MINUSTAH: A Financial Overview of Peacekeeping in Haiti (Observatory Bulletin No. 4)

CENTRE DE RECHERCHE, DE RÉFLEXION, DE FORMATION ET D’ACTION SOCIALE OBSERVAtoRY ON PUBLIC POLICIES AND ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION MINUSTAH: A FINANCIAL OVERVIEW OF PEACEKEEPING IN HAITI After former President Aristide's departure in 2004, Haiti was confronted with a major security crisis. The country seemed to be stigmatized by armed violence from groups which defied the au- thority of the Transitional Government and by others trying to perform law and order duties without authorization. Based on this situation and on various geopolitical interests, the United Nations Security Council voted in favor of its resolution 1542 (2004) creating a peacekeeping operation: The United Nations Stabiliza- tion Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). MINUSTAH succeeded several other U.N. interventions since 1990 and has now been in the country for nine years. MINUSTAH funding represents an important posi- tion in regards to funds the international community Traditionally associated with the monitoring of a ceasefire agree- mobilizes for Haiti aside from sums disbursed for ment between two warring factions, peacekeeping operations’ humanitarian assistance and long-term development characteristics under United Nations command has evolved over (Figure 1). In official statistics, peacekeeping expen- the years. Presently there are a variety of U.N. interventions in ditures are generally excluded from official develop- the world with a variety of tasks aimed at contributing to the end ment assistance. However, OECD emphasizes that of armed conflicts or to decreasing their risk. In many cases, these “some closely-defined developmentally relevant ac- operations made it possible to mitigate tensions and avoid escalat- tivities within peacekeeping operations are in- ing violence. In contrast, they have also revealed their limits. cluded”.¹ Currently, Haiti hosts about 10% of the uniformed personnel In this monitoring bulletin, the Observatory aims at (soldiers and police officers) deployed globally for U.N. peacekee- shedding some light on MINUSTAH's funding me- ping operations (Details page 3)¹. chanisms. . \ Content: I) Funding of MINUSTAH budget by U.N member states..…………….........p. 2 II) Voluntary contributions to peacekeeping......p. 3 III) MINUSTAH’s interventions in Haïti ……..p. 4 IV) Economic and political challenges..……….p. 5 V) Perspectives…………...……………………p. 6 JULY 2013 - PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI - BULLETIN #4 -1-  I - FUNDING OF MINUSTAH BUDGET BY U.N. MEMBER STATES -Each Member State is obliged to contribute to the United Nations in accordance with its economic conditions - The United Nations (U.N.) has a regular budget and a different Member States have to contribute. It is supposed peacekeeping budget whose expenditure is divided bet- to reflect the contributive and economic capacity of each ween member States. Like any peacekeeping operation country. The percentages established for the peacekee- (PKO), MINUSTAH has a specific budget that the U.N. ping budget differ slightly from the percentages of the General Assembly, based on the Secretary General’s and regular budget. The five permanent members of the Secu- an Advisory Committee’s reports, approves and controls rity Council, who are more influential in decisions each year. The budgetary cycle of peacekeeping opera- concerning the creation of a peacekeeping operation and tions goes from July 1st to June 30th (12 months). In this the determination of its mandate, have to pay a higher respect, the sum of 576 619 000 US$ has been approved rate. On the other hand, economically least developed for MINUSTAH operations for the 2013-2014 fiscal year. countries contribute at a lower rate. The proportions of Resources are classified into three main categories: assessed Member States’ contributions are the same throughout all peacekeeping missions. For instance, sin- Military and police personnel 263 million US$ ce 2013, the United States has to pay 28.4% of all peace- costs keeping budgets while France contributes 7.2% and the United Kingdom 6.7% (Figure 3) ¹. Civilian personnel costs 135 million US$ As a U.N. Member State, Haiti is therefore obliged to Operational requirements 179 million US$ pay a mandatory contribution to all budgets of the or- Source: UN GA Document A/C.5/67/19 ganization. In this sense, the country contributes 0.003% of the U.N.'s regular budget and 0.0003% of all the With this amount, MINUSTAH currently represents the peacekeeping budgets including that of MINUSTAH.¹ fifth largest budget of 14 peacekeeping operations throug- It is worth noting that Member States are sometimes hout the world. The total funding of worldwide peacekee- hesitant and withhold their contribution to the peacekee- ping operations amounts to 7.5 billion US$ in 2013- ping budget. The United Nations indicate that, in June 2014.¹ 2013, 1.24 billion US$ of debts for all operations in the In order to divide the costs, the United Nations adopted an world were outstanding. assessed quota scale which establishes percentages that the CENTRE DE RECHERCHE, DE RÉFLEXION, DE FORMATION ET D’ACTION SOCIALE C E R F AS -2- II - VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS -MINUSTAH’s military and police component is composed of personnel from different States- The United Nations (U.N.) has neither an army, nor a per- At the end of June 2013, MINUS- manent police force. When a peacekeeping mission is man- TAH totaled 8,793 soldiers and poli- dated by the Security Council, the U.N. requests contribu- ce officers: 910 individual police tions of troops and police officers from its member states. In officers, 1,676 contingent police offi- accordance with the needs of the different missions and with cers and 6,207 soldiers. Of these agents 1,407 came from each country's internal policy, these States propose to provi- Brazil, making it the mission's largest military contributor. de military and police contingents in order to serve the mis- As figure 4 shows it, the main contributing countries are sion. Likewise, the military equipment belongs to Member considered to be “developing countries”, particularly coun- States who make them available to the United Nations. tries from Latin America¹. In return for sending their personnel, for its logistic support Since the beginning of MINUSTAH's mandate, the number and its supplies, the Member States receive a flatrate com- of military and police contingents in Haiti authorized by the pensation. Said compensations thus apply to all States inde- Security Council's resolutions has varied significantly. With pendently of actually incurred expenses. For example, the 6,700 soldiers and 1,622 police officers in 2004, the force monthly compensation for a soldier amounts to 1028 US$ reached its peak in 2010 with 8,940 soldiers and 4,391 police per month and was recently increased by 6.75%. An addi- officers authorized following the earthquake. Today, with tional 303 US$ per month is paid for certain specialized sol- 6,270 soldiers and 2,601 police officers authorized in Octo- diers. This compensation is directly paid to contributing ber of 2012, the uniformed personnel was slightly reduced countries that are responsible for paying their personnel. The and Brazil, Japan and South Korea in particular, withdrew exact conditions of these payments are determined in a Me- some troops. MINUSTAH's 2013-2016 consolidation plan morandum of Understanding signed by the U.N. and each provides for a reduction of the uniformed personnel of about concerned country. About 46% of MINUSTAH's budget in 30% compared to that of 2012 if a certain number of condi- 2013-2014 is intended for these reimbursements¹. tions, related to security and Haitian authorities' administra- On the other hand, the civil personnel and certain police tion capacities, are met. A timetable for the gradual, well- officers sent outside of contingents receive their remunera- ordered and final withdrawal of the troops, which would ma- tion directly from the UN. ke it possible to bring together various concerned sectors at the negotiation table, has not been established yet.¹ It is worth noting that incurred expenses by contributing countries, namely for training, wages and equipment costs for the personnel they send, vary largely among the different States. For example, in 2010, the United States increased their budget by 45 million US$ in order to support the U.N. police force in Haiti with 35 additional agents and equip- ment, while South Korea contributed 240 additional soldiers, predominantly engineers, for a cost of approximately 25 million US$¹. While this compensation system is less expensive than maintaining a permanent force belonging to the United Na- tions, it has often been criticized as a less effective method because of the troops’ disparate preparation, the inadequacy of certain equipment and lengthy deployment delays. Observatory on Public Policies and on International Cooperation -3- III - MINUSTAH’S INTERVENTIONS AND IMPACT IN HAITI - Committment in numerous areas casts doubt on the exact mandate- MINUSTAH's mandate, which does not intervene in a Although social and economic development is certainly a conflict between two clearly established warring fac- crucial factor for enhancing a secure and stable environ- tions, is rather broad and anticipates supporting the Go- ment, it is worth wondering if extremely complex structu- vernment in the establishment of a safe and stable envi- ral problems like those in Haiti can be solved by dispersed ronment, particularly by strengthening the national police projects which are the by-product of a military force. force, promoting human rights as well as supporting a Apart from the doubt as to the real impact of the mission's constitutional and political process towards good gover- activities, its reputation was strongly tarnished because of nance and the rule of law (S/RES/1542)¹. Although its sexual assault cases perpetrated by certain soldiers and mission has been adapted according to the context - and following the scandal around the cholera epidemic. Since despite a certain improvement of the security situation the beginning of the spread of the disease in October since 2004 - contingents deployed in Haiti have hardly 2010, several studies have established a link between MI- decreased and the mission is intervening in an increasin- NUSTAH’s Nepalese contingent and the origin of the gly diverse range of areas. Today its military contin- epidemic. A of July 2013, cholera had infected 667,122 gents, police forces and civil agents are working not only people and had caused 8,190 registered deaths.¹ Although to support the police department and judicial reform, but a panel of independent ex- also to create labor-intensive temporary jobs, develop perts’ report admitted that municipalities, support the legislative agenda and cus- the Artibonite river has been toms authorities, promote human rights and gender equa- contaminated by a Southeast lity, etc. Asian strain of the virus, the Following the earthquake, support to infrastructure UN adopted the position that construction through military engineering contingents the origin of the epidemic is and small projects aiming at enhancing the mission's not important for the fight image (Quick Impact Projects = QIPs) have also against it and is only com- multiplied. Quick Impact Projects are short-term and mitting to prevention and treatment activities. small scale projects essentially aiming at reinforcing trust In this regard, in February and July 2013, the UN refused in the mission, in its mandate and in the peace process, to respond to a compensation claim filed by cholera vic- but they are not supposed to offer humanitarian support tims, even though the standing claims commission, provi- or long-term development. They allow, for example, the ded for in paragraph 55 of the agreement between the UN installation of solar street lamps or rehabilitation of and the Haitian Government concerning the status of MI- certain buildings and can be carried out by different NUSTAH, does not exist in order to deal with the dispute. stakeholders (NGOs, UN, Government or MINUSTAH itself). Between July 2004 and January 2012, 1201 QIPs More than two years after the epidemic's outbreak, a na- totaling 24.62 million US$ were implemented¹. The tional cholera eradication plan estimates that 2.2 billion importance of these projects in order to "enhance the US$ will be needed to fight the epidemic until 2022. In trust of the Haitian population towards MINUSTAH" December 2012, the UN announced a 23.5 million US$- was emphasized in the Security Council's resolution contribution, additional funding will depend especially on 2070 in 2012. their availability to raise other funds from official deve- lopment assistance. In view of the reduction of internatio- The costs of some of these activities are sometimes cove- nal commitments during the last year, it seems uncertain red by additional voluntary contributions coming from that the required funds will be available in time¹. certain donors, as is currently the case of Norway. JULY 2013 - PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI - BULLETIN #4 -4-  IV - ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES -The level of countries’ commitment in favor of PKO depends largely on their respective priorities- Five decades of peacekeeping operations in the world have Nevertheless, particularly for emerging economies these cost member states considerable amounts. These funds, compensations become less and less important and the whether mandatory payments to the United Nations (UN) political and operational reasons which justify deploying or voluntary contributions, are derived from the national troops cannot be cast aside. Within MINUSTAH, we most budgets of their respective Governments, who are account- specifically notice an important commitment from Latin able to their citizens. The support of another nation within American countries which provide about 70% of the the framework of external cooperation must therefore cor- troops. This participation of countries from the region can respond to the countries’ respective interests and priorities. be explained in part by these countries’ objective to jointly Although it is not possible to draw up an exhaustive list of ensure regional stability, but also by their will to assert the underlying reasons which push states to commit them- themselves on the international stage. selves to peace and international security, it is worth ana- Brazil, a rapidly rising economic force, is in a position to lyzing some challenges which are related to the deploy- take advantage of closer relations with the International ment of the U.N. force in Haiti. Community and has expressed its will to obtain a perma- Mandatory contributions to the budget nent seat on the Security Council. Many States also under- The obligation to contribute to the United Nations budget stand that the possibility of committing their troops to a stems from the will of sovereign States to become a mem- PKO is a recognition on the international stage and of ber of this international organization. Whereas all member their operational capacity. It is worth remembering how States have to contribute to the total of peacekeeping ope- much the Haitian authorities welcomed the U.N.'s invita- rations (PKO) in the world, the largest contributions come tion to send police officers to the MINURCAT in Africa from a small number of countries (Figure 3). During re- in 2009, even though this deployment ultimately was not cent years, major contributors, in particular from Europe, carried out. questioned the amounts they had to pay. Yet in other ca- In general, all operations do not represent the same inte- ses, States estimate that they have benefitted from cost rest for the different member states and budgetary negotia- sharing and the fact that PKOs are generally less expensi- tions are often difficult. Therefore, in certain cases the ve than the deployment of national armed forces. In this U.N. has difficulties in finding sufficient soldiers for the sense, the United States Government Accountability Office respective missions. In other cases, personnel contributing estimated in 2006 that a similar US intervention in Haiti countries complain of being deprived of expensive equip- would cost twice as much as MINUSTAH's intervention ment which would be necessary for an effective interven- (GAO, 2006). This would be notably due to higher stan- tion. dards in wages and facilities which would be necessary for US military deployment. These countries are generally hesitant to deploy their own personnel in peacekeeping missions, whether it is for fi- nancial reasons or other political considerations. Deploying personnel Development countries contribute the majority of military and police personnel. The contribution of personnel and equipment can constitute a considerable economic interest whether it is because of compensation Police station in front of «camp Canaan», a shanty rates or job opportunities for their citizens. town created after the 12.01.2010 earthquake CENTRE DE RECHERCHE, DE RÉFLEXION, DE FORMATION ET D’ACTION SOCIALE C E R F AS -5- V - PERSPECTIVES Senate of the Republic’s 28.05.13 resolution: More than nine years after MINUSTAH's creation, troops continue to be deployed in Haiti and the mission costs si- Article 1 – The Haitian Government must produce the formal gnificant sums to U.N. Member States. This shows that, for request and establish a timeline for the withdrawal of U.N. various reasons, a certain number of states in the internatio- forces in Haiti accompanied by a gradual decrease of troops nal community still attach great importance to foreign sol- and the subsequent transfer of military competences to na- diers “stabilizing” the country. tional forces. [...] Article 4 – The Haitian Government must develop a judicial In the meantime, MINUSTAH'S departure is at the heart of and legal framework and program in the 2013-2014 budget discussions within the Haitian population's different strata. ways and means to substantially reinforce manpower in On the one hand, diverse protest movements are organized Haiti's National Police in order to ensure the entire country's in order to demand its departure and claim compensation security. [...] for the cholera victims. Two resolutions adopted by the Haitian Senate, respectively in September 2011 and May 2013, demand progressive and well-ordered withdrawal mental causes of Haiti's instability, such as food insecurity, within a year. On the other hand, certain representatives of disaster risk, youth unemployment and social exclusion the Administration and from international institutions argue persist. that an immediate departure would comprise too many risks given the weakness of government institutions. Since 2006, two reform and development plans for Haiti's National police force have been adopted by the Haitian Go- In light of what we have been observing, it is worth wonde- vernment and international stakeholders. The evaluations of ring if there is a true will to succeed in peace and stability the 2006-2011 plan show that the objectives regarding the building in Haiti. Although different plans and strategies increase in police manpower could not be reached and that developed since 2004 have emphasized the importance of it has been seriously underfunded. Of the expected 700 mil- strengthening government institutions and particularly an in lion US$, only 175 million US$, hence 25%, have been -depth justice and public security system reform, results mobilized (Figure 5). It is still unclear whether the imple- still do not seem tangible. As a recent OECD study speci- mentation procedures of the 2012-2016 plan are going to fies, actions targeted at strengthening the government have change in order to produce more tangible results. not been integrated into coherent policies and the funda- Figure 5 : Estimates in regards to reinforcing Haiti’s National Police Department (Source : 2012-2016 Development Plan) In 2006 Results expected from Assessment after implementation of Results expected from the 2006-2011 plan the 2006 - 2011 plan the 2012-2016 plan Number of police offi- 7 157 14 000 10 106 (of which 989 prison officers) A minimum of 15 000 cers Budget 700 million US$ 175 million $ US 1.35 billion US$ A CERFAS initiative with the support of Progressio, CAFOD, and Oxfam America 27, 1ère Avenue du Travail, Bois Verna, Port-au-Prince, Haiti Phone: (509) 3944-5572 / 2227-8311 ; Email : observatoire@cerfashaiti.org This bulletin is available in French, Creole, English and Spanish ¹ For more information and a bibliography: www.cerfashaiti.org/observatoire.html C E R F AS **We welcome your questions, suggestions and comments** Observatory on Public Policies and on International Cooperation -6-