BTI 2026 Country Report - Haiti

BTI 2026 Country Report Haiti This report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2026. It covers the period from February 1, 2023 to January 31, 2025. The BTI assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of governance in 137 countries. More on the BTI at https://www.bti-project.org. Please cite as follows: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2026 Country Report — Haiti. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2026. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Contact Bertelsmann Stiftung Carl-Bertelsmann- Strasse 256 33111 Gütersloh Germany Sabine Donner Phone +49 5241 81 81501 sabine.donner@bertelsmann-stiftung.de Hauke Hartmann Phone +49 5241 81 81389 hauke.hartmann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de Sebastian Plate Phone +49 5241 81 81263 sebastian.plate@bertelsmann-stiftung.de Sabine Steinkamp Phone +49 5241 81 81507 sabine.steinkamp@bertelsmann-stiftung.de BTI 2026 | Haiti 3 Key Indicators Population M 11.8 HDI 0.554 GDP p.c., PPP $ 3183 Pop. growth 1 % p.a. 1.2 HDI rank of 193 166 Gini Index 41.1 Life expectancy years 64.9 UN Education Index 0.482 Poverty 3 % 58.0 Urban population % 60.5 Gender inequality 2 0.618 Aid per capita $ 92.6 Sources (as of December 2025): The World Bank, World Development Indicators | UNDP, Human Development Report 2025. Footnotes: (1) Average annual growth rate. (2) Gender Inequality Index (GII). (3) Percentage of population living on less than $3.65 a day at 2017 international prices. Executive Summary Since President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination on July 7, 2021, Haiti has continued to seek an effective political transition arrangement that will lead to elections amid a seriously deteriorating security situation. In December 2022, the government under Acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry signed a new political transition agreement with some political leaders, civil society organizations (CSOs) and prominent figures from the private sector that aimed to reschedule elections for 2023 and inaugurate a new government by February 7, 2024. However, implementation of this agreement flagged, and the deadline for installing a new government passed with little progress toward elections. Since February 2024, an unprecedented surge of violence has engulfed Haiti’s capital as gangs initially demanded Henry’s resignation. Armed groups have attacked state institutions, including dozens of official buildings and prisons, magnifying insecurity and disrupting humanitarian aid. The intensification of violence has led to widespread displacement and a humanitarian crisis. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) convened negotiations in Jamaica on March 11, during which a new transitional framework was established and Henry agreed to step down. The new transitional government is headed by the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), consisting of seven voting members and two non-voting members representing different political groupings and sectors of society. The nine individuals were sworn in on April 25, and a transitional prime minister, Gary Conille, took the oath of office on June 11. However, tensions quickly emerged between the TPC and Conille, most notably over accusations that three TPC councilors had demanded a $770,000 bribe from the head of Haiti’s Banque Nationale de Crédit. In November, facing pressure from the TPC, Conille stepped down, and the council appointed a new prime minister, Alix Didier Fils-Aime. BTI 2026 | Haiti 4 Amid failing transitional arrangements, the security and economic situation has continued to decline. The number of gang killings has soared, and 1 million people have been displaced in the Port-au-Prince region alone. As of the close of the review period, gangs controlled approximately 85% of the capital and had expanded into other regions. In October 2023, to help address the violence, the U.N. Security Council authorized a multinational security support mission (MSS), led by Kenya, to help address gang violence and support the Haitian National Police. After delays, the first Kenyan police officers arrived in June 2024. However, the mission has struggled with insufficient resources – by February 6, it consisted of only 1,000 officers out of a planned 2,500 – and has made limited contributions to improving security. The United Nations has imposed a sanctions regime (Resolution 2653) that has taken limited action, levying sanctions against only six Haitian gang leaders and one former parliamentarian. Bilateral sanctions levied by Canada, the United States, the European Union and others have targeted more than 30 gang members, politicians and business leaders. The deteriorating security situation in the country has been accompanied by an economic crisis characterized by a sixth consecutive year of negative growth. The inflation rate fell slightly to 28.5% by the end of 2024, although prices for basic consumer products continue to strain individual budgets. While the gourde, Haiti’s currency, has stabilized, and government monetary and fiscal management has improved, the situation remains dire. In 2023, an estimated 350,000 Haitians left the country to seek protection elsewhere in the region. History and Characteristics of Transformation Haiti’s transformation has been hindered by fragilities rooted in the country’s tumultuous history. The democratic movement that emerged in the late 1980s sought to quell the country’s chronic instability by introducing new political norms and advocating for economic and social inclusivity. However, this movement faced formidable challenges from anti-democratic forces, including numerous coups and fraudulent election manipulation intended to obstruct the democratic process. Nevertheless, attempts to reinstate authoritarian rule have consistently met with opposition from popular movements fueled by a desire for a better life. The democratic movement of the 1980s culminated in the ousting of the Duvalier regime (1957 – 1986) in 1986, when Jean-Claude Duvalier was compelled to flee amid widespread protests and pressure from the United States. In 1990, Haiti held its first free and democratic elections, resulting in the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former priest, as president in early 1991. However, a coup d’état disrupted the democratization process, forcing Aristide into exile and ushering in a three-year military regime. In October 1994, Aristide returned from exile with the assistance of 2,000 American troops deployed by the Clinton administration in Operation Restore Democracy. In 1996, René Préval, a close ally of Aristide, assumed the presidency. BTI 2026 | Haiti 5 In 2000, Aristide regained power through contentious elections. Popular among the poor, Aristide implemented wealth redistribution measures and reduced privileges for the affluent. Faced with tough measures from the United States and international financial institutions, Haiti’ s fragile economy suffered multiple setbacks, making it increasingly difficult for Aristide to govern amid mounting political polarization. Following violent protests and an armed rebellion, Aristide was compelled to leave the country on February 29, 2004. Subsequently, the Boniface-Latortue transitional government (2004 – 2006) took power and invited the United Nations to deploy a peacekeeping mission. The U.N. Security Council authorized the deployment of a multinational interim force to restore stability until the arrival of a U.N. peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). In 2017, MINUSTAH was succeeded by a smaller U.N. mission, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), which was tasked with reforming Haiti’s judicial system. In 2019, MINUJUSTH was replaced by a U.N. political office called the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). During Préval’s second term (2006 – 2011), in January 2010, Haiti was devastated by a catastrophic earthquake that killed more than 250,000 people and left 1.5 million homeless, severely damaging the country’s already fragile infrastructure. Amid this chaos, the international community insisted on holding elections in November 2010. The elections were marred by irregularities and violence, resulting in the election of Michel Martelly, a former singer, as president. In 2015, Martelly was unable to organize general elections for a smooth transition of power, leading him to relinquish power to a provisional administration in February 2016. Haiti finally conducted elections in late 2016; the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) declared Jovenel Moïse the winner with 55% of the vote. However, only 21% of eligible voters participated, severely undermining Moïse’s legitimacy. Moïse assumed the presidency in February 2017 but was assassinated in July 2021. Subsequently, Ariel Henry, whom Moïse had nominated to serve as prime minister days before the assassination, assumed the role of acting prime minister. Haiti operates under a free-market economic system that relies primarily on small-scale subsistence agriculture, free trade, assembly industries, tariff liberalization and foreign exports. In the 1980s, Haiti embarked on economic liberalization and became a key partner in the Reagan administration’s Caribbean Basin Initiative, transitioning from a partially state-dependent economy to an open system. This shift entailed the removal of protective import barriers and high tariffs, along with the restructuring of local production, particularly in the agricultural sector, which had to contend with subsidized U.S. agricultural products. Several structural adjustment programs were also implemented to foster private sector growth, albeit with limited success. Political instability, corruption and the government’s failure to modernize infrastructure and legal systems have discouraged foreign investment and hindered economic growth. BTI 2026 | Haiti 6 The BTI combines text analysis and numerical assessments. The score for each question is provided below its respective title. The scale ranges from 1 (worst) to 10 (best). Transformation Status I. Political Transformation 1 | Stateness Question Score The state’s monopoly on the use of force is significantly challenged by gangs, which have formed a coalition called Viv Ansanm that unites two formerly separate gang federations against the Haitian National Police (PNH). As of the close of the review period, gangs controlled an estimated 85% of the greater capital area, including all of downtown Port-au-Prince and substantial portions of the outlying suburbs. Gangs additionally controlled all roads leading out of Port-au-Prince, including those to the south through Martissant, to the Artibonite and Center Departments and the international road to Haiti’s border with the Dominican Republic. During the period, gangs extended their influence to middle-class neighborhoods previously considered calm, and attempted to attack areas in which many U.N. agencies and diplomatic missions are based. While gangs have sophisticated arsenals at their disposal, the PNH is ill-equipped and unable to guarantee citizens’ safety against gang transgressions (for example, killings, kidnappings and rapes). PNH staffing is inadequate, with 12,852 officers as of December 31, 2024. Moreover, the PNH continues to experience high desertion rates and difficulty training and graduating new recruits because of gang activity around the main police training center. Police officers are also prime targets for gangs. At the end of 2024, 75 of 412 police facilities nationwide were non- operational, including 55 in the Port-au-Prince area. The police have also suffered from increasing politicization, and some members have direct ties to gangs. In light of the continued expansion of gang control, the Haitian government is seeking to strengthen and expand the Haitian national army (FADH). Disbanded in 1995, the army was reestablished in 2017 by Moïse, but for years it existed as a force of only a few hundred, focused on natural disaster response. However, the army has supported the PNH in some recent engagements against gangs, and a new army base intended to accommodate 1,500 trainee soldiers was inaugurated in November 2024. Monopoly on the use of force 2 BTI 2026 | Haiti 7 Some citizens have also adopted vigilante forms of justice. More than 350 people were killed by “bwa kale” groups (meaning “ peeled wood”) during the height of the movement in April – August 2023. Between January and November 2024, 248 alleged gang members were killed. Neighborhoods are also increasingly adopting defensive postures, with local groups blocking roads in and out and sometimes demanding to see identification documents. Most Haitians accept the nation-state as legitimate. Regarding citizenship itself, there is no discrimination based on race, ethnicity, national origin, gender or political affiliation. However, the Haitian state fails to provide all citizens with civil-status certificates and identity documents. Access to viable identity documents has been a primary demand of citizens since the beginning of the popular protests during the Duvalier regime. While President Moïse initiated a citizen registry program in 2017 through the Office of National Identification, the following year the Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes (CSCCA) raised concerns about the contract with the German company Dermalog, particularly about whether individuals might be able to obtain – and thus vote with – multiple biometric identity cards. Before the suspension of the program in 2023, some 5.356 million people of voting age had registered by April 2023, although the distribution of identity cards lagged behind the pace of registrations. There is a fracture between urban elites and rural communities, and between the French spoken by a minority of citizens and the Creole spoken by all Haitians. This divide is evident in the country’s social relations, especially in the form of elite disdain and the corresponding resentment of those who feel excluded from society. Although the 1987 constitution adopted Creole as the country’s second official language, all acts, laws, decrees, orders and court decisions are published solely in French, which is spoken by only a small minority of Haitians among the educated elite. State identity 7 The Haitian state is secular, although Catholicism was for a long time the only official religion and the Catholic Church enjoys privileges originating from the 1860 Concordat signed between the government and the Vatican. The constitution recognized Voodoo as a legal religion before it became the country’s second official religion in 2003. With this legal recognition, adherents of Voodoo can undertake legal activities previously reserved for the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church’s influence has greatly diminished, to the benefit of the Protestant church, which is considered closer to the working population. Other religions, such as Rastafarianism and Islam, are also on the rise. Although religion typically does not directly influence politics, the Catholic Church and Protestant churches have played an important role as facilitators in negotiations to resolve political crises. In 2020, the Catholic Church and Protestant churches also protested the draft law on the new penal code that recognized LGBTQ+ rights and abortion, arguing that the draft was immoral and that it penalized discrimination based on sexual orientation. Their efforts were unsuccessful. No interference of religious dogmas 9 BTI 2026 | Haiti 8 Haiti’s physical infrastructure and services are concentrated in the capital and a few provincial towns. In poor urban and rural areas, social services are provided mostly by international technical and financial partners and by non-governmental and civil society organizations (CSOs). The central government does not allocate sufficient resources for the provision of drinking water, health, education and electricity services, and local authorities have few resources to meet demand for basic services. According to the International Finance Corporation, 60% of the urban population had access to drinking water in 2024, as compared to just 40% of the rural population. Electricity service is irregular, with frequent blackouts; 49.3% of the population has access to electricity, although the share is significantly lower in rural areas. One in five residents lacks access to improved sanitation facilities, and only one in 10 has access to a solid waste collection system. In October 2024, almost half the population suffered from hunger, according to Integrated Food Security Phase Classification projections. Transport services are inadequate, with 50% of the country’s territory poorly connected. Recent gang violence has severely disrupted internal and international movement. Gangs control the main roads into and out of Port-au-Prince and frequently shut down streets in the capital. For example, the main port in Port-au- Prince was closed for weeks in March – April 2024 due to gang violence. The main international airport was also closed for several months during 2024 for the same reason. During the review period, the loss of territorial control to gangs further weakened the state’s ability to provide basic social services. The health system in Port-au-Prince was on the verge of collapse. As of June 2024, 45% of health institutions in the region were no longer functioning, while only 18% were fully operational. In December 2024, exacerbating the situation, gangs set fire to Bernard Mevs Hospital, which housed the country’s only neurological trauma center. A week later, government efforts to reopen the State University of Haiti Hospital ended in tragedy when a gang attack killed a police officer and two journalists and injured seven other journalists, prompting the resignation of the health minister, who had been in office for just over a month. As of the close of the review period, State University hospital, intended as the capital’s main public hospital, remained inaccessible and non-functional in a gang-controlled area. Blocking access to four departments in the south of the country for more than two years has isolated the inhabitants of these regions, making it harder for them to access basic services. Health services in these regions have also deteriorated, with hospitals unable to obtain medical supplies. Basic administration 1 BTI 2026 | Haiti 9 2 | Political Participation Haiti’s most recent elections took place in 2016. Although marred by irregularities, they resulted in the election of Jovenel Moïse as president and a full set of members of the upper and lower chambers of parliament, in addition to local representatives. However, Moïse and parliament were unable to agree on holding subsequent elections. Following Moïse’s assassination in mid-2021, no transitional arrangement has yet made progress toward new general elections beyond the appointment of a Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) tasked with restoring the electoral process. The final two members of the CEP were appointed in December 2024. The Senate is supposed to include 30 members, and the lower legislative chamber 119. However, the tenure of all elected leaders has expired, leaving Haiti without any properly elected authority as required by its constitution. Free and fair elections 1 Although there are currently no elected political decision-makers, and successive transitional governments have governed by decree, several powerful groups remain capable of vetoing leaders’ initiatives. Among them, the business sector has increased its power in recent years and uses financial incentives to influence election outcomes and the actions of elected officials afterward. Moïse’s campaign exposed state capture by increasingly powerful rentier networks that effectively control the public administration and are able to short-circuit public policy decisions. The state’s financial weakness and dependence on foreign donors, international organizations and NGOs reinforce this decline in effective governing power. Effective power to govern 1 The constitution guarantees the rights of association and assembly. There are no prohibitions on independent political or civic groups and no interference with their assembly. There have been several cases of intimidation directed at participants in public protests organized by the opposition or by movements critical of the government, as well as at participants in protests organized by government supporters. Haitian law (the decree of July 23, 1987, on public meetings) requires anyone who wishes to hold a public meeting or peaceful demonstration to notify the local police 48 hours in advance. The person who notifies the police of the demonstration is responsible for participants’ conduct. The government grants permits for demonstrations on this basis. However, the government regularly permits the national police to use lethal weapons when controlling authorized demonstrations. Under the Henry government, the incidence of demonstrations and of the use of brutal tactics against demonstrators declined mainly because gangs have terrorized the slum neighborhoods in which most of the demonstrations take place, thereby preventing protests. Beyond the issue of insecurity, the number of demonstrations also declined during the review period due to sanctions on some business and political leaders and the country’s weakening economic situation. With little progress evident from past Association / assembly rights 3 BTI 2026 | Haiti 10 demonstrations, and given the significant socioeconomic impact of “peyi lok” – or country-lock-type protests that block streets – Haitians are increasingly polarized about the value of protesting. Whereas the 2014 Americas Barometer survey found that only 8% of Haitians “strongly disapproved” of protests and 20% “ strongly approved,” the 2023 poll found that 31% of Haitians “ strongly disapproved” and 36% “strongly approved” of participating in demonstrations. Additionally, given that protests have brought little in the way of progress, Haitians are increasingly disillusioned. Only 2% of LAPOP respondents (2023) agreed that participating in protests was an effective way to improve the situation. The constitution guarantees the freedom of expression and press freedom. Journalism, particularly radio journalism, is robust and varied as a result of a long struggle during the Duvalier years. Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index 2024 ranked Haiti 93rd out of 180 countries with a score of 55.92, noting that journalists face a dangerous and precarious work environment because of lawlessness and uncertainty, a lack of police protection in the face of death threats, and limited financial resources. It also cited the need to self-censor in response to the 2017 defamation law. The media landscape has changed significantly in recent years. The country’s last daily print newspaper, Le Nouvelliste, suspended its print edition after gangs attacked and looted its offices in April 2024, although it continues to publish online. Recently, there has been a significant proliferation of radio stations, television stations and especially online media, which are the most widespread sources of information. In September 2019, the Conseil National de Télécommunications (CONATEL) counted 398 broadcasting stations on the FM band, about 60 community radio stations and 111 TV stations. However, CONATEL denounced the illegal operation of many stations and the interference they caused to the telecommunications system. It is very difficult for journalists to access public information on public contracts and on the execution of public works or audits. Journalists often face government allegations of defamation, which prevent them from publishing reports about political figures. Investigative journalists are especially vulnerable. Threats against them have led to self-censorship and to avoidance of reporting on the involvement of public figures in drug and arms trafficking or corruption, for fear of reprisal. Three journalists were killed in 2023, according to the Inter-American Press Association. On December 24, 2024, two journalists were killed and seven were injured in a gang attack at a major hospital in a gang-controlled area of Port-au-Prince, where journalists had gathered for a planned press conference to announce the hospital’s reopening. Haiti ranked as the biggest offender in allowing murders of journalists to go unpunished, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists’ Global Impunity Index 2024. Freedom of expression 3 BTI 2026 | Haiti 11 3 | Rule of Law The constitution establishes the separation and balance of power between the executive, the two houses of parliament and the judiciary. However, both the head of state and parliamentarians have always sought to undermine that balance. Parliament has the means to oppose the head of state’s claim of preeminence, but has not always done so with the goal of strengthening institutions. During his presidency, Moïse appointed no fewer than seven prime ministers because parliament would not approve his nominees for the post. Given the expiration of all remaining elected mandates in the country in February 2023, recent transitional governments have ruled entirely by decree. The executive branch in Haiti has two significant levers that effectively give it power over the other two branches: patrimonial control of treasury resources and the authority to call elections. This electoral power is outlined in the constitution and entrusted to the Permanent Electoral Council. Past presidents, concerned about losing influence over this council’s composition, have not taken the steps needed to establish this council permanently. Instead, they have created successive temporary councils through a series of contentious processes involving various societal sectors. This situation jeopardizes the rule of law by incentivizing the president to delay elections and avoid renewing parliament. Successive recent governments have used this tactic to postpone elections, ultimately consolidating unchecked executive authority. Separation of powers 2 Civil rights are guaranteed by the constitution. However, access to justice is insufficiently protected, making it difficult for citizens to claim their rights in court. Poor citizens face discrimination in access to justice, as judicial services are generally out of reach. Moreover, the courts use French rather than Creole, and legal decisions and documents are in French, which effectively excludes most of the population. With the deterioration of the security situation, protecting civil rights has become even more difficult. Haiti has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Belém do Pará Convention that criminalizes violence against women. However, the security situation and the expansion of gangs in the country have led to massive violations of the rights of women and girls, who are raped, kidnapped and killed by gangs. In August – October 2024, BINUH recorded 102 incidents of sexual violence involving 123 individuals (including 49 minors) committed by armed individuals; 76% of incidents involved rape or collective rape. Even well-documented civil violations are neither prosecuted nor punished. Haiti has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the rights to non-discrimination and equality before the law, but the country’s poverty and religion’ s influence on opinion formation contribute to a widespread intolerance of LGBTQ+ people. During the 50th legislature, the Senate approved two anti-LGBTQ+ bills, one of which prohibits same-sex marriage. Independent judiciary 1 BTI 2026 | Haiti 12 Impunity became more widespread during the review period as abuses of power multiplied, making it considerably more difficult to hold authorities accountable. The clearest example involved an alleged attempt by three presidential councilors to bribe the head of the Banque Nationale de Crédit (BNC). As of the close of the review period, the three continued to serve as part of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), although the Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption (ULCC), the government anti-corruption unit, recommended that they be pursued for alleged abuse of office, bribery and corruption in December 2024. The responsible investigating judge summoned all three for a hearing, but none complied with the summons. Another example involved the alleged misappropriation of heavy machinery and public equipment belonging to the National Equipment Center. In November 2023, the ULCC released reports that accused several senior officials of involvement, including two former presidents and former government ministers who were subsequently issued subpoenas. In January 2024, the investigating judge called for the arrest of 36 civil servants, including eight former prime ministers. As of the close of the review period, none of the individuals had been arrested or brought to trial. Furthermore, in September 2024, the ULCC accused officials with the National Solid Waste Management Service of using more than half of the fuel purchased for agency operations for personal use. The ULCC also alleged that schools received little from the $2.9 million intended to purchase food for Haiti’s National School Food Program during October 2016 – February 2021. No action was taken against the accused individuals. The government also concluded an investigation into the assassination of President Moïse, which accused 51 individuals, including the former president’s wife and Prime Minister Henry, of complicity or involvement in his murder. Appeals have been filed challenging the allegations, which some Haitians view with skepticism. No progress was made in investigating and prosecuting those implicated in wrongdoing as part of the PetroCaribe scandal. The judicial system has also failed to follow up on numerous massacres in which police and senior public officials were implicated. Police officers frequently act with impunity when dealing with civilians, particularly during demonstrations and while conducting arrests. However, in early January 2025, in one example of action against government officeholders, the PNH arrested two former government officials tied to gang activities: former parliamentarian Prophane Victor and former head of the National Solid Waste Management Service Magalie Habitant. Both were awaiting trial as of the time of writing. Prosecution of office abuse 2 BTI 2026 | Haiti 13 Civil rights are guaranteed by the constitution. However, access to justice is insufficiently protected, making it difficult for citizens to claim their rights in court. Poor citizens face discrimination in access to justice, as judicial services are generally out of reach. Moreover, the courts use French rather than Creole, and legal decisions and documents are in French, which effectively excludes most of the population. With the deterioration of the security situation, protecting civil rights has become even more difficult. Haiti has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Belém do Para Conventions that criminalizes violence against women. However, the security situation and the expansion of gangs in the country have led to massive violations of the rights of women and girls, who are raped, kidnapped and killed by gangs. In August – October 2024, BINUH recorded 102 incidents of sexual violence involving 123 individuals (including 49 minors) committed by armed individuals; 76% of incidents involved rape or collective rape. Even well-documented civil violations are neither prosecuted nor punished. Haiti has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the rights to non-discrimination and equality before the law, but the country’s poverty and religion’ s influence on opinion formation contribute to a widespread intolerance of LGBTQ+ people. During the 50th legislature, the Senate approved two anti-LGBTQ+ bills, one of which prohibits same-sex marriage. Civil rights 1 4 | Stability of Democratic Institutions One reason for the traditionally poor performance of democratic institutions is the conflict between the two heads of the executive, the presidency and the prime minister’s office. The history of contentious relations between the two has contributed to the institutions’ instability and poor performance. When Prime Minister Henry was forced to resign in March 2024, he was the longest-serving prime minister in years, if not decades, with 19 months in office. The Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) has continued this pattern of conflict between the presidency and the prime minister, with tensions between the councilors and former Prime Minister Conille forcing his resignation after only five months. Political parties in Haiti do not actively contribute to the vitality of political life or the strengthening of democratic institutions. Instead, they often act as groups tied to individual political figures that exert pressure but lack a genuine social base. The disorderly and fraudulent nature of many of the country’s elections has led citizens to doubt the credibility of election results, eroding their trust in the functioning of these institutions. LAPOP surveys of Haitian citizens’ views on the performance of their democratic institutions consistently show very low levels of confidence in both the institutions and the individuals in charge. Former Acting Prime Minister Henry and the TPC have operated without clear performance requirements and have lacked accountability to any oversight authority. The mechanisms designed to maintain checks and balances are largely ineffective, if not entirely absent. Performance of democratic institutions 1 BTI 2026 | Haiti 14 The judiciary is fraught with corruption and complete dysfunction. The latter is exemplified by the extreme overcrowding of Haitian prisons, which currently have an occupancy rate of more than 300% – largely because many individuals are kept in pretrial detention, sometimes for as long as a decade. The percentage of detainees in pretrial detention has exceeded 80% for years. The judicial system suffers from a serious backlog, which has been exacerbated by attacks from gangs. The system was sometimes brought to a complete standstill by strikes in 2023 and 2024. Haiti lacks functioning democratic institutions, primarily because of the absence of elections, which in itself underscores the questionable commitment of most actors involved. This situation illustrates the extent to which politics in Haiti is a ruthless pursuit of power, in which individual and group interests often supersede any consideration of the common good. Most democratic institutions are only weakly accepted as legitimate by relevant actors, including political and economic elites. Certain business interest groups such as various chambers of commerce, the National Lottery Association and the association of gas station owners, as well as drug- trafficking networks, aim to influence the selection of a government that can be easily manipulated to serve their interests. Commitment to democratic institutions 1 5 | Political and Social Integration The political landscape is structured around two types of organizations: a first circle made up of parties such as the Haitian Tet Kale Party (PHTK), founded by former President Michel Martelly and one of the most influential parties during Henry’s mandate and under the TPC, as well as the Fanmi Lavalas party and a set of parties and political organizations connected to former President Préval’s party, Patriotic Unity or Inite. These parties have various constituencies, although the dividing lines between them are unclear and representatives can be found changing sides. They have exerted control for more than 30 years. Although deputies and senators nominally belong to parties, they must, for several reasons, be considered a distinct group of politicians. They straddle their party, the business sector, the gang network and their social bases. Other political parties in Haiti typically form as ad hoc coalitions of politicians shortly before elections. These groups are usually led by a figure of some political renown, and they position themselves as part of the winning candidate’s movement. They also engage in numerous rounds of political negotiations to secure public-service appointments. They have networks in society they can mobilize during these negotiations, lending an appearance of legitimacy to the incumbent government’s initiatives. These parties lack a clear ideological vision for Haitian society that would define their role in political struggles. Their financial fragility makes them prone to trade political support in return for state resources. Although successive governments have announced efforts to enact a law on political-party financing to enhance their independence, these endeavors have not yielded significant success. Party system 2 BTI 2026 | Haiti 15 Various interest groups represent different sectors of society. However, these groups have lost their influence over state affairs and their dominance in sociopolitical struggles. They are victims of the political system’s transformation from a basis in parties with a strong popular base and a populist orientation to the rise of new political actors that act as an economic oligarchy. The dismantling and privatization of public enterprises in the context of neoliberal policies have contributed to the erosion of interest groups’ power. The only unions active in the last two years have been the textile companies’ union and the transport union, which have participated in several large demonstrations and strikes. Students have staged sporadic demonstrations to protest security conditions and support their teachers’ demands for better working conditions. Although professional associations are weak, they have openly condemned kidnapping for ransom, as professionals continue to be prime targets for gangs. Still, professional associations have little internal life or capacity for mobilization. The most powerful interest groups in Haiti are in the private business sector. In recent years, this sector has established several representative organizations through numerous regional chambers of commerce and industry, as well as bilateral chambers of commerce. These organizations serve as points of contact for international technical and financial partners in the country and actively engage in negotiations to address the ongoing crisis. Still, their real strength lies, as observed during Henry’s mandate and under the TPC, in the close ties they maintain with the government and, for some, with gangs. Interest groups 3 Since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship, Haitians have continued to fight to deepen the democratic process. However, this process has faced many setbacks that have undermined confidence in democracy. Support for democracy requires support for its institutions. According to the 2023 LAPOP survey, only 24% of Haitians trust the electoral system, placing the country near the bottom of regional rankings, ahead of only Peru and Colombia. While 52% of Haitians support democracy as a form of government, up from 46% in 2021, only 12% are satisfied with how it functions in Haiti. Most Haitians view a focus on local governance as the best way to advance the country, with 32% recommending action through community boards and associations. Approval of democracy n/a In addition to trust in institutions, trust among citizens is equally important for democracy to function well. Given the social and political crisis in Haiti and the proliferation of violence, interpersonal trust is declining, especially in urban areas. In rural settings, social capital takes on a different meaning. Mutual aid among peasants in agricultural work is organized around proximity, interpersonal trust and good reputation. The role of social capital in promoting popular solidarity during the 2010 earthquake showed that it can strengthen the population’s resilience, helping it cope with the various shocks to which it is exposed and compensate for the state’s absence in providing basic social services. However, the recent years’ multiple shocks have Social capital 3 BTI 2026 | Haiti 16 weakened solidarity networks and interpersonal trust. The spread of gang violence and the scale and scope of displacement have weakened old solidarity networks and reduced the scope of proximate interactions. II. Economic Transformation 6 | Level of Socioeconomic Development Question Score Haiti was ranked at 158th place out of 193 countries on the 2022 Human Development Index, the latest year available as of the time of writing, with a score of 0.552. Human development conditions have likely decreased over the last two years. According to the most recent World Bank estimates, based on different poverty thresholds, 86% of the population lives on less than $6.85 a day, 58.7% lives on less than $3.65 a day, and 36.4% lives on less than $2.15 a day, the threshold for extreme poverty. The Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’Informatique (IHSI) estimates that the middle class has shrunk to include just 8% of the population. Haiti’s Gini coefficient is 0.41, one of the highest in the world. The country’s score on the Gender Inequality Index was 0.621 in 2022, which is also very high in international comparison. These two elevated levels demonstrate the stark division within Haitian society: a privileged economic elite controls the formal sector of the economy, while most poor people and actors work in the informal economy, which accounts for about 90% of employment. Women dominate the informal economy, which is characterized by very small production units with low profit margins. They are excluded from the bank credit system, government subsidy programs and public procurement. In rural areas, the subsistence economy relies heavily on small farms with low yields, which face competition in the domestic market from inexpensive agricultural imports. The current crisis has reinforced socioeconomic barriers and created new ones. Because gangs’ occupation of the country’s main roads has disrupted supply chains, women merchants cannot travel to markets to sell their goods. Women are also the primary victims of inflation, as they face falling demand in the consumer product markets where they sell their goods. Gang violence has prevented farmers from selling their produce. Socioeconomic barriers 1 BTI 2026 | Haiti 17 Economic indicators 2021 2022 2023 2024 GDP $ M 20877.4 20253.6 19850.6 25224.2 GDP growth % -1.8 -1.7 -1.9 -4.2 Inflation (CPI) % 16.8 34.0 36.8 26.9 Unemployment % 15.3 14.6 14.6 15.1 Foreign direct investment % of GDP 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 Export growth % 1.4 2.4 -9.6 -31.9 Import growth % 2.7 4.9 -0.4 -16.2 Current account balance $ M 87.7 -492.0 -682.6 - Public debt % of GDP 28.9 29.5 28.5 15.5 External debt $ M 2605.2 2561.7 2637.6 - Total debt service $ M 24.8 47.0 64.4 - Net lending/borrowing % of GDP - - - - Tax revenue % of GDP - - - - Government consumption % of GDP 7.5 6.9 6.2 5.7 Public education spending % of GDP 1.2 1.0 1.0 - Public health spending % of GDP 0.4 0.3 - - R&D expenditure % of GDP - - - - Military expenditure % of GDP 0.2 0.1 0.1 - Sources (as of December 2025): The World Bank, World Development Indicators | International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database. 7 | Organization of the Market and Competition According to World Bank estimates, Haiti’s informal sector accounts for 60% of GDP. The small formal sector is highly concentrated and poorly regulated. Haitian firms are primarily young microenterprises with few employees of generally low education levels. These firms have minimal levels of managerial skill and productivity. While women entrepreneurs play a prominent role in the Haitian market, their businesses tend to be smaller than those owned by men. Additionally, women are less inclined to take risks than men. This was particularly evident during the review period, when gang violence disproportionately targeted women. Market organization 3 BTI 2026 | Haiti 18 Liberalization in the 1980s was accompanied by an institutional framework that provides guarantees for competition. Yet the Haitian market remains highly concentrated despite the country’s trade openness. Prices are mainly set by market forces, but monopolies and oligopolies in many goods and services markets distort the price mechanism. The Haitian state does not impose any restrictions on the export of profits generated in the country or on the free movement of business personnel. The government has an incentive system for new investors in sectors such as agriculture, but has had to eliminate certain subsidies and exemptions because of their negative impact on revenue. With respect to currency convertibility, Haiti faces a structural shortage of foreign exchange because exports volumes are low, despite a significant flow of remittances from the diaspora. A system channels foreign exchange to essential imports such as fuel. After earlier unsuccessful attempts by the central bank to defend the gourde against the dollar by injecting dollars into the foreign exchange market, the bank has shown greater restraint in intervening, helped by slightly improved macroeconomic conditions. Haitian markets for goods and services are controlled by a minority of actors who hold monopoly and oligopoly positions. They use their parallel networks within the government to pay very little in taxes. Studies have pointed to the concentration of industries in the hands of a few families, a practice reinforced by Duvalier-era monopolies for specific goods and services. This explains why Haitian consumers pay the region’s highest prices for goods and services and, along with the ongoing insecurity crisis, why new investors are reluctant to invest in the country. Haiti does not have a price-control system, although it has historically subsidized and partially regulated the prices of petroleum products. Efforts to control prices are arbitrary and managed by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry through mobile brigades. Consumer associations struggle to organize, primarily because of financial constraints. Haiti also lacks a competition authority and is not a member of the International Competition Network. Efforts to strengthen the legal framework for trade and to establish quality-control services have waned because of a lack of political will, financial resources and qualified personnel. No steps have been taken to adopt a competition law or establish a competition authority. The adoption of an antidumping law is crucial, given the prevalence of anti-competitive practices in the import market for goods and services and the potential of these practices to hinder the development prospects of domestic production. Competition policy 2 BTI 2026 | Haiti 19 Haiti became a World Trade Organization member in 1996 and a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade member in 1950. Its economy is among the most open in the Caribbean. The country’s legislation does not discriminate between local and foreign companies. As part of the structural adjustment policies embraced in the 1980s, Haiti extensively liberalized its economy by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and opening its market to agricultural products. However, this liberalization occurred without measures to enhance competitiveness, legislation to counter the entry of cheap imports at dumping prices, or the creation of effective anti-smuggling mechanisms. Consequently, local production, particularly in the agricultural sector, has suffered considerably, and the country dedicates a significant portion of its foreign-currency reserves to purchasing food products. Haiti grants most favored nation treatment to all its partners and is a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The country has ratified the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, although implementation is pending. Similarly, the CARICOM Common External Tariff has not been published in Le Moniteur, the Official Journal of the Haitian State. Consequently, customs duties in Haiti are considerably lower than in other CARICOM countries. Under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), Haiti receives non-reciprocal preferential treatment from several developed countries. Haiti has privileged access to various markets, with the United States and the European Union being the most important. However, the country cannot fully benefit because of its limited export capacity. Haiti has comparatively low customs tariffs, but importers face additional levies at the border, including verification fees, duties and mandatory contributions to local government management funds. These additional charges can exceed the consolidated duties. The Haitian government maintains a very liberal incentive regime but has had to reverse some investor benefits because the associated revenue losses constituted a significant share of Haiti’s GDP. Haiti has not conducted a trade policy review since 2015, when the review indicated that these losses equaled 4.1% of GDP. Haiti applies a simple average most favored nation (MFN) rate of 9.7% for agricultural products and 4.2% for non-agricultural products. Liberalization of foreign trade 6 The banking system is marked by a high geographic concentration of banks in Port- au-Prince and by the dominance of three banks – Unibank, Sogebank and the Banque Nationale de Crédit (BNC). The central bank, the Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BRH), has introduced a supervisory framework for the banking system based on Basel principles to ensure that banks operate soundly and maintain sufficient capital to bear risks. The banking system’s vulnerability to systemic credit risk is heightened by the risk of company defaults due to acts of violence, the concentration of holdings and a limited number of borrowers. Banking system 4 BTI 2026 | Haiti 20 As of fiscal year 2023 – 2024, Haiti’s banking system comprised seven local banks with $4.8 billion in assets, although the market is highly concentrated. Unibank, Haiti’s largest banking institution, has $1.76 billion in assets. This bank, along with Sogebank and BNC, the next largest banks, collectively held 81.4% of the system’s total assets, 81.9% of total deposits and 77.8% of the country’s loan portfolio as of June 2024. The banks’ portfolios are highly concentrated – about 70% of loans are held by 10% of borrowers. Additionally, the banking system and capital market are poorly differentiated. All banks are controlled by the same small business elite; the last foreign-owned bank in Haiti, Citibank, exited the market in July 2024 due to the prevailing conditions of insecurity. The sector’s intermediation function is parasitic, primarily benefiting speculation, and causes incoherence between the financial sector and the real sector of the economy. The central bank conducts regular inspections to ensure that financial institutions remain in compliance with minimum capital requirements, asset quality, and currency and credit risk management. Concurrently, five of the commercial banks surveyed in May 2024 reported damage to their branch offices in Haiti due to gang violence, with losses at each bank totaling more than $75,000. As of December 2023, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans was 8.77%, a decrease from 10.09% in December 2022. However, the number of non- performing loans has likely risen in 2024 due to increased gang violence. The proliferation of illegal trafficking, widespread corruption and incidents of kidnapping for ransom have contributed to the growth of Haiti’s criminal economy, putting the banking sector in a precarious position. The sector is tasked with implementing measures to combat these issues. However, there is a risk that foreign banks may decline to do business with Haitian banks. Haiti has been subject to increased monitoring (also known as the “gray list”) by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) since June 2021 and is working to address deficiencies in its efforts to counter money-laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing. In 2023, Henry’s government issued a decree to establish an anti-money- laundering and counter-terrorism financing law that sought to enforce FATF best practices. The BRH also standardized anti-money-laundering regulations through the issuance of a money transfer policy and a policy for currency exchange institutions. BTI 2026 | Haiti 21 8 | Monetary and fiscal stability The Haitian government has taken steps to improve its macroeconomic position and pursue a more effective monetary policy. An IMF Staff Monitoring Program (SMP) ran from June 2023 – September 2024, but was not extended because of technical issues at the central bank and the impact of the spring 2024 gang violence. However, a new SMP began in December 2024 and was slated to run for a year, with the overall goal of supporting macroeconomic stability and enhancing governance. The SMP prioritizes mobilizing government revenue, managing expenditures, increasing social spending allocations, avoiding all monetary financing of the deficit so as to maintain price stability, and limiting foreign exchange interventions. The SMP also lays out steps to improve governance, including publication of the fiscal year 2023 audit of the central bank by June 2025 and the Governance Diagnostic Report. For the first time in many years, monetary financing in fiscal year 2024 was less than 20% of the revenue from the previous year’s tax returns. It accounted for 1% of GDP in FY 2023, down from 1.9% in FY 2022 and 2.8% in FY 2021. The reduction has eased inflationary pressures and created potential for more domestic borrowing. Government debt to the central bank amounted to 12.3% of GDP in FY 2023, roughly in line with recent years. The BRH operates with relative independence and has improved its management of monetary and fiscal policy. The gourde depreciated 12% against the dollar in FY 2023, but because of more effective central bank management of monetary policy, the exchange rate has remained fairly stable since the end of 2023. This has supported efforts to reduce inflation and provided greater predictability for the private sector. Inflation reached a rate of 47.2% by the end of 2022, among the highest levels in the country’s recent history, but decreased again over the course of 2023, assisted by reductions in monetary financing of the deficit. Inflation spiked again in February and March 2024 in response to supply constraints resulting from increased gang violence, but fell again over the course of 2024. At the end of December 2024, the inflation rate was 28.5%, according to the IHSI statistics bureau. The cost of a food basket has risen steadily due to gangs cutting off internal farm-to- market routes and major transport arteries from Port-au-Prince to the regions, the closure of the border with the Dominican Republic, and insecurity around the Port- au-Prince port area, the latter of which resulted in the port’s closure for several weeks at various points in 2024. As of January 20, 2025, prices of rice and milk were up 75% and 56%, respectively, compared with levels before the March 2024 expansion of gang violence. Monetary stability 5 BTI 2026 | Haiti 22 Haiti’s government budget has contracted in recent years because of revenue shortfalls tied to the country’s worsening socioeconomic situation. This includes negative growth for the sixth consecutive year. The revised $1.9 billion budget for FY 2023 – 2024 was 20.5% smaller than for FY 2022 – 2023. The 2024 – 2025 budget, released in September 2024, was $2.4 billion, a slight increase over the previous year. The fiscal deficit decreased to 0.6% of GDP in FY 2024, compared with 2.3% in FY 2023, largely because of insecurity that reduced capital expenditures and froze or reduced operations at the Port-au-Prince port, which receives more than 80% of the country’s international trade. The government continues to face challenges in raising revenue. Economic activity has declined due to escalating gang violence, which has blocked fuel distribution, port and airport operations, market operations, and trade. In 2023, total tax revenue collection improved to 6.3% of GDP, compared with 5.2% for FY 2022 – 2023, but this was reversed in 2024, when it fell to 5.4% of GDP due to increased insecurity and weaker economic activity. Higher revenues from customs and oil taxes could not offset these effects. Haiti’s tax revenue is low compared with the 2022 average of around 21.5% of GDP for other Latin American and Caribbean countries. A new tax code took effect at the beginning of October 2024, representing a step in the right direction. Customs revenues decreased by 3% between the first trimesters of FY 2023 – 2024 and FY 2024 – 2025, largely because trade fell due to the impact of gang activity at the Port-au-Prince port. This occurred despite recent efforts to increase customs revenues through the application of restrictive measures against members of the economic sector and customs officials involved in smuggling and influence peddling, as well as overall increases in customs duties. Historically, revenue has been lost at customs due to the capture of the institution by influential members of the business sector and their ability to circumvent their tax obligations. The data also indicate that trade decreased in FY 2024 due to insecurity, with exports dropping at an annual rate of 20% and imports by 10%. The national debt in 2024 amounted to 14% of GDP, down from 29.5% in 2022. This was largely due to an agreement between Haiti and Venezuela to restructure PetroCaribe debt, which cut the external-debt-to-GDP ratio from 12.9% in fiscal 2023 to 1.5% in fiscal 2024. The remainder of Haiti’s external public debt was largely concessional and came from multilateral creditors including the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the IMF. The decrease in external public debt has reduced the need for monetary financing of the budget deficit. Fiscal stability 4 BTI 2026 | Haiti 23 9 | Private Property The constitution guarantees private property and assigns the state the duty to protect and promote private entrepreneurship. However, overall respect for private property has declined significantly in recent years. Over the last several months of the review period, gang incursions into neighborhoods including Nazon, Solino and Fort National have been accompanied by attacks on residences and businesses, with many buildings burned. In addition, stores and warehouses are regularly looted by gangs. Many residential and commercial buildings in downtown Port-au-Prince have been abandoned by their owners because of the security situation. Over the past decade, land theft has increased in frequency due to a coalition of gang members, judges, police and notaries. Gangs’ control over Port-au-Prince has enabled them to carry out regular land-occupation operations and to steal from residential homes, resulting in disastrous consequences for the financial market and for property owners who have purchased their properties with bank credit. Haiti also lacks a land registry system. This deficit is the root cause of several of the country’s problems, including an unstable land tenure system, an increase in land conflicts and the subsequent negative impact on social stability, subpar agricultural investments that are usually short-term and not financially viable, and an inability to foster modern agriculture practices. The instability of land ownership has far- reaching consequences for real estate credit, the growth of construction firms, mortgage loans and the implementation of urbanization policies. According to the International Property Rights Index (2024), Haiti ranks 123rd out of 125 countries in terms of property rights and 19th out of 20 countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region, ahead only of Venezuela. Property rights 2 In principle, private enterprises can operate without restrictions in Haiti. However, the country does not provide sufficient protection for private property and lacks effective mechanisms for arbitration and mediation. About 96% of the entrepreneurial sector is made up of individual or family businesses, with 77% of these businesses engaged in buying and reselling mostly imported goods. There are very few productive enterprises. These enterprises face numerous difficulties in a regulatory framework that does not promote private investment. Additionally, they must contend with a market dominated by anti-competitive practices. The Business Support Services introduced by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry have not significantly affected this situation. Firms still receive little credit from the financial system, and employees generally lack management, marketing and accounting skills. The presence of foreign companies is extremely limited. A census conducted by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry found that only three out of every 1,000 enterprises were owned by foreign investors. Private enterprise 4 BTI 2026 | Haiti 24 The state has developed support programs to help Haitian companies access regional and international markets and obtain credit. However, the country’s economic and political crisis has interrupted these programs. Haiti’s poor integration into the global network of major shipping lines seriously hinders the expansion of private investment. In addition, port operations in Haiti are the most expensive in the region. Some improvement may come from the opening of a new port serving the southern peninsula − the St. Louis de Sud port near the city of Les Cayes − an effort more than 20 years in the making. The port promises to open shipping to and enable exports from the south, which has been largely cut off from Port-au-Prince for more than three years because of gang control of the roads leading south from the capital. During the review period, there was no privatization of public enterprises, but the operations of formerly publicly owned enterprises reveal problematic practices developed by many of these entities. The public is not informed about the financial performance of the privatized firms. These firms were privatized via a public-private partnership model, and are expected to provide the Haitian state with dividends and taxes. However, these firms have incurred debts to the state and have failed to meet their tax and dividend obligations. 10 | Welfare Regime In Haiti, the social safety net is extremely rudimentary, fragmented, limited in reach and underfunded. Four institutions form the backbone of the welfare system: the Office National d’Assurance- Vieillesse (ONA), which provides benefits to employees of private establishments; the Office des Accidents du Travail, de la Maladie et de la Maternité (OFATMA), which operates under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MAST) and provides insurance against work-related accidents and disability to workers in the private and public sectors; the Directorate of Civil Pensions (DPC); and the Caisse d’Assistance Sociale (CAS), which caters to the poorer segments of the population. The CAS provides personalized social assistance to the needy, distributes food kits and subsidizes communal asylums. In 2023, public expenditure on health amounted to just 0.3% of GDP, a relatively low level. However, international aid and private expenditure significantly increase this percentage. Life expectancy in Haiti is the lowest in the region, at 64.9 years. Welfare institutions have faced governance problems, limited financial resources and corruption scandals, including mismanagement and embezzlement in 2021 by the former head of the National Solid Waste Management Service, who was arrested in early 2025. Additionally, the contributory portion of the welfare system covers only people who have formal sector jobs, who make up only 10% of the population. Moreover, Haiti has the lowest level of net safety transfers in the region. The rural poor, who make up almost 70% of households and are considered chronically poor, suffer the greatest amount of exclusion from basic services such as clean drinking Social safety nets 3 BTI 2026 | Haiti 25 water, sanitary waste management and access to health care. Family and community networks function as the only reliable safety net in rural areas. The largest contribution to social welfare comes from the significant Haitian diaspora in the form of remittances. These flows have remained strong and relatively steady, representing 18.9% of GDP in 2023. Development partners play a crucial role in financing safety nets and providing education, health care and nutritional support, but they lack coordination. The government has provided very limited support for social programs despite increasing levels of poverty and food insecurity, the latter of which affects 48% of the population, according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification assessment for August 2024 – February 2025. However, the new government led by Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime initiated a Special Population Support Program at the end of 2024 to assist vulnerable households while supporting economic activity. The program allocated HTG 1 billion ($7.5 million) to food kits and cash transfers, labor-intensive public works, increased electricity production, and increased security measures. The Social Protection and Promotion Policy document, developed in 2020 by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MAST), outlines areas of intervention to address inequalities of opportunity and to initiate an active social promotion policy for vulnerable population segments. However, it has not yet been implemented. No special legal framework, apart from general provisions, has been established to promote equal opportunity. Rural communities and residents of poor neighborhoods face the greatest barriers to equal opportunity. Women have long experienced widespread gender discrimination. Violence against women, girls, people with disabilities and LGBTQ+ people is the most severe form of discrimination. Sexual violence has soared in step with rising gang violence in recent years, as gangs use violence against women as a means of exerting control. In the period from January to October 2024, the United Nations Population Fund reported 5,400 incidents of gender-based violence, 72% of which involved sexual violence. Historically, women have never held more than 6% of seats in the two official legislative chambers. Despite a 2012 constitutional amendment mandating that 30% of public offices be held by women, no subsequent action has been taken to enforce this provision. There is also a lack of public programs or initiatives aimed at increasing gender equality. Haiti has a Ministry of the Condition of Women and Women’s Rights, but it suffers from inadequate funding, which hinders the successful implementation of proposed legislation. Women typically receive an inferior education compared with men, and face employment constraints. In 2022, the Gender Inequality Index (GII) ranked Haiti among the worst performers globally, with a score of 0.621. In 2017, Haiti’s literacy rates were 73% for males and 64% for females. Although no recent enrollment data are available, 2022 GII data indicate that 28.0% of women and 36.9% of men have received at least some secondary education. Equal opportunity 3 BTI 2026 | Haiti 26 Gender is a significant risk factor for living below the poverty line. Women accounted for 48.8% of the total labor force in 2022, but are primarily concentrated in low- skilled, informal employment. On average, Haitian women’s wages are 32% lower than men’s, while women had received only 35% of credit issuances, according to the Haitian central bank in August 2024. About 62% of female-headed households in rural areas live below the poverty line, compared to 54% for male-headed households. 11 | Economic Performance Haiti has experienced negative per capita growth rates for six consecutive years, ranging from -1.7% to -4.2%. Most recently, the GDP growth rate was -1.9% in 2023, followed by an estimated rate of -4.2% in 2024, the worst result for the Haitian economy since the 2010 earthquake. Meanwhile, GDP per capita (on a purchasing power parity basis) fell from $1,835.4 to $1,075.8 in the 2021 – 2023 period, representing a significant drop in household income and purchasing power. Economic activity in the agricultural sector declined by an estimated 6% in the last quarter of the 2023 – 2024 fiscal year compared with the previous year, due in part to escalating gang violence in the Artibonite Department, which accounts for more than 70% of rice production. This downward trend has led to similar contractions in the secondary and tertiary sectors. Although the unemployment rate has remained relatively stable for several years at about 14% to 16%, more pressing concerns involve the high rates of informal employment and underemployment. Economic transformation involving a greater role for the secondary and tertiary sectors rather than the agricultural sector is ongoing. Trade has accounted for an average of 41% of GDP since 2010. The textile sector, supported by tariff-free importation to neighboring countries, contributes about 5% of GDP and accounts for 80% to 90% of exports, although it has been struggling with the effects of gang violence. The textile industry workforce fell to about 32,000 people in March 2024 – a reduction of more than 45% since September 2023 – due to supply chain issues, fuel shortages and gang violence. Many companies have cut staffing, while a small number have closed entirely. Foreign direct investment volumes continued to decline, falling from $50 million in 2021 to $39.3 million in 2023, according to the World Investment Report 2023. The inflation rate was 28.5% in December 2024 – still high but somewhat reduced and steadier – while the gourde remained relatively steady against the U.S. dollar, a helpful development for domestic private sector actors seeking to manage their investments. Government consumption in 2023 amounted to 6.2% of GDP, down from 7.5% in 2021 and the lowest level since at least 2000, reflecting the state’s poor fiscal situation. Net reserves totaled about $1 billion in September 2024, according to the IMF, close to the country’s average since 2017 of about $1.3 billion. This indicates continued effective monetary management despite the economy’s contraction. As of Output strength 1 BTI 2026 | Haiti 27 the end of 2024, public debt had fallen to 14% of GDP, following the restructuring of debt owed to Venezuela. As a result, the 2024 IMF SMP noted that public debt levels were low but the risk of debt distress linked to the remaining debt remains high, given Haiti’s substantial development needs and limited resource and export base. 12 | Sustainability Haiti has experienced significant environmental degradation, which increases its vulnerability to natural disasters such as earthquakes and tropical storms. In 2023, more than 100,000 Haitians were displaced by flooding, while water shortages and inconsistent rainfall contributed to declining agricultural productivity. This degradation has serious consequences for the population, affecting health, the economy, biodiversity and security. The loss of biodiversity and the impacts of climate change reflect the ongoing degradation of Haiti’s ecosystems, underscoring the need for a dynamic environmental policy that addresses issues such as soil erosion, watershed protection and adoption of a low-carbon energy system. In 2017, Haiti ratified the Paris Agreement, committing to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 31% by 2030 and significantly increase the share of renewable energy in its energy system. The country also pledged to enhance the management of coastal areas. Haiti has failed to make significant progress on any of these issues. It has a very low share of protected areas, and forest covers 12.4% of the national territory (2022). During the COP29 event in Azerbaijan, Haiti noted that it was focusing its national contribution on increasing its forest cover, promoting renewable energy and increasing its climate resilience in line with its National Adaptation Plan 2022 – 2030. The plan, finalized in 2022, is intended to serve as a reference framework for public policies intended to confront the impacts of climate change. The plan calls for establishing a national monitoring and verification system to track greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; however, little progress has been made on this front. Some mitigation measures have been implemented, including in the areas of flood management and water conservation. Environmental policy 2 The Ministry of Education (MENFP) has such limited resources that it cannot effectively carry out its regulatory role, even though the share of the state budget devoted to education (1.3% of GDP for 2023 – 2024) is high compared with other sectors. The resource gap is filled by a wide range of technical and financial partners, including the World Bank, the IDB, UNESCO, the European Union and UNICEF. These partners support the ministry in developing and implementing numerous education projects relating to educational quality, education planning and school access. The rise in gang violence has severely affected Haiti’s education system. At the start of the school year in October 2024, 900 of the country’s nearly 20,000 schools remained closed, mostly in the Port-au-Prince region, either because of gang violence Education policy / R&D 2 BTI 2026 | Haiti 28 or because they were being used to house displaced people. According to UNICEF, the number of school closures in June 2024 was 20% higher than at the same time in 2023. The quality of education in Haiti has been declining. Teachers and students have staged multiple strikes and protests to demand an end to insecurity and improvements in teacher pay, working conditions and educational resources, including a nationwide strike that closed schools in at least six cities for most of January 2025. The education system is plagued by numerous governance deficits and lacks sufficient public resources. A key issue in the school system is the inequality of access to education for children from low-income families. Approximately 80% of schools in Haiti are private institutions that charge prohibitively high fees, making them unaffordable for impoverished families who have no choice but to send their children to public schools, where a high-quality of education is not guaranteed. The predominance of private schools in Haiti’s education system is exceptional in the Caribbean. Moreover, the university system can absorb only a small share of demand from secondary schools because of its low capacity and weak material, financial and human resources. Haitian students are increasingly choosing to study at universities elsewhere in the region, most prominently in the Dominican Republic. On the 2022 U.N. Education Index, Haiti was ranked 160th out of 193 countries, with a score of 0.5. The broader challenges facing Haiti have limited the government’s ability to invest in R&D. However, the Haiti Strategic Development Plan 2012 – 2030 calls for funding for research and innovation. In November 2024, the central bank named its third cohort of funding recipients from the bank’s Fund for Research and Development. BTI 2026 | Haiti 29 Governance I. Level of Difficulty The country has faced entrenched structural difficulties for decades, rendering national institutions fragile. The persistence of macroeconomic imbalances has led to low levels of growth, which have in turn resulted in very high poverty rates and the state’s severely limited ability to meet the population’s basic social service needs. These macroeconomic imbalances are reinforced by an economy whose physical capital accumulation and sectoral productivity levels are very low. This applies to the agriculture sector, which has low productivity levels and is exposed to massive imports of agricultural products smuggled into the country. In addition, the decades- long absence of structures to enforce competition rules has facilitated the expansion of monopolistic and oligopolistic behavior in markets, with negative consequences for the quality and price of goods and services. The resulting high prices of consumer goods, especially food products, and consequent low levels of consumer purchasing power reinforce poverty and food insecurity for a large majority of the population. The frequent recurrence of natural disasters has contributed to a decline in GDP and household decapitalization. The losses and damage caused by Hurricane Matthew in 2016 and the 2021 earthquake in the country’s southern peninsula are estimated at 32% of GDP. The impact of natural disasters is amplified by rapid urbanization, as rural populations migrate to cities in search of opportunities. These populations generally settle in coastal areas, where they are exposed to serious environmental risks and live in situations of environmental injustice. However, Haiti has made some progress in the areas of disaster risk management and civil protection. Compared with the response to the 2010 earthquake, administrative structures were far more effective in addressing the August 2021 earthquake that devastated the southern peninsula. However, many Haitians expressed frustration with the government’s response to flooding in December 2024 that displaced hundreds of people in the region around Cap Haitien. Other serious shocks include gang violence in the Port-au-Prince region, which has expanded and escalated. This has led to fuel crises; the closure or destruction of hospitals, schools and government buildings; and the displacement of 1 million Haitians as of January 2025. This gang violence is tied to heightened levels of sociopolitical conflict and the reinforcement of predatory practices. The capture of the state by the influential private sector and the political class hinders the production of new wealth, maintains social inequalities and provokes growing popular disaffection regarding the country’s democratic transformation. A resurgence of Structural constraints 9 BTI 2026 | Haiti 30 cholera also threatens to become an epidemic if measures seeking to reduce drinking water pollution are not sufficiently effective, with 34,896 confirmed cases as of June 20, 2024. Until 1986, the culture of civic participation was very weak. After the fall of the Duvalier regime, a dense network of organizations of all kinds developed, including peasant organizations, student organizations, professional associations, religious communities, women’s organizations and human rights organizations, among others. This first generation of social organizations played a key role in engaging with the state in political negotiations. Social organizations were very active during Moïse’s presidency, demonstrating against impunity, corruption and the authoritarian drift of the president. More recently, these organizations held demonstrations over insecurity and the rising cost of living under Prime Minister Henry, protesting his illegitimacy and demanding his departure with growing intensity over the course of his tenure. The Henry government correspondingly limited its engagement with civil society, creating frustration over the government’s perceived isolation. The Montana Accord, a grouping of political parties and CSOs that is steered by the Montana Bureau de Suivi, has played an especially significant role in public discourse, demanding accountability from the Henry government and later calling for his resignation as a precondition for dialogue. In April 2024, a Montana Accord representative joined the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) as one of the seven voting members. In more recent months, CSOs have been affected by growing insecurity and gang violence, which has limited their ability to gather, express their concerns and organize protests. Civil society traditions 7 Although Haiti has no ethnic, religious or racial conflicts, the country’s history is marked by violent social and political conflict. The original divide in the country between a minority economic and cultural elite and most citizens fuels social conflict, which intermittently explodes from resentments accumulated over the course of history. Deep income inequality, poverty, a long tradition of police and military authoritarianism, and the lack of recognition of the general population’s social and economic rights help explain the country’s repeated crises. In late February 2024, while Prime Minister Henry was out of the country, spiraling gang violence engulfed most of central Port-au-Prince. Dozens of official buildings and institutions were looted and either damaged or destroyed. Gangs surrounded the country’s main international airport, demanding Henry’ s resignation. The intensification of gang warfare throughout Haiti’s capital has displaced a million people, forcing them to flee their homes and live in makeshift shelters. Subsequent governments have been unable to rein in the violence. Political parties and CSOs have not succeeded in establishing mediation channels capable of reducing the intensity of crises or providing lasting compromises. Although the promotion of dialogue and calls for negotiated solutions to crises are part of the political vocabulary, there are few moments of genuine social understanding around common projects. Amid the failure of political agreements, the security situation continues to decline. Conflict intensity 8 BTI 2026 | Haiti 31 II. Governance Performance 14 | Steering Capability Question Score The three governments that led the Haitian state during the reporting period focused on improving public security and building a political consensus to hold elections and return to democratic governance. However, little progress has been made toward either objective. The Superior Council of the National Police is the primary coordinating mechanism for security matters. Led by the prime minister, it includes senior police leaders and the ministers of justice and the interior. On December 21, 2022, Prime Minister Henry and various political, civil society and business groups signed an agreement entitled “The National Consensus for an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections.” The document called for the establishment of a high transition council to steer the government; the creation of a government oversight mechanism; restoration of the Court of Cassation; formation of a new provisional electoral council (CEP); and the launch of a constitutional review process. The agreement also called for elections to be held in 2023 with the goal of inaugurating a newly elected government by February 7, 2024. Following Henry’s agreement to resign, a Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) was established. The groups forming the TPC signed the Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition on April 3, establishing security, constitutional reform and elections as the transition’s priorities, with the transition focusing on five pillars: public and national security, economic recovery, a national conference and constitutional review, justice and the rule of law, and elections. In May, in line with the provisions of this agreement, the TPC selected Gary Conille as prime minister. He said his priorities were implementing the April 3 transitional agreement and moving toward elections. However, Conille’s efforts were undermined by tensions with the TPC over the division of responsibilities between the TPC and the government and by accusations of bribery leveled against three TPC members. Conille eventually agreed to step down, and in November 2024, Alix Didier Fils- Aime was sworn in as prime minister. In his inauguration speech, he said that addressing insecurity and organizing elections would be his two priorities. In December of that year, a decree was finally published outlining the functions of the National Security Council – an oversight body included in the April 3 agreement – although members of the council had not been appointed by January 31, 2025. Additionally, in early February 2025, Leslie Voltaire, the head of the Transitional Presidential Council, announced that elections would be scheduled for November 2025, following a constitutional referendum in May, although he noted that it might not be possible to open polls in parts of Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite Department. Prioritization 3 BTI 2026 | Haiti 32 Efforts to implement the national consensus agreement of December 21, 2022, began with the appointment of a three-member high transition council, but the council was not provided with an operational budget or satisfactory office space. A national dialogue on security was organized, but its recommendations and other provisions of the agreement were not implemented. For months, Prime Minister Henry promised the imminent appointment of a new provisional electoral council (CEP), but the government oversight mechanism was never created and a new constitutional review process never got off the ground. Without an appointed CEP, elections could not be organized, and no new government was available to take office in 2024. Achieving other priorities was difficult, as the prime minister spent considerable energy on various negotiation processes to develop and increase consensus on the way forward, inevitably extending his tenure. The projects and programs pursued by the sectoral ministries were, for the most part, developed by international experts. The two governments appointed by the TPC made some effort to implement the Council’s main priorities of improving security and preparing for elections. The Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition called for the establishment of a CEP within 60 days of forming a government. On September 18, Prime Minister Conille finally appointed the CEP, although this was several weeks behind schedule and lacked two members. On December 18, the TPC appointed the remaining two members of the CEP, marking the first full CEP appointed since before Moïse’s assassination. By the end of January 2025, the CEP had taken key steps toward laying the groundwork for elections, including hiring staff for election offices. Measures were also underway to identify representatives for the National Security Council to oversee engagement with the multinational security support mission (MSS) and security planning by the national police services. Prime Minister Fils-Aime instructed his ministers and civil servants to take action on the April 3 agreement’s five pillars. On December 8, 2024, Fils-Aime’s government adopted a “framework to reinforce institutional cohesion for a successful transition,” which clarifies responsibilities within the government and sets out procedures for policymaking and implementation. In January 2025, the government also published a “war budget” establishing funds for a significant scale- up in the number of police and military personnel and for the purchase of necessary equipment. An anti-gang task force initiated more aggressive measures against gangs in March 2025, shortly after the close of the review period. Implementation 2 Prime Minister Henry did not learn from previous administrations’ failures to adopt measures to improve governance and foster peaceful dialogue with civil society. Because of Henry’s lack of legitimacy, the government relied mainly on political negotiations to reach agreements with certain political parties. Consultations focusing on the development and implementation of public policies did not occur; even in a sector as important as public security, there was no consultation with academic experts or professionals in the field. By its nature, the Transitional Presidential Policy learning 2 BTI 2026 | Haiti 33 Council engages a wider set of political parties and societal sectors, which should bolster efforts to improve policy learning. However, some TPC members have become estranged from their party backers, while others have focused on defending their positions against bribery allegations rather than advancing a policy platform. 15 | Resource Efficiency Haiti faces severe financial constraints and difficulty raising revenue. These weaknesses are evident in ongoing budget deficits stemming from limited tax receipts, a deteriorating economy, increasing gang violence and the sociopolitical crisis. Because of these factors, as well as poor budget management and waste and inefficiency in managing financial resources, the state has had to seek other sources of financing to cover its expenditures, including monetary financing and efforts to increase customs revenue. Because increasing tax revenue is a top priority, developing a tax code and a tax procedure manual would be a major step toward increasing public investment, creating the budget space necessary to finance social protection and promotion programs, and reducing dependence on external financing. Reorganizing the tax system would enable the creation of a social contract by giving the state a financial base to provide basic services to the population and sufficient authority to require all citizens to comply with the rules of the game in taxation. With regard to human resources management, the public administration has very few qualified personnel. According to the Office de Management des Ressources Humaines (OMRH), fewer than 5% of public administration managers hold a degree. Educated and trained civil servants have left the country in significant numbers, including more than 4,000 such individuals during October 2023 – July 2024, many through the “humanitarian parole” program implemented by President Joe Biden in the United States. Even before this latest wave of brain drain, Haiti had the lowest proportion of civil servants in the region relative to its population. Estimates suggest that for every 1,000 residents, the public administration employs only eight people, while the neighboring Dominican Republic employs 34. Moreover, the public administration faces the politically motivated challenge of integrating new civil servants with each new election and change in government. Through the State Modernization Program (2018 – 2023) piloted by OMRH, efforts were made to establish competence-based recruitment procedures, but the many exceptions to the new rules cast doubt on the impartiality of the process. The exercise concluded at the end of 2023. Efficient use of assets 2 BTI 2026 | Haiti 34 The constitution enshrines the principle of decentralization, but the institutional structures it introduced have proved cumbersome to implement, involving different levels of territorial power that are difficult to reconcile. This affects the state’s governance capacity in a context marked by deficits in administrative culture. The state has duplications in its decision-making bodies, and confusion over responsibilities hinders governance. Some coordination bodies (notably the Council of Ministers, the Superior Council of the Judicial Power and the Superior Council of the National Police) bring together various ministries and agencies to set direction. However, they meet irregularly and must rely on the will of individual participating leaders to execute policy. There is also interference by actors interested in influencing the course of policies, as well as by a wide array of technical interlocutors; this is problematic because these interventions require a capacity to bring coherence to such discussions that the public administration lacks. Other factors include bureaucratic traditions that privilege a vertical style of coordination, which has negative effects including a lack of transparency and gaps in task assignment. A weak communication culture in the public administration exacerbates this situation. Ministerial cabinet compositions are the result of political negotiations. The weakness of planning instruments and their limited technical and financial capacities make effective implementation of public policies difficult. Policy coordination 2 Haiti lacks a unified system to monitor the management of state resources or fight corruption. At least five institutions and agencies oversee public resource management: the Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption (ULCC), the Unité Centrale de Renseignements Financiers (UCREF), the Bureau des Affaires Financières et Economiques (BAFE), the Commission Nationale des Marches Publics (CNMP) and the Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif (CSCCA). On paper, these institutions have the legal and institutional means to conduct oversight, but in fact receive little support from political authorities and have limited technical and financial resources. Additionally, reporting corruption involving high-ranking political figures and senior public officials can be very risky. Gaps between the state’s oversight system and the judicial system mean that, even when investigations are conducted, prosecutions rarely occur. For example, according to Fondation Je Klere, the ULCC transferred 87 cases to the judicial system during 2004 – 2023, but only one resulted in a conviction. There is no system of political-party financing in Haiti, despite multiple efforts in the past to introduce one. The excessive proliferation of parties and the heavy weight of co-optation and corrupt practices that characterize the political system prevent implementation. The systematic exclusion of the media from information about the functioning of public markets and the allocation and use of resources by public administrations also undermines anti-corruption policies. This is especially true for collection agencies such as the Direction Gé nérale des Impots (DGI), the General Administration of Customs, the National Port Authority, the Vehicle Insurance and Transport Control Agency, and institutions like the National Insurance Office, which collects contributions to the pension fund for private sector employees. Anti-corruption policy 2 BTI 2026 | Haiti 35 16 | Consensus-Building In December 2022, the Henry government signed a new agreement with political leaders, CSOs and prominent figures from the private sector that sought to reschedule elections for 2023 and inaugurate a new government in February 2024. The agreement also established a High Transitional Council (HCT) that would have the job of reviewing security arrangements, forming the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), revising the constitution, and ensuring transparency and accountability, among other tasks. However, implementation of the agreement quickly flagged amid strong opposition from the Montana Accord, a coalition of civil society members and political groups, despite efforts by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to mediate the impasse. When elections were not held in 2023 as planned, the government and the opposition were unable to agree on a new accord to replace the previous one and thus move toward the reestablishment of democratic governance. The sticking point was Henry himself, who made it a precondition for negotiations that any new transitional government include him as its head. Meanwhile, the Montana Group, frustrated by the lack of progress under Henry, insisted that his departure was a necessary condition for any dialogue. The current Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) is meant to embody the principle of consensus, since its nine members represent a variety of groups with diverse political leanings and backgrounds. However, in the months since its establishment, some political parties report becoming estranged from their representative on the TPC. Councilors, it seems, have increasingly represented themselves to the exclusion of anyone else. Moreover, parties interested in participating in the TPC, which was created through a negotiation process led by CARICOM, were required to accept a handful of preconditions, including supporting the deployment of the multinational security support mission (MSS). As a result, the TPC does not represent the full range of views on Haiti’s situation or on possible measures to redress it. Acceptance of, or support for, a market economy in Haiti is not currently a topic of intense public debate. Discussions surrounding Haiti’s economic choices were especially heated in the 1980s and 1990s, when two opposing groups clashed. One group advocated neoliberal values, pushing for a fully open economy, withdrawal of the state from the market and privatization of public enterprises. The other group, supported mainly by rural communities, trade unionists, representatives of the middle classes and CSOs, believed that Haiti’s underdeveloped state required an active state capable of making choices in the broader public interest. Support for neoliberalism came from multilateral agencies and private sector associations. Nearly 40 years later, the outcomes of these years of unbridled trade liberalization have proved highly negative. Monopolistic and oligopolistic positions have been reinforced, and those who supported trade liberalization have not emerged as dominant figures in the country’s industries. Consensus on goals 3 BTI 2026 | Haiti 36 The history of Haiti’s democratic struggles shows the capacity of anti-democratic actors to obstruct the country’s transformation. The democratic process has been interrupted repeatedly by military coups and strategies to block actors seeking to initiate reform. Prime Minister Henry’s rule by decree and the extent of corruption and impunity testify to the strength of authoritarian tendencies in Haitian society and the influence of anti-democratic actors. Historically, a small economic and political elite has concentrated all power and resources in its hands. Rentier behavior and corruption have weakened efforts to institute democratic governance. Veto players have actively created a state that is blind to the public’s interests. These players include members of the dominant, monopolistic families of the commercial sector; various national and regional political figures; drug, arms and smuggling networks; and the administration. Anti-democratic actors 3 Throughout Haitian history, controversial interpretations of term limits have fueled prolonged political instability. Acting Prime Minister Henry’s decision to remain in office after the December 2022 national consensus agreement expired on February 7, 2024, was almost certainly a trigger for the gang violence that erupted in late February 2024, which led to Henry’s resignation in March of that year. Before his departure, negotiations among the political opposition, civil society and Henry indicated that the only talks with a prospect of succeeding were those that delivered posts in the public administration; meanwhile, calls for in-depth state reform have been swept aside by supporters of the status quo, who veto the country’s transformation and prefer chaos, which enables all kinds of excesses. Prime Minister Henry’s first negotiations with the opposition resulted in an agreement signed on September 11, 2021, and the formation of a government that included members of the opposition to President Moïse. This move helped alleviate political pressure on Henry’s administration because the coalition of parties that previously opposed him, including the Democratic and Popular Sector (SDP), the Fusion of Haitian Social Democrats (FHSD) and Inite, was now working alongside his government. With this support, Henry appeared less inclined to engage in substantive negotiations with representatives of the Montana-PEN Accord. In December 2022, Prime Minister Henry launched a second round of negotiations with political parties, representatives of the business sector and civil society that resulted in the formation of the High Transitional Council (HCT) and the Organe de Contrôle de l’Action Gouvernementale (OCAG). The resulting document called for holding presidential and legislative elections in 2023. Under the Montana-PEN Accord, several political parties and influential figures did not participate in the negotiations or sign the agreement. Further negotiations between Henry’s government and the Montana Group in 2023 failed to overcome significant divisions between the two sides, despite the mediation efforts of CARICOM. Cleavage / conflict management 3 BTI 2026 | Haiti 37 The Henry government focused on meeting with members of political parties and CSOs to reach political agreements. Yet it made no effort to consult civil society on the public policies needed to address the many challenges facing the country. Henry did not consult civil society actors when defining his agenda or formulating his policies, let alone in implementing or evaluating them. Public consultation 2 The state has made little effort to confront the dark past of the years of dictatorship or the human rights violations of more recent vintage, and has not made a great effort to promote reconciliation. One notable exception was the Haitian National Truth and Justice Commission, 1995 – 1996, which examined human rights violations by the Cedras military regime during 1991 – 1994. The commission led to few consequences for human rights abusers. No case was successfully brought against former dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier before his death in 2014. Reconciliation 4 17 | International Cooperation The international community and Haiti’s technical and financial partners were highly active during the period under review. International support focused on humanitarian aid, technical support in the areas of security and policing, and the provision of basic social services, as well as on disaster management, education, social protection and the development of programs to modernize the state. This assistance is integrated into the national agenda. The government has developed strategic documents for almost all these areas of intervention with the help of technical and financial partners (TFPs). However, there is no road map specifying the steps to achieve defined objectives or the selection of necessary inputs. Several problems have arisen in implementing international cooperation in Haiti. First, aid volatility rises considerably during disasters, then drops sharply. Humanitarian aid has enabled the country to respond to the numerous disasters of recent years, but it has not enabled it to address the country’s major top -priority development challenges effectively and on a continuous basis. International assistance has also fostered dependence of sectoral ministries on TFPs; it has not helped develop national capacities to design and evaluate projects and programs. Moreover, coherence has been weak across these interventions. TFPs have been known to bypass national authorities to obtain quicker results. As a result, the public sector does not take sufficient ownership of implemented policies. The effectiveness of aid is also hindered by the high level of corruption in the public administration and the scarcity of national expertise in technical evaluation. Effective use of support 3 BTI 2026 | Haiti 38 In political advising, the influence of the international community has been decisive, yet it rarely takes into account the expertise available within Haitian civil society. The international community continues to insist on holding elections at the earliest possible date. In the interim, it accepts administration by a group of nominal representatives of political parties and groupings. Over the past 20 years, successive Haitian governments have aligned themselves with the international agenda and welcomed cooperation with donors and the main international agencies, particularly those of the United Nations system. Although there is a clear willingness to meet the commitments arising from the conventions and agreements Haiti has signed, the results have not been satisfactory. In particular, Haiti has been unable to meet its human rights treaty commitments, including the right to life, liberty and security of person. With respect to Haiti’s commitments on climate change or on International Labor Organization (ILO) core standards, efforts have been initiated and must continue to ensure they are fully respected. Accordingly, the Haitian government has developed a National Adaptation Plan 2022 – 2030 (NAPA) to meet its climate change commitments. This plan will serve as a framework for public policy to address climate change impacts. On the economic front, the IMF worked with Haitian authorities to develop and sign a new Staff Monitored Program (SMP) that was slated to run from December 2024 – December 2025. Haiti’s outstanding external debt is concessional. The restructuring of Haiti’s debt to Venezuela, which represented 82.7% of the country’ s external public debt, reduced total national debt to 14% of GDP in 2024, down from 29.5% in 2022. The Haitian government has benefited from IMF support in addressing problems related to reviving economic growth, improving economic governance and reforming fiscal policy. With help from the World Bank, USAID and the United Nations World Food Programme, efforts continue to implement a social protection system (NSPPP) based on a social protection strategy, and to establish a social registry. Credibility 3 Haiti is a member of specialized international agencies, all organizations in the U.N. family and all regional organizations, including the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). CARICOM has played an active role in seeking solutions to Haiti’s crisis and has expressed interest in helping mobilize financial and technical resources to facilitate normalization and the organization of elections in Haiti. CARICOM also provided support from the three-person Eminent Persons Group, which facilitated negotiations through 2023 between Prime Minister Henry, the Montana Group and other political groups, although this effort failed to convince the sides to agree on a path forward. Most recently, CARICOM hosted negotiations in early March 2024 on a new transitional government arrangement to replace the Henry government. In recent months, given concerns about the long-term viability of the transition, CARICOM has expressed willingness to re-engage if required. Regional cooperation 5 BTI 2026 | Haiti 39 Haiti has maintained close cooperative relations with Cuba for more than two decades. Relations between Haiti and Venezuela, historically very close, cooled significantly after President Moïse’s decision to vote to expel Venezuela from the Organization of American States (OAS), a motion presented by the United States. Meanwhile, Haiti’s relationship with Colombia has strengthened. In January 2025, Colombian President Gustavo Petro visited Jacmel, where he apologized for the role of 18 Colombian mercenaries in President Moïse’s murder and pledged to increase bilateral cooperation. Haiti’s relationship with its nearest neighbor, the Dominican Republic (DR), has soured considerably in recent years, partly because of increasing security concerns in Haiti and rising xenophobia in the DR – particularly ahead of elections in May 2024. The DR closed the border with Haiti in September and October 2023 amid a dispute over the construction of a canal in Haiti from a river the two countries share. The border was closed again amid increased gang violence beginning in March 2024 and had not reopened as of January 31, 2025. In October 2024, the Dominican president declared his intention to deport 10,000 Haitian migrants a week, many of whom were detained on the Dominican side of the border in deplorable conditions. In addition, there are ongoing disagreements between the two nations regarding matters such as the citizenship status of Dominican Haitians. BTI 2026 | Haiti 40 Strategic Outlook As 2025 unfolds, Haiti faces an escalating political, security and economic crisis of alarming proportions. The security landscape is marked by a disturbing loss of state influence. The outlook is bleak, given the limited deployment of the multinational security support mission (MSS) led by Kenya and its inability so far to help the Haitian National Police reestablish state presence in many areas of the capital, let alone other parts of the country. Rising insecurity, coupled with the government’s inability to address it, has left the Haitian population to fend for itself, increasingly cutting off neighborhoods from one another and fueling a significant vigilante movement. While the departure of acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry opened new opportunities for political engagement, the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) has so far failed to live up to its promises to restore security and prepare for elections. Moreover, insecurity and the lack of democratic governance are being exacerbated by high inflation rates, inequality and poverty, all of which intensify social tension. At the same time, the changing geopolitical situation and significantly decreased international aid flows are sure to undermine Haitian efforts to respond to the crisis, especially given the decreased likelihood of future support from the U.S., previously Haiti’s single largest donor by far. The TPC and its new prime minister, Alix Fils-Aime, must take concrete actions to fulfill their commitments, starting with the reestablishment of security. The National Security Council should be fully established and endowed with the appropriate resources and capabilities to carry out its role in overseeing the Haitian police and armed forces, as well as the MSS. A national security strategy should be created to guide the apportionment of security resources for various tasks. Efforts should be accelerated to recruit and vet new police and army officers and train them at decentralized police and military training grounds in northern and southern Haiti, away from Port- au-Prince. The Haitian government should also invest in appropriate offensive and protective capabilities for the security forces and ensure that all officers have a sufficient livelihood and adequate working conditions. The international community should support the Haitian National Police, including by providing sufficiently robust weaponry and armored vehicles, to enable it to provide adequate security. Finally, the government should prepare concrete measures to neutralize gangs and dismantle arms and drug-trafficking networks. As security is restored, the TPC should set a realistic timeline for a constitutional referendum and elections, ensuring these elections take place in a secure environment that enables voter participation. The TPC must also commit to concrete steps to uphold the rule of law in response to allegations of corruption on the part of three transitional presidential councilors. Furthermore, it will be crucial to implement measures to combat corruption and reform the justice system in order to restore citizens’ trust in the judiciary. Hybrid or externally supported judicial mechanisms should be considered until the justice system can be revitalized. BTI 2026 | Haiti 41 The Haitian government should adopt economic and social measures to stimulate and decentralize economic growth, including supporting small farmers, guaranteeing basic food security and creating job opportunities, particularly for women and youth. The state should also take steps to expand opportunities to develop businesses and enforce the rules of economic and political competition for all stakeholders. Most important, the Haitian people should work to identify ways to revitalize the social contract and develop a new political vision for the country founded on trust, inclusivity and compromise.