(2010) CRS - Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Summary — This Congressional Research Service report examines the crisis in Haiti following the devastating January 12, 2010 earthquake. It details the U.S. and international response, assesses the damage and humanitarian needs, and discusses long-term implications for Haiti's reconstruction and development.
Key Findings
- The January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti caused an estimated $8 to $14 billion in damage.
- Approximately 3 million people were affected, with estimates ranging from 1.2 to 2 million displaced.
- The Haitian government reported an estimated 230,000 deaths and 300,600 injured.
- Donors pledged over $5 billion for the first 18 months of Haiti’s reconstruction at a global donors’ conference.
- The U.S. government provided over $1 billion in humanitarian funding for Haiti following the earthquake.
Full Description
The report provides an overview of the immediate crisis in Haiti following the January 12, 2010 earthquake, including the scale of the disaster, the estimated damage, and the impact on the Haitian population and infrastructure. It describes the humanitarian relief operation, detailing the efforts of the U.S. government, the United Nations, and other international actors to provide emergency assistance, address basic needs, and coordinate the response. The report also examines the long-term implications of the earthquake for Haiti's political and economic situation, its development strategy, and the challenges of reconstruction. It discusses congressional concerns related to budget priorities, oversight, burden-sharing, immigration, and trade preferences.
Full Document Text
Extracted text from the original document for search indexing.
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
(name redacted)
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
(name redacted)<><>
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
May 6, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R41023
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service
Summary
The largest earthquake ever recorded in Haiti devastated parts of the country, including the
capital, on January 12, 2010. The quake, centered about 15 miles southwest of Port-au-Prince,
had a magnitude of 7.0. A series of strong aftershocks have followed. Experts estimate the
earthquake caused $8 to $14 billion in damage. Approximately 3 million people, roughly one-
third of the overall population, have been affected by the earthquake with estimates ranging from
1.2 to 2 million people displaced. The government of Haiti is reporting an estimated 230,000
deaths and 300,600 injured. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, President Rene Préval
described conditions in his country as “unimaginable,” and appealed for international assistance.
As the humanitarian relief operation continues, the government is struggling to restore the
institutions needed for it to function, ensure political stability, and address long-term
reconstruction and development planning. Prior to the earthquake, the international community
was providing extensive development and humanitarian assistance to Haiti. With that assistance,
the Haitian government had made significant progress in recent years in many areas of its
development strategy. The destruction of Haiti’s nascent infrastructure and other extensive
damage caused by the earthquake will set back Haiti’s development significantly. A post-disaster
needs assessment estimated the total value of recovery and reconstruction needs to be $11.5
billion. The Haitian government presented an action plan for reconstruction and development at a
global donors’ conference held on March 31, 2010. Donors pledged over $5 billion for the first 18
months of Haiti’s reconstruction. The United States pledged $1.2 billion. Extra-constitutional rule
will begin after May 10, when most parliamentarians’ terms expire; President Préval will
probably rule by decree after that. There is no timetable for new parliamentary elections.
The sheer scale of the relief effort in Haiti has brought together tremendous capacity and
willingness to help. As the rainy and hurricane seasons begin, the massive humanitarian relief
operation underway in Haiti is focused on providing waterproof emergency shelter, improving
sanitation and meeting the basic needs of the displaced and other vulnerable Haitians. The relief
effort is expected to last for many months. On January 12, 2010, President Barack Obama
assembled heads of U.S. agencies to begin working immediately on a coordinated response to the
disaster, with the U.S. Agency for International Development through the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance as the lead agency. On January 14, the Administration announced $100
million in humanitarian assistance to Haiti to meet the immediate needs on the ground. As of
April 30, 2010, total humanitarian funding provided to Haiti for the earthquake had reached over
$1 billion. In the FY2010 supplemental request, the Administration is seeking a total of $2.8
billion for Haiti. Of that, $1.5 billion is for relief and disaster assistance, which would reimburse
U.S. government agencies for services provided and for funds already obligated for ongoing relief
activities. The request for recovery and reconstruction is $1.1 billion. This is primarily for new
activities, focused on urgent infrastructure repairs, especially in the energy and agricultural
sectors; critical health care; governance; and security.
The Department of Homeland Security has temporarily halted the deportation of Haitians and
granted Temporary Protected Status for 18 months to Haitian nationals in the United States as of
January 12, 2010. Congressional concerns include budget priorities and oversight, burden-
sharing, immigration, tax incentives for charitable donations, trade preferences for Haiti, and
helping constituents with adoptions and other issues. Several congressional committees have held
hearings on Haiti. The focus of this report is on the immediate crisis in Haiti as a result of the
earthquake, the U.S. and international response to date, and long-term implications of the
earthquake. Related legislation includes P.L. 111-117, P.L. 111-126, P.L. 111-158,H.R. 144, H.R.
264, H.R. 417. H.R. 1567, H.R. 3077, H.R. 4206, H.R. 4577, H.R. 4616, H.R. 4952, H.R. 4961,
H.R. 5006, H.R. 5160, H.R. 5171, S. 2949, S. 2961, and S. 2978, S. 2998, S. 3202, S. 3275, and
S. 3317.
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Congressional Research Service
Contents
Recent Developments..................................................................................................................1
Current Conditions......................................................................................................................1
Preliminary Numbers at a Glance..........................................................................................3
Haitian Government Response ....................................................................................................4
The Government’s New Action Plan......................................................................................6
Extra-Constitutional Rule Begins after May 10......................................................................7
U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) ......................................................................7
Humanitarian Relief Operation..................................................................................................11
Overall Status of the Relief Effort ....................................................................................... 11
United Nations Humanitarian Response ..............................................................................12
Humanitarian Relief Sectors: Recent Developments ............................................................13
Haiti’s Humanitarian Needs in Context................................................................................15
Other Humanitarian Actors..................................................................................................16
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance .............................................................................................17
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Haiti FY2009-FY2011, Prior to the Earthquake..........17
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Haiti following the Earthquake...................................17
FY2010 Supplemental Humanitarian Relief Funding for Haiti.......................................18
USAID .........................................................................................................................18
Department of Defense: Operation Unified Response....................................................19
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)....................................................................20
Overall U.S. FY2010 Assistance.........................................................................................21
FY2010 Supplemental Funding Request for Haiti..........................................................21
International Humanitarian Funding..........................................................................................21
U.N. Consolidated Appeals Process.....................................................................................21
Other Pledges and Contributions .........................................................................................22
Donor Contributions and Pledges ........................................................................................22
Private Contributions ..........................................................................................................23
Recovery Planning among Donors and Haiti .......................................................................23
The Role of the United Nations and Other Organizations.....................................................24
Response of International Financial Institutions.........................................................................25
Multilateral Lending ...........................................................................................................25
World Bank...................................................................................................................25
Inter-American Development Bank ...............................................................................25
International Monetary Fund.........................................................................................26
Debt Relief Prior to the Earthquake.....................................................................................26
World Bank...................................................................................................................26
Bilateral Creditors.........................................................................................................26
Debt Relief Since the Earthquake........................................................................................27
Inter-American Development Bank ...............................................................................27
World Bank...................................................................................................................27
International Fund for Agriculture and Development .....................................................27
International Monetary Fund.........................................................................................28
The IMF and Haiti’s Financial Sector..................................................................................28
Debt Relief in the FY2010 Supplemental Funding Request.................................................28
Regional Response....................................................................................................................29
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service
Political and Economic Situation in Haiti..................................................................................29
Conditions in Haiti Before the Earthquake...........................................................................29
Political Conditions.............................................................................................................30
The National Assembly and the Question of 2010 Elections..........................................31
Socioeconomic Conditions Prior to the Earthquake.......................................................31
Long-term Reconstruction Strategy ...........................................................................................32
Review of Haiti’s Development Strategy.............................................................................32
Principles of Assistance for the Reconstruction of Haiti.......................................................33
Select Issues to be Addressed in the Long-term Reconstruction Strategy..............................34
Agricultural Capacity and the Environment...................................................................34
Decentralization of Population and Services..................................................................34
Education......................................................................................................................35
Energy ..........................................................................................................................35
Health Care...................................................................................................................35
Job Creation..................................................................................................................36
Trade and Exports.........................................................................................................36
Recovery and Reconstruction Funding in the FY2010 Supplemental Request......................36
Congressional Concerns............................................................................................................36
FY2010 Supplemental Funding Request for Haiti................................................................37
Budget Priorities.................................................................................................................38
Burdensharing and Donor Fatigue.......................................................................................38
Coordinating the Relief Response in Haiti...........................................................................39
Elections in Haiti ................................................................................................................39
Immigration, Adoption........................................................................................................40
Medical Evacuation ............................................................................................................41
Tax Incentives for Charitable Donations..............................................................................43
Trade Preferences................................................................................................................43
Constituent Concerns ..........................................................................................................44
Legislation in the 111
th
Congress...............................................................................................44
Figures
Figure 1. Haiti Earthquake Epicenter.........................................................................................10
Figure A-1. An Estimate of the Population in Haiti and Surrounding Areas Exposed to
Ground Shaking Caused by the January 12, 2010, Magnitude 7.0 Earthquake.........................51
Figure B-1. Movement Out of Port-au-Prince............................................................................53
Figure C-1. Click and type title, or delete .................................................................................54
Figure D-1. USG Humanitarian Assistance................................................................................55
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Haiti FY2009-FY2011..............................................17
Table 2. FY2010 Humanitarian Funding Provided to Haiti for the Earthquake ($US).................18
Table G-1. Regional Donors to Haiti Relief Efforts....................................................................64
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Exposed Population..............................................................................................51
Appendix B. Haiti Population Movement ..................................................................................53
Appendix C. Emergency Shelter Gap: April 19, 2010................................................................54
Appendix D. U.S. Earthquake Assistance to Haiti......................................................................55
Appendix E. The U.S. Government Emergency Response Mechanism for International
Disasters ................................................................................................................................56
Appendix F. Operation Unified Response: U.S. Military Units Participating..............................58
Appendix G. Donor Contributions and Pledges to Haiti in Response to the January 12,
2010, Earthquake...................................................................................................................59
Appendix H. How to Search for or Report on Individuals in Haiti .............................................67
Appendix I. How to Contribute to Relief Efforts........................................................................70
Appendix J. Links for Further Information ................................................................................71
Contacts
Author Contact Information ......................................................................................................74
Key Policy Staff........................................................................................................................75
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Recent Developments
• A major global donors’ conference was held March 31, 2010, in New York.
Donors pledged over $5 billion for the first 18 months of Haiti’s reconstruction.
The United States pledged $1.2 billion.
• The Haitian government presented an action plan for reconstruction and
development, and a Post Disaster Needs Assessment that estimated the total value
of recovery and reconstruction needs to be $11.5 billion.
• The Obama Administration requested $2.8 billion in FY2010 supplemental
funding for relief and reconstruction support for Haiti.
• Extra-constitutional rule will begin after May 10, when most parliamentarians’
terms expire; President Préval will probably rule by decree after that. Haiti
passed a State of Emergency Law on April 20 giving the President broad powers.
The international community is urging Haiti to hold legislative and presidential
elections in November 2010.
• Humanitarian assistance is focused on providing waterproof emergency shelter,
improving sanitation and meeting the basic needs of the displaced and other
vulnerable Haitians. The relief effort is expected to last for many months.
• Most U.S. military forces will withdraw from Haiti by about June 1, 2010.
Current Conditions
The largest earthquake ever recorded in Haiti devastated parts of the country, including the
capital, on January 12, 2010. The quake, centered about 15 miles southwest of Port-au-Prince,
had a magnitude of 7.0. A series of strong aftershocks have followed.
1
The damage was severe
and catastrophic. Thousands of buildings collapsed, leaving unknown numbers of people trapped,
and hundreds of thousands of people homeless in the streets. Estimates of casualties are
constantly being updated. According to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, “[o]f Haiti’s
9 million people, initial reports suggest roughly a third may be affected by the disaster.”
2
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) issued a study on February 11 estimating the
damage caused by the earthquake to be at least $8 billion, and as high as $14 billion.
3
One of the
report’s authors, economist Andrew Powell, said that, “This disaster, given the size of Haiti ... is
the most devastating catastrophe that a country has experienced possibly ever.”
4
The report
compared the damage to other catastrophes, finding, for example, that the earthquake’s damage
1
U.S. Geological Survey http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/us2010rja6.php, January 13,
2010. The largest earthquake ever recorded was the 9.5 magnitude 1960 Chile earthquake, see
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/historical_mag.php.
2
United Nations, Secretary-General, Briefing General Assembly on Haiti Disaster, Announces Release of $10 million
in emergency Funds to Kick-Start Response, SG/SM/12701; GA/10912, New York, NY, January 13, 2010.
3
Eduardo A. Cavallo, Andrew Powell, and Oscar Becerra, Estimating the direct economic damage of the Earthquake
in Haiti, Inter-American Development Bank, February 11, 2010, available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/
getdocument.aspx?docnum=35072649.
4
Mary Beth Sheridan, “Haiti earthquake damage estimated up to $14 billion,” Washington Post, February 17, 2010.
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amounted to 117% of Haiti’s annual economic output, while the 2004 tsunami damage amounted
to 2% of Indonesia’s annual economic output. The Haiti Post Disaster Needs Assessment,
conducted by Haiti and international institutions, reported similar findings, estimating the total
value of recovery and reconstruction needs to be $11.5 billion.
5
All of this damage was sustained in a country that the United Nations had already designated as
one of the 50 “least developed countries” in the world, facing a higher risk than other countries of
failing to come out of poverty, and therefore needing the highest degree of attention from the
international community.
6
Recovery efforts have been made extremely difficult by the loss of personnel and infrastructure
that would be part of a recovery effort. Among the missing and dead were Haitian government
officials and international aid personnel, including many U.N. personnel. Housing, hospitals,
schools, and many government buildings collapsed. Basic services such as electricity and water
were almost completely disrupted. Major transportation routes were damaged and/or blocked.
The Port-au-Prince airport control tower was destroyed; the airport continued to function, and air
traffic control authority was quickly transferred to U.S. personnel with portable radar. On
February 18, commercial air traffic in and out of Port-au-Prince resumed. As of early March,
relief flights into Haiti had dropped from a peak of 160 flights per day to an average of 75. The
main port suffered heavy damage; U.S. troops are repairing the port facilities. The port is
expected to handle 1,500 containers of relief supplies once it is fully repaired. The use of airfields
and ports in the Dominican Republic, with humanitarian corridors over land, have also eased the
burden on Haitian facilities.
Haitian government officials continue to function in makeshift conditions. The roof of the
Presidential Palace collapsed and the President’s private residence was also destroyed. President
Préval was initially unable to communicate with his Cabinet and has been working out of a small
room in a police headquarters. The Parliament building collapsed, with some Members trapped
inside and others killed. The Parliament has convened in the National Police Academy. Twenty-
eight of 29 Ministry buildings were destroyed.
The United Nations, which already had a strong presence in Haiti, is at the forefront of on-the-
ground response for security and humanitarian assistance, and suffered heavy losses as well. Its
headquarters collapsed, and 101 U.N. personnel are confirmed dead and 6 others remain
unaccounted for. The head of the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Special
Representative Hedi Annabi, and his deputy, Luiz Carlos da Costa, were among the dead. U.N.
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon sent Assistant Secretary General Edmond Mulet to Haiti on
January 13 to direct the U.N.’s immediate response efforts; Mulet is a former Special
Representative of the Secretary General for MINUSTAH.
Prior to the earthquake, the international community was providing extensive development and
humanitarian assistance to Haiti. With that assistance, the Haitian government had made
5
Government of Haiti, the United Nations, the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World
Bank, “Haiti Post Disaster Needs Assessment: draft executive summary,” March 10, 2010. Available at
http://www.haitisantodomingo2010.org/hsd2010/content/documents; and World Bank, Haiti Damage and Need
Assessment: World Bank Partners with Global Network of Scientists and Experts, Press Release No. 2010/240/LCR,
Washington, DC, January 26, 2010.
6
United Nations Office for Least Developed Countries. Facts About Least Developed Countries (LDCs) available at
http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/Publications/Factsheet.pdf, accessed January 15, 2010.
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
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significant progress in recent years in many areas of its development strategy, including security;
judicial reform; macroeconomic management; procurement processes and fiscal transparency;
increased voter registration; and jobs creation. It had also made progress in providing broader
access to clean water and other services. Parliamentary elections scheduled for February 2010
have been delayed. There is tentative agreement that Haiti will hold joint parliamentary and
presidential elections in November 2010. President Préval’s term will end in February 2011, and
he is not eligible to run for reelection.
The destruction of Haiti’s nascent infrastructure and other extensive damage caused by January’s
earthquake will set back Haiti’s development significantly. U.N. Special Envoy and former
President Bill Clinton said that Haiti’s long-term development plans “will need to be amended ...
but they cannot be abandoned.”
7
Soon after the earthquake, the government of Haiti and the
international donor community held meetings and conferences to begin planning a long-term
strategy for Haitian recovery.
A major global donors’ conference was held March 31, 2010, in New York at which 48 countries,
multilateral institutions, and a coalition of non-governmental organizations pledged $5.3 billion
for the first 18 months of Haiti’s reconstruction, part of nearly $10 billion pledged toward long-
term reconstruction efforts. The IDB damage assessment stated that donor coordination will be
key in any reconstruction effort. The report further noted that there are different models for
coordination, but that however it is coordinated, “[a] single executing agency with appropriate
powers, transparency and accountability to the Haitian Government and donors would be helpful”
in achieving the needed coordination on the ground.
8
To that end, Haiti and the international
donor community have established a Multi-Donor Trust Fund to monitor, coordinate, and
distribute funds.
The Obama Administration is requesting $2.8 billion in FY2010 supplemental funding to cover
costs associated with relief and reconstruction support for Haiti. The U.S. pledge of $1.2 billion
made at the donors conference is included in that request.
Preliminary Numbers at a Glance
It is estimated that 3 million people, approximately one-third of the overall population, have been
affected by the earthquake. The government of Haiti is reporting an estimated 230,000 deaths
(2% of the population), 300,600 injured and 383 missing.
9
Earlier reports indicated there were 1.2
million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), which included 700,000 people displaced in the
Port-au-Prince area, many without shelter, and more than 597,000 people who left Port-au-Prince
for rural areas.
10
More recent numbers indicate a higher number of IDPs with a possible total of
over 2 million displaced in Haiti. This number includes 1.69 million displaced in settlements in
Port-au-Prince and more than 300,000 in areas outside the city. Much smaller numbers of
Haitians have left for the Dominican Republic, nearby islands, and the United States.
7
Bill Clinton, “How We Can Help Rebuild Haiti’s Promise,” The Washington Post, January 14, 2010.
8
Cavallo et al., op. cit., pp. 11-12.
9
Estimates of the death toll vary; most reports now indicate 200,000 or more dead.
10
Initially, the government of Haiti facilitated the departure of several hundred thousand people from Port-au-Prince to
outlying areas. An unknown number of individuals may have used private means to leave the city and seek shelter.
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
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According to the State Department, a total of 16,000 Americans in Haiti have been accounted for,
and 16,704 U.S. citizens have been evacuated. There are 103 reported deaths of U.S. citizens due
to the earthquake. Now that commercial airlines are operating out of Port-au-Prince, the U.S.
embassy is no longer assisting with citizen evacuations.
Aftershocks Pose Future Risk
A series of aftershocks has followed the main January 12 earthquake. In a February 23, 2010 statement, the USGS
indicated that the frequency of aftershocks should diminish with time, but the threat of additional damaging
earthquakes remains. The USGS noted that buildings in the Port-au-Prince area will continue to be at risk from strong
earthquake shaking, and that the fault responsible for the January 12 earthquake still stores sufficient strain to be
released as a large, damaging earthquake during the lifetime of structures built during the reconstruction effort. The
USGS gave the following probabilities for aftershock activity in Haiti:
• magnitude 5 or greater earthquake = 90% probability over 1 year, 80% over 90 days, 55% over 30 days;
• magnitude 6 or greater earthquake = 25% probability over 1 year, 15% over 90 days, 7% over 30 days;
• magnitude 7 or greater earthquake = 3% probability over 1 year, 2% over 90 days, 1% over 30 days.
The USGS based its probability estimates on techniques developed to assess earthquake hazards in the United States.
Using these techniques, the USGS estimated that the probability of a magnitude 7 or greater earthquake occurring
within the next 50 years along the Enriquillo fault near Port-au-Prince is between 5% and 15%. The range of
probabilities reflects the current understanding of the seismicity and tectonics of the Haiti region. By comparison, the
USGS has estimated that that the probability of a magnitude 7 or greater earthquake occurring within the next 50
years along the Hayward-Rodgers Creek fault east of San Francisco is about 15%.
The USGS further asserted that the risk to new construction in Haiti from future aftershocks and strong earthquakes
can be minimized through the use of earthquake-resistant design and construction practices. Tailoring the design to
match the earthquake hazard likely requires applying results from a comprehensive earthquake hazard assessment,
which currently does not exist for Haiti. This is further complicated by the need for buildings to withstand high winds
from hurricanes, which are a more frequent hazard to Haiti than earthquakes. Constructing buildings that are both
hurricane and earthquake resistant could pose a challenge to short- and long-term rebuilding efforts in Haiti.
Building construction is very important to earthquake resilience. For example, the magnitude 8.8 earthquake that
struck Chile on February 27, 2010, caused only a fraction of the fatalities caused by the Haiti earthquake, in part due
to the greater prevalence of earthquake-resistant buildings in Chile.
Despite the occurrence of two devastating earthquakes in Haiti and Chile within less than two months of each other,
worldwide earthquake activity in 2010 is not particularly unusual compared to other years. The USGS reported that
an average of 16 magnitude 7 or greater—defined as major—earthquakes have occurred each year since 1900, with
some years showing considerable variation. Six major earthquakes have occurred worldwide in 2010 thus far, well
within the normal range according to the USGS.
Sources: USGS statement, “USGS Updates Assessment of Earthquake Hazard and Safety in Haiti and the Caribbean,”
February 23, 2010, at http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2413&from=rss_home; and USGS release. “Is
Recent Earthquake Activity Unusual? Scientists Say No,” April 14, 2010, at http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?
ID=2439.
Haitian Government Response
In the immediate wake of the earthquake, President Préval described conditions in his country as
“unimaginable,” and appealed for international assistance. The country’s top priority was to
conduct search and rescue operations for survivors. Other material priorities included an offshore
vessel medical unit and electricity generation capability. The government also requested
communications equipment so that government officials could better function and coordinate
response efforts. As those immediate needs are met and the humanitarian relief operation
continues, the government is struggling to restore the institutions needed for it to function and to
address long-term reconstruction and development planning. “The first thing is political stability,”
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
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said Préval. “Secondly, we hope the international community will help us in the short-term, mid-
term, and long-term.”
11
Prior to this disaster, the World Bank and others were working with the Haitian government to
incorporate disaster risk management into Haiti’s overall development strategy and to develop its
capacity for disaster response. The capacity was still in its early stages, however, and the focus of
much of its risk management efforts was not geared toward earthquakes, but toward hurricanes,
which are the most common cause of natural disasters on the island. The last major earthquake in
Haiti was 150 years ago, in 1860.
Some Haitians complain that they have seen or heard little of President Préval since the
earthquake. The perception that the Haitian government was not doing enough contributed to
calls by some Haitians, both in Haiti and the United States, for the United States to take control of
Haiti in place of the current government in the days following the disaster.
The destruction of buildings, equipment, and loss of skilled personnel has drastically reduced the
ability of the government to respond rapidly. According to the Haitian Chamber of Commerce,
the earthquake destroyed approximately 25,000 public and commercial buildings. Twenty-one out
of 22 Ministry buildings were destroyed. Along with the buildings, government records were
destroyed; re-establishing and expanding transparency in government spending will be
particularly challenging. These losses, plus the difficulty of delivering and transporting material
supplies, will hinder delivery of services. The already significant need for services is now vastly
expanded.
Haitian ministries are addressing issues such as long-term housing for those left homeless by the
earthquake as they operate out of makeshift offices. Haitian authorities and international relief
agencies are delivering food and water to hundreds of makeshift camps in Port-au-Prince. The
government provided free transportation to evacuate people from the capital to cities not damaged
by the earthquake. Interior Minister Paul Antoine Bien-Aime indicated that as many as 482,000
people may be relocated outside Port-au-Prince.
12
The Haitian government is sending officials to
small cities to help officials in those communities establish priorities.
Other elements of the government are working along with international actors. The Haitian
National Police are contributing to maintaining security, for example, and Haitian air traffic
controllers are working along with U.S. controllers at the Port-au-Prince airport.
The Haitian government, the United Nations, and donor representatives met in Haiti on January
14 to coordinate their efforts, and have continued to do so at various conferences. Eighteen
Haitian senators elected two commissions on January 28 to monitor aid and manage agreements
with aid organizations.
11
Jacqueline Charles and Lydia Martin, “Without even a shirt, Rene Preval stays focused; President Rene Preval no
longer has a palace or more than one borrowed shirt. But he survived the quake and is running his nation from a small
room,” The Miami Herald, January 20, 2010.
12
Jacqueline Charles, Lesley Clark, and David Ovalle, et al., “Relief Efforts turn to long-term rebuilding,” The Miami
Herald, January 21, 2010.
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The Government’s New Action Plan
President Préval and Prime Minister Bellerive went to the March 31 international
donors’conference with a 10-year recovery action plan. According to the Haiti Post Disaster
Needs Assessment conducted by Haiti and international institutions, the total value of recovery
and reconstruction needs is $11.5 billion.
13
At the conference The Préval Administration sought a
minimum of $3.9 billion for the first 18 months of Haiti’s reconstruction.
The priorities the Haitian government established in the “Action Plan for the Reconstruction and
National Development of Haiti”
14
are:
• ensuring preparedness for the 2010 rainy and hurricane seasons, especially for
displaced populations;
• providing assistance to the population affected by the earthquake while hastening
recovery efforts with an eye to reducing dependence on foreign aid;
• including environmental factors and risk and disaster management in all recovery
and reconstruction activities;
• actively providing employment and vocational training;
• strengthening governmental authority while also decentralizing basic services,
creating a social safety net for the poorest population; and
• creating growth poles to support and encourage settlement of displaced
populations around the country and to make Port-au-Prince less congested.
Haitian government officials see the earthquake’s devastation in Port-au-Prince as an opportunity
to establish a more sustainable distribution of population elsewhere in the country. Bellerive has
asked international donors to aid in a massive revival of agriculture, in order to provide jobs and
keep relocated Haitians in the provinces.
15
Some observers have questioned whether historical and current allegations of various levels of
corruption in the Haitian government may impair short- and long-term recovery efforts.
16
The
government of Haiti made major progress in recent years in reducing corruption, increasing
transparency, and improving fiscal management. These improvements qualified Haiti for Heavily
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt relief last year. In its new Action Plan, the government said
13
Government of Haiti, the United Nations, the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the
World Bank, “Haiti Post Disaster Needs Assessment: draft executive summary,” March 10, 2010. Available at
http://www.haitisantodomingo2010.org/hsd2010/content/documents; and World Bank, Haiti Damage and Need
Assessment: World Bank Partners with Global Network of Scientists and Experts, Press Release No. 2010/240/LCR,
Washington, DC, January 26, 2010.
14
Republic of Haiti, “Action Plan for the Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti,” March 2010, available at
http://www.haitisantodomingo2010.org/hsd2010/content/documents.
15
Tim Padgett, “Haiti PM: We Can Rise Out of Our Postquake Squalor,” Time, February 22, 2010. Haiti’s “Action
Plan for the Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti” is available at http://www.haitisantodomingo2010.org/
hsd2010/content/documents.
16
University of Colorado at Boulder, “Industry Corruption, Shoddy Construction Likely Contributed to Haiti Quake
Devastation,” E Science News, January 14, 2010; Senator Loren Legarda, “Commentary: Earthquake Devastation
Linked to Corruption,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 25, 2010; “Will Endemic Corruption Suck Away Aid to
Haitians?” Reuters, January 26, 2010.
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service 7
the momentum of those programs must continue, and proposed the Interim Commission for the
Reconstruction of Haiti, a Development Agency, and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund to improve
development planning, coordination, and accountability. New concerns about transparency and
oversight may also arise as the legislature ceases to function as a whole because elections have
not been held. Normally, the legislature must approve federal procurement contracts, and
authorize spending. Under a State of Emergency law passed by the legislature in April, the
executive branch will have those powers for the next 18 months.
Extra-Constitutional Rule Begins after May 10
Haiti passed a State of Emergency Law on April 20 giving the President broad powers.
The terms of all of the Chamber of Deputies, and of one-third of the Senate, will expire
on May 10. How the government will function after that is not entirely clear. President
Préval will probably rule by decree. The remaining 19 Senators may continue to meet,
however, and the Senate has the power to dismiss the Prime Minister and censure
government programs. As a result, political tensions are likely to increase. The
international community is urging Haiti to hold legislative and presidential elections in
November 2010. Préval has promised to step down when his term expires on February 7,
2011.
U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
17
The U.N. Security Council created the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) on April
30, 2004, having determined that the situation in Haiti continued to be a threat to international
peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. As a U.N.-
conducted peacekeeping operation, MINUSTAH was given a mandate under three broad areas: a
secure and stable environment, the political process, and human rights. On October 13, 2009, the
Council extended its mandate until October 15, 2010, “with the intention of further renewal.” The
Council monitors the activities of MINUSTAH through semiannual reports made by the U.N.
Secretary-General and his special representative, and also not later than 45 days before expiration
of its mandate.
On January 19, 2010, the U.N. Security Council increased the overall force levels of MINUSTAH
“to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts.” The Council decided
that “MINUSTAH will consist of a military component of up to 8,940 troops of all ranks and of a
police component of up to 3,711 police and that it will keep the new levels of troops and police in
MINUSTAH under review as necessary.”
18
The limits had been set at 6,940 for the military
component and 2,211 for the police component. As of April 13, 2010, the military component of
MINUSTAH totaled 8,306 troops, including four engineering companies, and 2,178 police
officers.
19
17
Prepared by (name redacted)<><><><>, CRS Specialist in International Relations, and (name redacted), CRS Specialist
in International Humanitarian Policy, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
18
The Council resolution that created MINUSTAH is S/RES/1542 (2004). The resolution extending the mandate in
October 2009 is S/RES/1892 (2009). The resolution adopted unanimously on January 19, 2010, is S/RES/1908 (2010).
19
These figures are taken from the Secretary-General’s April 2010 report to the Council; the police component
consisted of 828 U.N. police and 1,350 formed police unit officers. Additional police from Bangladesh, Italy and India
are expected in the coming weeks. See U.N. document S/2010/200, p. 9, para. 32.
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service 8
On April 28, 2010, the U.N. Security Council met to consider the situation in Haiti, especially the
April 2010 report of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on MINUSTAH.
20
This was his first report
since September 1, 2009 and covered up to April 15, 2010, with a focus on events since the
earthquake. Ban noted, in his report,
that his Special Representative will continue to oversee the activities of the whole United
Nations system and, within means and capabilities, ensure the full support of the
MINUSTAH military, police and logistics components to humanitarian and recovery efforts.
Ban proposed that MINUSTAH “assume the lead role in coordinating international electoral
assistance in order to ensure its efficiency and avoid the duplication of efforts.” Ban observed that
a “major focus of effort will be timely preparations for the 2010 presidential, legislative and
municipal elections.”
21
In addition, he stated that MINUSTAH “will reconfigure the military
component within the existing troop ceiling to provide additional military engineers on a surge
basis.”
22
Ban also recommended that the Council increase the MINUSTAH police component,
adding 680 police personnel to the force levels already authorized by the Council in January
2010.
23
As of May 3, 2010, the Council has not acted in response to the report of the Secretary-
General.
The headquarters of the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was demolished in the
earthquake, with 101 U.N. staff confirmed dead. These included the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General and Head of MINUSTAH Hedi Annabi and his Deputy, Luiz Carlos da Costa.
On March 31, 2010, Secretary-General Ban announced the appointment of Edmond Mulet, as his
Special Representative (SRSG) for Haiti and Head of MINUSTAH. Since January 14, 2010, Mr.
Mulet had been acting SRSG and Head of MINUSTAH.
24
On April 29, 2010, Ban announced the
appointment of Kevin Kennedy (United States) as Deputy Special Representative for Haiti and
Deputy Head of MINUSTAH, succeeding Mr. da Costa, and Nigel Fisher (Canada) as Deputy
Special Representative, Ad Interim, for Haiti, succeeding Kim Bolduc (Canada).
On March 24, 2010, President Obama, in a supplemental budget request to Congress on Haiti,
requested in the State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA)
account a total of $96.5 million for U.S. assessed contributions to MINUSTAH. This was to fund
the increase in assessments resulting from the Security Council’s increase in force levels on
January 19, 2010. The March 24 supplemental request also included, under Foreign Operations,
in the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs (INCLE) account,
$45,000,000 to support U.S. personnel to MINUSTAH: the “secondment of 50 police advisers,
20
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, U.N. document [dated April
22, 2010] S/2010/200.
21
S/2010/200, p. 14, para. 55. The legislative elections that had been scheduled for February 2010 had been postponed.
22
S/2010/200, p. 14, para. 57.
23
S/2010/200, p. 15, paras. 60-62. Ban’s increase would “represent 200 United Nations police and three self-sustaining
formed police units.” According to the U.N. peacekeeping website, “A Formed Police Unit is a cohesive and trained
team of 140 armed and well-equipped (for crowd control) police officers.” See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
sites/police/policework.shtml.
24
Mr. Mulet was Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Operations, in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. He
had preceded Mr. Annabi as SRSG for Haiti. On January 22, 2010, the United States and MINUSTAH had signed an
agreement, clarifying their roles and responsibilities in coordinating international relief efforts with the government of
Haiti.
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service 9
five corrections advisers, and one drug specialist.” These funds would increase the U.S. police
and corrections officer contribution to MINUSTAH from 50 and 5 to 80 and 10, respectively.
25
25
U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development. FY2010 Haiti Supplemental Budget
Justification. p. 44. This “peacekeeping” portion of the [total $143,489,000] request[ed] for the INCLE account would
also pay for the construction of a temporary camp for the U.S. contingent and enough supplies to make them self-
sustaining. U.S. assistance would also provide for the procurement of emergency supplies, replacement uniforms and
equipment lost as a result of the earthquake, and purchase additional equipment needed to support an increased
personnel contribution to MINUSTAH. Finally, the funds would support the training and equipping of a Formed Police
Unit for the MINUSTAH mission in the areas of crowd/riot control and protection of U.N. facilities and personnel.
CRS-10
Figure 1. Haiti Earthquake Epicenter
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service 11
Humanitarian Relief Operation
Overall Status of the Relief Effort
Experts break relief operations into several phases: search and rescue; treatment and survival;
relocation and rehabilitation; early recovery; and long-term reconstruction. As with any
significant natural disaster that has many moving parts, it can take days to get a relief effort
underway. Delays in transportation and congestion, lack of transportation infrastructure,
bureaucratic problems, and lack of access all can cause bottlenecks at key points in the system.
While timing is critical to save lives, to enable a network of this size to function efficiently
requires the coordination of assessments and appropriate responses with the government, local
communities, and the international community.
The sheer scale of the relief effort in Haiti has brought together tremendous capacity and
willingness to help, but an ongoing effort and strategic planning is required at each phase to work
out coordination and logistics issues. The massive humanitarian relief operation underway was
hampered by a number of significant challenges, including a general lack of transportation,
extremely limited communications systems, and damaged infrastructure. In many parts of Port-
au-Prince, roads were ruptured or blocked by collapsed buildings, debris, bodies, and people
seeking open space. Working conditions remain hugely challenging for aid personnel.
Humanitarian supplies are coming in to Haiti via Port-au-Prince and Santo Domingo, Dominican
Republic. The airport in the Dominican Republic is also being used as a humanitarian staging
area to help with the coordination effort and allow for relief teams and supplies to get to Haiti by
land.
Challenges consistent with a response to a disaster of this scope continue. In the first two weeks
following the earthquake, priorities were focused on (1) search and rescue assistance, including
teams with heavy-lift equipment and medical assistance and supplies; (2) addressing a critical
need for food, clean water and sanitation, medical assistance, and emergency shelter; and (3)
setting up key infrastructure and logistics operations. Three months after the disaster, the relief
effort remains an immediate and critical priority amid plans under discussion for early recovery
and reconstruction. There are concerns about security and potential for looting and violence, but
according to the United Nations, the overall situation remains calm and stable, with some
incidences of looting and criminality. However, 5,000 or so prison inmates escaped the National
Penitentiary and other jails in Port-au-Prince during the earthquake (with some re-apprehended)
and the whereabouts of the others is unknown, although it is suspected that a significant number
may have retreated to Cite Soleil. Reports of rape cases in camps, roadblocks and fake tolls along
roads, and other possible gang activity related to drugs and other crimes point to involvement by
some of these criminals. U.N. and government officials are urging Haitians to turn in escaped
criminals while also focusing on specific security interventions focused on their recapture.
More in-depth assessments, necessary to obtain a better understanding of the situation on the
ground, continue. The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) a joint effort among
representatives from the Government of Haiti, World Bank, United Nations and other actors, was
completed in time for the March 31 conference in New York. The information is critical for
determining whether personnel are in place with adequate resources, planning recovery and
reconstruction initiatives, developing strategies for the use of funding, and paving the way for
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service 12
donor pledges and long-term support. The PDNA and donors conference are discussed later in the
report.
United Nations Humanitarian Response
At the outset of the disaster, the United Nations established Disaster Assessment and
Coordination (UNDAC) and U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
teams.
26
The UNDAC team coordinated the Onsite Operations and Coordination Center
(OSOCC). Two sub-OSOCCs were established in Jacmel and Leogane to assist local authorities.
The UNDAC team concluded its work in Haiti in February.
In the weeks following the earthquake, OCHA helped to coordinate the search and rescue teams
and continues to coordinate the assistance effort while focusing on other humanitarian priorities.
In addition to working closely with the government of Haiti, OCHA is the lead agency working
with actors on the ground, coordinating with the military, and enlisting donor support. The
Humanitarian Country Team convened on February 1 and meets twice a week, with at least one of
those meetings co-chaired by a representative from the government of Haiti. In consultation with
MINUSTAH and international military forces, OCHA has developed a Joint Operations Tasking
Centre (JOTC) which began operating on January 26 and focuses on civil-military coordination
and logistics. The OCHA Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) team first convened on January
31 and brings together civil-military points of contact from humanitarian organizations,
MINUSTAH, and international military forces. A Debris Management Planning Task Force was
assembled on February 23.
Humanitarian relief sectors are typically established during humanitarian crises to enable the
United Nations to coordinate partners, prioritize resources, and facilitate planning. In Haiti, relief
sectors have been organized into twelve clusters led by various agencies.
27
The clusters include
• Agriculture (Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO);
• Camp Coordination and Camp Management (International Organization for
Migration, IOM);
• Early Recovery (U.N. Development Program, UNDP);
• Education (U.N. Children’s Fund, UNICEF);
• Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items (International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies, IFRC);
• Emergency Telecommunications (World Food Program, WFP);
• Food (World Food Program, WFP);
• Health (World Health Organization, WHO, and Pan American Health
Organization, PAHO).
• Logistics (WFP);
26
Kim Bolduc, the U.N. Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, was deployed to Haiti in November 2009.
27
The head of each cluster (indicated in parentheses) reports to the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator and works in
partnership with all relevant actors in that particular sector. The clusters meet at least once daily.
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service 13
• Nutrition (UNICEF);
• Protection (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR), with
Child Protection (UNICEF);
Gender Based Violence (U.N. Population Fund, UNFPA);
• Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (UNICEF).
Initially, there were criticisms of the slow initial response by the humanitarian aid community to
the crisis. In recent press conferences, the United Nations has stated the cluster system appears to
be working well, but others suggest that some clusters appear to be doing better than others.
Cluster arrangements have also been established in Leogane, Jacmel, and Gonaives. The cluster
set up in the Dominican Republic was dissolved on April 13.
Humanitarian Relief Sectors: Recent Developments
28
• Emergency Shelter: After the earthquake struck, people began gathering
spontaneously in open spaces in Port-au-Prince. It was estimated that there were
500 or more makeshift camp sites with a combined total of more than 700,000
people. Aid workers are delivering basic necessities to areas with population
concentrations. Emergency shelter was in very short supply. Reports indicate that
97,000 houses were destroyed and 188,000 sustained damage. It is estimated that
1.9 million lost their homes.
Approximately 597,000 people were initially reported to have relocated in
departments outside the city, with the highest number concentrated in Artibonite
Department. Reports indicated that a number of areas saw increases of 15%-20%
in the population. Ninety percent of the new arrivals were staying with host
families. Reportedly, prices of basic commodities increased. See the maps in
Appendix B and Appendix C.
In early April, the estimated number of displaced was adjusted, with an increase
in the number of IDPs in Port-au-Prince to 1.69 million and IDPs displaced in
areas outside the city appearing to decrease to 300,000. The adjustment may in
part reflect more accurate numbers as a result of IDP registrations. It may also
reflect a “pull factor” where those who left Port-au-Prince initially are now
returning to the capitol as services improve and recovery gets underway.
The United Nations reports that 86% of the known caseload of IDPs have been
reached with emergency shelter materials. As the rainy season begins, there
remain concerns about whether there is sufficient waterproof emergency shelter,
the need to move people from unsafe settlements, and ongoing challenges to
improve sanitation. In addition, houses and buildings weakened by the
earthquake could collapse or slide in wet conditions, adding to the 65 million
tons of rubble needing to be removed. Finding space to shelter the displaced
remains an issue.
28
Information derived from a variety of sources, including USAID/OFDA, Haiti-Earthquake, Fact Sheet #13, FY2010
January 25, 2010; Pan American Health Organization, Emergency Operations Center Situation Report #12 Haiti
Earthquake, January 25, 2010; OCHA, Haiti Earthquake, Situation Report #13, January 25, 2010.
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service 14
For those living in unsafe areas, the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) has identified several options: (1) return to the permanent home if the
structure is considered safe; (2) return to home area to a temporary shelter or
proximity site; (3) seek accommodation with host communities—usually
relatives or friends; (4) relocate to a new site. The first phase of humanitarian
relocations for vulnerable families living in high-risk displacement sites was
completed at the end of April, with more than 1,750 families moving to two
temporary relocation sites at the edge of Port-au-Prince. Another plot in Corail
Cesselesse (Port-au-Prince) has received over 3,000 people.
IOM also reported that an estimated 49% of IDPs in the Port-au-Prince area were
renters prior to the earthquake and 37% owned their own homes (14% did not
identify their status.) Providing sustainable, long-term shelter to renters may be
more problematic as renters do not own land for shelter installation and
landowners may decide not to rebuild rental homes. In addition, owners of
private schools have forced the eviction of those inhabiting their property as they
seek to reopen their schools.
Where to build on a more permanent basis will be a major decision—many of
the poorest people were squatters on land subject to landslides and floods. The
type of structures to be built will also have to be determined as there will be a
need for inexpensive housing that is both earthquake- and hurricane-resistant.
• Food: Food and water are reaching people every day, but the needs remain
constant. It is estimated that 2 million people in Haiti need regular food aid.
Some areas outside Port-au-Prince that were previously considered food secure
are facing difficulties as prices increase. Supplementary food programs have been
launched for children under 5 and pregnant women in the Port-au-Prince area.
WFP has provided emergency food rations to 3.5 million people since the
earthquake struck.
The heads of three U.N. agencies – WFP, the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) formed a
new Task Force for Food Security in Haiti. The task force aims to assist the
Haitian government with the implementation of a coordinated and targeted
immediate and long term food security strategy. It will also work with the
relevant U.N. humanitarian clusters. The WFP is now transitioning to a focus on
long-term food security and investments in human capital programs. As part of
this initiative, it is also rolling out food- and cash-for-work initiatives.
• Health: Acute respiratory illness is the most commonly reported illness, and in
recent weeks, there have been some possible cases of malaria identified, but
disease remains at baseline rates with none at epidemic levels. The health cluster
is coordinating closely with other clusters on food assistance, shelter, sanitation,
and education to assist the Haitian population. The need for sanitation and
medical assistance remains. Limited follow-up, post-operative care is available
and amputees are among those requiring longer-term assistance.
The government of Haiti has shifted away from emergency services to focus on
primary health care, health centers, and hospitals. The focus of the health cluster
is also on basic primary health care services, such as maternal child health,
rehabilitation services, and chronic diseases including diabetes, heart disease,
HIV, and tuberculosis. Vaccination programs are being implemented and a
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service 15
targeted immunization program for populations in temporary settlements began
on February 2. The provision of mental health care and psychosocial support to
help survivors deal with trauma is also a recognized priority and organizations
are mobilizing to address this issue.
The identification and collection of mortal remains continues.
• Logistics: In both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, WFP is heading the in-
country Food aid, Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications clusters.
UNHAS is running a twice daily flight from Santa Domingo to Port-au-Prince.
The WFP is prepositioning food and non-food items as well as equipment
throughout Haiti in preparation for the hurricane season.
• Protection: The sub-cluster is focused on child protection activities in
settlements, orphanages, and hospitals to determine the needs of children and to
provide care to separated and unaccompanied children. Another main priority is
protection of children during the relocation process. With so many people
displaced and in need of protection, general security against crime is a critical
concern. In addition, protection activities are focused on Haitian children
displaced in the Dominican Republic.
• Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH): A water supply strategy is being
planned to phase out water trucking and to develop more sustainable options.
Limited water network capacity remains a challenge. Access to safe drinking
water has improved. Latrine usage and sanitation remain problems at
spontaneous settlements. Increasing sanitation support is a main priority. This is
seen as an important public health issue to avoid spread of disease, particularly
during the rainy season. Plans are underway to increase the provision of water
and sanitation services in communities.
• Education: Schools in areas unaffected by the earthquake reopened on February
1. Schools continue to open progressively, although the official reopening of
schools was on April 5. Approximately 700 schools have now reopened in Port-
au-Prince. The United Nations reports that 4,000 students were killed in the
earthquake. It is estimated that 1,300 schools were destroyed and between 2,000
to 4,600 schools were damaged by the earthquake. Temporary schools are being
provided with shelters, safe water, sanitation facilities, and educational materials
for the rainy/hurricane season. Fourteen percent of the population of Haiti is
under 14 years of age.
• Early Recovery: More than 95,700 people have been employed under UNDP’s
cash-for-work program. Activities include clearance of drainage canals and the
removal of rubble.
Haiti’s Humanitarian Needs in Context
A number of natural disasters have struck Haiti in the last decade (mostly in the form of
hurricanes), prompting the need for international assistance through the United Nations and other
actors. In addition to miscellaneous humanitarian funding provided for general emergency
conditions, specific natural disasters include:
[... middle sections omitted for long document ...]
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service 72
U.S. Department of State
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/ha/earthquake/index.htm
U.S. Department of State Embassy, Port-au-Prince
http://haiti.usembassy.gov/
U.S. Geological Survey
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010rja6/
White House: Help for Haiti
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/01/13/help-haiti
Information on the Haitian Earthquake
Haiti Earthquake Damage Map
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullmaps_am.nsf/eca57e2740e7a919412569cf003180fa/
0573522688593a18c12576aa00483368/$FILE/100112_07.45NYT_Haiti_Epicenter.pdf
Haiti Earthquake Intensity Map
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullmaps_am.nsf/luFullMap/A4228B2905DCFFE6C12576AB00285
81B/$File/map.pdf?OpenElement
Haiti Earthquake 2010, Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake and Engineering
Research (MCEER)
http://mceer.buffalo.edu/research/Reconnaissance/Haiti1-12-10/default.asp
Other Resources
Center for International Disaster Information (CIDI)
http://www.cidi.org/news/haiti-quake.htm
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI)
http://www.eqclearinghouse.org/20100112-haiti/
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service 73
European Commission for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO)
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/caribbean_pacific/haiti_earthquake_en.htm
InterAction
http://www.interaction.org/crisis-list/earthquake-haiti
Inter American Development Bank
http://www.iadb.org/haiti/index.cfm?lang=en&id=6407
International Monetary Fund
http://www.imf.org/external/country/hti/index.htm
Organization of American States: Pan American Disaster Foundation
http://www.panamericanrelief.org/
Pan American Health Organization
http://new.paho.org/disasters/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1088&Itemid=1
Red Cross Movement
The American Red Cross
http://www.redcross.org
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
http://www.ifrc.org
The Haitian Red Cross
http://www.ifrc.org/address/ht.asp
The International Committee of the Red Cross
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/haiti
Relief Web
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc108?OpenForm&emid=EQ-2010-000009-HTI&rc=2
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service 74
United Nations
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) http://www.unicef.org/
infobycountry/haiti_newsline.html
United Nations Habitat(UN-Habitat)
http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=7780&catid=5&typeid=6&subMenuId=0
United Nations News Center
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=91&Body=Haiti&Body1=
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA)
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MUMA-
84TW2F-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/
United Nations World Food Program (WFP)
http://www.wfp.org/stories/haiti-wfp-bring-food-devastating-quake
World Bank
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/HAITIEXTN/
0,,menuPK:338184~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:338165,00.html
Author Contact Information
(name redacted)
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-.... (name redacted)<><><><>
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....
Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
Congressional Research Service 75
Key Policy Staff
Area of Expertise Name/Title Telephone E-mail
Haiti (name redacted)<><>
Specialist in Latin
American Affairs
7-.... #redacted#@crs.loc.gov
Humanitarian Issues (name redacted)
Specialist in International
Humanitarian Policy
7-.... #redacted#@crs.loc.gov
Military Assistance (name redacted)
Specialist in National
Security
7-.... #redacted#@crs.loc.gov
United Nations (name redacted)<><>,
Specialist in International
Relations
7-.... #redacted#@crs.loc.gov
Earthquakes (name redacted)
Specialist in Energy and
Natural Resources Policy
7-.... #redacted#@crs.loc.gov
General Julissa Gomez Granger,
Information Research
Specialist
7-.... #redacted#@crs.loc<><><>.gov
Trade (name redacted)
Specialist in International
Trade and Finance
7-.... #redacted#@crs.loc.gov
General (name redacted), Information
Research Specialist
7-.... #redacted#@crs.loc.gov
Immigration (name redacted)
Specialist in Immigration
Policy
7-.... #redacted#@crs.loc.gov
Debt Relief (name redacted)
Specialist in International
Trade and Finance
7-.... #redacted#@crs.loc.gov
Medical Evacuations Sarah Lister
Specialist in Public Health
and Epidemiology
7-.... #redacted#@crs.loc.gov
Adoption (name redacted)
Specialist in Immigration
Policy
7-.... #redacted#@crs.loc.gov
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