Implementation Completion and Results Report - Meeting Teacher Needs for Education for All Project

i Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR2427 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H4600) ON A PROPOSED GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 3.8 MILLION (US$6.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI FOR A MEETING TEACHER NEEDS FOR EDUCATION FOR ALL PROJECT December 19, 2012 Human Development Sector Caribbean Country Management Unit-Haiti Latin America and the Caribbean Region Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized ii CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective August 30, 2012) Currency Unit = Haitian Gourdes (HTG) HTG1.00 = US$ 0.0238 US$ 1.00 = 42.05 FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFD Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency) APG-1 First Adaptable Program Grant APG-2 Second Adaptable Program Grant BUDEX Bureau Départemental des Examens (Regional Examinations Office) BUNEX Bureau National des Examens (National Examinations Office) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CFAA Country Financial Accountability Assessment CIDA Canadian International Development Agency COSPE Consortium des Organisations du Secteur Privé de l'Education (Consortium of Private Sector Education Organizations) CPAR Country Procurement Assessment Review CS-FIA Comité de suivi-FIA (FIA Steering Committee) DAA Direction des Affaires Administratives (Department of Administrative Affairs) DCQ Direction du Curriculum et de la Qualité (Department of Curriculum and Quality) DDE Directions Départementales de l’Education (Regional Education Departments) DEF Direction de l’Enseignement Fondamentale (Department of Basic Education) DFP Direction de la Formation et du Perfectionnement (Department of Training and Professional Development) DRH Direction des Ressources Humaines (Department of Human Ressources) ECD Early Childhood Development EFA Education For All EFA FTI Education For All Fast Track Initiative EFACAP Ecole Fondamentale d’Application et Centre d’Appui Pédagogique (Teacher Professional Development Center) EFCU External Financing Coordination Unit EGRA Early Grade Reading Assessment EGRO I/II Economic Governance and Reform Operations (I/II) EU European Union FIA Formation Initial Accélerée (Accelerated Teacher Training) FMR Financial Management Reports GDP Gross Domestic Product GER Gross Enrollment Rate (total number of students enrolled in a particular level(s) divided by the total population of school-age children for the same level(s)) iii GIR Gross Intake Rate (total number of students enrolled in first grade (or other entry year such as kindergarten) divided by the total population of entry year-age children) GoH Government of Haiti HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative HIPC II Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative ICT Information and Communication Technology IDA International Development Association IDB Inter-American Development Bank IES Institutions de l’Enseignement Superièure (Higher Education Institutions) IFM Instituts de formation des maîtres (Teacher Preparation Institutes) IFR Interim Financial Report ISN Interim Strategy Note LOI Language of Instruction M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDG Millennium Development Goals MENFP Ministère de l’Education Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle (National Ministry of Education and Professional Training) MINUSTAH United Nations Military Force for Stabilization in Haiti MOF Ministry of Finance MPCE Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation NER Net Enrollment Rates (total number of students of the appropriate school-age for a particular level, divided by the total population of that age) NGO Non-Governmental Organization PCF Post-Conflict Fund PCU Project Coordination Unit PEMFAR Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review PFM Public Financial Management PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PTU Project Technical Unit SNA/EPT Stratégie Nationale de l’Alphabétisation et de l’Education Pour Tous (National Literacy and Education For All Strategy) UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNICEF United Nations Childrens’ Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development Vice President: Hasan Tuluy Country Director (Special Envoy): Alexandre Abrantes Sector Manager: Reema Nayar Project Team Leader: Patrick Ramanantoinina ICR Team Leader: Patrick Ramanantoinina ICR Primary Author: Richard J. Carroll iv HAITI Meeting Teacher Needs for Education for All Proj ect CONTENTS Data Sheet A. BASIC INFORMATION .............................................................................................................. V B. KEY DATES ............................................................................................................................. V C. RATINGS SUMMARY ............................................................................................................... V D. SECTOR AND THEME CODES .................................................................................................. VI E. BANK STAFF ........................................................................................................................... VI F. RESULTS FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... VI G. RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRS ...................................................................... IX H. RESTRUCTURING (IF ANY) ..................................................................................................... IX I. DISBURSEMENT PROFILE ......................................................................................................... X 1. PROJECT CONTEXT, DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN .............................................. 1 1.1 Context at Appraisal ......................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators ............................. 2 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification ................................................................................................................ 3 1.4 Main Beneficiaries ............................................................................................................ 3 1.5 Original Components ........................................................................................................ 3 1.6 Revised Components ......................................................................................................... 4 1.7 Other significant changes ................................................................................................. 4 2. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES ............................................. 4 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry ........................................................... 4 2.2 Implementation ................................................................................................................. 6 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization .................. 7 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance .............................................................................. 8 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase ............................................................................ 8 3. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES ................................................................................................... 8 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation ...................................................... 8 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives ........................................................... 10 3.3 Efficiency ........................................................................................................................ 11 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating ........................................................................ 12 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts ...................................................... 12 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops ................ 12 4. ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ............................................................ 13 5. ASSESSMENT OF BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE ..................................................... 13 5.1 Bank Performance .......................................................................................................... 13 5.2 Borrower Performance ................................................................................................... 14 6. LESSONS LEARNED ................................................................................................................ 15 7. COMMENTS ON ISSUES RAISED BY BORROWER/IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES/PARTNERS ...... 16 A NNEX 1. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING ............................................................................. 17 A NNEX 2. OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT ........................................................................................ 18 A NNEX 3. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS .................................................................... 19 A NNEX 4. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES ......... 21 A NNEX 5. BENEFICIARY SURVEY RESULTS .............................................................................. 23 A NNEX 6. STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP REPORT AND RESULTS ................................................. 24 A NNEX 7. SUMMARY OF BORROWER'S ICR AND/OR COMMENTS ON DRAFT ICR .................... 25 A NNEX 8. COMMENTS OF COFINANCIERS AND OTHER PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS ................ 38 ANNEX 9. LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS ........................................................................... 39 v A. Basic Information Country: Haiti Project Name: HT - MEETING TEACHER NEEDS FOR EFA Project ID: P106621 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H3750 ICR Date: 11/30/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF HAITI Original Total Commitment: XDR 3.80M Disbursed Amount: XDR 3.76M Revised Amount: XDR 3.80M Environmental Category: C Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Education, Fonds d'Assistance Economique at Sociale Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 10/30/2007 Effectiveness: 09/26/2008 09/26/2008 Appraisal: 03/03/2008 Restructuring(s): 10/27/2010 4/27/2012 Approval: 04/29/2008 Mid-term Review: Closing: 01/15/2013 06/30/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: MS Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: MS Borrower Performance: MS C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: MU Government: MU Quality of Supervision: S Implementing Agency/Agencies: MS vi Overall Bank Performance: MS Overall Borrower Performance: MS C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA): None DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Moderately Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 35 35 Sub-national government administration 17 17 Tertiary education 48 48 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Education for all 100 100 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Hasan Tuluy Pamela Cox Country Director: Alexander V. Abrantes (Special Envoy) Yvonne M. Tsikata Sector Manager: Reema Nayar Eduardo Velez Project Team Leader: Patrick Philippe Ramanantoanina Raja Bentaouet Kattan ICR Team Leader: Patrick Philippe Ramanantoanina ICR Primary Author: Richard J. Carroll F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) This project would support the Government of Haiti (GoH) in the development and implementation of an accelerated teacher preparation program. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) No revisions. vii (a) PDO Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Indicator 1 : 900 new teachers certified by program end and 1,400 complete the first year of practice teaching Value (quantitative or Qualitative) less than 500 less than 1,000 2,500 2,500 2,500 (Cohort 3) 900 1,400 Dropped 1,390 1,526 Dropped Date achieved 04/01/2008 01/15/2013 06/30/2012 06/30/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) First and second revised targets met and exceeded. Targets were revised at 10/27/2010 restructuring because of capacity constraints that were exacerbated by the 2010 earthquake. Cohort 3 was dropped in 4/27/2012 restructuring, because of earlier than planned Project closure, but was picked up by the Second Adaptable Program Grant (APG-2). Indicator 2 : Of those certified, at least 80% are employed as teachers; at least 10% of those are employed in the public sector Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A N/A 80% 50% 80% 10% Data to be collected in early 2013 Date achieved 04/01/2008 01/15/2013 09/30/2012 10/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target revised downward to 10% at the 04/27/2012 restructuring because of uncertainties in the overall government’s ability to hire employees, and because many public sector teachers are hired on a contractual basis. The Bank is working with the Government to collect data for this indicator prior to final ICR review by Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the Bank. Indicator 3 : Newly certified teachers complete high school (Bac II) and three-year teacher preparation program. At least 90% of student teachers who complete three-year program are successfully certified Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A 90% No revision 100% Date achieved 04/01/2008 01/15/2013 08/31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target met and exceeded. All 1,390 student teachers who have completed the three-year training are certified. Indicator 4 : At least 40% of newly certified teachers work in rural areas Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A 70% 40% 60% estimated. Data to be verified in early 2013 Date achieved 04/01/2008 01/15/2013 09/30/2012 10/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target was reduced at the 10/27/2010 restructuring because of the new geographic dispersion of IFMs that could continue their participation in the Project after the earthquake. The remaining IFMs were more oriented to urban areas than the original group of IFMs. The Bank is working with the Government to collect data for this indicator prior to final ICR review by IEG. viii Indicator 5 : Auditors find satisfactory financial implementation of MENFP-IFM contracts Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A Yes No revision Yes Date achieved 04/01/2008 01/15/2013 06/30/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target met. Audit opinion was unqualified and was submitted to the Bank in May 2012. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Indicator 1 : At least two cohorts recruited with at least 1,800 qualified candidates selected for each cohort by at least eight regional Departments for participation in teacher education Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A 8,250 4,574 4,574 Date achieved 04/01/2008 01/15/2013 06/30/2012 06/06/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target met. Target was revised at the 04/27/2012 restructuring because of early Project closing and dropping cohort 3. Indicator changed from reference to ten rather than eight regions. Indicator 2 : Revised curriculum produced and distributed to IFM; teacher educators trained and materials produced accordingly Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 1 1 No revision 1 Date achieved 04/01/2008 01/15/2013 10/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target met. The curriculum was revised throughout the Project, and new modules introduced. The draft of the whole curriculum has been produced and distributed to students and teachers. Plan is to distribute final revised curriculum for use in IFMs in Jan./Feb., 2013. Training materials were distributed to student-teachers (11/14/2011). Teacher educators were also trained at IFM, though number was not monitored. Indicator 3 : Financial systems for transfers from MENFP/MOF to IFMs operational for 100% of IFMs Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A Yes No revision Yes Date achieved 04/01/2008 01/15/2013 06/06/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target met The IFMs produced the financial reports as required for the release of each tranche. ix G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements (USD millions) 1 06/30/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 11/28/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00 3 06/05/2009 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 0.00 4 07/31/2009 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 0.00 5 12/13/2009 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 0.80 6 06/21/2010 Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 1.39 7 02/15/2011 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.08 8 04/12/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.62 9 12/04/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 3.95 10 06/06/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.50 H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USDMillions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP 10/27/2010 No U MU 1.39 1. A reduction in the targets for two outcomes and one intermediate indicator because of capacity constraints exacerbated by the January 2010 earthquake. 2. Strengthening of IFM capacity to ensure that revised targets are met. 4/27/2012 No MS MU 5.50 In the context of an overall portfolio consolidation in the Haiti education sector: 1. Scale down selection of teacher candidates and Strengthening Management of Teacher Training Program related to dropping Cohort 3 (which was picked up by the currently ongoing APG-2 x project). 2. Include teacher stipends in Participation Performance Agreements 3. A reduction in the targets for one outcome and one intermediate indicator. 4. Project close moved up to 6/30/12, 6.5 months early. I. Disbursement Profile 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. Haiti, at appraisal, was the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with a majority of the population living in extreme poverty (less than US$1 a day). With an infant mortality rate of 76 per 1,000 births, an illiteracy rate of 47 percent, and the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS outside sub- Saharan Africa, Haiti ranked 146th of 177 countries worldwide on the United Nations 2007 Human Development Index. N early one- half of Haitian children did not have access to primary education. The public sector provided only 20 percent of the primary schools in the country, and government spending on education was only 2.5 percent of GDP, about half the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region average. Because 80 percent of the schools were private, there wa s a financial burden on poor people who sent their children to school. 2. The Meeting Teacher Needs for Education for All Project ( Formation Initial Accélerée —FIA) originated as a component of the first Adaptable Program Grant (APG-1) Project. Additional resources under the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (H IPC) became available so that a separate teacher training program could be financed. Teacher training had not yet been initiated under APG-1, so FIA was the real beginning of accelerated teacher training in Haiti. Traditional teacher training in Haiti consisted of three years of pedagogical training in institutions (Ecoles Normales), whereas the new accelerated training called for only one year of pedagogical training followed by two years of student teachers working in primary school classrooms. The FIA Project was consistent with Pillar II of the GOH Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) which focused on human development and education. The emphases of this strategy were to: (i) reorient the education supply towards poorer students; (ii) introduce a certification policy for teachers and school directors; (iii) improve support to schools, parents and students; (iv) improve coordination between sector actors; and (v) increase the sector’s financial resources. 3. The rationale for Bank involvement was to provide better quality education services which are essential for improving human development outcomes and in reducing poverty in the long-term. In addition, the Government of Haiti (GOH) and the Bank wanted to achiev e “quick wins” to provide hope to Haitians who were suffering from an almost total lack of public social services. The Project aimed to support one of the strategic pillars in the Bank’s Interim Strategy Note (building human capital), and support ed reforms outlined in the HIPC initiative and the Strategie Nationale d’Action/Education Pour Tous (SNA/EPT). 4. FIA extended what was intended to be a short-term program under APG -1 into a comprehensive reform of teacher preparation. This commitment to teacher preparation was essential if Haiti w ere to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education For All (EFA) goals. The Project was designed to meet the supply -side need for a higher capacity and higher quality teacher preparation system, which complemented the demand-side APG-1 activities of tuition waivers and school nutrition. The APG-1 Project also facilitated the FIA Project by addressing implementation capacity issues such as financial management. The newly trained teachers were essential for achieving the long-term objective of expansion of both access to and quality of primary education. 2 5. Contributing to the urgency of Project preparation was that the Bank faced institutional pressures of “use it or lose it” for the funds to promote teacher training. The HIPC initiative required the GOH to meet certain requirements for selection of teacher training candidates. If the Project could not be prepared before the end of FY08 and if the Project did not commit to recruiting at least 2,750 teachers for each of three years, then the funds (US$6 million) would no longer be available to the teacher training initiative. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 6. The higher level national objective is for Haiti to improve access and learning in basic education and to reach Education For All (EFA) by 2015. In order to achieve this, a greater number of higher quality teachers is needed. The PAD states that the objective of the Project is to support the Government of Haiti (GoH) in the development and implementation of an accelerated teacher preparation program. The Development Credit Agreement (DCA) inappropriately mixed elements of the higher level objective into the Project objective. For assessment purposes, therefore, the ICR uses the PDO from the PAD. 7. Key indicators are presented in Table 1. The indicators went beyond the output of the training programs to include the appropriate placement of teachers to ensure improved access by students in rural areas. There was some confusion in the PAD regarding the PDO indicators as the Results Arrangements (p. 39) had a different set of PDO indicators than did the Results Framework (p. 37). TABLE 1: Summary of PDO Indicators and Revisions Original PAD Restructured/Revised- 10/27/10 Restructured/Revised-5/17/12 2,500 new teachers certified by June 2012 (program end) 900 new teachers certified by program end No revision at this restructuring 2,500 complete second year of practice teaching 1,400 complete first year of practice teaching No revision at this restructuring 2,500 complete first year of practice teaching 1,440 complete the IFM-based training Dropped—Cohort 3 no longer recruited under the Project (moved to APG-2) At least 80% are employed as teachers; at least 50% of those are employed in the public sector No revision at this restructuring Of those certified at least 80% are employed as teachers; at least 10% of those are employed in the public sector. Newly certified teachers complete high school (BacII) and three-year teacher preparation program. At least 90% of student teachers who complete three year program are successfully certified No revisions No revisions At least 70 percent of newly certified teachers work in rural areas At least 40 percent of newly certified teachers work in rural areas No revision at this restructuring Auditors find satisfactory financial and technical implementation of MENFP-IFM contracts No revisions No revisions 3 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators , and reasons/justification 8. There were no revisions to the PDO but a number of indicators and their targets were revised as shown in Table 1 . 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 9. The main beneficiaries were the teachers who were trained and the students who are receiving a better education from the better qualified teachers. The planned and revised numbers of beneficiaries included: • Teachers: Original—7,500 teachers (later revised to 2,300). Actual—2,916 teachers. • Students: Original—6.0 mil lion student years. Revised —2.3 million student - years. • Institutions de Formation des Maitres (IFMs) (capacity building): Original—18 IFMs. Revised and Actual—11 IFMs. 10. The number of student-years is based on the assumption that each teach er teaches 40 students per year over a 20 year career. Improved quality is an added benefit because the teachers are better trained. This increase in teacher training capacity also helps reduce excess demand for teachers in Haiti. 1.5 Original Components Component 1: Recruitment and Selection of Teacher Candidates 11. The Project financed the selection of teacher candidates, including screening of applicants through an entrance examination and review of qualifications for the teacher training program over three years. Component 2: Accelerated Teacher Preparation 12. This is the main component of the Project which financed: (i) the teacher training program; (ii) the iterative revision and piloting of curricula for formation initiale accelere (accelerated teacher training-FIA); (iii) the recruitment, professional development and payment of teacher educators in selected IFMs; (iv) certification and placement of teachers; and (v) related studies and evaluations. Component 3: Improved Management of Teacher Preparation 13. This component financed capacity building of the Direction de la Formation et du Perfectionnement (Department of Training and Professional Development-DFP) and other central and local agencies of the Ministry of Education ( MENFP) to better manage teacher preparation and contribute to the implementation of the reform. The DFP led the implementation and operational coordination of the FIA. The Direction Departementales de l’Education (regional education offices-DDE) had responsibilities to recruit student graduates, certify graduates and identify primary schools for practice teaching locations. This component supplied staff training, office equipment and supplies, technical assistance and other inputs to implementing units. 4 1.6 Revised Components 14. During the 2010 restructuring, component 1 was reduced in scope as fewer student teachers were to be recruited into the program because of the earthquake, and because of drop outs and a number of student-teachers failing the mid-term exam. Components 2 and 3 were expanded. Under component 2 IFM capacity to train student teachers was strengthened through the addition of a Pedagogic Advisor and a Practice Teaching Advisor (to begin in 2011). Under component 3 project management was strengthene d through the addition of four technical assistants and a project coordinator responsible for leading the implementation of project activities. The Project, however, no longer was to finance reinforcement of the Human Resources Division of the MENFP and the Regional Education Offices-- Directions Departementales de l’Education (DDEs), since there were not directly involved in project implementation. Component 2 was also revised later, during the 2012 restructuring, to include the payment of student -teacher stipends. 1.7 Other significant changes 15. The Project was restructured twice: 1. Level 2-October 27, 2010; percentage disbursed =$ 1.39m/$5.8m= 24.0 percent. 2. Level 2-April 27, 2012; percentage disbursed =$5.50m/$5.8m= 94.8 percent 16. The target for new certified teachers was scaled down in the 2010 restructuring (from 2,500 to 900 the first year and from 2,500 to 1,400 the second year) for the same reasons that the total recruited was reduced. The planned third cohort was dropped entirely from the Project because of earlier than planned Project close, but was picked up in the second phase of APG -2. The closing date of the Project was moved up to June 2012 from January 2013. The 2012 restructuring also reallocated funds from category 4 (goods and non- consultant services) to category 3 (eligible expenditures financed through Participation Performance Agreements (PPAs) under Part 2.3 of the Project) to pay student -teacher stipends. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 17. The implementation arrangements were based on those of the APG -1, with the MENFP implementing the Project through technical departments, primarily the Direction de la Formation et du Perfectionnement (Department of Training and Professional Development-DFP). A Project coordinator was hired for FIA through APG-1. Administrative and fiduciary support to the technical departments was provided by the APG-1 Project Technical Unit (PTU), which worked with the Direction des Affaires Administratives (Department of Administrative Affairs—DAA) of the MENFP. The technical team and the joint PTU/DAA administrative/fiduciary team was supported by a Comité de suivi de la FIA (FIA Steering Committee, CS -FIA), the equivalent of APG-1’s Project Advisory Committee (PAC). The CS-FIA was responsible for the overall coordination of activities. Technical departments and agencies within MENFP were responsible for implementing the Pro ject components. The MENFP was responsible for the consultations with non- public stakeholders and for providing sites for practice teaching. 18. The Project design was aligned with the PRSP and aimed to achieve the PRSP objectives through an increased supply of better-qualified teachers for which all stakeholders agreed there 5 was an acute need. A major advantage of the FIA approach was that teachers are in the classroom in the second year of the program and often teach independently in the third year; they are actually teaching students while improving their qualifications. However, with preparation on a compressed timetable, only five months for preparation, the Project did not have adequate time, prior to implementation, to fully upgrade the teacher training curriculum or to build ownership of the approach to teacher training at MENFP that could withstand changes in ministerial leadership. 19. The Project did take into account a major lesson from Bank experience that it is particularly important in a fragile state that the Project design incorporate close coordination with other donors to ensure comparative advantage for the Bank and avoid duplication of effort. In the FIA Project , the Bank opted to focus on the training of primary school teachers, which would address the problem of large numbers of out -of-school primary students. The USAID addressed a different education issue by financing a much larger project aimed at youth who were transitioning from school to employment. Similarly the Bank chose not to support pre - primary education because the IDB was already preparing an early childhood development project. 20. The Project incorporated a number of other lessons into its design by establishing entry level criteria to include high school graduation and to provide three months of instruction, Mis a Niveau (MNA), 1 in core subjects of the basic education curriculum to student-teacher candidates who needed it. This responded to the lesson in other Bank operations that maintained that teacher training programs are more effective when the candidates have at least a high school education. The Project design also provided for staff and financial resources for the supervision and monitoring of the student teaching program. However, these resources proved later to be insufficient and needed to be supplemented in the 2010 restructuring with the addition of the pedagogic and practice teaching advisors. Critical Risks 21. Institutional. The main risk to implementation was the education sector ’s limited capacity and slow absorption which could slow Project execution. The management capacity of some of the selected IFMs was weak. The risk stated in the PAD that “The increase in the annual graduation rate of trained teachers will require maximizing the capacity of existing public and non- public teacher training providers” was not adequately addressed in the initial design. The PAD’s mitigation for this risk was that “The Project design is simple, with few components, and provides financing to the training institutes in order for them to expand their capacity and meet the agreed targets for graduates.” However, the Project also programmed technical assistance in financial management . The timeframe for building this capacity was absent from the mitigation measure. 22. Technical. To minimize the risk of miscommunications about the teacher training and certification program, Project preparation engaged a broad range of stakeholders . This process was important to getting the sequence of steps in the teacher training program right. Another 1 The portion of the selected student teachers who did not demonstrate adequate mastery of French and mathematics were required to take a three- month remedial course in these subjects . After the 3-month MNA, candidates must pass an examination to be admitted to the teacher training program at an IFM. 6 technical risk concerned the student -teacher stipends. The Bank had determined that including stipends as part of the Project through the PPA was not a necessary incentive to participate in the teacher training. Thus, the Project did not finance student teacher stipends. The risk that was cited in the PAD was that the “The stipends to student-teachers may represent too large an amount for the MENFP to sustain over the long term.” The mitigation measure for this risk was only that “The MENFP will determine stipend amounts in consultation with the Ministry of Economy and Finance,” which did not counter this risk in any meaningful way (see Section 2.2) . However, this risk was addressed in the 2012 restructuring when the Bank decided to fund the payment of the student teacher stipend. 2.2 Implementation 23. A devastating earthquake occurred on January 10, 2010 that left more than 200,000 people, 5 percent of the population dead, including an unknown number of students and teachers . There was widespread destruction of infrastructure, schools and government buildings, including the MENFP and IFMs. From January to June 2010 very little could be done to move the Project forward. Implementation from January 2010 onward should be assessed in the context of this national calamity. 24. Under even favorable circumstances, teacher training is one of the more demanding types of projects from an implementation standpoint. The Project also was the first dedicated program to train primary school teachers in Haiti. The Project’s success can be attributed to the implementation and precise sequencing of a number of activities ranging from advertising the program through final selection of student teachers and remedial training (MNA). Sequencing activities was especially challenging because of the capacity constraints in Haiti. To support the timing of these steps, the TTL conducted unusually intensive supervision (“supervision plus”) including activities, such as following up with contractors and IFMs, as well as re- evaluating the IFMs after the earthquake. Sequencing was also made difficult because a revised curriculum was produced rapidly prior to the start of the Project, and needed to be further strengthened and introduced module by module as it became available. 25. In addition to sequencing challenges, there were partnership challenges. Key s to the success of the partnership between the MENFP and the IFMs were that both had to perform their roles: the MENFP had to develop curricula, provide money to the IFMs, and train trainers; the IFMs had to train and assess students. The Project branded the existing “Ecoles Normales” as IFMs, which enhanced their credibility as teaching institutions because they were identified with the new national program for accelerated teacher training. All IFMs signed contracts to participate in the program, which we re sent to the PCU. 26. Although teachers were trained and certified, the partnership broke down in a number of instances. The Project provided small civil works and capacity building to the IFMs, which did improve their ability to carry out the pedagogical portion of the program. However, the IFMs were not able to provide adequate supervision of the in- class portion of the student-teaching program, though this improved somewhat with the additional resources after the 2010 restructuring. The degree of ownership of the Project from the MENFP side was not always clear, partly a result of the short preparation time for the Project . It was also a result of the fact that the Minister of Education changed three times during the Project , which had several negative effects. For example, it was difficult for the Project to sustain capacity-building with the turnover in the ministry. In addition, each minister had different positions on the new teacher 7 training approach, including: (i) the allocation of stipends to student teachers; (ii) the duration of the training; and (iii) the process for recruiting the student teachers. Some officials in the MENFP believed that teachers should follow the traditional route of a three- year university degree program. The effect gave a sometimes stop -and-start quality to implementation. 27. Project management within the MENFP did not work well in the beginning. The Project implementation also was mistimed, with the student-teacher cohort 1 beginning its pedagogical training in March. The March start date threw off the schedule in IFMs which had ongoing programs of students who had begun in September. By beginning the training in March 2009, the student teachers could not complete their pedagogical training (one-year duration) in time to begin their practical training in September to align with the school year. The policy matrix for HIPC obligated Haiti to go through with the March cohort rather than wait until the next academic year. After a year of unsatisfactory implementation ratings at the beginning of the Project, the Bank decided to recruit four consultants and one assistant project coordinator to implement the P roject to replace the previous FIA Project coordinator. The Project Coordinator was the same person who managed APG -1). Project implementation began to improve as a result. 28. Stipend Issue for student teachers. A serious implementation problem was created by the MENFP’s pledge of an allocation, or stipend, for student teachers who were taking the accelerated teacher training. The Bank took the position that the stipend was not needed because student teachers typically paid for their education. The MENFP maintained that to reach remote areas a stipend would be necessary to ensure participation. The stipend was poorly implemented because the Ministry of Planning (MOP) constantly delayed approvals for the ME NFP to provide the stipend, which had been budgeted by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) . Delays and underpayment of the stipend undermined teacher morale and eventually led to a student-teacher strike. 29. Project Restructurings. The 2010 Project restructuring scaling down of targets was appropriate because of capacity constraints exacerbated by the January 2010 earthquake, as was the focus on strengthening of IFM s to ensure that revised targets we re met. A s documented in the 2012 restructuring paper, the Bank avoided further implementation delays and ended a student-teacher’s strike by agreeing to, what was viewed at the time as a “stopgap” measure, pay the stipends. Teacher stipends were put in PPAs. This move put the teacher training program back on track and the revised targets were met. The 2012 Project restructuring was carried out also in the context of an overall portfolio consolidation in the Haiti education sector. Shifting cohort 3 to APG-2 was a good move because the cohort timing could be re-set and coordinated with the school year, and did not have to start and finish by January 2013 to coincide with the Project closing date. Dropping cohort 3 made it possible to move the Project close date up to June 30, 2012 (6.5 months earlier) . 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 30. Design. The M&E framework was adequate for the purposes of assessing the achievement of the PDO from the standpoint of implementing the teacher training program through, for example, cohort completion and teacher placement. The M&E framework however relied on intermediate indicators to adequately assess the development of a teacher training program. Additional evidence of the development of a teacher training program was produced at the ICR stage. 8 31. Implementation. M&E was carried out by the Project coordinator (financed by APG I) and the assistant coordinator (financed by the FIA Project ). These coordinators had responsibility for tracking progress related to all key indicators. The coordinators collaborated with DFP and DDE staff and were supported by the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) specialist from the External Financing Coordination Unit (EFCU) who supported APG I. Numbers of teachers recruited, enrolled and graduated and certified were all tracked closely through individual IFMs. 32. Utilization. The monitoring of implementation was critical in making key adjustments to the program. P roject M&E revealed that teacher training targets needed to be scaled back. The often late and non- payment of the student-teacher stipend was also tracked, but not as carefully monitored because it was not part of the results framework. This also led to action taken by the Bank to remedy the stipend issue in the 2012 restructuring by reallocating Bank financing to cover it. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 33. Administrative and fiduciary support was provided to MENFP technical departments by the APG-1 Project Technical Unit (PTU) which worked with the Direction des Affaires Administratives (Department of Administrative Affairs-DAA). Despite some progress in building capacity, the overall fiduciary environment remained risky, with weak budget processes and financial controls throughout the government, and especially in the DAA of the MENFP. However, the Project did comply with FM audit requirements. An FM task was added with the Bank’s decision at the 2012 restructuring to pay of the student teacher stipend retroactively to 2011. Procurement requirements were complied with, although with some delays and implementation followed the Project procurement plan. 34. FIA was a Category C project and no environmental assessments were required. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 35. The first cohort of teachers was deployed to primary schools to take up their assignments in the current 2012/13 school year. The former third cohort of the FIA program has begun training under the APG-2. A fourth cohort is planned for 2013. APG- 2 is also financing the student-teacher stipend under a revised more sustainable schedule agreed with the MENFP. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 2 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Ratings: Before restructuring —Substantial After restructuring—High Overall—High 2 Although the P roject was restructured twice, it is rated at two rather than three stages. The reason is that only a miniscule amount of disbursement occurred after the second restructuring, and so the weight to a third outcome rating would be negligible. 9 36. Objectives. The objectives continue to be highly relevant because there is a continued deficit in trained teachers for primary schools. With 2,916 teachers trained under FIA, another 5,000- 7,000 are expected to be need ed to absorb out of school students. Though adjustments were made to the Project and to PDO indicators through the restructurings, the objectives were not changed. The original objectives are in line with the nat ional priority to achieve universal primary education as articulated in the Declaration of General Policy of the Prime Minister— May 2012 (Enoncé de Politique Générale du Premier Ministre) and the national education strategy, the “Operational Plan for Education 2010- 2015,” which calls for financing across nine strategic themes including the provision of support to basic education. They are also in line with strategic objective number 3 of the Interim Strategy Note (ISN) FY12-13, building human capital, by continuing the teacher training program, which improves access to primary education. 37. Design. The key feature of the Project was the accelerated and practical approach to teacher training. This new approach contrasted with the traditional training model of three years of institutional training in Ecoles Normales . The design of the program ensured better quality student-teachers because of stricter selection criteria (passing an examination, having completed high school and MNA). The higher quality of the student teacher made it possible to reduce the pedagogical component of teacher preparation from three years to one year. Current relevance of the Project’s design is also evidenced by the continuation of the FIA under APG-2, with a revised stipend formula to make the teacher training program more sustainable and aligning cohorts with the school year. The Project design also addressed the need for improved quality and addressed about one quarter of the need for new primary school teachers (assuming that all primary age students were to attend school). The design aimed to achieve higher quality teachers through an improved curriculum that was further strengthened and introduced module by module as it became available and through the supervision of the classroom training by the IFMs. About 70 percent of teachers are still not qualified. The FIA approach will continue to be relevant even when universal primary enrollment is eventually achieved, because there will still be a need to upgrade the qualifications of primary teachers in both public and private schools. The design of the program became more relevant when the teacher stipend was made part of the PPAs. 38. An additional design factor was how the Project fit complement ed other Bank-funded education projects (APG-1 and the Emergency School Reconstruction Project—ESRP). The FIA Project, along with ESRP (school reconstruction), dealt with the supply-side problem for primary education, i.e., the need for more teachers and more schools. APG-1 dealt with the demand side of helping students access primary education. The design also took into account other donor support in the education sector to help ensure that financing was available for different aspects of the national strategy. 39. Implementation. The restructurings improved the relevance during implementation. The first restructuring in the aftermath of the earthquake focused the teacher training in the more capable IFMs, added support to IFM capacity, and scaled down teacher training targets to realistic levels. The second restructuring improved relevance by funding student-teacher stipends, the non- payment of which was seriously impeding the implementation of the Proje ct. 40. As a result, the overall rating for the Project’s relevance is substantial up to the first restructuring, and high after the first and second restructurings. The lower rating for the first period owes to the improvements that were needed in the approach to implementation. 10 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Ratings: Before Restructuring—Modest After Restructuring—Substantial Overall—Substantial PDO: The objective of the Project is to support the Government of Haiti (GOH) in the development and implementation of an accelerated teacher preparation program. a. Development of an accelerated teacher preparation program 41. The Project results framework allows partial assessment of the achievement of the development of the teacher preparation program. PDO indicator 3 states that newly certified teachers complete high school (Bac II). This criterion was actually for admission to the program and was achieved. This criterion meant that the student teachers would be coming into the program with at least a basic level of qualification. The Project also produced a revised curriculum and distributed it to IFMs, trained teacher educators and produced training materials (target met). Financial systems for transfers from MENFP/MOF to IFMs operational for 100 percent of IFMs (target met). While these were intermediate indicators, they are evidence that a teacher preparation program was developed. The curriculum revision and the training of teacher educators were essential features of the development of the program because the accelerated approach was new and the existing curriculum was inadequate. Setting up t he financial mechanism was also an essential feature because the program could not be established without a way to provide resources to the IFMs which were the implementers of the teacher training program. 42. As additional evidence of the PDO, the ICR observes that the Project achieved a successful sequence of steps that constituted the development of a teacher preparation program: (i) advertising of teacher training in order to recruit student teachers; (ii) receiving applications; (iii) conducting a qualifying examination for the applicants; (iv) making the final selection of teachers; (v) ensuring that the training curriculum was ready for the teachers at the beginning of the program; and (vi) remedial training (MNA) for those who needed additional preparation (in French and Math) prior to entering the teacher training program. One weakness in the development of the preparation program was that, initially, the teacher preparation curriculum was only quickly revised, which meant that materials could not be fully upgraded at the outset of the program. However, continued revisions were made and introduced throughout the P roject. In addition, as reported by student teachers during the ICR mission, there was a scarcity of learning materials, such as curriculum guides, which made it more difficult for student teachers to prepare outside of class. b. Implementation of an accelerated teacher preparation program 43. By actually educating student teachers, the GOH objective of implementing a teacher training program was achieved. The Project exceeded revised targets for most of the PDO indicators: (i) the number of new teachers certified (900 target vs. 1,390 actual for cohort 1); (ii) the number of student teachers completing the first year of practice teaching (1,400 target vs. 1,526 actual for cohort 2); (iii) the percentage of graduates certified (90 percent target vs. 100 percent actual) ; (iv) auditors found satisfactory implementation of MENFP -IFM contracts (target met). By meeting and exceeding these indicators, the objective of implementing an accelerated teacher training program was achieved. T wo of the PDO indicators, percentage of graduates 11 deployed as teachers of which 10 percent in public schools and the percentage of newly certified teachers deployed in rural schools (40 percent target), still need to be verified. The Bank is working with the GOH to collect accurate and reliable data for this indicator prior to final ICR review by IEG. 44. The PDO indicators of the number and percentage of student teachers to be certified is prima facie evidence of successful implementation of the teacher preparation program. The indicator that student teachers complete the first year of practice teaching also provides evidence that the implementation of the program continued through cohort 2. The satisfactory audits of the MENFP-IFM contracts demonstrate that financial aspects of the program were successfully implemented as well. 45. The Project also provided educational materials to the IFMs and supported them with small civil works and capacity building. These resources to IFMs increased their ability to implement the pedagogical portion of the teacher preparation program as evidenced by the training of cohorts 1. and 2., and, thus, increased the supply of much needed, qualified teachers. Although the mistiming of the two cohorts was a weakness in design, it did not significantly affect the achievement of the objective. 3.3 Efficiency Ratings: Before restructuring—Modest After restructuring—Modest Overall—Modest 46. The economic analysis centers on the number of students benefiting from the output of newly certified teachers multiplied by the value of an additional year of schooling. The section on beneficiaries assumed 40 students per new teacher per year in calculating the number of beneficiaries. In the PAD, the planned number of teachers was 2,500 for each of three years. The actual number of teachers graduated was 1,390 in year 1, with 1,526 expected in year two for a total of 2,916 teachers. When multiplied by 40 students per year over 20 years of teaching the total number of student-years reaches 2.3 million. The PAD cited the Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) 2006 for the value of an extra year of schooling . The return to education was estimated at 16.2 percent with a conservative annual worker’s earnings at US$538 (updated by the ICR for inflation). Thus, the calculation is $538 X 0.162=$87.16. Annex 2 presents the net benefit stream, which has an IRR of 31.2 percent. 47. Another factor in measuring efficiency is that the total number of teachers trained was well below the original PAD target. In the final analysis, the output of new teachers is 2,916 compared with 7,500 in the original PAD target. T here were a number of factors why the actuals were well below the original target : overoptimistic targets for newly trained teachers, the severe damage to IFMs and the deaths of some students from the earthquake. Another factor was the inability of the Project to incorporate funds for the stipend explicitly in the Project from the outset. Thus, the number of teachers that could be trained through the Project was overestimated. This estimate was revised during the 2010 and 2012 restructurings, and the output of new teachers exceeded the revised target total of 2,300 teachers. Therefore, a lthough the economic analysis suggests strong returns to the Project’s output of new teachers , the efficiency rating before and after restructuring and overall is modest. 12 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Before restructuring —Moderately Uns atisfactory After restructuring—Moderately Satisfactory Overall—Moderately Satisfactory 48. Relevance and efficiency ratings before restructuring are modest. In achieving objectives, the development of the training program was substantial while the implementation of the program was modest. The combination of these pre-restructuring ratings yields a moderately unsatisfactory rating (Table 2). With the adjustments of the 2010 restructuring, the relevance and achievement of objectives ratings improve to substantial. These two overall ratings are weighted by disbursement percentages at the date of the 2010 restructuring. The overall weighted rating is 3.76 which is moderately satisfactory. TABLE 2: Achievement of PDO: Rating Summary Assessment 1 Sept. 2008-Oct. 2010 Assessment 2 Nov. 2010-Closing Overall Rating MU MS Rating Value 3 4 Weight 24% 76% Weighted Value 0.72 3.04 3.76 Final Rating MS 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 49. With Haiti’s extremely high average poverty rate (nearly 80 percent) and with the target that 40 percent of new teachers be deployed to rural areas where poverty is even higher, the Project focuses on the poorer segments of society. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening The capacity of the DFP and other central and local agencies of MENFP improve d with respect to management of teacher preparation and to the implementation of the reform. The DDEs showed improved capacity in carrying out responsibilities to recruit student graduates, certify graduates and identify primary schools where student teachers could be engaged for the practical phase of their training. IFMs received training, minor civil works, office equipment and supplies, technical assistance, as did local agencies. The IFMs improved their capacity as evidenced by the substantial number of qualified teachers that emerged from cohort 1. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 50. The student-teacher stipend, which was initially seen as an enticement to apply for the program, ended up being a serious implementation handicap because funds were not available to support it until late in the Project . 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops N.A. 13 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial 51. Haiti remains a fragile state with institutions such as the MENFP struggling to provide basic services. However, the teacher training program is becoming more established within the IFMs, which will hav e fully implemented, with Bank financing, a second cohort of new teachers by June 2013, which will be placed in classrooms (October 2013 for cohort 2) . In addition, the teacher training curriculum has been improved which will enhance the quality of the training and, therefore, the quality of education received by primary school students for a number of years. At the same time, the gains from the Project will continue to depend on donor assistance. APG-2 is allocating US$8 million to the continuation of the program, including cohort 3 (begun in September 2012) and cohort 4 (to begin in September 2013). 52. The payment of the student teacher stipend is still dependent on donor funding. However, the MENFP has reviewed the rate of the stipend and changed the terms to th e following: no stipend for the MNA stage, 50 percent during the pedagogical training and 100 percent during the in-practice training. This new schedule is designed to formalize the stipend, lower its cost, and increase its sustainability. MENFP is also considering the reduction of the training duration to two years instead of the original three years. With the early closure of the Project for portfolio management reasons on June 30, 2012, cohort 3 was effectively shifted beyond the scope of the FIA Project, but with the knowledge that it would be financed by APG-2. Thus, the delayed and non-payment of stipends to student-teachers has been resolved in APG-2 and should no longer threaten morale or the participation of the student teachers in the program. 53. IFMs need continued assistance to train future cohorts. One particular area of assistance is in building their capacity to carry out regular monitoring of the teacher candidates who ha ve completed pedagogical training and a re now in classrooms. The IFMs will need substanti al capacity to carry out this function going forward. This follow -up by IFMs is important to securing the gains from the pedagogical training which will ultimately benefit primary school students. Finally, it is important to sustainability that the MENFP take the decision as an institution that the accelerated teacher training method is going to be the standard approach to meet the need for primary school teachers. On balance, the risk to development outcome remains substantial. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: M oderately U nsatisfactory 54. The Bank faced institutional pressures of “use it or lose it” for the funds to expand the teacher training program. It was a good achievement of the Bank team to secure these resources for teacher training, but, as a result of the compressed time schedule, there were several significant shortcomings in Bank performance at entry. First, the Bank did not allow enough time for thorough revision of the teacher training curriculum. Second, the annual target of 2,750 was too high for the initial program, which should have incorporated the cost of the student teacher stipends. Third, the artificial t iming for Project preparation also threw the teacher training program out of synch with the school year because the first cohort began in March (2009). All of these issues were driven in part by pressures to meet the HIPC requirement. 14 55. Regarding the student teacher stipend, because teachers often paid for their own education, the Bank believed that it would be a sufficient incentive for teachers to receive free training under the Bank Project and that it was unnecessary to add an additional benefit to the participants. The Bank appears to have been incorrect in this issue. The risk matrix in the PAD shows that the Bank was aware of the stipend. However, the risk mitigation plan for what turned out to be a serious problem was weak. During the ICR mission, the team received a variety of views on the stipend with the majority believing that the stipend was needed. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory 56. The Bank dealt effectively with the impact of the earthquake and hired consultants to evaluate the IFMs’ physical infrastructure. The Bank also took the opportunity to re-evaluate managerial capacity and determine which IFMs were the strongest for the program going forward. The Bank also brought in supplemental technical assistance for curriculum reform, setting up the teacher practice teaching program and pedagogical supervision. T he additional resources for pedagogical supervision improved supervision somewhat, and the Bank performed well in recogniz ing the need to address the issue through the 2010 restructuring. The Bank provided “supervision plus” in which the Bank was a true implementation partner who worked intensively with the implementers, both before and after the earthquake. The restructurings were effective in improving Proje ct implementation and in adjusting targets to realistic levels. 57. The Bank had maintained that the student teacher stipend was not a necessary incentive to get qualified candidates to apply to the program. Later, the Bank correctly observed that, the non-payment of the stipend was impeding and would continue to impede Project implementation. There was also a reputational risk to the Bank of poor Project performance. In the 2012 restructuring, the Bank made the decision to fund the student teacher stipend retroactively to 2011, which was the right decision. A minor shortcoming is that the Bank addressed the stipend issue rather late in the Project. 58. Another decision that was helpful t o improving the implementation of the teacher training program was, for portfolio management reasons, to close the Project earlier than planned. This decision paved the way for the teacher training program to be picked up by the APG-2 and for the future cohorts 3 and 4 training to be aligned with the academic year. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: M oderately S atisfactory 59. The Bank’s performance at entry was moderately unsatisfactory, but improved to satisfactory at supervision. With the outcome rating at moderately satisfactory, the Bank’s overall performance is moderately satisfactory. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Uns atisfactory 60. The GOH and the MOF were generally supportive of the Project . However, although there were available funds allocated by the MOF for the student teacher stipend, for reasons not entirely clear, the MOP was sporadic in approving the release of the funds. As a result, student 15 teachers received much less than their promised stipends and always months late, which handicapped Project implementation and was a major shortcoming. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: M oderately Satisfactory 61. The MENFP, with the help of the Bank and the PCU, responded reasonably well to the devastating earthquake. The MENFP supported the adjustments that were agreed during the 2010 restructuring to focus on the IFMs that had the capacity, both physical and managerial to carry out their teacher training responsibilities. Thus, Project resources could be focused on those IFMs which were motivated to stay in the program and which had the capacity to operate after the 2010 earthquake. Even with the turnover in ministers and the sometimes limited ownership, the MENFP worked with the PCU to ensure that the contracts with the IFMs were implemented so that they could deliver on their revised targets. One moderate shortcoming was that the MENFP was still not realistic about its ability to implement the student- teacher stipend, nor about its ability to reach the original targets for student teacher graduates. However, in fairness, it was bound to these targets to be eligible for HIPC funding. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: M oderately Satisfactory 62. With the GOH (MOF and MOP) r ated moderately unsatisfactory, the MENFP rated moderately satisfactory, and outcomes rated as moderately satisfactory, the overall Borrower performance is moderately satisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned 63. Accelerated teacher training is an effective approach in the Haitian context in which there is an undersupply of qualified teachers. One important advantage of the program w as that student teachers were actively educating primary students after only one year of pedagogical training. On the quality side, applicants had to have a high school degree and pass an initial examination. Those two requirements alone put the qualification level of student teachers above that of many active teachers who have only a ninth grade education and who have never passed a screening examination. 64. If there is a stipend for student-teachers, it is critical to ensure at the outset that that stipend can and will be paid. In the Teacher Training EFA Project , the inability of the GOH to reliably pay the stipend caused serious implementation difficulties in the program to the extent that student-teachers even went on strike. The Bank and the Recipient need to ensure that the institutions with decision-making power regarding the stipend are on- board with its timely payment. Failure to regularly disburse the stipend can demoralize and disillusion the student- teachers and jeopardize the program. 65. A progressive implementation of stipends may provide a solution to fiscal constraints and to retention of student-teachers. The MENFP has devised a more sustainable formula and process, which is now in effect under APG-2: No stipend is paid for the MNA stage, half of the full stipend is paid during the one -year pedagogical stage, and full stipend is paid for the two-year practice teaching stage. 66. Implementation of a teacher training program should be coordinated with the academic year to ensure greater efficiency and less disruption to the training institutes 16 (IFMs). The teacher training program began its first cohort in March of 2009 which misaligned graduation of student-teachers with the beginning of the next school year. This meant that graduates would be released from the program with a long hiatus. It also was disruptive to the IFMs who had ongoing programs and had to suddenly accommodate the influx of new students. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners No comments were received. (a) Borrower/implementing agencies (b) Cofinanciers (c) Other partners and stakeholders 17 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Components Appraisal Estimate (USD millions) Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions) Percentage of Appraisal Selection of candidate teachers 0.33 0.08 24.1% Accelerated teacher training 4.09 5.3 129.2% Improved management of teacher training 1.57 0.5 29.2% Total Baseline Cost 6.0 5.8 97.2% Physical Contingencies 0.0 0.0 0.00 Price Contingencies 0.0 0.03 0.00 Total Project Costs 6.0 5.8 97.7% Front-end fee PPF 0.0 0.0 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.0 0.0 .00 Total Financing Required 6.0 5.8 97.7% Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding. (b) Financing Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing Appraisal Estimate (USD millions) Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions) Percentage of Appraisal Borrower 0.0 0.0 0.00 IDA Grant 6.0 5.8 97.7% Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding. 18 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Objective Latest Target Outputs Actual Outputs New teachers certified by program end and complete the first year of practice teaching 900 (Cohort 1) 1,400 (Cohort 2) 2,500 (Cohort 3) 1,390 1,526 NA Percentage of certified teachers employed and percentage employed in the public sector 80% employed 10% employed in public sector Data to be collected in early 2013 Percentage of newly certified teachers completing high school (Bac II) and three- year teacher preparation program. Percentage student teachers who complete three-year program are successfully certified 90% 90% 100% 100% Percentage of newly certified teachers working in rural areas 40% 60% estimated-to be verified in early 2013 Auditors find satisfactory financial implementation of MENFP-IFM contracts Achieved Achieved At least two cohorts recruited with at least 1,800 qualified candidates selected for each cohort by at least eight regional Departments for participation in teacher education 4,574 4,574 Revised curriculum produced and distributed to IFM; teacher educators trained and materials produced accordingly 1 1 Financial systems for transfers from MENFP/MOF to IFMs operational for 100% of IFMs Yes Yes 19 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis The cost-benefit stream of the teacher training program is provided below as well as the main assumptions on which it is based. Annex Table 3.1: Cost Benefit Stream for the Teacher Training Program Project Project Net Year Costs Benefits Benefits 1 500 0 -500 2 1,500 0 -1,500 3 2,000 0 -2,000 4 1,000 0 -1,000 5 860 0 -860 6 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 11 0 3,102 3,102 12 0 6,204 6,204 13 0 9,306 9,306 14 0 12,408 12,408 15 0 15,510 15,510 16 0 18,612 18,612 17 0 21,714 21,714 18 0 24,816 24,816 19 0 27,918 27,918 20 0 31,020 31,020 21 0 34,122 34,122 22 0 37,224 37,224 23 0 40,327 40,327 24 0 43,429 43,429 25 0 46,531 46,531 26 0 49,633 49,633 27 0 52,735 52,735 28 0 55,837 55,837 29 0 58,939 58,939 30 0 62,041 62,041 IRR 31% NPV@12% $48,183.41 20 Annex Table 3.2: General Assumptions for Economic Analysis Number of teachers Trained 2,916 Years of teaching 20 Students per teacher per year 40 No. of Students total per year 116,640 Cumulative inflation 2008-2011 34.6% Avg. Worker's earnings 538 percent owing to 1 year of school 0.162 $ owing to 1 year of school 87.21432 Additional years/year teaching factor 0.38 Assume students graduate from school in 6 years w/avg. starting point in 3rd grade. Thus benefits begin in year 12 Annex Table 3.3: Estimated Additional Education Attainment in Years, per Yea r of Participation in Component Component Additional Years Teacher Recruitment 0.23 Pre-Service Teacher Training 0.15 Total 0.38 21 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty Lending Solange A. Alliali Senior Counsel LEGES Sophia Guerrier-Gray Legal Analyst LEGLA Peter Anthony Holland Senior Education Specialist LCSHE Marsha Michel E T Consultant LCSHD Glenn S. Morgan Regional Safeguards Adviser LCSDE Fily Sissoko Lead Financial Management Spec AFTFM Yao Wottor Senior Procurement Specialist LCSPT Supervision/ICR Solange A. Alliali Senior Counsel LEGES Patrick Ramanantoanina Senior Operations Officer LCSHE Peter Anthony Holland Senior Education Specialist LCSHE Axelle Latortue Consultant LCSHE Asako Maruyama Consultant LCSHE Marsha Michel E T Consultant LCSHD Fily Sissoko Lead Financial Management Spec AFTFM Aracelly G. Woodall Senior Program Assistant LCSTR Yao Wottor Senior Procurement Specialist LCSPT (b) Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs) Lending FY08 9.83 274.41 Total: 9.83 274.41 Supervision/ICR FY08 19.29 FY09 7.4 181.85 FY10 7.8 211.31 FY11 16.5 103.06 FY12 2.6 78.29 FY13 2.6 22.56 Total: 36.9 616.36 22 23 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any) NA 24 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any) NA 25 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR REPUBLIC OF HAITI EDUCATION FOR ALL (EFA) PROJECT END-OF-PROJECT REPORT EDUCATION FOR ALL SUPPORT PROJECT (EFA- SP) ACCELERATED INITIAL TRAINING (FIA) Port-au-Prince July 2012 26 TABLE OF CONTENT ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ........................................................................................... 27 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 28 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 29 I. SITUATION AT THE START OF THE PROJECT ................................................................... 30 A. E CONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS ....................................................................................... 30 B. P RIORITIES OF THE EDUCATION SECTOR ................................................................................... 30 C. A CTIVITIES OF THE WORLD BANK AND OTHER SECTOR FINANCIAL BACKERS ........................ 30 II. IMPLEMENTATION .................................................................................................................... 31 A. IMPLEMENTATION MEASUR ES /DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES ................................................ 31 B. P ROJECT PREPARATION WORK .................................................................................................. 31 C. M ONITORING AND ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK ......................................................................... 31 D. R ESTRUCTURING AND CHANGES TO TARGETS .......................................................................... 32 III. RESULTS AND ASSESSMENTS ............................................................................................... 32 A. A PPROPRIATENESS OF THE PROJECT DESIGN AND OBJECTIVES (BASED ON PRIORITIES) .......... 32 B. R ESULTS INDICATORS BASED ON PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES .................................. 33 IV. PERFORMANCE OF T HE WORLD BANK AND TH E HAITIAN GOVERNMENT ........ 33 A. B ANK ........................................................................................................................................ 33 B. G OVERNMENT .......................................................................................................................... 34 V. VIABILITY ..................................................................................................................................... 35 VI. PROJECT LESSONS ................................................................................................................... 36 APPENDIX 1: PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING SOURCES ............................................... 37 27 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency AFD: Agence Française de Développement APE: Parents’ Association APG: Adaptable Program Grant CDB: Caribbean Development Bank IDB: Inter-American Development Bank SB: School board CEFEF: Basic Education Teacher Training Center COSPE: Consortium of Private Sector Educational Organizations DAA: Administrative Affairs Department DAEPP: Department for Support and Partnership for Private Schools DDE: National Education Department DSNCRP: Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ENI: Teacher Training School EFA: Education For All FIA: Accelerated Initial Training FONHEP: Haitian Foundation for Private Education IDA: International Development Association MENFP: Ministry of Education and Vocational Training WFP: World Food Programme PNCS: National School Meals Program SNA/EPT: National Strategy-Education For All SIP: Professional placement SPR: Practical placement (classroom) UCFE: External Financing Coordination Unit EU: European Union UTP: Project Technical Unit UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization USAID: US Agency for International Development DFP: Department of Training and Professional Development MNA: Academic remediation FPI: Vocational training 28 Introduction The Education For All Support Project (EFA-SP), commonly called the FIA , was launched in March 2008, as a complement to the 2007 Education For All (EFA) project, and more particularly the “Accelerated Initial Training” component (FIA) of component 1 entitled “Improved access to basic education.” Like the EFA project (phase 1), the EFA-SP was implemented and overseen by the MENFP, over four fiscal years (2008- 2009 to 2011- 2012). The project was intended to improve teacher qualifications, alleviate the shortage of qualified teachers to meet the need created by expanded access to basic education, and standardize teacher training curricula across the country. It was also consistent with the Haitian government’s more general objective of expanding education to all by 2015. The project included the following three components: - component 1: Recruitment and selection of student teachers; - component 2: Accelerated initial training for teachers; - component 3: Improved management of accelerated initial training. This document is the end- of-project report for the EFA-SP, which ended in May 2012, marking the end of the Haitian government’s commitment in this regard. 29 Executive summary The EFA-SP was introduced during a period characterized by increasing political stability and the beginnings of an economic upturn, despite the ongoing presence of worrisome socioeconomic issues. The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, crippling the country’s economy and triggering a breakdown in social conditions, had major repercussions on the EFA project. The education sector faces sizeable challenges. The MENFP is in no position to regulate this sector given that approximately 90% of the country’s schools are privately run. Schools are either clearly lacking or run down, and there is a severe shortage of qualified teachers. The EFA-SP was launched in March 2008 as an add- on to the EFA project to support the teacher training component, and stems directly from the Haitian government’s commitment to improving the quality of education in the country. It experienced a difficult start-up period and underwent restructuring to make sure objectives were attainable given the obstacles encountered. The revised objectives will most likely be reached and even surpassed, however, the indicators will only be measured at the end of the student-teacher training process, i.e. after the project is completed. The Bank’s performance is rated as satisfactory. It provided substantial support and supervision in improving the project management process, although its actions may have occasionally been perceived as overly interventionist. The government’s performance is rated as moderately satisfactory. It expressed renewed interest in and demonstrated concrete political support for this project, which is consistent with its goals for the education sector. However, the skills transfer process, to be achieved by adding experts to the MENFP teams, has not yet reached satisfactory levels. Several lessons were learned during implementation of the EFA project, namely with respect to strengthening institutional capacities and overcoming obstacles, the importance of communication and the involvement of decentralized stakeholders in education- related projects, the essential role of steering committees, and the need to pay student-teachers’ allowances on time as any delays have major repercussions on the project. 30 I. Situation at the start of the project a. Economic and social conditions At the time the EFA project was first introduced, the country seemed to have turned the page on its long history of political crises. The sense of insecurity had lessened and the economic reforms implemented were beginning to yield results. Inflation had dropped to 7.9% in 2007, compared to almost 40% in 2003. However, the economic and social situation was still alarming. With an estimated GDP of US$6.2 billion, Haiti is the last remaining least-developed country (LDC) in the Western hemisphere. According to the 2004 poverty map, 55% of households were subsisting on less than $1 per day, and 76% of the population were living below the poverty line with less than $2 per person per day. The education sector was already feeling the impacts of the perilous socioeconomic situation. Families cannot always afford the high tuition costs and the State is struggling to meet the need for education. It is estimated that 80% of schools in Haiti are private. b. Priorities of the education sector The priorities of the education sector were outlined in the following two documents: the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (DSNCRP 2008- 2011) and the National Strategy-Education For All (SNA/EPT). The planned changes involved redirecting educational services to poor students, improving teacher qualifications, emphasizing preschool education programs, improving the basic education system by focusing specifically on the problem of overage students and by providing families with assistance to send their children to school, adapting curricula to the socioeconomic conditions, and identifying ways to effectively oversee the education sector. In 2007, the year the project was launched, only 500 new teachers per year were graduating from the country’s teacher training program versus the 2,000 needed to achieve the objectives of the Education For All program. c. Activities of the World Bank and other sector financial backers The education sector is supported by a number of financial backers at virtually all levels, i.e. governance, improvement of programs and curricula, improvement of training for education stakeholders, support for basic education and early childhood education, vocational training, and the construction of new schools. The World Bank strongly supports implementation of the SNA/EPT operational plan, and provides funding for the EFA and FIA projects, and the Emergency School Reconstruction Project (ESRP). It emphasizes basic education and early childhood education. The Inter- American Development Bank (IDB) is another important financial backer of the SNA/EPT, contributing to financing for both the EFA and the ESRP. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provides funding mainly for primary education, and the European Union (EU) finances teacher training, classroom renovations, and a regional pilot project for overage students. Other financial backers include the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation 31 (AECID), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the World Food Programme (WFP), and specialized UN organizations such as UNESCO and UNICEF. II. Implementation a. Implementation measures/division of responsibilities The implementation measures were based on the model devised for the EFA project. The technical departments within the MENFP, mainly the Department of Training and Professional Development (DFP), were responsible for project implementation. Given the weaknesses noted within the DFP, it was decided to create a support framework for the FIA that would simultaneously bolster capacity-building within this department. This framework would help to ensure suitable conditions and technical support for the EFA-SP/FIA project. The Administrative Affairs Department (DAA), with support from the UTP/EFA, would manage the administrative and accounting aspects of the project. An FIA monitoring committee, comprised of representatives from the central technical departments, the private sector and the teacher training colleges, would be set up to coordinate project activities; however, this committee was unable to fulfil its monitoring role. b. Project preparation work The project preparation work was satisfactory and was based largely on available data, reports and information, as well as similar experiences with teacher training programs in other countries, notably Guinea and Senegal. The National Strategy-Education For All, a document on the vision and strategy behind EFA, was a valuable reference. Alternative scenarios were considered during the analysis/preparation phase; various institutional, financial, political and technical risks were analyzed, and mitigation measures identified. Finally, a great deal of groundwork was done to prepare for the project itself. However, not enough advance consideration was given to the principal contractor’s project management capacity (availability of human and material resources), resulting in objectives that were difficult to attain. This aspect of the project had to be reviewed in light of the problems at start- up, the delays encountered, and the new situation following the January 2010 earthquake. Moreover, the stakeholders’ reservations and misunderstandings about the project’s end goal were not adequately addressed in advance, which led to delays in implementing the project. c. Monitoring and assessment framework The monitoring and assessment framework was designed based on general project advancement indicators. The component coordinator and assistant coordinator were mainly responsible for monitoring the project’s advancement, jointly with the DFP and DDE, and under the supervision of the FIA monitoring committee. The UTP/EFA monitoring and assessment specialist assisted the FIA coordinators with monitoring activities, and quarterly reports were issued, albeit after substantial delays. The monitoring committee, which did not work out as planned, was supposed to have overseen application of the operational plans, budgets and procurement plans. 32 Assessments of project implementation results were to have been conducted by national or international independent consultants. d. Restructuring and changes to targets The FIA was initially conceived as subcomponent B of component 1 of the EFA project: improved access to basic education. Its goal was to introduce a short (one-year) initial training program that would produce large numbers of qualified teachers over a three- year period. It was developed in response to the poor quality of teaching offered in many public and private schools due to the shortage of qualified teachers. Major problems in implementing this subcomponent were encountered from the outset. The DFP, the project’s principal contractor, was unaccustomed to managing such a large project; not only did the DFP have to coordinate the project, it also had to ensure it was fully integrated. In addition, the institutional mechanism, the steering committee and the technical committees, set up to ensure the standardization, coordination and orientation of FIA activities, never got off the ground. These problems led to a series of delays (e.g. student-teachers starting work approximately one year behind schedule), prompting the World Bank to rate the project as moderately unsatisfactory. In September 2009, the decision was made to hire four technical assistants within the DFP. Despite the changes made and warnings issued by the Bank, by late 2009, the FIA still had not achieved the hoped- for results. The project was further jeopardized by the collapse of the MENFP building in the January 2010 earthquake, which killed the FIA coordinator, DFP director and assistant director. To make matters worse, several teacher training colleges in the Port-au-Prince region were either heavily damaged or completely destroyed. Following this tragedy, in October 2010, the Haitian government, jointly with the World Bank, acknowledged the need to restructure the project, specifically to revise the results indicators downward, to improve the teacher-training capacities of the MENFP and the selected teacher training colleges, and to revise the project budget upward to account for the restructuring costs. In the end, the restructuring that took place in 2010 did not yield the promised improvements. The teacher training process was held up due to delays in paying allowances to the students. The government request a second round of restructuring to again revise the indicators, shut down the project prematurely, and revise the budget to account for the restructuring process. III. Results and assessments a. Appropriateness of the project design and objectives (based on priorities) The Government of Haiti committed to the goal of EFA at the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien, Thailand in March 1990, and then reiterated this pledge at the World Education Forum in Dakar in 2000, subsequently including the goals of the Dakar Declaration in its SNA/EPT. One of these goals was to improve the quality of education across the board to ensure that all students achieve recognized and quantifiable results, specifically in reading, writing, arithmetic and essential life skills. The EFA-SP objectives were completely appropriate in that they were designed to help the Haitian government implement its Accelerated Initial Training program for teachers, so as to increase the number of teachers certified each year. As such, it was consistent with all 33 national priorities. The project components were defined based on the SNA/EPT and were all focused on achieving the goals set forth in the Dakar Declaration. b. Results indicators based on project development objectives Given the delays caused by the problems encountered during the start-up phase, the project had to be restructured twice in order to revise the target results downward. Original results indicators: o Minimum of 2,500 new teachers earn an FIA diploma (cohort 1), minimum of 2,500 additional teachers (cohort 2) complete the first year of practical training, and minimum of 2,500 additional teachers (cohort 3) complete classroom training; o 80% of new teachers are hired as teachers; 50% of new teachers are hired by public schools; o 90% of teachers who complete the third year of the program are certified; o At least 70% of FIA-certified teachers are hired in rural areas. Following the first restructuring in October 2010, the results were revised downward: o Minimum of 900 teachers are certified by the end of the project (cohort 1), minimum of 1,400 additional teachers (cohort 2) complete the first year of practical training, and minimum of 1,440 additional teachers (cohort 3) complete classroom training; o 80% of new teachers are hired as teachers; 50% of new teachers are hired by public schools; o 90% of teachers who complete the third year of the program are certified; o At least 40% of FIA-certified teachers are hired in rural areas. Following the second restructuring, the project end date was moved up to June 30, 2012, from January 2013, and target results were once again revised. Cohort 3 will fall under phase 2 of the EFA project, and the main results will not be known until after the FIA project is completed: o Minimum of 900 teachers are certified by the end of the project (cohort 1), minimum of 1,400 additional teachers (cohort 2) complete the first year of practical training; o 80% of new teachers are hired as teachers; 10% of new teachers are hired by public schools; o 90% of teachers who complete the third year of the program are certified; o At least 40% of FIA-certified teachers are hired in rural areas. Currently, 1,444 student-teachers are doing a professional placement. Far more than the target 900 students from cohort 1 will be certified by the end of the project. Moreover, 1,278 student-teachers are currently doing a practical placement (classroom). The other indicators will only be measured after the students from cohort 1 are certified, i.e. once the project is completed. IV. Performance of the World Bank and the Haitian government a. Bank The Bank’s performance is rated as satisfactory. The Bank team was actively involved in the project preparation work, providing data drawn from similar experiences in other countries and playing a central role in preparing the project content and guidelines. The project design was very appropriate and its objectives were consistent with the SNA/EPT. The decision to 34 appoint the MENFP as project coordinator was a clear departure from the usual practice of creating an external unit, and was part of a long-term plan to strengthen various Ministry departments. This process emphasized the sustainability of an ambitious project requiring a long-term investment. The Bank emphasized the planning and implementation schedule for the FIA mechanism, specifically the preparation of TDRs for studies required and prior technical assistance required. There was a sustained level of high-quality project supervision throughout the project. Supervision missions took place regularly. The mission of September 2- 10, 2009, rated the progress of the FIA project as moderately unsatisfactory and focused on devising an action plan to support its implementation; subsequently, the progress of this action plan was assessed during the mission of October 5, 2009. When it came time to restructure the project in 2010, the Bank team played a central role in redefining actions and targets. The recommendations made by the successive supervision teams helped to improve the project’s procurement process and financial management. However, response times to requests for the Bank’s “no objection” were occasionally too long. Moreover, the Bank’s heavy involvement in the project management process may have been perceived as an attempt to limit the Haitian stakeholders’ decision-making capacities, which led to misunderstandings between the principal contractor and the Bank as to what the MENF wanted and what the Bank thought it was necessary to do. b. Government The Government of the Republic of Haiti, via the MENFP, was responsible for overseeing the project. Due to weaknesses in the structures involved in implementing the project (particularly the DFP), the FIA coordinators, tasked with supporting the Ministry, played a very active role in this respect. The effective use of planned monitoring and steering mechanisms would have resulted in better project coordination and improved management. Despite everything, the target objectives set after the restructurings were achieved by the end of the process. The government's overall performance can be rated as moderately satisfactory. Coordination of the FIA is rated as satisfactory: due to initial problems caused by delays in the preparatory work, the programs and modules were not yet developed, the furniture was not available, and the teaching equipment and materials had not been acquired. Furthermore, the project did not yet have access to the necessary qualified teachers. Both the central and decentralized MENFP units that were tasked with implementing the project were not ready to do so, nor were they in a position to provide the necessary coordination on short notice. In these circumstances, the project had trouble getting off the ground and was rated as moderately unsatisfactory during the World Bank’s September 2009 supervision mission. Measures were taken to speed up project implementation, including the hiring of technical assistants (TAs) to provide skills training to DFP agents, the renovation and repair of damaged teacher training colleges, the finalization and distribution of FPI 1 modules, and the restructuring of the FIA project by the Haitian government with support from the World Bank. 35 Despite the delays, the progress seen today is an achievement given the problems encountered along the way. Nevertheless, the skills training that should have enabled the DFP to take over after the TAs left was unsatisfactory. Constant progress was made with the procurement process throughout the project, to achieve an overall satisfactory level. The Bank’s standards and requirements were generally respected. A procurement plan was drafted each year for the project activities. However, there were persistent shortcomings in terms of setting up an adequate monthly follow-up system. Financial management was satisfactory despite the shortcomings. The financial management department experienced problems at the outset and was especially hard hit by the January 2010 earthquake, in which its specialist perished and a large amount of documents were destroyed. However, the financial information needed for the Operating Manual or for monitoring purposes was sent regularly, although not always on time. Conversely, the internal control unit was the weak link in the chain and was unable to provide sufficient support for financial management and follow-up on recommendations. Moreover, malfunctions by the GESCOMPTE software prevented the adequate tracking of disbursements and resulted in delays in the presentation of financial information. The acquisition and installation of the new TOMPRO financial management software will resolve this problem and ensure the better flow of financial information. V. Viability Training quality teachers is essential to improving the quality of education in Haiti—a fact of which the Haitian government is well aware—and the FIA meets this need very well. However, the sustainability of this type of project will depend on several factors: the quality of training and the skill level of certified student-teachers, and the opportunity for newly certified student-teachers to quickly find jobs in public or private schools so as to attract new graduates to a field with almost- guaranteed employment, all of which will make the training content appealing to new teachers. However, while the Haitian government can partially subsidize this initiative, it does not have the means to take it over completely. Its sustainability will depend largely on the government’s capacity to obtain external funding. Thanks to this project, the DFP now has a curriculum and teaching materials. Once the training modules are finalized, the training program is likely to become a benchmark in the field of teacher training. Providing TAs to assist the DFP was not really effective. The skills transfer process was not made easier by the physical separation between the TAs and the DFP agents due to the collapse of the Ministry building. To speed up capacity-building, the TAs would have to work physically at the DFP and each be paired with at least one agent whom they would be responsible for training. The renovation of teacher training colleges meant that the MENFP had access to at least one acceptable initial teacher training centre per department, with the exception of Nippes. However, the sustainability of the renovated buildings and the materials provided will depend on the ability to finance their maintenance. 36 VI. Project lessons • In the Haitian education sector, any innovation quickly arouses suspicions and is met with significant resistance. An understanding of the causes of this resistance and the issues faced by the different stakeholders is needed to improve project outcomes. • Time and effort spent on seeking a consensus between the stakeholders is not wasted; it improves the project’s chances of success. • The FIA experience has shown that capacity-building for project stakeholders is an essential component of any project, which risks being jeopardized by the virtually total incompetence that plagues the country’s institutions. • The Ministry’s involvement and accountability in department-specific projects considerably increase the chances of success. • Communication, transparency and the efficient circulation of information between the various stakeholders is essential, as it prevents misunderstandings, controls rumours, and overcomes a number of other problems. • In projects involving the payment of allowances, every effort must be made to pay them on time, as delays will cause recipients to become discouraged, in turn holding up the project. • Having steering and monitoring committees that perform up to standard helps with the coordination of stakeholders and the exchange of information; it also allows for prompt action in the case of project delays. Unfortunately, in the case of the FIA , these committees were ineffectual. • There is a high level of incompetence in the public sector. However, this should not systematically lead to the creation of provisional or parallel project management structures. Projects need to be spearheaded by the public sector, in the aim of strengthening the country’s institutions in the long term. • The relationship between consultants and civil servants is still very troubled, largely due to discrepancies between the fees charged by the former and the salaries earned by the latter. The possibility of paying a bonus to civil servants involved in this type of project is being evaluated. 37 Appendix 1: Project Costs and Financing Sources a) Project costs per component (in millions of U.S. dollars) Component Estimate Current/latest estimate Percentage of estimate 1. Recruitment and selection of candidate student-teachers 0.332 0.080 24.1% 2. Accelerated initial training for teachers 4.095 5.290 129.2% 3. Improved management of initial teacher training 1.573 0.460 29.2% Total reference cost 6.000 5.830 97.2 Technical provisions 0 Financial provisions 0.030 Total project cost 6.000 5.860 97.7 b) Financing sources in millions of U.S. dollars Origin Type of joint financing Estimate Current/latest estimate Percentage of estimate IDA 6.00 5.86 97.67% 38 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Forthcoming 39 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Declaration of General Policy of the Prime Minister—May 2012 (Enoncé de Politique Générale du Premier Ministre) Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté (2008-2010) Financing Agreement (Meeting Teacher Needs for Education for All Project) between Republic of Haiti and IDA, July 2, 2008. Government of Haiti - The Operational Plan for Education 2010- 2015 Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR3.8 million (US$6.0 million equivalent) to the Republic of Haiti for a Meeting Teacher Needs for Education for All Project, April 1, 2008. Project Appraisal Document of a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR16.8 million (US$25 million equivalent) to the Republic of Haiti for an Education for All Project in support of the First Phase of the Education for All Program, March 21, 2007. Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of the HT-Meeting Teacher Needs for EFA Project Grant H375-0-HT Approved by the Board on October 26, 2010 to the Republic of Haiti, October 27, 2010. Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of the HT-Meeting Teacher Needs for Education for All Project (Grant H375-0-HT) to the Republic of Haiti, April 27, 2010. World Bank - Interim Strategy Note for FY12-13 To To Monte Monte Christi Christi Chaine de la Selle Chaine de la Selle (2680 m ) (2680 m ) Île de Île de la Gonâve la Gonâve CC ee nn tt rr aa ll PP ll aa tt ee aa uu MM aa ss ss ii ff dd ee ll aa HH oo tt tt ee NORD - OUEST NORD - OUEST NORD NORD NORD - EST NORD - EST ARTIBONITE ARTIBONITE CENTRE CENTRE OUEST OUEST SUD - EST SUD - EST SUD SUD GRANDE- GRANDE- ANSE ANSE Gros-Morne Gros-Morne Limbé Limbé Ennery Ennery Grande Rivière Grande Rivière du Nord du Nord Saint- Saint- Raphaël Raphaël Verrettes Verrettes Croix des Croix des Bouquets Bouquets Petit- Petit- Goâve Goâve Belle- Belle- Anse Anse Thiotte Thiotte Côtes-de-fer Côtes-de-fer Vieux Bourg Vieux Bourg d'Aquin d'Aquin Les Anglais Les Anglais Camp-Perrin Camp-Perrin Miragoâne Miragoâne Mirebalais Mirebalais Ferrier Ferrier Trou- Trou- du-Nord du-Nord Saint Michel Saint Michel de l'Attalaye de l'Attalaye Maïssade Maïssade Léogâne Léogâne LLeess TTrrooiiss AA rr tt ii bb oo nn ii tt ee GGuuaayyaamm pp uu oo Jacmel Jacmel Hinche Hinche Gonaives Gonaives Fort-Liberte Fort-Liberte NORD - OUEST NORD NORD - EST ARTIBONITE CENTRE OUEST SUD - EST SUD GRANDE- ANSE NIPPES Palmiste Môle St.-Nicolas Baie de Henne Gros-Morne Limbé Ennery Grande Rivière du Nord Saint- Raphaël Verrettes Pointe-à-Raquette Croix des Bouquets Marigot Petit- Goâve Belle- Anse Thiotte Côtes-de-fer Vieux Bourg d'Aquin Roseaux Anse d'Hainault Les Anglais Port-Salut Camp-Perrin Anse-à-Galets La Cayenne Mirebalais Ferrier Trou- du-Nord Saint Michel de l'Attalaye Maïssade Léogâne Jacmel Hinche Jeremie Gonaives Les Cayes Cap-Haitien Fort-Liberte Port-de-Paix Miragoâne PORT-AU-PRINCE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Les Trois A r t i b o n i t e Guayam p u o ATLANTIC OCEAN Caribbean Sea W i n d w a r d P a s s a g e Golfe de la Gonâve Lago Enriquillo Étang Saumâtre Lac de Péligre To Monte Christi To Santiago To San Juan To Barahona To Oviedo Île à Vache Grande Cayemite Île de la Gonâve Île de la Tortue C e n t r a l P l a t e a u M a s s i f d e l a H o t t e Chaine de la Selle (2680 m ) 20°N 74°W 74°W 73°W 72°W 73°W 72°W 18°N 19°N 20°N 18°N HAITI This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 Miles 40 Kilometers IBRD 33417R JANUARY 2006 HAITI SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS DEPARTMENT CAPITALS NATIONAL CAPITAL RIVERS MAIN ROADS RAILROADS DEPARTMENT BOUNDARIES INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES