang extended into the neighbouring Gressier, located to the south of Mariani, which has
been under the control of the 103 Zombie group of the Grand Ravine gang, led by Charlemagne Dorin (a.k.a “Ti Bebe
Bougòy”) (see S/2024/704).
The reopening of the RN2 has been one of the main concerns of the new municipal authorities of the Gressier commune.
Efforts by the municipality and the local population resulted in the destruction of the walls impeding movement, on 19 May
2026. On 29 May 2026, the police station in Gressier reopened after being closed for two years, although it has relocated
to another area176. However, as of the time of drafting, no police operation has been effectively carried out to enable traffic
to resume along the RN2. In fact, the disruption on the RN2 has been tied to major interests, benefiting for instance, business
operators handling private flights and barges and controlling ports 177. Insecurity creates economic incentives that benefit
many.
Air and sea routes have been used to bypass gang-controlled areas and roadblocks thereby benefitting air and maritime
operators. By sea, this route connects the National Port Authority (APN) terminal in Port-au-Prince to coastal access points
such as Petit-Goâve, Grand-Goâve, and Léogâne, located in the southern edge of the capital. Private barge owners charge
between $ 2,500 - $5,000 USD per container, depending on the value of the cargo being transported for one-way trip
between the APN port, in Port-au-Prince, and southwestern communes of Petit-Goâve and Miragoâne178. At the beginning
of 2025, someone paid about $ 300,000 HTG (approximately $ 2,300 USD) to travel one-way from APN to the southern
region179. A number of police officers ensure the security of the about 8 barges plying this route and reportedly receive
substantial financial compensation from barge owners. Private actors also reportedly pay for police security around the
APN zone180.
During the Panel visit to Jacmel, South-East department, in June 2025, civil society representatives informed the Panel that
operators of air taxi services used to charge $1,000 USD per flight connecting Jacmel to Port-au-Prince in 2023, which
could carry up to three passengers only. If there was one passenger, they paid the price of three, and if there were multiple
passengers, the cost was shared among them.
Sources disclosed to the Panel how they received pressure from business figures to slow down their efforts for the
unblocking of RN2, as well as for the security of the APN port area 181.
The Panel will continue its investigations into the involvement of private actors in the instability linked to gang control of
roads and port areas.
__________________
176
Interviews with local authority, May and June 2026.
Interviews with local autorithies, police officers, gang analysts, representatives of civil society and political party, June
2025 and May and June 2026.
178
Interviews with private actors, local authority, gang analyst and confidential source, May and June 2026.
179
Interview with confidential source, June 2026.
180
Information from confidential source, May 2026 and confidential source, June 2026.
181
Interviews with primary sources, May and June 2026.
177
52/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Annex 9 – Key challenges hindering effective security operations
1. Collusion between gangs and corrupt police officers
Police investigations launched in February 2026 revealed links between at least six police officers and the Tokyo gang’s
leader, Ralph Woodmyr Louissant (a.k.a “Chalè”), including a police officer called Charlemagne Volmar (a.k.a “Titit” or
“Steeve”).
The criminal network was involved in various criminal acts, notably kidnapping, murder, attempted murder, armed robbery,
and criminal conspiracy. Chalè’s gang was for instance responsible for the kidnapping of several individuals. On 11 March
2025, the gang kidnapped two individuals in Delmas 31 (released after paying ransoms of $ 400,000 HTG and 465,000
HTG each (approximately $3,100 USD to $3,600 USD), and one in Cité Militaire, released after paying $ 2,000,000 HTG
(approximately $15,000 USD). Other kidnappings were reported on 4 April 2025, along the airport road, and on 7 July
2025, where two individuals were kidnapped in Delmas 33; where victims were also released after paying ransoms. The
gang also robbed the victims’ vehicles182.
Charlemagne Volmar was in charge of picking up Chalès’ girlfriend, Wideline Louis (a.k.a “Wide”) at the airport after her
return from the Dominican Republic. Based on a confidential report, Chalè would always call Charlemagne after his gang
members had carried out a kidnapping to inform him of any potential loss of life. Charlemagne’s role also consisted of
identifying HNP checkpoints, thereby enabling gang members to carry out kidnappings without being intercepted by the
police. Charlemagne Volmar also undertook other duties, such as verifying the financial status of certain individuals prior
to their abduction. He was also responsible for transporting large sums of money intended for the purchase of ammunition
on behalf of the gang. He also identified another police officer known as Poupy, who sold an AR-15 rifle to Chalè183.
Another police officer, Friendy Jean-Baptiste, a.k.a "Ti Solèy," also member of the Tokyo gang, was responsible for
supplying the gang with firearms and ammunition. His function as police officer and ties to all Viv Ansanm members enabled
him to become a key supplier of firearms and ammunition. He also informed Chalè about all police operations targeting the
city center, particularly the Tokyo neighborhood and the Saint-Martin Street184.
In another case, on 13 January 2026, the police arrested Jean Misnord (a.k.a “Fado”), the third chief of Simon Pelé gang,
led by Stevenson Albert (a.k.a “Djouma”). Fado disclosed that two police officers that escaped prison with Djouma are part
of the gang, that includes over 180 individuals armed with fusils 185.
In October 2023, a police officer named Cleevens Degazon (a.k.a “My Man”) was arrested for his association with the Ti
Bwa gang, led by Christ-Roi Chery ( a.k.a “Chrisla”). Despite being dismissed from the police in August 2023, My Man who was also associated with the 5 Segond and Grand Ravine gangs - was colluding with Ryvelor Domond, an active officer
of the judicial police. The latter was in frequent communication with Chrisla and had contacts with influential Ti Bwa
members, including other police officers by the names of Sony Caidor (a.k.a “Kzo”), Shadbir Rooster Joseph (a.k.a “Peter”
or “POG”), Gaspard Henold, and Joseph Sonson186.
2. Gangs’ resilient structures and adaptive responses to ongoing security pressure
According to individuals with first-hand information on gangs and security actors, the fear of gangs regarding security
operations, including drone strikes, has reduced. The deployment of GSF does not seem to instil particular concern for most
gangs187.
Senior HNP officers highlighted some of the challenges in confronting gangs, describing them as highly resilient and
structured. When struck, gangs - such as 5 Segond, led by Johnson André (a.k.a “Izo” – HTi.002) - draw on reserves of
members, including former prison escapees, who are tasked with h
olding and consolidating territory. Gang members operate
tactically, advancing from house to house, building reinforced walls for protection, and demonstrating both local terrain
knowledge and a degree of operational coordination. They have increased physical obstructions to impede the police
__________________
182
Confidential investigative report, February 2026.
Interviews with confidential sources, and confidential investigative report, 2026.
184
Confidential investigative report, February 2026.
185
Interviews with confidential sources, 2026.
186
Interviews with confidential sources, and confidential documents, 2024 and 2026.
187
Interviews with civil society representative working in gang-controlled area, direct source in contact with gangs, police
officer, security and gang analysts, 2026.
183
26-09652
53/94
S/2026/714
advancement and are trained to fight effectively, being heavily armed 188. They use Molotov cocktails and rudimentary
countermeasures against drones’ attacks, such as placing nets over high-value areas, and propane gas tankers to hinder
operations189. Of note, interviews with individuals living in gang-controlled areas and a police officer with operational
oversight, indicated that Izo previously possessed a drone detection system installed by foreigners, but this was destroyed
by security operations190.
Losses in gangs’ ranks trigger further recruitment, including of children. An individual with first knowledge on gang
dynamics revealed that members of 5 Segond and Grand Ravine gangs are not only recruited within gang-controlled areas,
but also from youth coming from places such as Delmas and Pétion-Ville communes, who view joining gangs as a form of
employment. New recruits can earn about $1,000 USD and a motorbike for their enrolment. Children can receive between
15-25 thousand HTG every two weeks. In addition to receiving provisions such as food, alcohol, and drugs, they may
receive a risk allowance of $500 USD when they engage in important combat operations. Besides, since late 2025, the role
of women in gangs such as 5 Segond and Grand Ravine has evolved from functions such as antennas to direct engagement
in combat and participation in checkpoint operations. Both gangs have some cells that are exclusively female191.
Gangs are also deeply embedded across multiple segments of society. Their members are not limited to those holding
weapons, but include men and women who provide intelligence, resources, and logistical support to gangs, and are able to
move with less suspicion, and even cross borders. Late February 2026, Wideline Louis (a.k.a “Wide”), girlfriend of Tokyo’s
gang leader and member of the gang, was arrested at the national terminal of Port-au-Prince airport upon her return from
the Dominican Republic. Her role included buying clothing and supplies for the gang. In another case, three individuals
were arrested by the police in June 2025 for attempting to smuggle commercial drones from the Dominican Republic for
Viv Ansanm. They were, however, released (see paras. 51 and 77 of S/2025/597). Earlier, in September 2024, the police
arrested Vanessa Sanon and Marie André Nathalie Balaam, an employee at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, for
their association with the Les Argentins gang, who were respectively sister and concubine of its leader Kempes Sanon (a.k.a
“Kempes”). Vanessa Sanon operated as the gang’s financial manager, while his concubine acted as a scout while managing
a business on behalf of the gang leader192.
The alliance is also anchored in transnational trafficking networks that sustain them with arms, ammunition, and logistical
resources, and hinder security operations, since their ‘backers’ are widely connected to structures of the government and
the private sphere.
__________________
188
Interview with senior police officer with fist-hand knowledge of gangs and operational oversight, May 2026.
Interviews with senior police officer with operational oversight, individual with first -hand knowledge of gang dynamics,
May 2026, and international security source, June 2026.
190
Interviews with senior police officer and civil society representative working in gang -controlled areas, May and June
2026.
191
Interview with individual with first knowledge on gang dynamics, June 2026.
192
Interviews with police officers, 2024.
189
54/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Annex 10 - Gang reorganisation in unstable post-operational settings: the case of Bel-Air
Intensified security operations notably undertaken in early 2026, initially displaced gangs from their areas (see paragraph
17 of S/2026/241). However, unstable post-operational scenario led to a security vacuum that was progressively filled by a
diffuse, mobile and opportunistic presence of gangs, renewing instability 193. The current situation in Bel-Air, following
security efforts in early 2026, provides a good example.
Bel-Air is a strategic area for gangs. It also offers a fallback zone and a strategic corridor, facilitating regrouping and
logistical support for criminal activities, notably kidnapping. Key actors in Bel-Air highlighted gang dynamics such as
territorial consolidation and the re-emergence of violent hotspots across key sectors, after security operations. After the
MSS base relocated out of Bel-Air, no security mechanism prevented gangs of returning to the area. Police patrols were
mainly concentrated in securing Port-au-Prince downtown area and state infrastructure rather than focusing on Bel Air
neighbourdhoods194.
Despite Les Argentins gang being nearly dismantled by Viv Ansanm (see Annex 3 of S/2026/241), its leader - Kempes Sanon
(a.k.a “Kempes”) - continues to operate with the Grand Ravine gang, led by Renel Destina (a.k.a “Ti Lapli” - Hti.003).
Kempes exercises criminal control over the Magloire Ambroise corridor, a key axis linking downtown to central and
southern neighborhoods, and shaping access to Bel-Air via Champ de Mars, in the city center; thus, particularly useful for
kidnapping activities.
As the result of security operations against 5 Segond stronghold, most of its members had to leave Bel-Air to fight. The
Gran Ravine gang has then exercised strongest hold in several areas of Bel-Air. Additionally, Jamesley, the gang leader of
Baz Demeplè maintains a presence in the area, despite renewed operations against his hideout in late May 2026195.
Additionally, residents have been rendered vulnerable to gang recruitment due to the fragmentation of their urban
settlements with lootings and destruction of buildings, which resulted into massive displacement of residents and the
breakdown of services. Likewise, residents are reluctant to return to their neighborhoods of origin. Gaps in community
violence reduction programmes - an issue that broadly affects the country – contributes to continued relapse of violence in
environments controlled by gangs.
__________________
193
Interviews with gang analysts and local authority, May 2026 and confidential note. Mars 2026.
194
Idem.
195
HNP Facebook page, June 2026.
26-09652
55/94
S/2026/714
Annex 11 – Government Support Program to the Peace Brigadiers (Brigadiers de Paix)
56/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Source : Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales, 2026
26-09652
57/94
S/2026/714
Folder
58/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Source : Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales, 2026
26-09652
59/94
S/2026/714
Annex 12 – Viv Ansanm inter-fighting in Croix-des-Bouquets and Cité Soleil communes
Between 6 March and 3 June 2026, the conflict between two contending blocs of Viv Ansanm gangs caused heightened
tensions in several neighbourhoods of the communes of Croix-des-Bouquets and Cité Soleil of the West department. During
clashes, residents were caught in the crossfire, hit by bullets inside their homes, or targeted over suspected ties to gangs or
to the police. Gang members deliberately burned homes and other buildings, as well as vehicles. They also used sexual
violence - especially against women and girls - as punishment for living in areas controlled by rival groups. Public transport,
local businesses, and industrial activities came to a standstill196.Several factors triggered the clashes. Following early 2026
operations in lower Delmas (see Annex 2 of S/2026/241), the Tokyo gang aimed at relocating to Village de la Renaissance
(Cité Soleil commune) and re-establishing its operational capacity by setting up a checkpoint along a local road to generate
criminal income. Further, on 6 March 2026, after Chen Mechan members killed two Canaan members over Tokyo’s
relocation, gangs such as 400 Mawozo and Tokyo supported the Canaan gang to confront Chen Mechan, Pierre VI and Terre
Noire gangs197. From 6 to 11 March 2026, at least 74 people were killed, comprising 20 individuals with no reported links
to gangs. A further 76 people were injured, including 40 nonassociated with gangs 198.
Chen Mechan then shifted alliance and joined the gangs of 400 Mawozo and Canaan to take control over the territories of
Pierre VI and Terre Noire. Another key driver of the clashes was the setup by the Pierre VI gang of an illegal tollbooth along
the Duvivier Road, to generate revenue from the extortion of drivers, which displeased Jeff, the leader of Canaan gang 199.
During the first wave of gang violence, from 6 to 18 April, at least 111 women and girls were victims of rape and gang rape.
From 19 April to 9 May 2026, renewed gang clashes were driven by the Tokyo gang’s efforts to retain its presence in Village
de la Renaissance. Sexual violence was also reported in this new peak of violence, with at least 46 women subjected to rape,
including gang rape. A third wave of gang violence from 10 May to 3 June 2026 resulted in at least 147 people killed,
including 33 people with no reported links to gangs. Several additional casualties were reported 200 . Intense violence
impacted commercial activities and humanitarian operations.
On 21 April 2026, the Barbancourt Rum company stated that part of its sugarcane plantations was destroyed by fire.
__________________
196
o
Interviews with confidential source and gang analyst, April 2026, Le Nouvelliste, n 42458, 20 and 21 april 2026 and
confidential reports, 2026.
197
Interviews with confidential source and gang analysts, April 2026
198
BINUH, Flash Report - Intensification of Gang Violence in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac Area, August 2026. Available at:
https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/document-library/flash-report-intensification-of-gang-violence-in-the-plaine-du-cul-de-sac-1
199
Interviews with confidential source and gang analysts, April 2026
200
BINUH, Flash Report - Intensification of Gang Violence in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac Area, August 2026. Available at:
https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/document-library/flash-report-intensification-of-gang-violence-in-the-plaine-du-cul-de-sac-1
60/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Press communiqué of Barbancourt Rum company
Source:
Rhum
Barbacourt,
21
April
2026.
https://x.com/barbancourtHT/status/2046564722695139579
See:
Between 18 and 19 April 2026, staff from Doctors Without Borders (MSF) was forced to remain inside their homes, and
nearly 40 individuals - including staff and their families - took shelter at the MSF hospital in Cité Soleil 201. Renewed
violence from 10 May 2026 led MSF in Cité Soleil to evacuate and temporarily suspend its medical activities 202. Several
bullets hit different building, and a security guard203. Several charities and local support services had to close and leave the
area204. At least six children’s shelters in Sarthe and nearby areas of Cité Soleil were forced to relocate to Delmas. This
situation is of concern, considering that the displacement and the disruption of protection services increase risks of
recruitment of vulnerable children or re-recruitment of those leaving gangs, while the absence of adequate support makes
reintegration unsustainable and heightens the risk of exploitation or renewed involvement in gangs 205. As of 15 May 2026,
approximately 10,182 individuals had fled the violence206.
Additionally, the heavy crossfire in the vicinity of the international airport posed a recurring risk to both GSF and United
Nations personnel, premises and air assets, with an increase in the incidents reported 207.
__________________
201
https://www.doctorswithoutborders.ca/haiti-the-country-has-become-a-far-more-dangerous-place-to-live-or-seekmedical-care/
202
See: https://www.msf.fr/communiques-presse/haiti-msf-contrainte-d-evacuer-son-hopital-de-cite-soleil-et-d-ysuspendre-temporairement-ses-activites.
203
https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/haiti-msf-hospital-cite-soleil-reopens-after-three-week-closure
204
Interviews with representatives of civil society, May 2026.
205
Confidential note, 23 avril 2026.
206
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (15 May 2026). “Emergency Tracking Tool 93.1 – Updates on
displacement following armed clashes in Cité Soleil (10 - 15 May 2026)”, available at https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haitiemergency-tracking-tool-931-updates-displacement-following-armed-clashes-cite-soleil
207
Confidential report, 30 May 2026.
26-09652
61/94
S/2026/714
Context
The Cul-de-Sac Plain area, in the West department, encompasses several communes, including Croix-des-Bouquets,Cité
Soleil and Tabarre. It holds critical strategic importance within the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, serving as a key
corridor linking the capital to other parts of the country. The Plain also hosts industrial zones, and densely populated
neighborhoods and lies near the international airport.
The area witnessed violence of such intensity not seen since at least late 2023 208. At that time, Viv Ansanm was not yet
formed, and gangs integrated the rival alliances, G9 and G-Pèp. In September 2023, the death of G9-leader, Tysson
(Carrefour Drouillard gang) triggered clashes in Cité Soleil commune between two G9 camps (Boston, Belekou, Terre
Noire and Pierre VI against Chen Mechan and Carrefour Drouillard, supported by the G-Pèp-Brooklyn gang) (see Annex 4
of S/2024/253). Further, in November 2023, the death of Iskar Andrice (a.k.a “Iskar”), leader of the Belekou gang and cofounder of G9 led to the resurgence of further territorial disputes in the area, between G9 and G-Pèp (see para. 28 and Annex
4 of S/2024/253).
While the activation of Viv Ansanm alliance in 2024 reduced inter-gang fighting over territorial expansion and shifted focus
toward attacks on state institutions and consolidation of strongholds (see section II.A of S/2024/704), sporadic clashes
continued among affiliated groups, underscoring persistent internal rivalries and competition over territory and illicit
revenue sources. For instance, clashes erupted in June 2025 between the gangs of 400 Mawozo, and Chen Mechan over a
checkpoint in Lilavois (Croix-des-Bouquets). Residents were killed in Santo 25 neighborhood, including some who were
inside homes that were set on fire by 400 Mawozo gang members 209.
After a relative decrease in violence in Croix-des-Bouquets reportedly due to the relocation of many 400 Mawozo members
to the Centre and Artibonite departments 210, the beginning of March 2026 marked an escalation of violence in the area.
Following the destabilization of the Tokyo gang (led by Ralph Woodmyr Louissant, a.k.a “Chalè”) – which lost territory
after intensified police operations in early 2026 (see section II.A and Annex 2 of S/2026/241) - the gangs of Canaan and
400 Mawozo initially supported the establishment of the Tokyo gang in the area of Village de la Renaissance, in the Croixdes-Bouquets commune. While Chen Mechan was initially aligned with Pierre VI and Terre Noire to oppose this move, the
gangs of Canaan and 400 Mawozo ultimately persuaded Chen Mechan to extend its control over areas held by Pierre VI
and Terre Noire gangs211.
Residents and local stakeholders deplored the absence of police in the area, despite the proximity of the conflicts to police
headquarters212. On 29 April 2026, a group of private companies whose facilities are located near the site of the attacks,
denounced critical conditions of the National Road #1 (RN1) and the Route 9, which hinders effective police operations.
Economic stakeholders - whose companies account for thousands of direct and indirect jobs - then urged Haitian authorities,
on 30 April 2026, to rehabilitate these strategic sections and the access to the international airport, as well as to reassert
control over the area, and protect the population. They emphasized the economic and social importance of their activities
and highlighted the risk of the area becoming a new ‘lost territory’, on the doorstep of the international airport and the HNP
headquarters213.
Several on-the-ground police operations - with the first taking place only on 28 March 2026 - and one Task Force drone
operation were launched. Further, on 5 June 2026, a truce was agreed amongst Viv Ansanm gangs including the reduction
of armed presence (removing checkpoints, watchtowers, and barricades), the specific control of zones and the end of
fighting. According to the agreement, the Fourgy area, in Cité Soleil, would remain
a neutral and non-aggression zone,
__________________
208
Interview with confidential source, 23 April 2026.
209
BINUH/Human Rights Division: Quarterly report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, April - June 2025. Available
at: https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_ _june_2025.pdf
210
BINUH/Human Rights Division: Quarterly report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, July - September 2025.
Available at: https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026 01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20% 28july%20%E2%80%93%2
0september%202025%29.pdf
o
211
Interview with gang analyst, April 2026 and Le Nouvelliste, n 42458 | Lundi 20 et mardi 21 avril 2026.
212
Interviews with confidential sources, April 2026.
213
Statements by private companies, 2026.
62/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
while Village de la Renaissance was officially handed over to the Tokyo gang. Although Jeff Canaan subsequently reopened
the Route 9 that had been closed, Chen Mechan continued to clash with Terre Noire. The situation remains volatile 214.
This surge in violence is driven by gang competition over the control of key routes linking the Cul-de-Sac Plain to Cité
Soleil, which serve as critical corridor for trucks heading notably northwards. The clashes also raised questions about the
internal cohesion of Viv Ansanm and political drivers backing gangs’ motivations, particularly ahead of electoral period.
Some sources suggested that beyond territorial expansion for economic interests, the underlying drivers that led to the
constitution of former G9 an Fanmi e Alye (G9) and G-Pèp (see S/2023/674) remain active215. The Cité Soleil coalition is
essentially composed of G9 gangs while the Croix-des-Bouquets group is made up of G-Pèp ones, notably the 400 Mawozo
and Canaan gangs. However, the heavy infighting likely reflects the expansionist ambitions of the Canaan and 400 Mawozo
gangs as they push into the Plain after securing key areas in the Centre and North departments 216 (see section II.A.3 of
S/2025/597).
__________________
214
Interviews with gang analyst, Cité Soleil and Croix -des-Bouquets residents and workers, June 2026.
Interviews with gang analysts, police officers, representatives of civil society, local authorities, and humanitarian
workers, May and June 2026.
216
Interviews with gang analysts, May and June 2026.
215
26-09652
63/94
S/2026/714
Annex 13 – Sustained gang violence in Kenscoff217
More than a year and a half since the first large-scale attack against Kenscoff, on 27 January 2025 (see Annex 6 of
S/2025/597), insecurity persists in Kenscoff’s communal sections, even if some areas in the centre appear relatively calm.
Gangs continue to maintain a persistent presence in localities such as Nouvelle-Touraine, Bongars, Grand Fond, Belle
Fontaine, Belot, Furcy, Kafou Bèt, and Sourçailles. To makes matter worse, amid intensified security operations, gangs
continue to infiltrate the commune - particularly through a direct corridor from Carrefour commune to Kenscoff - to take
refuge in the most remote communal sections where access is extremely difficult and gangs have cut off roads 218.
According to sources, there has only been one major police operation in 2025 (see paragraph 47 of S/2025/597), and it
yielded no results. Since then, security interventions remain largely reactive, achieving limited tactical successes, and not
resulting in sustained territorial recovery. Gangs maintain their presence in rural and elevated out of reach areas, to move
freely and prepare attacks. While no permanent security presence remains to control secondary axes, gangs quickly use
them to reinsert themselves (see Annex 6 of S/2025/597).
Multiple calls have urged the national authorities to provide the police with assets such as helicopters, motorcycles, and
terrain-adapted vehicles, as well as sustained capabilities for territorial consolidation. Sources interviewed by the Panel call
for units capable of operating off-road, at high altitude and at night - as attacks systematically occur between midnight and
early morning - and in mountainous terrain.
The communal sections - the source of agriculture for the municipality - have been devastated by gangs. For instance,
Bongars was overrun by gangs on 21 January 2025, resulting in 279 people killed, 500 residences burnt and the displacement
of thousands of residents. As for the Nouvelle Touraine communal section, it is fully under gang control, that arrived on the
locality on 3 March 2025. The police and State are totally absent, and gangs have carried out massacres, looted everything,
destroyed livelihoods and 90% of the population has fled Nouvelle Touraine. Gangs have also controlled local markets
through an illegal arrangement whereby people have to give 50% of everything they sell to gangs. Livestock is valued at
approximately $ 4,000 HTG for goats, $ 6,000 HTG for pigs, and $ 80,000 USD for cattle, of which half must be surrendered
to gangs. In the case of vegetables, they sometimes seize the entire production 219.
The Panel interviewed farmers that were driven out of their land by violence and have lost everything. Having depended on
agriculture for their survival, they now struggle in difficult conditions in other parts of the capital, as their entire way of life
was destroyed.
In early July 2026, coordinated attacks by Viv Ansanm triggered a new wave of violence in Kenscoff, from the night of 4 to
5 July at least until 8 July 2026, beginning in Téléco, Le Refuge, and Viard (Nouvelle Touraine communal section), before
spreading on 8 July to several other localities, including Robin, Mahotière, Dumisseau, Do Blanc, Bernard 1 and 2, Do Pak,
Kabamòn, and Dè Savann (Grand Fond communal section), with the escalation resulting in widespread destruction,
kidnapping and killings. According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), approximately 5,840 people were
displaced as a result220. Sources on the ground described the attacks as one of the most violent ones in the reporting period,
leading to the death of at least 61 residents killed, although interviews with residents suggested a significantly higher death
toll. The municipal authorities have buried at least 43 bodies221.
Gangs in Kenscoff
At least four gangs are present in Kenscoff, each represented by a local leader. They collaborate closely when needed. Izo
2 is a
representative of the 5 Segond gang, led by Johnson Andre (a.k.a “Izo”, HTi.002). While several sources identify Izo
2 and Dady Paul, known as Frantz Valmyr (a.k.a “Didy”) as the same individual, some local sources indicated that Didy is
originally from Furcy. leads his own gang, and is another ‘general’ of Viv Ansanm. Didy controls the area of the Téléco site
- an essential telecommunications hub providing signal support for civil aviation, internet, media, and public safety
__________________
217
This annex is based on interviews with local autorities, residents, victims, gang analysts, 2025 and 2026.
218
Interviews with local authority and residents, 2025 and 2026. See also:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ATsTVoDo4Rs
219
Interviews with residents, May 2026.
220
https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-1001-updates-displacements-following-armed-attacks?utm
221
Interviews with gang analyst and residents, 2026.
64/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
operations throughout Haiti -, Furcy, Tête K-Jacques, and the road leading to Seguin. Blanco is a member of the Ti Bwa
gang, led by Christ-Roi Chery (a.k.a “Chrisla”), and controls the Belot area. Barak is linked to the Grand Ravine gang led
by Renel Destina (a.k.a “Ti Lapli”, HTi.003). Wilson Joseph (a.k.a “Lanmo San Jou”, HTi.004), head of the 400 Mawozo
gang had also sent gang members to Kenscoff, at the beginning of the conflict, in early January 2025, but many of them
were killed by the police222.
During the 27 January 2026 attack, residents estimate that nearly 3,000 gang members were mobilised, but currently, this
figure has decreased, as some gang members were killed by security operations and self-defense groups while others - being
non-local and unable to adapt to the cold and mountainous conditions - have left the area. Local sources estimate that nearly
1,500 of them are present in Kenscoff, mostly locally recruited 223.
Sustained gang violence in Kenscoff commune224
During the reporting period, Kenscoff continued to face sustained violence.
On 11 October 2025, gang members set fire to the Camp Zoï rural hotel and the Wynne Farm Ecological Reserve, which
offers camping services, cultivation and reforestation workshops, and other environmental protection training activities.
On 5 November 2025, in Fermathe 56, gang members fired at a group of people, killing two persons and injuring two men .
On 27 December 2025, gang members fired at a group of farmers heading to their fields in Galette, killing at least two
members of the population and severely injuring two others.
In early January 2026, the 400 Mawozo and 5 Segond gangs attacked the localities of Fort-Jacques and Viard, as they were
confronted by self-defence groups.
On 11 February 2026, gang members killed at least one person and burnt several homes. Earlier attacks on 29 January and
8 February in K-Jacques had already caused at least seven fatalities and several kidnappings.
On 21 February 2026, in Nouvelle-Touraine, gangs set fire to a vehicle with employees of the telecommunications company
Natcom, in the Morne Tranchant area. Two employees were killed and another injured. In Belle Fontaine, between 7 and 8
March 2026, gangs operating around Tête K-Jacques, carried out large-scale thefts of livestock belonging to farmers. They
moved from Tête K-Jacques crossing into Gélin, a small community above the town of Kenscoff, setting houses on fire.
Many farmers were robbed of their animals, at least three people lost their lives during these attacks, not including other
unreported cases, according to a media interview of the mayor of Kenscoff, on 11 March 225. Gélin, located in the 4th
communal section of Belle Fontaine, has been reported as important for gangs for the transport of drugs 226.
__________________
222
Interviews with residents, March and April 2026.
223
Interviews with residents, 2025 and 2026.
224
This section is based on interviews with residents, 2025 and 2026 as well as on BINUH Quarterly Report on the Human
Rights situation, October-December 2025. Available at: https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/202601/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20 %20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf and confidential reports, 2026.
225
Interview with local authority on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ATsTVoDo4Rs
226
Interview with resident of affected area, March 2026.
26-09652
65/94
S/2026/714
Gangs burned several houses belonging to residents of the mountains area of Gelin
Still from video shared on social media, on 7 March 2026
https://www.facebook.com/share/1B2UsWjG62/
On 12 March 2026, gangs set fire to a site housing a communication antenna, belonging to Digicel, located near the
Téléco site. Some weeks before, seven employees – including an Irish missionary - and a 3-year-old child were kidnapped
by the gang of Didy from the orphanage located near the Téléco site. They were released nearly a month later.
66/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
12 March 2026 arson attack against a communication antenna site
Stills from video shared on social media, March 2026.
https://x.com/chantalmelie/status/2032253354282193077?s=12&t=3kFgrKDPT9SeorQ5dwAnew
HNP intervention
Source: HNP Facebook page, March 2026. See: https://web.facebook.com/pnh.ht
In April 2026, during a media interview, the Mayor of Kenscoff reported other attacks, including in Belle-Fontaine
communal section, in the locality of Nankoupé. Gang members killed livestock and stole three goats during the day 227.
On 1 April 2026, in Viard, two victims were shot by gang members along a road.
On 1 May 2026, two men were killed and their bodies set on fire during an armed attack, in Malong, a locality in
Sourçailles228.
At the time of drafting, attacks were still ongoing in Kenscoff.
__________________
227
228
26-09652
https://www.facebook.com/reel/834758695622452
https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/266896/two -killed-one-missing-in-fresh-armed-attack-in-kenscoff
67/94
S/2026/714
Annex 14 - Warrant notices for Alfredo Antoine and Nenel Cassy
Source: HNP Facebook page, February 2025. See: https://web.facebook.com/pnh.ht
68/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Annex 15 - Coordinated attacks by Viv Ansanm across the lower Artibonite: over 100 residents killed 229
Almost two years after the Pont-Sondé massacre (see paras. 36-37 of S/2025/356 and special report submitted in November
2024), Viv Ansanm launched a new wave of coordinated attacks in the lower Artibonite region of the Artibonite department.
Between 29 March and 3 April 2026, gangs of the Viv Ansanm alliance - Gran Grif (HTe.001), led by Luckson Elan
(HTi.007), Kokorat San Ras, led by Bendjy, and Canaan, headed by Jeff Larose - perpetrated a series of coordinated attacks
across at least 16 localities in the lower Artibonite region, notably in the communes of Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite,
Marchand Dessalines and Montrouis, resulting in at least 95 residents killed and 38 others injured 230. However, the number
of people killed and injured is higher, as the gangs continued their attacks over successive days231. About 9,000 residents
were displaced between 28 March and 1 April 2026232.
The assaults occurred in the early hours of the day - between 02:00 and 08:00 - while residents were at home. Several
victims were shot dead after being forcibly taken from their beds or killed or injured while attempting to flee. Several houses
were burned233. In a single day - 29 March 2026 - at least 67 residents (38 men and 29 women) were killed, and 30 others
(17 men and 13 women) were injured during coordinated attacks carried out by the Gran Grif gang in the communes of
Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite and Marchand Dessalines234.
1.
Context
The department of Artibonite - once considered Haiti’s agricultural breadbasket in Northern Haiti - has become one of the
most alarming centres of gang violence. The rise of gangs like Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras (between 2015 and 2017)
drove increased insecurity through 2020, followed by a temporary decline in early 2021 after the death of the Gran Grif
leader, Odma Louissaint. From March 2022, the human rights situation deteriorated sharply. 235 According to local
sources236, the intensification of violence was also marked by the attack by Gran Grif in January 2023 against the Liancourt
police station, in which six officers were killed (see para. 68 of S/2023/674).
The region has faced increasing violence not only from Gran Grif (HTe.001), led by Luckson Elan (HTi.007) but also from
Kokorat San Ras, led by Bendjy, as well as from gangs coming from the capital, namely Canaan, led by Jeff Larose (a.k.a
“Jeff”), and 400 Mawozo, led by Lanmo San Jou (HTi. 004), who advanced into the lower Artibonite, after seizing strategic
towns in the centre department in April 2025 (see S/2025/597).
To collectively oppose gang activities, since late 2025, around 30 self-defense groups distributed across the department
united into a coalition, called the Lower Artibonite Coalition. The latter is led by Francky Pierre, a.k.a “Ti Mépri”, and its
membership totals roughly 300 individuals. Ti Mépri is also responsible for the Coalition des révolutionnaires pour sauver
l’Artibonite (known as the Jean Denis coalition), based in the locality of Jean Denis (Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite
commune). The group - considered by many interlocutors as a gang rather than a self-defence group, since it regularly
commits human rights violations including the killing of inhabitants and burning of properties - was formed to resist the
activities of Gran Grif gang,237 that exponentially enlarged its area of control and influence since 2022 (see para. 49 of
S/2023/674).
__________________
229
This annex is based on interviews with individuals with direct experience in gang -controlled areas in Artibonite, police
officers, local authorities in lower Artibonite, civil society representatives, victims of attacks in Artibonite, member of s elfdefence group, as well as confidential report, 2026; Centre d’Analyse et de Recherche em Droits de l’Homme (CARDH)
report, 1 April 2026; confidential reports, March-April 2026.
230
Confidential report, April 2026.
231
Interviews with local authorites, police officer, and residents, 2026.
232
https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-881-updates-displacement-following-armed-attacks-petite
233
Interview with representative civil society working in the lower Artibonite, April 2026
234
Confidential report, 2026
235
OHCHR report, Criminal violence extends beyond Port-au-Prince: the situation in Lower Artibonite from January 2022
to October 2023, November 2023. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/Haiti report-criminal-violence-artibonite-2023-EN.pdf
236
Interviews with local authority and with individual with direct experience in gang -controlled areas in Artibonite, April
2026.
237
Idem.
26-09652
69/94
S/2026/714
These attacks are part of a broader strategy to expand control across the lower part of the Artibonite region, not only by
gangs (for revenue collection), but also by politicians. Control over the region is politically significant because it is a densely
populated and economically important region. For political actors seeking to gain or maintain power, securing influence in
this area can translate into control over key electoral districts, local authorities, and logistical routes. Gang networks, in
turn, have historically become instruments that assert their territorial dominance to shape political dynamics.
1.1. Escalation of tension between Gran Grif gang and the Lower Artibonite Coalition
Given the proximity of the locality of Jean Denis to Savien locality (stronghold of Gran Grif), both areas have become
hotspots of violence, with frequent clashes between Gran Grif and Jean Denis coalition 238. Several recent developments
have heightened tensions between the two groups, prompting Gran Grif’s chief, Luckson Elan (HTi.007), to plan
coordinated attacks not only in Jean Denis area but also across localities where members of the Lower Artibonite Coalition
are present239.
Repeated seizures of weapons and ammunition intended for Gran Grif by the coalition reportedly prompted the launch of
attacks. For instance, on 3 August 2025, nine boxes of ammunition intended for the Gran Grif gang was seized by the
Coalition (see Annex 19).
Another key factor significantly contributing to the onset of the attacks was the establishment by the Jean Denis Coalition
of a checkpoint in Carrefour Kado, at the entrance of the city, in 2025; where informants sent by Gran Grif gang or
individuals suspected of having links with the gang have been frequently intercepted and killed by its members 240. For
instance, on 28 March 2026, on the eve of the massacre, two women were killed at the Jean Denis Coalition’s checkpoint,
after being accused of purchasing supplies - fabric - for the gang in Pont-Sondé market 241 . In addition, the set-up of
roadblocks by self-defence groups across the lower Artibonite has constrained Gran Grif’s revenue, which is largely
dependent on extorting vehicles and travellers, thus fuelling discontent of its leader.
1.2 Threats of attacks by Gran Grif gang leader
From early March 2026, Luckson Elan was openly threatening to eliminate the Jean Denis Coalition and to seize control of
the commune of Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite242.
Through an audio message, Luckson Elan vowed to devastate the entire lower Artibonite region in search for members of
the Lower Artibonite Coalition, and particularly Ti Mépri. He also said that any areas that dare to harbour them will be
razed to the ground243.
2.
Kenken as a key actor of the attacks
Kenken a.k.a “chat 2 pye” (meaning char d’assaut blindé sur deux pieds, or one-man assault machine), a key member of
Gran Grif, can be seen in live videos related to the attacks, alongside the second chief of the gang, Wender Choisy (a.k.a
“Dèdè”). Kenken is a former member of the Lower Artibonite Coalition, and switched side to become a Gran Grif gang
member in October 2025, reportedly because the gang has greater resources 244. He was one of the coordinators of the attacks
and violently confronted the population, as he knows the areas intimately. Residents connected to gangs were also used to
supply information about certain areas.
__________________
238
Interview with gang analyst, 3 April 2026.
239
Interview with gang analyst, 24 April 2026.
240
Idem.
241
Interviews with gang analyst, April 2026 and individual with direct experience in gang -controlled areas in Artibonite,
April 2026, and confidential report, 10 April 2026.
242
Idem, and other confidential report, 2026.
243
Audio message shared with the Panel on 3 April 2026 and interview with gang analyst, April 2026.
244
Interviews with resident in Artibonite with direct experience in gang -controlled areas, and gang analyst, April 2026.
70/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Kenken (with weapon raised) leading a group of gang members (likely including minors)
Stills from video shared on social media, April 2026
Gran Grif gang members on live videos about the attacks
Gran Grif members on live video with Wender Choisy (a.k.a “Dèdè”), second
Kenken (in the bottom right corner)
chief of Gran Grif (on the left) and Kenken
Stills from videos shared on social media, April 2026
3.
Evolution of the attacks
3.1. 29 March 2026: initial round of attacks by Gran Grif gang
On 29 March 2026, four groups of Gran Grif gang members of about 50 each, including several minors, well-armed and
equipped with telephones and radio handsets undertook coordinated attacks against at least 10 localities in the communes
of Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite and Marchand Dessalines, between 2:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. 245. They also used live videos
to facilitate coordination.
In the commune of the Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite, Jean Denis was among the first localities targeted. Ti Mépri’s coalition
attempted to repel the attacks; however, outnumbered and outgunned, its members withdrew. During clashes, four members
__________________
245
26-09652
Interview with individual with direct experience in gang-controlled area, 17 April 2026.
71/94
S/2026/714
of the Coalition were killed. Residents were forcibly removed from their beds and shot dead, or fled into nearby fields. The
assailants burned several houses 246 . Simultaneously, other groups carried out coordinated attacks on multiple areas,
including Négriel, Boulin and Rémonsin, where over 20 people were killed and dozens were injured. Other communities
including Manglouet, Blain and Sédrène also scored a heavy toll of victims. The commune of Marchand Dessalines was
further attacked, at around 7:00 a.m., where Gran Grif members made more victims in Bois-Jour.
The attackers had also previously blocked access to routes to prevent the security forces from intervening 247.
Gran Grif group, likely including minors, led by Kenken
Stills from video shared on social media in March 2026
3.2. 30 March 2026: the communes of Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite and Montrouis respectively attacked by
Gran Grif and Canaan gangs
On 30 March 2026, in the Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite commune, between 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., members of the Gran
Grif gang attacked Beaufort, Védry, and Rémonsin. In Beaufort and Védry, two men were killed inside their homes while
25 houses were burned.
In the meantime, in Montrouis commune, at around 2:00 a.m., members of the Canaan gang attacked the village of Vidon
Piâtre, where 10 people were shot dead inside their homes, and 20 houses were set alight. Two members of the Piâtre selfdefence brigade were also shot dead in a clash with members of the Canaan gang. Their bodies were burned.
3.2. Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras join forces to seize the commune of Marchand Dessalines
Gran Grif capitalized on the momentum of the attacks over Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite to extend its presence throughout
Marchand Dessalines commune. Therefore, on 31 March 2026, at around 6:00 a.m., members of the gang attacked the
villages of Pont-Jour and Carrefour Roger. While attempting to flee, residents were killed and people injured inside their
homes. Over twenty houses were set alight after being looted in Bois-Jour and Carrefour Roger. During this attack, a
member of the Barrage self-defence brigade was shot dead and decapitated with a machete, and his body was burned.
__________________
246
247
72/94
Confidential report, April 2026.
https://lenouvelliste.com/article/265845/attaque-meurtriere-du-gang-gran-grif-a-jean-denis-racontee-par-des-residents
26-09652
S/2026/714
Gran Grif members in the Ponjou Market, on 31 March 2026
Stills from video shared on social media, 31 March 2026.
To secure control over areas of Marchand Dessalines, the Gran Grif gang entered in an arrangement with its ally, the Kokorat
San Ras gang, led by Bendjy. The arrangement reportedly encompassed targeting localities where members of the Lower
Artibonite Coalition were believed to be present, but refrained from conducting armed operations in downtown, since it
hosts a significant number of relatives and affiliates of Kokorat San Ras.
On 31 March 2026, Bendjy was seen moving in downtown Marchand Dessalines throwing banknotes to residents, aiming
at “reassuring” inhabitants that no harm would be inflicted by the gangs 248.
__________________
248
Interviews with police officer, individual working on gang dynamics in Artibonite, and gang analyst, March and Arpil
2026.
26-09652
73/94
S/2026/714
Bendjy arriving in Marchand-Dessalines and throwing money for residents to grab.
Stills from video shared on social media, April 2026.
Later, on 1 April 2026, in a symbolic assertion of control, Bendjy and members of both gangs converged at the statue of
Jean-Jacques Dessalines, in Marchand Dessalines. Bendjy stated that neither Kokorat San Ras nor Gran Grif had any issues
with residents, but that both gangs would kill all members of self-defense groups and anyone hosting or collaborating with
them.
74/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Bendjy, leader of the Kokorat San Ras gang (masked) and members of Kokorat San Ras and Gran
Grif, at the foot of the Dessalines statue
Stills from videos shared on social media, April 2026.
Other attacks were reported on 2 and 3 April 2026, both in Marchand Dessalines (including Carrefour Roger and Ti Bois)
as well as in localities of Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite (including Bois-Laville and Dézile), with further killings and burning
of properties.
The road leading to the Marchand-Dessalines area was cut off by Kokorat San Ras gang.
Following a series of attacks, at the time of writing, the commune of Marchand Dessalines is under full control of Kokorat
San Ras and Gran Grif gangs.
26-09652
75/94
S/2026/714
Blockage of the road leading to Marchand Dessalines by the Kokorat San Ras gang
Source: Photograph shared on social media, in May 2026.
The situation in the commune of Marchand Dessalines remains critical, with escalating threats and violence, with Kokorat
San Ras and Gran Grif carrying out repeated abuses and public displays of force.
On 5 May 2026, between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., these gangs had the time to use sledgehammers and destroy the local
police station in Marchand Dessalines249.
Marchand Dessalines has effectively become a base of operations for these gangs, allowing them to act freely. As a result,
the commune is now largely under their control, forcing residents to flee 250.
__________________
249
250
76/94
https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/267005/gangs-destroy-police-station-in-marchand-dessalines
Interviews with gang analyst, May 2026.
26-09652
S/2026/714
Further developments
Many other localities have been targeted by Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras. In just one week, in mid-April 2026, around
six people were shot dead, and ten others were injured, in the commune of Marchand Dessalines 251.
On 1 May 2026, the Gran Grif gang, reportedly supported by elements of the Kokorat San Ras gang, launched another
attack against the locality of Jean-Denis, targeting the Jean Denis Coalition. Clashes left multiple people dead and others
injured, while numerous homes were burned and residents fled 252.
Worrying reports, audio messages and videos have circulated on social media suggesting many other attacks. In several
videos, Kenken can be seen attacking different localities. In the Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite commune, he led a group of
Gran Grif members to attack the locality of Pitray, on 1 May 2026.
At the time of writing, violence continues.
On 1 May 2026, Kenken led a Gran Grif group to attack the Pitray locality
Stills from video shared on social media, May 2026.
In other video, he appears showing his weapon, which he then passes to other gang members, who fire it, while they say:
“Danger is around / all around us… Death is right before our eyes”.
__________________
251
Interview with individual working on gang dynamics in Artibonite, and gang analyst, March and April 2026.
252
https://realiteinfo.com/attaque-a-savien-plusieurs-morts-et-des-maisons-incendiees-dans-une-nouvelle-flambee-deviolence/
26-09652
77/94
S/2026/714
Kenken showing his weapon and passing it to other gang members to shoot
Source: Stills from video shared on social media, in May 2026.
Blockage of the National Road #1(RN1)
In the context of the broader escalation of violence in the lower Artibonite region and the absence of police response, on 20
April 2026, Ti Mépri, the leader of the Lower Artibonite Coalition, appeared in front of a truck blocking the RN1, a few
weeks after the attacks, in the Troi-Pont locality. He stated that it will remain closed until the government decides to
dismantle the gangs in Artibonite. He also asked for proper drones, that can be effectively deployed to ‘the right places’.
Ti Mépri blocking the RN1
Stills from video shared on social media, on 20 April 2026
Traffic has come to a halt also on other stretches of the road, with blockage by trucks in the villages of Saint-Marc and in
L’Estère communes, as part of protests organised by civil society organisations and self-defence groups.
4.
Response from the authorities
Following the first attacks, the police deployed two armoured vehicles from the Patchwal sub-station to Jean Denis on the
morning of 29 March 2026, which left after few hours. The following day, while gang members returned to Jean Denis, the
78/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
deployment of two armoured vehicles in the early morning temporarily restored calm; however, significant loss of life and
damage to property had already occurred.
Local police face significant operational constraints, including insufficient firepower, a lack of heavy armoured vehicles
and air support, limited specialized personnel, and inadequate access to surveillance technology. Maintenance capacity is
also severely limited. In addition, a large proportion of armoured vehicles are out of service, sometimes due to minor
technical issues that require intervention from Port-au-Prince. Operational effectiveness is further hindered by centralized
decision-making, as joint actions with supporting forces depend on authorization from higher authorities 253.
The situation is further complicated by allegations of collusion between certain police officers supplying gangs with
weapons and ammunition and providing them with information on security operations, undermining the effectiveness of
security efforts (see Annex 19).
Local authorities and the population vividly deplored the delayed reaction of the government and the lack of a robust
response. This highlights not only the absence of effective state protection but also that a cycle of massacres has taken place
in total impunity, reinforcing a climate of fear and insecurity.
Interviews with the police in Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite also highlited the security gap left by the departure of the MSS
forces from the area. Since their withdrawal, gangs have advanced, particularly in Savien, Jean Denis, Barrage, Carrefour
Paye, and along the road to the commune of L’Estère. According to the police, both Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif are
well equipped in terms of personnel and resources, while the police remain unable to conduct operations due to limited
resources and insufficient staffing254.
On 8 May 2026, the HNP, supported by the Task Force, conducted operations in the lower Artibonite region, particularly
in Jean-Denis, killing around thirty gang members and seizing weapons. However, the following day, on 9 May 2026, six
people were killed by members of the Gran Grif gang in the Robert district of the municipality of Saint Marc. They also
stole seven motorcycles. The incident occurred following an attack by the gang in the area. Nine people were also wounded
by gunfire and three motorcycles were set alight255.
Victims of the Gran Grif attack against Robert locality, in Saint Marc commune, on 9 May 2026
Gruesome images
Photographs and still from video shared with the Panel, on 9 May 2026.
Other security operations also targeted areas such as Savien and La Croix-Périsse, and key routes in the Artibonite Valley,
including raids on gang strongholds.
__________________
253
Inteview with local authorities and police officer, May 2026.
254
Interview with police officer, 4 May 2026.
255
Interviews with resident of Saint-Marc and with gang analyst, 9 May 2026.
26-09652
79/94
S/2026/714
Situation in Saint Marc commune
Saint-Marc consistently targeted by gangs due to its strategic importance
Saint-Marc is the second-largest city in the Artibonite department and a major port town with relatively developed
infrastructure. Its economy is largely driven by locally produced agricultural goods, while also attracting significant interest
from members of the diaspora and a wide range of economic stakeholders. The city holds strategic importance due to its
role as a key transport hub linking Port-au-Prince with the Artibonite and northern regions. Its position along major road
networks, combined with its port facilities and economic activity, makes it a critical centre for trade, logistics, and regional
mobility.
Saint-Marc thus became a major refuge for residents fleeing gang violence and a pressure point, while gangs have been
ultimately targeting to seize this strategic commune. Not only Gran Grif but also the gang of Canaan want to extend their
territory up to Saint Marc to increase criminal revenues. However, they have met the strong resistance of residents,
transporters, local merchants and self-defense groups, who are seeking to secure road access for their goods from the port
of Saint Marc to the other regions.
According to a local authority of Saint-Marc, the commune is surrounded by gangs which have taken over Montrouis, La
Chapelle, Marchand Dessalines, and Liancourt, as well as the first and second sections of Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite. In
addition, Saint-Marc is becoming saturated, as it has received many people displaced from neighbouring communes 256.
In the case of Montrouis, a local authority explained to the Panel that, since October 2025, gang members faced no resistance
to infiltrate the town, coming from the coast, the RN1 and the mountain areas. They operate freely, with each locality under
the control of a designated leader. In this touristic area, they move at their will, looting major hotels, vacation homes,
churches, and Vodoo temples. The population almost entirely displaced to other areas, such as Saint-Marc and Arcahaie
communes257.
Local authorities and residents fear attacks against the commune of Saint-Marc, notably following the alliance between
Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras, which has led to the control of Marchand Dessalines. In this way, outraged by the violence,
residents and notably victims of the violence in Jean Denis locality, organized a protest, early May 2026, to call on concrete
action from the authorities to dismantle the gangs that are terrorising several areas in the region. Participants erected
barricades using burning tires and vehicles in several neighbourhoods, and on the RN1, bringing traffic to a complete
standstill. As a result, commercial and school activities were suspended.
Tensions escalated while police intervened to disperse the crowd. Two people, including a 16-year-old boy, lost their lives
due to police actions. Several others were injured, and people were affected by heavy use of tear gas 258. While condemning
acts of violence by the population during protests, such as burning tires, vehicles, or property – including the office of the
Directorate General of Taxes (Direction Générale des Impôts - DGI) - the population deplored the disproportional use of
force against protestors.
Amid worsening security conditions, on 5 May 2026, local authorities in Saint-Marc imposed a 72-hour curfew across the
municipality. The measure restricts night-time movement and requires police authorization for public gatherings, with
participants identified259.
__________________
256
Interview with local authority of Saint-Marc, April 2026.
Interview with local authority, 28 April 2026.
258
Interview with human rights analyst, May 2026.
259
Statement from the municipal government of Saint-Marc, 5 May 2026.
257
80/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Office of the Directorate General of Taxes set on fire
One of the three demonstrators killed by police officers
Gruesome image
Sources: Stills from video and photograph shared with the Panel, on 4 May 2026.
Security forces in Saint-Marc are insufficient and under-resourced, while gangs remain constantly on the offensive, and
have increased capacity. As in other communes of the lower Artibonite, residents have organized themselves and worked
alongside the police in an effort to stop them.
The MSS base established in Pont Sondé in 2024 proved relatively useful as a deterrent, but it fell short of local expectations
in terms of supporting security forces to reclaiming territory occupied by gangs. On the contrary, gangs have increased
capacity, continuing to attack frequently. Local authorities deplored the absence of the government response to the major
attacks260.
At the time of the drafting, Saint-Marc commune remains under threat of gang attacks.
__________________
260
26-09652
Interview with local authority of Saint-Marc, April 2026.
81/94
S/2026/714
Annex 16: Seizures conducted at Haiti’s ports of entry or on their way to Haiti between the adoption of resolution
2356 on 22 October 2022 and 1st July 2026
Date
Location/
authorities
Firearms
25 October 2022
Miami
Airport
USA
9mm handgun
8 November
2022
Elias Pina,
Dominican
Republic
12,000 rounds of
7.62x39mm
10,160 rounds of
5.56x45mm
31 December
2022
Cap-Haitien
Haiti
989 rounds of 9x19mm
11 January 2023
Miami port
USA
24 April 2023
Cap-Haitien
Haiti
7 June 2023
CPS
container
park– Port au
Prince
Haiti
2023
(unknown date)
2023
(unknown date)
18 October 2023
1 November
2023
30 November
2023
2 December
2023
82/94
Miami
USA
Miami
USA
Dajabon ,
Dominican
Republic
Miami
USA
Ammunition
Other
materiel
1 magazine
One revolver
41 rounds
One 9mm
handgun
Eight 9mm rounds
4 boxes of 12-gauge
rounds (100 rounds)
2 knives
340 rounds of
5.56x45mm
115 rounds of 9mm
5 magazines
1 helmet
PA-15 5.56mm
rifle
2 pistols
Information
The pistol was
discovered in a parcel
being shipped to Haiti
Two Haitian women
were arrested while
attempting to cross the
border into Haiti in a
private vehicle.
Seizure from a
container coming from
the US. One individual
was arrested in Haiti.
The revolver was
concealed in a sofa
Found in a container
transported by the Sara
Express coming from
the Miami River
(Antillean Marine
Shipping).
Container coming from
Miami. Some materiel
concealed in a popcorn
machine. The rifle was
purchased for the first
time in the US in 2017.
Two individuals
arrested in Haiti.
1 magazine
23 vests
1 revolver
357 Magnum
1,850 rounds of 9mm
A minor was
intercepted while
trying to exit the DR
5 rounds of S&W .40 cal
36 rounds of 9x19mm
Commercial Vessel
Miami
USA
International
Airport
Haiti
50 rounds of .45
40 rounds of 5.56x45mm
150 rounds of 9x19mm
25 of 12 gauge cartridges
22 December
2023
Cap Haitien
Haiti
9mm handgun
5.56x45mm rifle
92 rounds of 9mm
9 rounds of .45
78 rounds of 5.56x45mm
05 April 2024
Cap Haitien
Haiti
Nine 5.56x45mm
rifles
Three
7.62x39mm rifles
14 handguns
999 rounds of
ammunition
(7.62x39mm,
5.56x45mm, .40 S&W,
9mm, .25 ACP)
29 April 2024
Cap Haitien
Haiti
One .40 handgun
13 rounds of 9x19mm
‘35 cannon
L-1 37mm’
[the Panel was
not able to
identify what
exact item it is]
19,390 USD in
cash
Six radios
One video
surveillance
system
One flak jacket
3 flak jackets
1 helmet
7 magazines
Commercial aircraft
Passenger arriving
from NY on
commercial aircraft
Seizure from container
from Florida
Serial number of the
handgun was erased
Container coming from
Florida
2 magazines
Container from Port
Everglades, Florida
26-09652
S/2026/714
One 9x19mm
handgun
11 June 2024
Cap Haitien
Haiti
31 October 2024
Miami
USA
16 January 2025
January 2025
25 February
2025
23 September
2025
Miami
USA
Haina Port,
Dominican
Republic
Haina Port,
Dominican
Republic
150 rounds of
ammunition
One 5.56x45mm
rifle
One 22LR
Seven 9mm
handgun
One .380 pistol
One .45 handgun
2 magazines
900 rounds of .223
100 rounds of
5.56x45mm
640 rounds of 7.62
646 rounds of 9mm
2286
Seven 9mm
handguns
Thirty rifles
(mostly
7.62x39mm)
16 7.62x39mm
rifles
One 50. Rifle
One 9mm submachine gun
Five 9mm
handguns
20 000 rounds of
7.62x39mm
16 000 rounds of
5.56x45mm
36,000
Port-auPrince
International
Airport
Port-auPrince
International
Airport
Port-auPrince
International
Airport
Cap-Haitien
container
terminal
.40 handgun
5.56x45mm rifle
2 x 9mm
handguns
7.62x39mm rifle
1800 rounds of 9mm
luger ammunition
6 January 2026
Cap-Haitien
container
terminal
9 x 9mm
handguns
5,500 rounds of
7.62x39mm
23 January 2026
Cap-Haitien
container
terminal
2 x 5.56x45mm
rifles
3 x 9mm
handguns
3400 rounds of
ammunition
24 October 2025
October 2025
29 December
2025
26 January 2026
21 May 2026
TOTAL
Cap-Haitien
container
terminal
Saint Marc
Port
Conversion kit
(handgun
to
rifle)
Commercial vessel
18 magazines
Barrel
extension for a
handgun
Commercial vessel
Container heading to
Cap-Haitian
37 magazines
Commercial vessel
Container from
Brooklyn
18 magazines
for rifles
13 magazines
for 9mm
handguns
1 magazine for
50. Rifle
1 silencer
Commercial vessel
Container in transit
from Miami
Heading to Belladère,
Haiti
Air freight from the
USA
4,000 rounds of inert
ammunition
245 magazines
for handguns
Air freight from the
USA
Rifle
Air freight from the
USA
One
9x19mm firearm
69 handguns
67 semiautomatic rifle
One 50. caliber
rifle
2 magazines
for 9mm
handguns
4 magazines
for 7.62x39mm
rifle
9 magazines
for 9x19mm
handguns
3 magazines
for 9mm
handguns
12 magazines
for 5.56x45mm
rifles
Maritime container
from the USA
Maritime container
from the USA
Container coming from
Florida
2490 x 9mm, 40 x
7.62x39mm, 40 x .30-06
SPRG
Container coming from
Florida
1000 rounds of 9x19 mm
Container coming from
Florida
80,944 rounds of
various calibers
Sources: Data provided by Customs and Border Protection (CBP), including through FOIA requests, as well as Haitian,
Dominican and US law enforcement agencies, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026.
26-09652
83/94
S/2026/714
Annex 17: The use of privately made firearms by armed actors in Haiti
The Panel had previously reported the presence of PMFs manufactured from 80% receivers (see S/2024/704) in the arsenal
of gangs, as well as the transfer of firearms components in violation of the embargo. During the reporting period one PMF
was documented by the Panel in Cap-Haitien, and several PMFs, likely built in the United States, were seized as part of
shipments having violated the arms embargo. Investigations are ongoing.
PMFs are firearms produced by individuals rather than by licensed commercial manufacturers. They may be assembled
from part kits, unfinished receivers, or self-manufactured components, including those produced using 3D-printing
technology. PMFs are often fabricated and acquired by individuals seeking to circumvent firearms regulations. As they are
generally unserialised, they are particularly difficult to trace and therefore present significant challenges for law
enforcement authorities.
The rapid evolution of manufacturing technologies, particularly 3D-printing, now enables the production of increasingly
sophisticated and reliable firearms that can be difficult for an untrained observer to distinguish from commercially
manufactured weapons.
Although the scale of the phenomenon remains difficult to quantify, the proliferation of PMFs appears to be increasing in
North America and across the Caribbean region, including Haiti 261.
Seizure of a FMGC-01 in Cap-Haitien
Documented by the Panel in October 2025, the firearm below was seized on 19 July 2025, in La Madeline, near Cap-Haitien
from a car transporting three individuals who claimed to be members of the Ouanaminthe Brigade de Surveillance des Aires
Protégées (BSAP) unit262. As indicated in previous reports (see S/2024/704, Annex 26), the BSAP is a rogue armed brigade
composed of autonomous units operating across the country outside of protected areas, whose members are involved in
both local security and criminal activities, including arms trafficking.
This firearm is a rare variant of an advanced 3D-printed firearm, the FGC-9 (for Fuck Gun Control 9mm). It is composed
at 90% of 3D printed parts mixed with components that can be sourced from any hardware store. 263 The FGC-9 was designed
around 2020 by an individual in Europe and a detailed fabrication manual was published online 264. Compared with earlier
generations of 3D-printed firearms, the design is more advanced and robust, and relatively easy to produce - it no longer
requires manufactured firearms components. This firearm could technically fire hundreds of rounds during its lifetime.
Source: Photograph taken by the Panel, Cap Haitien, October 2025
__________________
261
See also Dangerous Devices: Privately Made Firearms in the Caribbean | Small Arms Survey
262
Interview with senior police officer, Cap Haitien, October 2025.
263
Global Ghost Gun Intelligence Network. The FMGC-01. The FMGC-01- A compact select-fire PCC for Europe | Impro
Guns
264
Interview with an expert on PMFs, November 2025.
84/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
This particular variant (FMGC – 01) was likely in its beta testing phase (2022) during which the designer disseminated a
near final version of the fabrication instructions beyond the core development group to evaluate the making process and the
firearm265. This variant was designed by an individual in Europe and likely shared with other PMFs community members
in Europe and North America. This is the first FMGC-01 that has been documented outside of the PMF makers community
and the chain of custody remains unclear.
__________________
265
26-09652
Interview with an expert on PMFs, November 2025.
85/94
S/2026/714
Annex 18: Dominican ammunition in use by Haitian gangs
During the reporting period, the Panel documented several types of ammunition that appear to have been diverted from
Dominican national stockpiles. Multiple security sources consulted by the Panel, both in the Dominican Republic and in
Haiti, indicated that corrupt officers within the Dominican police and armed forces were involved in the diversion of
materiel, including sales in border areas for onward transfer to Haiti.
Ammunition from the Dominican police
During its most recent inspections of seizures of ammunition in Port-au-Prince in 2026, the Panel noticed that ammunition
consistent with those that had been diverted from the Dominican police as previously reported by the Panel in 2025 (see
S/2025/597, section II.C.2.c and Annex 25), were in use by 400 Mawozo and several gangs in Bel-Air, Port-au-Prince.
In 2024, the Panel investigated the seizure of several boxes of 5.56x45mm ammunition (5000 rounds) from non-state actors
in Mirebalais, Centre department of Haiti. The Panel shared the information with the Dominican authorities, who conducted
an inventory of the Police stockpile and arrested several officers (see Annex 25 of S/2025/597). This shed light on the
diversion of 908,001 items, mostly ammunition, from the Dominican National Police stockpile, including more than
489,000 rounds of 9mm, 230,000 rounds of 5.56x45mm, and 26,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm ammunition, as well as 93,000
12-gauge shells266.
While it is difficult to accurately estimate the amount of materiel that reached Haiti, some Dominican security experts
explained to the Panel that, given the fact the market for 5.56x45mm and 7.62x39mm ammunition in the Dominican
Republic is quite limited, it is likely that most of this materiel was moved on to Haiti as these are the two primary calibers
used by gangs267.
Ammunition from the Dominican Armed Forces
The Dominican Armed Forces apply the good practice of marking their ammunition, which allows for better management
of their stockpiles, and preventing, identifying and investigating diversions.
The Panel identified several types of ammunition marked ‘ERD’ (Ejercito Republica Dominicana – Dominican Armed
Forces) during its latest inspections of seized materiel in February 2026 (see photographs below). The ammunition was
consistent with those produced by Industria Militar de Colombia (Indumil). Responding to a Panel’s official
communication, the Colombian authorities confirmed that the items had been produced by Indumil and were parts of two
contracts signed with the ERD and the Dominican Ministry of Defense respectively in 2022.
The Panel contacted the Dominican authorities, asking which units these particular lots of ammunition had been allocated
to and whether they could share any information about the results of their investigations into these diversions.
The Dominican authorities responded that the ammunition had been procured in 2022 from a producer in Colombia.
Furthermore, they told the Panel that, in December 2025, a second lieutenant from the ERD had been arrested in San Juan
de la Maguana Province, Dominican Republic, along with a Haitian national, while transporting 1516 rounds of ammunition
on a motorbike268. The prosecution case is ongoing.
The Panel is yet to receive additional information about which units used the various lot numbers or whether further
investigations are ongoing.
__________________
266
Information provided by the Dominican authorities, 2025.
267
Interviews with security officers, Dominican Republic, 2025.
268
Official communication from the Dominican Republic authorities, March 2026.
86/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
All photographs taken by the Panel in 2026:
Markings: ERD (Ejercito Republica Dominicana) – 22 (year of production) – P009 (lot number) –
IM (manufacturer: Industria Militar).
Markings: ERD (Ejercito Republica Dominicana) – 22 (year of production) – P010 (lot number) –
IM (manufacturer: Industria Militar).
Markings: ERD (Ejercito Republica Dominicana) – 22 (year of production) – P011 (lot number) –
IM (manufacturer: Industria Militar).
Markings: ERD (Ejercito Republica Dominicana) – 22 (year of production) – P012 (lot number) –
IM (manufacturer: Industria Militar).
Markings: 22 (year of production) – P087 (lot number) – IM (manufacturer: Industria Militar).
Markings: 22 (year of production) – P088 (lot number) – IM (manufacturer: Industria Militar).
The Panel also documented 7.62x51mm ammunition from the 1970s from a seizure on a gang in Bel
Air, which is consistent with materiel currently in use by the Dominican Republic Army 269.
__________________
269
26-09652
Confidential source, 2026.
87/94
S/2026/714
.50 cal ammunition in use by 400 Mawozo
Wilson Joseph, a.k.a “Lanmo San Jou” (Hti.004), leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, posted videos on social media with
distinctive surplus .50 cal ammunition which the Panel had identified as being produced in the Dominican Republic in the
1950s (see below). Analysis of .50 cal rounds retrieved from the gang in 2026 has further confirmed this, with at least 15
of 32 rounds documented by the Panel produced in the Dominican Republic. However, the precise chain of custody of this
surplus ammunition remains unclear, with quantities of these items having been imported for the United States civilian
market in the past and still available for purchase on collectors’ sites 270. The Panel sent two tracing requests to the Dominican
authorities. The authorities provided photographs of ammunition manufactured by the Armeria de la Fuerzas Armadas de
San Cristobal throughout the 1950s up until 1960, and explained that the surplus ammunition was in the process of being
destroyed and they had not detected any diversions.
Stills from videos posted on social media by Wilson Joseph, a.k.a “Lanmo San Jou” (Hti.004), leader of the 400 Mawozo
gang, showing 50. caliber ammunition with a distinctive yellow tip.
Source: Video shared on social media, 2024
Ammunition seized from 400 Mawozo in 2025 and documented by the Panel:
50 cal. Ammunition produced in 1958 in the Dominican Republic, photograph taken by the Panel, 2026
__________________
270
88/94
See for instance BUYER BEWARE! Dominican AP Yellow Tips - .50BMG Series
26-09652
S/2026/714
Annex 19: Arms and ammunition trafficking to armed actors in the Artibonite department
The surge in armed violence in the Artibonite during the reporting period (see Annex 15) was sustained by the capacity of
armed actors - both self-defence groups and gangs - to procure arms and ammunition through multiple trafficking channels.
These include the purchasing of materiel to networks procuring in the Dominican Republic as well as individuals using the
port of Saint-Marc to transfer items from the United States. For instance, in May 2026, the seizure of one firearm in second
hand good coming from the United States led to the domicile of a trafficker where additional materiel was seized (see Annex
16). Beyond international supply, armed actors benefit from diversions from HNP officers, while gangs also receive materiel
through inter-gang transfers.
Acquisition of materiel by self-defence groups
Self-defence groups in the lower Artibonite, while much less equipped than the gangs they oppose, have increasingly
managed to procure materiel. Financial contributions from the local population- sometimes collected forcibly at checkpoints
– and the diaspora are supporting them in purchasing materiel.
In December 2025 and January 2026, the Haitian Customs in Cap-Haitien intercepted several parcels from maritime
containers coming from the United States with firearms and ammunition (see Annex 16). The trafficker, Clément Thelusma
was arrested and explained that he was selling to various clients, including to the Jean Denis Coalition (see para. 61 of the
present report).
Self-defence groups also obtain ammunition from HNP officers with whom they collaborate during operations. In May
2026, a video shared with the Panel shows materiel stolen by the Gran Grif gang from members of the Jean Denis Coalition,
including a box of 5,56x45mm ammunition recently imported by the FADH, of which some had been transferred to the
HNP (see para. 113 of the present report)271.
Source: video shared with the Panel in May 2026.
Acquisition of materiel by gangs
Both Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras have been displaying new materiel on a regular basis. In October 2025, Kokorat San
Ras released a video showing seven brand-new M4-pattern rifles (see picture below), along with six 5,56x45mm magazines.
The type of materiel and the packaging in which they were transported likely indicate that they were shipped from the
United States entering Haiti labelled as second hand goods.
__________________
271
26-09652
Video on file with the Panel
89/94
S/2026/714
Source: still from video shared with the Panel, October 2025.
Inter-gang transfers
Gran Grif received rifles and ammunition toward the end of February 2026 from Jeff Canaan, leader of the Canaan gang
who participated in the brutal attacks in the Artibonite department along Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif 272. This influx of
materiel contributed to the surge of attacks that followed in March.
Diversions from police stockpiles
Through loss on the battlefield
The HNP have lost several officers in combats against gangs in the Artibonite department, including 3 members of Unité
Temporaire Anti-Gang (UTAG), a specialised tactical unit of the HNP, on 30 May 2026. In a propaganda video (see below),
the head of Gran Grif, Luckson Elan, published a video to congratulate his head of cell and show the seized materiel. This
includes six firearms consistent with HNP stockpiles (9mm Glocks, one Taurus, one PTR 91 rifle, one M4-type rifles and
one Galil rifle), as well as related ammunition and a UTAG flak jacket273.
__________________
272
273
90/94
Confidential source, 2026 and confidential report, 2026.
Video on file with the Panel
26-09652
S/2026/714
Source: still from video showing materiel retrieved from HNP officers by the Gran Grif gang – shared with the Panel in May 2026.
Through theft by HNP officers
Investigations by the Panel indicate that a network of UDMO officers in the Artibonite department have been involved in
diversions of ammunition. They sold ammunition to armed individuals involved in land spoliation as well as to gangs 274.
Their modus operandi included the gradual syphoning of boxes of 20 rounds of 5,56x45 mm ammunition that they would
sell for 10.000 Haitian gourdes (roughly $75 USD). They have also been selling semi-automatic rifles seized by the HNP
for between $5000 and $8000 USD.
On 3 August 2025, a motorcyclist was arrested by members of the Jean Denis Coalition while transporting boxes of
ammunition for the Gran Grif gang. The nine boxes of ammunition had been supplied by Edouens Elan, cousin of Gran
Grif leader, Luckson Elan (HTi.00x). The ammunition was consistent with those used by the HNP, including with some that
had been donated to the HNP by an international partner. Edouens Elan worked for a local private security company (not
registered officially with the Ministry of Interior) whose co-owner is a senior UDMO officer in charge of the logistics and
ammunition management for UDMO for the Artibonite department. He is a central figure of the network and used his
position to divert ammunition275.
Boxes of 7,62x51mm ammunition coming from the HNP stockpile were also identified in pictures of the arsenal of Destin
Wilgens, a.k.a “Tibab”, the late gang leader of Montrouis commune, which had purchased them from an UDMO officer 276.
__________________
274
Interviews with several HNP officers, local authorities and confidential sources, 2026.
275
Interviews with several HNP officers, local authorities and confidential sources, 2026
276
Interviews with confidential sources, 2026. Photos on file with the Panel.
26-09652
91/94
S/2026/714
Annex 20: Loss of materiel from the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS)
Paragraph 14 of resolution 2700 (2024) calls for the MSS to implement weapons and ammunition management processes
and to report to the Panel any diversion of weapons and ammunition, including through theft and loss.
During their deployment in Haiti, two Kenyan officers lost their lives and one went missing in clashes and ambushes by
gangs, while others were forced to abandon vehicles, potentially with materiel inside. The Panel requested detailed
information on all the materiel lost, including types, calibers, manufacturers and serial/lot numbers for firearms/ammunition.
The Panel also asked to know the names of the gang(s) which likely took custody of the materiel.
In addition, the Panel documented several rounds of ammunition seized from gangs which seem consistent with those used
by the Kenyan Police while deployed in Haiti. The Panel requested the Kenyan authorities to confirm whether the
ammunition below was indeed used by Kenyan MSS personnel and how the rounds escaped their custody.
Source: photo taken by the Panel, 2026
Markings: KOFC (Kenyan Ordnance Factory Corporation)
Lot: 30A
Year of production: 21
On 6 July 2026, the Kenyan authorities responded that in the course of operations, the MSS experienced loss of equipment
in Port-au-Prince, including during a gang ambush in Kenscoff and a road traffic incident in Thomassin in August 2025,
which resulted in deaths or serious injuries of MSS personnel. All loses were documented and comprehensive Boards of
Inquiry were conducted.
The materiel lost included firearms (one G3 rifle, one anti-riot gun, one PG 540 tear gas launcher), magazines (11 for AKtype riles, 614 for G3 rifles) and ammunition (120 rounds of 7,62x39mm, 55 rounds of 5,56x45mm and 20 rounds of
7,62x51mm). According to the Kenyan authorities, the materiel was lost in areas under the control of the following gangs:
5 Segond led by Izo, Krazye Barye led by Vitelhomme Innocent, Ti Bwa led by Chrisla and Wharf Jeremie led by Micanor.
The Kenyan authorities stated that the materiel found in unauthorized hands (see the ammunition above) was a result of the
above mentioned loses.
92/94
26-09652
S/2026/714
Annex 21: The diverse ways characterizing kidnappings
- Targetting affluent areas, including in the ‘green zones’: Gang influence is being felt in areas including those considered
to be ‘safer,’ or initially considered as ‘green zones’, such as Pétion-Ville, in their effort to kidnap ‘high-value’ targets for
maximizing revenue (ransom). Gangs infiltrate those areas by deploying ‘spies’ to identify potential targets based on their
social status (wealth) or those with family ties abroad.277
- Involvement of some HNP officers: Some HNP officers also undertake kidnappings in a pattern similar to gangs that
impersonate them. Security agents are therefore faced with the challenge of differentiating between gang-impersonated
kidnapping and police-engineered kidnapping.278 In one case, four HNP personnel were linked to a kidnapping incident
near the Hotel Montana area in April 2026. This led to some of their HNP colleagues nick-named “amis des quatre - friends
of the four” to mobilize protesters on 27 April 2026, in Delmas, Turgeau, Canapé-Vert and Pétion-Ville in West department
to agitate until they were released.279
- HNP Tip-offs: The inter-dependence between gangs, government staff and some HNP officers is not new. This relationship
is visible in situations where gangs are tipped off by some HNP insiders about impending HNP/security operations
(S/2026/241, para. 19; and Annex 12 of the present report). Sources described to the Panel how some HNP officers look
aside during patrols to allow gangs escape with victims. They also alert gangs about specific locations of potential victims
and their movement patterns.280
__________________
277
Interview with two gang analysts and CCE members, June 2026.
Interview with a resident of a gang-controlled area, a gang analyst and two HNP officers, May 2026.
279
Interview with a gang analyst, a HNP investigator and two Delmas residents, May 2026.
280
Interview with anti-kidnapping official, a gang analyst and two HNP officers, June 2026.
278
26-09652
93/94
S/2026/714
Annex 22: CBP data on bulk cash seized from individuals departing the United States for Haiti (July 2025 to May
2026). As shown, the bulk of the cash related to outbound movements.
Source: Data provided by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) based on a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request
by the Panel in May 2026.
94/94
26-09652
Comment citer
Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, Rapport final du Groupe d'experts sur Haïti, S/2026/714, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/PoE/Reports
- Titulaire des droits
- United Nations