Risk Bulletin: Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti - Issue 1

RISK BULLETIN CLICK HERE TO VIEW THE Global Organized Crime Index ISSUE OBSERVATORY OF VIOLENCE AND RESILIENCE IN HAITI 1 JULY 2024 ABOUT THIS RISK BULLETIN Welcome to the first issue of this Risk Bulletin, a capital. Port-au-Prince has returned to the precarious periodic publication of the Observatory of Violence and order that prevailed before 29 February, in which daily Resilience in Haiti, a forum for research and analysis, civil life coexists with gang shootings and attacks. One major society empowerment, capacity building and support for exception is that the Multinational Security Support multilateral actors. The bulletin will analyze key trends in (MSS) mission, led by a Kenyan police force, was finally the political economy of violence in Haiti. deployed on 25 June, with 200 troops on the ground. This inaugural issue analyzes these dynamics and more. The crisis that began on 29 February, with coordinated gang attacks on the capital, Port-au-Prince, led to a For more analytical content from the Observatory of violent reconfiguration of the political situation on the Violence and Resilience in Haiti, see ground. The ensuing months have been marked by an https://globalinitiative.net/observatory/ht-obs/. unprecedented level of humanitarian crisis, infrastructure destruction and deep institutional transformation, with The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized the resignation of Prime Minister Ariel Henry, the creation Crime (GI-TOC) is a platform to promote greater debate of a Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) and the recent and innovative approaches to serve as the building formation of a government, led by the appointed prime blocks of an inclusive global strategy against organized minister, Garry Conille. crime. See GI-TOC: https://globalinitiative.net/. Although the crisis undoubtedly marked the edge of the Sign up to receive the Haiti observatory’s news and abyss, the gangs have ceased in their conquest of the publications here. Summary highlights Viv Ansanm: How a gang coalition has operation, the MSS should not be considered a silver transformed violence in Port-au-Prince. bullet. A way forward, framed by solid and transparent A key development in Haiti’s gang violence is the re- legal bodies, and a clear public security strategy, must be formation of the gang coalition Viv Ansanm (Living put in place to tackle the complex Haitian ecosystem of Together, in Haitian creole), meant to bring together the violence, marked by a coexistence of criminal groups and criminal groups in a unified front against the Haitian the state. It is critical that the Haitian authorities and the national police and the government. The operations and international community make progress in terms of influence of Viv Ansanm, represented by Jimmy facilitating humanitarian access and development by ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier, illustrate the multifaceted nature of reconsolidating public institutions and by seeking a Haiti’s crisis. Viv Ansanm’s control over significant parts judicial solution to the gangs. of Port-au-Prince and strategic infrastructure, coupled with its violent tactics and political connections, poses a systemic threat, and demands comprehensive and Sanctions and Haiti’s criminal crisis: What can be done to strengthen the mechanism? sustained efforts to dismantle its influence and restore Given the delays in the deployment of the MSS mission, order. Security, economic, humanitarian and political the most visible multilateral response to Haiti’s crisis has challenges will not be miraculously solved by the MSS been the use of targeted sanctions by the international mission alone. community. However, both UN and unilateral sanctions have seen little further movement, with no designations The rebuilding of Haitian institutions, the MSS issued since late 2023 (with the exception of Canada). and the ecosystem of criminal violence: How to

The EU, which has several members with important ties provide coordinated security and justice responses? to Haiti, has not issued any designations under the Driven by the international community, in particular the sanctions regime it created in July 2023. There appears Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Transitional to be substantial reluctance by the Security Council to Presidential Council (TPC) was established to replace designate such backers, most likely because of the risk Prime Minister Ariel Henry. After a chaotic start, the TPC that designations on elites could negatively impact appointed in May a new prime minister, Garry Conille, peacebuilding and government formation, though this who formed his government on 11 June. As Haiti’s comes with the equally palpable risk of allowing the institutions look to transition to a more solid mode of elite-gang nexus to operate unhindered. RI S K BU LLETI N #1 – JU LY 2024 2 Viv Ansanm: How a gang coalition has transformed violence in Port-au-Prince. On 29 February 2024, a coalition of gangs known as between March and June 2024, the number of Viv Ansanm (Living Together, in Haitian Creole) was internally displaced people increased from 362 000 to formed through the merger of two former rival over 578 000.4 alliances: the G9 Family and Allies, and the G-Pèp (GPeople) alliance.1 Collectively, Viv Ansanm, embodied In the capital, gang-led violence has severely impacted by Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier, exerts control, or at least daily life. At the peak of the violence, between March substantial influence, over an estimated 80% — possibly and May, hospitals, stores and schools closed or became more — of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, as largely inaccessible, while most people who lived in safer well as the zones immediately outside the capital. 2 areas avoided venturing out of their homes. Moving around the capital became almost impossible, leading The coalition’s attacks have left a large majority of the one contact to liken the city to an ‘open-air, gang- capital’s population facing a dire humanitarian crisis controlled prison’. Gangs forced the closure of the (see the box). The first quarter of 2024 was the international airport between 3 March and 20 May, deadliest since the United Nations started monitoring placing the country under almost total lockdown. 3 gang-related violence in the country. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Canaan 3 1 1 11 3 Port-au-Prince Bay Cité-Soleil 88 Tabarre La Saline 1 8 8 1 2 PORT-AU-PRINCE PORT-AU-PRINCE 2 2 Carrefour 101 101 Martissant Pétion-Ville 101 101 0 N 4.5 km FIGURE 1 Port-au-Prince and periphery, showing areas prone to gang violence. RI S K BU LLETI N #1 – JU LY 2024 3 QUANTIFYING THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT IN HAITI Homicide rate: 40.9 per 100 0005 Numbers killed or injured, January to March 2024: 2 5006 Rate of internal displacement: 60% increase, March to June 20247 Number facing emergency levels of food insecurity: 1.64 million8 Proportion of households that lack macro- and micro-nutrient requirements: 65%9 As the capital’s main shipping ports came under While large numbers of the population are displaced, blockade by Viv Ansanm, the cost of fuel, food and mostly in the capital and the south of the country, living basic goods has skyrocketed over the past months. conditions in gang-controlled areas still depend almost The World Food Programme reported that since exclusively on the standards imposed by criminal groups. January 2024, the cost of a food basket has risen by As they regulate daily life, including by enforcing 27%, ‘making food inaccessible for millions of Haitians’, restrictions on movement, the gangs have at the same while violence and the closure of critical infrastructure time, through the Viv Ansanm coalition, leveraged their has driven more and more people to the black markets,

rhetoric of protecting the population. By distributing food where fuel prices, can be ‘40% to 50% higher than the or petty cash, or providing work and social recognition to official price’.10 children enrolled as foot soldiers,11 the gangs seek to consolidate their legitimacy. This quest involves promising Number of people (x100 000) 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 FIGURE 2 Forcibly displaced persons, 2013–2023. Note: At close to 700 000, the number of forcibly displaced reached an all-time high in 2023. The latest annual figure is more than twice that of any previous figure in the past decade. Source: UNHCR RI S K BU LLETI N #1 – JU LY 2024 4 50 Percentage 40 30 20 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 10 FIGURE 3 Inflation, 2003–2023. Note: 2023 marked the largest annual percentage increase in the past two decades. Source: IMF Artibonite Ouest Sud Centre Nord Grand-Anse Nord-Ouest 33% 17% Sud-Est Nationwide Cite Soleil Nord-Est 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Number of people (x100 000) Emergency Crisis FIGURE 4 Food insecurity, June 2024. Source: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, Famine and Early Warning System RI S K BU LLETI N #1 – JU LY 2024 5 to protect the population from attacks by the police, or population between a rock and a hard place. The MSS, the MSS mission; they capitalize on their closeness to the as an external player, will need to rapidly deliver tangible people, in contrast to their abandonment by the state.12 security results to the community, so as not to be seen Chérizier, in particular, has put much effort into cultivating as part of the problem but part of the solution. his public image, casting himself as an anti-state, antisystem and anti-elite hero of the people.13 Beyond violence: The political and economic game Since February, the gangs’ ecosystem has evolved in These practices, classic of criminal groups, are aimed as several ways. Viv Ansanm has now taken root,16 and much at rallying the population as solidifying the group criminal groups have got used to working together in the itself, by reinforcing the separation between the gang’s coalition, even though sporadic conflicts have occurred territory and the rest of society. This division between between them. The months of collaboration have nurtured the inside, presented as safe, and the outside, the land of a kind of institutional memory, a habit of cooperation that danger, has been adopted in the rhetoric of the gangs, has produced positive results for the coalition and who called on the displaced population to return to their contributed to their feeling of being now more powerful as original neighbourhoods, despite the unprecedented a collective. This is true in terms of territorial control, 14 level of destruction in much of the downtown. political and economic weight, and media exposure, as well Residents feared that the gangs’ aim is to use them as as the capacity to arm themselves. 15 human shields against the police and the MSS. Under the banner of Viv Ansanm, gangs have not only Some residents of areas that have been controlled by extended their domination, but have also changed their gangs for several years, notably parts of Cité Soleil and strategy by systematically targeting key public and Martissant, also express how they have had to adapt to private institutions. These include prisons, one of them living in a domain controlled by criminal bosses. the capital’s main penitentiary, from which most of the Although they do not necessary place hopes in the inmates have escaped in March; a dozen police stations, promises made by the criminals, the stark reality which have been looted or destroyed; the international expressed by interviewees is that it is the gang leaders

airport, which remained closed for almost three months; who regulate daily life. and the capital’s fuel terminal, which was blocked by the gangs for several days, between April and May. Other testimonies, however, illustrate the diversity of criminal leaders’ profiles. In certain territories, some of Their modus operandi has also shifted. The most which are small enclaves, criminal leaders are seen as powerful gangs have shown they are capable of hours- effective protectors, particularly against attacks by rival long shoot-outs and have become more confident in gangs. They are also seen as de facto authorities capable how they conduct operations.17 Between February and of maintaining a semblance of organized daily life. These June, the gangs moved from a strategy of maximum gang leaders, who usually do not feature in the media, pressure, marked by daily, simultaneous attacks on would appear to reflect the construction of the ‘legal multiple points of the city to more punctuated targets.18 bandit’. As such, and besides their social embeddedness This seemed to be a shift towards more strategic in the neighbourhood, such gang leaders seek to objectives, such as ambush attacks on police convoys,19 position themselves as interlocutors with the authorities, and destroying police stations and secondary jails.20 The with a view to the political sequence of events that will latter have been shelled in large-scale attacks in cat-and- soon begin, especially with the MSS force now on the mouse tactics that have left dozens of dead officers,21 ground, and around future elections. and such tactics might be used again, including against MSS officers. Several of these attacks have been claimed Despite efforts by gang leaders to project themselves as by gang leaders in videos posted on social media.22 service and governance providers, only a small proportion of the population genuinely supports the The gangs have improved their coordination and tactical groups. What dominates is a sense of abandonment by operating capabilities, presenting a huge challenge for the state and despair in the face of a catastrophic the Haitian police and MSS force. A police officer told economic situation. The state and the gangs are the GI-TOC that gangs have also become more regularly pitted against one another, with both sides powerful ‘because of the political influences that seen as responsible for the current crisis, leaving the finance them’.23 Media reporting corroborates this, with RI S K BU LLETI N #1 – JU LY 2024 6 one report stating the Village de Dieu gang (led by Village de Dieu members in operations to confront the Johnson André, ‘Izo’) has received support from the police,24 coaching them into a more organized, militia- former head of presidential security, Dimitri Herard, type operation, as well as providing key connections for who escaped from the central prison during the March drugs and arms trafficking. attacks (the last story in this bulletin also examines elite political protection). Herard is allegedly helping train Location 850 400 200 N Q2 2023 936 900 800 700 Q1 2024 763 600 500 400 300 200 100 Q1 Q2 Q3 2018 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 2019 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2020 Incidents Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 2021 Q2 Q3 2022 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 2023 Q4 Q1 Q2 2024 Fatalities FIGURE 5 Incidents of gang violence in Port-au-Prince and periphery, 2018–2024. Note: Since 2018, close to 60% of violence has been concentrated in the capital. Source: ACLED RI S K BU LLETI N #1 – JU LY 2024 7 In the face of these tactics, the Haitian National Police as a key entry point — but also the myriads of (HNP), lacking in capacity, have been forced to adopt a intermediaries that smuggle weapons and ammunition reactive strategy, intervening following alerts or citizens’ within the country.29 These networks make use of calls for help.25 Between April and May, however, the

individuals in the United States and Haiti to acquire legal police progressively managed to retake certain strategic weapons through straw purchasers in the US, before infrastructure, including the fuel terminal and the airport, packing them — assembled or not — into containers, thanks to more offensive operations,26 while in June clearing them through customs and transporting them to 455 new specialized officers were sworn in, a rare but Haiti.30 In the capital, larger gangs are said to be in charge crucial development. 27 The rebuilding of the police, and of bulk acquisition of firearms and ammunition, before their coordination with the MSS (notably through reselling some of them to other, smaller gangs, that do strategic meetings and joint patrols), represents a crucial not necessarily have access to the full chain of brokers. effort on the part of the government and builds the foundation for a public security strategy. Within these networks, the presence of Haitian officials, from customs and the police, has come to light. These Military-grade weapons actors are essential to facilitating the firearm trade. Since February, however, gangs’ firepower has raised Reports have also indicated links between Haitian gangs much concern. While it is unlikely that the most and Dominican arms smugglers, as well as South American powerful groups acquired their entire arsenal in the criminal organizations.31 The potential connection with months since then, the period has nevertheless revealed Colombian traffickers has sparked alerts about combined the scale of their weaponry power. The most structured cocaine and firearms routes, while the presence of Belgian groups are in possession of military-grade weapons, FN FAL rifles, which can be manufactured in Brazil (under commercial drones and tactical equipment and gear, and licence by Indústria de Material Bélico do Brasil),32 raises are capable of mobilizing men who look like they are questions about potential links between Brazilian and trained and kitted out for combat. In this respect, some Haitian criminal groups. gangs — Village de Dieu, in particular — are increasingly looking like small militias. It is difficult to measure precisely the number of firearms in circulation in Haiti. In 2019, the head of the National According to William O’Neill, the UN Designated Expert Commission for Disarmament, Dismantling and of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,28 and a Reintegration, said that around 500 000 illegal firearms UNODC May 2024 report to the UN Security Council, were circulating in the country, more than double the gangs received shipments of weapons, ammunition and figure announced by the HNP in 2015.33 According to equipment, even during the total blockade of the capital the United Nations Security Council Group of Experts, and despite the UN arms embargo on the country. the figure for 2022 was around 600 000 weapons, the Moreover, evidence coming from judicial cases confirm vast majority of which were illegal.34 An estimate of the not only the central role of the Florida-to-Haiti route used acquisition prices of firearms is shown in the table. by arms trafficking networks — an axis that allegedly includes the Port-de-Paix area in the north of the country Category Price (US dollars) AR-15 7 000–9 000 AK-47 6 000–8 000 IMI Galil 9 000–12 000 Rifle 4 000–7 000 Glock pistol (9 mm) 1 500–3 000 Ammunition US$1 per bullet (on average) FIGURE 6 Estimated firearm prices, Port-au-Prince, June 2024. Source: Information based on interviews in Port-au-Prince, in collaboration with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime RI S K BU LLETI N #1 – JU LY 2024 8 These dynamics illustrate the diversity of gang profiles in MSS, the governments of the countries concerned (first Haiti. While not all criminal groups have the means to and foremost the US) and the international community

acquire weapons of war, the consolidation of networks (such as CARICOM’s Implementation Agency for Crime of intermediaries and the continual inflow of firearms and Security35), to step up the fight against arms pose the risk of ‘democratized’ access to weapons by trafficking and draw up an effective disarmament medium-sized or small groups. Moreover, the situation strategy for Haiti. requires the Haitian authorities, in coordination with the Notes 1 Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, Matt Herbert and Ana Paula Oliveira, Haiti: The gang crisis and international responses, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), February 2024. 2 United Nations, Haïti: Le Conseil de sécurité autorise l’envoi d’une force internationale de sécurité dirigée par le Kenya, 28 April 2024. 3 United Nations, Security Council Authorizes Multinational Security Support mission in Haiti, led by Kenya, 22 April 2024. 4 OCHA; ReliefWeb, Urgence Haïti: Rapport de Situation N°26 du 1 au 7 juin 2024, 9 June 2024. 5 6 7 9 poursuit, Le Nouvelliste, 23 May 2024. 21 More than 300 police officers were assassinated by gangs between 2015 and 2023, according to the National Network for the Defense of Human Rights. 22 HaitiLibre, Haïti - FLASH: 400 Mawozo a démoli le Commissariat de Croix-des-Bouquets et la Prison des Femmes de Titanyen, 19 May 2024. 23 Interview conducted in Port-au-Prince by the GI-TOC in May 2024. United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), Quarterly 24 Christiaan Triebert, Maria Abi-Habib and John Ismay, How a report on the human rights situation in Haiti: Oct–Dec 2023. Haitian gang is trying to turn itself into a militia, The New York United Nations, Security Council Authorizes Multinational Times, 21 May 2024. Security Support mission in Haiti, led by Kenya, 22 April 2024. 25 Widlore Mérancourt, Les policiers désertent les rues de Port-au- OCHA; ReliefWeb, Urgence Haïti: Rapport de Situation N°26 du 1 Prince, AyiboPost, 7 March 2024; HaitiLibre, Haïti - Actualité : au 7 juin 2024, 9 June 2024. 8 Junior Celestin, La destruction des commissariats et des prisons se Zapping…, 2 May 2024. United Nations, Haïti: Guterres salue la nomination d’un nouveau 26 HaitiLibre, Haïti - Actualité : Zapping…, 2 May 2024. Premier ministre et la formation d’un gouvernement, 27 May 2024. 27 Jean Junior Celestin, 455 nouveaux policiers spécialisés prêts à Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Jerome Wendy Norestyl, My life as a child member of 5 Segonn in Village de Dieu, AyiboPost, 18 June 2024. 12 Laura Louis, Gang leaders are the kings of social media in Haiti, AyiboPost, 4 June 2021. 13 Luke Taylor and Tom Phillips, Haiti gang boss ‘Barbecue’ Jimmy Cherizier, The Guardian, 10 March 2024. 14 Rebecca Bruny et al, Exclusive: Izo builds a wharf in preparation for the Kenyans, AyiboPost, 25 May 2024. 15 Ibid. 16 Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, Violence in Haiti: Politics, crime, gangs, GI-TOC, 25 March 2024. 17 Info Thanzie, Dimanche noir à Port-au-Prince: Trois policiers tués lors d’une attaque à Delmas 18, 10 June 2024. 18 Ibid. 19 Jean Junior Celestin, La destruction des commissariats et des prisons se poursuit, Le Nouvelliste, 23 May 2024. 20 Police stations were attacked in Martissant, Portail Léogâne, PontRouge and Cesselesse; the groups targeted the Croix-des-

renforcer la lutte contre les gangs armés, Le Nouvelliste, 18 June 2024. 28 United Nations Security Council, Security Council approves measures to support peace and stability in Haiti, 22 April 2024. 29 Jay Weaver and Jacqueline Charles, There’s an arms race in Haiti, and it’s fueled by Florida’s pipeline of weapons of war, Miami Herald, 21 May 2024; see also HaitiLibre, Un Haïtien condamné à 5 ans de prison pour trafic d’armes, HaitiLibre, 29 February 2024. 30 Alter Presse Haiti, Haïti-Criminalité: Lynchage de deux présumés trafiquants d’armes à Mirebalais, 31 March 2024. 31 United Nations, Deadly violence in Haiti at record high, some worst scenarios now realities, special representative tells Security Council, urging deployment of support mission, 22 April 2024. 32 See Small Arms Survey, Multiplying the sources, 2007. 33 Samuel Céliné, 500 000 armes à feu circulent dans le pays. Seulement 45 000 sont légales. Ayibopost, 18 January 2021. 34 Final report of the Group of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) - S/2023/674, September 2023. 35 See the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security. Bouquets civil prison and the Cabaret women’s prison. See Jean RI S K BU LLETI N #1 – JU LY 2024 9 The rebuilding of Haitian institutions, the MSS and the ecosystem of criminal violence: How to provide coordinated security and justice responses? After months of delays, the MSS force, mainly funded by community and civil society.1 In an environment of the United States and led by Kenya, finally deployed in fragmented and violent governance, with institutional Port-au-Prince on 25 June. With this initial force of 200 responsibilities dispersed between the Transitional officers, the MSS should bring operational oxygen to the Presidential Council (TPC), and the recently formed Haitian police in the form of much-needed capacity, and government of Prime Minister Conille, there is a risk of a will help recruit and train local officers. Hopefully, it will lack of coordination of the MSS Mission on the ground, also provide some respite for the population, enabling and lack of clarity regarding its oversight, with particular them to return to a more normal life, and allow improved concerns over judicial and human rights repercussions. humanitarian access to the country. The TPC was sworn in on 25 April, and Henry’s official However, there is still much uncertainty surrounding the resignation as prime minister came immediately mission in terms of its strategy and rules of engagement, afterwards.2 The fruit of an agreement brokered by and questions over mechanisms to provide oversight of CARICOM in March, the TPC is a governance body the force. And it is still not clear how the mission will made up of seven members from Haiti’s main political coordinate with the Haitian authorities, the international parties and representatives of the private sector and civil Haiti’s Prime Minister Garry Conille meets members of the first contingent of Kenyan police, who arrived on 25 June as part of the Multinational Security Support mission. Source: © Guerinault Louis/Anadolu via Getty Images RI S K BU LLETI N #1 – JU LY 2024 10 society.3 The TPC’s terms of reference state that it will themselves in this moment of political transition, and exercise presidential functions until the investiture of particularly since the installation of the TPC. the president-elect, ‘which must take place no later than February 7, 2026’. Garry Conille was appointed by the Although the rhetoric of some Haitian gang leaders, TPC as prime minister on 28 May.4 such as Chérizier’s repeated declarations, might be inferred as a will to overthrow the system, they are not The decree establishing the council also mandates it to actually proposing an alternative ideological or set up a national security council, although at the time governance model. Instead, criminal groups focus on

of writing, it had not yet been appointed. The TPC is gaining strategic territories or markets. Whether by force also required to collaborate with the National or negotiation, or usually both, the gangs are therefore Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and able to extract rents from trade routes, ports and Reintegration, and to oversee the installation of a truth, passenger transport, agricultural production and illicit justice and reparations commission. trade, with cocaine at the forefront. These initiatives, which are fundamental to the policy to In this sense, gangs participate in governance, but be pursued for conflict resolution, seem to be making without intending to replace the state model. Rather, slow progress. The TPC must develop these structures if gangs are part of a logic of shared sovereignty within it is to formulate a clear proposal and strategy for the territories where civilian populations must oscillate future of peace and stability in Haiti. In the context of between the authority — and violence — of the gangs the arrival of the MSS force, a way forward, framed by and of the state. The two coexist in an unstable order solid and transparent legal bodies, must be put in place that now includes the Multinational Security Support to tackle the complexity of the Haitian security crisis, (MSS) mission, formed by elite officers drawn from marked by a violent coexistence between criminal Kenya’s Police Recce Squad, Rapid Deployment Force groups and the state. As is the case in other situations and a Special Operation Group comprising Kenyan involving criminal groups, particularly in urban contexts border police.7 Other countries have also pledged to — such as Rio de Janeiro, for example — armed provide personnel for the MSS, including Jamaica, confrontations, public governance and political-criminal Bahamas, Guyana, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, relations do not operate as a zero-sum game. Bangladesh, Benin and Chad.8 As previously reported by GI-TOC,5 Haitian gangs do While it is impossible to predict how the gangs will react not follow an insurrectionary logic.6 They seek to to the deployment of the MSS force in the long term, it maximize their position within the political and is likely that it will not be a homogeneous response. economic system, not outside of it, and to position Some of them may fight, while others will seek to themselves as indispensable brokers between the negotiate with the Haitian government. It is therefore community, and the public and private sectors. To critical that institutional roles are better defined, and establish oneself as a broker, a future political ally, or to that the Haitian authorities speak with one voice — both remain in place as a rent-seeking ‘legal bandit’, one must for the country’s citizens and the international appear reliable, indispensable and powerful. This is community. As Haiti’s institutions look to transition to a precisely how gangs’ leaders, whether they choose to more solid mode of operation, the two-headed be visible in the media or not, want to position functioning of political life will pose challenges. Notes 1 GI-TOC, Who is in charge of the Haiti mission?, 18 June 2024. 2 HaitiLibre, «Prestation de Serment et installation des membres du CPT», 26 April 2024. 3 5 escalating crisis, GI-TOC, 17 October 2022. 6 Jake Johnston and Chris François, Haiti News Round-Up 16: Transitional Presidential Council is sworn in, a president is 4 Jacqueline Charles, UN expert, former prime minister is named to Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, Violence in Haiti: A continuation of politics by other means?, GI-TOC, 25 March 2024. 7 selected, but disagreements ensue, Center for Economic and Policy Research, 8 May 2024. Summer Walker, Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, power and an Ken Opala, Green light for Kenyan police boots on the ground in Haiti, GI-TOC, 15 May 2024. 8

Michelle Nichols, Five countries pledge personnel for Haiti security mission, UN says, Reuters, 1 March 2024. lead Haiti’s transitional government, Miami Herald, 28 May 2024. RI S K BU LLETI N #1 – JU LY 2024 11 Sanctions and Haiti’s criminal crisis: What can be done to strengthen the mechanism? With delays in the deployment of the MSS force, the Canadian nationality. States are generally reluctant to most visible response to Haiti’s criminal crisis has been levy sanctions on their own citizens, preferring the the use of targeted financial and mobility sanctions by route of legal prosecutions (although there have been the international community. This involves two separate, few visible investigations or legal actions pursued by though complementary, elements. the US or Canada against senior officials alleged to have backed gangs to date). First, in October 2023 and January 2024, the UN Security Council issued designations on five gang While understandable, the consequence of this leaders, emanating in part from investigations approach of waiting on prosecutions, or in some cases conducted by the designated Panel of Experts (POE).1 prioritizing the slow development of national Secondly, there have been a series of unilateral designations over UN designations, is shaping a number designations issued mainly by the United States, of negative developments on the ground in Haiti. Canada and the Dominican Republic. Notably, US and Canadian authorities have been willing to designate The pause in designations, either due to slow UN politically powerful individuals, including politicians and processes or a preference for prosecutions, will have a businessmen, which the UN has avoided to date.2 counter-productive effect on efforts to target the gangs Since late 2023, however, both UN and unilateral and the key elites who back them. During a previous sanctions have seen little further activity, with no lengthy pause in UN sanctions, between November designations issued. Notably, the EU — which has a 2023 and February 2024, the GI-TOC recorded number of members with important ties to Haiti — has growing scepticism in Haiti on the reality of sanctions, not issued any designations under the sanctions regime as well as on the international community’s political will it created in July 2023.3 to enforce them. Between late 2023 and early 2024, the dissuasive effect of sanctions, or at least the Precise reasons for this seeming pause in activity are deterrent impact of their possible application, seemed unclear. The UN Security Council is historically slow in to have partly disappeared. considering and issuing sanctions, with decisions requiring consensus among members of the Security Given the overall degradation in the situation in Haiti Council.4 In Haiti, this general trend is likely to have and the lengthy delay in the deployment of the MSS been exacerbated by the complexities of the situation force intended to help stabilize the country, a renewed and the reality that many gang backers are also push on sanctions is arguably an important element both prominently involved in business and/or political to address and shape the criminal threats impacting Haiti activity.5 There appears to be substantial reluctance by and to signal focus to the Haitian population. member states on the Security Council to designate such backers, most likely because of the risk that Doing so, however, arguably needs to be rethought in a designations on elites could negatively impact way that is both more strategic and has a deeper peacebuilding and government formation, though impact than current approaches. A multinational obviously this comes with the equally palpable risk of strategy should be developed to address Haiti’s gangs, allowing the elite-gang nexus to operate unhindered. their logistical suppliers and business partners, and their political and business enablers.

Such a rationale may also explain why the US and Canada have hit pause in their designations. However, The development of such a strategy should involve the there is another explanation, in that unilateral sanctions UN and the Security Council, as well as regional actors, on some elites are also likely to be impeded in cases such as CARICOM. The strategy should not be solely where those individuals hold both Haitian and US or sanctions-focused, but rather seek to coordinate ways in RI S K BU LLETI N #1 – JU LY 2024 12 which all cooperating state tools, including national A regional approach could also help expand support prosecutorial approaches, aid, data sharing and within Haiti for international efforts to address the sanctions, can be applied towards a cohesive end. current crisis, underscoring the international community’s understanding of the substantial Crucially, such a strategy should aim to draw together transnational elements fuelling the country’s gangs. states that use sanctions and those that do not as a tool against organized crime, with the latter instead Finally, there is a need for a more nuanced focus on leveraging other options in their foreign policy or justice the business and political enablers of gang activity toolkits — including economic and security force within Haiti. As the UN POE has detailed, many of assistance, information sharing and prosecutions — to these enablers wear multiple hats, engaging in a contribute to the broader effort. Such a strategy should melange of business, politics and criminality.7 This has also bring non-traditional players, such as the US complicated efforts to sanction them, as some within Department of Justice, more directly into the effort, the international community view any involvement in heightening investigations, prosecutions and mutual politics as sufficient grounds to avoid designation. legal assistance to Haiti and its neighbours. While understandable, such a Manichean approach to political involvement risks distorting incentives in Haiti. There also needs to be a dose of realism in the near-, It could well lead business actors with connections to middle- and long-term objectives of such a strategy. gangs to dabble in politics as a shield against sanctions, Eliminating gangs in Haiti is likely to prove unfeasible. to the detriment of both Haitian politics and efforts to Degrading their current martial power, breaking the link break the link between elites and gangs. A more between gangs and elites, and ending sexual violence nuanced approach would involve a fine-toothed are arguably more realistically achievable. assessment of the degree to which an individual is a political actor, and how current and systemically To support this strategy, there needs to be a rethinking important such political activity is. of how sanctions are employed, including their potential deeper impact. This involves a more comprehensive Ultimately, information suggests that international sanctioning approach targeting the totality of the sanctions can have a shaping effect within Haiti, criminal ecosystem around Haitian gangs, rather than particularly when it comes to deterring business and simply a focus on gang leaders. Lower-profile but critical political elites. Used strategically and in tandem with actors, such as financiers, money launderers and other elements in the international toolkit, sanctions weapons suppliers, should be a key focus. thus offer an option for responding to the current crisis. Doing so, however, requires a renewed drive of The same thinking should apply to criminal actors unilateral and UN designations, done in a strategic outside of Haiti’s borders, who play important manner, with a focus that goes beyond key leaders and supportive roles with the gangs, or who have deepened towards the facilitative actors and political backers who their business ties during the current crisis. An example

support them. As sanctions progress, targeting and could be the targeting of drug trafficking organizations messaging need to be calibrated to have a stronger explicitly for working with gang boss Izo, and through impact, without stigmatizing the entire private or state him shipping cocaine to Europe.6 The aim of such an sector, and risking turning them into pariahs. Critically, approach would be to deter regional criminal actors the aperture for such approaches should be widened from engaging with Haitian ones, impacting the beyond Haiti to include the complex criminal and financing of the latter. financial networks that enable the gangs. Such an approach can help Haiti, while also helping the broader region to address increasingly transnational threats. Notes 1 Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, Matt Herbert and Ana Paula 3 Oliveira, Haiti: The gang crisis and international responses, GITOC, February 2024. 2 Ibid. Council of the European Union, Haiti: EU sets up autonomous framework for restrictive measures, 28 July 2023. 4 Matt Herbert and Lucia Bird, Convergence zone: The evolution of targeted sanctions usage against organized crime, GI-TOC, December 2023. RI S K BU LLETI N #1 – JU LY 2024 13 5 See UN Security Council, Interim report of the Panel of Experts 6 on Haiti submitted pursuant to Resolution 2700 (2023), S/2024/ 253, 29 March 2024. Maria Abi-Habib, Haiti’s gangs grow stronger as Kenyan-led force prepares to deploy, The New York Times, 21 May 2024. 7 See UN Security Council, Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to Resolution 2700 (2023), S/2024/ 253, 29 March 2024. RI S K BU LLETI N #1 – JU LY 2024 14 Risk Bulletins are regular outputs of our regional observatories, which draw on civil society networks to provide new data and contextualize trends related to organized-crime networks, illicit trade and state responses to them. If you would like to subscribe to future editions of the Risk Bulletin, please sign up here. ABOUT THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime is a global network with 600 Network Experts around the world. The Global Initiative provides a platform to promote greater debate and innovative approaches as the building blocks to an inclusive global strategy against organized crime. www.globalinitiative.net