Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment for Haiti (Original)

RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 1 /OCTOBER 2024/ HAITI RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT A report prepared by the government of the Republic of Haiti with the support of the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the World Bank. RÉPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI 2 This Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment (RCIA) report for Haiti is a collaborative product authored jointly by the government of Haiti and the staff of the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the World Bank. Acknowledging the institutions’ different mandates and areas of expertise, the findings, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in the RCIA do not necessarily constitute the views or formal recommendations of the European Union, United Nations, Inter-Americaan Development Bank, or World Bank on all issues, nor do they reflect the views of the governing bodies of these institutions or their member states. It is also recognized that because of different mandates, not all of the collaborating institutions will share or engage in all activities set forth or proposed in the report, and it is further understood that each institution will carry out or be engaged with any such activities in accordance with its mandate and operational policies and procedures. RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 3 /OCTOBER 2024/ HAITI RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT 4 Arrondissement boundary Commune boundary Commune in focus of RCIA 7. 5 15 km N S W E Communes Included in the Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment within the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Area RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ i Acknowledgments The Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment was carried out jointly by the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the World Bank, under the leadership and participation of the Government of Haiti. The contributions provided by senior government officials were essential, among them from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooper- ation, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, the Ministry of Interior and Territorial Communi- ties, the Ministry of Public Health and Population, and the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications, as well as various other government agencies. The authors appreciate the strong support and contribu- tions of the various national stakeholders that made this effort possible, as well as the leadership and technical con- tributions of each of the partner institutions. ii Table of Contents Acknowledgments Acronyms and Abbreviations Executive Summary Methodology Summary of the Impact Assessment Investment Needs (2024–2026) Crisis Recovery Framework Institutional framework I: Introduction Background and Rationale Objectives Assessment Methodology Structure of the Report II: Context of the Crisis in Haiti Macroeconomic Context Crisis and Violence Context Scenarios and Risks III: Crisis Impact and Priority Needs Priority Axis 1: Economic Recovery, Support for Economic Diversification, and Strengthening of Economic Governance Context Agriculture Industry Services Governance Transparency and Accountability Overview of Recovery Needs Priority Axis 2: Rehabilitation of Economic and Social Infrastructure and Reduction of Vulnerabilities to Natural and Climate Shocks Transportation Infrastructure Electric Infrastructure Water and Sanitation Telecommunications and Digital Infrastructure Housing Public Buildings Overview of Recovery and Reconstruction Needs iii 1 1 1 3 3 4 5 6 6 6 8 9 10 13 14 17 18 19 20 20 21 24 27 27 29 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ iii 34 34 35 36 36 37 38 39 41 41 41 42 42 43 43 46 47 48 48 50 50 52 53 54 55 56 58 59 62 75 Priority Axis 3: Promotion of Access to Health Care, Education and Other Basic Social Services; Social Inclusion and Food Security Internal Displacement Social Protection Infrastructure for Elementary and Secondary Education Higher Education Infrastructure Food Security and Nutrition Health Infrastructure Overview of Recovery Needs Priority Axis 4: Strengthening Rule of Law and Public Security Justice System Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Police Penitentiary System Community Violence Reduction Overview of Recovery and Reconstruction Needs IV: Crisis Recovery Framework Crisis Recovery Vision, Strategic Objectives, and Core Principles Programmatic Framework for Recovery Prioritization and Sequencing Transversal Issues Assumptions, Prerequisites, and Risks V: Institutional Arrangements Institutional Framework Monitoring Arrangements VI: Investment Plan Investment Plan Financing Platform References Appendix A: Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment Programmatic Framework (2024–26) Appendix B: Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment Investment Plan 3 Acronyms and Abbreviations ACLED BINUH CPI CRF DAP DGI DINEPA GBV GDP HNP IADB IDP IHSI IPC MEB MEF MSSM OMU PPP RCG RCIA SGBV SIMAST ZMPP Armed Conflict Location and Event Data United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti Consumer Price Index Crisis recovery framework Directorate of Penitentiary Administration General Directorate of Taxes National Directorate for Drinking Water and Sanitation Gender-based violence Gross domestic product Haitian National Police Inter-American Development Bank Internally displaced person Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Minimum expenditure basket Ministry of Economy and Finance Multinational Security Support Mission Operational monitoring unit Purchasing power parity Recovery coordination group Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment Sexual and gender-based violence Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor database Port-au-Prince metropolitan area RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 1 Executive Summary Armed Conflict Location and Event Data United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti Consumer Price Index Crisis recovery framework Directorate of Penitentiary Administration General Directorate of Taxes National Directorate for Drinking Water and Sanitation Gender-based violence Gross domestic product Haitian National Police Inter-American Development Bank Internally displaced person Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Minimum expenditure basket Ministry of Economy and Finance Multinational Security Support Mission Operational monitoring unit Purchasing power parity Recovery coordination group Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment Sexual and gender-based violence Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor database Port-au-Prince metropolitan area After having several multidimensional crises affect Haiti for years, the country is at a critical juncture. The Kingston Declaration of March 11, 2024, concluded negotiations among various Haitian actors and led to the April 3 Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition. The agreement involved a wide range of Haitian stakeholders and established a transitional institutional architecture consisting of the Presidential Transition Council (TPC) and a transitional government to oversee the transition process. This agreement was formalized in the May 27 decree establishing the organization and functioning of the TPC, identifying the five strategic objectives for the transition period (see Section II). After years of crises, this transition process presents a window of opportunity to end the cycle of violence and forge a path out of fragility. Recognizing that tangible economic, social, and institutional recovery must accompany progress in the political transition, the government of Haiti launched the Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment (RCIA) in May 2024. The RCIA has been undertaken under the leadership of the Ministry of Economy and Finance and with the support of the World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). The RCIA was conducted between July and October 2024 and had the following three objectives: • Assess the impact of the crisis (2021–24) in areas most affected by the security crisis, particularly the Port- au-Prince metropolitan area (ZMPP, see map above), on the population, the economy and poverty, physical infrastructure, and basic services and institutions. Where possible, the assessment included other affected areas, notably the Artibonite Department. • Define a recovery framework and investment plan for fiscal years 2025 and 2026, and identify – where possible – initial provisions for the medium-term (2026–30) to consolidate recovery and development gains. • Strengthen coordination of actions and interventions between the government and technical and financial partners with the support of the European Union, IADB, United Nations, and the World Bank. This report summarizes the findings and recommenda- tions of the RCIA. It evaluates the impact of the 2021–24 crisis and defines urgent stabilization and recovery prior- ities, complementing broader security, political, and hu- manitarian efforts. As the RCIA assessment took place at a time in which the security crisis remains unresolved, future Methodology The RCIA follows a rapid assessment methodology draw- ing from post-conflict and post-disaster approaches. Giv- en time and access constraints, the RCIA drew on exist- ing data and analyses and consultations with an extensive network of stakeholders. Given the urgency to define im- mediate recovery needs, the RCIA identifies and quantifies damages and short-term priority needs based on rapid as- sessment methodologies. It goes on to develop an invest- ment plan to address the identified priorities leveraging existing programs where possible and based on previous experiences and absorption capacities. As such, the RCIA does not apply the standard methodology of Recovery and Peace Building Assessments and Post Disaster Needs As- sessments but develops standardized prioritization criteria to ensure a targeted, selective approach to identifying criti- cal interventions, results, and investment requirements. Al- though recognizing that the security crisis extends beyond the metropolitan area, the RCIA has prioritized ZMPP as the most affected area by the crisis. The RCIA is structured around four priority axes of intervention covering economic recovery, infrastructure rehabilitation, social security and services, and rule of law. These priority axes, and corresponding sectors and subsectors, were identified in joint workshops under the leadership of the Government of Haiti and are aligned with the strategic objectives outlined in the May 27 decree establishing the organization and functioning of the TPC. They also reflect the guidance received during the May 31 meeting of the TPC, with the four institutions outlining the parameters of the RCIA. Summary of the Impact Assessment The 2021–24 crisis has had a devastating impact on Port-au-Prince and the country as a whole. The impact of this crisis has been far reaching, affecting most of the population in the metropolitan area and resulting in disruptions, damages, and losses across all sectors, spanning economic productivity, critical infrastructure, assessments will complement the present evaluation. To facilitate such future assessments, the RCIA establishes a recovery framework to allow for progressive expansion to other parts of the country as security conditions improve. 2 basic social services, and the ability of the state to provide essential institutional functions, including public security and law and order. Although the RCIA focuses on the most- affected areas and populations of the ZMPP, the crisis had cascading effects throughout the country, given regional commercial, financial, transport, and other dependencies. The core findings of the impact assessment in the four axes are summarized below: AXIS 1 ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION, AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE • Private Sector: The security crisis has led to a significant decline in economic activity and employment, notably through looting, pillaging, and disruption of transportation routes. The secondary (manufacturing and industry) and tertiary (services) sectors have suffered the greatest losses. In the secondary sector, manufacturing, construction, and public utilities (electricity and water) with economic activity declined by 16 percent, 23 percent, and 43 percent. The apparel sector, for example, accounts for about 90 percent of manufactured exports yet witnessed a 20 percent decline in exports and lost approximately 30,000 jobs (54 percent), with 15 companies ceasing operations between 2022 and 2024. In the tertiary sector, formal and informal trade and the hospitality industry experienced a decline in economic activity by 26 percent and 23 percent. • Governance: The crisis has exacerbated deficiencies in essential functions of human resource management. Public sector employment fell from 112,631 in September 2021 to 104,029 in June 2024, a 7.8 percent reduction in the workforce. More than half of the departing civil servants were technical staff. This situation has also greatly affected the personnel of local administrations in affected areas, where dozens of employees have left. In some places, such as Gressier, municipal offices have been closed and abandoned. AXIS 2 REHABILITATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND REDUCTION IN VULNERABILITY TO NATURAL AND CLIMATE SHOCKS • Transportation infrastructure: The transportation infra- structure (roads, ports, airports) and associated services (drainage, waste management, transportation of people and goods) have suffered damages of US$220 million, with a loss of US$15 million for the ports of Port-au-Prince and an additional cost of US$6.5 million for securing the international airport. • Electric infrastructure: Between 2021 and 2024, six substations and twenty distribution lines have been damaged by gang violence, affecting 60 percent of the customer base in the ZMPP. The closure of the Martissant terminal has reduced energy storage capacity by 11 percent, and the transport of hydrocarbons has become extremely difficult, increasing prices by 15 to 20 percent. • Water and sanitation: Since 2022, gang violence further reduced the limited potable water coverage available, with 55 percent of sites of the National Directorate for Drinking Water and Sanitation damaged by gang violence. Damage is estimated at US$70 million, with revenue loss of US$3.6 million for the ZMPP and Croix des Bouquets technical operating centers. The crisis has also led to loss of human resources and made the only official landfill site inaccessible, affecting solid waste collection. • Telecommunications and digital infrastructure: Lack of access, high prices, and poor quality of broadband networks are major constraints on growth of the digital sector and expansion of digital payments. Armed groups threaten infrastructure, limiting maintenance and fuel supply. Between September and November 2023, 85 percent of Digicel (a mobile telephone service provider) sites in the capital and 40 to 60 percent in small towns were operational, but rural sites were almost all out of service. • Public buildings: Armed groups have targeted public buildings in conflict zones, vandalizing them and stealing equipment. Communal and national buildings have been looted and burned, totaling damages of US$9.2 million. Several entities have had to relocate operations. • Housing: The housing sector was deficient before the crisis, with most real estate transactions being informal and vulnerable populations living in high-risk areas. Since 2021, more than 700,000 people have left their residences, and 3.2 million people are in need of shelters. The crisis has led to abandonment of entire neighborhoods, reduction in the housing stock, and an increase in rents of up to 200 percent. AXIS 3 PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, EDUCATION, AND OTHER BASIC SERVICES; SOCIAL INCLUSION; AND FOOD SECURITY • Food security and nutrition: Gang violence has contributed to unprecedented levels of hunger. In the ZMPP alone, the number of people in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 3 crisis or higher has increased from 856,000 in 2019 to more than 1,118,000 in 2023. Overall, the IPC of September 2024 indicates a disastrous situation throughout the country, with 50 percent of the analyzed population, 5.4 million people, experiencing acute food insecurity, an increase of more than 600,000 people RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 3 since August 2023 and more than 850,000 since the assassination of President Moïse in July 2021. • Displacement: The rise in violence, particularly in and around Port-au-Prince, has rendered entire neighborhoods uninhabitable. A significant proportion of the displaced population is from the ZMPP alone, with many residents fleeing to safer areas of the city or other regions of the country. As of September 2024, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded 702,973 internally displaced persons, a 22 percent increase from the previous assessment in June. • Access to basic services: Gang violence has left a large portion of educational and health care infrastructure damaged or destroyed. Of 93 health care institutions with beds in the ZMPP, 2 private hospitals have been destroyed, 11 hospitals partially damaged, 14 health centers with beds partially or totally damaged or looted, and 38 health care institutions closed. In terms of education, 233 of 6,774 schools were vandalized or damaged and 418 closed due to gang violence in the ZMPP, affecting more than 140,000 students. AXIS 4 RULE OF LAW, PUBLIC SECURITY, AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS • Rule of law and justice: The security crisis has weakened the judicial system, particularly in the ZMPP. Courts have been burned and looted, and gangs have threatened and killed judicial actors. Many judges have left the country, while many courts, including the tribunaux de première instance of Port-au-Prince and Croix-des-Bouquets, have had to be relocated to cramped, insecure premises, significantly affecting the judicial system’s ability to function. According to the Tribunal de Première Instance of Port-au-Prince, the volume of cases has decreased by 67 percent since 2020. • Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV): The level of violence has increased substantially in the ZMPP since 2021. Data from Kay Fanm, an SGBV service provider based in Port-au-Prince, indicates a 340 percent increase in the number of cases per year between 2020 and 2023. In some neighborhoods, up to 80 percent of women and young girls are survivors of SGBV. SGBV response services are also affected, facing institutional and systemic challenges that limit their capacity to address the problem. • Haitian National Police: Since 2021, the Haitian National Police (HNP) has lost a significant number of staff, as 86 police officers have died and many more have been injured, while more than 1,000 have left their posts. Infrastructure was heavily damaged as well. Of 412 HNP buildings, 76 are nonfunctional while 146 require major rehabilitation. In the first eight months of 2024 alone, 81 gang attacks destroyed 47 police stations and 2 prisons, and damaged 13 other buildings. • Prison system: Between 2022 and 2024, the Directorate of Penitentiary Administration (DAP) witnessed a reduction of more than 33 percent of its staff, from 1,224 to only 809 agents. Of these 809 agents, 787 are available for field duty, but only 262 are present simultaneously to oversee 11,273 detainees—a ratio of 43 detainees per agent. Most of the buildings are former military buildings that are unsuitable as prisons. • Community violence: Since 2023, armed groups have controlled approximately 80 percent of the ZMPP. Between April 1 and June 30, 2024, the Human Rights Service of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti documented 1,379 people murdered or injured and 428 kidnapped; 88 percent of the murders were in Port-au-Prince, often due to gang attacks. Investment Needs (2024–2026) The RCIA indicates the need for investment of approximately US$1.34 billion from 2024 to 2026: US$450 million (34 percent) for infrastructure, US$388 million (29 percent) for security and rule of law, US$386 million (29 percent) for social protection (of which US$150 million for essential recovery and social protection functions and US$118 million for access to basic services), and US$114 million (9 percent) for economic recovery and economic governance. Where possible, the RCIA includes provisions for the medium term (2026–30). The assessment recognizes that the investments needed for the transition period will require additional investments to consolidate the recovery and realize development gains. For 2026–30, the RCIA identifies provisional investment needs of US$2.3 billion: US$1.85 billion for infrastructure, US$270 million for security, US$153 million for social security and services, and US$24 million for economic recovery and governance. Crisis Recovery Framework Implementation of the RCIA will be based on the overarching vision for recovery as articulated in the April 2024 Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition “to put Haiti back on the road to dignity, 4 existing coordination arrangements in Haiti, including those related to humanitarian and security assistance, and will be linked accordingly. It is proposed that the government lead an institutional ar- rangement supported by a dedicated intergovernmental body responsible for overall coordination of recovery ef- forts. The proposed institutional framework for post-crisis recovery consists of the following groups: • A recovery steering committee should be established with overall responsibility for recovery efforts, including strategic oversight and decision-making on implementation and financing. As in other countries, it is proposed that the head of government lead this committee, which should be comprised of relevant line ministries, the four partner institutions, and international partners. • A recovery coordination group (RCG) should be estab- lished with responsibility for programmatic and opera- tional coordination, implementation, monitoring, review, and updating of the crisis recovery framework (CRF). It is proposed that the head of an operational monitoring unit (OMU) will chair the RCG, which will comprise technical representatives from relevant ministries and international partners. The RCG will constitute a forum for ensuring co- ordination across the four priority axes of the RCIA. • Thematic groups, corresponding to each of the four RCIA strategic objectives, should be established with responsi- bility for sectoral-level coordination, implementation, and monitoring. To support this institutional framework, the government proposes to establish an OMU to ensure coordination with international partners and enable effective mobilization and allocation of international financing. The proposed OMU will support the government ministries, organizations, and general directorates in the technical and financial planning, implementation, and monitoring of the RCIA. It is proposed that the World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and IADB support the OMU by providing technical advice and capacity-building support. • Monitoring arrangements: The RCIA monitoring frame- work will be based on the RCIA program framework and will be used to measure progress against three main aspects of RCIA implementation: progress toward programmatic out- puts, results, and outcomes during RCIA implementation; a set of milestones articulating actions that will serve as stepping stones for achieving the objectives; and transpar- ent tracking of aid flows (pledges, commitments, disburse- ments) and indicators for increasing aid effectiveness. 1 Article 16, Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition democratic legitimacy, stability, and sovereignty, and to ensure the proper functioning of the State’s institutions.” 1 This vision is based on a dual approach to recovery: addressing the immediate impact of the crisis while advancing longer-term reforms and structural changes that address deep-rooted drivers of instability and fragility. For the first two years of RCIA implementation, the overarching goal is to support recovery of communities most affected by the 2021–24 security crisis. Prioritization and sequencing: The environment for im- plementing recovery interventions will remain challenging over the short term, with enabling conditions emerging pro- gressively over time as progress is made on the security and political fronts. This will require a flexible and agile ap- proach to coordinating implementation of efforts across the strategic objectives and sectors of the RCIA. A three-stage approach to prioritization and sequencing of program im- plementation will be developed as a basis for coordination between the sectors, comprising geographic and temporal prioritization and sequencing of interventions where secu- rity conditions allow, operational phasing of interventions to account for variations in project delivery capacities and timelines, and prioritization of funding and resource alloca- tions to ensure that the most urgent and essential interven- tions are adequately financed in a timely manner. Transversal issues: The RCIA has followed an inclusive, participatory approach involving consultations with nation- al and local authorities, international partners, civil socie- ty, and the private sector. Factors such as gender and age have played a key role in understanding the needs and abilities of individuals and the risks they face in this crisis. Each priority axis reflects a range of cross-sectoral issues, including gender, children and youth, and climate. Imple- mentation of identified investments will ensure that the tar- geting mechanisms reach the most vulnerable populations. Institutional Framework Ensuring alignment of national and international efforts in implementing post-crisis recovery efforts requires adequate institutional capacity for recovery planning coordination and monitoring. Building on international best practice and experience, a three-level structure is proposed for the institutional framework for implementation of recovery efforts identified in the RCIA. This architecture, which will be further developed and agreed between the government and its partners at the start of RCIA implementation, will also provide the framework for managing future revisions, updates, and expansion of recovery efforts as conditions evolve. This framework will complement—and not duplicate— RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 5 I. Introduction 6 Objectives 4. The RCIA will guide efforts to address immediate sta- bilization and recovery priorities. The priorities are de- signed to create conditions for a peaceful long-term tra- jectory of development and growth. Building on the vision for transition and recovery articulated in the April 3 agree- ment, as well as the transitional government’s roadmap, the RCIA has three objectives. • Assess the impact of the crisis (2021–24) in the most af- fected regions, particularly the ZMPP, on the population, the economy and poverty, physical infrastructure, and ba- sic services and institutions. • Define a recovery framework and investment plan for fis- cal 2025 and 2026 aligned with the priorities outlined in the prime minister’s roadmap for the transition period. • Strengthen coordination of actions and interventions between the government and technical and financial partners with the support of the World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and IADB. 5. The RCIA is structured around four priority axes of intervention: economic recovery, infrastructure reha- bilitation, social services, and rule of law. These priori- ty axes, and corresponding sectors and subsectors, were identified in joint workshops under the leadership of the Government Haiti (GoH), reflecting government programs and priorities for the transition period (Figure 1). The rele- vant government ministry and partner institution co-led the work under each axis, depending on their mandate and comparative advantage. Assessment Methodology 6. Development of the RCIA followed a three-phased approach: an initial preparatory phase to define the scope, objectives, and parameters of the assessment (June/July); an assessment phase to conduct the impact and needs assessment (August); and a consolidation phase to develop the RCIA reports, recovery framework, and investment plan (August/September). 7. The RCIA follows a rapid assessment methodology that draws from post-conflict and post-disaster approaches and builds on ongoing government programs and mobili- zation of local expertise through projects and partners to develop estimates of damages and needs as a basis for Background and Rationale 1. After having experienced several multidimensional crises for years, Haiti is at a critical juncture. The Kingston Declaration of March 11, 2024, concluded negotiations among various Haitian actors for an inclusive political transition and led to the April 3 Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition, bringing together a wide range of Haitian stakeholders and establishing a transitional institutional architecture that includes a bicameral executive with a Presidential Transition Council and a transitional government. After weeks of consultations, the Presidential Transition Council was officially established on April 25, 2024, a transitional prime minister was designated on May 28, 2024, and a cabinet was appointed to implement a program aimed at concluding the transition process (see Section II). After the escalation of political and social instability since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, this transition process presents a window of opportunity to end the cycle of violence and forge a path out of fragility. 2. Recognizing that improvements in infrastructure and services must accompany progress in the political pro- cess, the government requested support for a rapid crisis impact assessment (RCIA). In May 2024, the government requested assistance from the World Bank, United Na- tions, European Union, and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (the partner institutions) in assessing the im- pact of the 2021–24 crisis and developing an investment plan to address immediate stabilization and recovery pri- orities. The RCIA has been undertaken under the leader- ship of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) with the participation of relevant government ministries and expert teams from the four partner institutions. It was conduct- ed between July and October 2024 based on the 2008 Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recov- ery Planning 2 and follows the established methodology and global practice that has been used to support govern- ments in similar post-crisis assessment and planning. 3. This report summarizes the findings and recommen- dations of the RCIA. It evaluates the impact of the 2021– 24 crisis and defines urgent stabilization and recovery priorities, complementing broader security, political, and humanitarian efforts. In light of the dynamic nature of the situation, the RCIA identifies recovery priority interventions for 2024–26 with a focus on the Port-au-Prince metropol- itan area (ZMPP) and establishes a recovery framework to guide the expansion of interventions to other parts of the country as security conditions improve. 2 The Joint Declaration seeks to mobilize the resources of the European Commission, the United Nations Development Group, and the World Bank to harmonize and coordinate post-crisis response frameworks to enhance country resilience to crises by meeting the recovery needs of vulnerable populations and increasing the capacity of national institutions for effective prevention, response, and recovery. RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 7 • Rapid assessment approach: Recognizing the urgency of the situation, the RCIA has drawn on existing data and analyses as well as consultations with an extensive network of stakeholders. Given the paucity of existing primary data, targeted field assessments and primary data collection have been undertaken where critical information gaps persist. • Limited timeframe: The RCIA identifies and quantifies short-term priority needs for the transition period of 2024–26, although implementation of associated projects may extend beyond the first two years. Where possible, the assessment includes provisions for the medium term (2026–30) to identify investments necessary to consolidate recovery and development gains. • Prioritization of needs: Given the two-year investment planning period agreed upon for the RCIA, a set of standardized prioritization criteria were applied as part of the needs assessment. • Geographic focus: While recognizing that the security crisis extends beyond the ZMPP, the RCIA has prioritized the communes that the crisis has affected most (see map above and Section II). Wherever possible, given the constraints in time and access, the RCIA does cover the Artibonite Department (notably for Axes 2 and 3). The results and the associated recovery framework establish the basis upon which further assessments can be conducted, including in areas outside of Port-au-Prince. • Inclusive, agile coordination: The RCIA was conducted by government and partner institutions and involved technical teams drawn from across all relevant ministries prioritizing investments in recovery and reconstruction. To arrive at these estimates, the RCIA differentiates direct from indirect impacts. Direct impacts are damage and losses to physical and human capital (e.g., destruction of infrastructure, death, population displacement, environmental risks), and indirect impacts encompass broader social and economic consequences (e.g., losses in access to markets, education, or employment; increases in malnutrition, mortality, and crime). 8. The RCIA methodology also draws on lessons learned from implementation of the 2004 Emergency Assistance Programs for Post-Conflict Crisis and from initiatives re- lated to the 2010 and 2021 post-disaster needs assess- ments. The RCIA identifies priority interventions, results, and investment requirements and provides the foundation for long-term recovery planning to ensure sustained sup- port to security, governance, infrastructure, and social ser- vices. 9. In addition to the analysis of crisis impact and associated recovery needs, the RCIA includes development of a crisis recovery framework that defines a set of priority actions and an associated investment plan for 2024–26. This recovery framework is designed to help operationalize the RCIA, facilitate operational alignment between national and international partners, and ensure that adequate financing is allocated. The assessments of damages and needs provided in this report are estimates that will be refined during the implementation stages, as the security crisis remains unresolved at the time of this writing. 10. The RCIA was undertaken on the basis of the following parameters (Box 1). FIGURE 1: Overview of Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment Priority Axes Economic recovery and diversification and institutional strengthening PRIORITY AXIS 1 PRIORITY AXIS 2 PRIORITY AXIS 3 PRIORITY AXIS 4 PRIORITY AXIS 1 1 Private Sector1 Transportation 1 Internal Displacement 1 Justice 2 Administrative Governance 2 Electricity 2 Social Protection2 SGBV 3 Economic & Financial Governance 3 Water & Sanitation3 Education 3 Police 4 Transparency /Accountability 4 Telecoms & Digital4 Food Security 4 Prisons 5 Housing 5 Health 5 Community Violence Reduction 6 Public Buildings Economic recovery and diversification and institutional strengthening Promote access to basic social services, social inclusion and food security Rehabilitation of infrastructure and reduction of vulnerabilities LEADS: MTPTC - IADB LEADS: MAST - IADB/WBG LEADS: MTPTC - UN LEADS: MEF - WBG/EU Rule of law, public security and institutional reforms 8 and sectors. With the government leading the process, the RCIA has included consultations with national and local authorities, international partners, civil society, and the private sector. • Complementarity: The RCIA programs complement and do not duplicate other assessment and planning processes such as the Humanitarian Action Plan. Implementation and funding appeals will be coordinated with these other processes. BOX 1: RCIA Prioritization Criteria 11. Constraints and limitations: The RCIA was conducted within a short time frame and in a context of ongoing violence in the ZMPP, with virtually no access to the geographic areas of focus. This placed significant constraints on the types, amount, and accuracy of data available to conduct the impact and needs assessment across a range of sectors. Where possible, the teams used geospatial technologies and modeling to complement existing data and analyses from the government and the partner institutions. As such, the results of the RCIA are estimates that require further development as data availability improves. Mandatory Criteria • The activity aligns with the five priority areas defined in the April 3, 2024 Agreement and the Transitional Government’s roadmap. • The activity will have an immediate and visible impact on the restarting of economic activity and public services. • The activity will have an immediate and visible impact on the poorest and most vulnerable groups or households in the population. • The activity can be feasibly implemented within the proposed timeline, considering the current security context, available implementation capacities, and financial constraints. Additional Criteria • The activity builds trust and momentum for the transition by restoring state authority and presence, improving security, reducing violence, and facilitating the return of displaced populations. • The activity lays the groundwork for long-term investments in recovery and development. Structure of the Report 12. This report has two main components. The first (Sections II and III) outlines context and summarizes the outcomes of the RCIA, and the second (Sections IV to VI) presents a recovery framework and investment plan for operationalizing the RCIA and ensuring a structured, coherent approach to the coordination, implementation, and financing of priority interventions for 2024–26 while establishing a process for expanding recovery efforts as conditions evolve. RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 9 • Inclusive, agile coordination: The was conducted by government and partner institutions, involving technical teams drawn from across all relevant ministries and sectors. With the government leading the process, the RCIA has included consultations with national and local authorities, international partners, civil society, and the private sector. • Complementarity: The RCIA programs complement and do not duplicate other assessment and planning processes such as the Humanitarian Action Plan. Implementation and funding appeals will be coordinated with these other processes. BOX 1: RCIA Prioritization Criteria 11. Constraints and limitations: The RCIA was conducted within a short time-frame and in a context of ongoing violence in the ZMPP, with virtually no access to the geographic areas of focus. This placed significant constraints on the types, amount, and accuracy of data available to conduct the impact and needs assessment across a range of sectors. Where possible, the teams used geospatial technologies and modeling to complement existing data and analyses from the government and the partner institutions. As such, the results of the RCIA are estimates that require further development as data availability improves. Structure II. Context of the Crisis in Haiti 10 13. Haiti’s political transition provides a window of opportunity to exit the cycle of violence. After the resignation of the government under Prime Minister Ariel Henry in March 2024, political factions reached consensus on the provisions of the transition process and modalities for political decision-making during this process, including a transitional presidential council and a transitional government led by a prime minister. The transitional presidential council assumes the functions of the president and includes nine representatives from various political parties and civil society (seven voting members, two observers). A transitional government was inaugurated to create the conditions for improving security and preparing and implementing elections. During the transition period, retaining the integrity of government and the presidential council will remain critical to sustaining political stability and ensuring implementation of critical investments. 14. Transition authorities committed to the implementa- tion of a roadmap, pursuing five objectives: public and national security; economic recovery, infrastructure reha- bilitation, food and health security; constitutional issues; rule of law and justice; and elections for the renewal of po- litical personnel. The last pillar highlights that the author- ities have committed to conclude the transition in Febru- ary 2026 by installing newly elected officials after general elections with the support of international partners. 15. While elections are supposed to conclude the transition period, the brevity of the transition requires swift action to improve livelihoods of violence-affected populations. With the last general elections held in 2015, parliament, the senate, and many local governments have exhausted their political mandates. In the present context, organizing of general elections requires a complex set of constitutional amendments and administrative preparations. Notably, a substantial improvement of security conditions remains a precondition to ensure an environment in which elections can be held that yield results that are widely accepted among political parties and will not be contested ex post. Past experiences indicate that gangs may be used to garner votes for candidates, which would undermine the credibility of the outcome. An improvement in the security environment will not only depend on advances in law enforcement but need to be complemented by progress in political processes. The living conditions of populations affected by violence need to be improved swiftly, notably in areas where state authority is reestablished, to sustain government control and strengthen the resilience of local communities against gang infiltration and violence. 16. International support for additional investments in Haiti’s social, economic, and physical infrastructure will be critical to generate confidence in the transition process and ensure improvements in service delivery and economic opportunities. Considering the economic contraction, the transition government has limited fiscal space to advance the necessary investments. On August 19, the council of ministers issued an amended budget decree for fiscal 2024 that reduced the overall budget available by 20.5 percent due to a shortfall in projected resources. Similarly, the execution rate of capital spending remains low (see Section III), highlighting that the ongoing multidimensional crisis has further limited institutional capacities due to brain drain that the upsurge in emigration has generated. In light of these constraints and the damage and losses due to the crisis, increased international support for the funding and implementation of investment priorities remains indispensable for the success of the transition period. Macroeconomic Context 17. Haiti’s economy has contracted by an estimated 8.5 percent over the past decade as longstanding structural challenges increased vulnerability to shocks. 3 Structural challenges include state capture by vested interests, a non- enabling business environment, underinvestment in human capital, and deficient infrastructure. Underdeveloped financial markets and limited market contestability have contributed to a large informal economy, limiting domestic resource mobilization and fiscal space. Disaster risk management and response systems are inadequate to address vulnerability to natural hazards and climate change, which disproportionately affects the poor. In this context, Haiti has been highly vulnerable to a series of significant shocks since 2018, including the COVID-19 pandemic, a surge in international commodity prices after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, earthquakes and storms, and most recently, escalation of violence and political instability. 18. The business environment deteriorated progressively since 2018 and then sharply beginning in 2021 because of a series of sociopolitical disturbances, creating a challenging operating environment for enterprises. Social unrest and waves of violence, including several episodes of complete paralysis of the economy, characterized 2018 and 2019. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic introduced shocks that led to economic contraction and layoffs. The increase in gang-related violence by the end of 2021 disrupted domestic supply chains, including fuel and food distribution. For firms, this resulted in a reduction in productive activities and profits because of partial or permanent closure of production sites or firms, increasing security costs, staff resignations due to emigration, and pillaging and vandalism that have resulted in losses and damage to capital stock (physical and human). 3 Contraction in real gross domestic product (GDP) from 2015 to 2024, including estimates for 2023 and forecasted values for 2024. RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 11 19. Inflation accelerated in 2020 and surged in 2022 as Haiti navigated shocks and logistical disruptions. Sharp depreciation of the Haitian gourde in 2020 led to higher import prices in local currency terms. Central Bank intervention briefly slowed inflation in 2021, before a commodity price shock led to monetization of the deficit, weaking the gourde. Inflation accelerated in late 2022 and early 2023 as food and fuel prices surged, following disruptions at the ports due to gang violence. Headline inflation is trending down, but food inflation remains high, affecting poor households the most (Figure 2). Living standards have deteriorated, with 36.4 percent of Haitians living in extreme poverty in 2024 (less than US$2.15/day FIGURE 2: Inflation, Annual Percentage Change Jan 20 CPI CPI–Local ProductsCPI–Imported Products Sep 20 May ... May ... Jan 22 Jan 24 Sep 22 May ... Source: L’Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’Informatique. “Indice des Prix à la Consommation.” https://ihsi.gouv.ht/publications/publications_regulieres. Note: CPI, Consumer Price Index. 0 20 40 60 80 3.65 US$ 2017 PPP Source: World Bank 2024a. Note: PPP, purchasing power parity. FIGURE 3: Share of Population Living Below Lower-Middle- Income (US$3.65) and International (US$2.15) Poverty Lines 20122014201620182020202220242026 % 30 20 40 50 60 70 2.15 US$ 2017 PPP 2017 purchasing power parity), up from 29.9 percent in 2020 (Figure 3). 20. Changes in nighttime light intensity reflect Haiti’s prolonged economic contraction, illustrating the particularly severe impact of insecurity on Port-au-Prince. Nighttime light intensity is strongly correlated with economic activity and is often used to assess GDP (Beyer, Hu, and Yao 2022; Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2012; Morris and Zhang 2019; Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2016). Nighttime light intensity in Haiti is highest in the urban centers of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitian, where economic activity is concentrated. Figures 4a and 4b illustrate the substantial –100% 0% 100% 200% 167% 137% 129.7% 91.2% 40.5% 29.9% 24.8% –45.0%Ouest L’Artibonite Centre Sud-Est Nord Sud Nord-Est Nord-Ouest Nippes –17.5% Source: Román et al. 2018. Source: Román et al. 2018. 2018 0 1 2 3 20192020202120222023 Cap Hatien Port-au-Prince Autre 2024 a b NIGHTTIME LIGHT INTENSITY FIGURE 4: Change in Nightime Light Intensity, 2018–2024, According to (a) Urban Area and (b) Department 12 2020 2022202320242021 Sources: Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (MEF), World Bank estimates and forecast for 2023 and 2024. FIGURE 5: Trade Balance and Remittance Inflows 2015 8 6 4 2 0 –2 –4 –6 20172016 20192018 US$ BILLIONS Exports Trade BalanceRemittance InflowsImports Sources: MEF (2024); World Bank estimates and forecast for 2023 and 2024. FIGURE 6: Revenue, Expenditures, and Fiscal Balance 2015 11 5 1 -4 2017 2020 20222016 20192018 2021 20232024 Revenues Remittance InflowsExpenditures PERCENT GDP FIGURE 7: Monthly Sales Tax Revenues, Realized and under Counterfactual Scenario, Large Taxpayers, Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince, Million Haitian Gourdes at 2018 Prices ConterfactualActual Sales Tax Revenues Source: Calculations by CEPAL based on data provided by the General Directorate of Taxes, Ministry of Economy and Finances 2014 1.200 1.000 800 600 400 200 - 201520162017201820192020202120222023 and persistent decline in nighttime light intensity in Port-au- Prince, which declined by an estimated 45.9 percent from January 2018 to August 2024. 21. Haiti’s trade deficit has widened, led by a decline in exports since 2019. As in other countries, the COVID-19 pandemic dampened demand for exports in 2020, particularly in the apparel sector. Exports continued to decline in US dollar terms in 2023 and 2024, amidst widespread insecurity and disruptions to port operations (Figure 5). Imports also decreased during the pandemic but rapidly increased as global commodity prices rose in 2021 and 2022. Persistent economic contraction and depreciation of the gourde have limited demand for imports. Remittance inflows have been an important external source of stability, helping finance an increasing trade deficit. Remittances have increased with more workers leaving the country. The current account balance has oscillated as a result of changes in the trade balance and remittances, moving from deficit in 2019 to a surplus in 2020 as imports contracted and back into a deficit as international commodity prices surged in 2022 and 2023, resulting in an increase in the import bill. Higher remittance inflows are expected to narrow the current account deficit to 0.2 percent of GDP in 2024. 22. Fiscal and monetary underperformance reflect the challenging economic, political, and security context. Revenues and expenditures have declined as a percentage of GDP since 2015 (Figure 6). As Haiti collects more than 50 percent of tax revenue at the border, the contraction in trade has compressed government revenues. The fiscal deficit widened substantially during and after the pandemic. Part of the deficit was monetized, contributing to inflationary 4 In the terminology Haitian tax authorities indicate, this category includes taxpayers whose annual revenue is 10 million gourdes or more (~US$75,000). 5 Similar results are obtained by projecting the evolution of turnover tax using econometric techniques using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and by weighting the participation of the distributive trades sector in total economic activity. pressure and leading to depreciation of the currency. Subdued economic activity and weakened administrative capacity have reduced sales tax revenues. Sales tax data (value-added tax on large taxpayers 4 in the ZMPP) shows that accumulated losses reached 8.9 million gourdes at April 2018 prices 5 (equivalent to approximately US$67.7 million) compared with an alternative estimated scenario of collections under normalized conditions (Figure 7). Revenue collection strengthened moderately in 2023 following administrative reforms in customs and an increase in fuel tax revenue, whereas an increase in violence impaired implementation of capital projects in 2024. As a result, the deficit has narrowed, and for the first time in many years, monetary financing remained within statutory limits of 20 percent of the previous fiscal year’s tax revenues. RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 13 Source: World Bank (2018), (2020). Note: U.S. dollar estimates based on 2024 exchange rates. 2018–202021–24 TOTAL TOTAL -18.4 -20.7 -39.0 Agriculture -1.8 -4.5 -6.3 Industry -9.3 -5.9 -15.2 Services -4.9 -11.8 -16.7 Net taxes on production-2.4 1.5 -0.9 2018-20 2021-24 TOTAL -4.6 -5.1 -9.7 -0.5 -1.1 -1.6 -2.3 -1.5 -3.8 -1.2 -2.9 -4.2 -0.6 0.4 -0.2 PERCENTAGE OF 2024 GDP US$ BILLION FIGURE 8: Estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Losses, 2018–2024 Pandemic-Period Losses –18.4% of 2024 GDP, –$4.68 2021-24 Losses –20.7% of 2024 GDP, –$5.1B Crisis and Violence Context 25. The security context has gradually worsened since 2018 and remains volatile. Since the resignation of former Prime Minister Ariel Henry on April 25, 2024, the number of violent events and fatalities remains high and above the long-term average. According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), the number of violent events rose from 463 in 2018 to 1,623 in 2023 and 1,449 in the first eight months of 2024 (Figure 9). Data from the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) 6 indicate a declining trend in Q2 of 2024, recording 2,113 gang-related killings from January to April and 1,340 from May to August. Since 2018, waves of violence have increased in severity, with the standard deviation of the count of all violent events of one particular year increasing from below 10 in 2018 to above 60 in 2024 (Figure 10). At the same time, the share of protests and riots to violent events decreased, with volatility within previous ranges despite significant risks of renewed periods of large-scale civil unrest. 26. While reporting on fatalities from gang violence varies among data sources, the average lethality of a violent event appears to have declined in 2024 from previous INDEX (2015 = 100) 2015201620172018201920202021202220232024 130 125 120 115 110 105 100 95 90 85 2018 Forecast 2020 Forecast Actual 6 Reported numbers of fatalities differ between ACLED and BINUH due to different methodologies. While ACLED relies mostly on newspaper articles 23. Comparing Haiti’s economic performance with precrisis forecasts can provide a framework with which to estimate total economic losses. A 2018 forecast serves as an upper estimate of Haiti’s economic trajectory prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and a subsequent period of deepening political instability and violence (Figure 8). A late 2020 forecast provides an adjusted estimate of economic growth incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Actual economic growth is estimated using national accounts supplemented by recent estimates for 2023 and a forecast of 2024 growth. This approach provides an estimate of lost economic output over two periods: 2018–20 (the pandemic period) and 2021–24 (corresponding to the RCIA). These estimates provide initial quantification of losses and analysis of the economic sectors most affected. 24. Total lost output since 2018 is estimated at 39.0 percent of 2024 GDP (US$9.7 billion). The services sector lost the most output (16.7 percent of 2024 GDP), followed by industry (15.2 percent) and agriculture (6.3 percent). Total output lost can be decomposed between the pandemic period (18.4 percent of GDP) and the 2021–24 period (39.0 percent of GDP). The channels of transmission of the crisis in the respective economic subsectors are further analyzed in Section III. and social media posts, BINUH relies on personal networks within affected communities. 14 FIGURE 10: Share (left a xis) and Standard Deviation (SD) (right axis) of Violent Events, Protests, and Riots Protests and RiotsViolent Events SD Violent EventsSD Protests and Riots Source: See Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (accessed September 1, 2024), https://acleddata.com/. 2018 20192020 202120222023 2024 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% FIGURE 9: Number of Violent Events (left axis) and Fatalities (right axis), 2018–24 Violent events Fatalities (RHS)Protests and riots Source: See Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (accessed September 1, 2024), https://acleddata.com/. Jan 18 Aug 18 Mar 19 Oct 19 May 20 Dec 20 Jul 21 Feb 22 Sep 22 Apr 23 Nov 23 Jun 24 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 years. From January to August 2024, ACLED counted 1,020 conflict-related fatalities (a decrease of almost 44 percent compared with the same period in 2023). For the same period, BINUH counted an increase of 15 percent from 2,999 fatalities in 2023 to 3,456 in 2024, highlighting the challenges of monitoring, verifying, and classifying violent events in Haiti’s context. 7 According to ACLED, the month with the single most violent events was in 2024, although the average count of fatalities has largely remained below the 2023 average (Figure 11). Tabarre, Gressier, and Port- au-Prince emerge as hotspots in terms of relative violence intensity. Per 100,000 population, Tabarre registered more than 76 fatalities in 2023 and 2024, Gressier 65, and Port- au-Prince 54 (Figure 12), significantly above the average of many other countries affected by conflict or violence. Areas such as Carrefour, Delmas, and Kenscoff are subject to violence yet registered fewer fatalities relative to their population size. At the same time, serious human rights violations remain of major concern. Between January and September, BINUH counted more than 1,054 kidnappings for ransom and a significant increase in cases of sexual violence against women and girls (BINUH 2024). 27. Violence remains concentrated in the Ouest Department. 8 Gangs have sought to expand their areas of influence outside of the ZMPP. They have attacked government infrastructure in the south of the ZMPP and in downtown Port-au-Prince and gained control of all routes 7 Various factors can affect the error margin of methodologies relying on media analysis, such as cellphone penetration and internet coverage (Dietrich and Eck 2020). in and out of Port-au-Prince, disrupting transportation and limiting access to humanitarian aid. During the summer of 2024, gangs launched attacks in previously largely violence-free communities such as Carrefour, Ganthier, and Gressier and expelled the Haitian National Police (HNP), causing serious damage to police infrastructure. Gangs also attempted to gain control over Arcahaie and Cabaret, although up to September 2024, their advances were limited amid resistance from local communities and the HNP. The Ouest Department accounted for more than 80 percent of all violent events between 2018 and August 2024 (Figure 13). Artibonite is the second most affected department and witnessed the largest relative increase in violence between 2022 and 2023, severely limiting economic and agricultural activities in the area (BINUH 2023). Scenarios and Risks 28. Improvements in the security environment of Port- au-Prince will depend both on the success of the transi- tion process as well as the support for the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) and the HNP. The MSSM became operational throughout the summer of 2024 8 ACLED may underreport violent events in areas outside metropolitan Port-au-Prince due to lack of access to internet or media outlets, which may contribute to more comprehensive coverage of events in Port-au-Prince. 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 15 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 FATALITIES 0 100 200 300 Violent events Linear (violent events) Fatalities 2023Fatalities 2024 Source: See Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (accessed September 1, 2024), https://acleddata.com/. FIGURE 11: Average Fatalities per Month from Violent Events, 2018–24 FIGURE 12: Fatalities per 100,000 Population by Commune, September 2023 to August 2024 Source: See Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (accessed September 1, 2024), https://acleddata.com/. 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Tabarre Thomazeau Pétion-Ville Gressier Cité-Soleil Delmas Port-au-Prince Ganthier Carrefour Kenscoff Croix-des-Bouquets Fonds Parisien Source: See Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (accessed September 1, 2024), https://acleddata.com/. FIGURE 13: Share of Violent Events According to Department Ouest Sud-Est Nord-OuestArtibonite Centre Grande-Anse Nippes Sud SudNord-Est Nord 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% with the deployment of a contingent of approximately 400 officers (out of 2,500 officers initially anticipated). 9 In initial operations with the HNP, the MSSM helped secure some key infrastructure and temporarily liberated, among others, the Varreux terminal as well as road corridors from gang control. The MSSM cooperates closely with the HNP to clear areas from gang control, with a number of successful operations amid continuous support from Kenya for the MSSM and pledges for additional deployment of personnel by other countries. However, persistent shortages of 9 At the time of this writing, support from Caribbean nations remains well below projected levels, with only 24 officers from Jamaica arriving instead of 250 expected from the Bahamas, Belize, and Jamaica. 234 344 527 699 1401 1958 4 59 52 26 135 283 860 68 16 personnel, resources, and appropriate equipment are limit- ing its operational effectiveness and ability to maintain con- trol of liberated areas. 29. Most major political factions came to align on the priority of improving security conditions, including with the help of external security forces. The MSSM is the latest in a series of security support missions in Haiti, some of which have created significant resistance against external intervention. While differences persist, Haiti’s political leadership and population have increased their support for the MSSM. While the renewal of the United Nations Security Council mandate for the MSSM until October 2025 does not envision its transformation, the debate on the future of the MSSM highlights the need to equip the MSSM with sufficient resources and equipment to achieve the goal of establishing a secure environment for general elections. At the same time, it showcases a broad consensus to ensure reliable, sufficient funding for the MSSM, with a predictable long-term horizon. 30. Three broad scenarios are conceivable, determin- ing the extent to which the RCIA investment plan can be implemented. Under an optimistic scenario, political stability sustains and supports an expansion of the op- erations of the HNP, supported by the MSSM. Legislative and administrative preparations for the elections are con- cluded in time, made possible by a gradual improvement in security conditions. Elections are held with no or only small delay. In such a scenario, investments in social cap- ital and physical infrastructure can play an important role in improving social cohesion and reducing violence. Pro- curement and implementation of projects, notably for in- frastructure rehabilitation, improve, and access to affect- ed neighborhoods for social protection and employment schemes increases. As the election results are widely ac- cepted, projects will be able to operate and disburse after the transition period ends. 31. Under a second scenario, the consensus on the transition process begins to fail, threatening political stability, fueling violence, and undermining the abili- ty of authorities to base political decisions on a broad consensus. Allegations of corruption and government re- shuffles or other high-level disputes can undermine polit- ical stability and the integrity of the transition institutions, drawing attention away from recovery and stabilization efforts. The MSSM continues to operate in support of the HNP but has difficulty maintaining security in liberated areas as a political consensus is lacking or delayed on how to expand service provisioning and deal with current or former gang members. Elections are held but contest- ed. Security conditions improve, and investment projects proceed, yet the time horizon is limited due to the risk of political unrest and gang activities, including persistent threats to the national ports and airports. 32. Under a pessimistic scenario, political instability undermines the advances of the HNP and MSSM and may risk the missions’ sustainability over political disagreements on external support. As security conditions remain poor, few investments can proceed, with challenges in procurement and access prevailing for all investments foreseen in the RCIA. The sustainability of commenced projects depends on whether elections can be held in time and peacefully. 33. The second and third scenarios entail significant risks. Gangs would be likely to reinforce their established criminal networks in the neighborhoods under their control and extend them to newly infiltrated areas. With strong territorial control, gangs risk gaining political and social capital and credibility by claiming that political and economic elites, as well as the international community, would remain unable to protect the population and pro- vide services. At the same time, attacks against the popu- lation to consolidate or expand territorial control are likely to increase, including in areas outside the ZMPP. The illic- it economy linked to international illegal trafficking net- works would grow as gangs’ violence capacity increases, undermining confidence of the population of the ability of the state to protect its population and infrastructure. RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 17 III. Crisis Impact and Priority Needs 18 Priority Axis 1 ECONOMIC RECOVERY, SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION, AND STRENGTHENING OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 37. The security crisis has had widespread, persistent impacts on every sector of the economy. As illustrated in Section 1, comparing Haiti’s economic performance with precrisis forecasts can provide a framework to estimate total economic losses. Total lost output since 2018 is es- timated to be 39.0 percent of 2024 GDP (US$9.7 billion), which includes losses originating in the 2018–20 period (18.4 percent of 2024 GDP) and the 2021–24 period (20.7 percent of 2024 GDP). The substantial decline in economic activity is confirmed by a statistical analysis of economic activity, declining intensity of nighttime lights, and a sharp decline in port traffic. The 2021–24 security crisis has led to a significant decline in economic activity and employ- ment, notably through looting, pillaging, and disruption of transportation routes. 38. The security crisis has also exacerbated deficiencies in essential functions of economic governance at the national and local levels. Public sector employment fell from 112,631 in September 2021 to 104,029 in June 2024, a 7.8 percent reduction in the workforce. More than one- half of departing civil servants were technical staff. This situation has also significantly affected the personnel of local administrations in affected areas, where dozens of employees have left. In other cases, such as in Gressier, municipal offices have been closed and abandoned. 34. The 2021–24 crisis has had a devastating impact on Port-au-Prince and on the country as a whole. The impact of this crisis has been far-reaching, affecting most of the population in the metropolitan area and resulting in disruption, damage, and losses across all sectors, spanning economic productivity, critical infrastructure, basic social services, and the ability of the state to provide essential institutional functions, including public security and law and order. While the RCIA focuses on the most affected areas and populations of the ZMPP, the crisis has had cascading effects throughout the country, given regional commercial, financial, transportation, and other dependencies. 35. This section summarizes the impact assessment of and corresponding needs to stabilize the respective sec- tors and facilitate economic and social recovery. In the short term (2024–26), the RCIA has identified needs of US$1.34 billion. US$450 million (34 percent) is needed for infrastructure, US$388 million (29 percent) for security and rule of law, US$386 million (29 percent) for social protection (of which US$150 million is for essential social protection programs and US$118 million for access to basic services), and US$114 million (9 percent) is needed for economic re- covery and governance (Figure 14). 36. Recovery needs for 2024 to 2026 were selected using a rigorous prioritization process that informed the definition of priority programs and interventions and associated investment requirements across the four priority axes and corresponding sectors. This section summarizes the results of the RCIA and needs identification for all four priority axes. Where possible, estimates for medium-term recovery needs (2026–30) have been included, which will be further developed in future reviews of the RCIA recovery and investment framework. FIGURE 14: Financing Needs by Axis, 2024–26 500,000,000 450,000,000 400,000,000 350,000,000 300,000,000 250,000,000 200,000,000 150,000,000 100,000,000 50,000,000 0 US$ 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% AXIS 1: Economic recovery, support for economic and diversification, and institutional reforms to strengthen economic governance AXIS 2: Rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure and reduction of vulnerabilities to natural and climate shocks AXIS 3: Promotion of access to health, education, and other basic services, social inclusion, and food security AXIS 4: Rule of law, public security, and institutional reforms 388,979,947385,941,400 450,192,439 114,950,000 9% 34% 29% 29% RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 19 CONTEXT 39. The business environment has deteriorated progres- sively since 2018 and sharply since 2021, creating an ex- tremely difficult operating environment for enterprises. The 2018–2019 period was characterized by social unrest, waves of violence, and several episodes of complete pa- ralysis of the economy (“peyi lòk”). In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic introduced several shocks that led to econom- ic contraction and layoffs. The increase in gang-related violence by the end of 2021 disrupted domestic supply chains, including fuel and food distribution. For firms, this resulted in a reduction in productive activities and reduced profits because of the partial or permanent closure of pro- duction sites or firms, increasing costs for security, staff res- ignations due to emigration, and pillaging and vandalism that resulted in losses and damage to capital stock (physi- cal and human). 40. Indicators of economic activity point to a persistent decline. The Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics Economic Activity Indicator is a broad measure of economic activity across the primary (agriculture), secondary (industry), and tertiary (services) sectors. Between the first quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2024, the Economic Activity Indicator declined by 17 percent. In the secondary sector, manufacturing, construction, and utilities (electricity and water) were severely affected, with a decline in economic activity of 16, 23, and 43 percent. In the tertiary sector, trade and the hotel industry (restaurants and hotels) suffered the greatest losses, with 26 and 23 percent declines. Data from economic activity on social media confirm the sizable impacts on sectors such as utility services. 10 41. The composition of employment has changed dramatically in the past four years. According to the Haiti High-Frequency Phone Survey, the share of employed respondents holding retail jobs—typically small-scale trading activities—increased from 27.8 to 43.2 percent between 2020 and 2023. At the same time, the share of employed respondents primarily engaged in public administration and education—core government functions—fell from 3.3 percent in 2020 to 2.4 percent in 2023, and the share primarily engaged in manufacturing almost halved, from 5.2 to 2.9 percent. High levels of informality prevail, and noncompliance with social security contribution payments rose from 78.9 percent in 2021 to 85.8 percent in 2023. 42. The labor market is increasingly characterized by in- work poverty. The High-Frequency Phone Survey 2021–23 shows that, despite dropping initially between 2020 and 2021, the share of working-age Haitians in employment increased between 2020 and 2023 by around 10.6 percentage points. At the same time, the marginal progress in poverty reduction between 2012 and 2018 has been reversed over the past three years amid further reduction in living standards. These developments suggest that an increasing share of the population is left in poverty despite employment, seeking alternative activities to sustain their livelihoods to cope with income shocks. 10 Grazzi, Llamas, Lotti and Peña (forthcoming) use activity by firms on Facebook and nighttime lights as proxies for economic activity, and using a two-way fixed-effects model, explore how increases in political events (battles, riots involving mob violence, explosions or episodes of remote violence, violence against civilians) and civil events (explosions or episodes of remote violence targeting civilians, general episodes of violence against civilians) can affect economic activity. FIGURE 15: Forecast vs. Actual Agriculture Growth FIGURE 16: Economic Activity Indicator, Indexed to Q1 2019 Agriculture Estimated Losses Compared with Forecasted AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 2018–20 2021–24 TOTAL Agriculture -1.8 -4.5 -6.3 2018–20 2021–24 TOTAL -0.5 -1.1 -1.6 PERCENTAGE OF 2024 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT US$ BILLION INDEX (2015 = 100) 20152017201920212023 120 115 110 105 100 95 90 85 80 75 –1.8% of 2024 GDP –4.5% of 2024 GDP 2018 Forecast 2020 Forecast Actual INDEX (100 = Q1 2019) 20192019202120212022 20232023 145 135 125 115 105 95 85 75 65 20 Estimated Losses Compared with Forecasted INDUSTRIAL SECTOR AGRICULTURE 43. Insecurity has caused supply chain disruptions, with dire consequences for millions of farmers. Total lost output in the agriculture sector from 2021 to 2024 is estimated at 4.5 percent of 2024 GDP (US$1.1 billion) (Figures 15 and 16). The agricultural sector is the main source of labor income for a large share of the population. The last household survey (2012) indicated that agriculture accounted for 39 percent of employment in Haiti. The sector is also an important contributor to export earnings. In 2021, agricultural exports included vetiver essential oil, which accounted for 4 percent of exports (US$46 million), followed by fisheries and crustaceans (US$27 million), tropical fruits (US$12 million, primarily mangoes), and cocoa (US$9 million). Gang control of the main road connecting the metropolitan zone with the south has essentially cut off road travel to the southern peninsula, where most vetiver production and some cocoa production occurs. Gang control of the roads connecting Port-au-Prince with the northern departments created disruptions for mango exports, and gang control of the road leading east through Croix-des-Bouquets threatens transport of coffee from Thiotte. 44. Due to insecurity, mangos can no longer be precleared for export to the United States, removing access to the main export market and drastically reducing income for farmers. Before the crisis, mango exports accounted for US$12 million annually, an essential source of income for hundreds of thousands of informal farmers. After a 48 percent decline in mango exports in 2022 due to issues related to lack of security, exports to the United States were halted in October 2022. The U.S. Department of Agriculture suspended the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services preclearance program because inspectors’ safety could not be guaranteed. The preclearance program was formally closed in January 2023 (Haiti Libre 2022) and has not been reinstated, making it unlikely that the U.S. market will reopen to Haitian farmers for the 2025 mango season. INDUSTRY 45. An industrial contraction began during the COVID-19 pandemic and deepened during the 2021–24 security crisis. The decline in industrial growth has been broad (Figure 17), with the Economic Activity Indicator showing a decline in manufacturing, construction, electricity and water, and mining activity (Figure 18). The estimated loss in output from the industrial sector is 15.2 percent of 2024 GDP, including the pandemic period (9.3 percent of 2024 GDP) and the 2021–24 period (5.9 percent of GDP). This decline corresponds to severe disruptions in electricity supply, as insecurity has constrained fuel shipments. Lower construction activity is reflective of the impact of insecurity on private investment and low execution rates of public investment capital projects. 46. In the manufacturing sector, the apparel sector has lost more than one-half of its formal employment since 2019, with losses concentrated in Port-au-Prince. Apparel PERCENTAGE OF 2024 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT US$ BILLION FIGURE 17: Forecast vs. Actual Industrial Growth INDEX (2015 = 100) 20152017201920212023 135 125 115 105 95 85 75 –9.3% of 2024 GDP –5.9% of 2024 GDP 2018 Forecastt 2020 Forecast Actual FIGURE 18: Economic Activity Indicator, Indexed to Q1 2019 INDEX (100 = Q1 2019) Mar 19 Nov 19 Jul 20 Mar 21 Nov 21 Jul 22 Mar 23 Nov 23 140 120 100 80 80 40 Manufacturing ConstructionElectricity and Water Mines and Quarries 2018–20 2021–24 TOTAL Industry -9.3 -5.9 -15.2 2018–20 2021–24 TOTAL -2.3 -1.5 -3.8 RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 21 2018 100M 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 0M 500M 1,000M 12-MONTH MOVING AVERAGE MONTHLY VALUE (US$) FIGURE 19: U.S. Textile and Apparel Imports from Haiti Source: Office of Textiles and Apparel Trade Data, U.S. Department of Commerce, https://www.trade.gov/otexa-trade-data-page. was Haiti’s top export, accounting for 82 percent of total exports and 90 percent of manufactured exports in 2019. The sector exported US$1.09 billion worldwide and employed nearly 53,000 people in 2019 (Vijil, Lewis-Bynoe, and Amo 2021). Duty-free access to the United States 11 and speed to market were among Haiti’s most significant competitive advantages (World Bank 2013). The COVID-19 pandemic constrained factory operations and output capacity, and U.S. orders declined precipitously. As worsening security conditions disrupted transport routes and availability of raw materials, the sector lost approximately 30,000 jobs (54 percent), and 15 enterprises stopped operations between 2022 and 2024. Approximately 55 percent of job losses overall occurred in the ZMPP (16,594, or 75 percent of all jobs in the garment industry in the ZMPP) in the same period. In June 2024, there were 18 enterprises employing 25,694 workers at a national level, of which only 5,396 remained in the ZMPP. 12 The decline in apparel exports to the United States from Haiti are evident from textile and apparel import data (Figure 19). The 12-month moving average of exports to the United States declined from US$1.0 billion in January 2019 to US$0.7 billion in 2024. SERVICES 47. The services sector accounts for the largest share of lost output from 2021 to 2024, estimated at 11.8 percent of 2024 GDP (Figures 20 and 21). This is reflective of the large share of services in the Haitian economy and the profound impacts of the security crisis on transportation, restaurants and hotels, and commerce, compounding the losses that began in the pandemic period. 11 Through the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act and Haiti Economic Lift Program. 12 Data from the Better Work Programme Haiti of the ILO. TRANSPORTATION 48. Transportation has been severely disrupted, as reflected in declining port traffic in Port-au-Prince. Since 2021, gangs have progressively increased control of the three main roads from and to the ZMPP (north via Tabarre and Canaan, south via Martissant, east via Croix des Bouquets), establishing checkpoints and threatening passengers and cargo in return for bribes. Control of these main arteries in and out of the capital has had devastating spillover effects on tourism, agriculture, apparel, and other sectors whose operations require the transport of persons or goods. In addition, the port (La Saline) and the airport of Port-au-Prince have been subject to gang attacks or seizures, resulting in their temporary closure, with serious consequences on virtually all aspects of supply and resulting in a sharp decline in import and export shipment volumes in Port-au-Prince between 2019 and 2024 (Figures 22a and 22b). FINANCIAL SECTOR 49. The worsening economic crisis and deteriorating op- erating environment for private enterprises has deeply affected the functioning and performance of the finan- cial system. Credit activities in the financial sector have been severely affected. The rate of nonperforming loans has progressively risen, from 2.5 percent of loans in Sep- tember 2018 to 6.7 percent in 2022 and 12.7 percent by March 31, 2024 (BRH 2024). 13 Exposure of the financial system to credit risk increased sharply, from 4.9 percent in September 2023 to 12.8 percent by March 31, 2024. A decrease in interest revenue has led to a decrease in return on assets, from 1.9 percent in 2021 to 1.1 percent 13 Évaluation d’impacts et Programme d’Appui aux Institutions Financières et Entreprises Débitrices du Système Financier Victimes de la Crise Socio- Politique, Banque de la République d’Haïti, Juillet 2024. 22 FIGURE 20: Forecast vs. Actual Services Growth FIGURE 21: Economic Activity Indicator, Indexed to Q1 2019 INDEX (2015 = 100) 20152017201920212023 135 125 120 115 110 105 100 95 90 –4.9% of 2024 GDP –11.8% of 2024 GDP 2018 Forecast INDEX (100 = Q1 2019) Mar 19 Nov 19 Jul 20 Mar 21 Nov 21 Jul 22 Mar 23 Nov 23 120 90 100 110 80 70 60 Commerce Restaurants & Hotels Transport & Communications Financial Institutions Other Services Non-Commercial Services 2020 Forecast Actual 2018–20 2021–24 TOTAL Services -4.9% -11.8% -16.7% 2018–20 2021–24 TOTAL -1.2 -2.9 -4.2 Estimated Losses Compared with Forecasted SERVICES SECTOR PERCENTAGE OF 2024 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT US$ BILLION FIGURE 22: Volume of (a) Imports and (b) Exports Sources: UN Global Platform, https://www.officialstatistics.org/; IMF PortWatch https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/faqs. Port-au-PrinceCap Haitien Saint-Marc 2019 0K 100K 200K 300K 2020 2019 2020 20222021 2023 20242021 2022 2023 2024 ESTIMATED VOLUME a b in 2024. Of all loans in difficulty, 68 percent are in the commerce sector and 17 percent the industrial sector. The same trends are visible in the microfinance sector. The nonperforming loan rate of savings and credit cooperatives rose from 8.5 percent in September 2021 to 11.1 percent in September 2023, and the nonregulated microfinance institutions’ nonperforming loan rate increased from 18.9 percent in September 2021 to 30.7 percent in September 2023 (BRH 2024). Financial institutions have also been victims of vandalism and violence. By September 2022, 41 bank branches across the country had been victims of aggression, pillaging, or arson, causing their closure. By March 2024, 18 more bank branches were vandalized or closed in the ZMPP. [... middle sections omitted for long document ...] RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 71 Priority Axis 4 STRENGTHENING RULE OF LAW AND PUBLIC SECURITY Priority ActionsPrograms Subprograms Indicators Budget, US$ (2024-2026) Guarantee proper functioning of justice and the fight against impunity Court and tribunal recovery program Accountability program for judicial actors Percentage of judicial actors trained on accountability mechanisms 28,861,447 Identify spaces that are sufficiently secure and large to relocate the two tribunaux de première instance Number of secure and suitable spaces identified Infrastructure rehabilitationNumber of judicial buildings rehabilitated Strengthen the National Identification Office Percentage of population with access to official identification via National Identification Office Accountability program for judicial actors Specialized courts program Number of operational specialized courts Strengthening of central financial intelligence unit Percentage increase in financial investigations conducted by central financial intelligence unit Strengthening of judicial inspection of Ministry of Justice and Public Security and High Council of the Judiciary of the Technical Certification Commission Number of inspections conducted in the courts Implementation of internal control mechanisms within courts and reinitiation of computerized management of judicial cases program Number of courts with internal control mechanisms in place and functional computerized management of judicial cases program Implementation of new penal and criminal procedure codes Development of draft laws to accompany codes Number of draft laws developed Participation in training seminarsNumber of training seminars organized Make recommendations for infrastructure and organize a popularization campaign Number of recommendations proposed and campaign conducted Specialized court program Training programs for magistratesNumber of magistrates trained Victim and witness protection programs for magistrates Number of protection programs in place 18 jurisdictions benefit from a legal assistance office Construction of six new legal assistance offices Number of jurisdictions benefiting from legal assistance office and new legal assistance offices built Strengthening of National Council for Legal Assistance through its 2021–26 strategic plan Number of measures of the National Council of Legal Assistance Standardization of legal assistance programs offered by other organi- zations, including nongovernmen- tal organizations Number of standardized programs Infrastructure program Rehabilitation Number of buildings rehabilitated Reconstruction Number of buildings rebuilt Equipment Amount of equipment provided 72 Priority ActionsPrograms Subprograms Indicators Budget, US$ (2024-2026) Strengthening prevention and response to SGBV Prevention of SGBV Education and awareness Number of awareness campaigns conducted 7,070,000 Training of community and religious leaders Number of leaders trained Community dialogue Number of community dialogues organized Media campaigns Number of media campaigns broadcast Response to SGBV Community monitoring mechanisms Number of monitoring mechanisms in place Multisector support services Number of people receiving multisectoral support services Training of professionals Number of professionals trained Safe spaces Number of safe spaces established Police Legal, institutional, command and control framework Consolidation of legal, institutional and structural framework of HNP Number of consolidated legal and institutional frameworks 138,960,000 Strengthening of gender policy within HNP and provide it with legal instruments to combat gender-based violence Number of gender policies strengthened Establishment of internal control mechanisms within HNP Number of internal control mechanisms established Human resources and working conditions Increasing training capacity of the HNP (exiting project) Number of training projects initiated Development of human capital Number of human capital development programs implemented Strengthening of institutional capacity of HNP Tbd Improvement in working conditions by providing work material and equipment Amount of material and equipment provided Administration and communication Consolidation of HNP's communication capabilities Level of improvement in communication skills Public safety and judicial police Increase in operational capacity of intervention units Number of reinforced intervention units Increase in intelligence and intelligence capabilities of the HNP Level of increase in intelligence and intelligence capabilities Increase in operational capacity of HNP in terms of border control Number of border controls units reinforced Increase in operational capacity of HNP in fight against maritime crime Number of operations against maritime crime initiated Increase in operational capacity of HNP in fight against human trafficking Number of operations against human trafficking initiated Increase in investigation capacity of HNP Number of investigations initiated by HNP Infrastructure framework Increase accessibility of HNPTbd Improvement of infrastructure of HNP through construction, relocation, and rehabilitation (long term) Number of construction, relocation, and rehabilitation projects completed RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 73 Priority ActionsPrograms Subprograms Indicators Budget, US$ (2024-2026) Prisons Normative, institutional, command and control framework Consolidation of legal, institutional, and structural framework of HNP Number of consolidated legal and institutional frameworks 7,070,000 Strengthening of gender policy within DAP and mechanisms to combat gender-based violence Number of gender policies strengthened Strengthening of internal control mechanisms of DAP Number of internal control mechanisms promoted Increase in administrative and operational autonomy of DAP Level of administrative autonomy achieved Human resources and working conditions Increase in DAP workforce Number of staff hired Increase in institutional capacity of DAP through continuing training Number of continuing training courses carried out Improve working conditions Tbd Increase in institutional capacity of the DAP Improvement in DAP's communication capabilities Level of improvement in communication skills Increase in security of prisons Development of policy for management and security of prisons Number of management policies implemented Acquisition of materials and equipment for prison surveillance Amount of surveillance equipment acquired Increase in operational capacity of the Intervention and Escort Team Number of operational teams reinforced Infrastructure framework Increase in infrastructural capacity of DAP through construction and rehabilitation of prisons Number of construction and rehabilitation projects completed Improvement in detention conditions Improving prison life Number of measures implemented 74 Priority ActionsPrograms Subprograms Indicators Budget, US$ (2024-2026) Community violence reduction Weapons and ammunition management Entry point control mechanisms Number of control mechanisms implemented or strengthened 44,450,000 Strengthening of legal mechanisms Number of legal mechanisms amended Development of the National Strategy for Disarmament, Dismantling and Reintegration / Reduction of Community Violence National Strategy for Disarmament, Dismantling and Reintegration / Reduction of Community Violence action plan developed Institutional and operational strengthening Level of institutional and operational strengthening Economic recovery and community capacity building Local dialogue mechanisms Income-generating activities Percentage of beneficiaries expressing satisfaction with economic and entrepreneurial empowerment initiatives by 2026 Community projects Number of community projects supporting restoration of basic social services implemented Community safety mechanisms Number of security mechanisms implemented Community mobilization and civic engagement Youth training Percentage of people trained by the project who undertake activities to promote peace and change behaviors in support of social cohesion structures by 2026 Local conflict prevention mechanisms Percentage of local conflict resolution and prevention mechanisms identified or created that have received technical and material support by 2026 Protection Campaign to promote protection Percentage of people in project intervention areas who feel they have been made aware of protection through the campaign Training Number of community protection facilitators trained in first aid through public protection institutions Victim support Number of victims supported Institutional and operational strengthening Level of institutional and operational strengthening Note: DAP, Directorate of Penitentiary Administration; HNP, Haitian National Police; SGBV, sexual and gender-based violence. RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 75 APPENDIX B RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT INVESTMENT PLAN 76 AXIS 1 Budget (2024–26) FUNDING SOURCES National budget International resources Private sector resources Resources to mobilize U.S. DOLLARS Revive economy through targeted support for private investment that generates wealth and decent jobs 70,000,000 – 15,000,000 – 55,000,000 Support development of value chains in processing and productive sectors 8,000,000 – 1,500,000 – 6,500,000 Implement rapid-result actions to improve business environment 5,750,000 – 5,550,000 – 200,000 Strengthen public finance reform7,000,000 – 6,850,000 – 150,000 Continue public administration reform 22,200,000 – - – 22,200,000 Strengthen accountability, transparency, and anticorruption framework 3,850,000 – 3,850,000 – - TOTAL 116,800,000 – 32,750,000 – 84,050,000 AXIS 2 Budget (2024–26) FUNDING SOURCES National budget International resources Private sector resources Resources to mobilize U.S. DOLLARS Rehabilitate transportation, water and sanitation, and electricity infrastructure in metropolitan areas, Artibonite, and other areas affected by gang violence 312,232,439 – 54,000,000 16,400,000 241,832,439 Implement labor-intensive projects and income-generating activities conducted with small and medium-sized enterprises and support of municipalities (sanitation and cleaning projects to create temporary public employment) 78,860,000 – – – 78,860,000 Establish strategic air transportation plan and improve major airports intended to accommodate international flights 9,500,000 – 9,500,000 – – Rehabilitate houses and neighborhoods in metropolitan areas, Artibonite, and other areas affected by gang violence 43,200,000 – - – 43,200,000 Make public buildings functional6,400,000 – 400,000 – 6,000,000 TOTAL 450,192,439 – 63,900,000 16,400,000 369,892,439 RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 77 AXIS 3 Budget (2024–26) FUNDING SOURCES National budget International resources Private sector resources Resources to mobilize U.S. DOLLARS Implement urgent actions to support displaced persons 19,756,250 - - - 19,756,240 Create emergency jobs and income for young people, particularly women, in areas affected by violence 15,500,000 - - - 15,500,000 Establish free schools available at the start of the school year 108,975,808 25,887,985 21,279,000 - 61,808,823 Strengthen of shock response mechanisms using cash transfers for vulnerable households 77,918,904 - - - 77,918,904 Improve food and nutritional security 45,000,000 - 10,000,000 - 35,000,000 Guarantee access to basic social services, particularly in disadvantaged areas affected by violence, taking into account people with disabilities and respecting gender equity 118,790,438 - 1,000,000 - 117,790,438 TOTAL 385,941,400 25,887,985 32,279,000 - 342,018,165 AXIS 4 Budget (2024–26) FUNDING SOURCES National budget International resources Private sector resources Resources to mobilize U.S. DOLLARS Guarantee the proper functioning of justice and the fight against impunity 32,861,447 - 5,550,000 - 27,311,447 Sexual and gender-based violence7,070,000 - - - 7,070,000 Police 244,096,000 35,000,000 109,636,000 - 99,460,000 Prisons 60,502,500 10,000,000 21,630,000 - 28,872,500 Reducen community violence 44,450,000 - - - 44,450,000 TOTAL 388,979,947 45,000,000 136,816,000 - 207,163,947 RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI OCTOBER / 2024/ 80