Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, power and an escalating crisis

ww October 2022 Expansion, power and an escalating crisis GANGS OF HAITI © 2022 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Global Initiative. Cover: © Ricardo Arduengo/AFP via Getty Images Please direct inquiries to: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Avenue de France 23 Geneva, CH-1202 Switzerland www.globalinitiative.net ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report was researched and written by a Haitian research team who wish to remain anonymous for security reasons. The interviews published in this report were carried out during 2021 by a second team of local researchers, who also wish to remain anonymous for security reasons. The report was complemented by research and writing by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s Summer Walker and Maria Velandia. We would like to thank Mark Shaw for his review of this report and the GI-TOC Publications team. CONTENTS Acronyms and abbreviations���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������2 Summary���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3 Gangs and politics �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5 Role of armed groups in Haitian politics����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5 Relations between gangs and the political class��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8 Electoral services������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10 Violent services���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10 Gangs in contemporary Haiti: A spreading crisis���������������������������������������������������������������������������������12 Expansion, conflict and alliance building�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������12 Mapping major gangs and alliances��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16 Conclusion ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20 Notes������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21 2 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS BSAP Brigade de Surveillance des Aires Protégées CEP Provisional Electoral Council CIMO Corps d’Intervention et de Maintien de l’Ordre CNDDR National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration CSCCA Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif FRG9 Revolutionary Force G9 GIPNH (SWAT) Groupe d’Intervention de la Police Nationale Haïtienne. G9 Criminal federation of nine gangs Lavalas Fanmi Lavalas, political party MINUJUSTH United Nations Mission in Support of Justice in Haiti MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UN United Nations PetroCaribe Oil agreement between Caribbean countries and Venezuela PHTK Haitian Tèt Kale Party HNP Haitian National Police RNDDH National Human Rights Defense Network UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund VSN Volunteers for National Security 3 SUMMARY T he growth of gang violence in Haiti has been a major concern in recent years. Years of political dysfunction in the Caribbean country have combined with deteriorating economic conditions, the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters, to create a weakening of state power. Under these conditions, gangs have multiplied, joined up forces and asserted authority in an increasingly destructive manner. In the last five years, gangs have grown rapidly in number, expanding their territories and tightening their control over Haiti’s political and economic infrastructure. They have established themselves as the mercenary partners of politicians and state administrators, as mafia-style armed groups profiting from the private sector and as the local coordinators of international criminal networks. There are now an estimated 200 gangs operating across Haiti, and around 95 in the capital, Port-au-Prince, alone. 1 This has resulted in a major insecurity crisis, with large-scale attacks on communities, politicians and journalists, high levels of violence, mass kidnappings and large-scale forced displacements. Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the Caribbean. Income inequality is among the highest in the region, with the richest 20 per cent holding over 64 per cent of the country’s wealth, while the poorest 20 per cent own barely one per cent of national wealth. 2 Long-standing international debts, government corruption, a three-year embargo by the United States from 1991 3 and a series of natural disasters have all contributed to undermine economic growth. The 2010 earthquake caused roughly US$8 billion in damage, while the destruction from Hurricane Matthew in 2016 came to US$1.9 billion – the equivalent of that year’s national budget. Later, between 2017 and 2021, the Haitian parliament ground to a halt: no major laws were passed and only one budget under regular conditions was voted on. Public administration came to a standstill due to the government’s inability to pay its staff. This had serious consequences for national healthcare, education and security. Alongside this, judicial positions were not filled, prosecutors stopped filing charges, and suspects sat in jail as trials collapsed. 4 In 2019, the government failed to hold elections, and President Jovenel Moïse dissolved parliament, seeking to rule by decree until his assassination in July 2021. 5 The result has been an accelerated deterioration in the living conditions for the population, especially among the working class, with the slum areas characterized by a dearth of basic social services. In the absence of effective state power, political figures across the spectrum have employed gangs as a form of hired muscle. Gangs routinely act on behalf of government and opposition figures to control key urban areas by suppressing dissent through assassinations, kidnappings and massacres; influencing the outcome of elections through bribery and intimidation; and disrupting political opponents by fomenting protests and destroying polling stations in districts where their candidate is set to lose. 4 Gangs have also captured large swathes of Haiti’s economy. They not only profit from kidnapping, raiding businesses and stealing food, fuel and other supplies, but have also taken control of key areas of economic activity – drawing revenue from customs, public markets, water and electricity distribution networks, and bus and tap-tap stations. 6 The gangs largely control the exits and entrances to metropolitan areas, including major roads in and out of Port-au-Prince, which provide access to strategic infrastructure such as ports, oil terminals, the commercial and industrial districts, and Toussaint Louverture International Airport. 7 Public institutions and private sector groups operating in these territories are forced to pay protection money to permit them to operate. Many of the gangs are small local groups, but recently they have begun to coalesce into larger structures. In 2020, the G9 was formed by a former police officer bringing together nine powerful gangs in Port-au-Prince linked to the ruling political party, and gradually expanded its connections with smaller gangs. In the capital, this coalition building has also resulted in inter-gang rivalry. G-Pep, a gang coalition loosely linked to opposition parties, 8 has increasingly come into conflict with G9 in the Cité Soleil suburb. Other gangs are said to be so popular they have waiting lists for recruits to join, such as 400 Mawozo, 9 which – following the extradition of its leader to the United States – has allegedly joined the G-Pep coalition. These groups are multiplying, and creating formal and informal alliances. This report assesses the current situation of the gang threat in Haiti, looking specifically at the relationships between organized crime and politics. It addresses the historical relationship between politics, armed groups and gangs, and the political economy of gangs in the present day. It does not seek to assess the international response, but rather contribute to our understanding of the political economy of gangs in Haiti. The report summarizes several of the main gangs and coalitions in Port- au-Prince, including a map indicating their estimated territorial control. The eyewitness accounts of people living in gang-afflicted areas provide a first-hand impression of how gang violence and gang control have impacted the lives of communities living in Haiti’s ganglands. A timeline published separately provides an overview of the historical and sociopolitical evolution of Haitian armed groups and their activities from the 1950s to the present: see https://globalinitiative. net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/GITOC-Gangs-of-Haiti-Timeline.pdf. Degenerating infrastructure. A view of Léogâne portal, an area of Port-au-Prince reportedly controlled by a gang belonging to the G9 federation. © Pierre Michel Jean/The Washington Post via Getty Images 5 GANGS AND POLITICS Role of armed groups in Haitian politics The deployment of non-state armed groups has been a core component of Haitian politics since the 1950s. Following an unsuccessful military coup against President François (Papa Doc) Duvalier in 1958, Duvalier sought to bypass the armed forces by creating a personal militia, the Tonton Macoutes, 10 (which later became known as the Volunteers for National Security (VSN)). Through the ‘Macoutes’, the Duvaliers deployed brutal state-sponsored violence to suppress opponents of the regime. It served as the basis of the Duvalier family’s power until their overthrow (his son succeeded him as president). However, even after the removal of Jean-Claude Duvalier in February 1986, Haiti has endured a turbulent politic environment marked by continual coups, deeply contested elections, mass protests, accusations of fraud and unrelenting violence over the decades. Political parties and leaders have often had informal armed groups at their disposal to intimidate opponents and their voters, as well as to disrupt political rallies and the electoral process. Armed groups have been involved in massacres, attacks on labour strikes or peasant uprisings, and politically motivated assassinations for various leaders and parties ever since Duvalier’s reign. Efforts have been made over the years to disband certain armed groups – and even the armed forces – but a failure to disarm them effectively allowed for their resurgence. For instance, in 1986 the Macoutes were disbanded by the National Council of Government but never disarmed, such that they continued to operate informally and re-emerge as far-right vigilantes. This mistake was repeated in 1994 when President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned to power. Aristide out- lawed the pro-Duvalier paramilitary groups and the Haitian armed forces but did not fully address issues such as disarmament, military pensions or retraining former soldiers. Once again, this caused them to morph into informal armed groups. Between 1994 and 2004, armed groups made up of former soldiers continued to operate as an anti-Arisitide insurgency. In the capital, young people from the working-class neighbourhoods associated with Aristide’s Lavalas political movement set up local self-defence groups – or baz – to protect themselves against attacks by groups of President François Duvalier in 1958. © Bettmann Archive/Getty Images 6 6 former soldiers. Over the years, these youth gangs were fused with the state police to form a group at the service of Aristide and Fanmi Lavalas – the social-democratic political party that arose from the movement. These gangs took control of the communes of Cité Soleil, the Saline neighbourhoods and the Croix des Bossales market. Initially militants acting on behalf of the Lavalas party, they increasingly became independent agents forming a de facto leadership in the slums of Port-au-Prince. Following the 2010 earthquake, many self-defence groups were overtaken by younger, less politi- cally motivated gangs who were more likely to raid other gang territories to fight for turf. 11 These loosely organized groups, made up of young people from fragile neighbourhoods, have developed into established gangs. In 2022, there are an estimated 200 gangs in operation across Haiti, with nearly 100 in Port-au-Prince. 12 These gangs cover a large proportion of the national territory. They are present in approximately 63 communes (or incorporated municipalities), including strategic communes for electoral, economic, drug trafficking and smuggling purposes such as Port-au-Prince, Pétion Ville, Ile de la Tortue, Corail, Ouanaminthe and Croix des Bouquets. The current gang crisis draws on the historic deployment of armed groups for political purposes, but it is an emerging phenomenon and threat in its own right. Gangs are becoming a central organizing force for young people, they are heavily armed, and largely driven by profit and power, rather than political ideology. At the same time, their connection to the political economy persists. Residents fleeing gang-infested Martissant are temporarily sheltered in a sports complex, October 2021. © Richard Pierrin/AFP via Getty Images EVOLUTION OF HAITI’S ARMED GROUP PHENOMENON 1958 Failed coup attempt to overthrow President François (Papa Doc) Duvalier. 13 1959 Duvalier creates armed force known as Tonton Macoute as a counterweight to the army. 14 1993 FRAPH, a far-right group, emerges to support Cédras, along with other armed groups. 1971 Jean-Claude Duvalier renames Macoute as the Volunteers for National Security (MVSN). Late 1980s to early 1990s The Macoute re-emerge as a pro-government armed group. 17 1991 Jean-Bertrand Aristide becomes first president not aligned to Duvalier. Overthrown later in same year by Raoul Cédras-led coup. January 2010 Earthquake hits Haiti with devastating impact. Police cannot address security in camps. Groups form armed defence units. 21 Early 2000s Aristide forms his own armed gangs known as the Chimeres. 20 GANG/NON-STATE ARMED GROUP EVENTPOLITICAL EVENT 1986 An army-led interim government is established, led by General Henri Namphy. 15 1986 MVSN disbanded by government. Never disarmed, they continue to operate on informal basis. 16 1994 Aristide returns to power with help from multinational forces. Haiti’s National Assembly creates new civilian law enforcement. 18 Aristide outlaws military and paramilitary groups. 1994 Decommissioning of Haitian Armed Forces leadership sees the military evolve into an illicit power structure. 19 July–August 2022 Violence and displacement flare up again in Port-au-Prince; insecurity continues. 2020 G9 and Family (G9 An Fanmi) forms as alliance of nine gangs in Port-au-Prince. G-Pep emerges as an alliance of gangs in Cité Soleil, in opposition to G9. 27 Ariel Henry assumes leadership as prime minister, with support from foreign powers. 2021 Moïse assassinated by a team of foreign mercenaries. Murder remains unsolved. 2017–2018 Members of Moïse’s government allegedly assist in massacres by providing gangs with government support in attacks in Port-au-Prince, including La Saline. 25 2017 President Jovenel Moïse announces reinstatement of Haitian Armed Forces. 26 PetroCaribe scandal implicates high-level politicians in a US$2 billion corruption scheme, triggering popular protests. 2010 Thousands of prisoners escape in Port-au-Prince. 22 Some take over makeshift camps for earthquake victims. Gender-based violence and insecurity spreads in the camps. 23 Self-defence groups, the bazes , are overtaken by younger, less ideologically driven gangs after the earthquake. 24 July 2021 Jimmy Cherizier (G9 leader) calls for protests against the assassination accusing the opposition leaders and the police of being behind Moïse’s killing. 28 January–May 2022 Violence continues to escalate between gangs in Port-au-Prince; hundreds kidnapped or killed between January and May 2022. 34 2022 Most gangs in the capital now belong to either the G9 or G-Pep alliances; 32 400 Mawozo joins G-Pep. 33 2021 Gangs act as de facto authorities in parts of the country, including in the capital. 29 G9 holds up fuel trucks at port, leading to fuel shortage in country, demanding Henry’s resignation. 30 400 Mawozo gang abducts 17 US missionaries, 31 prompting US to target the gang’s US arms suppliers and extradite its leader. 8 FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS Ruth (Martissant) R uth (not her real name), a 19 year-old, lived in Martissant until 2 June 2021. She and several thousand others were forced to leave because of armed gangs in the Grand Ravine neighbourhood who killed, raped and burned down houses. ‘A six-month-old baby was ripped from his mother’s arms and trampled to death by armed men,’ said Ruth, who was rehoused with her family to Carrefour-Feuilles. Months later, several hundred families in Martissant were still sleeping in reception centres, in public squares or taking refuge in their home province. Schools have been relocated, including Ruth’s. ‘I did all my classes there,’ says Ruth. ‘It was a peaceful neighbourhood. Everything changed over the last three years with the gang conflicts. But on 2 June last year, it became terrifying when the gangs of Grand Ravine attacked those of Ti Bwa, resulting in horrific deaths,’ she recalled. ‘I lost friends … my best memories are from there.’ According to Ruth, the authorities let the situation fester until they lost control. ‘The nonchalance of the authori - ties has allowed the proliferation of gangs.’ She does not want to opine on the links between gangs and politics, but intimated that elected officials rubbed shoulders with gun - men in her neighbourhood. Ruth explained that her neighbourhood of Martissant 2A had always been spared from the bloody clashes, which always occurred in Grand Ravine. Later, the gangs would come down to commit kidnappings and hijack trucks. ‘One gang leader, reportedly, sometimes prevented attacks, including prevent - ing armed bandits from Grand Ravine from kidnapping and hijacking trucks on the national road in Martissant. He often received the support of police vehicles to repel the Grand Ravine gang during clashes,’ said the young girl. This is cor - roborated by other former residents of Martissant. Ruth believes that these neighbourhoods, including Martissant, need more attention from the authorities, including certain basic service provision and paid work to prevent young people from falling into delinquency. ‘Only if more attention is paid to the vulnerable classes can we hope for a better country,’ said Ruth. ‘Armed conflicts prevent any civic initiative in a neigh - bourhood where gangs are armed and formidable.’  ■ Relations between gangs and the political class As we have seen, there has been a long-standing close link between armed groups and political elites in Haiti. In the current context, gangs work with politicians and parliamentarians – both those in power and the opposition – to exert violent control over strategic areas and communities. The political class in Haiti is dominated by three main political groups: the PHTK (Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale), the ruling party since 2011, bringing together neo-Duvalierists and former elected officials from the Fanmi Lavalas party; secondly, the Prévalisme movement, bringing together disaffected members of Fanmi Lavalas, left-wing and centre-right parties associated with workers organizations and private sector groups involved in national production; and, thirdly, the Lavalas movement, predominantly drawn from the urban youth and marginalized urban poor. During the last 20 years, these three major groups have dominated institutions such as the Electoral Council, the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the Superior Court of Accounts and financial institutions. 9 A major trend in recent years has been the emergence of a new category of politician: the Pol- businessmen, i.e., politicians who do business (some through legal businesses and others through illicit activity). This group consists mostly of deputies and senators from the middle class and peasantry. They are considered the new economic and political force in the country (for instance they include former leaders of PHTK), but, generally, they are not looked upon favourably by the public. From 2014 onwards, their rise encouraged others from the private sector to invest in control of parliament while developing relationships with the most influential political bosses. Overall, this has contributed to the decline in political party platforms and the rise of the self-interested politician. Corruption has played a major role in undermining the state. The 2018 PetroCaribe scandal has been the most recent high-profile case. 35 Through the PetroCaribe alliance, Haiti was able to import Venezuelan oil but defer payment for up to 25 years, freeing up revenue to develop the economy and fund social programmes. While government officials claimed they had funded 400 projects totalling US$4 billion, Haitians felt there was little to show for it. The scandal sparked mass protests. Moïse himself was head of Agritrans, a banana company that was paid around US$700 000 to repair roads. An audit in 2017 requested by the Senate found evidence of corruption over the course of three administrations and, when the government attempted to increase fuel prices a year later, protests broke out and lasted for months. 36 In 2020, Haiti’s High Court of Auditors released a report claiming US$2 billion was mismanaged from 2008 to 2016, affirming earlier allegations. 37 Haitians react after the assassination of President Moïse, 8 July 2021. © Richard Pierrin/Getty Images 10 The political battle between the opposition and the government between 2018 and 2021 has bene- fited the gangs, which use this to their advantage. There has been a proliferation of gangs since 2018 in Port-au-Prince and the country’s major cities. In particular, there are allegations that Moïse allowed the G9 and its affiliated gangs to gain power in Port-au-Prince by granting impunity to cause harm in opposition-dominated neighbourhoods. 38 Many of these gangs have since been operating with impunity and claim to belong to certain political groups, both in power and in opposition. Electoral services Gangs have developed a strong presence in municipalities with strategic electoral importance. In the 63 communes where gangs have taken hold, they have begun to dominate town halls in preparation for elections. Two of the most important town halls in the West department, 39 namely Pétion Ville and Port-au-Prince, are linked to the G9 gang and its allies. As a result, it is estimated that gangs now control more than 3.5 million voters. Growing gangs like 400 Mawozo control communes with a combined total of approximately 950 000 voters, while G9 can influence about 2 million. Gangs provide six main electoral ‘services’ to political actors: ■Campaigning – they distribute leaflets in their neighbourhoods for candidates during elections and in polling stations on election day. ■Voter intimidation – because of their knowledge on the ground in their respective neighbourhoods and territories they lobby from door-to-door among the inhabitants, sometimes forcing people to vote for a particular candidate by showing up at the voting centres. ■Bribery – making cash or in-kind donations to voters on behalf of certain candidates during the campaign and on voting day. ■Fundraising – gangs have been known to raise money for certain candidates’ campaigns by extorting businessmen and notables in territories they control. ■Vandalism – including ballot stuffing in favour of their candidates and destroying polling stations in areas where their political paymasters are set to lose. ■Disruption – organizing protests for their candidates and suppressing the rallies of opponents. Violent services Assassinations and mass violence have often been used to repress popular uprisings or to achieve political objectives over decades in Haiti. The National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH) has reported at least 16 massacres in the West department since 2018, some involving up to 500 deaths. 40 The massacres perpetrated in the Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods of La Saline, Bel Air, Tokyo and Delmas 32 between 2018 and 2021 resulted in slowing down popular mobilization in the country following outrage over the PetroCaribe funding scandal and contestations over President Moïse’s constitutional term, which was widely perceived to have expired. While he stayed in power, the PetroCaribe movement began to call for Moïse’s resignation. La Saline, a peripheral district of downtown Port-au-Prince wedged between Cité Soleil and the popular market of Croix des Bossales, is a bastion of resistance against the PHTK regime. According to local human rights groups, it was a strategic zone during the popular mobilizations over the PetroCaribe scandal and many believe the 2018 massacre there was meant to send a message to the opposition. 41 11 Opposition figures use their own affiliates to further their political agendas. The series of ‘country locks’ – a term referring to mass protests, roadblocks and strikes – organized over the last three years to force the resignation of Moïse, were carried out in collusion with gangs close to opposition political actors throughout the country and particularly in the capital. 42 Gangsters in Port-au-Prince’s Cité Soleil area. © Alpeyrie/ullstein bild via Getty Images 12 GANGS IN CONTEMPORARY HAITI: A SPREADING CRISIS W hile gangs have a clear link to the political class and elites, they are now challenging their role as subordinates. Since the assassination of Moïse (not attributed to a Haitian gang), gang members have asserted themselves as self-proclaimed community leaders and flexed their power through public demonstrations. G9 and affiliates held up fuel distribution for weeks in 2021 demanding that Prime Minister Ariel Henry resign, showing their ability to significantly disrupt the economy. They have carried out brazen attacks on the leadership, including preventing Henry from commemorating a national holiday by blocking access with heavily armed men and gunfire. 43 There was a shoot-out between Henry’s security team and gangs in the northern city of Gonaïves in January 2022. 44 Attacks on police stations and other outposts have become more frequent, seemingly as part of a deliberate campaign to undermine what little remains of the state security apparatus and to secure additional firearms. While this disconnect between the state (the gangs’ ‘masters’) and the gangs grows, they are causing ex- treme levels of violence and insecurity for the people of Haiti. Gender-based violence has been pervasive, with many cases documented during gang attacks, but also in shelters and makeshift areas for displaced persons. 45 Violence and insecurity have caused massive internal displacement. From June to November 2021, a reported 13 000 were forced from their homes in Port-au-Prince due to gang violence. 46 Gangs engage in full-scale disruption of economic activity. Not only do they kidnap for ransom, attack businesses, steal food, fuel and other supplies, but they have seized control of key areas of economic activity, and continue to fight to maintain control of these areas. This includes major roads in and out of Port-au-Prince, secondary major roads, the commercial district of Port-au-Prince and the industrial zone, especially the warehouses and factories along the road to the Toussaint Louverture International Airport. 47 Expansion, conflict and alliance building The last five years have been marked by the expansion of armed groups throughout Haiti, especially in vulnerable communities in urban, peri-urban and rural areas. Some gangs, such as 400 Mawozo, are said to be so popular they have recruitment waiting lists. Armed groups are multiplying and forming alliances to strengthen and broaden their control over public administration, strategic economic territories and the population.  13 In 2020, the G9 was formed by nine powerful gangs in Port-au-Prince linked to the ruling PHTK party, and since then has continued to absorb others. Coalition building in the capital has also intensified inter-gang rivalry. G-Pep, formed to counter the activities of G9, has increasingly come into conflict with the latter in the Cité Soleil suburb, with one such clash in July 2022 resulting in the deaths of 50 people. 48 G-Pep has incorporated 400 Mawozo after the extradition of its leader to the United States. Such coalition building is seen as a step towards expansion from the capital into other regions of Haiti. In the past, gangs tended to remain within their neighbourhood limits. However, throughout the country, and more specifically in the communes of Cité Soleil, Delmas, Croix des Bouquets and in the neighbourhoods of Martissant and Bel Air, violent confrontations between rival gangs are becoming increasingly frequent, with serious consequences for the civilian population. These conflicts have also been used by gangs as a cover for the intentional killing of civilians. The Bel Air massacre of 1 April 2021, for instance, was blamed on an inter-gang confrontation but has also been labelled political. Such incidents result in numerous deaths and injuries, and cause mass displacements. Attacks on journalists trying to bring attention to the crisis have become commonplace. Two journalists were killed in Cité Soleil in September 2022; 49 earlier, two others were killed in January 2022 in the Laboule 12 neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince, an area where gangs are fighting for territorial control due to the strategic asset of its second major road, which leads to the south of the country (the main road is already controlled by gangs). 50 This followed the June 2021 murder of 15 people, including journalist Diego Charles and opposition activist Antoinette Duclair, in Port-au-Prince. 51 Abductions have surged, including the kidnapping of entire bus-loads of local people. Haitians across all strata of society are victims, with nearly 800 recorded kidnappings from January to October 2021. 52 Foreigners have been seized for ransom, such as the 17 US and Canadian missionaries in October 2021 by 400 Mawozo. Community members protest against a spike in gang-related violence. © Richard Pierrin/AFP via Getty Images 14 FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS Louis (Fontamara) L ouis (not his real name) lived for 30 years in Fontamara, which borders Martissant at the southern entrance of Port-au-Prince. Broken pavements, open sewers, bullet holes in the facades of houses, abandoned vehicles, gangs armed with assault rifles standing guard – these have been the defining features of Martissant for several months. Fontamara used to be a peaceful residential area before uncontrolled urbanization sent it spiralling into decline. It is not unplanned urbanization, however, that forced Louis, a professor, to flee his home, but the gangs. He left in 2021. That year, Martissant became one of the capital’s most dan - gerous neighbourhoods for residents. ‘Three gangs have been fighting for about three years in Martissant. These are the Grand Ravine gang, the Ti Bwa gang and the fearsome Village de Dieu gang (a.k.a. 5 Seconds gang). Territories were lost to the Ti Bwa gang on 2 June in bloody clashes with Grand Ravine.’ Since then, the situation has remained tense, said Louis, who had not been able to go downtown for several weeks because of armed gang conflicts. ‘Several hundred fam - ilies in Martissant and Fontamara found themselves on the street one morning. The gangs have also killed all the economic activities in the area, by kidnapping people and holding them for ransom. They have blocked access to the petroleum terminals, which has had serious consequences for hospitals and all sectors of national life.’ ‘The road from Martissant to Carrefour is in very bad con - dition. The Ministry of Public Works has done nothing to improve the situation. For security reasons, no worker wants to risk his life on this stretch of road,’ he explained. ‘Because of the gangs, schools that used to provide free education for children have been closed or relocated. No community asso - ciation can work in such an atmosphere. This situation has unimaginable consequences.’ According to Louis, there are no local initiatives that pro - tect the community from gangs: ‘Many neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince, in other cities and in remote corners of the country used to have brigades to fight crime,’ he recalled. ‘But, because the gangs are so heavily armed today, it has become difficult to take these initiatives. The state should set up social assistance programmes and vocational schools, and create income-generating activities for young people in working-class neighbourhoods. Vulnerability is at the root of this banditry.’ Louis argues that the close connections between politi - cians and gangs are an obstacle to fighting the phenome- non effectively: ‘It is difficult to fight gangs when police or political authorities are in collusion with them. Local forces are not sufficiently trained or equipped to fight this scale of organized crime. If there are no adequate responses, the political and security situation is likely to get worse in the coming years,’ he warned, denouncing the ‘passivity’ of the international community in the face of the deteriorating security situation in Haiti in recent years.  ■ Conflicts between rival gangs over territory are fought over economic resources. In strategic areas, such as ports and oil terminals, businesses are forced to deal with gangs for the survival of their businesses, and thus they are highly lucrative areas for gangs to control. Gangs not only profit from kidnapping, raiding businesses and stealing fuel and other supplies, but have also taken control of key areas of economic activity – drawing revenue from customs, public markets, water and electricity distribution networks, and public-transport stations. The gangs now largely control roads in and out of Port-au-Prince, which provide access to strategic infrastructure, such as ports, oil terminals, the commercial and industrial districts and the airport. 53 Public institutions and private sector groups 15 operating in these territories are routinely forced to pay protection money to allow them to operate. In working-class neighbourhoods gangs have even been known to seize shipments of food products for supposed redistribution to their communities under the guise of humanitarian and social action. These acts of ‘largesse’ to the communities under their control are intended to boost loyalty, while increasing their vulnerability and economic dependence. FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS Fabie and Lyne (Bel Air) T he women of Bel Air, as in other Port-au-Prince neigh- bourhoods, face very high risk of sexual violence. Fabie (not her real name), 20, is one of the victims. In 2020, on her way home from school, she was sexually assaulted by men with guns. ‘I couldn’t identify them because they put a black bag over my head,’ she said. ‘I was not taken to hospital afterwards. Three months later, I realized I was pregnant. I did not want to have an abortion. Now I have a little girl on my hands whose father I will never know. I don’t work, and my father can’t work either after he was shot in the foot. [Fabie’s father, a bricklayer, was shot twice a few months prior.] I was forced to do housework to pay for food,’ said Fabie. ‘Embarrassed by the situation, my father forbade me to continue.’ She had to delay school because of the fees. ‘I have a daughter. I am her mother and also her father. My older sister helps me as much as she can,’ she said. ‘It used to be so nice to live in Bel Air. It was a peaceful neighbourhood. We couldn’t accept that young people now didn’t go to school. The enemy gang attacks anyone who sets foot in its territory. They burn young people alive and sometimes send the videos to the victims’ families.’ Because of the gangs in Bel Air, a health centre that served vulnera - ble groups had to close, she explained. Lyne (not her real name), 18, was born and raised in Bel Air. When conflict broke out between two gangs, armed men burned down houses, and killed and raped residents. She was attacked one night in her home. ‘Since then, I am not myself anymore. I’m afraid of men.’ Lyne, who lost three of her friends, said, ‘The situation has led me to smoke and sometimes drink.’ Since her attack, Lyne has been living with a friend who is also a rape survivor. Before going to school, Lyne prays in a church. ‘They some - times share food with me at church.’ She dreams of working at the State University of Haiti after finishing her classical studies. Asked if there are any citizen initiatives to protect the neighbourhood from gangs, Lyne said she doesn’t really know: ‘The authorities are absent. The gangs have been in charge since last year. The police have never carried out an operation in the area since this war started.’  ■ 16 MAPPING MAJOR GANGS AND ALLIANCES G9 alliance The G9 gang, formerly known as G9 Family and Allies, is an alliance of nine powerful gangs in Port- au-Prince: Delmas 6 Gang (led by Jimmy Chérizier); Baz Krache Dife; Baz Pilate; Nan Ti Bwa; Simon Pelé’s gang; Baz Nan Chabon; Waf Jérémie; Nan Boston; and the Belekou gang. These gangs exercise power in the capital primarily, and especially in the communes of Delmas, Pétion Ville and part of Carrefour, thanks to alliances with other gangs that control districts of certain communes in the Western department. Through the alliance, G9 holds a strategic position along the coast and uses its reach to disrupt the economy, including fuel stoppages, halting food deliveries and extorting businesses using the ports. The coalition was formed in 2020 by Chérizier, a former police officer who led the Delmas 6 Gang while in the police. He was alleged to have carried out the La Saline massacre alongside several of the gangs that would later become members of the G9. 54 Chérizier was fired from the police service after the attack, one of the worst in recent history, in which 71 people were killed. 55 The G9 was formed at a time when Moïse was facing mass protests over the PetroCaribe scandal. Delmas 6 coordinated attacks with other gangs on neighbourhoods – many of which were opposition strongholds – in order to take over territory from residents and exert their control. Following attacks across the Pont-Rouge, Chancerelles, La Saline and Fort Dimanche neighbourhoods, Chérizier took to YouTube to announce the formation of the G9. The alliance includes former and serving police officers, young ex-Lavalas members, PHTK’s political base from working-class neighbourhoods, deportees and former soldiers. Gangs within this coalition have maintained a loose alliance and have sometimes fought one another over turf. In some cases, the G9 leadership has served as a moderating force for its constituent members. The G9 also calls itself ‘Forces Révolutionnaires’, promoting itself as a revolutionary movement even during the most recent administration. While G9 was believed to have strong links to PHTK during Moïse’s leadership, since his death the group has tried to use its power to remove Moïse’s replacement, Prime Minister Henry. Following the death of Moïse, Chérizier held press conferences, led demonstra- tions and held up fuel distribution in the port district to demand that the prime minister step down. 17 The gang presents itself as being on the side of the people and opposed to government corruption, but members of the coalition are known for brutal violence, including rape, arbitrary killings and the dismembering of bodies, as well as looting and burning down shacks and market stalls. It has been reported that the G9 has been building a broader set of alliances with smaller gangs, dubbed the G20, as part of a strategy to spread out from the capital into other parts of the country. 400 Mawozo The 400 Mawozo gang 56 is considered to be the largest in Haiti, with a waiting list to join. The gang is principally based in the outskirts of Ganthier commune in the eastern Croix des Bouquets arrondissement and in communes within Port-au-Prince, such as Tabarre and residential areas of FIGURE 1 Port-au-Prince gang territories. NOTE: This map is an estimate of gangs’ primary locations based on local research and OSINT in October 2022. However, many operate in multiple areas. Territorial control can change quickly as the situation rapidly develops. DELMAS TABARRE CIT