(2016) La Réponse d'Abri et la Récupération du Logement dans les Deux Premières Années Après le Séisme de 2010 en Haïti: Qu'avons-nous Appris?

[page 1] = nm. Ye } : # A à se Fra Dir à a L Me se PMR ANS A 4 ENS tetes RE PE Dis PS D À AN nt f 20 LEE VOX mn V2 f RAS LPS EP RE = < h DST 2 Tel | | Sr =) WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake ©GFDRR @uenonosan fab UNOHABITAT HOME [page 2] [page 3] WHAT DID WE LEARN? [page 4] © 2016 The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington, DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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[page 5] PE Table of Contents FOrEWOrd een VI Preface idees VTT Acknowledgments iii ÎX ACTONYMS nr rrnnrnnnnenennnnnnennnnneneneeenenennennnenenennennennneee XÏ Executive SUMMAFY rires TT I Introduction A. Purpose of the Report... B. Development of the Report...) C. First 24-Month Timeline 2 IL. Overview of the Haïti Earthquake Shelter and Housing Response A. The Context of the Earthquake Event D B. Recovery and Reconstruction Policies and Goals 10 III. Analysis of the Shelter and Housing Effort A. The Shelter Response 27 B. The Housing Response OZ C. Risk Reduction in Post-Disaster Reconstruction... CO D. Land and Urban Development Issues 70 E. Recovery and Reconstruction Finance... OC) Appendix 1. Excerpts from the Haiti PNDA T5 Appendix 2. Larger Housing-Related Projects including Permanent Housing Commitments eee LT IV. Conclusions A. Summary of Findings 11 B. Recommendations from the First Two Years of Response and Recovery in Haïti 129 C. Final Questions 135 [page 6] ANNEXES ANNEX I: Haiti Housing Recovery Case Studies Case Study 1: Katye Neighborhood Upgrading and Recovery Program in Port-au-Prince .….….… 141 Case Study 2: Experience with Rental Assistance Programming 147 Case Study 3: The Canaan Settlement in Croix-des-Bouquets 151 Case Study 4: The Rehabilitation of 16 Neighborhoods and Voluntary Return of Residents from six Camps Project... 155 Case Study 5: The Logement-Quartiers (Housing-Neighborhoods) Working Group….….…....160 Case Study 6: Haut Damier New Settlement Project in Cabaret... 162 Case Study 7: Urban Neighborhood Upgrading Projects PRODEPUR and PREKAD...............164 Case Study 8: Santo Development Project in Léogâne...............................................168 Case Study 9: Simon Pelé Project in Port-au-Prince... 171 Annex Il: Haïti Shelter and Housing Timeline.…....…............. 170 Bibliography... 181 List of Tables Table 1: Average Annual Disbursement of ODA by Top 10 Bilateral and Multilatera Donors, 2009-2013 and 2007-2008... een L Table 2. Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Summary of Recovery and Reconstruction Requirements Years 1-3, in US$... nee LB Table 3. Summary of Original and Revised Requirements, Emergency Flash Appeal 2010, and Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal 2011 (US$ million)... 30 Table 4. Building Conditions by Category and Building Type... 47 Table 5. Building Condition by Unit Type... AT Table 6. Reports of T-shelter, Housing Repairs, Retrofits, and New Construction, and Rent Subsidies..….................. inner 60 Table 7. Types and Impacts of Natural Disasters in Haïti since the Eighteenth Century 67 Table 8. Criteria for Mitigation Based on Zoning.…......................................... 74 Table 9. Damage and Losses for Housing and Community Infrastructure (in US$ million) ……. 99 Table 10. IHRC Estimates of Funding Needs for Housing and Neighborhood Reconstruction…...101 iv [page 7] List of Figures Figure 1. Map of Haïti and Its Environs... té Figure 2. Topographic Map of Haiti... st Figure 3: Composition of Official Development Assistance to Haiti, Al Donors, 2005-2012, in millions of USD... iennnnne 12 Figure 4: Humanitarian, Peacekeeping and Development Aid 2000-2008, in millions of constant 2007 USD... nn 13 Figure 5 Distribution of Gross ODA Disbursements by Major Sector, 5-year average, Figure 6. Was your organization working in Haïti before the earthquake? 15 Figure 7. What did your organization use as its national-level policy framework to design Îts recovery or reconstruction interventions? 17 Figure 8. Haiti Response Emergency, T-shelter, and Recovery Solutions Provided, January 2010-August 2011 in thousands of units 20 Figure 9. Did the organization you worked for provide support to host families? 36 Figure 10. Example of T-Shelter Elevation 38 Figure 11. How would you rate the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms in which you participated?........................................... 42 Figure 12. What were your organization’s principal recovery and reconstruction activities related to shelter, housing, and urban development? (42 responses)... 50 Figure 13. IDPs in Camps by Tenancy Status 2010-2012... DT Figure 14. Reasons for Leaving IDP Camps, reported by Sample of Leaver Population, March 2011... nee D Figure 15. What could have been done to improve government’s capacity to manage recovery and reconstruction? iii DB Figure 16. How clear were government’s goals and standards for DRR and “building back better”? eee 2 Figure 17. For each type of intervention, which urban challenges did you find the most difficult? 84 Figure 18. Downtown redevelopment as envisioned by Duany Plater-Zyberk and the Prince's Foundation for the Built Environment... 86 Figure 19. Neighborhood rehabilitation as envisioned by Caribbean architects….…................ 86 Figure 20. Port-au-Prince reconstruction as envisioned by Centre Haïtien de Recherche en Aménagement et an Développement (Haïtian Center for Research in Planning and Development) and Groupe Trame 86 Figure 21. Funds Raised and Disbursed in Support of Haïti as of December 2012....................102 Figure 22. For what purposes were funds channeled directly to beneficiaries or host families by your organization? 108 Figure 23. IHRC Regular Housing Project Submissions 2010-2011, in US$ million 111 V [page 8] List of Boxes Box 1: Recovery Framework Objectives…........................... ss 17 Box 2: Vision and Approach for Haïitis Rebuilding 19 Box 3: Immediate Actions for the Future... 20 Box 4: Sample of Performance Indicators Used by Shelter and Housing Agencies in Haïti, Box 5: Revised Flash Appeal (February 2010)... 28 Box6: The Urgent but Complex Task of Debris Management 33 Box 7: Host Family Assistance in Earthquake Affected Haïiti…................................37 Box 8: Meeting Shelter Needs ss 40 Box 9: Constituents and Terminology of Risk...........................................................66 Box 10: Risk Assessment in the 16/6 Project in Port-au-Prince: From Risk Information to Risk-Informed Planning 74 Box11: Relocation to Secondary Cities... ot Box 12: Terminology of the PDNA es O8 Box13: Haiti - Economy: The project “Kay pam” increases from 30 million to 500 million ŒOUrdS ire LLO vi [page 9] , | | TRAITÉE f : >. | r} 5 4 MONT : EN NA MR À de = = ù 4 { 7 on Aa | a où & 0 (Brie (KA Ma à de (1e A | g | ! } + 2 he: 2ù TR Photo credit: UN-Habitat he World Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) and their partners, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), UN-Habitat, and Habitat for Humanity International, joined forces in 2013 to analyze what was learned from the 2010 Haïti earthquake shelter response and housing recovery experience. This report is the outcome of that process. It is based on candid conversations and reflections among the people and organizations that helped shape and deliver the international community’s urban shelter and housing assistance programs following one of the major urban disasters of recent times. This report is not a formal evaluation, but rather a synthesis of the experiences, observations, and recommendations of a large group of experienced post-disaster shelter and recovery experts gathered from interviews, surveys, and direct discussions, and information derived from a desk review of the wide variety of available evaluations and reports. The shelter response and housing recovery efforts in Haïti during the first two years after the earthquake have been widely scrutinized. There is certainly much that could be questioned—with respect to timeliness, policy orientation, equity, and cost-effectiveness. There were also aspects of these efforts that worked well, despite some initial delays. Lessons learned have already been incorporated in subsequent post-disaster recovery responses and have motivated organizational reforms. It has become almost a cliché to say that we live in an increasingly vulnerable world. Haïti embodies many of the factors that contribute to global vulnerability: it is rapidly urbanizing, low-income, hampered by fragile governance mechanisms and institutions, supported by an economy that is largely informal and that exhibits extreme disparities, and highly dependent on its external partners for both social and economic support. Worldwide, population growth and unplanned urbanization in the fragile cities of developing economies, combined with the impacts of climate change, are causing a concentration of urban risk. Helping the countries most at risk become more resilient and better prepared for more effective urban crisis response is a collective responsibility. We hope this report can contribute to that effort. Members of the Steering Committee Sylvie Debomy Lead Urban Jean-Christophe Adrian Former Mike Meany Chief Operating Officer, Specialist, World Bank Group Director, UN-Habitat Office for Liaison Habitat for Humanity Haïti Michel Matera Senior Disaster Risk with European Institutions Graham Saunders Head, Shelter & Management Specialist, World Bank Filiep Decorte Chief Technical Settlements, IFRC Group Advisor, UN-Habitat New York Liaison Kip Scheïdler Senior Director, Priscilla M. Phelps Consultant, Office Disaster Risk Reduction and Response, World Bank Group and GFDRR Xavier Genot Consultant, IFRC Habitat for Humanity David Lallemant Consultant, International GFDRR:; Assistant Professor, Nanyang Maggie Stephenson University Technological University, Singapore College London vii [page 10] LE TA # — = ANT € Sr cu 1 fl Ph , <Z sd #7 . & DE À ar À h * Fr. \ an 4 Bd : Photo credit: IFRC, Eric Quintero Kay koule twompe soley soley men li pa twompe lapil. À leaky house can fool the sun, but it can't fool the rain. (Haïtian proverb) any of us left Haïti after our completing our work on post-earthquake recovery with feelings of regret. These regrets had much to do with leaving Haïti and its people behind. But they had also to do with our acknowledgment that the results we had accomplished did not reflect the effort we had made. Moreover, we faced criticism from some Haïtians and perplexed questions in our home countries that we sometimes struggled to answer: “Where did the money go?” “Ts there as much corruption as they say?” “Why couldn’t they do it themselves?” “Why did you stay so long?” “Why did you leave so soon?” These questions, and many others that we asked ourselves, do not have easy answers. Perhaps the experience should be stored away with the files and mementos we brought back. But for some of us, examining the experience in detail, and discussing it collectively, seemed like it could be useful both to ourselves and to others who may participate in future recovery efforts. The agencies involved in this initiative, led by the World Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), graciously provided the time and resources to allow this analysis to be carried out. The Steering Committee provided invaluable support. À large number of individuals and organizations, Haïtian and foreign, gave their time, feedback, and materials (see the Acknowledgments). Hopefully this report conveys the good intentions that motivated the work on recovery in Haïti, while explaining how it was often undermined by the complex situation that faced Haïitians and external actors alike. It describes successes and failures, including the difficulty of thinking long term while dealing with so many urgent requirements. It shows how, in the effort to show results, equity and accountability were too often sacrificed. And it demonstrates that urban disaster recovery will require new approaches and skills. This is one of many reports produced by agencies hoping to better understand the impact of their involvement in Haïti in the aftermath of the devastating January 2010 earthquake and how to apply the lessons taken from this experience to future recovery programs. My hope is that it contributes something uniquely useful, and that the observations, findings, and recommendations included here will be taken in the constructive spirit in which they are offered. Priscilla M. Phelps Consultant, World Bank Group and GFDRR Report Project Manager viii [page 11] raies Photo credit: UN-Habitat Acknowledgments he production of this report is the result of the collaboration of many people and organizations working through a variety of media from various places around the world. The authors and Steering Committee wish to express their deepest gratitude to those mentioned here and to others who have been inadvertently omitted. Contributors included Harry Adam, Tahir Akbar, Ali Y. Alwahti, Willy Amisi, Raja Arshad, Joseph Ashmore, Vlatko Avramovski, Jennifer E. Duyne Barenstein, Benoist Bazin, Clement Keke Belazaire, James Bellamy, Sandra Berberi, Elizabeth Blake, Ugo Blanco, Aurélie Boukobza, Caroline Broudic, Aby Brun, Eric Calais, Giovanni Cassini, Samy Checcin, Kenneth Chulley, Carolina Cordero- Scales, Tom Corsellis, Kate Crawford, Luca Dall’oglio, Gilles Damais, Odnell David, Francois Desruisseaux, Alexis Doucet, Erdem Ergin, Jessica Faieta, Lilianne Fan, Jeff Feldmesser, Emmett Fitzgerald, Marcel Fortier, Therese Foster, Fenella Frost, Ross Gartley, Marcia Urquhart Glenn, Grégoire Goodstein, Marjorie Greene, François Grünewald, Rose-May Guignard, Judith Hermanson, Niels B. Holm-Nielsen, Chantefort Igor, Chantal-Sylvie Imbeault, Yvon Jerome, Chedler Joseph, Damien Jusselme, Michele Keane, Jim Kennedy, Siobhan Kennedy, Earl Kessler, Anna Konotchick, Vera Kreuwels, Marie Le Gac, Ann Lee, Josef Leitmann, Esteban Leon, Simon Levine, Christopher Loan, Wilson Louis, Legrand L. Malany, Suranga Mallawa, Ascension Martinez, Juslain Mathieu, Gregg Mcdonald, Bradley Mellicker, Rodrigo Melo, Jared Mercadante, Kathleen Miner, Felipe Munevar, Claude-André Nadon, Achala Navaratne, Adriana Navarro-Sertich, Rafael Mattar Neri, Carline Noaïlles, Daniel Oneil, Takuya Ono, Michele Oriol, Emmanuel Pajot, Ayaz Parvez, Philippe Philius, Del Pinto, Natalia Rodriguez, Amelia Rule, Jude Saint-Natus, Victoria Salinas, Arcindo Santos, Irantzu Serra, Charles A. Setchell, Samba I. Sidibe, Mark South, Margaret Stansberry, Kate Stohr, Samantha Stratton-Short, Gerhard Tauscher, Melvin Tebbutt, Jean Frantz Theodat, Kelogue Therasme, Saincius Thony, David Tordjman, Brian Leo Treacy, Eduard Tschan, Noll Tufani, Kulendra Verma, Anna Wachtmeister, Christopher Ward, Anna Wellenstein, Antje Wemhoener, and Paolo Zorzoli. Particular credit goes to members of this report’s Steering Committee that oversaw this effort, and to the organizations they represent or work for, for their commitment, patience, and willingness to provide feedback and resources: Jean-Christophe Adrian (UN-Habitat), Sylvie Debomy (World Bank), Filiep Decorte (UN-Habitat), Xavier Génot (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies [IFRC]), David Lallemant (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery [GFDRR]), Michel Matera (World Bank), Mike Meaney (Habitat for Humanity Haïti), Priscilla M. Phelps (World Bank and GFDRR), Graham Saunders (IFRC), Kip A. Scheidler (Habitat for Humanity International), and Maggie Stephenson (University College London). ix [page 12] [page 13] MAP FER, . SE FLAT = A, EX Rd 2] LH !}, 4 <= P$ m4 f me. $ 4 [+ Le fs ] * 1 FE 1 vai: Va ae Se EE | NS à = Véix "14 LÉ! 4 \ D: 271 or 0 ti k É | y fs "814 ; D. LENS DA e a Fi + 1 mit lee pl F Photo credit: UNOPS, Adriana Navarro Acronyms 16/6 Rehabilitation of 16 Neighborhoods and Voluntary Return of Residents from 6 Camps AFD Agence Française de Développement APNRDH Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haïti BBB Building Back Better BMPAD Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d'Aide au Développement (Office of Monetization of Development Aid) CBO Community-Based Organization CCCM Camp Coordination/Camp Management CHAP Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal CIAT Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire (Interministerial Committee for Territorial Planning) CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CNGRD Comité National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres (National Risk and Disaster Management Committee) CNIGS Centre National d'Information Geo-Spatiale DALA Damage, Loss, and Needs Assessment DGI Direction Générale des Impôts (General Tax Office) DRF Disaster Recovery Framework DRM Disaster Risk Management DRR Disaster Risk Reduction DTM Displacement Tracking Matrix ECAP Emergency Community Assistance and Planning EERI Earthquake Engineering Research Institute EPPLS Entreprise Publique pour le Logement Social ER Early Recovery ERC UN Emergency Relief Coordinator EU European Union FAES Fund for Economic and Social Assistance FTS UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service G11 Group comprising the EU, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations, Canada, Spain, France, the United States, Japan, and a rotating representative of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile GC Global Communities GDP Gross Domestic Product GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery GPS Global Positioning System HCT Humanitarian Country Team HFHH Habitat for Humanity Haiti HFHI Habitat for Humanity International HLPWG Housing Land and Property Working Group HNRSP Housing and Neighborhood Reconstruction Support Program HRF Haiti Reconstruction Fund HSDP Haïti Strategic Development Plan IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee IDB Inter-American Development Bank xi [page 14] IDP Internally Displaced Person IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies IHC Interministerial Housing Commission IHCSR Interim Haïti Commission for Shelter and Reconstruction IHRC Interim Haïti Recovery Commission IHSI Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique (Haitian Bureau of Statistics) ILO International Labor Organization INA Integrated Neighborhood Approach 10M International Organization for Migration MAST Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor MEF Ministère de l'Economie and des Finances (Ministry of Economy and Finance) MICT Ministry of Interior and Local Government MINUSTAH UN Stabilization Mission in Haïti MPCE Ministère de la Planification et de La Coopération Externe (Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation) MTPTC Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications NDC Neighborhood Development Council NGO Nongovernmental Organization NRHRF Neighborhood Return and Housing Reconstruction Framework OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ODA Official Development Assistance OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance OSE UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haïti PCI Project Concern International PDNA Post-Disaster Needs Assessment PMC Project Management Contractor PNGRD Plan National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres (National Risk Management Plan) PPR Plan de Prevention des Risques (Risk Prevention Plan) PREKAD Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project PRODEPUR Urban Community-Driven Development Project RRS Return and Relocation Strategy RSCG Rental Support Cash Grant SAG Strategic Advisory Group SILQ Système d'Information du Logement et des Quartiers (Housing and Neighborhoods Information System) SNGRD Système National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres (National Disaster Risk Management System) SPDH Strategic Plan for the Development of Haiti SPGRD Secrétariat Permanent de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres (Permanent Secretariat for Disaster Risk Management) TWIG Technical Working and Information Group US. United States UCLBP Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics (Housing and Public Building Construction Unit) UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UN-Habitat United Nations Human Settlements Programme UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services USAID U.S. Agency for International Development WASH Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated. Figures without source information are based on the survey conducted for this report. xii [page 15] Toy, € ue D aa SPA UE ET donner Jus RL Tr IN! CRT À mL. EE. : . c Man L Fate Era Te ie ES Dei 0) . HT res Ps € En ln PARENT ér Cr re a Te à Er = 7 Les EU 1 MC eg DÉl — ingaaer “dt <> fr NT on” LL Eu he. a ET En TPE En © Nr = = CR" —— ai Le D — ——— STE TRE ra \=BMmétes Ÿ] pl ] LE en - | de, — EE 7 = PE HE BE Er “ou Se F: # "IÉRRQTE [A - XX AR | 0. e- - | RE À RTE R s _ "il FR 4 | ff L ” À = S # en. Lt. Photo credit: World Bank El The Haïti Earthquake: Unprecedented Damage in an Urban Context hen Haïti was hit by a 7.3 magnitude earthquake at approximately 5:00 pm on January 12, 2010, the effects were stunning: hundreds of thousands of people dead or wounded and damage to buildings and infrastructure later estimated at $7.8 billion, a figure that exceeded the country’s entire gross domestic product (GDP). Housing was the sector most affected, with total damages estimated at $2.3 billion. Disaster risks in Haiti were well understood, but the country was not prepared for an event of this scale. Listed by the World Bank as a natural disaster hotspot, with particular exposure to seismic and hydro-meteorological hazards, Haïti is one of the most vulnerable countries, due to such factors as topography, environmental degradation, poverty, and uncontrolled urbanization. The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) estimated that 1.5 million people were directly affected by the earthquake. Around 105,000 buildings were destroyed and more than 208,000 were damaged. Educational buildings, hospitals, and health centers were lost, as were the presidential palace and the buildings of parliament, the courts, and many ministries. While the earthquake affected the entire country, Haïti’s urban areas were especially hard hit. There was widespread physical destruction in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and in cities in the southwest and southeast parts of the country. xiii [page 16] xiv / EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Challenge of Response and Recovery: Planning and Coordinating in the Absence of Policy International assistance was offered to Haïti following the earthquake at a level not seen since the 2008 Indian Ocean tsunami. The Inter-Agency Steering Committee (ASC) immediately mobilized the cluster system, and a flood of financial and technical assistance began to arrive. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the focus was on the humanitarian crisis, but by the time the donor pledging conference was convened at the United Nations (UN) in New York in March 2010, the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) had been created, and attention turned to the reconstruction and recovery effort. The 2010 Haïti earthquake recovery demonstrated that, in spite of the level of assistance made available, good recovery from a major disaster does not just happen. It depends on important decisions being made at critical moments, and on diligent planning and coordination among all involved. The Shelter Response: Laudable Efforts in the Early Weeks and Months The emergency shelter response following the January 12, 2010, earthquake was successful. A straightforward initial “Shelter Sector Response Plan” was developed by the Shelter and Non-Food Items Cluster (hereafter referred to as the “Shelter Cluster”) that had been established by the IASC. The plan had three clear objectives—emergency shelter within three months, before the hurricane season; full transitional shelter within 12 months; and plans for durable shelter for the entire affected population developed within 12 months—and was supported by both the Haïitian government and the international community. The original emergency shelter goal of providing emergency shelter for 100,000 families before the hurricane season was met. The success factors included a strong mobilization effort and implementation capacity, the early coordination framework, and agreement on the three objectives. In the early months, Haitians and international actors worked in concert. After initial effective collaboration, overall coordination weakened as a result of, among other things, lack of familiarity by Haïtian actors with the IASC cluster system and a failure of clusters to adapt to Haitian requirements; limited government resources to coordinate with numerous international actors, since many interactions took place outside of cluster coordination; turnover and instability in the cluster system itself; discontinuity in decision making during the election and early post-election periods; and language and cultural barriers. The initial shelter strategy was not adjusted sufficiently as the situation evolved. While the IASC cluster system was fully activated in Haïti, there was significant variation in capacity from one cluster to another and weak inter-cluster coordination, which contributed to the fragmentation of the response. Further, the clusters were humanitarian mechanisms that had no mandate for housing recovery and reconstruction. Decision making on the recovery approach needed to come from the government. With no government platform assuming responsibility for recovery coordination and planning, the transition from shelter to recovery faltered. [page 17] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / xv Ultimately, shelter resources were concentrated on two options: camp support and a massive “T-shelter” program. These two options reflected more what agencies could provide than what the population needed, preferred, or was capable of doing for itself. The T-shelter strategy, and the disproportionate funding it absorbed, supported property owners more than renters, since T-shelters required access to land. Miscalculating the capacity for self-recovery and the resilience of the urban property market resulted in an underfunding of solutions for renters and landlords, for hosting arrangements, and for support to safe self-recovery. The humanitarian shelter and housing recovery strategies needed to be developed jointly, with the government. Doing so would have ensured that the two phases reinforced each other and that they were manageable and managed by the government. Better knowledge of the housing culture in Haïti and better analysis of how the shelter strategy would affect recovery and would ultimately wind down could have contributed to a shorter humanitarian phase that transitioned more effectively to housing recovery. Instead, the humanitarian phase continued for years after the earthquake. Housing Sector Recovery: Households and the Informal Sector Led Housing Recovery The government had no policy framework on which to base the housing reconstruction strategy. There was also no agency of government to which the responsibility for planning and coordinating housing recovery would have naturally fallen. Housing reconstruction planning required clarity about reducing disaster risk, a topic never systematically addressed by national agencies. Debates ensued over relocation versus rebuilding in place. Project proposals overemphasized the need for agencies to build housing, rather than to create the conditions for housing recovery. Time was lost analyzing fundamental housing recovery issues. There was a scarcity of data for planning housing reconstruction. By late 2010, as the result of building safety assessments overseen by the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications (MTPTC), there were good data on building conditions, but there were limited data on affected households, except for those in camps. While the range of situations of households was understood (renters versus owners, types of displacement, etc.), there was no guidance on which households or types of households should be helped first, and in what way. It was not until 2012 that the Système d'Information du Logement et des Quartiers (Housing and Neighborhoods Information System) was launched by the Centre National de l'Information Géo-Spatiale (National Geospatial Information Center) with support from the Housing and Neighborhood Reconstruction Support Program (HNRSP). This will be useful data for future disaster recovery planning, but most recovery aid had already been programmed by the time the data were available. Household self-recovery was the predominant form of recovery. Large numbers of affected Haïtian households displayed their characteristic resilience and found housing solutions on their own. Self- recovery of housing was the principal method utilized by households in the first two years. This included repair and continued occupation of damaged buildings, rebuilding by households with the financial means, and acquisition of owned and rented housing through normal housing market forces. Market-based options grew to include renting out T-shelters and shelters in internally displaced person (IDP) camps. [page 18] xvi / EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Put another way, the informal sector was the biggest player in housing recovery. Housing construction in newly settled informal areas, housing repair and reconstruction in informal urban neighborhoods, and non-permitted construction of new rental units throughout the country were three major sources of housing units for those displaced by the earthquake. While agencies aspired to promote higher housing standards and to formalize housing production activities, the existing informal system set about providing housing for the displaced population. Disaster Risk Reduction in Recovery: The Challenge of Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction The earthquake created a renewed awareness of the need to strengthen disaster risk management (DRM). Although significant work on DRM had taken place in Haïti before the earthquake, the urgency of additional institutional strengthening became clear to everyone afterward. Areas to strengthen include, among others: (i) the capacity of national DRM agencies and local governments in disaster risk reduction (DRR) and recovery (in addition to disaster response), (ii) the engagement of civil society and the scientific community in DRR policy, (iii) the norms and capacity for risk-informed urban planning, (iv) architectural and construction sector capacity for safe building, and (v) enforcement of building codes and construction supervision. The building safety assessment process was successful and provided data that were used in unanticipated ways. In March 2010, MTPTC launched the building safety (or habitability) assessment process to assess the condition of all buildings in the earthquake-affected area. The assessment process demonstrated that, with adequate assistance, a high-quality assessment process can be conducted even when technical experience is limited. While the focus was on speed and consistency, greater attention might have been paid to communications and the collection of additional information, given the multiple uses for which the data were later used. There were significant efforts to improve construction methods, but the related knowledge didn't reach important target groups. The government worked on critical DRR issues with external assistance following the earthquake: guidelines for repair and construction of small masonry buildings were completed by January 2011, retrofitting guidelines were published in 2012, and significant resources were dedicated to training masons in improved building methods. These masons then found work on many donor projects. Nevertheless, the benefits of these efforts were not fully realized because the guidelines were not widely distributed and little effort was made to require production of the quality construction materials that the guidelines called for. While many masons were trained, few were involved in self-recovery projects, where their expertise could have improved the safety of the majority of houses that were built or rebuilt by families themselves. Assistance to the government did not sufficiently strengthen îts regulatory capacity. Technical support on reconstruction guidelines, building codes, training, and related matters was welcomed by government agencies. While this assistance helped build short-term technical capacity, government's enabling and regulatory roles in DRR were rarely strengthened by these efforts. Without a strong lead agency for DRR, government policy on DRR in recovery was unclear in the first two years, even within the government, and DRR in recovery was implemented in a somewhat ad hoc manner. One result of this leadership gap was that no agreement was ever reached on what key concepts such as “building back better” (BBB) and “acceptable risk” meant in the Haitian reconstruction context. [page 19] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / xvii DRR standards should have been more widely communicated and self-enforcement promoted. Instead of being promulgated through minimal but credible norms and regulations, the DRR imperative was pursued almost exclusively on a project-specific basis. The policies applied were based on good international standards, but they benefited only a small percentage of the affected population. In effect, DRR was treated as a “private good,” not a “public good” accessible to all. Given that most households were not assisted by any reconstruction project, but instead recovered on their own, much more emphasis should have been put on making DRR a public good: communicating DRR messages, regulating the quality of construction inputs, and promoting self-enforcement of safe building practices at the household level. This communication program could have begun with engineers carrying out the building safety assessments, since they visited every affected neighborhood. Using conditional financing to incentivize safe construction practices—an international good practice—should also have been much more extensively employed. Post-disaster DRR policy needed to have been established in advance. The post-disaster period is not the right time for DRR research or policy making; it must be done before a disaster strikes. In addition, responsibility for DRR must be clearly assigned. While the disaster motivated donors to provide more support to the Système National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres (SNGRD) (National Disaster Risk Management System), recovery policy was not within its mandate. Haïti has established a number of good DRR practices as a result of the earthquake recovery, but most still need to be codified in national policies or regulations. Land and the Urban Context: Managing the Spatial and Economic Dimensions of Urban Recovery The urban nature of the earthquake had wide-ranging effects on recovery. Government and development partners were unprepared for the spatial, physical, and institutional challenges associated with recovery from such a large-scale urban disaster as the earthquake. Weaknesses in urban planning, land management, and development regulation; difficulty in removing rubble; and lack of space for emergency shelters and transitional housing were all issues specific to the urban context that affected the pace of recovery decision making, the relevance of prior experience, and the speed of implementation. Initially, urban economic realities and their impact on recovery were not well understood. The nature of economic vulnerability and the cash economy, and their implications for recovery, were not well understood by many recovery actors. Agencies were not always prepared for such situations as families occupying both housing and camps or the exploitation that took place between those with and without income or among gangs. While agencies came to understand urban survival strategies and how they affected their recovery projects, in some cases these dynamics caused the abandonment of agency interventions. Tools to more carefully assess the urban economy, its incentives, and the implications for urban recovery interventions should be employed early in future urban disasters. Agencies and government used reconstruction to improve neighborhoods. Realizing that rebuilding housing was not enough, agencies turned to the “integrated neighborhood approach” (INA) for reconstruction in existing neighborhoods. Community planning, never employed before the earthquake, was seen as the best way to organize INA. Agencies that were involved in community planning coordinated with both the national government and local governments and standardized [page 20] xviii / EXECUTIVE SUMMARY their methods. Early community planning pilots helped the government develop replicable community planning and neighborhood upgrading models in the Rehabilitation of 16 Neighborhoods and Voluntary Return of Residents from 6 Camps (16/6) Project that can have important long-term urban development benefits for Haïti. An institutional framework will be needed for these activities, so that the capacities developed and outputs produced will be built on in the future. The time required for larger-scale planning was incompatible with the need to accelerate recovery. Government and external agencies agreed on the importance of using the recovery process to advance strategic development goals, but disagreed on the cost of delaying recovery to take time for urban planning. Even so, the plans that were prepared after the earthquake, such as those for downtown Port-au-Prince, have the potential to positively influence future development in the country, as does the National Housing and Neighborhood Strategy, approved in 2012. However, what was more critical in the first two years, which was never put in place, was an urban planning framework that could have increased the coherence of recovery projects at the local level and guided newly urbanizing areas, in order to maximize the contribution of these initiatives to strategic urban development goals. Land-related challenges consumed enormous resources and greatly affected recovery outcomes. The weakness of land regulation and tenure in Haïti may have contributed more than any other factor to the disaster. Attempting to address such conditions as informal ownership and the lack of records affected both the quality and the timeliness of international housing-related interventions and absorbed significant resources in new settlements projects. Addressing the lack of tenure security of most Haïitians should be a national priority, and could be viewed in itself as a DRM strategy, since secure tenure encourages households to invest in such activities as retrofitting and safer construction. The participation of mayors and neighborhood residents and groups in recovery built Local capacity that should be sustained. Resilience means having local systems capable of recovering from future shocks. À goal of any recovery program should be to strengthen systems for engagement and mutual support, including the planning and management capacity of the people involved. Haïti has slowly built rural capacity in aspects of DRM such as preparedness, but building capacity in the urban context is more complex. Significant efforts were made to engage local actors (e.g., mayors and neighborhood residents and groups), including through community platforms. These nascent efforts require evaluation and continued support to ensure their sustainability. Recovery Financing: Leveraging Scarce Resources to Stimulate Maximum Recovery Uncertainty about how to finance housing recovery began with the PDNA. The donor-led PDNA and the government-led Action Plan for National Reconstruction and Development of Haïti (APNRDH) reflected significantly different ideas of what government’s role would be in financing housing recovery. For example, the PDNA assumed the government would finance the contingent liability of housing reconstruction for low-income Haïitians, whereas the government assumed a combination of humanitarian funds and credit would be used. The PDNA assumed repair and reconstruction in situ would be major cost items, whereas the APNRDH assumed the major costs would be for land acquisition and infrastructure for major relocation sites. [page 21] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / xix A housing sector recovery framework was needed to reconcile differences and to provide the basis for programming housing recovery funding. The APNRDH was not translated into a financing plan, so the differences between the PDNA and APNRDH were never addressed. Absent this reconciliation, agencies with funding were on their own to design housing interventions and program their funds. Many found costs rising as projects progressed, so the number of housing units declined, which resulted in fewer project beneficiaries. IHRC and Haïti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) support for recovery financing was limited. These agencies were viewed early on as a system for approving financing for projects. But in general this was not true, since donor contributions to the HRF were quite limited and often earmarked for specific projects. As a result, most proposed projects submitted to the IHRC lacked financing and a number were not financeable, due to issues with design or the experience of project sponsors, or both. IHRC staff reviewed projects and made suggestions, but greater effort to assist sponsors to design more financeable projects and to raise financing would have been useful and might have helped more locally generated housing recovery initiatives prosper. Tracking of agency financial commitments was not systematic in the IHRC or elsewhere. Good efforts established at the beginning of the recovery period to monitor the mobilization of recovery funds and coordinate humanitarian action were not sustained, making it difficult to monitor recovery expenditures and project outputs. With no systematic tracking, the collection of project data was limited, which undermined any effort to account to the Haitian people for the use of recovery funds. Public and donor funds were rarely used to leverage private investment. Co-financing of construction with households, neighborhood groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (including local NGOs or diaspora groups), and the private sector was rarely tried in Haïti. Most public funds (including HRF funds) went to projects that were fully publicly funded, which ignored interesting opportunities for collaboration and leveraging. At the same time, agencies downplayed the context and experience from other disasters to pursue various models for providing small-scale housing credit. Haiti had in place few of the conditions necessary to ensure the success of new credit programs for housing reconstruction, and worldwide post-disaster experience would generally discourage such initiatives. Nevertheless, numerous agencies attempted to set up credit programs. There were no results from these efforts in the first two years, but these initiatives should be analyzed over the medium term to guide similar efforts in future recovery programs. Recovery Coordination and Capacity: Gaps in Policy and Planning Affected the Entire Recovery Effort Strategies for shelter and for housing recovery were considered separately. This disconnect between shelter and housing strategy was due to gaps in coordination between humanitarian and recovery actors and the predominance of funding mechanisms that supported one type of activity or another, skewed toward humanitarian shelter. The government was not prepared to communicate a clear national vision of recovery to the international community on which an exit strategy from the humanitarian phase could be based or to assume responsibility for the planning and coordination of recovery. [page 22] xx / EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The lack of an overall reconstruction strategy caused the reconstruction effort to fragment. There was a near consensus among national and international agencies about the issues that the reconstruction strategy needed to address. However, there was no government body with the mandate or influence to build on this consensus to develop a reconstruction strategy that would serve as the roadmap for all. Even the IHRC was not capable of serving this role, in spite of the involvement of major donors. Even though the international community recognized this situation, it was not capable of acting collectively to establish an effective system to support this critical government role. With or without a strategy, agencies needed to complete fundraising and implement recovery activities. Having no strategy both simplified and complicated agencies’ work. While there was no requirement to conform to government guidelines or priorities, each agency had to identify a place to work and define its own approach. The result was a proliferation of unique standards and approaches in individual housing-related projects and an inequitable distribution of the available resources. The technical assistance provided to the government was fragmented. The lack of an overriding reconstruction strategy led each project sponsor to seek individualized advice from ministries on project design and implementation issues. Realizing that the government had limited capacity to manage this “one-off” approach, donors provided technical assistance to support housing-related decision making by government agencies. While relatively generous, this support was poorly coordinated and not strategic in its purposes. Only the HNRSP addressed the need for inter- institutional coordination by providing programmatic support to key agencies, but its impact was blunted by delays and institutional culture in both the UN and the Haïtian government. The transition from programmatic to project-based recovery made the results more unequal. International donor support to Haïitian recovery was generous. While financial commitments to housing recovery fell considerably short of the $3.2 billion reconstruction need estimated in the PDNA, they were still significant. However, the housing recovery model pursued in Haïti produced (and continues to produce) a small number of high-quality, relatively high-cost housing reconstruction projects. If these projects set new safety and quality standards that are maintained in the future, that will be a positive outcome. Recommendations for the Future: Learning from the First Two Years of Response and Recovery in Haïti Recover resiliently Plan recovery so that it serves as a bridge between humanitarian action and development and accelerates this transition. Maintain social capital and minimize urban displacement by reopening neighborhoods and adapting to informal systems. Commit to a goal of strengthening resilience through recovery and give preference to approaches that accelerate recovery from the current disaster while leaving central and regional governments, local governments, and communities more capable of coordinating with each other and managing future events. Accountability systems contribute to resilience by giving those at risk a voice in recovery decisions, so international agencies should make an effort to strengthen national accountability mechanisms and, at a minimum, model good accountability in recovery. [page 23] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / xxi Recover strategically Clear government direction on recovery both informs the affected population and ensures that partner investments contribute to strategic housing and urban development goals. Early designation of a lead agency for housing and urban recovery is key. À housing recovery plan provides a necessary framework for collaboration between central and local governments and partners. Recovery policies and arrangements established before a disaster make strategic recovery more likely. Recover equitably Governments should seek equity in recovery programs and favor approaches that encourage self- recovery, build up local institutions, and support solutions that can reach scale. This may mean discouraging “showcase” projects until minimal assistance for priority affected households is fully funded. Empower households and local actors by supporting participatory problem solving instead of providing ready-made solutions that limit options. Recover safely Understand the urban context and build on its dynamism. Promoting safe construction when most housing is provided by the market does not mean government becoming a homebuilder, but rather government focusing on removing barriers to safe construction practices. Disseminate guidance on reducing risk to acceptable levels widely and, if regulation is weak, encourage self-enforcement. Recover (cost) effectively Think holistically about recovery financing and use scarce public and donor resources in ways that leverage private investment, including that of households. Public investments in risk reduction and basic infrastructure are often enough to encourage private investment in housing, for example. Seek consistency in eligibility rules and levels of financial assistance. Encourage all funding sources to align programming with the recovery plan, and—to ensure accountability—track and report on results. [page 24] [page 25] Lg. rs d Fr D" 2 D = M sc À E + =, D te + PERS sai a pe, un D pres 2e : Li mi à LC PPS. 117 ges E Sr Te À TN Æ. : PA. h à : = CESSE N < UE MERE PES Te Sel y Ven Photo credit: UN-Habitat de É PE ducti I. Introduction A Purpose ofthe Report in particular, the development of the Guide . to Developing Disaster Recovery Frameworks The response to the January 2010 Haiti (DRF Guide)!. Increasingly, disaster recovery earthquake has been in the spottight ever frameworks are being prepared to use the since the disaster, and a significant number : . : ; information gathered and analyzed in post- of evaluations and analyses have been disaster needs assessments (PDNAs) to plan disseminated in the years since. post-disaster recovery and reconstruction This report is intended to help housing and programs. The DRF Guide is a tool to help shelter practitioners improve future post-disaster governments carry out this planning process shelter responses and housing recovery programs and to put pre-disaster recovery arrangements and the integration between them. The report in place. It provides a framework for covers the shelter and housing responses in Haïti, defining recovery policy, assigning roles and and looks especially at how early decisions about responsibilities, and establishing an inclusive sheltering affected the housing response. The process for planning and implementation. analysis also covers other interrelated topics that Haiti was one of 10 countries studied in depth in heavily affected work on shelter and housing: developing the DRF Guide in order to assess its disaster risk management (DRM), the urban . | planning framework and recovery strategy. context, and recovery financing. The report served as an input to work of the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and © GFDRR, 2015, “Guide to Developing Disaster Recovery . . Frameworks,” https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr/files/ Recovery (GFDRR) to improve disaster recovery, publication/DRF-Guide.pdf. 1 [page 26] 2 / L Introduction B. Development ofthe Report experience. Invitees were selected to ensure a representative mix of institutional experiences; The World Bank and GFDRR initiated a series however, participants were not necessarily of activities to consolidate the Haiti post- representing their organizations2. Participants earthquake experience and to extract lessons also acted as peer reviewers for an early draft of for future post-disaster situations. This this report. included formation of a Steering Committee composed of representatives from Habitat for . . . Humanity International (HFHI), UN-Habitat, the C. First 24-Month Timeline International Federation of the Red Cross and No one involved in the Haïti earthquake Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the World Bank, response and recovery had a complete and GFDRR to guide the development of this understanding of what occurred, particularly report. in the first year. Few of those involved in Annex 1 has a detailed timeline of events and the development of this report understood key decisions made in the aftermath of the the numerous attempts at decision making, disaster. The process of putting this timeline coordination, or programming. together confirmed, for example, that certain A timeline developed while carrying out this key early decisions that greatly affected long- analysis is included as Annex IL. It includes term housing and shelter recovery were heavily key activities related to: national events, influenced by high-level decision makers, such such as elections; government coordination; as military personnel, unfamiliar with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) dynamics of housing recovery. coordination; policy, planning, and financing; The authors conducted a review of literature and implementation. Milestones were verifed that included agency internal evaluations, third- through interviews and agency documentation. party evaluations, documents on best practices, The timeline presents a revealing snapshot of surveys of displaced people, and financial the recovery effort. It also helps put in context reports related to the Haïti housing and shelter many critical moments and sequences of events response. mentioned in the report. Some observations Forty-three organizations and 25 individuals about the timeline follow. responded to a survey prepared to gather Integration among activities. The structures information for the report, and approximately set up to coordinate actors and facilitate 30 organizations participated in face-to-face decision making themselves did not always interviews. One version of the survey was function in a coordinated and open manner. For provided to those who could answer on behalf of instance, while the Shelter and Non-Food Items an organization that was active in Haïti after the Cluster (hereafter referred to as the “Shelter earthquake. Another was provided to individuals Cluster”) was already active when the PDNA who were actively involved and answered on and the Action Plan for National Recovery and their own behalf. Survey and interview results Development of Haïti (APNRDH) were prepared, were incorporated into this report. there was minimal communication between Forty technical experts who had worked the teams working on these documents and with more than 25 organizations convened in Washington for a meeting in May 2013, 2? Chatham House Rule was followed, and, as a result, ne . participants were free to use the information received, but to analyze the Haiti shelter and housing neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speakers, nor that of any other participant, is revealed in this report. [page 27] D NP AD TT te Pr A à = HAS CE re AN 2 4 y: FS c Be LA À 1 à SE { | S NE: US OR (NE r _ AR 5 de COR \U LS LOS SR DV a Sans . Ts Mar AL CT © P &S # & FN er “ Ÿ Se _ + l'A uU F 4 RE PR PNR nr ER FN 7 PSS CT — mali. Ÿ L 7% Sr, ts à RER Eu 2 | RS Le LS 2 x RC POPMLTERATORNTRERNLELERL n_" ao n = LE SA RCA TI. Le. | A ke er + ‘ee ee = + REC É Fr = Te ù, bai D < | ri SUR M JE Photo credit: UNDP à: the clusters. Similarly, neither the government International shelter sector coordination. nor international agencies briefed the Interim Numerous changes took place in international Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) sector coordination structures over time, in staffing, teams on the numerous planning and policy- lead agencies, and available resources. This making efforts that had already taken place was particularly the case with the Shelter before the IHRC started up. The government Cluster. While these changes sometimes brought was committing funds to shelter and housing in new experiences and energy, they also projects that were never reported to the IHRC. created uncertainty about mandates, weakened These types of situations undermined the coordination, and undermined efforts to work efficiency and effectiveness of the shelter and with the government. At the same time, it is housing response. important to acknowledge that the Shelter Cluster mandate did not go beyond transitional Continuity of and support for government shelter. efforts. The government made numerous efforts to establish coordination structures Timing and assignment of critical decisions. and to define recovery objectives, but these The direction of the Haïti recovery process was generally did not advance. Rather than determined as much by decisions that were identify and address the factors that were not taken as by the ones that were. Giving too undermining leadership and management by much influence in decisions to actors with little the government, humanitarian structures were knowledge of housing recovery, such as military operated in parallel, which further weakened officials, set resettlement patterns in motion that government authority. Uncertainties created will be very costly to mitigation in the future. by the electoral process and difficulties Not designating a lead agency for housing establishing a stable government weakened the recovery and not sanctioning any one of several government’s response during a crucial period proposed housing recovery strategies produced for both humanitarian action and recovery, from a fragmented, suboptimal recovery process and approximately mid-2010 to early 2012. an inefficient use of recovery resources. [page 28] [page 29] ne ET, ZA om ee Û ES re es 2 ü & Pi Cr A. Lure lle Pas see Dr SE ne Sn TN) 74 ‘=s lets LEE W | ! Fe Er 2, + RE PR LE Sr " “ll 4 LI ‘HR À D | I, ri l'ENS 2.4 FFC Pa SHOT | : D Pat 3 a ges TL & * de: | dr” Led Le LEP | , H VA. be ML LE n. "a 4 RS y se og" … ES et ca er dc Di l . A BUS en “5. ASE | ü EF A 2008 > me +» NT ge me È — j . A + PR RNE Photo credit: UN-Habitat A. The Context of the highest exposure to multiple natural hazards, the destruction observed after the January Earthqua ke Event 2010 earthquake was exacerbated by other . contributing factors, such as topography, On January 12, 2010, at approximately 5:00 pm, . 8 k POBTAPNy, . | environmental degradation, poverty, and an earthquake of magnitude 7.3 on the Richter Re Lune uncontrolled urbanization. scale hit Haïti for 35 seconds. The hypocenter of the earthquake was located at a depth of 10 km, Haïti shares the island of Hispaniola, the second while the epicenter was located near Léogäne, largest island of the Antilles, with the Dominican 17 km from the capital city, Port-au-Prince. The Republic. It occupies the western third of the earthquake affected the entire metropolitan area island, with a surface area of 27,749 km?. Its of Port-au-Prince, as well as the cities of Jacmel location makes the country vulnerable to seismic in the southeastern part of the country, and hazards that are caused by the interaction of the Léogâne, Grand Goâve, and Petit Goâve in the Caribbean and North American tectonic plates, southwest. It was the most powerful earthquake as shown in the map in # in Haïti in more than 200 years. ne : y In addition, the country is exposed to Although Haïti is known to be very vulnerable hydro-meteorological hazards related to the to natural disasters (the most important ones are seismic and hydro-meteorological) and the — ————————— , . 3 Maxx Dilley, et al., 2005, “Natural Disaster Hotspots: À Global World Bank’s Natural Disaster Hotspots study Risk Analysis,” http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7376. ses : Hp # D.M. Manaker, E. Calais, A.M. Freed, SIT. Ali, P. Przybylski, G.S. ranks Haiti among the countries with ‘the Mattioli, et al., 2008, “Interseismic plate coupling and strain partitioning in the Northeastern Caribbean,” Geophysical Journal International 174(3), 889-903, doi:10.1111/j.1365- 246X.2008.03819.x 5 [page 30] 6 / IL. Overview of the Haiti Earthquake Shelter and Housing Response Figure 1. Map of Haïti and Its Environs 75W 70°W 65°W 60°W 6, . Cr North American Plate We ; % NOAM | EN Hispaniola fau L7 o o E. 4 ñ 20°N nn '…. Rico Trench Haïti Foten; ° <® ° ÿ one x à & ° HISP 0 # PTRC a® x Dominican & Co à € | Enriquillo Faut Republic * © cn %. nriq R RQ RE 4 S D ° 2 Mers Toce ® .% 5 Caribbean Plate EE — pr —— pe CARI Okm 500 km à 15°N Source: Geophysical Journal International. Used with permission. precipitation caused by northern polar fronts, unusable. The country’s main port could not be tropical cyclones, the Inter-Tropical Convergence used. The presidential palace and the buildings Zone, and convective-orthographic activity. El of parliament, the courts, and many ministries Niño/Southern Oscillation episodes affect Haiti were destroyed. The monetary damages by delaying the arrival of the rainy season, nationwide from the earthquake were estimated creating drought conditions, and increasing at $7.8 billion, more than 120 percent of the the number and intensity of cyclones. Other country's 2009 gross domestic product (GDP). secondary hazards that have an impact in Haïti include landslides, torrential debris flows, soil While the earthquake affected the entire country, liquefaction, and tsunamis.5 Haïtis urban areas were especially hard hit. There was widespread physical destruction 1. The Impacts of the Earthquake in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and in several other cities in the southeast and The impacts of the earthquake were devastating. southwest. The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) estimated that roughly 1.5 million people were The metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. directly affected, more than 300,000 died The Port-au-Prince metropolitan area includes and similar number were injured.$ In addition, the municipality of Port-au-Prince and the around 105,000 buildings were destroyed and surrounding municipalities of Carrefour, Croix- more than 208,000 were damaged. Over 1,300 des-Bouquets, Cité Soleil, Delmas, Kenscoff, educational institutions and more than 50 Pétionville, and Tabarre. It has the largest hospitals and health centers collapsed or were agglomeration of people in the country. With an estimated 2.5 million people, the Port- ° Ibid. au-Prince metropolitan area overshadows 5 As a result of subsequent research, this figure is now h h nus ee : d'infl d generally considered to be a significant overestimation. The the other cities in its size and influence, an proposed figure on the order of 100,000 to 200,000 is still a represents about 27.3 percent of the country's catastrophic event. [page 31] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake /7 population and 47.9 percent of its urban in Jacmel, which included 3,393 families with a population. population of 14,617. According to the displacement camp registration Léogâne. The city of Léogäne, located in the update issued by the International Organization West Department about 32 km from Port- for Migration (I0M) in October 2010, there au-Prince, was near the epicenter of the were 891 camps housing displaced people in earthquake. Due to its location on the Gulf the metropolitan area, which included 262,851 of Gonâve and in the fertile Léogâne Plain, families or a population of 1.1 million. This Léogâne’s economy is based on fishery and represented nearly 85 percent of the entire cultivation of sugar cane, fruit, and other crops. displaced population. Of this population, nearly Léogâne served as an administrative center of 86 percent reported being located in a camp the colony of Saint-Domingue. Léogâne was in the same commune and the same communal rebuilt after being destroyed by an earthquake section as where they had been living. In in 1770. ddition, 1 t ho believed . a addition, 19 percen EE owners no Deeve An estimated 20,000 to 30,000 of Léogâne’s that they could repair their buildings, 11 percent . . , : 100,349 inhabitants were reported to have were owners who did not believe that they could . . died in the earthquake and a large number of repair, and 64 percent were renters. Tr. | . buildings were destroyed.f The IOM registration Jacmel. Located 80 km from Port-au-Prince, update in October 2010, identified 179 camps the city of Jacmel is the capital and main city of in Léogâne that housed 27,220 families, or a the South-East Department, with a population population of 94,645. À higher percentage of of 43,906. The commune of Jacmel had a this population reported being owners than in population of approximately 140,000 during the Port-au-Prince, with 16 percent owners who last census in 2003. Jacmel is a port city, located could repair, 38 percent owners who could not in the Bay of Jacmel, east of the La Gosseline repair, and 42 percent who were tenants. River. Its economy is based on services and retail. The city is known as a tourist destination, Petit Goâve and Grand Goâve. The two towns especially during the carnival period and of Petit Goâve and Grand Goâve are located in the Jacmel Film Festival. Tourists are also the West Department and are among the oldest attracted by the vast array of handicrafts. As the cities in Haïti. The two towns were originally administrative center of the department, Jacmel one, named Goâve by the Amerindians. After housed the government’s departmental offices. French colonization, the French divided the . , . city into Petit Goâve and Grand Goâve. Petit According to the mayor’s office, 350 people in à . Lune Goâve, 72 km southwest of Port-au-Prince, Jacmel lost their lives in the earthquake, 307 . . in ne had a population estimated at nearly 100,000 buildings collapsed, 11,131 buildings were too . . . inhabitants at the time of the earthquake. In the dangerous to occupy, and 4,589 buildings were nr a L earthquake, Petit Goâve was almost destroyed. damaged. The unaffected buildings represented NN The church, the state telephone company less than 30.0 percent of all buildings in the Le , | ue building, the mayor’s office, a hotel, and scores city, and the destroyed and damaged buildings . : Un of houses were destroyed. Residents estimated represented 16.6 percent of all buildings. As of that at least 350 died the IOM registration update in October 2010, ‘ there were 21 camps housing displaced people 7 Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique (IHSI), 8 World Food Programme official quoting U.S. military report, in: 2007, Projections de population totale, urbaine, rurale et Lisa Millar, January 2010, “Tens of thousands isolated at quake économiquement active. epicenter,” ABC News, Australia. [page 32] 8 / IL. Overview of the Haïti Earthquake Shelter and Housing Response Grand Goâve, with a population of approximate 2013 (versus 73 and 69, respectively, worldwide 68,000, is located closer to Port-au-Prince on and 61 and 58, respectively, for all low-income National Route No. 2. The Grand Goâve River countries).1° is located east of the town. Th thquak 15 0catec East or te town ser quart The Haïitian economy is dominated by the destroyed 90 percent of Grand Goâve’s : : ie ! . . nue tertiary sector (retail, the restaurant and hotel buildings, including public buildings, such as . : . . . industry, transportation and communication, schools, city hall, and the police station. . . other trade and non-trade services), which As of October 2010, the IOM registration update makes up 58 percent of the country’s GDP. The counted 88 camps in Petit Goâve that included primary sector (agriculture, forestry, cattle, 10,423 families with a population of 42,704, and fishing, and extractives industries) contributes 53 camps in Grand Goâve that included 9,518 25 percent of total GDP, and the secondary families with a population of 38,364. sector (manufacturing industries, electricity and t ices, truction, and publi k As in Léogône, a higher percentage of the water services construction, and public works) . . . . comprises 17 percent of GDP.1 displaced population reported being owners in these two towns than in Port-au-Prince, but the Much of the Haïtian population lives in poverty. number of people with houses that could not be The World Bank has characterized the situation repaired was high. Of the population registered in as follows: Petit Goâve, 22 t h ld . . . en . DVE, 22 PETCENLINETE OWTETS WA cou With a GDP per capita of US$656 in 2009, one repair, 23 percent owners who could not repair, . es : of the lowest in the World, Haïti is also one of and 50 percent reported being tenants. In Grand . a . the most unequal countries in the World (Gini Goâve, 23 percent reported being owners who : | . . coefficient of 0.59). Over half of its population could repair, 36 percent owners who could not mn . . repair, and 37 percent were tenants of 10 million was estimated to live on less pair P ° than US$1 per day, and 78% on less than : : US$2 per day in 2001 (last available data). 2. The Socioeconomic Context $2 per day in 2001 (last available data) Any poverty gains from the country's average According to the Institut Haïtien de Statistique real growth of 2.2 % p.a. from 2004 to 2009 et d'Informatique (IHST) (Haitian Bureau of are likely to have been eradicated by the Statistics), in 2010, Haiti had an estimated earthquake. The country ranks 158th out of population of just over 10 million inhabitants, 187 in the 2011 Human Development Index .." and a population density of 941 people per . m? (359 per km’)? As of the previous census, The informal economy represents about 30 conducted in 2003, the population was percent of the Haitian economy and comprises slightly more rural than urban, with a strong mostly the unregulated MICrO, small, and urbanization trend. The population is young, medium businesses that provide employment for with 35 percent of the population 14 years about 80 percent of he workforce. The informal of age or younger in 2013 (versus 26 percent sector generally provides precarious working worldwide and 42 percent for all low-income conditions, a reflection of low-produetivity and countries). The infant mortality rate is high, lack of economies of scales.”# Complicating the at 55 per 1,000 live births in 2013 (versus 34 worldwide and 53 for all low-income countries), 2 World Bank, 2013, Word Development Indicators, 2013. : ; : #° Banque de la République d'Haïti, 2011, Rapport Annuel 2010. and the life expectancy is relatively low, at 2 World Bank, 2012, Haïti: Interim Strategy Note for the Republic 65 years for women and 61 years for men in of Haïti for FY13-FY14. 5 Office of the UN Secretary General's Special Advisor, 2013, “On Community-Based Medicine & Lessons from Haiti," http:// 9 IHSI, 2007. www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/lessons-from-haiti/key-statistics/. [page 33] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 9 employment picture is an adult literacy rate of About 98 percent of the Haïtian territory is around 55 percent.“ deforested. The Haïitian economy is dependent on The average annual rainfall in Haïti is more than remittances from the Haïtian diaspora. 1,300 mm. Hurricanes are a major threat because Remittances represented 26 percent of the of both their direct effects (rain and wind) and country’s GDP in 2010 or $500 million. their secondary effects (particularly floods and Over a third of the adult population of Haïti landslides.). During the last decade, Haïti has with incomes below $500—over 1 million been hit by at least one major hurricane every individuals—-receive remittances from their year. In 2008, Haïti experienced four hurricanes. relatives, mostly from the United States (U.S.). The risks of hydro-meteorological hazards are Emigration has been a major factor in Haïti’s aggravated by the topography oftne country, the development since the 19605, although reliable deforestation, and the urbanization of the steep data are not readily available. There were slopes. Torrential rains hitting steep deforested 535,000 Haitians in the US. in 2008, of whom slopes cause landslides, erosion, and heavy sedi- 230,000 were lawful permanent residents.'° mentation that clogs rivers and washes to the sea. According to the Inter-American Development The fertile lands in the Cul de Sac Plain and Bank (IDB), the number of recorded Haïtian other areas surrounding Port-au-Prince are migrants to the Dominican Republic is about becoming urbanized, reducing agricultural 100,000, but Dominican officials estimate that production areas for a growing population. This there are about 1 million Haïtian immigrants." has contributed to the reduction of rainwater The other popular destinations for Haïitian infiltration and increased the volume of surface migrants are Canada, Guadeloupe, France, water. Each year during the rainy season, French Guiana, Bahamas, Cuba, and Martinique. hundreds of houses and their occupants are exposed to serious, sometimes fatal, flooding. 3. The Environmental Context This happens both on hillsides and in the lower ” ; Ne . floodable areas. Haiti” means “little mountain” (or “mountainous land”) in the language of the Tainos/Arawaks, Collectively, these environmental phenomena the native inhabitants of the island. Most of the affect the health of watersheds and the country is occupied by limestone mountains environment in general, causing irreversible soil with very marked gradients, bordered by small degradation, declining agricultural production, and inland and narrow coastal plains (see Figure a significant water deficit: 25 of the 30 watersheds 2). The population density in Haïti, as well as are extremely eroded, which prevents the the populations low standard of living, creates groundwater recharge that would help ensure the pressures on the environment, and explains in availability of water supplies during dry periods. great part the rapid deforestation and other forms of environmental degradation that have occurred 4. The Urban Context in the country over the past several decades.i$ The January 2010 earthquake was an urban pi disaster, as the most-affected areas were cities, 5 Dilip Ratha, 2010, “Helping Haïti through migration and including the Haïtian capital, Port-au-Prince. In remittances,” People Move blog. 2 US. Census Bureau, 2008, “American Community Survey.” 1° Jason DeParle, 2007, “Border Crossings: À Global Trek to Poor Nations, From Poorer Ones,” The New York Times, December % Gérard Holly, 1999, “Les Problèmes Environnementaux de la 27, 2007. Région de Port-au-Prince," Port-au-Prince: United Nations # World Bank, 2012, Haiti-Disaster Risk Management and Development Programme (UNDP)/Ministère de la Planification Reconstruction. et de la Coopération Externe. [page 34] 10 / IL. Overview of the Haïti Earthquake Shelter and Housing Response Figure 2. Topographic Map of Haïti TZ ES —— min ann pre ET S- 54 crc ÉTR nm s 5 ee ER EE. 7 AK LE 7, Pr mme + } À PRE, ” € = à 7 x : * Ac “æ.. Le Qgeres more à | 27 ET, = c: D + CT « . . a: F | Source: Rémi Knaupp. Permission under Creative Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Haiti topographic map-frpng. addition to the intensity of the earthquake, the sometimes referred to as the “Republic of Port- urbanization process that Haïti is undergoing au-Prince.”2° contributed significantly to the level of devastation. . . Le . . . . Migrants come to the Port-au-Prince Urbanization is taking place in the socioeconomic . note . . metropolitan area, and other cities like Jacmel, context described above and in the absence of any LR x significant plannin land lati Léogâne, and Grand Goâve, from rural areas and or land use regulation. uses . 8 P 8 gu'ano other smaller cities in the country in an effort The annual population growth rate between 1982 to escape poverty. Rural poverty is due to the and 2003, the years of the last two censuses, was destruction of the environment, overpopulation, 2.5 percent for the total population, 1.0 percent lack of economic opportunities, and very limited in rural areas, and 5.8 percent in urban areas. access to basic services. Haïiti’s rural area has The 2003 census showed that 47.8 percent of the a high population density living on already Haïtian population lived in urban areas and 52.2 fragile land. À recent study on poverty in Haiti percent in rural areas. In 1950, 12 percent of the showed that 90 percent of the poor inhabitants population lived in urban areas. in the rural areas live on between $1 and $2 per day per capita. Fleeing the countryside is seen In 2003, the economic activities of the Port- yp P 8 ue ÿ | . as one of the only hopes for Haïtian peasants au-Prince metropolitan area represented 90 : : Los ne seeking to improve their living conditions. percent of the economy's secondary sector and 75 percent of the tertiary sector. As a result, it is 20 Georges Anglade, 1982, “Atlas Critique d'Haïti.” [page 35] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 11 However, in reality, the unemployment rate Nationally, 58 percent of the population had access is higher in urban areas than in rural areas, to water before the earthquake, but only 19 percent reaching 40 percent in urban areas compared had access to improved sanitation facilities. In to 33 percent in rural areas. Migrants who flee Port-au-Prince, 67.1 percent had access to safe the impoverished countryside can face lower drinking water, yet only 15.4 percent of households . Lu ! had water piped to their homes; most relied on incomes in cities other than Port-au-Prince. . . However, household incomes in Port-au-Prince public standpipes and water tanks. In Port- . | . au-Prince, 29.2 percent of the population had in 2007 were four times those in rural areas. usine: . . access to a toilet inside their dwelling; others Haitian cities are growing without the planning relied on shared toilets and 13.2 percent had no and regulation that would help ensure the access to sanitation facilities at all.# availability of safe land and housing. The . metropolitan area is a coastal plain surrounded 5. The Political Context by the Morne l'Hôpital mountain chain, The year of the earthquake was the last year which severely limits the availability of land of President René Préval's second five-year for growth.? The trees and other vegetation term. At the time ofthe earthquake, there was that used to cover Morne l'Hôpital have relative political instability in Haïti, especially in almost completely disappeared, giving way comparison to the several preceding years. to a spontaneous and anarchic urbanization In 2007 and 2008, the country experienced a occurring on both state-owned and private series of riots to protest the dramatic increase in land. This unplanned urban growth has created food and gas prices. Because of the government’s vulnerabilities for both the physical environment inability to bring down food prices and restore and those who live init. peace, the senate dismissed Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis in April 2008. In Numerous plans had been produced for the September 2008, Michele Pierre Louis was cities affected by the earthquake, but without confirmed as prime minister, but was dismissed proper institutions and sufficient political will, in late 2009, partly as the result of charges that they have remained largely unimplemented. she did not effectively manage the recovery effort Most housing for low-income households is following the 2008 hurricane season. Jean Max supplied through the informal sector. As a result, Bellerive became prime minister in October 2009. the areas of extension of the Haïtian cities have Presidential, parliamentary, and senatorial developed into slums with a very high building elections were scheduled for February 28, density and a lack of roads and formal urban 2010, but were postponed until November 28, services, such as water, sanitation, and waste 2010, because of the earthquake. Thirty-four management. In 1997, it was reported that 67 candidates ran in the presidential election. percent of the Port-au-Prince population lived on Initial results were announced on December 7; 22 percent of the city's inhabited area.% however, protests ensued due to charges of intimidation at the polls and vote rigging. After a period of recounts and wrangling, during which 2° Dorte Verner and Willy Egset, eds. 2007, Social Resilience and the second-place finisher, Mr. Jude Celestin, State Fragility in Haiti, World Bank. withdrew, Mrs. Mirlande Manigat and Mr. Michel | Nm Pasta Printer Heu Denhamps des Ans Martelly were announced as candidates for 2° UNDP, 1999, Project HAI-94-003, Commission pour la commémoration du 250e anniversaire de la fondation de la #4 Duong Huynh et al., 2013, “Housing Delivery and Housing ville de Port-au-Prince. Finance in Haïti: Operationalizing the national housing policy,” [page 36] 12 / IL Overview of the Haiti Earthquake Shelter and Housing Response the runoff election, which took place on March in Haïti, particularly affected the pace and 20, 2011. On April 21, 2011, Michel Martelly direction of the reconstruction effort. was declared the winner of the runoff, and he Two other political events threatened to became the 56th president of Haïti on May 14. ni , Li . destabilize the country’s politics during the The Martelly presidency started slowly. Parliament reconstruction period: the return of former rejected Martelly’s first two nominations as dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier on January 7, 2011, prime minister (Daniel Gerard Rouzier and after 25 years in exile, and the return from exile Bernard Gousse) and finally, on October 5, 2011, of former President Jean Bertrand Aristide on confirmed Garry Conille to the post, 5 months March 18, 2011. Ultimately, these events had after Martelly’s inauguration and more than 10 minimal impact on the course of recovery. months after the first round of voting. Conille resigned on February 24, 2012, amid conflict 6. The International Donor with his ministers and Martelly over a number of Context policy and governance issues. In May 2012.18 Official Development Assistance has played a months after the first round of elections, Laurent . | . . Li significant role in financing Haïti’s development Lamothe succeeded Conille as prime minister. a activities over the past decades, but had The elections and delays in establishing the fluctuated notably in the years preceding the government made access to government officials earthquake, ranging from a low of $714 million more difficult for international agencies. in 2006 to $2.1 billion (including nearly Instability in the office of the prime minister, $1 billion in debt relief) in 2009, according to where many policy decisions are normally made OECD data shown in Figure 3. Figure 3: Composition of Official Development Assistance to Haïti, Al Donors, 2005-2012, in millions of USD 4,500 4,000 Be S S 2000 n DETTE A RE ET ET Source: OECD-DAC from Aid Flows database www.aidflows.org. [page 37] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 13 Figure 4: Humanitarian, Peacekeeping and Development Aid 2000-2008, in millions of constant 2007 USD 700 & S 600 RS re |E a NN ë 400 IE EE © EE EPS EE D. Ë 200 20 DEEE NE 8 100 MERE E. PIE PP | (e] 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 M Humanitarian Aid m Peacekeeping m Development Aid Source: OECD-DAC Online database and ‘Annual Review of Global Peace Operations.” Events such as tropical storms, elections, Development Bank have predominated over and civil unrest affected the level of external time. The average annual total disbursement of financing, as shown in Figure 4, which includes the top 10 donors to Haïti was $1,485 million peacekeeping expenditures in addition to for the period 2009-2013, compared to an humanitarian and development aid.? annual average of US$775 in the prior two years . . . 2007-2008), nearly a doubling of assistance Many bilateral and multilateral donors provide ( 7 . ) y 8 Le ne in nominal terms. Table 1 shows the annual support to Haïti, although the contributions . . . average disbursement of the top 10 bilateral and of the U.S., Canada, and the Inter-American . . multilateral donors for these two periods. #° Figures 3 and 4 are based on separate data sources and definitions, so annual data are not identical. Table 1: Average Annual Disbursement of ODA by Top 10 Bilateral and Multilatera Donors, 2009-2013 and 2007-2008 Average disbursements Share Average disbursements Share Country Name 2007-2008, in million USD 2007-2008 2009-2013, in million USD 2009-2013 United States 230.97 30% 588.38 40% Canada 133.39 17% 232.54 16% IDB Special Fund 114.24 15% 173.56 12% EU Institutions 107.65 14% 157.82 11% France 56.92 71% 75.45 5% Spain 30.45 4% 78.32 5% IDA (World Bank) 31.26 4% 70.56 5% IMF (Trust Funds) 30.93 4% 47.69 3% Japan 31.90 2% Norway 28.31 2% Global Fund 29.16 4% Italy 9.85 1% Total 774.79 100% 1,484.53 100% Source: OECD-DAC. [page 38] 14 / IL. Overview of the Haiti Earthquake Shelter and Housing Response Figure 5: Distribution of Gross ODA Disbursements by Major Sector, 5-year average, 2009-2013 Production sectors, 4% ES | Multisector/cross-cutting, 5% —— Education, 5% —— Humanitarian aid, 27% Program assistance, 7% Economic infrastructure and services, 9% Health and population, 10% —— Debt reduction, 19% 1 Other social sectors, 14% Source: OECD-DAC. Social sectors and infrastructure have housed in the Ministry of Planning and External traditionally received the bulk of donor support. Cooperation, to coordinate donor support. The distribution of ODA disbursements by sector over the 2009-2013 period is shown in Figure 5. 7. Conclusions Even though the distribution is heavily weighted The social, economic, environmental, and toward humanitarian aid (27 percent) and debt political contexts in Haiti necessarily had reduction (19 percent) during this period as the an impact on what outside agencies could result of the earthquake, health, population, accomplish—especially in the short term—to and other social sectors together received address the housing situation of those affected 24% of donations. Separate data for housing by the earthquake. dsl di t available, but . . . an à um UPBra mg are no aval 30e u are The long history of international donor likely included in “Other social sectors.” The : : . nn involvement in the country might have been prevalence of humanitarian aid suggests that . . | | ? nn beneficial for housing recovery; however, donor the economic return on risk reduction activities coordination mechanisms were not in place to should be very high in Haïti. handle the influx of support, and donor support Haïti was working to improve its donor to housing was historically extremely limited. coordination prior to the earthquake, including Further, even though donors had long-standing the creation of sector-level coordination (sector presence in the country, many agencies working tables), with support from the U.N. This process on housing recovery implementation had limited advanced slowly in 2010-2011. Momentum to knowledge of these issues both in general, improve sector coordination increased once and in Haiti. The survey conducted for this the IHRC closed in October 2011. In May 2013, report revealed that only 22.5 percent of the the government launched the Coordination agencies working in shelter and housing after Framework for External Aid for the Development the earthquake had experience in these sectors of Haiti (CAED) (Cadre de Coordination de in Haïti beforehand, and another 25.0 percent l'Aide Externe au Développement d'Haïti), had “somewhat related” interventions. [page 39] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake /15 SURVEY QUESTION Figure 6. Was your organization working in Haïti before the earthquake? Yes, but interventions were not related to Not present in Haïti neighborhood upgrading before the earthquake or housing 35.0% 17.5% Yes, with interventions Yes, with interventions in neighborhood somewhat related to upgrading or housing neighborhood upgrading 22.5% or housing 25.0% The remaining 52.5 percent either had no in sector and thematic teams, each led by a interventions in the sector or were not present in government-appointed official. Haïti before the earthquake. (See Figure 6 1 ( 8 ) Overall damage and losses from the earthquake The pace and coherence of the activities were estimated $7.8 billion in the PDNA, described in this report were strongly influenced of which $3.7 billion, or nearly 50 percent, by the complex contextual factors discussed in was attributed to housing and community this section. But the lack of familiarity of this infrastructure. Of this $3.7 billion, only about context, and of the housing sector and recovery 25 percent was considered loss and damage of practices in general, also may have been a public goods (the majority of that community significant impediment for many of the agencies infrastructure), since housing is categorized as a and individuals working there. International private good. agencies might reflect on what can be done in The total value of needs of $12.2 billion over future disasters to ensure adequate capacity and three years was divided into 52 percent for the preparation within their own organization. social sectors, 15 percent for infrastructure, and 11 percent for the environment and risk B. Recovery and and disaster management.% The remaining 22 R t ti P Li . percent was distributed among the production econstruction Foricies sectors, governance, and cross-cutting aspects. and Goals Housing and infrastructure were included for a total of $825 million in the infrastructure 1. Introduction component, which was 7 percent of overall needs. (Section IILE includes more discussion of À PDNA was conducted from February 18 to these figures.) March 24, 2010, under the direction of the government, with assistance from about 200 2 Total needs in the PDNA from the PDNA working groups are . also stated as $11.5 billion, which appears to be an editing national and international experts working error in the document. [page 40] 16 / IL. Overview of the Haiti Earthquake Shelter and Housing Response The short timeline for delivering the PDNA program. The following section describes several created limited opportunities for stakeholder of the reference documents that were used in consultations, which affected the legitimacy the absence of a recovery plan, and the different of its goals in the eyes of many Haïtians in ways in which these documents defined the government, civil society, local government, goals of recovery. and affected communities.? This influenced the decision of the government to develop 2. Recovery and Reconstruction a parallel Action Plan for National Recovery Objectives and Development in Haiti (APNRDH), based on an ongoing national strategic development Those who responded to the survey were asked planning process. to identify the national-level policy framework that had guided the design of the interventions The question of whether there would be with which they were involved. The most sufficient resources to finance a full recovery frequently named source was the Shelter Sector began to be raised soon after the donor pledging R : : | | . esponse Plan, which provided very general conference at the United Nations (UN) in New . . ' | guidance and emphasized emergency and York in March 2010. Concern about constrained ui . | : transitional sheltering. The next most commonly resources should have created an imperative to . cited framework was the strategy of the carefully define recovery goals and to program . : . organization for which the respondent worked. the available resources to produce maximum | . Twenty-seven percent also cited the Haïti results. Ideally, a recovery plan or framework for | . Strategic Development Plan (HSDP). However, the housing sector would have been developed, il fter th hauake_ th based on the PDNA, in which the policies, until nearly two years after the gart quare, t . Le ue version of the HSDP that was available provided principles, and institutional framework for e L ‘ housing recovery were defined. Unfortunately, very limited guidance on housing. this did not take place. While the PDNA and the Action Plan for National As a result, there was little consensus on Recovery and Development of Haiti (APNRDH) precisely which policies should guide recovery were among the top five choices for respondents and reconstruction in Haiti and on the concrete from organizations, for individuals these two were goals and objectives of the reconstruction in the bottom five, perhaps reflecting a greater familiarity of representatives of organizations 7° GFDRR, 2015, Disaster Recovery Framework Case Study: Haïti with the documents, since they were presented Disaster Recovery Framework: Recovery from a Mega Disaster. ! The case study identifies three factors that undermined the to donor organizations at the donor pledging usefulness of the PDNA as a basis for recovery planning: (i) f . h h f limited public consultation, (ii) data limitations concerning the conference. Figure 7 shows the responses 0 scale and impact of the disaster and the cost of rebuilding, and representatives of organizations involved in the (ii) uncertainty about the amount of funding that would be . available. recovery and reconstruction effort. [page 41] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 17 SURVEY QUESTION Figure 7. What did your organization use as its national-level policy framework to design its recovery or reconstruction interventions? Shelter Sector Response Plan (Shelter Cluster) 73% A Organization's own strategy 57% EE Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) 54% EE IHRC sector targets 49% A Action Plan for National Development and... 46% A IHRC Housing Framework document 43% Objectives defined with other agencies 35% Strategic Development Plan for Haiti 27% ne National sector-level strategy 22% Don't know 3% Percentage of Organizations Responding a. Recovery and Reconstruction Objectives [Box | in the PDNA The PDNA identified the objectives for Recovery Framework Objectives post-earthquake recovery shown in Box 1, The objective of the recovery framework is anticipating that a recovery framework would to offer a coherent, and concrete view of the be developed.# actions to be undertaken in order to respond to the communities’ immediate recovery As well as describing the damages and losses needs over a period of 18 months. The from the earthquake, the PDNA lays out a list objectives being pursued are: of recovery activities for the housing and the ne . os = Respond to communities’ needs in urban and community infrastructure sectors, . | . . . . terms of the economic and social along with their respective costs. Associated k . u . dimensions of human security. with each cost were expected results and output indicators, including: = Support communities’ abilities to withstand disasters. farcis assistance is transferred to the = Take over as quickly as possible from enenciartes. humanitarian aid. AlLthe players involved mm housing : = Lay down the foundations for longer- reconstruction a trained in risk-resistant term recovery, while incorporating construction techniques. measures for preventing, reducing, and = The target populations and groups managing future risks. # Government of Haïti, 2010a, “Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and sectoral needs: Annex to the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haïti,” p. 20. [page 42] 18 / IL. Overview of the Haiti Earthquake Shelter and Housing Response Table 2. Haïti Earthquake PDNA: Summary of Recovery and Reconstruction Requirements Years 1-3, in US$? Housing Sector Housing rebuilding fund (1) 500,000,000 Security provision funds 100,000,000 Training in reconstruction and security provision 42,000,000 Public information campaign 1,000,000 Support to communes 12,000,000 General technical assistance, coordination and monitoring 5,000,000 Total 660,000,000 Urban and Community Infrastructure Sector Reconstruction fund 146,000,000 Technical assistance (TA) to national authorities 9,200,000 TA to towns 3,600,000 Strengthening of local community and civil society organizations 2,200,000 TA and training of public and private businesses 2,800,000 Technical assistance for the definition and monitoring of risks 1,500,000 Total 165,300,000 Grand Total 825,300,000 (1) The total estimate for the housing reconstruction fund was based on a financial assistance of: (a) 500 USD per partially damaged dwelling, (b) 1,000 USD per damaged dwelling, and (c) 3,500 USD per dwelling damaged beyond repair or destroyed dwelling. Source: Haiti PDNA. receive continuous information about the community infrastructure totaled more than reconstruction policy and are made aware of $825 million. The principal outputs and their risk assessment. associated costs are shown in Table 2.32 “ Appropriate construction techniques and . nn b. Recovery and Reconstruction Objectives standards are adopted. . . in the APNRDH “ Towns are capable of monitoring the progress of reconstruction work. The PDNA was attached to the APNRDH as an “ Local NGOs are capable of ensuring cohesion annex when the two documents were presented in their actions. to donors at the donor pledging conference # A legal framework that is appropriate and at the UN in New York. The APNRDH laid out respected is established. both a long-term development vision and a set k k k of shorter-term (18 months) reconstruction m The financial assistance is released on the Lu ou basis of the inspections objectives. The organization of the APNRDH asis o . : Lo p mirrored that of the HSDP, the principal The recovery and reconstruction requirements identified in the PNDA for housing and 2 32 PDNA tables show three-year costs for some sectors and four-year costs for others. The figure of $825 million represents three-year costs for both housing and community Government of Haiti, 2010a, pp. 77 and 79 infrastructure. [page 43] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 19 [ Box2 The HSDP vision is to make Haïti an emerging economy by 2030. Short-term activities in the Vision and Approach for Haïti’s Rebuilding APNRDH were organized to show how they would support the long-term vision of the HSDP. [Haïti will rebuild] by turning the disaster PP 8 .. DnA2 January 2010 ntolanlopportanity to Box 2 shows the long-term vision and the short- make it an emerging country by 2030. This term goals from the APNRDH. restructuring will be marked by: The four pillars of the HSDP are described below: = A fair, just, united and friendly society = “Territorial rebuilding. Including identifying, living in harmony with its Énionment planning and managing new development and culture; a modern society centres, stimulating local development, characterised by the rule of law, freedom rebuilding affected areas, implementing of association and expression and land economic infrastructure required for growth management. (roads, energy and communication), and = Asociety Gb E modern;diversified, managing land tenure, in order to protect strong, dynamic, competitive, open and property and facilitate the advancement of inclusive economy based on the land. large projects. "A ae \i a pipes ie on “ Economic rebuilding. Along with developing CIO EUC ETUI EL REL 7 on QE LE Ie ÿe key sectors, this pillar will aim to modernise "A knowledge:based SE) with universal the various components of the agricultural ETC in basic education, mastery sector, providing an export potential in terms of qualifications based onjajrelevant of fruits and tubers, livestock farming and professional ne Jen ane ie fishing, in the interests of food security; cet Nr S 4 ie dut dt develop the professional construction Innova " ” y a mo rte. € nu sector with laws and regulations relating to nou tune ofcitiren the COUnEIV needs for earthquake-resistant and hurricane-resistant oneruction y materials and implementation and control For ths ” de . h structures; promote manufacturing industries; = of this, under the supervision of a : . and organise the development of tourism. responsible, unitary state guaranteeing " . 8 . P . the implementation of laws and the Social rebuilding. Prioritising a system of interests of the people with a strong education guaranteeing access to education Commitment to deconcentrationtand for all children, offering vocational and decentralization. university education to meet the demands of Source: Action Plan for the Reconstruction and Economic modernisation, and a health system Development of Haiti. ensuring minimum coverage throughout the country and social protection for the most vulnerable workers. output of a planning effort that was under # Institutional rebuilding. Focus on making way before the earthquake in the Ministère de State institutions operational again by Prior. la Planification et de la Coopération Externe tising the most essential functions; redefining (MPCE) (Ministry of Planning and External our legal and regulatory framework to better Cooperation).# adapt it to our requirements; implementing a structure that will have the power to manage #1 Government of Haiti, 2010b, “Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti: Immediate Key Initiatives # Government of Haïti, 2010b. Housing was included in the for the Future.” Social rebuilding pillar of the APNRDH. [page 44] 20 / IL. Overview of the Haiti Earthquake Shelter and Housing Response reconstruction; and establishing a culture of Prince and to pay for reconstruction and other transparency and accountability that deters (unspecified) activities.%* corruption in our country. The territorial rebuilding pillar includes a The government then identified in global number of other land and infrastructure-related terms, by pillar, the actions it wanted the requirements, including debris management, reconstruction program to support for the first land appropriation, land use and urban planning, 18 months, as shown in Box 3.3 and basic infrastructure. Two other requirements For housing and community recovery, $295 identified under the territorial rebuilding pillar million was budgeted in the APNRDH to set up are “Regional development centres and urban five new settlement sites outside of Port-au- renovation” and “National planning and local development.” There were significant differences between | BOX3 the PNDA and the APNRDH with respect to the InmesdiatesctionefonthelEnture defined requirements and the costs associated : : with them. These differences are examined in The Action AE for National Recovery, and more detail in Section LILE1. Development includes actions which are defined in time, over an eighteen month APNRDH goals were broad and general, and timescale. It is based on four major areas they needed to be translated into specific of work which should enable the practical results and related projects and reconciled with rebuilding of Haïti. The sectoral actions and requirements identified in the PDNA. In fact, the ENNES ELEC brought together according io PDNA acknowledges that this will need to take the inemes ofregional. STONE socialland place. However, this reconciliation of recovery institutional reconstruction. Lu : goals and objectives did not occur. To the extent The specific action plans for each field are government and agencies continued to refer to organized in the following way: either the PDNA or the APNDRH as they planned = Territorial rebuilding: Reconstruction and executed recovery activities, they may very of the devastated zones and'urban well have operated with different visions of what renovation, the road network, regional the reconstruction priorities were. development hubs and urban renovation, preparation for the hurricane season and c. Interim Haiti Recovery Commission regional planning and Local development. Recovery and Reconstruction Objectives = Economic rebuilding: Relaunch of national The Interim Haïti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was production, restoration of economic and a joint national/international entity created to serve financialcireuits,)access to electricity, mostly as a high-level forum for donor coordination. = Social rebuilding: Health, food safety, Created by presidential decree in April 2010, the nutrition, water, sanitation, highly labor- THRC began operations in June 2010. intensive activities. = Institutional rebuilding: Democratic The principal planning horizon of the IHRC was institutions, restart of public not the entire reconstruction effort; it was the administration, justice and security. 18-month mandate period of the IHRC itself, ———————————————————————————— which ended in October 2011. 3 Government of Haiti, 2010b. M Ibid,p 42 [page 45] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 21 The IHRC was organized into sector teams. help owners rebuild and assist renters to Beginning with the December 2010 IHRC Board reestablish their rights as tenants Meeting, sector teams presented targets to be “ Improve the safety of houses, and the safety met by the end of the IHRC mandate period. The and functionality of neighborhoods that are targets for housing presented in December 2010, reoccupied through community planning and with a cost of $320 million, were the following. a “building back better” (BBB) approach = 400,000 people relocated from camps " Reduce the number of houses and =_25 percent of all “yellow” houses repaired® neighborhoods in unsafe and undesirable " New projects for 5,000 households completed rations using risk assessment and relocation # All affected households registered/solutions | identified # Ensure that both reconstruction and new = Phase I of Port-au-Prince strategic construction contribute to urban renovation redevelopment plan completed and financial and regional development, 35 envisioned m plan outlined the government’s long-term rebuilding plan m Credit program for housing in operation The NRHRF included principles for projects “Financial plan for housing in place in the sector (such as that “housing” projects LL a. . must also provide funding for infrastructure Implicit in this proposal were three assumptions: and rubble removal). It also proposed that the (2) that funding in the amount of $320 million overnment and the IHRC work with agencies was available in the Haïti Reconstruction Fund È onal and tabl “ h (HRF) and donor programs,# (2) that the IHRC to ensure a rational and equitable use of the had the ability to influence the programming overall pool of resources available for housing of funds to accomplish these goals, and (3) and neighborhood reconstruction and to that these projects would see results in the issue a financial plan that would coordinate remaining 10 months of the IHRC's mandate reconstruction resources. The NRHRF was never approved; the draft document continued The housing targets reflected goals proposed to serve as a reference document, but without in the Neighborhood Return and Housing the imprimatur of the government or the IHRC Reconstruction Framework (NRHRF), a policy Board. document developed by IHRC staff with national and international input and issued in draft in d. Recovery and Reconstruction Objectives October 2010 for government and IHRC Board in the Shelter Cluster approval. The NRHRF established the following objectives: Entities operating under the umbrella of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), " Restore the status of households to what including the Shelter Cluster and the Emergency/ it was before the earthquake, that is, Transitional Shelter and Camp Coordination and #5 IHRC, “Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, Board Meeting. Camp Management Cluster, issued several policy December 14, 2010,” PowerPoint presentation. documents during the first 18 months of the 3% The safety assessment labeled all buildings as either “green” Poli lstoth t (building may be safely occupied), “yellow” (no entry to response. FOlicy Proposals Lo he governmen a portion of the building or some restriction on the use or addressed the overall response and strategies occupancy of the whole building), or “red” (unsafe to occupy : or enter the building for any reason). See Section IIL.C for a for camps and emergency shelter. Over time, the description of the building safety assessment. approach became more operational and focused 37° The HRF multi-donor trust fund went into effect on May 11, . . ’ . 2010, upon signature of the first Administration Agreement on transitional shelters, repairs, reconstruction, with Brazil. The World Bank acted as trustee of the HRF on Siti : : behalf of the government. It was administered by the UNDP and activities that would make it possible for the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office displaced to leave the camps and find permanent [page 46] 22 / IL. Overview of the Haïti Earthquake Shelter and Housing Response housing solutions. These documents included, e. Recovery and Reconstruction Objectives among others: in International Partner Projects m Emergency/Transitional Shelter and Camp The objectives defined in individual partner Coordination and Camp Management (ETS/ projects are important to understand because, CCCM) Strategic Framework for Haïti, Version in the absence of programmatic guidance for 5, ETS/CCCM Cluster (January 2010) shelter and housing recovery, the “project # Shelter Sector Response Plan, Shelter Cluster approach took over. In theory, each project contributes to an overall reconstruction (February 2010) : | . . . program; however, without a housing sector # Transitional Shelter Technical Guidance, sus recovery plan, strong coordination, and Shelter Cluster (February 2010) os . . monitoring, the results of projects can be quite = Host Family and Community Needs variable and the collective impact of all projects Assessment Guidelines, Shelter Cluster (April hard to measure. 2020) wWh d'individual en organizations and individuals were “ Transitional Shelter Parameters, Shelter 8 . Lu . surveyed regarding the objectives of the Cluster (April 2010) . . . : projects they were involved in, they reported *_Advocacy Document, Shelter Cluster (April significant variation. Agencies generally focused 2010) on outputs, such as the number of Tshelters “ Return and Relocation Strategy, Inter-Cluster or repairs, and in some cases the stability of Coordination/Humanitarian Country Team the family in the housing solution (this could (HCT) (January 2011) be considered a surrogate for beneficiary The HCT began developing the “Return and satisfaction) or other social indicators. In Relocation Strategy” (RRS) in September 2010 interviews, some organizations mentioned that The content of the RRS was similar to that of the they Were given unusual flexibility and length NRHRF, and many key agencies were involved of time by their headquarters to define their in the preparation of both. Nevertheless, project-level objectives (in some cases . long preparation of the two documents took place as two years), due to the fluidity of the situation. independently. Draft 13 of the RRS was approved When asked how well the government defined its in January 2011 by the HCT and the Inter-Cluster expectations of agencies involved in recovery, Coordination Team. The RRS document did not and how well these were communicated to define an operational plan for implementation, these agencies, 54 percent of organizational but stated it would be presented in a separate respondents and 83 percent of individual document. This operational plan was never respondents answered that this was “poorly developed. defined.” This largely explains the range of policy documents used as references and project objectives defined by organizations. Box 4 lists a small selection of the project indicators in housing recovery-related projects # According to the UN Office for the Coordination of reported by organizations. While these Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Humanitarian Country on . . Team (HCT) is a strategic and operational decision-making indicators are not wholly inconsistent, they help and oversight forum established and led by the Humanitarian demonstrate the diversity of goals and outcomes Coordinator. Composition includes representatives from the . Lu . UN, IOM, international NGOs, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent established for individual recovery projects? Movement. Agencies designated as Cluster leads represent the Clusters as well as their respective organizations. The HCT is responsible for agreeing on common strategic issues related to #° World Bank, 2013, Haiti Shelter and Housing Organizations humanitarian action Survey. [page 47] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 23 Sample of Performance Indicators Used by Shelter and Housing Agencies in Haïti, 2010-2013 “ Improve the culture of construction toward safer and better quality housing and housing services. “ Accelerate self-recovery. #“ Improve quality of life through better access to basic services, improved spatial organization, connection/integration within the city and reduced risks. “ Contribute to social cohesion; contribute to improved governance by (re)establishing dialogue between communities and their elected official and government; contribute to overall improvement of the city functioning at agglomeration level; strengthen government institutions with responsibilities for the planning and/or management of housing, urban development, and risk reduction. “ Serving 50,000 families through a range of different interventions over the response and recovery phases in Haïti. #“ Number of houses to safely repair in accordance with the priority areas for the government, internally displaced persons (IDPs), affected areas, and availability of funds. “ Repair as many houses as we could afford to repair. “ Initially, number of people served directly with assistance. Now, people trained, served and the impact of this in the medium term, for the future, indicators will be improvement of connectivity between sectors, for example the number of families which are served by public services, but also who are paying taxes. #“ Households still in the same safe place after one year. # Indicators from the ASPIRE tool for Sustainable Development. [page 48] [page 49] We # D > M de 5 (PAS 3 Le] FA 7 2° be nr ; PTE | | ï SA: "21 4 PR 24 (24 LES 5e ae D” RE z nr , cs . ) Là Dar « 4 2 —— — —s## | 4 TE —_ _— ; 1. ei FA = PR » _mrË pe MES 7 Has > F cf Photo credit: Global Communities NX This chapter details the key activities undertaken, the issues that were being addressed, the findings related to those activities, and recommendations for future recovery programs. The sections address the shelter response, housing activities, disaster risk management, the impact of land and urban development issues, and recovery finance. 25 [page 50] [page 51] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 27 PE A. The Shelter Response GOOD PRACTICE IN POST-DISASTER SHELTER INCLUDES: “ Acknowledging that there is one housing sector in which both shelter and housing interventions take place “ Developing an integrated strategy that anticipates the impact of the shelter response on housing self-recovery and reconstruction “ Defining a shelter strategy that reflects both humanitarian standards and country goals “ Providing choice among a variety of context-sensitive sheltering solutions that are consistent with normal housing processes “ Setting up coordination platforms for shelter agencies, led by government “ Using two-way communications to keep the shelter response flexible, coherent, and cost- effective # Involving the affected population in the design and monitor of interventions 1. Background Perhaps no contingency plan could have fully prepared Haïti for a disaster on the scale According to the International Federation of the of the 2010 earthquake, especially since Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the disasters in Haiti have tended to affect rural goals of the humanitarian shelter effort in the areas, not the capital city. The Inter-Agency aftermath of a disaster are to save lives while Standing Committee (IASC) global cluster setting the path for sustainable reconstruction.“° system was established to ensure a more The emergency or relief phase should orient coherent and effective response at the country the recovery phase, and both should have level by mobilizing groups of agencies and disaster risk reduction as a principal objective. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to However, the massive humanitarian and respond strategically across key sectors.“ It had transitional shelter response in Haïti, while it existed for a few years before the earthquake can be credited with saving many lives, did not but it had never been mobilized to handle a establish a clear path for housing recovery. The disaster on the scale of the Haïti earthquake in reasons for the disconnect are discussed in this an urban context. For shelter sector actors, the section. challenge was to support the short-, medium., and long-term sheltering needs of a huge population in a dense, volatile, and complex urban environment. “9 IFRC, "What We Do in Shelter," website. “Ibid. These principles comprise what the IFRC calls the “one “UNICEF, 2011, “Partnering in the humanitarian context” housing sector approach.” website. [page 52] 28 / III A. The Shelter Response Revised Flash Appeal (February 2010) Shelter Sector Response Plan Objectives The overall objective of this cluster is to achieve safe and dignified shelter for those families affected, both directly and indirectly, by the earthquake. Two main phases have been identified: Phase 1: Shelter within three months, before the hurricane season: 100,000 displaced and non- displaced families receive waterproof cover before 1 May. Cluster members will strive to provide support to the rest of the affected populations responding to on going needs analysis; Phase 2: Full transitional shelter within 12 months: 100,000 targeted families, both displaced and non-displaced, are living in safe transitional shelters with an expected lifetime of up to three years before the rains of 2011. A further 100,000 hosting families in rural areas receive material shelter support within the same time frame. This activity should start with immediate effect.” Plans for durable shelter for the entire affected population are developed within 12 months. The objective for coordination is to ensure that governmental and humanitarian stakeholders in the response participate in a single coordination structure. The capacities of the armed forces and the private sector are recognized by this coordination structure. Working with other Clusters to advocate that plans for rubble clearance are developed, prioritizing drainage and demolition of unsafe structures, and recycling of materials as appropriate.” Source: UN OCHA, 2010, Flash Appeal: Haïti Humanitarian Appeal (Revised). An estimated 1.3 million people (approximately # Plans for durable shelter for affected 260,000 households) had immediate shelter population developed within 12 months needs following the earthquake. With the . 8 . : . The emergency shelter target was met. On March hurricane season coming, shelter was quickly | un Le 24, the coordinator of the Shelter and Non- acknowledged as a humanitarian priority . . . Food Items Cluster (hereafter referred to as the and received immediate support through the , Re . nous . . Shelter Cluster”) issued a press release calling mobilization of key international actors and . : . . : : . it one of the quickest international emergency massive funding commitments.“ ” responses ever. a. Shelter Sector Response Plan After 18 months, the Shelter Cluster reported The Shelter Sector Response Plan was issued that 48 percent of the estimated shelter needs in draft on January 26, 2010, just 14 days after had been met with more than 124,000 solutions: the earthquake. The plan had three principal # 93,000 T-shelters objectives (see Box 5): # 18,000 packages of shelter materials # Phase 1: Emergency shelter within 3 months, # 1,900 rental subsidies before the hurricane season = 6,600 repairs # Phase 2: Full transitional shelter within = 4,600 new houses 12 months # United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2010, “Humanitarian Bulletin Issue #3,” http:// “Haiti Shelter Cluster Coordinator, 2010, “Haiti [Steering reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/fles/resources/ Committee] reaches nearly a million people in one of the D43EE984293AC8228525772D0065474E-Full Report.pdf. fastest shelter-relief operations of recent years.” [page 53] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 29 Figure 8. Haiti Response Emergency, T-shelter, and Recovery Solutions Provided, January 2010-August 2011 in thousands of units 1000 100 900 Emergency shelter material [Left scale] 90 & 800 80 È —#— Housing repair completed È 600 6e 60 ë un 500 50 % ë 400 430 430 40 È s 355 > 5 S 300 30 È 200 20 (] 8 (] Jan-10 Apr10 Jul-10 Oct-10 Jan-11 April Jul-11 Source: IFRC data. This included 2,100 T-shelters built at the Corail the Camp Coordination/Camp Management Cesselesse camp and 500 shelters built at the (CCCM), and the Early Recovery (ER) Cluster, and Tabarre Issa camp. Both sites were designated consolidated by OCHA, the general objectives for this purpose by the government in February of the clusters were complementary: to achieve 2010. safe and dignified shelter for families affected : Lou both directly and indirectly by the earthquake. Figure 8 shows the progress of the distribution of emergency shelter material, T-shelters, and Through the 2011 CHAP, an additional $36 million other sheltering and housing solutions including was raised for camp management and shelter, repairs and reconstruction in the first 18 months for a total of $237 million. As shown in Table after the earthquake. 3, this represented 18.5 percent of the total humanitarian funding for the 14 clusters between b. Shelter Financing 2010 and 2011, although it was Less than half of The 2010 Flash Humanitarian Appeal was what was originally requested by these clusters. launched by the United Nations (UN) Office for In the Flash Appeal, 67 percent of the requested the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) amount Mere qe cie provided only 38 on January 16, 2010. From the more than $1 percent of the requested amount. billion in funding received in response, shelter Other sources of funds used in the shelter and camp management-related clusters received response included money contributed by the $201 million. public directly and by bilateral and multilateral In November 2010, OCHA issued the 2011 donors. The recipients of these funds were Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal (CHAP). # In addition, IFRC had a budget of $2,238,475 for the While the funding requests for the appeal were coordination of the Shelter Cluster through the IFRC Emergency Appeal. Financial Tracking Service as of June 5, prepared separately by the Shelter Cluster, 2013. [page 54] 30 / III A. The Shelter Response Table 3. Summary of Original and Revised Requirements, Emergency Flash Appeal 2010, and Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal 2011 (US$ million) Original Revised Funding requirement requirement received % covered Emergency Flash Appeal 2010 Shelter and Non-Food Items Cluster $29.3 $162.3 $107.9 67% Early Recovery Cluster $49.2 $140.7 $56.8 40% Camp Coordination/Camp Management Cluster $13 $78.8 $36.5 46% All shelter/housing-related $79.8 $381.7 $201.2 53% Total for all 14 clusters $562.1 $1,502.2 $1,095.9 73% CHAP 2011 Shelter and Non-Food Items Cluster $91.8 $31.8 $12.2 38% Early Recovery Cluster $1157 $30.9 $7.2 23% Camp Coordination/Camp Management Cluster $93.0 $48.5 $17.0 35% All shelter/housing-related $300.5 $111.2 $36.4 33% Total for all 14 clusters $910.5 $382.4 $190.8 50% Grand total shelter/housing-related $380.3 $492.9 $2377 48% Grand total all 14 clusters $1,472.6 $1,884.6 $1,286.7 CELA Shelter/housing-related as % of total 18.5% Source: OCHA, 2010, Flash Appeal: Haiti Humanitarian Appeal (Revised), http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&emerglD=15797. humanitarian agencies, such as the IFRC, as well a. The absence of a designated national as NGOs, faith-based organizations, and other counterpart complicated decision making shelter sector agencies.“ The OCHA Financial . Les ; Tracking Service (FTS) recorded $2.5 billion of No single government institution was designated rac . . . N 8 _ to chair the Shelter Cluster or to establish the additional humanitarian funding in 2010 and us L ; 4283 million for 2011. coordination structure anticipated in the Shelter ‘ Sector Response Plan. This could be attributed to the fact that there was no institutional 2. Issues os ua framework for affordable housing in Haïti. Even though its Phase 1 and Phase 2 shelter . . . _ . Government entities with which the clusters objectives were met during the first 18 months . . . cooperated on shelter matters included the of the response, the humanitarian community followin confronted many challenges and questions, both & within and among organizations. “ The Interim Haïti Commission for Shelter and Reconstruction (IHCSR) was created by President Préval in January 2010, with “For the IFRC only, shelter-related expenditures were Minister of Tourism Delatour appointed as $172,157,495 as of September 30, 2011. IFRC, 2010, Haiti : cet L : Farthquake 2010, Tro-Year Progress Report. chair. The commission co-chaired the Shelter 47° FTS, 2013, “List of all humanitarian pledges, commitments Cluster beginning in late January 2010, which and contributions (2010 and 2011),” Report as of June 17, . Le . 2013. Table ref: R1Oc. http://fts.unocha.org. Non-appeal helped provide political backing to the Shelter figures in 2010 include expenditures of $464 million by the Sector Response Plan. However, the IHCSR U.S. Department of Defense. Agencies voluntarily report . L . humanitarian contributions to the FTS. disappeared after a few months, and co- [page 55] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 31 chairmanship of the cluster by the government government chair or co-chair of a shelter- or ceased. housing-related cluster since March 2010. “ The Secretariat for the Committee on Return b. Clust d'inter-clust dination had was created in May 2010. It did not engage . Le he 4 Fate er cooraination ha with the Shelter Cluster, and disappeared strengins ane Weaxnesses aîter few weeks.# The Interim Haiti Recovery Some good cluster coordination practices were Commission, (IHRC) was activated in mid- in evidence in Haïti, but there were also flaws in 2010. Shelter actors expected it to serve a the way international coordination was carried role similar to that of the Badan Rehabilitasi out. These included a succession of handovers dan Rekonstruksi, which coordinated the of responsibility and a shortage of resources for recovery from the Aceh tsunami in Indonesia coordination. in 2004. The commission convened a meeting The UNE Relief Coordi ERC of key housing and shelter stakeholders L 1e U lt ee o0r a (l ) f in October 2010 that provided the first initia y tas ked tl e nternationa rganization for . . Migration (I0M) with coordination of the Shelter opportunity to discuss the overall scope of | ‘ ous Cluster and the CCCM Cluster and with developing the shelter and housing situation. However, he Shelter S R Plan. Thi licated internal disagreements about the IHRC's role te € ter Sector esponse . an 15 ep icate . Lee Lu the assignment of responsibility established kept it from establishing a strong coordination L ! . during the 2008 hurricane response.S° Before capacity for the sector. | = The Interministerial Housine C . the Shelter Sector Response Plan was finalized, € nterministerla using commission however, the IFRC assumed Shelter Cluster (IHC), headed by the Ministry of Social Le . É . coordination and finalized the plan. Affairs and Labor (MAST), was created in October 2010.47 It served as a mechanism In November 2010, after the 2011 Shelter Cluster for information exchange among numerous strategy was prepared for inclusion in the CHAP, ministries, but did not assume any leadership Shelter Cluster coordination was transferred in the Shelter Cluster or with shelter and from the IFRC to UN-Habitat. In September 2011, housing actors. Shelter Cluster coordination was transferred from . . . UN-Habitat again to IOM, and the Shelter Cluster In late 2011, following the dissolution of the . n was merged with the CCCM Cluster, at the request IHRC, the government created the Unité de ns : à . of the Humanitarian Coordinator. Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics (UCLBP) (Housing and Public Building Human resources were also a problem. The Construction Unit), in the office of the prime Shelter Cluster Coordination Team grew to minister. It quickly developed Haiti's first-ever 22 staff in the early months of the response.5t housing policy. When a member of the UCLBP However, by the time UN-Habitat took over management team assumed co-chairmanship coordination from the IFRC in November 2010, of the CCCM Cluster, he was the first Haitian resources were available for only four staff.52 #8 The Secretariat was created by the government to support 5 During August and September of 2008, 800 Haitians were President Préval's effort to organize return initiatives from killed by four consecutive tropical cyclones (Fay, Gustav, camps to neighborhoods, initially to support the return of Hanna, and Ike). displaced persons from the Champs de Mars to the Fort 5 Documents that explain the Shelter Coordination Team are National neighborhood. available at: https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/ # The IHC, created by a decree issued by President Préval on docs/Shelter%20Coordination%20Team%20%28SCT%29.pdf. October 1, 2010, was composed of MAST; the Ministry of % Alfonso Calzadilla Beunza and Ignacio Martin Eresta, 2011, Planning and External Cooperation; the Ministry of Interior and “An Evaluation of the Haïti Earthquake 2010, Meeting Local Government ; the Ministry of Economy and Finance; and Shelter Needs: Issues, Achievements and Constraints,” the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ MAST was responsible for convening the IHC. HTShelterClusterReview11.pdf. [page 56] 32 / III A. The Shelter Response Keeping roles and responsibilities clear among Léogâne, Petit Goâve, Carrefour, Delmas, Port- the clusters and agencies was a challenge. au-Prince, Tabarre, Croix-des-Bouquets, and In March 2010, the Shelter Cluster Strategic Pétionville, and local and international NGOs Advisory Group (SAG) published a paper to clarify operating locally. One hundred twenty hub and the roles of various clusters. The Shelter Cluster sub-hub meetings were held, beginning in April was assigned the lead role for emergency shelter, 2010. transitional shelter, non-food items, and host . . Je ae The Shelter Cluster SAG, which met 16 times, families. The CCCM Cluster had responsibility . . . : . ne was tasked with defining objectives and for site selection and camp planning, internally . Lu . . . . strategy, in coordination with other clusters, the displaced person (IDP) tracking, and coordination . : . . Le . international community, and the government. of basic services in camps as part of its camp coordination and camp management role. The The Technical Working and Information Group ER Cluster was responsible for land tenure and (TWIG) defined guidelines and standards on property, permanent housing, urban planning, and practical matters, such as shelter parameters, rubble removal. outreach messaging, and cash for work. The TWIG developed a “Who Does What Where” It was soon decided that the ER Cluster did not . . P . . ue matrix; an information system for shelters; have sufficient resources for the responsibilities us . . . . . . and the Haïti Shelter Cluster website, which it was assigned. In May 2010, the United Nations . . . . made documents, meetings minutes, technical Development Programme (UNDP) decided that . l . ut standards, and agency contact information the debris management responsibilities of blicl ilable 5 ublicly available. the ER Cluster were better turned over to the P y Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation Frequent staff changes and difficulties mobilizing (MPCE). The ER Cluster was then dissolved, sufficient French-speaking staff negatively but it was reactivated in August 2010.These affected the quality of coordination and the changes negatively affected the coordination of capacity of agencies. Most meetings (especially agencies involved in debris management and national-level meetings) were held in English, other activities under the ER Cluster’s oversight and many documents were produced only in (see Box 6). English. This reduced the engagement of the overnment and local NGOs in Shelter Cluster In spite of these issues, the Shelter Cluster 8 . . , . . L meetings. In spite of ongoing efforts by both the continued to serve an important coordination . : : . international community and government, the function for 18 months after the earthquake, . . . : . . . cluster system gained a reputation of lacking holding 40 national-level meetings with an Le L 6 . uns Haïitian involvement and ownership.5 average of 35 agencies participating. Four of these meetings were held jointly with the Inter-cluster coordination was also weak at Logement-Quartiers (Housing-Neighborhoods) times, due to shortages of leadership and working group in 2011.%* resources. Poor coordination between the Water, Lo Le Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Cluster and In an effort to decentralize its coordination, Ye . ( ) . » x the Shelter Cluster, for instance, slowed the the cluster created nine “hubs” and “sub- | | . à . resolution of key issues that required hubs” at departmental and municipal levels in collaboration with the mayors of Jacmel, 5 The Shelter Cluster website in English and French is accessible at https://sites.google.com/site/shelterhaiti2010/. 5 Ibid. 5% Silvia Hidalgo and Marie Pascale Théodate, 2011, “Inter- 5* Between 26 and 47 agencies attended Shelter Cluster Agency real-time evaluation of the humanitarian response to meetings. the earthquake in Haiti, 20 months after.” [page 57] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 33 The Urgent but Complex Task of Debris Management Debris often stood in the way of people who wanted to return and rebuild in their neighborhoods. From the donor and government sides, there were shortages of funding, expertise, and coordination mechanisms for debris management. Disputes over dumping sites and the feasibility of recycling the debris for reconstruction slowed decision making. Agencies were “learning by doing” much of the time. UN agencies supervised debris projects themselves and used cash-for-work debris removal programs to inject needed cash into communities and clear certain zones. Community members salvaged metal and other material of value, and property owners moved debris to streets. However, the limitations of labor-intensive debris removal soon became evident, and later projects used a more mechanized approach when possible, still largely supervised by international agencies. UNDP executed two large-scale rubble projects financed by the Haïti Reconstruction Fund, and the government used Petrocaribe funds to hire private contractors to clear priority zones, such as downtown Port-au-Prince. Prices paid per unit removed diverged considerably at the beginning, but converged over time. Once timing and cost patterns were established, contractors were more likely to be paid by volume removed than for their time and effort, which greatly increased efficiency. Agencies—generally in collaboration with local governments—established procedures to secure permission to demolish damaged buildings. But implementing these procedures proved to be an obstacle to scaled-up debris removal, due to questions about the reparability of buildings and the authority to grant permission when land and building ownership were not clear, owners could not be located, or owners were not ready to demolish. Another obstacle was the density of neighborhoods, which in many cases did not permit the entry of heavy equipment. Eventually, the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications, with support from Shelter and ER cluster actors, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haïti (MINUSTAH), IOM, and others, established a coordination platform. Certain buildable zones had not been cleared two and even three years after the earthquake, and the opportunity to use rubble removal strategically as a way to direct settlement away from high-risk areas was largely Lost, except in some of the neighborhoods covered by the 16 Camps/6 Neighborhoods project. UNDP was one of the international agencies most involved in debris management and has written a detailed guide describing its approach: “Signature Product: Guidance Note on Debris Management” available at http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/ crisis-prevention-and-recovery/signature-product--guidance-note-on-debris-management. html. Source: Based on interviews with various agencies and individuals. [page 58] 34 / II A. The Shelter Response collaboration, such as the relocation of water d. The affected population was only partially service from camps to neighborhoods.57 identified c. Information was collected but not well The question of how best to register affected shared populations in an urban setting remains an unanswered question post-Haiti earthquake. Beginning immediately after the earthquake, Numerous initiatives were undertaken to the emergency response in Haïti triggered a identify or register the affected population, but proliferation of data-gathering exercises: the UN none was intended to identify the entire affected Institute for Training and Research Operational population, both displaced and non-displaced, Satellite Applications Programme damage or even the most vulnerable subcomponent. assessments; crowd-sourcing to update street maps; the I0M Displacement Tracking Matrix Registration was complicated by a number of (DTM); a geographic information system to factors, including: track Tshelter commitments by location; and = The high levels of structural vulnerability the data collected during Ministry of Public before the crisis (e.g., was a displaced Works, Transport, and Communications (MTPTC) person more deserving of assistance than a itabili j 58 habitability assessments, just to name a few. person who had been homeless before the Even 50, especially during the first crucial earthquake?) months, there was a general feeling that data # The difficulty of defining who was an “affected were either lacking altogether or hard to access. person,” since the combined direct and indirect Haitian institutions lost data in the earthquake effects were so widespread and lacked protocols for open information “ The number of Haitians without a reliable form sharing. Among humanitarian agencies, there of identification (e.g., national ID number) was duplicative data collection and systems P . u The lack of a full count of the affected population were often not designed to support access or D. . | . Le : made it difficult to estimate the cost of various interoperability. Some data were publically dt the deli f . recovery programs and to manage the delivery o shared, often after long delays, but other crucial ist YP Se 8 y . . . assistance. data remained restricted well into the first two years. The IOM established the DTM in March 2010. The . . . . DTM was a camp-based, rapid assessment tool This proprietary approach to information . ‘ | . Lou that gathered information through observation, management undermined coordination of hysical ti dinf Lintervi . Le sical counting, and informant interviews on shelter and housing programs and the ability to pny ‘ 18 . . . : the population in formal and informal camps. The adapt strategies and improve geographic and . . DTM became a de facto system for monitoring operational coherence. . . k the affected population, even though it omitted those who were displaced but not in camps (such as those being hosted by others) and affected 57 “At the level of specific Clusters, inclusion of cross-cutting ce : : : : issues is limited. This was the case even in the Shelter Cluster, families who remained in their neighborhoodés. which, when led by IFRC, was considered one of the best- run and most comprehensively resourced and coordinated Clusters.” François Grünewald and Andrea Binder, 2010, # According to a study by IOM and the Brookings Institution, “Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the 51% of families said that they were not displaced by the earthquake.” earthquake. Of those families that were displaced, only Some advocates of information technology for disasters 51% spent time in areas that they identified as camps. considered Haiti a major success story. See Dennis King, See Angela Sherwood et al., 2014, “Supporting Durable 2010, “The Haïti earthquake: breaking new ground in the Solutions to Urban, Post-Disaster Displacement: Challenges humanitarian information Landscape,” Humanitarian Exchange and Opportunities in Haiti,” Washington, DC: I0M and the Magazine, Issue 48. Brookings Institution [page 59] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 35 It also counted as affected those in the informal e. Emergency shelter options for the settlements of Canaan, Jerusalem, and Onaville, displaced included spontaneous camps as well as the population in Tshelter sites. and being hosted Periodically, the I0M also sampled the IDP Le . . . | y . p . Many families stayed in their homes or on their population and reported on its characteristics in « . on own land after the earthquake, although often the “IDP Registration” reports.50 . . . in somewhat precarious conditions. About half An effort to systematically register all affected of the urban population was displaced. The households and their associated housing alternatives for the displaced population were to in earthquake-affected neighborhoods move to spontaneous settlements, and later to began in mid-2011, as part of the Housing camps; to be hosted by relatives or friends; or to and Neighborhood Reconstruction Support find alternative housing in the market. Program (HNRSP) that was financed by the 78 ( ) . y IDP camps. The humanitarian agencies were Haïti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). This census, . . . . . sometimes faulted for creating the IDP camps organized according to national census tracts, . nu . nu in Haïti. In fact, they originated from the was managed by the Institut Haïtien de : Lu : ne ; . . collective decisions of the affected population, Statistique et d'Informatique (THST) (Haïtian . . . . who settled on any available land to avoid the Bureau of Statistics), with support from I0M . : . . . risks of aftershocks before emergency relief was and the United Nations Population Fund. The . Lu Ne deployed. In Port-au-Prince, debris limited the initiative helped IHSI prepare for the next . ue. . . k . provision of emergency relief in neighborhoods, national census and provided useful baseline Lu : : . . so food and water distribution was set up near information on earthquake impacts that will . . these spontaneous settlements. Before long, be useful in future national census. But by the nou . . . nn . humanitarian agencies started to manage these time it launched, reliably associating previous : . . . settlements, and many of them evolved into residents with earthquake-affected housing had | . more formal camps.ft become nearly impossible. …. . Originally, the Shelter Cluster agreed with the I0M performed a critical data-gathering gma y Le g Lou . : . government to prioritize tarpaulin distribution function when it established the DTM. Its sb . over tent distribution due to the lower unit outputs were used for a range of purposes, n . .. cost, versatility, small footprint, and secondary some of them unanticipated. Nevertheless, . . : . 1e uses of tarpaulins. After six months, resale using IDP data to estimate the social impact . . . . of emergency shelter materials had become of the entire population underestimated the . L . . commonplace in local markets and humanitarian scale and misrepresented the precise nature . : . actors expressed concern that continued of the displacement problem. The reliance on on . . . . distribution of materials and provision of camp data also signaled to the population that . . . . . . services in camps were discouraging the return presence in a camp was required to be eligible ne . . of households to their neighborhoods and for any future assistance. Anecdotally, this . . even pulling people to camps. Nevertheless, encouraged households to maïintain a camp ses . . . distributions to replace worn tarpaulins took presence even after finding another housing . . nu Le . place in July 2010, October 2010, and May 2011. solution, thus splitting up families, creating more “households,” and artificially inflating the camp population. Other camps were intentionally established by international agencies. These were generally managed camps that provided 0 OM, "Phase II Registration" website, http://www. services. Movement of displaced families among camps was iomhaitidataportal.info/dtm/regcommunel.aspx. not uncommon. [page 60] 36 / III A. The Shelter Response International experience demonstrates that families in rural areas with material shelter closing camps must be done proactively, support). To support hosting, the Shelter Cluster and as soon as possible, to avoid the loss issued the “Host Family and Community Needs of households’ social networks, to reduce Assessments Guidelines” in early April 2010. vulnerability, and to allow funding and In recognition of this situation, the housing effort to he redirected to "ecovery. While the and shelter strategy developed by the IHRC collaboration of on mn ue the identified help for municipalities as one ofits camps was quite effective, ESpecta ÿ urine four pillars (Pillar 3: Provide Support Outside of 2010, no agency was responsible for closing : . : the Earthquake-affected Region). them. If a government or international agency had been assigned responsibility for putting in Even 50, minimal support was provided by place programs that would allow the camps to donors or NGOs for hosting (see graph on be closed, incentives such as household or rental next page). Many agencies lacked experience subsidies might have emerged sooner. with it; others assumed that hosting was not Hosting. In the early weeks after the earthquake, sustainable, due to the pull factor of Port-au- about 600,000 people left the Port-au-Prince Prince and to the lack of complementary support, metropolitan area for the “provinces.” Keeping such as for municipal governments that were some of that population where they had relocated accommodating the population influx. The U.S. was a stated goal of government. Some camps Agency for International Development (USAID) were created in these locations to accommodate Office of US. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) displaced households, but the vast majority were was one important exception (see Box 7). hosted” by relatives or other local families. Most of the IDPs who left the Port-au-Prince Providing support to hosting families was a key metropolitan area after the earthquake soon component of the Shelter Sector Response Plan returned. Monitoring would likely have shown (it stated a goal of providing 100,000 hosting that hosting was a highly effective short-term SURVEY QUESTION Figure 9. Did the organization you worked for provide support to host families? Yes, supported from early on 8 RE PE PE AE RE Yes, supported, but after delay 6 RE RE RE RE No, we did not identify need 5 RE RE RE RE No, we lacked resources 5 RE RS No, we lacked experience 3 BR Other situation 2 [page 61] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 37 BOX 7 Host Family Assistance in Earthquake Affected Haïti The earthquake generated an exodus of more than 600,000 people from Port-au-Prince and other disaster-affected areas to seek shelter with family and friends in outlying areas that were not damaged by the earthquake. Although most of those who left the affected area later returned, many chose to remain in a hosting relationship. Without some form of support, however, these relationships would have strained the patience and resources of all concerned, possibly resulting in movement of people to the then-burgeoning spontaneous camps, thereby exacerbating camp conditions. The level of hosting support was notable, resulting in the provision of humanitarian shelter for thousands of families. Nearly 18,500 hosting arrangements—70 percent of hosting total by three NGOs—may have evolved into permanent housing solutions for those families, as they have decided to stay in hosting arrangements and host communities for the foreseeable future. As many as 20 percent of all T-shelters may have been built on land provided by host families. Hosting is not only an important humanitarian shelter solution, but appeared in Haïti to have also helped address longer-term housing needs at a cost far below housing reconstruction, and long before those efforts even commenced. Based on: Charles A. Setchell, 2011, “Hosting Support in Haiti: An Overlooked Humanitarian Shelter Solution” http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PAOO]781.pdf. strategy, which not only provided income to Already by February 5, 2010, 24 organizations host families, but in some cases allowed hosted had committed to building a total of 116,100 families to take advantage of the T-shelter T-shelters, including 30,000 by the IFRC. rogram.®? However, the relative effectiveness of . ” n 8 tiviti t itored When the IASC issued the Transitional Shelter ese activities was not monitored. : . . Technical Guidance on February 19, 2010, it f. A single T-shelter concept became the recommended a transitional shelter of 18-24 m° only transitional solution at scale that would have a three-year lifespan, allow easy maintenance, be upgradeable by the recipient, Different approaches to transitional sheltering and cost a maximum of $1,500. The guidance have been used successfully in recent large-scale made recommendations on foundations, roofing disasters. The approach adopted in Haïti was to material, roof pitch, strapping, and designing for provide a temporary structure to households. loads, and suggested that the structure be built These Tshelters quickly became the predominant post-emergency shelter solution financed by ji j ies 83 = international agences. transitional shelter is not temporary housing, but a relatively low-cost solution aimed at those with land on which they intend to reconstruct their housing. It provides privacy to % Charles À. Setchell, 2011, “Hosting Support in Haïti: An the family on its own property or in a nearby location and is Overlooked Humanitarian Shelter Solution.” made of materials that can be reused, often in the permanent S Emerging good practice internationally is to provide reconstruction process. transitional shelter to those displaced by disasters or conflicts 4 IASC, 2010, “Transitional Shelter Parameters,” Shelter as an alternative to continued occupation of camps or to the Cluster Haiti, and IASC, 2010, “Transitional Shelter technical construction of temporary housing. In this way of thinking, guidance,” Shelter Cluster Haïti. [page 62] 38 / III A. The Shelter Response Figure 10. Example of T-Shelter Elevation nn W TA Ÿ NU à NN PES cs el RS ST Les her Ju NS PCT si ( UN à LR Tan nl T TT] k LI b 4 CONSTRLCNON SOUENCE RER En 1 05 tarder nos dm nue | see CE —— RSS fe arfund _ Snues te STANDARD FRAME FRONT 7. Comes ans AM en gout me 5 LA unes an cure © Dong ture noms ut sanme nds DRE DANS EE 25 feu MATRA Damnons seausen F1 tt pas nd nr race araçpeg 1 unes cf ns = | Do 17 Pyeé 213000 h LE sr "e Was ITS SO : Smsataineuteumionetemenne CET ES we Pate sheetrg 4m Ma ns. GRERENE à 7 L 3 CG! shesting LL 4 2 11. taf dons and mind Muters. CURe Re SR RS mpummnes |_1107 | 7” | DOORS AND MNDONS TO BE FRAME MT ur TAVBERS _—— Source: Haiti IASC Shelter Cluster web site. to withstand a 100 mph wind speed for Port-au- were imported). This amount came close to the Prince. It also recommended that the location cost of a modest-sized permanent house that a be chosen by beneficiaries, generally at or near Haïîtian family could build from standard quality to the existing “homestead,” so that permanent materials. housing reconstruction was not impeded.f° 8 P Delivery times were affected by such activities An elevation from one agency’s T-shelter design, as customs clearance, rubble removal, that of TearFund, is shown in Figure 10. community mobilization, and site stabilization, as well as the need to address land tenure The T-shelter concept as it evolved responded to . . : . . issues. As of September 2010, approximately certain agency concerns that predominated in Ie : Le 13,000 T-shelters had been constructed and the first year, especially its potential portability | . . delivered, most in areas south of the capital, as a response to the lack of proof of land . . . . close to the earthquake epicenter. Of these, ownership, and its apparent low cost, given the . : . . , Le just over 2,000 had been delivered in the six number of displaced families. However, concerns : . k k metropolitan Port-au-Prince communes, and about hurricane resistance were also strong . à only 133 in Port-au-Prince itself.$5 The Phase and caused a sort of T-shelter design “arms . Le. , 2 target of full transitional shelter within 12 race.” Before long, the recommended $1,500 . months (January 2011) was not met, although solution became a wooden structure able to . . . by August 2011, 93,000 T-shelters had been withstand three Level 3 hurricanes, costing as deti dE Nearly all the 113,000 T-shelt . . . ; elivered.f? Nearly all the 113, -shelters much as $10,000, including design, materials, y Labor, warehousing, and shipping (plywood and 56 IASC/Shelter Cluster, 2010, Jransitional Shelter Progress : : Update. corrugated galvanized iron sheets for roofing 7 OCHA, 2010, “Revision of the Flash Appeal for Haiti 2010,” http://www.unocha.org/cap/appeals/revision-flash-appeal- 5 IASC, 2010, “Transitional Shelter technical guidance.” haiti-2010. [page 63] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 39 finally committed were delivered by the second seeking housing solutions. Tents and T-shelters anniversary of the earthquake, in January 2012. had simply been assimilated as additional . . : market options. One international agency estimated that 20 P percent of the T-shelters helped households In the spirit of the “one housing sector” leave camps. The overwhelming majority approach, it is obvious that more leadership of urban IDPs were renters without land was needed to bring government and agencies and therefore they could not benefit from together to answer the question “If this is the T-shelter program. Beneficiaries were transitional shelter, what is it a transition to?” predominantly wealthier families (those with Alternatives to providing T-shelters could have land) disproportionately located outside of the been more support for hosting solutions and Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, where there scaling up repair and reconstruction early on, is more level land and plots were larger. (At one particularly of rental housing. point there were enough excess T-shelters in Humanitarian agencies were generallv ill Léogâne that the requirement for a family to be repared to ns these 0 fee ï hottes earthquake-affected was dropped.) At the time P pe . P ° . funding was difficult to reprogram toward other allthe T-shelters were distributed, the camp . . solutions once commitments were made, and, population had fallen significantly; 515,000 . IDPS remained in camps without pressure from the government to change ps: course, there was little incentive to do so. The T-shelt has b idely debated. SSneter Program . 25 sen ey < ate As a result, in the first two years, households The structures had limited applicability in . . : : . were offered very few choices, and the choices dense metropolitan neighborhoods and diverted . . . that were available were not suitable for resources from the reconstruction process. The . IHRC estimated the total cost of the 113,000- many people, especially renters. The T-shelter unit T-shelter program at more than 4500 program was debated within the humanitarian million.$5 Most of the materials were imported, community even while ï es being carried out, which limited the contribution to the local but the next steps in housing recovery were not LL . . clear, nor did resources appear to be available economy and livelihoods; and without technical . . . . 7. . for more permanent solutions, except in specific assistance, there were limited options for safely . . : : small-scale donor projects (see Box 8). upgrading most designs. Other problems in urban areas included the frequent construction At a minimum, it will be important to monitor of T-shelters on urban sites so small that no the long-term impact of the T-shelter program reconstruction could take place around them and on households, neighborhoods, and the housing the inefficiency of blocking sites with single- sector in Haiti. story T-shelters where multistory reconstruction mn could take place g. Rental subsidies were successful after a slow start Haïîtians quickly incorporated T-shelters, and even tents, into the housing economy, and began Rental subsidies, also called Rental Support Cash to sublet them. This was evidence of a reality not Grants (RSCGs), were an appropriate response to always understood by international actors: that the fact that renters made up the majority of the there was a single market in which people were displaced households in the camps. RSCGs were not new to Haïti; they had been used after the & Priscilla M. Phelps, 2011, “Haïti Housing and Neighborhoods 2008 Gonaïves floods. They were also listed as an Reconstruction: Building the Bridge While We Walk On It." alternative to be considered in the February 2010 Unpublished Interim Haïti Recovery Commission end of mandate report. Shelter Sector Response Plan. [page 64] 40 / III A. The Shelter Response were livable units available in the housin BOX 8 $ market, and a later study showed that the availability of rental funds in turn increased Meeting Shelter Needs : 8 the supply.210M reported that in 2011, 6,000 Lol the donon community, it was very households had moved from camps into safe desirable to pick on one or Eo very | housing thanks to RSCGS? simple solutions. It was easier to explain to their constituents, to the population An evaluation of the program conducted in who was funding them, or back to their early 2013 seemed to show that the subsidies parliament, and it was very easy to had not raised rents. In addition, 77 percent of articulate to their media. te challenge the landlords reported that about two-thirds of for the sector for future disasters BLO the rent that they received from grantees had try to ensure that conversation on a more : : : k k . been invested in their property to meet program tailored, flexible approach happens right . : Là . requirements and that they planned to invest at the very beginning. That meeting . . k n a similar amount in further rental space in the shelter needs means a range of solutions; . . it's not the provision of a shelter product.” coming year. However, 75 percent of families receiving rent subsidies did not remain in the Graham Saunders, Head, Shelter and Settlements, . 74 IFRC, Haiti: Lessons to be learned. https://www. same accommodation beyond one year. youtube.com/ watch?v=z3nWo_y9_Q. . While the evaluators expressed concern that the program would have a higher social return While some agencies feared rent escalation and if overhead costs were reduced so that more displacement of existing tenants, a few began households could receive subsidies, the RSCG piloting this option beginning in mid-2010. They program was characterized as “a rapid, effective were piloted by the IFRC in October 2010 and and relatively inexpensive method of providing by other organizations in 2011.% In the first 18 housing solutions,” with a significant secondary months, fewer than 2,000 subsidies were made benefits.: available.7° . In late 2011, the government began working Interest grew in rental subsidies with the with an inter-agency working group to define successful and highly visible project to close standards that reflected the experience the camps in Place Boyer, Place St. Pierre, and gained during the first 18 months of rental other priority public spaces in late 2011, under subsidies.76 the Rehabilitation of 16 Neighborhoods and : | Voluntary Return of Residents from 6 Camps The rental subsidy program is discussed in the (16/6) Project. Initial funding came from context of the shelter response and camp closure the US. Office of Transition Initiatives, and in Section IIL.A2. implementation was carried out by IOM. RSCGs provided $500 for one year’s rent and other incentives to encourage continued occupancy HAThion of the rental unit./! This pilot proved that there 7 Condor Juin, and Rene, 2013. By June 2013, 45,035 families had left the camps with & Jeremy Condor, Charles Juhn, and Raj Rana, 2013, “External subsidies, and an additional 15,700 were planned. Evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach Applied 7 UN-Habitat, 2013, “Improving the impact of rent subsidies,” to Return and Relocation Programs in Haiti.” Internal discussion paper. 7 Among the first agencies providing rental subsidies were the 5° Condor, Juhn, and Rana, 2013. IFRC, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 7° Three years after the earthquake, 33,194 households had and the Lutheran World Federation. benefited from this option, helping them finally move from the The IFRC subsidy was $1,000. All other agencies provided $500. temporary camps. [page 65] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / 41 h. The humanitarian system was not set up The humanitarian phase continued well after to coordinate reconstruction the normal six-month to one-year humanitarian During the first 24 months after the earthquake, period. Many clusters continued to operate, the lack of an official coordination platform for albeit at a reduced level. The umanitarian housing reconstruction delayed recovery. System lacked both protocols and funding mechanisms for recovery coordination. As Humanitarian platforms such as the clusters a result, there was a weak link between were created to coordinate humanitarian humanitarian action and housing reconstruction, interventions. Once the humanitarian action and agencies with funding for reconstruction is completed, these agencies typically hand programs began to work in a fragmented way, further action back to government and reduce without policy guidance or coordination. their profile (sometimes referred to as an “exit strategy”). Only the ER Cluster, which 3. Findings in Haiti attempted to coordinate housing and neighborhood response, rubble removal, The following findings summarize the situation and livelihoods, is intended to address post- of the shelter response in the first 18 months humanitarian requirements. after the earthquake. Nevertheless, as the humanitarian programs of A straightforward initial “Shelter Sector many of the agencies participating in the Shelter Response Plan” Was developed. The plan Cluster evolved into reconstruction programs, had three clear objectives, and was supported the Shelter Cluster did its best to evolve as well. by both the Haïtian government and the Agencies and individuals rated the clusters as international community. relatively effective (see Figure 11). The emergency response was successful. The In April 2010, a new cluster-type entity was success factors in the emergency response created-—the Logement-Quartiers (Housing- included a strong mobilization effort and Neighborhoods) working group. Led by UN-Habitat implementation capacity; the early coordination and placed under the ER Cluster, it advocated for framework; and agreement on clear the adoption of a neighborhood-based approach benchmarks, including universal coverage of to reconstruction and repair and for a focus on emergency shelter needs within three months. supporting IDPs to return to their neighborhoods There were difficulties in adjusting the initial rather than continuing the heavy emphasis strategy to the evolving situation. These on the management of camps. But it had no difficulties were due to the absence of shelter or mandate to develop a housing recovery strategy, housing sector policies prior to the disaster; the lack and lacked resources, official status within the of a reconstruction framework and common, clearly international coordination architecture, and an defined goals; wrong assumptions and a lack of official government counterpart (see the Logement- clarity on funding for reconstruction; and the failure Quartiers case study). of humanitarian agencies to define an exit strategy. Major housing reconstruction actors, including There was fragmentation among sectors the multilateral and bilateral agencies, did and a poor transition between shelter and not participate regularly in the clusters or the housing programming. Significant variation Logement-Quartiers (Housing-Neighborhoods) in capacity from one cluster to another and working group. Their participation might have weak inter-cluster coordination contributed to strengthened the dialogue about the lack of the fragmented response. The poor transition strategy and planning with the government. between shelter and housing can be attributed [page 66] 42 | II A. The Shelter Response SURVEY QUESTION Figure 11. How would you rate the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms in which you participated? Cluster meetings IHRC m Very effective HR m Somewhat Geographically based effective coordination meetings . m Ineffective Dent eau m Don't know/didn't Sector table participate Other (specify) (eo 10 20 30 40 Number of organizations answering to a lack of a cluster mandate for housing 4. Recommendations recovery and reconstruction, and having k no government platform ready to assume Base shelter and housing strategy on the responsibilities concept of a “one housing sector approach” to reinforce the link between relief, Haïtians and international actors were rehabilitation, and development. increasingly not working in concert. This was the result of a number of factors, including the Even if a Shelter Sector Response Plan is lack of familiarity with the cluster system by developed early, during the emergency response, Haïitian actors or a failure to adapt it to Haïtian it should consider the entire housing recovery requirements, or both; limited government process and try to define mid- to long-term coordination of international actors; turnover housing reconstruction objectives and to identify and instability in the cluster system: the strategies to support self-recovery. Unless this difficulty of maintaining continuity during the is done, it is difficult for humanitarian shelter election and early post-election period: and interventions (including transitional shelter) to language and cultural barriers. set the path for permanent reconstruction./? Ultimately, the shelter response consisted The leading agencies in housing, self-recovery, almost exclusively of camp support and a and development need to fully engage key massive T-shelter program. These options were ER —— . à 7 “Reconstruction actors need to be in place as soon as the made available based more on what agencies crisis occurs, and should provide the framework for much : : of the emergency response. If reconstruction efforts were could provide than on what the population properly resourced and were on the ground in a timely way, preferred or was capable of doing for itself. The emergency actors should Look to phase out short-term tools T-shel d h much sooner; indeed one of the reason for the ‘mission creep' -Shelters supported property owners more than of the humanitarian response into long-term reconstruction renters, by committing disproportionate funding is precisely the weakness in the development/reconstruction . . response.” Simon Levine, Sarah Bailey, Béatrice Boyer, and to T-shelters, which required access to land, Cassandra Mehu, 2012, “Avoiding reality: Land, institutions and underfunding rental subsidies and hosting and humanitarian action in post-earthquake Haiti,” http:// www.odi.org.uk/publications/6979-haiti-land-earthquake- arrangements. humanitarian-cluster-camp-shelter. [page 67] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / 43 institutions in the early days of a response the mandate for housing recovery. It is therefore and provide technical support so that a viable crucial to identify in advance which institution Shelter Sector Response Plan can be developed. willtake the lead on shelter and housing, and k . . what support it will need to fulfill its role. Establish housing sector coordination mechanisms that are properly resourced, Support the autonomy of the affected and avoid the fragmentation of the “one population to identify and implement their housing sector approach” into a “shelter own sheltering and housing solutions. » “ ; » ; sector and a “ housing sector,” especially Affected households generally know better than in the urban context. others what their best sheltering and housing To be effective, inter-cluster coordination options are and how to navigate the local mechanisms must have the necessary system, even if that system has changed due to : : : : the disaster. However, households attempting leadership, expertise, and systems to identify | : : self-recovery (assisted or not) should not be left cross-cutting areas and to integrate the work of . . . Le . completely to their own devices by recovery clusters and other agencies. This includes having de : . actors; even these households should be the capability to resolve key impediments, such . . . monitored to ensure that they succeed. as debris management and land issues. . . . Particularly in the early months, shelter The international community should look for . y y . . . . provision must be untied from formal resolution mechanisms to better link humanitarian and . : . of land tenure issues. The affected population reconstruction frameworks early on. The role , should be supported to find land solutions of the Shelter Cluster SAG should also be bre : , : within either the formal or informal system. reassessed, since in those instances where the government is unable to provide a coordination Offer multiple shelter options, and focus on platform for reconstruction, it could play an solutions (i.e., transitional sheltering), not integrating policy role in housing recovery. products (i.e., T-shelters). Improve host government’s and There is no one-size-fits-all solution to sheltering development institutions’ understanding or housing in any context, but especially of the cluster approach and cluster for urban disaster recovery, due to both understanding of government requirements. the complexity of the environment and the adaptability of city dwellers. Agencies should If governments do not understand the cluster develop the capacity to offer a range of options approach when clusters are activated, to the affected population, understanding engagement and collaboration will be hampered. that appropriate forms of support are likely to Contingency planning should include evolve over time, based on the response of the dissemination of information about the cluster population and on the changing context. Funding approach, especially in disaster-prone countries. and management systems must allow the Tools are also needed to better assess and flexibility needed to implement this approach. strengthen the capacity of central and local À lesson learned from Haïti is that T-shelter governments to manage both shelter response programming is complex. It entails not just and housing recovery. Shelter and housing production of the physical structure, but can be difficult sectors in which to coordinate understanding the environmental, social, with government through the cluster system cultural, and economic context. If the approach because there is often no single ministry with is adaptable and open to feedback, a program [page 68] &4 | LI A. The Shelter Response can be started with limited assessment; Work to reach a common understanding however, a rigidly designed program, with long of urban shelter options and standards, materials pipelines and slow adjustment times, including the relevance of the Sphere such as existed in Haïti, creates its own risks, standards. because it is difficult to fine tune over time."# : a An agreement is needed within the global Use social intelligence and information humanitarian response framework on shelter systems to inform the strategy, and monitor approaches for urban settings, and on the uptake of solutions offered, to ensure the country framework to use to maintain that they help intended beneficiaries and compliance with agreed standards. T-shelter facilitate their access to acceptable choices. programming in Haiti diverged greatly from the : : parameters established in the IASC transitional Shelter sector strategies and contingency ne . LL . shelter guidelines, without the applicability planning should be based on lessons learned . . É . : . . of either the guidelines or the approach being from past disasters in the country, information : . . reassessed. about the housing market in normal times, and local social intelligence. The Sphere standards were often referred to Lo . by agencies as the default standards in Haïti, The response to a major disaster requires . : no but these need to be reviewed to respond inclusive, independent monitoring to ensure . ‘ : to important shortcomings that have been that program outcomes are being met. The . ! ne identified there and elsewhere.ë° monitoring system should use feedback loops, including beneficiary communications, to adjust Governments should ideally define shelter operations over time./? options and related standards in advance to : : . ensure the quality, equity, and coherence of the All options should be monitored, using q Ÿ q Y: .. : . shelter response. It is critical that Haïti develop an information system that covers related housi t £ k buildi LL . a housing sector recovery framework, buildin sectors, such as WASH, livelihoods, and debris 8 y . 8 ne , on the earthquake experience, to increase the management, and indicators agreed to with . . ni . . . efficiency and predictability of shelter and government. Local and international agencies . due . : housing activities in future disasters. must be given adequate resources early on to build the necessary information base. 5 Sphere Project, 2011, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. Even though Haïti 78 Levine, Bailey, Boyer, and Mehu, 2012. T-shelter parameters had been issued, respondents to the 7 Peter Rees-Gildea and Olivier Moles, 2013, “Lessons Learned Shelter and Housing Survey for Organizations (20%) and & Best Practices: The International Federation of Red Cross Individuals (18%) identified the Sphere standards as the basis and Red Crescent Societies Shelter Programme in Haïti 2010- for their T-shelter designs. For organizations, this was the 2012.” most-used reference. [page 69] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 45 PE e B. The Housing Response GOOD PRACTICE IN POST-DISASTER HOUSING INCLUDES: “ Developing humanitarian shelter and housing recovery strategies jointly, so that they reinforce each other “ Ensuring that a lead government agency for housing recovery and reconstruction is appointed early on, and that it has a clear mandate and the necessary authority, tools, and capacity #“ Communicating regularly with affected households with messages that encourage self-recovery and that keep expectations realistic “ Focusing on reactivating both demand and supply in the housing market, since housing is a private good generally acquired through the market # Involving households in deciding on recovery approaches and ensuring a choice of housing solutions “ Aiming for solutions that are similar to pre-disaster housing, but safer, while avoiding relocation, and supporting vulnerable households to recovery “ For government, focusing on its enabling role in building houses; this role is usually considered not necessary and, even when carried out, it is often unsuccessful 1. Background produced per year between 2003 and 2009, nearly all of it by informal means. The Haïti earthquake took place when, as a result both natural population growth and Most buildings in Haïîti are one to three stories. rapid urbanization fueled by migration over the According to IHSI, most families, regardless past three decades, there was already a pent- of income, reside in a house.” One-story, up demand for housing in the Port-au-Prince single-family dwellings comprise 63 percent metropolitan area. Not all of Haiti’s urban of the housing stock in metropolitan Port-au- population growth took place in Port-au-Prince, Prince and 72 percent in surrounding urban but of the 2 million people added to urban areas areas. Other housing types include multistory between 1982 and 2003 due to migration, 1.3 houses or apartments (10%), taudis-ajoupa million were added in the West region, where (slums) (14%), kay ate (mud houses with Port-au-Prince is located.8 joined roof and walls) (6%), and “other” (7%). : . n Urbanization has led to very high density and The Institut Haïtien de Statistique et multistory construction, particularly in informal d'Informatique (IHSI) (Haitian Bureau of neighborhoods. Statistics) population and household size estimates for the metropolitan region suggest that in excess of 15,000 housing units were # However, IHSl's categorization of multistory single-family 8 World Bank, 2006, Haiti: Social Resilience and State Fragility structures and apartment buildings into a single category in Haïti, À Country Social Analysis. makes it difficult to analyze the prevalence of apartment units. [page 70] 46 } II B. The Housing Response In secondary cities, concrete block housing is concrete, block, or stone. Sixty-nine percent of similarly constructed, but less densely built. multistory buildings and 64 percent of one-story Wood frame construction and traditional designs houses were built with concrete slab floors. are also more prevalent outside of Port-au- The remaining multistory buildings had tile or Prince, including Victorian frame houses and wood floors and the remaining one-story houses two-story frame structures with a commercial had compacted earth floors.® Other roofing first floor and residential second floor that methods included wood frames overlaid with are still found in many town centers. Over lightweight corrugated metal. To reduce concrete time, however, these traditional buildings are requirements, concrete blocks were often placed being replaced by the type of concrete block within the floor and roofing slabs when they construction found in Port-au-Prince. were being cast. A number of factors contributed to the extensive Post-earthquake condition of housing. After damage and destruction of housing from the earthquake, the Ministry of Public Works, the earthquake. Because Haitians regularly Transport, and Communications (MTPTC), with experienced ferce tropical storms, they were assistance from several development partners, most attuned to hazards like wind, rain, and conducted an extensive building safety (or flooding, and preferred solid houses that habitability) assessment.f° The assessment could withstand these conditions. Yet most included housing in informal neighborhoods. homes were designed and constructed by This assessment was originally meant to the owner or a local mason, with no building indicate the advisability of occupying buildings permit or construction inspection.% Housing immediately after the earthquake, but, in the was commonly built over time as funds were absence of better information, it was used for acquired, which resulted in construction that various other purposes, including to estimate was inconsistent and haphazard. Finally, poverty the overall scope and cost of the housing (and the lack of regulation of materials markets) reconstruction effort. Table 4 shows the fueled a market for lower-cost construction distribution of building types and conditions. materials that were also of poor quality and, in the case of sand and aggregate, sometimes Multifarmily buildings made up a significant scavenged from nature. portion of the urban housing stock. If each multifamily building was assumed to have The predominant structure type in Port- four housing units (each often just one or two au-Prince was (and continues to be) a non- rooms), then the number of multifamily units engineered building constructed of unreinforced was closer to the number of single-family units, masonry walls framed by slender concrete as shown in Table 5 for red- and yellow-tagged columns.% Hollow concrete block was the buildings. Most multifamily units were rental primary masonry unit used, with concrete slabs units. for floors and roofs. Ninety-seven percent of multistory dwellings and 76 percent of one-story houses were predominantly constructed with 8 Housing was not unique in this respect: the lack of & IHSI, 2003, Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie d'Haïti, Port- construction regulation was universal, as evidenced by the au-Prince: Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances (MEF) number of public buildings and commercial locations that also (Ministry of Economy and Finance) collapsed. %% The habitability assessment labeled buildings as “green” % Anna F. Lang and Justin D. Marshall, 2011, “Devil in the Details: (habitable), “yellow” (habitable with caution or minor repairs), Success and Failure of Haitis Nonengineered Structures,” or “red” (inhabitable). See Section IIL.C for a description of the Earthquake Spectra. Vol. 27, No. S1, S345-S372. building habitability assessment. [page 71] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 47 Table 4. Building Conditions by Category and Building Type Residential - single-family 155,757 72,413 59,560 131,973 287,730 72% Residential - multifamily 37,324 20,966 11,477 32,443 69,767 17% Total housing units 193,081 93,379 71,037 164,416 357,497 89% Other building type 23,308 10,558 9,360 19,918 43,226 11% Total buildings 216,389 103,937 80,397 184,334 400,723 100% % 54% 26% 20% 46% 100% Source: MTPTC habitability assessment. Table 5. Building Condition by Unit Type NEO Red Red+Yelou | Red Red + Yellow % Residential - single-family 72,413 59,560 131,973 50% Residential - multifamily 20,966 11,477 32,443 Residential - multifamily units @ 4/building 83,864 45,908 129,772 50% Total housing units 156,277 105,468 261,745 Source: IHRC estimates based on MTPTC data. 2. Issues housing reconstruction policy. Such a framework could have helped improve the direction and the a. Haïti lacked an institutional framework coherence of housing recovery effort. for housing : . b. A housing recovery strategy was Prior to the earthquake, there was no single lead : never articulated agency mandated to address housing issues in Haïti. There were individual agencies with À government-led housing recovery strategy, limited mandates in specific areas related to prepared in consultation with families and community development and housing, including agencies, should have defined goals, assigned MTPTC, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor roles and responsibilities, and laid out the (MAST), the Ministry of Interior and Local financing plan. Unfortunately, such a strategy Government (MICT), and Entreprise Publique was never approved, to the detriment of affected pour Le Logement Social (EPPLS). But support for families and all involved. affordable housing in the national budget was : infinitesimally small, so the involvement of these Both external agencies and government agencies in this sector was almost nonexistent. agencies, such as the Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire (CIAT) There was also no national policy on housing for (Interministerial Committee for Territorial the low-income population or any strategy for Planning), pointed out the urgent need for policy integrated upgrading of informal neighborhoods. decisions and coordination on housing and The lack of a lead agency and an institutional neighborhood reconstruction. The Logement- and policy framework for affordable housing Quartiers (Housing-Neighborhoods) working before the earthquake meant that there was group started advocating in April 2010 for a no available starting point for establishing a neighborhood return approach. [page 72] 48 / II B. The Housing Response By early 2010, both domestic and international were not consistent with the direction ministries agencies, including the Shelter Cluster, CIAT, and wanted to go.5? UN-Habitat, identified the full range of housin . une LL e . 8 8 Where a policy issue fell squarely within the situations that the reconstruction strategy : would need to address, and drew attention to mandate of a single government agency, these : 1. . agencies did their best to provide advice. the predominance of low-income renters in the 8 . P . opulation.# For instance, MTPTC provided guidance on pop ° construction standards for buildings and sites. By mid-2010, there was a consensus on the But many open issues required consultation principal housing reconstruction policy gaps. among government agencies. With no lead agency Agencies were seeking direction from the appointed, and individual ministries stretched government on, among other things: to the limit, policy direction that the government = Debri | provided on housing-related questions in the ebris remova . crucial first year was somewhat ad hoc. “ Disaster risk management (DRM), including where it was safe to rebuild In October 2010, the Neighborhood Return and = Tenure security Housing Reconstruction Framework (NRHRF) = Land for new developments was prepared by the Interim Haïti Recovery itdi d P Commission (IHRC) at the request of the IHRC LI Building codes co-chairs. The draft framework was based on the "Standards for repair, retrofitting, and results of a workshop with international agencies neighborhood improvements and the government. It identified four overriding “ Beneficiary selection objectives for the housing and neighborhoods " Subsidy and financing strategy reconstruction process: Agencies also wanted to know the government's “ To restore the status of households to what own plans in the housing sector, as word it had been before the earthquake, that is, to of various government-promoted housing help owners rebuild and to assist renters to initiatives circulated frequently.# reestablish their rights as tenants The level of demands by international *_ To improve the safety of houses, and the agencies and the dispersion of effort at times safety and functionality of neighborhoods that overwhelmed the government. The shear number dre rrtpiee es te (B8R) pennine of meetings and requests for advice left Little anc'a purang Jack better 2Pproac time for government to chart its own course. " To reduce the number of houses and Rather than offering programmable resources, neighborhoods in unsafe and undesirable agencies proposed pre-set projects and locations using risk assessment and activities, which government officials did not relocation feel empowered to turn down, even when they # To ensure that both reconstruction and new construction contributed to urban renovation and regional development, as envisioned in 57 See, for example: “Stratégie du Gouvernement d'Haïti pour » : AE appuyer Le retour des populations au foyer dans habitat sûr the government’s long-term rebuilding plan et reconstruire les logements et les quartiers,” prepared by CIAT, UN-Habitat, World Bank, and others, in July 2010. Other early policy documents practically overlook the rental housing challenge. See, for instance: Nicole Rencoret, Abby Stoddard, Katherine Haver, Glyn Taylor, and Paul Harvey, 2010, “Haiti Earthquake Response: Context Analysis.” # GFDRR, 2014, “Disaster Recovery Framework Case Study: #8 AlterPresse, 2011, “Haïti-Séisme-Un an: Population de Fort Haiti Disaster Recovery Framework: Recovery from a Mega National en colère.” Disaster.” [page 73] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 49 The framework also identified four operational were under pressure to say how the funds were approaches that would make the realization of to be programmed. these objectives possible: ! P The failure to produce and enforce a housing “ Return to safe homes in safe neighborhoods reconstruction strategy had a number of m Relocation from unsafe houses and sites unfortunate impacts. It left agencies without a = Support outside the earthquake-affected area unifying vision of housing recovery, which caused = Closure of the camps a fragmentation of housing interventions.” The interventions proposed by donors were very The framework and an initial work plan were diverse, due to the lack of guidance on standards, presented to the IHRC Board in December 2010, and often overly complex and expensive, leading but were never formally approved, due partly to to extensive delays. Principal activities of 42 questions about IHRC'’s mandate. Uncertainties agencies who answered the survey associated surrounding the presidential elections also with this report are shown in Figure 12. seemed to make approval of any housing reconstruction strategy by the government Good practices were sacrificed, as some impossible. agencies were unfamiliar with good .. international practices or unsure about how In January 2011, the Inter-Cluster Coordination they could be adapted to the post-earthquake and Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) issued the context. Economies of scale were also lost. “Return and Relocation Strategy.”” Its purpose This is particularly true with the use of was to “define general guidelines necessary owner- or community-driven reconstruction, to implement durable solutions for displaced which delegates considerable responsibility people after the earthquake, with reference to households and communities, but requires to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: | a significant investment in training and international principles related to the ‘Restitution management that was difficult to justify for of Housing and Property of Refugees and small-scale projects Displaced Persons’; Haiti’s Constitution, Article 22; the Government's Decree 22 of March 2010, c. Household Self-Recovery Was the recognizing the obligation of the State to relocate Predominant Form of Recovery earthquake-affected families; and the NRHRF.” . k . Repair and reconstruction activity that was This strategy was said to represent the joint observed in cities in the first year was carried perspective of the clusters, but it was not out mostly by households building on their presented to government or the IHRC, nor was a own. These households generally received no promised implementation plan prepared. technical assistance; they repaired and rebuilt Agency response to policy gap. Agencies in the same way they had built in the past, using hopi ! . : : traditional incremental construction? oping or planning to be involved in housing reconstruction needed a strategy for fundraising Incremental housing construction was the norm and programming purposes. Agencies were still in Haïti before the earthquake. Households fundraising in mid- to late 2010, but lacked build and extend their housing as resources are concrete ideas about what interventions they mobilized. At the same time, because erecting should finance. Others had raised funds and LL % The setup of the IHRC contributed to this fragmentation, since it served largely to review projects designed by donors, rather than to establish project parameters ex ante. 90 Inter-Cluster Coordination and HCT, 2011, “Stratégie de Retour % UN-Habitat, 2012, “Support for Housing Rehabilitation and et de Relocalisation, Final.” Reconstruction: Progress and Issues.” [page 74] 50 / III B. The Housing Response SURVEY QUESTION Figure 12. What were your organization’s principal recovery and reconstruction activities related to shelter, housing, and urban development? (42 responses) Community planning/technical assistance 29 A, Basic services in neighborhoods 27 A, Disaster risk reduction 27 D Housing repairs 27 . . A, Housing reconstruction 26 A, T-shelter 26 D Emergency shelter 23 A, Institutional support (government or other) PE) A, Housing retrofitting 22 D Rubble removal 20 A Other 17 A Services in camps 15 EE mm Rental subsidies 12 | Camp management 6 Other financing EH | a permanent structure demonstrates ownership messages and designing housing-related of informally occupied land, there is pressure interventions, but communication with to advance the project to a significant degree as homeowners about how to reconstruct or to soon as the land is acquired. get help were inconsistent and intermittent. Le ue Donors such as the U.S. Agency for International Incremental construction is sensitive to the cost . . Development (USAID) announced large-scale of inputs, and for low-income households nearly . . . . Lo qe . housing interventions, but history told many all inputs are acquired in the informal market. n . . Haitians that they would not have the necessary Plots are acquired through the informal land . . . . . influence to be selected for these programs. market often in precarious, illegal locations; . . . . Workers and some homeowners were being labor is supplied by the household itself, . . . . . trained on safe construction practices, mostly unlicensed contractors, or both; and materials, . . . . . . , in connection with a specific donor project; the such as blocks, ingredients for mortar, and . . . Le general publics access to such training was reinforcing iron, are purchased from unregulated . : : extremely limited. roadside suppliers whose products are largely substandard. As a result, owners and landlords recovered . . . as best they could, using a sped-up version of This dynamic operated with greater urgency . y 8 . p P ue . . the incremental construction model. Canaan after the earthquake, as Haitians displayed their . ie Le Le and other new informal settlements within the characteristic resiliency and employed self- . : . . urban core were largely developed by internally recovery to restore their housing, both for their . displaced person (IDP) households through self- own use and for rental purposes. recovery (see Canaan case study). The fact that In the first year, the government and donors landlords had repaired and rebuilt made rental were developing disaster risk reduction (DRR) assistance programming feasible. [page 75] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 51 Recovering on their own meant households could inspection and providing planned, serviced sites leave the IDP camps or avoid them altogether, for new construction went largely unrealized. thus mitigating camp-related risks, such as high Haïti demonstrated how important it is that rates of crime, including sexual assaults. The governments and international agencies find a Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) registered middle ground in recovery where the informal a drop in owners in camps from approximately construction systems productivity can be 280,000 in September 2010 to 76,000 in harnessed and quickly augmented by minimal January 2012 (see Figure 13). Some of that drop norms and standards, so that, in contexts where could be attributed to the provision of T-shelters self-recovery is prevalent, disaster risk is reduced. to land owners, but in a group sampled by the k : . International Organization for Migration (I0M), d._ Rehousing the renter population required in March 2011, less than 1 percent reported targeted approaches having received a Tshelter and Less than 3 percent Renters became displaced after the earthquake reported receiving an assistance package (see for two principal reasons: damage or destruction Figure 14). The remaining drop can safely be of their housing and inability to find an attributed to self-recovery. apartment or to afford to pay rent. Anecdotally, Informal self-recovery had its drawbacks, there were renters avicted by profiteering : . . landlords, but there is no evidence that this particularly that the construction materials and ! à | . methods used often made the new structure no was a major factor. While repair and rebuilding safer than the old structure that was damaged added both owner and rental units to the in the earthquake. On the other hand, this housing market, addressing the lowrincome . « » . renter population also required “non-structural informal “system” was remarkably productive Un and efficient, both for owner-occupied and rental solutions” that took longer to figure out. housing. In effect, the informal sector was the In the 2003 census, IHSI reported that 53 biggest producer of housing for recovery. In percent of all Port-au-Prince metropolitan area contrast, goals such as reforming and expanding residents were renters. This figure rose to 65 construction regulation through the application percent if those who rented land for an “owned” of the building code and permitting and house were included. This included 20 percent Figure 13. IDPs in Camps by Tenancy Status 2010-2012 s 1,600,000 & 1,400,000 3 1200,000 ë 1,000,000 S 800,000 TZ 600,000 É 400,000 “ 200,000 _ September 2010 January 2012 Source: I0OM DTM and registration data, March 2012. [page 76] 52 / III B. The Housing Response Figure 14. Reasons for Leaving IDP Camps, reported by Sample of Leaver Population, March 2011 Poor conditions 32% Raïin/hurricane 21% Crime/insecurity 13% Eviction 17% Family/friend offered support 5% General lack of services 4% Other-specify 3% My home was repaired 3% Assistance package 3% T-shelter 1% Null 1% Employment 1% Cholera 1% No school «41% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% Source: I0M DTM and registration data, March 2011. of all residents of single-story houses and 48 Landlords and property owners willing to percent of multistory building residents. become landlords were obviously key players in . . . any effort to rehouse renters, yet initially both The Phase 1 camp registration published by y . y Y . agencies and the government were hesitant the IOM, in December 2010, reported the camp . . to provide support to these groups. There population to be 31 percent owners and 64 : . were concerns that paying for rentals would percent renters. By June 2011, the proportion . . overheat the rental market. There were also of renters in the camps had risen to 79 percent. . . se Lu . . . questions about the equity of giving subsidies Another I0M report on camp resident intentions, . . to landlords (landlords were assumed to be issued in August 2011, reported that few tenants . . : . wealthy) and about the means by which the land had any fears about leaving the camps, including . . . had been acquired (land was distributed by past concerns about the loss of services. However, . . : : : governments to political partisans). °* Helping 57 percent reported lacking the financial means . | : . , landlords with no proof of ownership was a to leave, including to pay the first year’s rent, . . : . hurdle for some agencies.” which was estimated at just over $500. The provision of rental housing for low-income % [OM -ACTED, 2011, Enquête Haïti: Intentions des Déplacés. families can be supported on the demand side http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FulL. mn . k Report 1967.pdf. (rental subsidies) or the supply side (construction Offering a choice of solutions to those displaced is good practice, but suggesting that solutions were available that were not may have created false expectations—and a %% In fact, according to 2003 IHSI census data, about 10 percent willingness to wait in IDP camps. The I0M's October 2010 of all households have property-related revenue, which makes Registration Update showed while 80% of owners who could up 2.8 percent of all household revenue. Excluding the bottom not repair and 89% of owners who could repair intended to quintile, the percentage of property-related revenue does not return to their neighborhood of origin, 74% of renters, who vary significantly across income levels. made up 61% of the camp population, expressed an intention % This may not have been a major concern: The 2003 census to move to housing in a new planned site, an option that for showed that 81.5 percent of owners of multistory houses most would never be available. reported having a deed for their property. [page 77] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 53 or repair subsidies), or both. Without an overall Prince, the “return to neighborhood” strategy housing reconstruction strategy, agencies had was originally focused on basic requirements: difficulty devising interventions on the supply removing physical barriers to return, especially side, except for ongoing repairs and rebuilding debris; moving basic services, such as water in neighborhoods, but eventually a demand-side delivery, from camps to neighborhoods; and strategy emerged, with the provision of rental expanding the availability of transitional and subsidies. The Rental Support Cash Grant (RSCG) permanent housing in neighborhoods. program succeeded partly because more than Agencies had different criteria for identifying a year had passed before the program reached : . . : . | | | | neighborhoods in which to work, including scale, which provided time for owners to repair : . . . | | prior relationships. As agencies became more and reconstruct rental units on their own. À Le : . ue d fi | ehth familiar with neighborhood conditions, they more targete Program of incentives might have often became more ambitious in defining what accelerated this process and allowed renters to : ded. Thi ded begin leaving camps earlier in larger numbers improvements were needec. This expande sn 8 p 8 ‘ definition of what needed to be done at the The rental subsidy program is discussed in the neighborhood level became known as the context of the shelter response and camp closure “integrated neighborhood approach” (INA). in Section IIL.A2. . . . moecron INA is an area-based intervention that reflects e. Challenges in neighborhood the social, economic, and physical features of reconstruction included limiting project an area; responds to multisectoral needs; and is scope informed by community-based decision making. For a brief period following the earthquake, the According to USAID's Office of LL.S. Foreign disaster was seen as an opportunity to reduce Disaster Assistance (OFDA): “The [INA] approach the population of Port-au-Prince by moving is shelter-led, but settlement-focused:; it shifts slum dwellers and displaced households to the attention from conventional ‘four walls and new planned sites and enticing those who left a roof" efforts centered on households, toward the metropolitan area after the earthquake to a more synergistic and complementary focus on stay in their new locations To support the the entire community in defined spatial contexts. government with this, a number of agencies The process requires understanding of available embarked on a “new settlements” projects (see local resources, emergent opportunities, and next subsection). potential constraints regarding the sheltering of people, the recovery of affected economies, But the majority of agencies and the government and the reduction of risks associated with itself soon realized that for most of the displaced vulnerability to natural hazards.”?7 a “return to neighborhoods” strategy was : | needed. This strategy aimed to return people The British Red Cross saw INA as helping to to or close to their neighborhood of origin so bridge the gap between relief and development, that they could focus on self-recovery and avoid but also giving rise to questions about mandate losing social capital. for humanitarian agencies: “A geographic approach linked to urban systems is not without The presence of rubble and the condition of problems, such as knowing where a humanitarian streets and service infrastructure affected mandate ends and that of development and households’ ability to return home. In Port-au- 7 USAID OFDA, 2011, “The ‘Neighborhood Approach,’ A Means %° Nicolai Ouroussoff, 2010, “A Plan to Spur Growth Away From of Improving the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in Urban Haitis Capital.” Areas.” [page 78] 54 / III B. The Housing Response government agencies begins, and what to do if Even experienced agencies found it difficult state and development partners fail to meet the to execute these projects. The capacity gap basic needs of vulnerable people. However, if well cited most often in the survey was project managed, such an approach provides a significant implementation. The first initiative of this opportunity for a more joined-up response from kind by the government was the clearance and government agencies (including civil defense, proposed reconstruction of Fort National, which emergency services, line ministries and service faltered. UN-Habitat supported this approach providers), the private sector and civil society.”°# with various partners, including Habitat . . for Humanity in Simon Pelé and Fondation INA project components were a reflection of the . , D : . . Architectes de l’Urgence in Bristou-Bobin. More resources and competencies of the executing . : . LL . than one agency adjusted project scope due to agencies and priorities identified from the ue . k conditions on the ground. local level. Generally, INA projects included community organizing, community enumeration, With little government direction, agencies had risk mapping, and community planning, which full discretion to use INA. But the philosophical together provided a baseline for identifying question is not so clear—whether it was fair interventions that involved physical investment, (especially in a highly inequitable country such ranging from repairs and reconstruction of as Haiti) to concentrate reconstruction funding housing to improvement of neighborhood on these relatively high unit-cost “showcase” amenities. Some INA projects invested only in projects that provided much more than housing neighborhood upgrading and not directly in recovery in select neighborhoods, while housing. INA was also used in less urban projects. neglecting other neighborhoods and leaving (See case studies for the Katye program, the many displaced families in camps, and whether Rehabilitation of 16 Neighborhoods and Voluntary this was the best way to use funding donated for Return of Residents from 6 Camps (16/6) Project, recovery and reconstruction purposes. PRODEPUR and PREKAD, and the Simon Pele £ Chall . tt t ct project, all of which used a form of INA.) _ a enges nnewse emen s proJec $ included costs and beneficiary selection INA projects addressed critical needs, but they : _. . Several new settlements projects were initiated could become complex and expensive. The | . . . Le . in the first two years after the earthquake by the upfront investment in becoming familiar with . . . . Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), USAID, the neighborhood and developing trust with . . . . . . . Habitat for Humanity Haïti (HFHH), faith-based residents could be significant. The temptation iyati dth t th for agencies who “adopted” a neighborhood 9rganizauions, ang ne government, among olners. was not just to restore housing, but to raise New settlements generally took longer and cost the quality of life to a level acceptable to the more per unit than in situ housing recovery, agency and its donors. Because Haïti had no and often took longer and cost more than neighborhood upgrading standards in place, originally planned by the agencies themselves. agencies had to develop their own approaches, In a number of cases, the result was a reduction which also increased project costs. Unit costs in the number of units provided. Finding land, varied widely.°° verifying ownership, and subdividing land were %5 British Red Cross, 2012, “Learning from the City: British Red case study 1). The Agence Française de Développement (AFD)/ Cross Urban Learning Project Scoping Study,” http://reliefweb. European Union “Integrated upgrading of informal settlements int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Learning%20from%20 in Port-au-Prince,” which was originally planned to produce the%20City%20%282012%29_0.pdf. 2,000 improved housing units, may have cost over $22,000 % The Ravine Pintade project spent about $9,500 per housing per unit. These averages are calculated using housing units solution and $2,600 per household on improvements (see replaced or built as the denominator. [page 79] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake /55 such complex activities that they led to the designed to include various services, such as abandonment of some projects. water and sanitation, electricity, in addition . . Le to a police station, a health center, elementary Beneficiary selection was another complicating . | . and vocational schools, and a marketplace, and factor in new settlements projects. As opposed Lu . . . | several amenities, including a public square and to a neighborhood reconstruction effort, where . | . . . . . a soccer field. À key feature is an industrial park, prior residents were still onsite or could be . . . . . . also being built by government. The beneficiary identified, new settlements projects were by . . ne Lo . selection process was not made public, although definition in unoccupied sites and required . NE sn . police officers and those still in camps were beneficiaries to be selected. Project executors . . . . . . mentioned as priority beneficiaries. struggled with beneficiary selection and sought guidance from the government and the IHRC. Haïti Fund for Economic and Social Assistance. À natural instinct of these agencies was to The 400-unit “400 pour 100” housing project select disadvantaged households. Yet not built in the Oranger area of Croix-des-Bouquets, only were distinctions between more and less north of Port-au-Prince, with funding from the disadvantaged households difficult to make, IDB, was managed by the Fund for Economic due to the lack of a central register of affected and Social Assistance (FAES) and received households and of any government social implementation and financial support from safety net programs where the disadvantaged Food for the Poor. The houses were part of a might have been registered, moving vulnerable project approved by the IDB in April 2010, with families to what in some cases were relatively an original goal of housing 5,000 households remote sites was not good policy, since it only in temporary housing on individual plots of increased their isolation and vulnerability. land. In June 2011, this number was reduced Descripti f tt t projects in Haut to 1,000 housing units in Oranger and 1,000 Escrip 10nS OF NEW Setlemen proJec : m au near the Caracol Industrial Park. The FAES used Damier, Santo, and Canaan are included in the : ! : . LR. É a screening and interview process to select case studies. À few others that were initiated in benefciaries, with data and logistical support the first two years are described below. from the IOM. The 35 m? permanent houses cost Government of Haïti. The Lumane Casimir an estimated $20,000 per unit. The project was Village (or Morne a Cabrit project) included inaugurated in February 2012. construction of 3,000 planned units of housing U.S. Agency for International Development. and an industrial park in Thomazeau, 15 km In 2010, USAID pledged to develop 15,000 northeast of Port-au-Prince. Begun in early 2012, new settlements plots, on which it would build the first keys were delivered to 1,128 households up to 4,000 houses, with nongovernmental in May 2013. As of late 2013, $49 million had organizations (NGOs) and other donor partners been allocated from Petrocaribe funds to the building the remaining 11,000 houses. Between 3,000 housing units, an average of $16,000 2010 and 2013, USAID reduced its new per unit, making it the largest housing project settlements targets by more than 80 percent as and perhaps the largest single reconstruction unit costs increased from $9,800 to more than project in the country. The project was $33,000 per unit, due to input cost increases and design changes.!° In 2013, only 2,649 Haïti joined the Petrocaribe agreement in October 2007, housing units were expected to be built (906 and under it, the Haitian government purchases and resells gasoline, diesel, kerosene, fuel oil, and asphalt from Venezuela at prevailing international market prices. À portion of the more than $1 billion to the government invoiced amount is paid in cash, and the balance is payable #7 US. Government Accountability Office, June 2013, Haiti over 25 years with 1% annual interest, after a two-year grace Reconstruction: USAID Infrastructure Projects Have Had Mixed period. At the time of earthquake, the agreement had provided Results and Face Sustainability Challenges. [page 80] 56 / Il B. The Housing Response houses by USAID and 1,743 by NGOs). Even so, g. With oversight, upgrading of T-shelters USAID's funding commitment increased from could provide permanent safe housing $53.3 million to approximately $90 million. . . k Projects in the program included the 750-unit Most T-shelters provided by agencies had timber Caracol-EKAM site near the Northern Industrial frames or steel box or angle section frames. With Park, as well as projects in the municipalities proper maintenance, they may last as long as a of Cabaret, Quartier Morin, Terrer Rouge, and decade-” Titanyen. USAID hired consultants to design In rural areas, where traditional construction the beneficiary selection process, and worked includes single-story, timber frame housing with the IFRC to select beneficiaries. Not all with woven or low-strength masonry infill, the households selected were earthquake-affected T-shelters can be converted relatively easily (see Haut Damier case study). to a similar permanent construction type. Lutheran Church Missouri Sinod. The “Building Modifications to T-shelters in these areas began Homes and Hope in Haiti” project, a partnership almost immediately. In dense urban sites, less between the Lutheran Church Missouri Sinod modification to shelters was seen, as residents and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Haïti, instead saved for new permanent construction. is planned to include about 225 houses in three However, basing permanent construction on a Lutheran Villages in Jacmel, Beaudouin, and T-shelter is unlikely to result in a building that Léogâne. The project was originally proposed to meets urban standards, and doing so could the IHRC in 2010 as a 1,500-unit project. create significant risks unless technical guidance Mission of Hope. In November 2010, Mission is provided by the concerned authorities. Safety of Hope began its “Blue to Block” project in could be compromised, for example, if blocks Leveque on property provided by the local or inadequately reinforced masonry is used government. This was the first faith-based to enclose T-shelter frames or if additional project registered in the IHRC. The initial goal weight or stories are added without adequate to build 500 permanent homes for displaced foundations. families has been increased to 650. Using local Only one T-shelter project was designed for small construction firms, the Mission of Hope upgrading. The IOM and EPPLS project of 335 has built as many as 20 houses per month, at an semi-permanent shelters in Jacmel featured average cost of $6,000 (originally estimated at houses with a concrete foundation and partial $5,000). The project includes a church, a school, concrete wall, topped by metal frame and fiber a marketplace, clean water solutions, and cement board that could be replaced over time playing fields. The organization partnered with by masonry. 410 Bridge to incorporate a deaf community from the La Piste slums into the community, Given the sheer number of T-shelters reserving 160 of the anticipated 650 homes for (approximately 124,000 units), upgrading deaf families. could contribute to the permanent housing stock over time. For this to happen safely, Given the variety of new settlement project government and agencies would have to develop parameters, an impact evaluation after 5-10 and disseminate information on safe and cost- years would be valuable to gauge which effective approaches to upgrading. Without such projects fulfilled their stated objectives and to understand their impact on the beneficiaries and 192 This section is adapted from: UN-Habitat, 2012, “Support for Housing Rehabilitation and Reconstruction: Progress and the local areas. Issues.” [page 81] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / 57 guidance, household resources would be better Project (PREKAD) and the Urban Community- invested in permanent, safe construction based Driven Development Project (PRODEPUR), on correct site preparation, foundations, and each of which included substantial technical reinforcement to allow for additional stories. assistance components (see the PREKAD and PRODEPUR case study). h. Technical assistance to government was plentiful but fragmented United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP had long-term technical assistance Various government agencies received technical relationships with various government ministries assistance to address capacity gaps related before the earthquake, and this commitment to housing and neighborhood reconstruction. expanded as a result of the earthquake. In In some cases, this was provided to facilitate particular, UNDP assisted the Ministère de la specific reconstruction projects, such as Planification et de la Coopération Externe (MPCE) assistance to MTPTC in the context of the Ravine (Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation) Pintade project (see Katye program case study). with urban and strategic planning and with In other cases, donors provided staff or funding coordination of debris removal, and MICT and the to strengthen the policy and implementation Secrétariat Permanent de Gestion des Risques et capacity of specific government agencies that des Désastres (SPGRD) (Permanent Secretariat was not project-specific. Yet technical assistance for Disaster Risk Management) on a range of DRM was not able to overcome the fragmented activities. way in which the government and agencies were working. Some examples of the technical US. Agency for International Development. assistance provided include the following. OFDA financed the Emergency Community Assistance and Planning (ECAP) Program, which UN-Habitat. UN-Habitat provided policy support was implemented by consortium led by Habitat on numerous occasions, including developing for Humanity International (HFHI). The ECAP or contributing to outputs listed in the recovery Program mobilized Haitian professionals, mostly timeline, including the Strategic Emergency from the diaspora, who provided technical Plan presented to the prime minister (February support to several agencies, including MTPTC, 2010), the housing chapter of the Post-Disaster the Centre National d'Information Geo-Spatiale Needs Assessment (PDNA) (March 2010), the (CNIGS), CIAT, and the IHRC. USAID also provided Government of Haiti Strategy to Support the extensive support to the IHRC. Return of Populations to Safe Habitats and the Rebuilding of Homes and Neighborhoods with Haïti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). The Housing CIAT (July 2010), and the IHRC NRHRF (October and Neighborhood Reconstruction Support 2010), among others.1: Program (HNRSP) was a $24.4 million multi- agency technical assistance program, funded by The World Bank. The World Bank assisted the HRF and the Haïtian government. Executed MTPTC with the building safety (habitability) as a United Nations (UN) Joint Program led by assessment and other technical activities and UN-Habitat, the program collaborated with assisted CIAT in strengthening its capacity on MPCE, CNIGS, IHSI, MICT, and local governments DRM issues. The Bank also financed two major to improve the management of reconstruction neighborhood upgrading programs, the Port-au- atthe municipal and neighborhood levels. By Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction attempting to strengthen government leadership 2 UN-Habitt, 2012, “Haiti Deux années d'appui d'ONU-Habitat of reconstruction and build capacity for urban aux efforts de refondation territoriale.” development and urban management, the [page 82] 58 / I B. The Housing Response HNRSP was a unique attempt to move from advisors in ministries or providing funds to hire a fragmented, project-based approach to a government staff would have helped address this more programmatic approach by addressing problem, as shown in Figure 15. the most urgent needs and capacity gaps in . ; 8 . p y BP In spite of the consensus on the issues where government agencies. The project included . : . . , . policy guidance was needed, the demand to the funding to establish the Systeme d'Information . . . : . government from agencies seeking guidance on du Logement et des Quartiers (SILQ) (Housing . k : . . . housing reconstruction was not well articulated. and Neighborhoods Information System) in . . . Similarly, the guidance from the government to CNIGs. Delays in IHRC approval, compounded . . Lis . . . . the agencies was not well coordinated within by difficulties with project management and . . on the government or well communicated. But interagency coordination in the first year, . . , . . . more importantly, the international community undermined the accomplishment of some neither proposed to the government a joint HNRSP objectives.!% In addition, by the time . Prop 8 l . . . housing strategy that they would commit to implementation got under way, the fragmented | . . . follow nor provided timely technical assistance approach to recovery had already taken hold to . . . . that enabled the government to coordinate and the point that it was very difficult to overcome. . . 10 provide guidance to the agencies.1® In the survey conducted for this report, both agency representatives and individuals ï. Data for planning and monitoring housing cited policy making as the greatest capacity recovery were Scarce weakness of the government, followed closely To plan recovery, information was needed at a by coordination. Curiously, only about 50 minimum on: the affected population, damaged percent of agencies thought that either placing 1 In late 2011, the government created the Unité de Construction 1% Groupe U.R.D., 2012,"Evaluation du programme d’appui à La de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics (UCLBP) (Housing reconstruction du logement et des quartiers: Évaluation- and Public Building Construction Unit), which was charged phase 2012," http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/URD-ONU-Habitat_ with policy making for the housing sector and interagency Evaluation 2012 Synthese.pdf. coordination. SURVEY QUESTION Figure 15. What could have been done to improve government’s capacity to manage recovery and reconstruction? Better government / recovery partner coordination 71% Better planning of reconstruction program 68% Better articulation of government's strategy 68% Stronger role for mayors 57% More effective IHRC / HRF 54% More advisors placed in ministries 50% More funds to hire government staff 46% Fewer recovery partners 36% Better use of sector tables 36% [page 83] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / 59 property and the cost to repair or replace it, report in April 2012 showed similar results for risks, and the financial resources available for completed units. recovery. To monitor recovery, information was ue . also needed on what Drojects were being carried By March 2013. the Linité de Construction de out, on their progress and completion, and on Logements etde Bâtiments Publics (uCLBP) . their beneficiaries. Almost none of these data (Housing and Public Building Construction Unit) were readily available, nor was there any system began monitoring and publishing improved EPalr for accumulating and analyzing the data. and reconstruction activity data that included a larger number of NGOs. UCLBP was assisted by As discussed previously, information on building the CCCM Cluster and supported by the HNRSP. conditions was collected through the building . safety assessments and data on families in The data from various reports prepared between camps was collected through the DTM. Beginning December 2011 and March 2013 are summarized in mid-2010, data from both started to become in table 6. available to agencies. Data on reconstruction The problems with these data are obvious, costs, other damages at the community level, including different activities being reported and households that were affected but not in on, different groups of agencies reporting, camps were limited, and coming mostly from the voluntary nature of the reporting, and no community assessments, enumeration exercises, information on beneficiaries. Further, each and (in the case of costs) pilot projects. report is incomplete, since no measures were in Information on project plans and results was place to monitor the most widespread means of available only anecdotally. housing recovery, which was self-recovery. The IHRC attempted to identify and track ou housing projects, based on its project 3. Findings submission system and other sources. The following are findings from the first two By October 2011, when the IHRC closed, years of housing recovery in Haïti. commitments for repairs and new construction had been identified for 58,000 housing units The government had no policy framework judged to have a high probability of being on which to base the housing reconstruction funded. The need for a more systematic effort strategy. There was also no agency of to collect and organize damage, household, government to which this responsibility would and project data was a principal motivation for have naturally fallen. Nor was there a policy developing the HNRSP. framework for housing or slum upgrading. There In January 2012, UN-Habitat and the Camp was a near consensus among national and Coordination/Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster international agencies about the issues that issued a report summarizing data on repairs, the reconstruction strategy needed to address. retrofits, and new construction, using voluntary However. there was no body with the mandate or reports from 32 agencies including 14 (often influence to build on this consensus to develop small, church-based groups) assisting fewer than : reconstruction strategy proposal that could be 200 households each. The report lacked data negotiated with the government and serve as the from major housing donors, local NGOs, and roadmap for all. Even the THRC was not capable many religious organizations.:° A CCCM Cluster of serving this role, in spite of the involvement of major donors in the commission. 1% Major housing projects and donors not covered included the 2 16/6 Project, AFD, the World Bank, USAID, the IDB, and other major stakeholders. [page 84] 60 / Ill B. The Housing Response Table 6. Reports of T-shelter, Housing Repairs, Retrofits, New Construction, and Rent Subsidies Rent December 2011 = 25,472 13831 15224 5,189 _ UN-Habitat/CCCM Cluster April 2012 _ _ 13,198 _ 4,843 — CCCM Cluster March 2013 113,345 _ 27,100 _ 7,242 45,035 UCLBP/CCCM Cluster There was incomplete data for planning the government that, while relatively generous, housing reconstruction. There were eventually was generally not coordinated, nor strategic fairly good data on building conditions, but in its purposes. The HNRSP, which attempted no comprehensive registration of affected to overcome the lack of inter-institutional households except those in camps. While coordination, provided support to key agencies, the various situations of households were but its impact was blunted by institutional understood, there was no guidance on which culture in both the UN and the government.!7 households should be helped first, and in . : P Household self-recovery was the predominant what way. It was not until 2012 that the SILQ . form of recovery. Large numbers of was launched by CNIGs with support from the . . k HNRSP affected Haitian households displayed their ‘ characteristic resilience and found housing The lack of an overall reconstruction strategy solutions on their own. Self-recovery of housing caused the reconstruction effort to fragment. was the principal method utilized by households With or without a strategy, agencies needed to in the first two years. This included repair and complete fundraising and implement recovery continued occupation of damaged buildings, activities. Having no strategy both simplified rebuilding by households with the financial and complicated agencies’ work. It was simpler means, and acquisition of owned and rented because there was no need to conform to housing through normal housing market forces. government standards or priorities, but more Market-based options grew to include renting complicated because each agency had to find its out T-shelters and shelters in IDP camps. own place to work and define its own standards . . . Put another way, the informal sector was and approach. The result was a proliferation : . . sie : . . the biggest player in housing recovery. of individual housing reconstruction projects . . . . . Housing construction in newly settled informal with their own standards and approaches and : : k . D ’ areas (such as Canaan), housing repair and an inequitable distribution of the available Lio . reconstruction in informal urban neighborhoods, resources. . . and non-permitted construction of new rental The technical assistance provided to the units throughout the country were three major government was equally fragmented. Not ————— Le . 27 In spite of these difficulties, government officials who surprisingly, the lack of a reconstruction strategy participated speak well of the program and its impact on led to a program of technical assistance to agency collaboration in a program video. http://uclbp.gouv. . . : ht/pages/228-programme-d-appui-a-la-reconstruction-du- support housing-related decision making by logement-et-des-quartiers.php. [page 85] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 61 sources of housing units for those displaced Ensure early that there is a lead by the earthquake. While agencies aspired government agency for housing recovery to promote higher housing standards and to and reconstruction with a clear mandate formalize housing production activities, the and the authority and ability to ensure an existing informal system set about providing equitable and rational allocation of housing housing for the displaced population, with very reconstruction resources. limited technical support. Housing reconstruction agencies established 4. Recommendations before or after a disaster should have both the Le, k responsibility and the authority to deliver their Develop humanitarian shelter and housing mandate. This requires that they be able to influ- recovery strategies jointly, ence donor and NGO programming and funding. so that they can reinforce each other. Technical assistance should support the lead While the early humanitarian intervention in agency and be coordinated among donors. Haïti was more the result of circumstances than : . Li : Even with a lead agency in place, recovery of a plan, subsequent decisions on formalizing , | ne planning for the housing sector should be camps and providing T-shelters were planned. : | . Better knowledge of the housing culture in Haïti conservative, taking the legal and organizational and better analysis of how the shelter strategy context into consideration and carefully would wind down might have contributed to analyzing potential risks. approaches that did not so extensively prolong Immediately prepare a recovery plan the humanitarian phase. for housing. This disconnect in thinking reflected gaps The PDNA should inform a recovery plan or in coordination between humanitarian and framework that identifies general recovery recovery actors on housing reconstruction, which priorities and strategies. The PDNA needs to were reinforced by the funding mechanisms be led by the national government. Ownership that supported the various agencies. This setup of the recommended strategies allows a quick needs to be evaluated at an international level to transition from assessment to planning. reduce the differentiation between humanitarian | and recovery funding to ensure that recovery The recovery plan for housing should be led by can begin earlier after a disaster and can be the lead government housing agency, developed supported by humanitarian funding. in consultation with the affected population, and ideally endorsed by the donor and the The difficulty of managing the gap between humanitarian and development communities. humanitarian action and recovery for major he olan should b ifc and : disasters in weak states like Haïti also deserves The plan should be speci can Strategic . : ; about roles and responsibilities and about to be evaluated by the international community. : . . how available resources are to be allocated. In Once it became obvious that the government or Lie general, the government should minimize its would not be ready to assume full responsibility : . . role as a house builder and focus on enabling for recovery, or even to oversee the planning, | . . : others, including households. The government some action needed to be taken to design a | . may strengthen regulations, such as those that system of support and an exit strategy that . ce | . cover the quality of building materials, or fund would accomplish agreed goals. . . strategic investments in infrastructure that support housing recovery. [page 86] 62 / I B. The Housing Response Putting local agencies at the center of the can undermine support for the recovery strategy, strategy will help build resilience and ensure so a communications strategy for the media is capacity exists to manage recovery from the also needed. future disasters. An exit plan and schedule for . . . nou Haitians received a lot of communications both humanitarian and recovery actors can help : | : uns during the first two years, but much of it ensure that a sense of urgency is maintained. | concerned public health and safety matters, The housing recovery plan should favor especially once cholera broke out in October enabling housing self-recovery. 2010. Communications about housing, safe À bi h should mal Lab construction, and related issues were limited, n ena Ing approac S où Make avalan'e even once the MPTPC repair and reconstruction various “shelter solutions” versus “shelter Li . : . ; guidelines were published. By using all available products” for each category of affected : . M Lu : media, and broadcasting repetitive, distinct households, and should encourage family . les : . . Re . messages, public health officials involved in financial participation and initiative. Subsidies : . . k . . managing the cholera epidemic demonstrated should be structured to incentivize good choices, : . ue . . how effective public communications can be such as safer reconstruction, without unduly . l L k when the purposes and audiences are clearly impeding recovery. External financial and human defined resources should leverage better use of private ° and local resources. Major localized funding committments . . should be allowed only after there is The housing framework has to balance equity, se : | minimum assistance for all. coverage, and the need for scale. Special consideration should be made in the framework INA strategies help ensure area-based for the rehousing needs of extremely vulnerable coordination and create synergies and populations. economies of scale. Ideally, this type of Work is needed in advance of future urban po es be pee on a serie pren disasters to develop better models for self- or development of the area and should use . : common methods and standards. recovery in these circumstances. Use the media and communications to De goal . agencies a seat as inform and motivate affected households. ousing, but ensuring t ata ected households get properly rehoused. Neighborhood À continuous communications strategy about investments that improve the accessibility and housing strategies and options is needed safety of neighborhoods and upgrade services among the affected population, humanitarian/ may encourage housing investment and self- development actors, and the donor community recovery. to ensure that all stakeholders understand . . . .. . . However, if donors stake their reputation on the recovery policies and the reasoning behind . : . : . quality of a particular neighborhood project, them. For households, the communication . . . they can overinvest and (inadvertently or should be two-way, and should be designed . . in . not) divert funding from providing minimum to encourage self-recovery and to manage : . : tati assistance in other areas, thereby reducing expectations. Le . P the number of benefciaries who are assisted. Housing and neighborhood recovery takes Coordination with local government is critical, time; the pressure to absorb funds and the but local officials may be subject to the same reputational risk created by misinformed media biases. [page 87] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 63 If the government is not in a position to regulate Politique nationale du logement et de l’habitat INA projects across the disaster-affected area, (National Housing and Neighborhood Policy) donors should seek independent advice on the developed by the UCLBP in 2013 provides a relative value of different types of interventions. key element of the framework for this effort."° . . k Donors should work with the UCLBP and the Haïti and other countries should be assisted other agencies supported by the HNRSP to before the next disaster to put housing develop policies, protocols, and information- recovery arrangements in place. sharing tools that will allow quicker planning . . and implementation of future disaster recover The creation of the SILQ and the founding of the p . ie y . Le programs in the sector. Similar initiatives are UCLBP provide good conditions for development . : k n needed in many other countries. of a housing recovery framework that Haïti could apply in the event of future disasters. The 2% UICLBP, 2013, “Politique nationale du logement et de l'habitat.” [page 88] [page 89] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / 65 PE e e e e e C. Risk Reduction in Post-Disaster Reconstruction THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (DRR) IN RECONSTRUCTION ARE THE FOLLOWING: “ Setting standards for DRR in reconstruction early and communicating them clearly, covering both site risk and building risk, and based on an open and realistic discussion of “acceptable risk” “ Conducting large-scale, repeated, and continual communication on best practices for more resilient reconstruction # Establishing DRR and reconstruction policies that take into consideration people’s perceptions of risk and that address the vulnerability of households over time “ Capitalizing on the short-term awareness of risk created by a disaster to permanently shift the culture of risk “ Recognizing that promoting safe housing does not necessarily mean building safe homes, but rather reducing the barriers to safe construction “ Using pre-disaster risk information presented in a form that is useful for post-disaster planning, complemented by post-disaster risk assessments conducted according to government standards “ Promoting “reformative” processes in reconstruction whenever possible, rather than just “restorative” ones 1. Background through unsafe construction practices, lack of risk-informed land-use planning, inadequate Disasters result from the interaction of hazard, response and recovery mechanisms, and much exposure, and vulnerability (see Box 9). Disaster more. risk management (DRM) is therefore concerned . ; ; Disasters make obvious the need to reduce risk with understanding the hazards to which people : ' M : . in recovery, so that avoidable calamities are not and infrastructure are exposed, and reducing ue 10 repeated. Often, however, the demand and need vulnerability to them.1°° . ., U . . . for risk reduction in reconstruction is faced with Every deadly earthquake is a reminder of ._ . | . | significant obstacles due to the complexity and how risk and disaster are created over time, : : constant urgency of post-disaster environments. 29 This report uses “disaster risk management” or DRM to This section describes some of the fundamental mean the systematic process to use strategies, policies, and components for risk reduction in the post- improved coping capacities to Llessen the adverse impacts of P P hazards and the possibility of disasters. It uses “disaster risk earthquake recovery and reconstruction, and reduction” or DRR to mean the practice of reducing disaster : risks through analysis and management of the causal factors of specifcally how these were addressed or could disasters. DRR in reconstruction entails raising awareness and have been addressed in Haïti following the 2010 changing construction and land use practices in the course of the reconstruction program. earthquake. [page 90] 66 / III C. The Housing Response BOX 9 Constituents and Terminology of Risk Risk arises from the interaction of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability. “Hazard” refers to the potential occurrence of an event that may have adverse impacts on vulnerable and exposed elements (people, infrastructure, the environment, etc.). It is described in terms of potential intensity, whose measurement unit depends on the type of hazard in question. “Exposure” describes the elements that are affected by the hazard due to their spatial and temporal overlap. For example, a large earthquake hazard poses no risk on a deserted island, since there are no elements exposed to it. “Vulnerability” describes the propensity for adverse effects from exposure to a particular hazard. Hazard, exposure, and vulnerability are the necessary contributors to disasters, and they serve as the starting point for disaster risk management. Source: Alanna Simpson, Rick Murnane, Keiko Saito, Emma Phillips, Robert Reid, and Anne Himmelfarb, 2014, Understanding Risk in an Evolving World, Washington DC: World Bank. Haïti currently ranks as one of the countries The SPGRD, led by the Director General of MICT, with the highest exposure to natural hazards, is composed of technical representatives of the according to the World Bank's Natural Disaster signatory Ministries of the NDRMP and of the Hotspots study.!° But this has always been true. Red Cross and is divided into two branches: Throughout its history, Haïti has experienced a disaster management branch consisting of significant losses due to multiple hazards the Emergency Operation Center; and a risk (Table 7), and these have affected its long-term management branch, composed of thematic and sectoral committees. development. ns : : The principal f SNGRD The Haïtian disaster risk management system € due pire nt hurri is headed by the National Risk and Disaster prepare ee ‘ one bu SNCRD tmcane response. Significant efforts in Management Committee (CNGRD), which is Led P É y by Prime Minister (with leadership delegated the years prior to the earthquake had led to y "me . INIST UM sa STSnIP ce sBete a notable reduction in mortality linked with to the Minister of the Interior and Territorial : . hurricane and flood events. Collectivities (MICT)) and composed of the signatory Ministers of the National Disaster Risk The DPC, established in 1997, is the institution Management Plan (NDRMP) and the President of most involved in the implementation of the the Haitian Red Cross. NDRMP, yet does not have the legal mandate or : : technical capacity to design national or sectoral At 2 more operational level, the Directorate DRR strategies, nor does it posess the ability to of Civil Protection (DPC) and the Permanent motivate the design and implementation of sector- Secretariat of Risk and Disaster Management level strategies by key line ministries. Further, (SPGRD) work to implement the NDRMP. SNGRD lacked the legal backing, and the financial a — and administrative autonomy, to effectively fulfill #1 World Bank, 2005, “Natural Disaster Hotspots: À Global Risk . . . Analysis,” http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7376. its interministerial coordination role. [page 91] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 67 Table 7. Types and Impacts of Natural Disasters in Haïti since the Eighteenth Century Hydro-meteorological 97 69. 19,262 7.5 5,363,876 45.6 Drought 20 14.3 - _ 2,668,000 22.7 Seismic 13 9.3 235,952 92.2 3,721,730 31.6 Landslides/Debris Flows 10 71 635 0.3 10,509 0.1 Total 140 100.0 255,849 100.0 11,764,115 100.0 Source: World Bank Disaster Risk Management in Haïti - Country Note Report, 2010. Certain time periods are missing. 2. Issues Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), municipal governments, or various presidential a. Responsibility for policy making on DRR committees. This left development partners, in recovery was not clearly assigned implementing agencies, the general population, and government itself unsure who should Government agencies are expected to carry be providing guidance on DRM policy. In the out a number of key roles to promote DRR in absence of government direction, numerous reconstruction immediately following a disaster. (often competing) quasi-policies were These roles include: established by various agencies. " Managing the damage and safety assessment The Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and of public and private buildings Communications (MTPTC) became the de facto " Clarifying the existing legal framework, or lead agency for many reconstruction activities developing an interim emergency framework and DRR, as it carried out the building safety for DRR (habitability) assessment and debris clearance, = Quickly developing policy and standards and worked to fulfill its responsibility for public for DRR and safe reconstruction, including infrastructure reconstruction. With financial and minimum standards for site-risk assessment technical support from several development and for repair, reconstruction, and retrofitting partners, MTPTC implemented programs that of buildings created standard practices and de facto policies. : . . However, in spite of its authority to set building # Ensuring compliance and self-compliance : with safe reconstruction standards, including codes and standards, it lacked a clear mandate k É 7. . to coordinate these aspects of recovery and continuous widespread communication with : Le de : . reconstruction, or to lead policy discussions the public on them within government, which would have " Setting DRR policy that takes into required coordination and support at the cabinet consideration the multiple priorities and risks level. faced by households In carrying out its responsibility for The Haitian government had mixed success reconstruction of public infrastructure, MTPTC in fulfilling these DRR roles. Problems began was also well positioned to coordinate with when no agency was empowered or appointed municipal governments on reconstruction and to lead these efforts. There was significant DRM. Some attempts were made by MTPTC to confusion over where the responsibility for strengthen the capacity of municipal government these activities fell in government, whether to promote safe reconstruction, but these were to ministries, interministerial entities, the not very successful, due in part to the complex [page 92] 68 / III C. The Housing Response relationship between ministries and municipal the staff of a hospital that had suffered only governments. cosmetic damage before the staff would return to work.) b. New vulnerabilities were created in addressing emergency needs Numerous international missions arrived to conduct early damage and safety assessments. Following the earthquake, the affected In spite of the high level of technical expertise, population was in a heightened state of these initiatives used different assessment vulnerability. The humanitarian response was methodologies, and those conducting them remarkably effective in terms of speed and lacked authority for tagging and often assessed coverage, but agencies often acted without the same buildings. In response, in March proper consideration for long-term impact on 2010, MTPTC launched the “building safety risk and vulnerability. For example, numerous assessment” (sometimes referred to as the sites selected by agencies for camps were “habitability assessment”), a program to assess exposed to high levels of hazard, specifically to all buildings in the affected area carried out flooding and landslides. with funding from the World Bank, the Global The scarcity of safe sites for camps was Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery an argument in favor of the “back to (GFDRR), and the US. Agency for International neighborhoods” approach to response and Development (USAID) Office of US. Foreign reconstruction. Alternatively, rapid hazard Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and technical assessments could have been conducted by assistance from the World Bank, the United qualified personnel to assess potential camp Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and sites. Humanitarian organizations interviewed a private engineering firm. generally lacked the technical capacity for such The main objectives of the MTPTC assessment assessments. process were to: (i) protect human life by un . informing users of the potential dangers c. Building safety assessments had wide- . sde SRE ranging and unanticipated benefits of occupying a building (5) TINImIze L homelessness and loss of economic activity One of the most important drivers of risk in the by quickly identifying buildings that were months following the earthquake was damaged safe to occupy and use; (iii) identify causes buildings, which could experience further of building damage, which would become damage or even collapse in an aftershock or input for the reconstruction and rehabilitation under severe weather conditions. This concern standards and associated guidance, training, was on the minds of many Haitians after two and outreach; and (iv) provide initial data to school buildings collapsed in 2008, one in authorities for such uses as recovery planning, Pétionville and one in Canapé Vert, killing more estimating funding needs, and allocating than 90 children. available resources. Atthe same time, buildings providing critical The Bureau Technique d'Evaluation des services—hospitals, police stations, municipal Bâtiments (Building Assessment Technical buildings, and government offices—needed to be Office) was established within MTPTC to reopened, but traumatized people were nervous ————— . . 11 These included the EERI/Pacific Earthquake Engineering about entering them. (An early reconnaissance Research Center reconnaissance mission of January 2010, the team led by the Earthquake Engineering program and the ARUP carthquae response team among Research Institute [EERI] had to reassure others. [page 93] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 69 manage the assessment process. More than data would be applied been understood 300 evaluators were trained in the assessment in advance, the assessment could have methodology and organized into teams. Surveys been designed to better meet the needs of were conducted with electronic hand-held reconstruction planners. devices equipped with global positioning system “ Agencies and individuals did not understand (GPS) and sent daily to a central database the meaning of the red, yellow, and green managed by MTPTC. In the 15 months from tags. Repeated references were made to the March 2010 to June 2011, over 400,000 green-tagged buildings as “safe,” yellow- buildings were assessed and tagged red, yellow, tagged buildings as “in need of repair,” and or green, according to their level of safety as red-tagged buildings as “to be demolished." affected by the earthquake.!?An assessment-on- In fact, the tag was meant to convey only the demand function was set up for buildings missed reduction in safety due to the earthquake in the initial assessment process. Some critical and was not a judgment about the building's conclusions from this program are summarized reparability or its capability of withstanding below. future events. Greater effort should have been m The assessment was the first large-scale, invested in communicating the meaning of the visible government program that followed the tags to agencies and the general population. disaster. In an otherwise skeptical Haïtian m The assessment teams might have provided population, the process was considered or collected other information needed for authoritative and objective. The leadership recovery. Given the logistical complexity of of government engineers helped reinforce the sending assessment teams to the affected legitimacy of the process. Some important area, it might have been advisable to combine lessons were learned from conducting the the safety assessment with, for instance, assessment process. household enumeration, a reparability " Anexisting international assessment assessment, a debris assessment, or a basic methodology (ATC-20) could be successfully site hazard assessment. Teams might also adapted to Haïti.* The adaptation was done have distributed information on the tagging to reflect Haitian construction types and or on other safety matters. While additional materials and the most common damage data collection would have required more typologies. Using a standard international funding, it could have increased the quality methodology enabled staff to be trained of data collected (since these additional data quickly with existing material and increased were eventually collected, sometimes in an the technical legitimacy of the process. ad hoc manner) and the efficiency of recovery = It was assumed that other assessments planning. would follow this rapid assessment, but = The program demonstrates that high-quality that did not occur. As a result, the data from assessments can be conducted even where this assessment became the main source of existing technical capacity is weak. While information for a range of recovery planning all evaluators possessed some form of activities. Had the uses to which these engineering background, none had received 12 The safety assessment labeled all buildings as either “green” any training in earthquake engineering and (building may be safely occupied), “yellow” (no entry to few possessed structural engineering training. a portion of the building or some restriction on the use or Le . occupancy of the whole building), or “red” (unsafe to occupy Even so, training and quality control ensured Post-Earthquake Safety Evaluation of Buildings.” process. [page 94] 70 / II C. The Housing Response d. Building codes and standards were not were published in January 2011. They were well disseminated based on construction guidelines prepared Les Le by organizations with experience with Responsibility for building codes were shared y oTe | p : by MTPTC and the Ministry of Interior and Local earthquake-resistant construction based on Government (MICT). In the year before the confined masonry principles. Confined masonry Fe is prevalent in Haïti, although it is often not earthquake, the two ministries had started to p | ted É develop a national building code, with funding Propery executec. from the World Bank. Guidelines for the retrofitting of small masonry To provide some guidance for reconstruction, buildings were also developed by MTPTC and MTPTC issued a press release on February issued in 2012. These guidelines were aimed 9, 2010, in which it approved the use of the at improving the resilience of buildings and United States building code, EuroCode, and the addressed the vulnerability of buildings to earth- Canadian construction code for any building quake and hurricane hazards. The construction reconstruction activity.# MTPTC required that and retrofitting guidelines, along with the repair plans for any construction that fell outside these guidelines discussed below, were well designed, codes be sent to MTPTC for technical review. with extensive drawings and text in Haïtian This information was not widely publicized and Creole. They were made available on MTPTCS most organizations did not make use of these website, but were not distributed to the public. options. e. Efforts to promote risk reduction in One obstacle to the use of the international shelter and housing were numerous and building codes was that they required Haïti- successful, mostly in isolation specific input related to earthquake and À number of actions were taken to promote hurricane hazards. The World Bank funded a : Le P . . . . . the physical resilience of shelters, housing, project to produce an interim document with the . icite hazard ; . binati and infrastructure. In the case of shelters and requisite hazard maps, to use in combination . | h with the approved building design codes. nie ie actons tente » be proue . . oriented,” i.e., focused on how to make an These rules were not published until February l k 2011. À more important obstacle in the case already-chosen solution more resistant. The 1. Le : more fundamental questions about what was of housing was that the building codes did not « Lie q un . cover construction of small masonry buildings acceptable risk” in Haïti, what risks the affected like most housing in Haiti ' population itself was concerned about, and ‘ what options existed to reduce these risks to MTPTC concluded that most reconstruction acceptable levels rarely took place, and they could not be expected to follow code-based guided reconstruction policy even less. design processes. In the context of the national . . building code project, MTPTC undertook the Transitional sheltering and DRR. In the weeks development of “construction guidelines” for following the earthquake, the primary concern small residential buildings, aimed at local of shelter agencies was to secure the population masons and contractors. The guidelines against the impending hurricane season. In that context, transitional shelter was proposed as the 4 Le Nouvelliste, 2010, “Les normes de construction en vigueur en Haïti,” http://lenouvelliste.com/lenouvelliste/ 26 MTPTC, 2011, Guide de Bonnes Pratiques pour la Construction article/80387/Les-normes-de-construction-en-vigueur-en- de Petits Bâtiments en Maçonnerie Chaînée en Haïti. Guides for Haiti repair (2010) and retrofitting (2012) were also prepared: Guide #5 MTPTC, 2011, “Règles de calcul intérimaires pour les Pratique de Réparation de Petits Bâtiments en Haïti and Guide de bâtiments en Haïti.” Renforcement Parasismique et Paracyclonique des Bâtiments. [page 95] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 71 best approach. But while transitional sheltering guidelines in May 2010, and issued them in is more a philosophy than a physical solution, November 2010. The repairs described in these the working group began immediately to focus guidelines would bring the building back to the on developing a T-shelter design."7 previous state, but did little if anything to improve 0 . h ticipated : ti resilience. À concern arose that beneficiaries of NE engineer wno participa scin meenngs repairs did not understand that the vulnerability where T-shelter was discussed observed that LL thert itional shelteri Hi desi of buildings as a whole had not been reduced. In ouner ar ru “ ! ETIng N Let ne addition, the work recommended in the repair 2SSumpuons, ane risk Were no care y . guidelines was complex and required engineering analyzed. À representative of one international supervision, which was infeasible for most 28ency revealed nan interview that the households. The guidelines were made available decision to build T-shelters to withstand three on the MTPTC website and distributed by some Level 3 hurricanes was made by him alone. recovery partners, but were not widely distributed Another consideration in developing the to the public. T-shelter design was indignation on the part of Material supply and DRR. Much of the damage government representatives that Haitians might to residential buildings in Haïti, especially those be sheltered in structures with walls formed of built by low-income households, was due to plastic tarps."* Eventually, the Tshelter design the use of poor-quality materials. Construction funded and built by most international donors materials were produced mostly by small-scale and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) was local businesses who responded to market a well-anchored, slightly raised plywood house demand for lower-cost construction inputs. D of at least 32 m° with a corrugated metal roof. Concrete blocks, for instance, display quality The cost exceeded $4,000 per unit. and strength very far below common design Repairs and DRR. The need to repair damaged standards. housing was recognized early on, but it took some In February 2010, MTPTC banned the use of time before support and funding was mobilized. white limestone powder as an aggregate for Repairs Were perceived to be complicated and concrete frame elements. Previously, the use of risky, ownership of buildings was sometimes smooth river rocks as aggregate was banned, difficult to verify, and expertise in carrying out but the ban was not enforced. The limestone ban repairs was limited. also did not extend to concrete masonry blocks. Some partners were concerned about liabilities Large limestone powder quarries around the city from making repairs and hoped for government- were closed, but because this ban was also not issued guidelines for repairs that would give enforced, the quarries soon reopened. them some protection. Until guidelines were Several offers of assistance were received by issued, the contracting of private engineering the government to improve national materials firms by some donors helped establish interim standards and enforcement, and several small technical standards for repairs and cost initiatives were launched. But in the first two benchmarks. years after the earthquake, no significant MTPTC initiated the preparation of housing repair national-level effort was under way to improve the regulation of the quality of building #7 Shelter Centre and UN Office for the Coordination of materials. Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2008, Transitional Settlement and Reconstruction after Natural Disasters. Several organizations including the Swiss 8 This is common practice internationally, as is using walls of . . woven grass mats and other local materials. Agency for Development and Cooperation, the [page 96] 72 | IC. The Housing Response SURVEY QUESTION Figure 16. How clear were government’s goals and standards for DRR 30 and “building back better”? em 25 E LA 7 20 © ee œ 15 5 8 10 E = Z 5 (o] Government DRR goals DRR standards to apply Process for review in projects of DRR approach m Very clear M Relatively clear B Unclear m Not applicable/ don't know International Labor Organization (ILO), Build safe construction methods. This method puts the Change, Architects for Humanity, and UN- onus for safety compliance on the homeowner, Habitat, collaborated with MTPTC on programs to but must include adequate technical assistance. train masons in safer building methods, which For a number of reasons, some of which are generally included instruction on material quality. discussed elsewhere in this report, reconstruction In all, hundreds of masons were trained. If these was generally managed by agencies rather than masons convince their future customers to use homeowners, and only in isolated projects were higher-quality materials, this could potentially attempts made to adapt to Haïti what has been a affect change in local markets over time. very effective method elsewhere. Reconstruction and DRR. With respect to Building back better. The phrase “building new construction, little was built in the first back better” (BBB) was used widely in two years, except by individual households Haïti—in reference to policies, programs, and following the same building practices as before standards. It is mentioned repeatedly in the the earthquake. Agencies either consulted Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), in with MTPTC on a project-by-project basis or the IHRC Neighborhood Return and Housing designed projects following the standards that Reconstruction Framework (NRHRF) document, they deemed appropriate. In some cases, these and in countless donor and NGO strategies. standards may actually have exceeded what was . . It was apparent, however, that the phrase lacked necessary, which raised costs and reduced the . . . k . a common meaning for those using it, which coverage of their assistance. Le TT, . undermined its usefulness as a policy imperative. Past experiences with owner-driven This confusion is well reflected in the “Building reconstruction have demonstrated the Back Better Communities” Expo event that was effectiveness of paying homeowner reconstruction launched by the Clinton Foundation in the early subsidies progressively, conditioned on the use of months after the earthquake. The event consisted [page 97] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 73 of several activities, the most ambitious of which Mapping by MTPTC, and the PPR prepared for was a design competition for private builders of the Rehabilitation of 16 Neighborhoods and housing and manufacturers of building materials. Voluntary Return of Residents from 6 Camps This initiative promoted an interpretation of (16/6) Project neighborhoods by the firm BBB that it was about safe buildings as physical Ingénierie des Mouvements de Sols et des products to be delivered, rather than building Risques Naturels (see Box 10). À number of as a process involving material supply chains, challenges were confronted in trying to use this builders, site planning, and other activities. information to inform reconstruction. The thinking behind the Expo was that if new “ Spatial resolution. The information collected housing designs could be introduced that were . . Le . . | a was designed for strategic decision making individually more resistant to Haïtis hazards, . : , at the national level, to guide development then people’s risk would be reduced. nos . . and territorial planning policy, but was A more relevant interpretation of the BBB phrase inappropriate for decision making at a for Haiti would have been that increased safety neighborhood scale. was about changing practices and policies, not s . . . BE P P = Timing. The time required to acquire about structures per se, and that knowledge . . . . . . Le . information with the correct spatial resolution about risk reduction is a public good that needs . . : : : : . for neighborhood planning was often at to be widely disseminated. This understanding ; . . : . Loue odds with the urgency of the reconstruction motivated many of the risk reduction activities . . ! do eue . . process. The microzonation project now under described in this section, including the , . - | way, led by MTPTC's National Laboratory with development of guides and standards, and the . . . . k . funding from the United Nations Development implementation of the Plan de Prevention des . : . | . Programme (UNDP), is an important program Risques (PPR) (Risk Prevention Plan). However, . . D | for land-use planning and policy making in the delays and shortages of resources for promoting os Se . . long term, but it will have limited impact on this approach to BBB reduced its impact, : highlightine the importance of focusing on risk the post-earthquake reconstruction process. 8 8 8 1P 8° À disaster can increase the demand for reduction as a social process and a public good Ne . . . . initiatives such as the microzonation project, rather than a private benefit. . but the results of such a project are rarely f. Site-related risks were assessed but not available for recovery from the same disaster. translated to policy “ Application. Hazard identification is just one Extreme site-related events were also to blame input needed for risk-informed reconstruction for destruction from the earthquake. In Port-au- policy. The information from the assessment Prince, the collapse of a single house could drive must be formulated so that it can support a cascading collapse of numerous others below it. decision making about specific risk mitigation Entire neighborhoods in Canapé Vert and Carrefour- options and can be used to address questions Feuilles were destroyed from slope failure.1° about acceptable levels of risk. This might include identifying scenarios and analyzing In an effort to inform the recovery and mitigation options, to understand their social reconstruction process, several initiatives were and economic implications to arrive at rules. launched to identify and map hazards. These Almost any risk could be mitigated in situ, i 120 j H i included NATHAT and 2,°° Seismic Zonation but the costs were likely to be prohibitive. # Soil liquefaction was a Lesser issue for residential buildings, Relocating households from high-risk but caused significant damage to coastal infrastructure. 29 World Bank, 2012, “Analysis of Multiple Natural Hazards in Haiti (NATHAT).” [page 98] 74 BOX 10 Risk Assessment in the 16/6 Project in Port-au-Prince: From Risk Information to Risk-Informed Planning Findings Significant hazard and risk information and products were collected/developed in the aftermath of the earthquake, but there was a significant gap between risk information and risk- informed planning. Very few agencies and institutions had the capacity to use risk maps in an operational sense. The decision was made to use the 16/6 Project as a pilot to develop a PPR. Recommendations Professionals in various fields should work together: planners to develop risk-sensitive plans (at various scales), civil engineers to develop site mitigation plans, and risk scientists who can evaluate vulnerabilities and exposure. Risk products need to be operational, rather than scientific, exercises. They should be geared toward decision making and presented in language that is understandable to decision makers. The results should also be communicated to and discussed with the affected population. Pilot Project: Risk Reduction Plan for the 16/6 Project The unique aspect of the PPR is that it attempted to bridge the gap between risk informationa nd risk-informed planning. Its main objectives were to: “ Develop maps of constructible, non-constructible, and conditionally constructible zones “ Develop rules to mitigate risks for the associated zones To support risk-sensitive planning, three main steps were involved: # Risk mapping - based on assessments of hazards, exposure, and vulnerability “ Zone mapping - identify zones as non-constructible, constructible, or constructible conditional on specific mitigation measures “ Mitigation rules — develop prescriptive mitigation rules, in particular for the conditionally constructible zones. Table 8. Criteria for Mitigation Based on Zoning No protection or Protected by an Prevention mitigation measure and/ effective protection/ Hazards measures Non-urbanized spaces | or ineffective mitigation mitigation measure Extreme Technically hazards (4) | impossible Major dt o Ve r hazards (3) y costly Generally Medium costly, requiring hazards (2) construction works (for the collective level) Buildable under . Moderate costs, conditions that BuEbE ass Buildable under requiring small : conditions that Le Low : prevention measures ar : conditions of construction . individual prevention : hazards (1) are considered, maintenance of works (at : measures are : Lo unbuildable when : protection works individual Level) : considered there is human danger Sources: PPR, Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics (UCLBP), UNDP. September 2012. [page 99] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake /75 zones would have serious social impacts. ravines) so that they can reduce their economic Without a risk mitigation policy, the hazard risk by being closer to employment in the city. information did little to provide the rules for . . . . . Governments get involved in managing disaster reconstruction. : : risk because they know about risks that No guidance was provided by the government individuals might not, because decisions of on site-related risk mitigation. To stimulate one individual or household can affect another, discussion of the issue, workshops and training and because bad decisions by individuals or sessions were held by various institutions (Comité households can create contingent liabilities for Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire government (such as the need to pay for post- [CIAT], MICT, Secrétariat Permanent de Gestion disaster housing reconstruction). Government des Risques et des Désastres [SPGRD] [Permanent interventions can reduce risk directly, or Secretariat for Disaster Risk Management], IHRC, government sanctions and incentives can change the World Bank, and others). These efforts served people’s tradeoffs among risks and ultimately mostly to reinforce the need for policy making. their behavior. By failing to manage most risks In the absence of rules and other guidance, associated with residential land use and building implementing agencies made decisions at the construction, the Haïtian government has left project level using their own criteria. Agencies management of these risks almost completely up sometimes relied on community-based risk to individuals. The result was seen in the impact assessment and mapping. of the earthquake. Community-based risk assessment provides In sites where agencies intervened with a structure for community members to reconstruction projects, they imposed their evaluate hazards and vulnerabilities, judge own risk management regimes. But most of the community’s capacity, and develop plans those affected did not benefit from any agency for mitigation. These assessments are seen to support. The only ways they would have both inform communities and empower them built more safely were if they had received to make decisions to reduce their own risk. supervision and conditional financing or if they However, because the identification of risks can had self-complied to standards. often be highly technical, communities may not ny . y A recent study on self-recovery processes always understand the risks that they face. In . ns . k . in Haïti found that most households who preparing for some projects, for example Habitat : ce u . . reconstructed on their own expressed a for Humanity’s Simon Pelé project, community LU : : . . k . willingness to pay more to hire trained masons risk assessment was combined with a formal risk : : Le Di and obtain better quality materials./?! However, assessment. : : Lo: : information and training for the general public g._ Enforcement was weak on how to do this was largely absent. In the and self-enforcement ignored Haïtian context, where government capacity to enforce standards is weak, and no universal Households constantly make tradeoffs among large-scale intervention was planned, promoting risks that they are aware of. Many households self-compliance to such standards should opted to occupy red-tagged buildings, for have been one of the main objectives of the example, rather than be exposed to security reconstruction process. risks in internally displaced person (IDP) camps. In a country where access to both land and employment is difficult, households in Haïti live 4 Konotchick, 201, “Reconstructing Risk Hitan Sel on high-risk urban sites (on steep slopes and in Recovery,” USAID/OFDA and Interaction. [page 100] 76 / III C. The Housing Response Communications were needed to promote building codes, training, etc. was welcomed awareness of and compliance with resilient by government agencies and helped build reconstruction practices. Messages about how technical capacity, but government’s enabling to recognize improperly tied steel reinforcing and regulatory roles were rarely strengthened by bars or check the quality of concrete blocks these efforts. When guidelines were completed, could very easily have been communicated at they were not well explained or widely a massive scale, potentially with significant disseminated to the public, for example. impact. In situations where the government . . . . DRR policy was made at the project level. DRR is not prepared to communicate these types . . . . approaches and policies were left to agencies to of messages following future disasters, . _ . . define at the level of their project interventions. development partners should make this a . . . Le Lu . The policies applied, while often based on good priority before dedicating themselves to their . . . Lie Lu . international standards, were product driven, individual project interventions. . not holistic. They benefitted a small percentage ee of the affected population. 3. Findings Per . . . Standards were not explained, nor was self- The following are the principal findings ! | ? enforcement promoted. Given the unequal associated with DRR from the first two years of subies : ; the Haiti earthqual distribution of assistance, much more emphasis Een earmquare recovery. should have been put on communicating DRR Leadership to establish DRR as a priority in messages, regulating the quality of construction recovery was missing. Without a lead agency inputs, and promoting self-enforcement of for DRR, government policy on DRR in recovery safe building practices at the household level. was unclear and was not addressed, even within These communications could have started the government, in a systematic manner. One with those involved in the building safety result was that no agreement was ever reached assessments, since engineers were sent to every on what constituted “acceptable risk” in the neighborhood. Using conditional financing Haïtian reconstruction context. to incentivize safe construction practices, an international good practice, was barely used in The building safety assessment process was Haiti Bo0CP d successful, although the results were used ‘ in unanticipated ways. The building safety Post-disaster DRR policy needed to have assessments demonstrated that, with adequate been decided in advance. The post-disaster assistance, a high-quality assessment can be period is not the right time for DRR research or conducted even when technical experience policy making; it must be done before a disaster is limited. While the focus was on speed and strikes. In addition, responsibility for DRR must consistency, greater attention might have been be clearly assigned. While the disaster motivated paid to communications and the collection of donors to provide more support to the SNGRD, additional information, given the multiple uses recovery policy was not within its mandate. Haïti for which the data were later used. has established a number of good DRR practices from the earthquake recovery, but most have yet Assistance to the government did not strengthen : 1 . y . : Y . . to be codified in national policies or regulations. its regulation of DRR. The government carried out work on critical DRR issues with The earthquake created a consciousness external assistance, but what resulted was of the need for reform. While significant rarely disseminated as guidance or rules. work on DRM had taken place in Haïti before Technical support on reconstruction guidelines, the earthquake, the urgency of additional [page 101] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 77 institutional strengthening became clear to Carry out large-scale, continuous everyone afterward. Areas to strengthen include, communication to educate the public on best among others: (i) the capacity of SPGRD and practices for more resilient reconstruction. local governments in risk reduction and recovery do (in addition to disaster response), (ii) the Repeated, large-scale communication is critical engagement of civil society and the scientific to inform the public about risks, explain the community in DRR policy, (iii) the norms and importance of construction codes and standards, capacity for risk-informed urban planning, (iv) and promote training opportunities. architectural and construction sector capacity Where enforcement of construction codes for safe building, and (v) enforcement of building is weak, communications should be used to codes and construction supervision. encourage households to comply voluntarily with safe construction standards. 4. Recommendations Le ” Set policies for DRR and resilient The following recommendations are based on the reconstruction taking into consideration benchmarks proposed at the beginning of this how people perceive risks and how their section for successful DRR in reconstruction. vulnerability changes over time. Designate a lead agency for DRR early so it Reconstruction policies and programs should can establish and communicate standards recognize the various risks that households for DRR and coordinate their utilization in are exposed to (including economic risks and recovery. security risks). Policies will be more realistic if . see th flect derstanding of th isks and The agency may be one of the line ministries, SJ Elec an UNcerstancIng Of MESE 1S<S an : : the tradeoffs that households and communities and its role may be temporary, but in any case . . : Lu : are making. Because not all risk tradeoffs affect it should be empowered politically, financially, | . . . just the household, the government should use its and technically to play its role. The lead agency te Loue : resources to reduce public liabilities and to create should coordinate but not usurp the role of . . . . us sue : . incentives to reduce its contingent liabilities. ministries and other agencies to promote DRR in their respective sector. Reconstruction should capitalize on the ; short-term awareness of risk to permanentl The standards should cover both site and : : P y di shift the culture of risk. building risk and should be based on an open and realistic discussion of what level of risk is Post-disaster contexts provide a short acceptable. Appropriate standards will balance window of opportunity to permanently shift such factors as risk level, costs, timeliness, and the awareness and culture of risk. A critical familiarity, among others. first step is to understand the processes that The lack of standards early on should not are interconnected to extreme vulnerability paralyze reconstruction planning or discourage and therefore disaster. Universities and civil self-recovery. Standards may need to be defined society organizations can help promote these incrementally as an understanding of the damage discussions. Large-scale communication about and its causes grows. risks, safe construction practices, and disaster preparedness is effective and necessary. [page 102] 78 / IL. Analysis of the Shelter and Housing Effort Agencies should recognize that promoting Formal technical risk assessments should safe housing does not necessarily mean be complemented by site-level assessments, building safe homes, but rather removing including community-led assessments. Involving the barriers to safe construction practices. the community in assessments also serves to improve its understanding of risks. Common obstacles to safe construction that the government can address include lack of Whenever possible, reconstruction should information on risks, lack of knowledge of safe promote “reformative” processes rather construction methods by those involved in than just “restorative” ones. self-recovery, lack of effective market suppl . . . y . . PPYy Addressing the root causes of vulnerability chains for safe materials, the need to improve . . . (rather than the symptoms, such as construction construction sector methods, and the limited . : Lt ns . quality) may require reform of institutions, availability of safe sites. : legal frameworks, land-use policy, markets, Governments and their development partners supply chains, and regulatory tools. While these often don’t have to provide the solution long-term changes cannot be fully addressed (building the safe house), but should look during recovery, a commitment to “reformative for opportunities to reduce risk by providing reconstruction” should be promoted. incentives (such as conditional subsidies) or by . Le . . It is legitimate to use some recovery funding enabling households or contractors (through Le L. . . for reform that supports long-term resilience. training or ensuring access to safer materials). . : : : This requires engaging the private sector, Develop risk information in advance of civil society, educational institutions, and disasters and complement it by post- public stakeholders in the policy debate and disaster assessments conducted according implementation of reforms. to proper guidelines. There is no time after a disaster to gather the high-quality, low-scale hazard and exposure information needed for recovery planning. It should be gathered and analyzed before a disaster. [page 103] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 79 PE D. Land and Urban Development Issues GOOD PRACTICE IN URBAN CONTEXTS IS STILL EMERGING. BASED ON THE HAITI EXPERIENCE, IT SHOULD INCLUDE: “ Adopting an urban strategy based on timely analysis of urban institutions, conditions, communication tools, and development trends “ Intervening in ways that revitalize the urban economy and reactivate Land and housing markets, since these are key drivers of recovery “ Developing urban plans and regulations required for reconstruction, including neighborhood plans, when needed, using approaches agreed to with local officials “ Strengthening urban institutions and supporting household coping and self-recovery “ Minimizing displacement by prioritizing early expenditures that facilitate neighborhood return, such as rubble removal, risk reduction, and the reinstatement of basic services “ Encouraging strategic thinking while being cautious about trying to address long-standing urban deficits, particularly if doing so will cause extended displacement “ Understanding that informal property markets and incremental construction are rational adaptations to conditions that are unlikely to be changed during reconstruction; focus on improving, not eliminating, these practices 1. Background or that has national or regional development : : implications. Municipalities have planning The earthquake affected the mayor metropolitan responsibility in their territories, as long as center of Haïti, Port-au-Prince, and the adjacent their plans are consistent with the national towns in the urbanizing zone of Axe des ! frameworks. But capacity and resource Palmes, including Léogâne and Petit Goâve, Ltée note ut ’ limitations in cities make plans, where they 25 well 3s the secondary city of Jacmel on the exist, difficult to implement. In the Port-au- Caribbean coast and rural areas surrounding . : . : . ue . . Prince metropolitan region, as in capital cities all of these urban areas. This section focuses us ! . . around the world, political considerations, on land and urban development issues ne : . Fo | and the proximity of the national government, confronted in reconstruction in the metropolitan Le DE . . . limit municipalities’ autonomy with regard area of Port-au-Prince, but the findings and 12 IL: : : | to planning. While the metropolitan region recommendations are relevant to all affected Lucie à . . . encompasses seven municipalities, it does urban areas, both in Haïti and other disaster- . not have a metropolitan-level governance affected areas. : : mechanism of any kind. a. Responsibility for Urban Development Unlike in the housing sector, where no agency The central government is responsible for 22 Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) interview with urban policy and for planning that is strategic LOKAL, Fall 2010. [page 104] 80 / III D. Land and Urban Development Issues was responsible for policy making before the At least 12 major plans were developed for Port- earthquake, there were several agencies with au-Prince between 1974 and 2010. These plans responsibility in specific aspects of urban and were led by various ministries, generally MPCE regional development.!# Responsible agencies or MTPTC, often with the support of outside included: the Ministry of Planning and External agencies, such as the United Nations (UN) orthe Cooperation (MPCE); the Ministry of Public Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Future Works, Transport, and Communications (MTPTC); development directions and key projects were the Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du identified in these plans, and a near-consensus Territoire (CIAT) (Interministerial Committee for existed among planners regarding certain Territorial Planning); the Ministry of Interior and objectives (such as the need make the downtown Local Governments (MICT), and municipalities.12* waterfront publicly accessible). Even so, there Lun . was no legally approved Master Plan for the cit CIAT's mission is to define government policy for Ba y PP! . y . or any corresponding development regulations land, watershed management and protection, . . in force at the time of the earthquake.130 water management, sanitation, urban and regional planning, and infrastructure. Among Development plans had been prepared by its functions are to coordinate and harmonize some secondary cities, such as Jacmel, which government actions on these topics among the prepared a plan with assistance from the City ministries listed above, plus the Ministère de of Montreal. Urban plans were prepared by l'Economie and des Finances (MEF) (Ministry several secondary cities in the 19905, with of Economy and Finance); the Ministry of the support of UN-Habitat. The regulatory Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural instruments, institutional capacity, and funding Development; and the Ministry of Environment. to systematically implement and enforce . these plans was limited, nor was there always Many of the laws governing urban development P un | y . sufficient participation to ensure buy-in from lacked regulations or were poorly enforced.15 : ee : key stakeholders. The focus was on identifying These included the 1937 Decree-law on jorit ‘ects that imol ted . . riority projects that were implemented as Housing and Town Planning#; the 1971 Decree, Fodne Bcame available p Modifying 1937 Law‘; and the 1963 Subdivision 8 ‘ Law, which establishes the requirements b. Land Tenure System for the subdivision of land.?5 The 2006 : _. Decentralization Decree!? gives municipalities Haits land tenure system is still based on j 131 a role in urban planning, but the enforceability the French colonial system. A notary deed of this decree is questioned by some due toits registered m the Direction de la Conservation approval during an interim government. Foncière (Directorate of Land Conservation) of the Direction Générale des Impôts (DGI) (General Tax Office) in the MEF establishes 22 The government reported in 2009 that as many as 50 private property rights, based on a parcel survey public agencies had some responsibility related to urban development. conducted by a surveyor. 24 UN-Habitat, 2009, “Strategic Citywide Spatial Planning (full report)” p.28. At independence in 1804, all the territory was #5 This section is based on: Leah Mueller, Esq., 2011, Haitian Law « » as it Applies to Housing and Neighborhoods Reconstruction: À declared “state land, except land legally owned … Legal Summary, Port-au-Prince: IHRC by freed slaves. State land in the public domain 6 Decree-law of July 22, 1937, arts 22-33, Moniteur No. 63, Aug. : : : : 5, 1937. is managed by the Direction du Domaine of the 7 Decree March 23, 1971, art. 1, Moniteur No. 25, March 29, 1971. 28 Law of May 29, 1963, arts. 53-57, Moniteur No. 51, June 6, 1963. 9 UN-Habitat, 2009, “Strategic Citywide Spatial Planning.” Decree of Feb. 1, 2006, Moniteur Special No. 2, June 2, 2006, #1 Based on: IDB, 2012, “Haiti: Land Tenure Security Program in Chapter I-IL Rural Areas, HA-L1056,” Grant Proposal, pp. 2-3. [page 105] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 81 ? The Shel d h fter th hquake / 8 DGI. State lands in the private domain can be identifying the implications for reconstruction leased, sold, or granted to private persons. Since strategy. Entities involved in coordination independence, land transactions have included of recovery actors, such as the Logement- sales, grants, and leases of state land to private Quartiers (Housing-Neighborhoods) working owners; sales and gifts between private owners; group, pushed for agreement on such tactics and divisions due to inheritance. as neighborhood return, but did so without Untilthe middle of the 20th century, most reference to an urban reconstruction strategy . . : agreed to with the government. land sales and inheritances were registered and new owners received legal title. After that Behind the lack of a strategy were differences point, poverty, emigration, and urbanization in perspective between local officials, local all'increased. As plots became smaller and less experts, and international agencies. The thinking valuable, high transaction costs (up to 40 percent of international actors was more about “how to of the parcel value, according to one estimate), manage a crisis in a city.” Humanitarian actors absence of owners, and long processing times saw a crisis that could be responded to using all reduced the proportion of land transactions variations on standard site-specific, sector- that were registered. Over time, many forms of oriented humanitarian practices in shelter; water, property title documentation appeared:; in 2001, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH): protection: etc. it was estimated that more than 60 percent of all In addition, those without experience in Haiti parcels had no official registered title. had trouble distinguishing between the effects Other characteristics of the existing land system of the earthquake and conditions that existed include: (i) Less than 5 percent of the country is beforehand, and therefore had difficulty setting covered by a cadastre; (ii) survey techniques do limits on their work. not provide georeferencing of parcels; (iii) deeds For local authorities, the thinking was more are manually registered and transcribed into the about “how to manage the city in crisis,” that is, fiscal land registry and archived in chronological how to redevelop the city and its neighborhoods order, making the retrieval of records difficult; and in ways that addressed recovery, but also (iv) there is no reliable inventory of state land. addressed challenges that had existed long Allthese circumstances create overlapping before the crisis. boundaries, risks of competing claims over the . . . Local planners perceived recovery as an same parcel, and other conflicts. In addition, : “ » : . . opportunity to “start over”: redeveloping the system does not provide public access to os . . | | k downtown, reducing informal neighborhoods, information on land ownership or sales, which Lo . dds to market ineffciency reconstructing infrastructure, and addressing a 2 y range of long-developing urban deficits. In this I context, the exit of people from Port-au-Prince 2. Issues immediately after the earthquake was seen as : es something positive that gave some breathin a. There were different visions for urban BP 8 . 8 : room for redevelopment. The Action Plan for reconstruction . . National Recovery and Development of Haïti Recovery documents referenced the urban (APNRDH) stated that 100,000 inhabitants of context from the beginning, but without clearly Port-au-Prince should be transferred to more 2 appropriate sites. 2 [bid. In 2012, the government received a $27 million grant from IDB for a rural land reform project, to be executed by Recovery actors such asthe development CIAT, to pilot activities that could eventually lead to a strategy for modernizing certain aspects of the system. banks understood that the earthquake was a [page 106] 82 / III D. Land and Urban Development Issues unique opportunity to think strategically, but of government agencies, as well as a lack of also knew from experience that time was of consensus within the Haïtian government the essence. Before long, people would return regarding the mandates of ministries. À lead to the cities, pressure to show recovery results agency was needed for policy discussions and to would increase, and the flow of funding would ensure that key decisions on urban development decline. There was also concern about how long and land-related issues that would affect strategic planning activities would take, given reconstruction were made and communicated the dispersion of planning authority and other widely. institutional issues. Interpreting the existing urban and land- The debate over the recovery strategies in use legal frameworks and their relevance to informal neighborhoods in the Port-au-Prince reconstruction was particularly challenging, metropolitan area is a perfect reflection of these and became the focus of numerous government competing visions. Tensions arose over whether and donor initiatives. Immediately after the solutions such as the T-shelters promoted by earthquake, CIAT disseminated a document humanitarian agencies were a good short-term in which it pointed out the legal reforms that solution. They were viewed by local officials would be needed to facilitate reconstruction."3 as substandard and a problem that would International agencies sought interpretation of eventually have to be dealt with so that they laws from the government and local attorneys, did not create more slums. Yet donors knew and both national and local governments that the organized relocation of large numbers spent considerable effort responding to these of urban households was infeasible. They could requests. In 2010-2011, Interim Haiti Recovery not finance it and knew that most people would Commission (IHRC) Housing and Neighborhood choose to remain on their urban plots, near team lawyers identified and analyzed laws schools and livelihoods. relevant to housing and neighborhood reconstruction, and issued a report.f# The team Agencies had to choose which vision to pursue: also provided informal advice to agencies. helping government remake Haïti (refondation as the APNRDH put it), which meant addressing The Housing Land and Property Working the fundamental urban conditions that had Group (HLPWG) provided guidance on land led to the impact of the earthquake, or making issues. The group issued a glossary of legal practical short-term investments using available terms in November 2010 and updated it in funding. Rhetorically, agencies tended to September 2011.%° The HLPWG also developed a advocate for refondation, but, recognizing the coordinated response to forced evictions, based difficulty of accomplishing fundamental reforms on international agreements and the Haitian in practice, they simultaneously promoted legal framework, and trained camp management projects that could be brought to completion in officers and nongovernmental organizations a time span of one to two years with available (NGOs) on preventing evictions.®° funding. b. Guidance on urban reconstruction policies #3 Société d'Aménagement et de Développement, 2010, “Etat A ss. des lieux et Analyse des textes applicables en matière and legal issues was limited d'urbanisme, d'aménagement et de construction: Une évaluation critique,” CIAT. Agencies reported that they lacked clarity 3% Leah Mueller, Esq., 2011. regarding mandates for urban development 5 “Glossaire Foncier à l'usage des organisations travaillant dans le domaine de logement-foncier-propriété en Haïti - version and land use in reconstruction. This reflected du 15 Septembre." the impact of the earthquake on the capacity 5 HLPWG, 2011, “Procédures opérationnelles standardisées pour une réponse coordonnée aux expulsions forces. [page 107] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 83 Haïtian legal professionals and a group of As shown in the survey conducted for this study, agencies led by Habitat for Humanity Haïti the majority of international actors recognized (HFHH) and Architects for Humanity formed the that they needed different skills for an urban Haïti Property Law Working Group. The group disaster than for a rural one and that their analyzed laws and procedures related to land interventions required different designs than purchase, subdivision, titling, and registration, those in rural areas. Key challenges reported and in 2012 published a guide on property by the agencies almost all refer to the urban transactions in Haïti.®7 These external efforts context, including the complexity of high-density helped systematize available information and informal settlements; the urban governance identify practices, but more leadership on context; the preexisting urban vulnerabilities; land issues in recovery was needed from the the lack of clarity on land and property tenure government. issues; and the high level of urban poverty, . . precarious employment, and informal economic c. International agencies initially lacked activity (see Figure 17). urban expertise . : d. Efforts to involve municipal officials Humanitarian agencies initially mobilized started early, but were not systematic relatively few staff with urban experience, whether to inform their own programming or to The Directorate of Local Authorities in MICT was support government capacity with the response. charged with managing Haiti's decentralization The unique nature of the disaster and difficult process and strengthening the role of local living conditions made recruiting experts authorities. Local authorities were not only a challenge. Efforts to bring international used to managing cities in crises, they had government officials with experience in large- practices and skills that could be built on and scale disasters to consult with the government strengthened through technical support, thereby were generally unsuccessful. Team profiles building longer-term capacity. adjusted over time, when most agencies The first engagement of local authorities in mobilized more urban expertise in-house or planning the response to the earthquake took through partnerships. place in March 2010, during a meeting between À number of agencies had important local authorities and the teams developing the publications on urban recovery topics in the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), organized works that were published immediately before by UN-Habitat. PDNA sector teams laid out their or after the earthquake, but the information preliminary findings and recommendations, contained in these documents was not widely and local authorities presented their needs, known or easy to disseminate in Haiti.138 priorities, and proposed approaches. 7 Haiti Property Law Working Group, 2012, Haiti Land Local authorities also participated in the Transaction Manual, Vol. 1: A How-To Guide for the Legal Sale of International Conference of the Cities and Property in Haiti. The guide was partially funded by the Digicel : Las : Foundation, and the document is introduced by a letter from Regions of the World for Haiti, held in the Minister of Interior and Local Government. Martinique in March 2010. The conference #5 For example: ALNAP, 2009, “Lessons No. 5: Responding to : ce urban disasters: Learning from previous relief and recovery was intended to mobilize donors and local operations;” Abhas K. Jha et al., 2010, Safer Homes, Stronger authorities internationally to help strengthen Communities: À Handbook for Reconstructing after Natural . . Disasters; UN-Habitat and Global Land Tool Network, 2010, local governance in Haïti and to support local Count me in: Surveying for tenure security and urban land se : : management; International Federation of the Red Cross and authorities in their recovery work. Various Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 2010, “Owner- Driven Housing Reconstruction Guidelines;” UN-Habitat, 2010, Land and Standing Committee (IASC), 2008, Meeting Humanitarian Natural Disasters: Guidance for Practitioners; and Inter-Agency Challenges in Urban Areas. [page 108] 84 } II D. Land and Urban Development Issues SURVEY QUESTION Figure 17. For each type of intervention, which urban challenges did you find the most difficult? 18 16 14 » = £ 12 = © a 10 [2 œ 5 8 & € 6 = z 4 2 Q T-shelter provision Housing repair/ Housing construction Other intervention reconstruction mLackofland mHigh costs mLack of neighborhood plans m Informality of settlements m Density of settlements : Lack of responsible institutions initiatives resulted from the conference, of the Municipalities of the Palmes Region including technical cooperation between the (CMRP) and the Administrative and Technical municipalities of Montreal and Port-au-Prince, Directorate of the Intercommunity of Palmes establishment of a consortium of cooperation in (DATIP) to provide recovery leadership, and the Axe des Palmes region, and risk mapping in received technical assistance from the Canadian the East Department. Municipal Federation. Major towns other than Port-au-Prince planned Humanitarian agencies, the UN, and donors and managed recovery in processes largely supported local authorities, through planning detached from national-level initiatives. Jacmel of local recovery processes: locating cluster authorities combined their existing multisector coordination at the municipal level; and creating coordination group with the humanitarian Agences Techniques Locales and providing clusters, and partnered with government other program resources, under the Housing and agencies to conduct damage assessments Neighborhood Reconstruction Support Program on public and historic buildings. From this, (HNRSP) they drafted an earthquake recovery plan with sectoral strategies. Jacmel's Government However, the involvement of and support to Delegate also served as a focal point for mayors was not systematic. Mayoral elections reconstruction, liaising with other Local should have taken place along with the authorities, UN entities, civil society, and 2011 presidential election, but were instead international NGOs. The towns in the Palmes indefinitely postponed. The new administration region (Gressier, Léogâne, Grand-Goâve, and replaced elected mayors with appointed Petit-Goâve) worked through the Community “Interim Executive Agents,” which undermined [page 109] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / 85 democratic governance at a crucial time and urban development, a new vision of urban weakened the role of local authorities in the development and a stronger commitment to response to the earthquake."° Weak financial planning did result from the earthquake. management also made the transfer of resources tc ‘ty planni k k to the municipalities difficult. . ommunity p anning was an innovation for informal neighborhoods e. Many master plans were prepared, put Informal urban neighborhoods in Haïti are none helped short-term reconstruction similar to those in many fast-growing cities that Major disasters often give rise to new planning lack planning regulation. They often have no exercises, in the belief that the crisis will allow agreed boundaries or official names, nor are a previously lacking consensus on priorities to they identified on maps."° Many lack passable emerge and that new funding will be available se which du them du rom pare nel un to carry them out. The City of New Orleans am ?u ances, police patrols, an Barnage pc “UP. ! . Residents get access to services such as electricity was subject to numerous such exercises after . FT . . . through informal networks and construction is Hurricane Katrina, as was Port-au-Prince after ” Loue unregulated. Settlements are extremely dense, the earthquake. In Haïti, these activities were k . . and plots are small and irregular. To the extent often time-consuming and extremely ambitious ne . that there are controls, they are the community’s (see Figures 18-20). . Le own. Environmental conditions create a range Some planning exercises overlapped (various of hazards. Urban neighborhoods are diverse proposals for downtown Port-au-Prince were and stakeholders have competing interests. prepared, for instance), but most had a distinct Newcomers tend to be located in the most territorial focus. However, there were critical vulnerable sites and often belong to different disconnects between decision making on social networks than longer-term residents. priorities and the mandate and resources to Numerous community plans were prepared carry them out, and between planning and the in the context of reconstruction in an attempt direction of private investment. While downtown to address these conditions. Starting in 2010 Port-au-Prince was being replanned, most with pilot initiatives, by 2013, more than 30 reconstruction-related commercial investment local plans had been developed. While there was being made in Pétionville. No plan Was were no government-sanctioned guidelines for developed for the Canaan area, even while : . Le . community-level planning, there was significant thousands of households were settling there. : . . consultation among sponsoring agencies Descriptions of significant post-earthquake and government counterparts on how best to planning activities are shown in Appendix 1 to approach it, and a guide was prepared.? this section. 0 À participatory exercise to delineate neighborhoods was The sustainability of any planning process begun by the IHRC and completed under the supervision of the ce ne Centre National d'Information Geo-Spatiale (CNIGS) with the depends on the ability of Haitian stakeholders support of UN-Habitat. to reach consensus on the direction of #1 Widening and paving streets emerged as a priority in many community planning exercises, and doing so in the Ravine development and of the government to approve, Pintade neighborhood resulted in the first-ever garbage service regulate, and finance its implementation. While (see case study D). . LT . #2 UN-Habitat, 2011, “Initiatives de restructuration des quartiers institutional weaknesses remain, and were précaires: Reconstruire mieux et améliorer Le cadre de vie.” nr : : In all, 13 planning initiatives are discussed in this report, always the principal constraint on strategic some of which began before the earthquake, for instance, in Martissant, led by FOKAL. In mid-2013, UN-Habitat reported # Groupe U.R.D., 2013-15, “Evaluation du Programme d'appui à 32 neighborhoods where community planning and risk la reconstruction du logement et des quartiers en Haïti.” mapping had been carried out. [page 110] 86 / III D. Land and Urban Development Issues Figure 18. Downtown redevelopment as envisioned Community planning engaged local residents by Duany Plater-Zyberk and the Prince’s Foundation and other stakeholders in the preparation of for the Buïlt Environment diagnostics, plans, and project identification. Planning processes were often donor- < à financed and undertaken to identify project- LT LES 2È 2 specific investments to be financed by Rs. | ee CRE AT Rex 7 neighborhood upgrading projects, such as the >: RRÉES W9 AT bé, 16 Neighborhoods/6 Camps (16/6) Project , 4 FX 1 (Re SE y RE V2 or the Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing à M VOS CEE. sen pare Reconstruction Project (PREKAD). Processes & MN 7 were led by international or national NGOs, « 4 ri ét piece sometimes supported by local planners. $ FER LE Agencies generally aimed to develop stakeholder capacity not only to plan, but also Figure 19. Neighborhood rehabilitation as to engage in dialogue with local authorities envisioned by Caribbean architects regarding outcomes. Mayors were often —————_—_—_— involved in the planning exercises, as were ER ce CIAT and MTPTC'’s Urban Planning Service. For je: + ÉLASICS >\ TE example, when government implemented the 49 mancxe f : Le Le 16/6 Project beginning in early 2012, it adopted ee (È es HA 12 a participatory model by creating “community a 2 À Ex ET ï 1" k Li platforms” in each project neighborhood (see CRE == AD 22 \ LP the 16/6 Project case study). However, mayors 33 Æ RE LS 2 542 had little involvement in the PDNA or recovery so ÉTRE SA LR Æ È planning at the national level, and limited fx FRE, ar RE, ARE access to reconstruction funds to implement RE er \ these plans on their own." . . . The outputs of these community planning Figure 20. Port-au-Prince reconstruction as . . envisioned by Centre Haïtien de Recherche en activities—as well as the introduction of the Aménagement et an Développement (Haitian Center practice of community planning itself—could for Research in Planning and Development) and have positive, long-term repercussions for Groupe Trame community development and social cohesion TT in Haïti. The involvement of CIAT and MTPTC's Urban Planning Service, the establishment of — Agences Techniques Locales and Community à < | Resource Centers under the HNRSP, and the D . nr : D - creation of community platforms in the 16/6 ! SET Ne: Project were all attempts to institutionalize -| J P fs À ’ 5 | {| \ community planning within the larger urban | | e ; || planning system and to establish the role of = “ "M ) ; neighborhood stakeholders and local authorities ] j #3 GFDRR, 2014, “ Disaster Recovery Framework Case Study: d Haiti Disaster Recovery Framework: Recovery from a Mega Disaster.” [page 111] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 87 in community development and upgrading. with CIAT, the HLPWG organized a series of us . meetings between 2010 and 2012 to develo In addition to producing an unprecedented body 18 . P Lo sun . a participatory enumeration model that the of data and plans, these initiatives provided . . ses . . national government would authorize, but the an alternative vision of community leadership . so . effort produced no decisions. and engagement in informal neighborhoods. Community leaders played an important role Agencies proposing new settlement projects had during the Vil Nou Vle À (The City We Want) particular challenges. Some could not legally forum, for instance, where they presented their buy land. Others expected the government or views and concerns in relation to reconstruction municipalities to supply land for these purposes and the future of Port-au-Prince. The government free of charge and were dismayed at the delays and donors should continue to follow up on involved. Even those agencies willing and able these initiatives to capitalize on the experience to purchase land in the private market ran into gained. difficulties. Private owners set unrealistic prices or couldn’t prove ownership.° g. The land system was perceived as an obstacle to housing recovery The informal land tenure system was understood better by Haïitians who must operate within Physical space to manage displaced people is it than by international actors. Agency often a critical constraint in urban disasters. unfamiliarity with the system and risk aversion In Haïti, access to urban land became a major caused delays, as extended efforts were made to obstacle to agencies during reconstruction. resolve problems that Haitians may have been Large tracts of land were controlled by a few able to solve more efficiently on their own.l' A families, many plots within the urban footprint successful practice used in other post-disaster were vacant because of ownership disputes or reconstruction contexts has been to shift the absentee owners, and so-called “public” land risks associated with land tenure to beneficiaries was very limited and also often had unclear title. who—either individually or collectively—find Government systems for land registration and and negotiate the land for donor projects. The titling were affected by the earthquake, but in settlement of Canaan suggests that this might informal neighborhoods most residents didn't have worked in Haiti as well. #7 participate in the formal system in any case. Meanwhile, at least 30,000 households were Tenure arrangements instead were arrived at enumerated through various community projects. through customary practices. Agencies initially The enumeration data served various planning hesitated to locate shelters or provide housing purposes and were also seen as providing a assistance if the recipient could not prove minimum of tenure security to those enumerated, ownership of his or her property, but had trouble in spite of government's skepticism of and getting actionable advice from the government regarding tenancy issues. — most notably in Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean G d DE k | : [ tsunami. The process requires government involvement so overnment decision makers were skeptica that the enumerated parcels can be officially registered or of certain measures, such as community otherwise recognized. . 25 The US. Agency for International Development (USAID) enumeration, that have been used successfully worked for more than two years with a landowner to develop to clarify informal or disputed land rights in one new settlement project that was eventually abandoned . . . . when land issues could not be resolved. other post-disaster situations.f## In collaboration 36 Simon Levine, Sarah Bailey, and Béatrice Boyer, 2012. “Avoiding reality: Land, institutions and humanitarian action in post-earthquake Haïti.” #4 Participatory community enumeration exercises have been #7 See Groupe U.R.D., 2013, “How does one become the owner of used on a large scale to clarify tenure status after disasters, a plot of land in Canaan?” [page 112] 88 / III D. Land and Urban Development Issues unwillingness to sanction this approach.“ Where services not available in those neighborhoods, enumeration data were incorporated into a including water, sanitation, and health care. The land information system and local government camps quickly became part of the urban fabric: officials were involved, enumeration may have a distribution point for assistance and another strengthened the tenure security of those option in the “affordable” housing market.1# enumerated. Otherwise, enumeration may have publi . h k added another layer of informality to an already upic perception grewt at presence ma . camp was the principal criterion for future complex informal system. . L help (especially when only camp residents h. Urban camps established a dynamic that were registered or given identity badges), so was hard to reverse households were known to maintain a camp . : presence even after other options opened up. The spontaneous relocation of families to Camps also became a point of arrival for rural public sauares and other available private and migrants seeking livelihood opportunities public sites, which began immediately after the offered by the humanitarian response. Over time, earthquake on January 12 and grew during the especially as camp management and services period of aftershocks through January 27, was were withdrawn, or the camp population fell, quickly formalized into a Camp management conditions in many camps deteriorated, and risks approach. For residents of neighborhonds with associated with staying increased. extensive damage and poor access, it was a logical solution. As the Displacement Tracking Neither government nor humanitarian agencies Matrix (DTM) documented, most people stayed offered compensation to the owners of land in camps close to their original neighborhoods, where camps were established. Still, in allowing them to restore their livelihoods and solidarity, landlords generally allowed occupants maintain social relationships. Urban camps to stay. But the protracted displacement made became the symbol of the Haiti earthquake, these arrangements increasingly fragile, and by and their continued presence was the principal mid-2010 forced evictions began (sometimes indicator of the progress of recovery. carried out with support of the police). By Le. : May 2011, the Camp Coordination/Camp Good practice mn camp management is to Management (CCCM) Cluster estimated that of minimize the time people spend displaced, 634,000 people in camps, 133,000 were at since social networks and family life are risk of eviction and almost 59,000 people at disrupted and dependency increases. Even so, 93 sites had been evicted or “partially evicted.” the options offered by the urban context and the À compensation system might have reduced entrepreneurial capacity of landlords in Haiti these evictions and, in cases where risks were Were underestimaied for an extended period, manageable and service provision was feasible, and people languished in camps years after the might even have allowed more permanent earthquake, waiting for support they needed to settlements to develop.5° move out. . . Soon after the 2011 presidential elections, the The earthquake increased the large existing . . ‘ . | new government established a goal of closing housing deficit, and in the early months . : . . L camps in several important public spaces in the camps offered lower-cost accommodations in conditions sometimes no worse than those in F5 Journalists and others reported on the sublet market for both poor neighborhoods and provided free access to tents and T-shelters. See: Haiti Grassroots Watch, August 23, 2011, “Transition to What?” Part 2 of3. #9 À few donors eventually proposed projects to support #8 UN-Habitat and Global Land Tool Network, 2012, Handling land conversion of specific camps to permanent neighborhoods, - Innovative tools for land governance and secure tenure, p.109. such as the USAID POSITEC program [page 113] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 89 metropolitan area, including those in Place Boyer, mobilize significant amounts of cash at specific Place St. Pierre, and near the prime minister’s times of the year. Agencies supporting recovery office. This decision demonstrated the positive had to operate in this cash economy, without influence of government direction and good public always understanding it or the impact on it of relations, as agencies had official support to their interventions. facilitate the reinsertion of displaced households . . . . . . . Humanitarian agencies often provided goods in a manner that otherwise might have stirred . . . . in-kKind (non-food items, shelter materials, controversy. (This approach was successfully . . . or shelters), rather than cash, fearing that scaled up in the 16/6 Project and other agency Id mi the funds or (in the first . . . eople could misuse the funds or (in the firs interventions. See the 16/6 Project case study.) PEOP ., few months) believing that markets were not Government and agencies faced challenges functioning. Agencies were sometimes dismayed addressing and reversing the massive when recipients sold non-food items to get cash. displacement to urban camps. Funding But as a largely import-dependent economy, was lacking for priority actions to reduce markets in Haiti were functioning almost displacement (in particular, for rubble removal immediately; the main constraint was not goods and repairs) and resources such as landowners but disposable cash.5! with buildable space or landlords with available | . . . . : Outside funding had both positive and negative units were overlooked as part of the solution. . : : effects on the urban economy. Private health care Agencies may have reduced camp occupation . ‘ n b Lun . . providers complained that the provision of free y registering households in neighborhoods or. ! . : Los Li health services in camps negatively affected their earlier (not just in camps), avoiding survey . | . : : practices.!®? At the same time, agency demand for questions that created false impressions about . . | : . : : higher-quality concrete blocks created economies the housing solutions on offer, funding solutions ; : of scale that supported some production changes. that were more appropriate for the urban | : | . idiocs While the T-shelter “philosophy” is to use local context (repairs and rental subsidies instead : 7. . materials and local ways of building whenever of T-shelters, although a number of agencies db han half ofth | d realized this and reoriented their funding with POsSI e, more than half of t e estimatec $500 time), and better understanding the mobility of million spent on Tshelters was spent on imported the urban population (less emphasis on return to materials and agency costs that contributed little : : : to the local economy. previously occupied neighborhoods). Lu A int t fected the urb Job creation for low-income Haïitians was 1. Agency interventions affectec Ine urpan identified as a priority by all. Haïitians generally economy expressed a preference for jobs over handouts Rigorous analysis of economic impact is rare for of relief items. Agencies did their best to engage post-disaster interventions, but the practice may local firms and hire Local Labor, including need to be better utilized for urban disasters. In for debris removal, T-shelter construction, cities and towns, people rely on cash to acquire neighborhood upgrading, and other activities, food, transport, housing, and basic and social although selecting workers could itself create services. Household savings are very low and 22 h hold call | bl ki 51 See the reports on marketsfor beans, construction Labor, ousenolas are economically vulnerable, making corrugated galvanized iron, and rice, available at: EMMA, 2011, the shock of the earthquake hard to absorb. “Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis Toolkit.” . . . . #2 Rohini J. Haar, Sassan Naderi, John R. Acerra, Maxwell Mathias, The need for cash is also quite variable: Rent in and Kumar Alagappan, 2012, “The livelihoods of Haitian ti : : health-care providers after the January 2010 earthquake: Haïti is generally paid a year m advance, and to a pilot study of the economic and quality-of-life impact of pay for education (a high priority) families must emergency relief.” [page 114] 90 / Il D. Land and Urban Development Issues community conflicts. Numerous agencies trained 3. Findings people for in-demand jobs, such as masonry, : . . : Lo The following summarizes the principle findings and some supported the reactivation of small : ; | . : Lo norous of the report in connection with the management businesses. À few job-creation initiatives, such k . . . of land and urban development issues in the as paving block production from earthquake : : : post-earthquake recovery. debris, may have the potential to be sustainable beyond the recovery period. The urban nature of the earthquake had . k . wide-ranging effects on recovery. Weaknesses Creating sustainable private employment . . D. ‘ . in urban planning, land management, and is difficult in Haïti, due to a range of factors . : ! : . development regulation; difficulty of removing well beyond the mandate of international Les ‘ L k rubble; lack of space for emergency and agencies involved in housing and neighborhood transitional housing; and the economic recovery. # Cash-for-work provided income, but vulnerability of households were all issues didn't create sustainable jobs. Many government specific to the urban context that affected the works were implemented by larger firms, pace of recovery decision making and speed of including a number from outside the country implementation. who imported labor. Agencies and government used reconstruction to Experience in post-disaster housing repair and improve neighborhoods. Community planning in reconstruction shows that an owner-driven informal neighborhoods was never carried out reconstruction approach to housing repair and before the earthquake, but was carried out by reconstruction is the most flexible and cost- numerous agencies afterward. Early community effective, while contributing to the revitalization planning pilots served to help government develop of markets.!* With this model, affected a replicable community planning model in the 16/6 homeowners are provided cash or vouchers, Project. Agencies that were involved in community along with technical assistance to ensure safe planning coordinated well and established relatively construction. À 2010 pilot program of cash standard procedures. Many established successful subsidies and technical assistance by Haven coordination with municipalities. Lacking an Partnership in Cabaret was successful, but was institutional framework for these activities, not replicated by other agencies. The Logement- there is a risk that the capacities developed and Quartiers (Housing-Neighborhood) working data and outputs produced will be Lost. group, UN-Habitat, the International Federation of Participation of mayors and neighborhood the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), residents in recovery could be the basis for CARE, Build Change, and others encouraged building sustainable Local capacity. Resilience both the government and agencies to use this means having local systems capable of recovering approach, based on their successful experience from future shocks. À goal of recovery should with it in other countries, but without owner- be to strengthen these systems, including the driven reconstruction policies or standards, planning and management capacity of the people agencies generally opted for either agency-driven involved. Haïti has slowly built rural capacity or contractor-driven housing reconstruction. in certain aspects of disaster risk management (DRM), such as preparedness, but building capacities in the urban context is more complex. 43 World Bank, 2012, Doing Business 2013: Haiti - Smarter Efforts were made to engage local actors (mayors Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises : Comparing i i Business Regulations for Domestic Firms in 185 Economies. and neighborhood residences and groups), 5% Abhas K. Jha et al., 2010. including through community platforms and [page 115] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 91 Relocation to Secondary Cities In the wake of the earthquake, as many as 600,000 people reportedly left Port-au-Prince for secondary cities and rural areas. As early as February 9, 2010, it was proposed that the recovery program should include funds for secondary cities, in hopes of relieving the pressure on Port-au-Prince and rebalancing the national urban system. This reflected the thinking in the Strategic Plan for the Development of Haïti (SPDH), which identifies 20 cities with economic development potential and land for urban extensions. It was estimated that these cities could accommodate up to 200,000 people. The potential of building up secondary cities as a medium-term recovery strategy was limited, for several reasons, including: (i) most people intended to leave Port-au-Prince only temporarily, until normalcy was restored, believing that Port-au-Prince was still the place to find jobs and access services; (ii) even if people were willing to relocate, creating new urban settlements with livelihood opportunities would take longer than they could wait; (iii) humanitarian funding was tied to investments in earthquake-affected areas; and (iv) given the resource constraints, the opportunity cost of pursuing a secondary city approach (while ignoring pressing needs in the earthquake zone) would have been a hard sell politically. Predictably, most of the population that Left returned to Port-au-Prince within a few weeks, augmented by newcomers attracted by the possible access to aid and employment opportunities, and the population of the capital continued to grow. Nevertheless, the need to expand and revitalize secondary cities has gained attention as the result of the earthquake, and investment plans being developed by local governments, CIAT, MPCE, and others for these zones have gained momentum. The industrial park, housing, and tourism investments in the north are examples of this. Source: Authors’ research and interviews. committees. These were nascent efforts whose The nature of economic vulnerability and sustainability may depend on continued support. the cash economy, and their implications for The timelines for larger-scale planning recovery, were not well understood by many and urgent recovery were incompatible. recovery actors. Agencies were not equipped Government and external agencies agreed on the to handle such situations as families occupying strategic importance of recovery, but disagreed both housing and camps or the exploitation on the cost of delaying recovery to take time for that took place between those with and without urban planning. Whether the plans that were income or among gangs. In some cases, these prepared, such as those for downtown Port- challenges caused the abandonment of projects. au-Prince, will influence future development An in-depth assessment of the urban economy remains to be seen. What was missing in the first and its incentives might have been helpful for two years was a planning framework to increase donors designing urban interventions. the coherence of planning and interventions at Land-related challenges absorbed enormous the local level. resources and greatly affected outcomes. The Initially, urban economic realities and their weakness of land regulation in Haïti may have impact on recovery were not well understood. contributed more to the disaster than poverty. [page 116] 92 / II D. Land and Urban Development Issues Not surprisingly, the same conditions (especially In metropolitan areas and capital cities, informal ownership and lack of records) affected recovery will depend on effective relationships both the quality and the timeliness of housing- between levels of government. Understanding related interventions and wasted resources that how to optimize these relationships may require could have gone to recovery. Addressing this outside expertise. situation should be a national priority, and could Promote urban recovery approaches that be viewed as a DRM strategy. contribute to strategic urban development . objectives. 4. Recommendations k . Commit public and donor resources to strategic Encourage and incentivize urban problem urban development interventions that will solving rather than providing solutions. leverage private resources and facilitate future Because reconstruction will take many years, development, such as quality infrastructure urban recovery should aim to establish projects in low-risk target zones to encourage approaches and capacity in government and civil housing investment there. society so resilient development will continue Where strategic planning has not been done in the future. Projects should improve the before the disaster, governments should be resiliency of urban systems and take advantage somewhat cautious about launching new planning of their adaptability, not focus simply on processes. Governments should particularly the short-term replacement of lost assets or discourage outsiders from developing complex substituting for local capacity. recovery plans that have no financing and create Governments and agencies should try to play an expectations that local officials will have to enabling role, guiding and adding value to the manage. New plans are needed for greenfeld efforts of local actors. To support substantive sites and where damage is extensive. But not participation of local governments and local all disasters call for new plans; it may be more NGOs in recovery, they should provide technical important to strengthen the regulation of existing and financial support. plans and to provide frameworks that improve the coherence of reconstruction activities. The “learning by doing” approach that international agencies find acceptable in their The government should also discourage own projects should be encouraged in local donor projects that create luxury “islands of initiatives as well. excellence,” but lack replicability. Concentration of assistance in discrete areas reduces equity, Carefully analyze the urban context. coverage, and sustainability. In contrast, area- Urban experts should analyze how the physical, based interventions led by local authorities or social, economic, and institutional situation communities can have wide-ranging benefits, in the city will affect recovery. The analysis and should be encouraged. should cover housing, land, and financing Leverage the connectedness and systems, both formal and informal, and such adaptability of urban residents. topics as livelihoods and household finances, communications media, and the capacity of the In urban recovery, it's important to develop construction sector. The urban analysis should approaches that reflect the distinct dynamics also identify assets (systems, skills, institutions) of cities, where people have diverse coping that can be leveraged to make recovery mechanisms and ready access to information. widespread and systematic. At the same time, diversity—and the demands of [page 117] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 93 survival—create conflicts and discrimination that complex, mobile urban environment. If a project agencies may need to address. will be improved by consultation or participation, agencies should seek out local experts who can More urban recovery approaches are needed . ne de advise on communications and engagement that reward the adaptability and resourcefulness . . . ne strategies for different stakeholder groups. of the urban population. In Haïti, there were virtually no “demand-side” approaches that Avoid massive displacement and facilitate provided people with the resources to solve their neighborhood return. own problems, nor any programs that tested one : | approach against another. Recovery strategies People generally don tseek mayor changes in may need to be adjusted if unintended outcomes their housing situation after a disaster, but emerge, because word travels fast in cities, and expect to reenter the housing market that city dwellers respond quickly to any incentive. existed beforehand, which is what they are used to and can afford. The sooner they reenter the Preference should be given to housing market, the greater will be the market response strategies that encourage self-recovery, such to provide new housing. as transferring cash to urban households for : | shelter, repair, construction, hosting, and/ To reduce displacement, agencies should help or renting. Urban families can often mobilize reactivate the housing market and people’s matching resources, and should be encouraged reentry into it. For renters, agencies and to do so. Cash is preferred to in-kind solutions, government should consider providing resources since cash revitalizes local markets and leads to on both the “demand side” (rental subsidies) lower-cost solutions. and the “supply side” (landlord subsidies) with associated technical support. Informal property markets and construction practices are rational adaptations to existing Agencies should use social communications conditions. Recovery strategies should improve to clarify the rules of the game and dispel on these systems, not undermine or seek rumors about assistance. Assistance should be to formalize them when it is not feasible or delinked from presence in camps, by holding necessary, and could delay recovery. eligibility processes in public buildings or . former neighborhoods. Use the occasion of the Be aware of the complexity of the urban k disaster to expand the national identification political economy and how outside agencies system. affect it. To keep neighborhoods occupied and safe, Agencies should not shy away from participatory priority expenditures should be those that approaches in urban areas, but must have an facilitate neighborhood return and reoccupation, understanding of the political, economic, and such as rubble removal, risk reduction, basic social dynamics that may affect them. Agencies infrastructure, and repairs. At the same time, must also recognize that urban crises disrupt recognize that urban populations are mobile: political systems and create new conflicts of returning people to their original neighborhood interest and opportunities to gain power, which may not be necessary or advisable if it will external actors can inadvertently influence. impede recovery or if reconstruction should be While engagement contributes to transparency, directed elsewhere. accountability, and social cohesion, and builds urban governance capacity, methods used in rural areas may not be appropriate for the more [page 118] 94 / II D. Land and Urban Development Issues Appendix 1. Significant Post-Earthquake Planning Activities in Haïti Haïtian sponsor Urban Initiative Date presented (cost) Outside sponsor Haïti Demain : Objectifs et Stratégies Territoriales pour la Reconstruction d'Haïti March 2010 TT None (http://www.oas.org/en/ser/dia/docs/ HAITI DEMAIN.pdf) Haïti Demain was a set of proposals for orienting and organizing the reconstruction process. It defined practical approaches and identified key projects for regional development, roads, public facilities, watershed management, urban development, and access to land. Haïti Demain also proposed roles for CIAT in land management and development planning that could have positively affected reconstruction in the urban sector. These roles were either later assumed by other agencies or not assigned at all. Action Plan for National Recovery and Various donors assisted with Development of Haiti (APNRDH) Hein AGHE DRE perte le 59 (UND The APNRDH was based on the Strategic Plan for the Development of Haiti (SPDH) (see below) and was intended to serve as a guide to help national authorities and international partners identify emergency measures and key reconstruction projects. Various, including Miranda Foundation, Fundaciôn Workshop on the Reconstruction of Port- July 2010 None (cost Comunitaria de Puerto Rico, Au-Prince, Haïti y unknown) Colegio de Arquitectos y Arquitectos, and Fundaciôn por la Arquitectura The Coalition of Caribbean Urbanists documented the workshop on the reconstruction of Port-au-Prince, held by the coalition in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in July 2010. The report describes the planning challenges in Port-au-Prince in the form of contexts, development objectives, and institutional options, and proposes a Planning Implementation Framework that includes the creation of four regional Redevelopment Authorities. Port-au-Prince Master Plan (http://www. . Li . . Prime Minister’s , . princes-foundation.org/what-we-do/ The Prince’s Foundation for . ? den January 2011 Office/MPCE k . projects/ht/port-au-prince-haiti-disaster- the Built Environment . ($295,000) recovery-regeneration) Prepared by Duany Plater-Zyberk and the Prince’s Foundation for the Built Environment, this plan envisioned a government center around the presidential palace with civic and administrative buildings, museums, concert halls, schools, and green spaces. The plan envisioned maintaining the street grid and placing small parks on street corners, as well as rebuilding the waterfront and using rubble to improve drainage downtown to protect against future flooding. It also proposes that each residential block be designed to provide its own utilities and parking, with systems owned by a cooperative or condominium. Harvard Graduate School Exemplar community (http://issuu.com/ None (cost of Design, MIT School of sdmit/docs/ designingprocess) June 2011 unknown) Architecture and Planning, B Deutsche Bank, Clinton Foundation À team of designers and planners led by professors from the Harvard Graduate School of Design and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology School of Architecture and Planning were engaged by Deutsche Bank and the Clinton Foundation to develop a replicable 125-unit community for resettling internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Zoranje. In June 2011, the team presented its vision, which included a vocational training center and housing, to President Martelly and former President Clinton. At the time, the project did not advance beyond the planning stage. [page 119] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / 95 Haïtian sponsor Urban Initiative Date presented (cost) Outside sponsor Municipality of Port-au-Prince Redevelopment Plan August 2011 Port-au-Prince None (cost unknown) The result of 14 months of work by 40 Haïtian experts, engineers, architects, and planners led by Groupe Trame and the Centre Haïtien de Recherche en Aménagement et an Développement (Haitian Center for Research in Planning and Development), the plan proposed a “futuristic” fully rehabilitated Port-au-Prince, with trams, a zone for public buildings on the Champs de Mars, a financial district, a tourist and Leisure area, a redeveloped waterfront, and an artisans village. The estimated budget is $3.3 billion, over a period of 5 years. Vil Nou Vle A (The City We Want) (http://www.onuhabitat.org/index. November 2011 MPCE (cost UN-Habitat php?option=com_ docman&task=doc_ unknown) download&gid=846&ltemid=235) À forum organized for MPCE with support from UN-Habitat and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to gather stakeholder input on those aspects of the SPDH related to Port-au-Prince. Vil Nou Vle À was preceded by a process involving 600 Haïtians in defining visions for the future of Port-au-Prince at the neighborhood, municipal, and agglomeration levels. À brochure was published to summarize the results of the process and to provide inputs from municipalities, the private sector, community leaders, professionals, academics, and civil society to the planning being carried out by MPCE. Similar consultations were held for secondary cities affected by the earthquake and regional development centers identified in the APNRDH. a Version for public UE Plan for the Development of comment issued MPCE None May 2012 MPCE had begun preparation of the SPDH at the time of the earthquake, with the assistance of a private planning firm. It served as the background for the MPCE’s APNRDH as a guide to help national authorities and international partners identify emergency measures and key reconstruction projects beginning in April 2010. The SPDH is meant to guide national and international development partners in the planning and monitoring of future projects that will make Haïti an emerging country by 2030. The plan is not an urban plan, but urban investment projects that vary in scope from strategic to practical (such as the construction of community centers and bus stations) are proposed in each pillar. [page 120] [page 121] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 97 PE e e E. Recovery and Reconstruction Finance GOOD PRACTICE IN POST-DISASTER FINANCING INCLUDES: “ Establishing the means for coordination between donors and government when financial resources are being mobilized and programmed. “ Ensuring that donor programming is consistent with the recovery plan # Using public and donor funding strategically to leverage private financing, including that of households, and to incentivize good practices, such as safe reconstruction “ Announcing eligibility rules and levels of financial assistances as early as possible, and providing grievance redressal for those who believe that they have not been fairly treated “ Tracking reconstruction resources, programming, and progress centrally, and reporting results regularly to the publicTransferring financial resources for housing directly to eligible households or owners, ideally in tranches and on a conditional basis “ Avoiding unfamiliar construction practices, housing designs, and financing vehicles #“ Remembering that the most efficient use of public resources to facilitate housing recovery is probably something other than building housing 1. Background # Seeking funding commitments and mobilizing and monitoring external aid and other funding The objectives of recovery and reconstruction . . ; à # Programming funding according to agreed- financial management for government are Lou upon goals and priorities to mobilize funding and to ensure that the . . . . . # Implementing financial management and available funding is allocated to accomplish the nos k . monitoring of results best possible results. Funding is almost always a constraint on recovery, so establishing priorities The Haïti recovery began with the mobilization between sectors and among social groups is of more than 100 experts, both Haïtian and critical. Reconstruction policies help clarify international, to prepare the Post-Disaster Needs these priorities and tell financial managers how Assessment (PDNA), which was completed in to target and program funding to accomplish the March 2010. Based on PDNA estimates, as well greatest impact. as the goals established in the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti Post-disaster financial management comprises (APNRDH) and the results of other assessments, four principal activities, all of which need to extraordinary funding commitments were be integrated and coordinated—ideally by made to Haiti recovery at the donor pledging the government within the context of existing conference at the United Nations (UN) in New public financial management systems. These York in March 2010 and through other channels. activities are: . Damage to housing was the largest “ Identifying damage, losses, needs, and goals damage category in the PDNA, which is not [page 122] 98 / ILE. Recovery and Reconstruction Finance unusual. While most housing is private, the D Boxa reconstruction of housing (especially housing for the poor) is often considered an obligation . poor) . . . É Terminology of the PDNA of government following a disaster. This occurs especially where there is no insurance market PENEEE The replacement value of for residential property, and housing becomes physical assets wholly or partly destroyed, Loc : built to the same standards as prevailed a liability of the government, as is the recovery . k . : . prior to the disaster. of agriculture and small and medium-sized business." In fact, government budgeted very Losses: The change in economic flows little for housing recovery in Haïti, as discussed resulting from the temporary absence of below, but it was a major concern of donors. the damaged assets. ; : Needs: Takes into account the activities of For the housing sector, the financing process . . . . eu recovery, reconstruction, and setting up in Haïti faltered at both the mobilization and ga n . Within af hs of the Haitian state again. Programming Stages. ithin a ew mont 18 9 Source: Government of Haïti, 2010, “Haiti Earthquake the donor pledging conference, it was evident PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and that the institutional arrangements were not in sectoral needs." place to mobilize sufficient funding for housing recovery, or to program these resources to shelters, the cost of demolition, and the value address the priorities laid out in the PDNA, the of rental losses. Losses in the housing sector APNRDH, or elsewhere. were estimated at $739 million, which was 23 percent of all losses. Together, damage and a. Estimates of Damage and Losses losses totaled $3.072 billion, 39 percent of total in the PDNA earthquake damage and losses. As defined in the PDNA methodology, “damage” Because housing is a private asset, $459 million can be rebuilt. “Losses” are economic effects of this total amount of damage and losses for resulting from additional costs or loss of income housing were classified as public sector losses that can be compensated for only until the and $2.613 billion as losses of the private sector, economic flows are restored. “Needs” are the including households. These figures are shown proposed recovery activities (see Box 12). in Table 9. Housing. Damages include the value of housing Urban and community infrastructure. that was destroyed and partly destroyed and Damage and losses to urban and community damage to household goods. According to infrastructure were estimated at $412 million the Haïti PDNA, housing was the sector most (damage) and $184 million (losses), for a total affected by the earthquake, with housing of $595 million. This represented $514 million damages estimated at $2.3 billion, out of total in public sector losses and $81 million in private damages of $4.5 billion.#$ This was 52 percent sector losses. Damage and losses to housing of all damages from the earthquake. Losses and community infrastructure were therefore include the costs of providing temporary estimated at $3.667 billion. These figures are a : shown in Table 9. 15 Olivier Mahul et al, 2014, Financial Protection against Natural Disasters: An Operational Framework for Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance. b. Estimates of Needs in the PDNA 6 Government of Haiti, 2010, “Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and sectoral needs: : ty Annex to the Action Plan for National Recovery and Housing and community infrastructure needs Development of Haiti,” p. 7. were quantified in two different ways in the [page 123] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / 99 Table 9. Damage and Losses for Housing and Community Infrastructure (in US$ million)‘ Total all sectors $4,526 $3,278 $2,075 $5,723 $7,798 Housing $2,333 $739 $459 $2,613 $3,072 Percent of all sectors 52% 23% 22% 46% 39% Community infrastructure $412 $184 $515 $81 $595 Percent of all sectors 9% 6% 25% 1% 8% Total Housing and Community $2,745 $923 $974 $2,693 $3,667 infrastructure Total percent of all sectors 61% 28% 47% 47% 47% Source: Government of Haiti, 2010, “Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and sectoral needs.” PDNA. PDNA Table 5 showed estimated total rebuilding, and institutional rebuilding) and housing reconstruction needs for 2010-2013 covered only an 18-month period.#$ Housing is (four years), but provided no estimate for included in the social rebuilding pillar. While reconstruction of community infrastructure, the APNRDH referred to the figures on housing and was based on the damage, loss, and needs damage and losses presented in the PDNA, assessment (DALA) methodology. it presents a significantly reduced funding PDNA Table 7 showed needs for three years, as requirement for housing. defined by the PDNA working groups, for both Requirements were identified as costs for housing and community infrastructure. This setting up five new settlement sites outside of needs figure of $825 million was included in the Port-au-Prince, with the assumption that all PDNA estimate of total needs, which came to other housing finance would be borrowed and $12.2 billion. was therefore accounted for in a section on Detailed tables that show the cost items that banking-®” Of the amounts needed to set UP the support the figures in PDNA Table 7 are included new sites, (see APNRDH Table 8.3.1), all ofit as appendices to this section. was characterized as being funded from non- APNRDH sources (ï.e., from humanitarian and c. Estimate of Needs in the Action Plan for military donations). National Recovery and Development of Haïti In the territorial rebuilding pillar, a number of The APNRDH was prepared in March 2010. It other land and infrastructure-related costs were was organized according to four pillars (terri- budgeted, as follows (see APNRDH Table 411). torial rebuilding, economic rebuilding, social ———— 5 Government of Haiti, 2010b, “Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haïti: Immediate Key Initiatives for the Future.” #7 Ibid., Table 2, p. 7. # Ibid., p. 42. [page 124] 100 / III E. Recovery and Reconstruction Finance From PDNA Table 5. Estimated Total for Reconstruction Needs (based on DALA methodology):°° Reconstruction Activity (in US$ million) 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total Rebuilding $500 $500 $500 $444 $1,943 Repairing $400 $319 $719 Household goods $350 $235 $585 Housing total $1,250 $1,054 $500 $444 $3,247 From PDNA Table 7. Summary of Total Needs (based on the PDNA working groups)‘ (in US$ million) 6 months 18 months 3 years Total Housing $5.2 $149.8 $505.0 $660.0 Urban and community infrastructure $0.7 $68.0 $96.6 $165.3 Total $5.9 $217.8 $601.6 $825.3 From APNRDH Table 4.3.1. Housing for the Population: Temporary and Permanent Budgetary data for 18 months Preparation of new sites $140m* Funds for reconstruction and other activities $155m** Total $295m *__ Not accounted for since they have already been taken into account by humanitarian and military stakeholders ** Not accounted for since they are included under “Re-launching economic and financial circuits.”* # The “Re-launching economic and financial circuits” section included funds to guarantee private borrowing. From APNRDH Table 4.1.1. Reconstruction of Devastated Zones!‘ Debris management $265 million (including $50 million of budget support) Land appropriation $500 million Land use plan and urban plan $5 million Basic infrastructure $500 million (including $100 million of budget support) Total $1.270 billion Other urban and regional planning activities regional development plans, targeted regional were budgeted, including: development strategies, local development . lans, and urban plans, and (ï) protection, “ 4.1.4 Regional development centres and p rss p Gp . . . : rehabilitation and enhancement of 10 specific urban renovation: $75 million for regional . ue . zones of interest. development plans and initial preparation work in three provincial towns at $25 million per = 4.1.5 National planning and local a pe De development: $50 million to cover (i) 28 Ibid, p. 13. [page 125] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 101 Table 10. IHRC Estimates of Funding Needs for Housing and Neighborhood Reconstruction Cost item Estimated cost (in US$) Construction and repair (housing and neighborhood improvements) $1,063,000,000 Inflation @ 20% $213,000,000 Administrative overhead @ 35% $372,000,000 Average cost per household @ 167,000 households $9,855 Source: IHRC internal calculations. Both the PDNA and the APNRDH were presented special allocations, contributors of funding, at the donor pledging conference at the UN in recipients of funding, etc.) Variations are New York in March 2010, as a result of which a also due to the lack of an official tracking and few donors pledged funds for housing. Pledges monitoring system that could provide reliable to the sector amounted to approximately $260 data. million. According to the United Nations Office of the d._ Estimate of Needs by the Interim Haiti Special Envoy for Haiti, multilateral and bilateral Recovery Commission (IHRC) agencies allocated $133 billion to relief and recovery efforts in Haïti for 2010-2020.$5 In 2011, the IHRC developed a set of This was distributed between $2.6 billion for assumptions and estimated minimum housing humanitarian purposes, and $10.8 billion for and neighborhood reconstruction costs at $1.65 recovery. Of this $13.3 billion, an estimated $6.4 billion, as shown in Table 10. billion (48 percent) was disbursed by December 2012. Of the $6.4 billion disbursed, $2.4 billion These costs were based on assumptions was for humanitarian aid and $4.0 billion for about the distribution of red-, yellow-, and recovery. green-tagged houses (see Section III.C for an explanation of the building safety assessment) An additional $3.06 billion was estimated to from Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and have been contributed following the earthquake Communications (MTPTC) data and subsidy to UN agencies and NGOSs by private donors . . . (foundations, companies, individuals), including amounts for reconstruction ($3,500 per unit), retrofitting ($2,500 per unit), and repairs $14 billion from the US. ($1,500 per unit), including for multifamily Three UN humanitarian appeals from 2010 to structures. À cost per person for neighborhood 2012 raised an additional $1.38 billion out of a improvements of $350 was also assumed. The total of $2.04 billion requested. estimate was prepared in an effort to stimulate a An estimated $300 million of the $2.4 billion discussion on the financial plan for the sector. disbursed for humanitarian support and an e. Funding Raised for Relief and Recovery estimated $582.3 million of the $6.4 billion disbursed for recovery between 2010 and 2012 The overall funding raised for relief and went to the government as budget support. Haïti recovery following the earthquake is difficult to also benefited from $1 billion in debt relief. Figure quantify. Figures vary due to the use of different 21 shows the flow of funds for humanitarian relief categories (humanitarian versus recovery, and recovery as of December 2012. official development assistance (ODA) versus 16 Office of the Special Envoy For Haiti, 2012, Key Statistics, 254 Data presented to the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/lessons-from-haiti/key- (IHRC) by the UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haïti (OSE). statistics/. [page 126] 102 / ILE. Recovery and Reconstruction Finance Puy 5 © 2° Æ >< 2 & 8 © 6 2 = San œ% TD TD w sua Œ = S 5 29 æ 2 ELN = 1 À SU = ER SZ = gi EZ re] œ © © ® cl = = © Li m & 2 É É 2e & ® JUS se 5 LS Es, s# SER 25 u Zz © ds ve A 5 = Sa SET sLs.L£ E £ M OL © CEE à © $S 2 TO 20 ms 5;Evr oo VA =;:535L2SE E © LR rgdoesLsTGse> 5 5 n SO ms; zve£S I mi AÉLESSG us SsCe = £ © £sO <szut d © s © > SE £ GO £< £ © NN SN2T- Soc. ro] = 2 = ES sisé © A] FF CE Ce — e 2 © PS s% © € E 8 E + £ 8 A D + T 8 a S EE & 2 1 re 5 ii [=] a = = © 2 £ = = 8 à 2 s = sus _ ä nul LS <£ E20 E E=] 29 & >; ESA ü 2 = = 5 © 5 à = 5 0 c] SN DE ac # R © I 29 25 42e D, =? ë ES GE SSs« D Et BE = E AN £ M mn S% 55 = = Zz = Œ = £ 25 © = © 5 ü 52 A Sn < S Ba >» Le = = A = Ës 23 2e _ BA 5 2° an SA E à QN SE > S 0 zZz Ed m2 LE £E Es <s EN es EE _ ÊR 37 3 ER LE ES ss a = 2 B Ê = Son n E2 55 » = a = a € ue = D 0 + EZ LÉ rs 5 .& S à EN EE E 0 © x DE SE = 2 © w2= 9 <S5 ST E © a ÿ <= r $S £E £zR 252 = à “ 5 S = 2 EE Ÿ So £ © FE 20 29 EE 838 = 8 $ = D = an S en Æ = & s LE 2 © Œ 5 7 Êe E È S| £ os Es» CRE E à T Z © Te ? — ra L£0O = se Fi a A EN Où LE La TS ‘m £g © Zu EL T É SN se ©: œ œŒ L8 rs ÊÈ+ É n En Lz3 3: E T 560 2 zo S £ NN a£r s% Fu al m 35% £h £ Le m à s £ = si El 5 9 3 Qi ZE £ D & ms 2 € F4 ÿ 8% S 5 So &82= _ Er] £ TS 2 S < 8 S = E 2 É S >= ä £ 2 ü = © a a a œ 5 “5 œ 8 £E S ä 3 3 3 [page 127] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 103 2. Issues Reconstruction funding from external sources a. Funding for shelter and housing was Normally, bilateral and multilateral investment significant, but difficult to quantify projects are negotiated and agreed to with governments. Increasingly, they are also Funding for housing reconstruction came from a accounted for in government financial reporting. variety of sources, both local and international, However, in 2010, only donor contributions for including; (i) international donor funds; (fi) budget support were included in the national private funds raised by international and local budget in Haiti. Donor investment projects, HRF NGOs; (iii) the HRF; (iv) government funds funding, and funding raised by NGOs were not (normal budget and Petrocaribe funds); and (v) accounted for in the budget. private funding, including household private resources, such as savings, insurance proceeds; Bilateral and multilateral donors. New program gifts, especially remittances sent from abroad; funding from international bi- and multilateral and credit (both formal and informal). Presented donors mobilized as the result of the earthquake below are estimates of amounts raised and some included pledges made at the donor pledging issues related to each source. conference at the UN in March 2010. In other cases, existing program funding negotiated with Humanitarian assistance the government prior to the earthquake was The distinction between humanitarian and reprogrammed for reconstruction purposes. reconstruction funding was often not very Major housing donors, who met as a group clear in Haiti. Funding was raised for housing facilitated by the World Bank, maintained a list of reconstruction through the humanitarian committed housing projects. As of March 2012, appeals. Solutions such as Tshelters and repairs the group identified 19 major donor housing were financed by both funding streams. projects with a total value of $408 million, as The Flash Appeal raised $1.096 billion, of shown in Appendix 3 to this section. The number which $201 million went to the three clusters of housing units these projects would produce that carried out camp-, shelter-, and housing- was difficult to determine. These projects were related activities. The 2011 CHAP raised a total generally registered with the IHRC and were of $191 million, of which $36.4 went to the same financed with new or recommitted funding. three clusters, as shown in Figure 9. International and local NGOs. NGOs raised Some of the additional humanitarian funding extensive funding from private sources for raised by the International Federation of the Red housing, some of which was reported to the Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and FTS. For example, the American Red Cross other agencies outside of the Flash Appeal and raised $486 million, of which $136 million CHAP was also earmarked for temporary and was committed to housing and neighborhood permanent housing. The FTS recorded $2.5 billion reconstruction. There was no central reporting of additional humanitarian funding in 2010 and system in Haïti for this group. $283 million for 2011, which was only a portion of Haitian NGOs raised resources locally and the additional funds donated." from diasporta groups, but there are no figures available on the amount of resources raised. 166 FTS, 2013, “List of all humanitarian pledges, commitments and contributions (2010 and 2011).” Report as of June 17, 2013. Table ref: R1Oc. http://fts.unocha.org. Non-appeal figures in 2010 include expenditures of $464 million by the 37 International Monetary Fund, 2012, “IMF Country Report No U.S. Department of Defense. Agencies voluntarily report 12/220 - Haiti: Fourth Review Under the Extended Credit humanitarian contributions to the FTS. Facility—Staff Report and Press Release.” [page 128] 104 / LITE. Recovery and Reconstruction Finance Many local and international faith-based were not accounted for in the government organizations raised funds directly from private financial statements. for housing. Th tem fl . Face " and STE Was NO SJSLEm lon Between 2010 and 2011, the governing body racxing Inese uns. approved $845 million in projects, including NGOs were often contracted by donors to five housing and debris management projects. execute projects, including a number of the Overall, housing received the second largest projects profiled in the case studies, but this was Share of funding (7.2%), after infrastructure not additional funding. (55.29%). Approved projects were for shelter ($11.6 million approved in February 2010), Haïti Reconstruction Fund. The HRF was a debris management ($10 million in August multi-donor trust fund managed by the World 2010 and $15 million in May 2011), Fort Bank and the UN. In some cases, the funding National housing ($22 million in May 2011, later pledged was already tied to specific projects. reallocated to the Morne a Cabrit development In total, $386 million was raised, of which project), and Bowen Field ($22 million in May $162 million was committed to housing-related 2011, later reallocated to other sectors). projects by the HRF. This included two projects for demolition and debris management ($42 Reconstruction funding from households million), the Housing and Neighborhood Insurance proceeds. Neither micro- nor formal Reconstruction Support Program (HNRSP) ($25 insurance proceeds was a significant funding million), the Port-au-Prince Neighborhood source for reconstruction, particularly in Housing Reconstruction Project ($65 million), informal neighborhoods. Insurance penetration and the Haitian government’s Rehabilitation was extremely low in Haiti at the time of the of 16 Neïghborhoods and Voluntary Return of earthquake—around 0.3 percent of the gross Residents from 6 Camps (16/6) Project ($30 domestic product (GDP). The only micro- million). insurance program in Haiti, MiCRO, was launched by Fonkoze for its borrowers in 2011. Reconstruction funding from government Purchase of insurance has been imposed as a sources condition of housing reconstruction assistance The government had two principal sources of after other disasters, notably in India and . : os Turkey, but this was not considered feasible in funding for reconstruction: its own budget and n . Haïti. Petrocaribe funds. Government budget. Government funding used Household savings and remittances. Haitians : ps . used their own resources for most housing for reconstruction was budgeted within specific . . | Le : reconstruction, as observed in all neighborhoods ministry budgets and was not possible to track. . . and in new sites such as Canaan. For Canaan, Petrocaribe funds. The Petrocaribe Agreement UN-Habitat estimated that as much as $100 was the principal source of government funding million may have been invested through 2012 for capital investment projects in 2010-2011.155 (see Canaan case study). Haiti had borrowed $1.46 billion through May 31, 2013. Venezuela cancelled $395 million of 19 The Morne a Cabrit development project received a total of the debt after the earthquake, leaving a balance $59 million in funding from Petrocaribe, including $22 million n ? u reallocated from the Fort National project in September 2011; of $1.07 billion. At this time, Petrocaribe funds $10 million for the industrial park, approved in February 2012; and $27 million for housing and site improvements, approved in July 2012. This may be the single largest project undertaken by the government since the earthquake. 18 Haiti joined the Petrocaribe agreement in October 2007. See #9 Property Casualty 360, 2010, “Haiti Quake Loss Has Little footnote 100 for more detail. Insurance Cover, Modeler Says.” [page 129] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 105 Many low-income households in Haïti depend before the earthquake. As discussed in Chapter I, on remittances sent from abroad to survive. there was no policy framework for housing, nor Many remittances are sent informally, due to any credit or subsidy system in place, either high transfer costs, making data on remittances on the demand side (households) or the supply reaching Haiti incomplete.”? In the years before side (builders). As a result, there was no policy the earthquake, remittances generally exceeded “frame of reference” for financing housing and Official Development Assistance. In 2010, $1.971 neighborhood reconstruction. billion in remittances (over 30 percent of Haiti’s 2010 GDP) were sent through formal channels. During the first two years, no institution was This represented an increase of 20 percent designated to lead housing recovery. À recovery over 2009.77? Recorded remittances increased framework and financing plan were needed 4.4 percent in 2011 to $2.057 billion: The for housing, but neither was prepared. Nor Haitian community has also organized many was there an international agency significantly hometown associations that pool remittances involved in housing, slum upgrading, or other and contribute them to small development related activities who could assume an advisory projects. Fonkoze provides financial services to role to government. hometown associations, and its directory lists The Entreprise Publique pour Le Logement Social over 300 organizations. Hometown associations (EPPLS) is the sole public institution charged in Canada and the United States (U.S.) donate on . . . Le u hei n with affordable housing development in Haïti. Frcaes Fe nn y to their communities The EPPLS had built very little housing in the or social projects. years before the earthquake, and its ranks were There was no organized effort in Haïti to work depleted due to minimal budgetary support. The with remittance recipients or senders (including EPPLS model (rent to own over a 30-year period) hometown associations) to expand remittance was largely discredited due to its reputed flows, to match remittances with subsidies, failure to collect rents and to the condition of its or to encourage investment of remittances in properties. safe housing reconstruction, although these While the law under which the EPPLS operated types of post-disaster programs have been . . . dus ! ? : was relatively wide ranging, permitting the successful in other countries. If just 20 percent ne . | ' organization to borrow, issue bonds, and take of formal remittances were spent on housing . Lette . | on other financial responsibilities, these options reconstruction, there would have been more . ne . . had never been exercised. Its management than $400 million available for that purpose in . 2011 al had proposed legal reforms to modernize a7one. the organization, but they had not found b. No agency had responsibility for traction in government before the earthquake. overseeing housing recovery finance Nevertheless, the EPPLS became a valuable intermediary for some development partners, The Haïitian government had virtually no role due to its ability to carry out a unique range in financing low-income housing development of financial and land operations, although FT Analysis of Word Bank dt ir International Migrants itwas not in a position to define housing Remittances Observatory, 2013, “Assessment of Remittances reconstruction or financing policy. Policies and Programs in Haïti - Draft Report.” #? René Maldonado, Natasha Bajuk, and Marie Luisa Hayem, In the absence of a housing recovery plan 2011, “Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean in . . ’ 2010: Stabilization after the Crisis.” donors decided what projects were needed, 3 Ibid. imec i ion wi #* United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2012, sometimes in consultation with the government, “Maximizing the Development Impact of Remittances.” but often on their own. When asked what policy [page 130] 106 / III E. Recovery and Reconstruction Finance framework guided their housing reconstruction- pledges made in connection with the donor related decisions, agencies named everything pledging conference at the UN in March 2010. from their own internal policies to guidelines The last tracking report was issued in December issued by clusters (see Figure 4). 2012. The OSE reported by sectors, in theory using the 18-month budget shown in the c. Reconstruction funds were not regularly APNRDH, for which housing had no budgeted tracked, nor were projects monitored amount. The $180 million in allocations for “Tracking” in the recovery context generally housing identified by the OSE were shown refers to a system for following up to ensure the as being in excess of that requested by the delivery of external pledged funds. Tracking in government. this sense may include both external funds and The Interim Haïti Recovery Commission government recovery funds. “Monitoring” more (IHRC). The IHRC established a project often refers to the collection and analysis of data registration and approval system in 2010, on project expenditures and physical execution. with the objectives of identifying projects and Both are necessary to ensure the effective use tracking their progress, whatever their funding of recovery funds, timely delivery of results, and source. Unless the sponsor was seeking funding accountability to stakeholders. The use of both from the Haïti Reconstruction Fund (HRF), in Haiti was less than systematic. there was no incentive for a project sponsor to register its project. For this reason, the Tracking project registration system did not cover all The Indian Ocean tsunami and other large-scale reconstruction activities. Even government-led disasters have demonstrated the importance housing reconstruction proposals, such as those of tracking aid and coordinating finance in for the Fort National neighborhood and the old reconstruction programs, especially those where military airport (La Piste), which were receiving numerous development partners are present. No Petracaribe funding saone trou tie IHRC unified aid tracking system was established in government, Were not registered with the oo the first two years in Haiti. À number of agencies For housing and neighborhoods reconstruction, had some role in tracking earthquake-related see 01 00 proleets were registered in the funding and projects. These are described below. Projects System. The UN Office for the Coordination of Ministère de la Planification et de la Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Through the Coopération Externe (MPCE) (Ministry of . . . . : Planning and External Cooperation). Even Financial Tracking Service (FTS), OCHA . ne : . un when their funding did not flow through monitored the collection of the humanitarian . . ledges made by governments and others government systems, bilateral and multilateral Pets Ye . donors were required to establish an agreement to the Flash Appeal and the Consolidated . L itarian À L(CHAP) Thi with the MPCE to report on the progress of ur Ut et h tan act , their programs. MPCE and the IHRC began Wes arge y tun me 9rnumanilarian achvInIes, coordinated project tracking and review in 2011, not accounted for in government systems, as d d : d : d di d'in Section IILA and records on registered projects were turne Iscusseg in ec UT over to MPCE when the IHRC closed in October The UN Office of the Special Envoy for TRS SE NAS CENT NEN 2000 bvthe General . . #5 The was created in May 2009 by the Secretary Genera Haïti (OSE). The OSE tracked and monitored of the United Nations to “assist the Haitian government and donor funding commitments on behalf of the people in implementing their vision and priorities by engaging . with the international community, government donors, UN government and the IHRC, particularly the funds and programmes, and other non-state stakeholders." [page 131] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 107 2011. Whether MPCE continued to monitor these information management and from working projects is not known. No reports were made with an agreed set of characteristics or goals publicly available. (and corresponding indicators) against which } A ue reconstruction programs can be monitored and Unité de Coordination des Activités des P 8 . Le evaluated. These indicators could be based on Organisations Non-Gouvernementales : . : . . a pre-established set of universal goals, such (Unit for the Coordination of the Activities . . . LR. . as the quantity, quality, and cost-effectiveness of Nongovernmental Organizations). Certain : nel . of outputs; the efficiency, equitability, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were ired to register in this special office within transparency of the recovery program; and the require . . VPCE dt 8 + thei p tiviti satisfaction of affected households and other anc to TEport enr program acuvi es stakeholders with the results. Many of those required to register never did. In July 2010, the NGO activity coordination unit d. Housing subsidies were a challenge for published a list of 160 registered NGOs for the agencies to design and implement entire country, when it was estimated that more than 1,000 such organizations were operating. Government and development partners were NGOs submitted progress reports voluntarily; the providing subsidies to households any time unit did not have an active monitoring function. that they supplied free houses, rent, repars, or other forms of housing assistance. Targeting Monitoring of subsidies ensures that limited funds go to . . priority recipients and that all recipients meet The lack of agreed, explicitly stated housing Lcpele Ho : . the eligibility criteria. When many agencies recovery goals and objectives (Who gets new . : | | are involved in recovery, governments should housing? What should it cost?); of output and : : : Lu 7 provide policy guidance to set priorities (elderly outcome indicators; of an obligation on the part : : | or handicapped households, for instance) and of partner agencies to report on the progress of : Los : | d | 87 to suggest maximum and minimum subsidy their projects; and of a centralized monitoring . . ee _ . amounts. No such guidance was given to system made monitoring the Haiti housing agencies in Haiti. recovery process impossible. Without these elements, tracking the actual delivery of outputs Targeting subsidies to affected households could also not take place. . | . . Targeting housing assistance requires a system The ability to analyze results and improve for verifying eligibility. Both formal and on the recovery and reconstruction effort community-based verification processes can be as it progressed was also lost. The Unité de used. Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments In existine sit ; ked with Publics ) (UCLBP) (Housing and Public Building reus mes Es; par ners WOr<e | wl . . : : Lou communities and municipal officials to identify Construction Unit) and the Camp Coordination/ th ti d'of agsist MF, sect ose most in need of assistance. Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster reported or projects aggregate data on housing solutions delivered, #6 The definition of subsidies used here excludes “cash for but comparative objective data on outputs work,” because these transfers compensate the recipient ’ . . for the value of his or her labor, whereas housing subsidies and outcomes were not available. Information represent a windfall to the household. : : #7 For example, the Fund for Economic and Social Assistance on results was provided mostly by executing and the International Organization for Migration collaborated agencies for promotional purposes. to select beneficiaries for the Inter-American Development Bank-financed Oranger project, based on a carefully defined ; : : set of criteria and the camp registration data. The American Governments and international agencies would Refugee Committee helped the U.S. Agency for International benefit from dedicating more resources to Development select beneficiaries for its Haut Damier project [page 132] 108 / III E. Recovery and Reconstruction Finance in new sites, selection was more complicated. Channeling subsidies For the Fund for Economic and Social Assistance Most d decided to f dri . ost donors decided to forego owner-driven (FAES)/Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) hes to housi “ tion that “400/100” project in Oranger, the International ed . . nn ME " on “ dual Organization for Migration (I0M), FAES, and IDB require Sizable transters o une 5 to indivi ua : developed a multi-stage screening, application, or neïghborhood groups. Subsidies for housing and selection process using Displacement repair and reconstruction were largely provided Tracking Matrix (DTM) data, although some of in kind. those selected ultimately declined to be relocated Figure 22 shows the organizational survey to the site. The U.S. Agency for International responses to a question about providing direct Development (USAID) worked with the IFRC to subsidies (excluding fully constructed houses). carry out the selection process for its Haut Damier The two most prevalent subsidies were cash for project (see Haut Damier case study). work (40% of agencies) and rental subsidies Over time, it became increasingly difficult to (36% of agencies). Five organizations (1%) distinguish earthquake-affected households from offered subsidies for repair and reconstruction. the chronically vulnerable. Some donors revised . . . . This compares to 27 organizations (64%) their targeting to include non-earthquake- : t irs, 26 (62%) . t affected households. As a result, it is impossible nes. où M d 22 (6290 € où . to say whether all those who received housing ous recons lucton, an ‘ 0) carrying . out retrofitting (as shown in Figure 12). assistance were the most needy among the earthquake-affected, or were even earthquake- Rental subsidies had injected at least $5 million affected at all. into the housing market as of October 2011. from a pool of households known to the committee as They Were paid partly to landlords and partly “earthquake-affected.” to families. Seventy-four percent of landlords SURVEY QUESTION Figure 22. For what purposes were funds channeled directly to beneficiaries or host families by your organization? Cash for work Rental subsidies No transfers to beneficiaries Cash transfers / other expenses econstruction/ repair subsidies Other Grants to host families o 2 4 6 8 10 Number of Agencies [page 133] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 109 receiving these subsidies reported that the Nevertheless, numerous efforts were undertaken payments were being used for housing repair.7$ soon after the earthquake to establish new credit programs for housing reconstruction by e. _ Numerous efforts were undertaken to low-income households, and it will be important provide housing credit to monitor the results of these initiatives. Haïti had extremely limited formal housing The government’s Kay Pam program (see Box 13) credit before the earthquake. Despite liquidity was launched in July 2011 by the Bank Nationale in the banking system, risks associated with de Crédit, supported by the Banque Populaire imperfections in the judicial, legal, and d'Haïti. The 500 million gourde ($12.5 million) regulatory environments, and the difficulties program was designed to provide 30-year of enforcing property rights and contracts, housing loans to public employees and other have constrained the development of the credit customers of the Bank Nationale de Crédit with market. As a result, most household borrowing land titles to help repair or build their homes. As by low-income households takes place outside of early 2013, the program had extended only a of the formal banking system, making it difficult few mortgages. to quantify the extent to which credit has been used for reconstruction. Several international financing initiatives were undertaken. Haïîtian respondents to a USAID survey expressed interest in borrowing for housing, #_The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) even though only 20 percent of the households attempted to develop a housing lending reported ever having borrowed for any program that would complement its purpose. Most borrowing took place for investments under the Rehabilitation of business purposes from microfinance 16 Neighborhoods and Voluntary Return of institutions or through informal arrangements. Residents from 6 Camps (16/6) Project, but Only 6 percent of borrowing was for housing- did not identify a scalable solution (see 16/6 related purposes. Project case study). . . k # USAID ($6 million), the Clinton Bush Haiti Establishing credit programs for low-income Fund ($3 million), and the Overseas Private households for reconstruction is very difficult; Investment Cor Gration ($17 million) virtually no new housing finance programs at supported Rat » à credit program scale have been successfully established in a d " dbvau < based prog ft with . . evelope a U.S.-based nonprofit wi post-disaster environment. ! Households are " s Haiti d F dsf : . . connections to Haïti to provide funds for generally reticent to borrow in a post-disaster housing microfinance sr small and medium environment due to loss of livelihoods and other 8 . . ee enterprise repair and construction. uncertainties. “ The International Finance Corporation 18 Cash sas provided to ouseholds and landlors under the launched an advisory program with rental subsidy program. For a description of the measures : : taken, see: Jeremy Condor, Charles Juhn, and Raj Rana, SOGEBANK and CEMEX to provide housing 2013, “External Evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant credit and oversight of housing repairs and Approach Applied to Return and Relocation Programs in Haïti . #% Carl F. Braun, 2011, “Pour dynamiser l'offre de financement de reconstruction. l'immobilier en Haïti,” PowerPoint Presentation, Mercredi de sus Réflexion, IDB/World Bank, Port-au-Prince. " Leopard Haïti Fund LP launched the first 180 University of Chicago, 2011, “Housing Demand in Port-au- private equity fund for Haïti in July 2012, Prince,” Financial Sector Knowledge Sharing Project. The Lou . a primary data were collected by Bureau de Recherche en initially raising $20 million from the Informatique et en Développement Economique et Social. : ; : #1 Abhas Jha et al., 2010, “Safer Homes, Stronger Communities: À International Finance Corporation, the Handbook for Reconstructing after Natural Disasters.” Netherlands Development Finance Company, [page 134] 110 / LITE. Recovery and Reconstruction Finance with the IHRC had no funding Haïti - Economy: The project “Kay pam” The IHRC Housing and Neighborhoods team increases from 30 million to 500 million reviewed 66 projects submitted to the IHRC gourds between July 2010 and October 2011 through The projet “Kay pam” a major program the normal IHRC project submission system. of mortgage for the purchase of housing, These were submitted by government agencies, which was to be launched by the National multilateral and bilateral agencies, international Bank of Credit (BNC) on Tuesday June organizations, and NGOs (both international and 14 had been postponed, following the local). The projects ranged in size from under assassination of the President of the Board $1 million to $930 million. The total value of of Directors of the BNC, Guiteau Toussaint submitted projects was $4.2 billion. Not all were on June 12 [2011]. directly housing related; for instance, debris The project “Kay pam” will finally be management and disaster risk management officially launched on Friday, July 22, had (DRM) projects were assigned to this team. announced last Saturday the President : : MohelMetelle The 1 For a number of projects, the funding source was 1ee J ES US LES MARIE : already identified, including funds committed program aims to help people of the middle . | at the donor pledging conference at the UN in class to buy decent homes. ” . New York. The registration system also revealed Initially provided with an amount of 30 funding sources that were not previously known, milions gourds, the Head of State has : such as funds raised by NGOs. Many project indicated that the funds available for this sponsors registered projects without funding program were increased to 500 million : . : . because they were seeking funding from the gourds, available at the beginning of the . . . Le HRF, for which registration was a prerequisite. program. Source: Haiti Libre, September 7, 2011. Many of the housing project submissions were not suitable or feasible, which in some ways reflected poor communications by the IHRC regarding and the IDB, with affordable housing among the project submission process. As shown in its target sectors. Figure 23, only 19 percent— $808 million—of # The Haïtian microfinance institution Fonkoze the proposed projects entailed construction, piloted a housing-related lending program reconstruction, or repair of housing, and were with support from Habitat for Humanity Haïti deemed to be feasible. Approximately 35 percent CHFHH), but had closed the program before of the costs of these feasible projects had funding the earthquake. It launched no new housing when they were registered. With full funding, lending program afterward. these housing-related projects would have a . . . : created more than 88,000 units of housing, at an Providing housing credit to low-income families | Lu . | average cost of $9,150. at scale in Haïti will require a commitment by the nation to provide widespread access to À large number of private manufacturers capital through formal channels, followed by submitted projects based on the erroneous fundamental reforms related to land tenure, impression that government would be issuing income documentation, and banking. large-scale orders for housing units or housing materials, or setting up factories to produce them. These projects are included in the [page 135] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 111 Figure 23. IHRC Regular Housing Project Submissions 2010-2011, in US$ million Other projects, A : 42,098 (50%) à re projects, Housing construction related projects, $808 (19%) Total cost of projects Technical assistance submitted: $4.2 billion projects, $106 (3%) Source: Priscilla Phelps, 2011, “Haïti Housing and Neighborhoods Reconstruction: Building the Bridge While We Walk On It.” IHRC end-of-mandate report. “housing factory projects” category. “Other although most projects included other types of projects” included items such as temporary investments. shelter, debris management, and activities L . . . . Estimating project costs was difficult and a unrelated to housing or neighborhood . . . Mouse à . . . number of agencies had to increase project rehabilitation included in housing projects. A . . . . funding or reallocate funding as the project small number of project proposals (3%) were to . . . . . progressed. Even experienced agencies faced provide technical assistance. . daunting challenges. Of the 13 organizations In response to a more specific call for responding to a survey question regarding projects in August 2011, the IHRC received 28 project changes during implementation due to additional housing-related project proposals. financial issues, 55 percent said costs increased, Approximately 15 percent of the costs of these 50 percent said the number of beneficiaries projects were already funded, and the average decreased, and 80 percent said execution took unit cost was just over $6,000. When the IHRC longer than planned.1#? For example, the World closed in October 2011, none of these projects Bank revised its Port-au-Prince Neighborhood had received funding. It is not known how many Housing Reconstruction Project (PREKAD) of the housing-related projects submitted to the in 2012 to reallocate more investment to IHRC without funding were later built. infrastructure and rental subsidies. Housing unit k . . . costs on USAID’s Haut Damier New Settlement B- Without policy direction, financing went Project increased by more than 250 percent (see to projects, not programs case studies 7 and 6). With no government housing policy or À few high-quality, high-cost reconstruction standardized program parameters, donors were projects resulted and will result from this model left to identify a particular neighborhood or : : | : : | of housing recovery model. If these projects set community to assist and to design a project for : . | : new standards for future housing and upgrading, and with the residents. Donors generally defined : us . : that will be a positive outcome. For example, the their commitments by the number of houses or housing units that they would build or repair, #2 World Bank, 2013, “Haiti Shelter and Housing Survey.” [page 136] 112 / LITE. Recovery and Reconstruction Finance 16/6 Project demonstrates the improvements that the lack of experience of sponsors, or both. can be made in informal urban neighborhoods, Enormous effort was spent reviewing infeasible and created a replicable model. projects that would have been better used helping . : . the government develop a strategy and design Most households received no financial assistance 8 | P 8y 8 . . more suitable, financeable approaches. for recovery. They recovered using their own resources. Many are likely living in conditions Agencies needed more direction on that are no safer than those they were living in programming their own reconstruction funds. before the earthquake. Had housing recovery Without a housing recovery framework, agencies been carried out with the goal of using available with funding were on their own to design funds to “acquire” the most safety overall housing interventions and program their funds. and an equitable distribution of benefits, the Many found costs rising as projects progressed, outcome might have been quite different. How to so the number of housing units declined, accomplish recovery that focuses on safety and reducing the number of beneficiaries. distributes benefits more equitably are the key . . . k . Lou Tracking of financial commitments and project challenges for future disasters in similar contexts. . . . outputs was not systematic. While various ee tracking initiatives were carried out at the 3. Findings beginning of the recovery period, they were not Confusion on housing financing strategy began coordinated and were too focused on monitoring with the PDNA. The donor-led PDNA and the the mobilization of funds, while ignoring government-led APNRDH reflected significantly expenditures and outputs. With no systematic different ideas of what government's role would tracking, the opportunity to learn from project be in financing housing recovery. The former experiences was lost, as was all accountability assumed government would finance much of the to the Haïtian people for the use of these funds. ti t liability of housi tructi . con 1ngen 1epnl y° QUSINE reconstrucron Agencies downplayed the context and for low-income Haïitians, whereas government . : : . _ 2. experience from other disasters in pursuing assumed a combination of humanitarian funds . . us : housing credit. None of the conditions for and credit would be used. . . us . success existed in Haïti for developing new À housing sector recovery framework and credit programs for housing reconstruction. financial plan were sorely needed. The Worldwide post-disaster experience also APNRDH was not translated into a recovery plan discouraged such initiatives. Nevertheless, time by either the government or the IHRC. Because and money were spent by numerous agencies no housing recovery plan was developed, no attempting to set up credit programs. The strategy was agreed on and the differences results of these initiatives should be analyzed as between the PDNA and APNRDH were never guidance for future recovery programs. reconciled. À financial strategy for housin . 8y . 8 Public and donor funds could have been better recovery could not be developed in the absence . . . used to leverage private investment. Co-financing of a framework. . . : of housing construction with households or The IHRC and the HRF provided only limited neighborhood groups or of projects with NGOs guidance to project sponsors seeking financing. (including local NGOs or diaspora groups) and Early on, the IHRC and the HRF were viewed as private sponsors was not pursued in the housing a system for approving and financing projects. sector. Most public funds (including HRF funds) But most projects submitted lacked financing and went to completely publicly funded projects, many were not financeable, due to poor design, leaving aside interesting opportunities for [page 137] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 113 collaboration and leveraging. No known efforts Track all reconstruction resources, were made to mobilize or channel remittances or programming, and progress centrally, funds from diaspora groups. and report results regularly to the public. Project-based recovery made the result of housing Even if many agencies control their own funds, recovery more inequitable. When Haïti housing the financial plan should include them. Public recovery devolved into a project-based program communications on the use of reconstruction funds without a plan or coordination, it increased the should be continuous and substantive; otherwise, likelihood that many households would not get suspicions will arise about whether or not funding assistance, among them many highly vulnerable is not being properly used. Such suspicions households. Donor projects set new standards undermine governance at a crucial time. In for housing recovery and slum upgrading that some reconstruction programs, monitoring is will hopefully be replicated in the future. At the necessary down to the household level. same time, this approach left the majority of . . : households to recover with their own resources, Use public and donor funding strategically many in conditions no safer than those they to leverage private financing, including were living in before the earthquake. While it that of households, and to incentivize good would have been challenging to accomplish practices like safer reconstruction. and to measure, providing safety to the largest The financial plan should identify both public possible number of households and an equitable and private sources and establish transparent distribution of benefits should have been goals financial policies and rules. It should be that guided the entire housing recovery effort. standard practice that household and private . sector input is sought in developing the plan, 4. Recommendations so that it reflects private financing plans and The recommendations that follow are associated identifies where public investment is needed with the good practices that introduce this to leverage it. For instance, a basic housing section for a large-scale reconstruction effort in subsidy can be matched with remittances or a poor country with a weak state, such as Haïti. private property owners may agree to co-finance extra rental units with government. Requests Ensure that donors coordinate with for proposals for repairs or reconstruction can government on programming of financial require a private funding match. resources, and that programming is : : Transfer more financial resources directly consistent with the recovery framework. . . to eligible households or landlords, ideally Following the PDNA, ensure that a recovery in tranches and on a conditional basis, and framework or reconstruction plan is developed, support the expansion of the owner-driven and is used as the basis for financial planning. reconstruction model. Use the financial plan as a reality check, to . k k Owner-driven reconstruction with agency ensure that the goals of the recovery framework Lu Le . are attainable. supervision is a best practice in housing recovery programs, since owners rebuild more quickly than In future disasters, development partners agencies, better understand their housing needs, must remember that this planning is essential and have more concern for quality. Training if limited funds are to be used effectively, and associated with owner-driven reconstruction should support their preparation before project raises both contractor and homeowner knowledge development begins. of improved building practices. [page 138] 114 / UE. Recovery and Reconstruction Finance This model needs to be updated to keep it conformance with policies that aim for equity relevant in contexts like Haiti, where ownership and minimum and maximum standards. At the was difficult to verify, reconstruction and same time, this conformity should not be seen repair were complex and unique, housing was to contradict the idea that households should be dense, and much of the damaged housing was given choices and encouraged to contribute to multifamily rental. the design of their own recovery. Use funding to recreate pre-disaster housing Housing recovery should contribute to shared status and improved housing construction prosperity, rather than foster resentment and practices, while avoiding unfamiliar designs further inequity among social groups. and financing vehicles. . . In programming financial resources, Experiments, such as the establishment of new government and agencies should analyze credit programs for reconstruction by low- cost-effectiveness and consider the long income borrowers or innovative housing designs, term. can absorb enormous resources of multiple : agencies and produce few results. Disaster In Future large-scale disasters, donors should recovery is not when agencies should be working consider offering multiple options, especially on outside their areas of expertise, especially on short-term solutions, such as rental subsidies . : : or hosting, and compare the results (e.g., more complex topics such as housing credit. ? people safely rehoused) for a given level of Agencies should share knowledge to avoid expenditure. À program to evaluate the cost- duplicating efforts and bring in appropriate effectiveness of various solutions in Haïti should expertise. They should also realize that be undertaken. households are likely to be risk-averse after . . . . . LL Many large-scale post-disaster housing projects a disaster due to economic uncertainties and ds . . built with public funds are abandoned over trauma, and prefer the old ways. It is better to : : : : . . . n time or never occupied. Private builders rarely build on financial practices familiar to affected : h holds th h dditional ris make the same mistakes because they conduct ouseholds than to expose them to additional risk. market studies before deciding to build. Seek uniformity in eligibility rules and Government and agencies should also recognize levels of housing financial assistance. that the difficult part of housing recovery is not building the house, but providing solutions Government rarely controls all financial that are valued by beneficiaries and that are resources for housing recovery, but those financially and operationally sustainable over who raise funds for recovery on behalf of an time, especially for multifamily housing or large affected population can be asked to use them in developments. [page 139] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 115 © u = e] e] 8 Fi É 2 2 e la > m Q. Q. © ee] re] © M op re] S a le a. 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The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 121 PE e e A. Summary of Findings The findings in this report are intended to identify experiences that, while specific to Haïti, may have relevance to future major disasters with significant involvement of humanitarian and donor agencies. They provide the basis for the recommendations made in the final section. The findings relate to the technical topics explored in this report, as well as to two cross-cutting topics: accountability and institutional frameworks. The Shelter Response fragmented response. Clusters, which operated relatively well in the emergency phase, had The 2010 post-earthquake emergency response no mandate to plan housing recovery and was successful. There Was à strong mobilization reconstruction and no way to wind down. effort and good implementation capacity, a Work in specific sectors advanced, including coordination framework was designed early with government agencies, but a mechanism on, and agreement was reached on clear for inter-sector coordination was lacking. The benchmarks. The “Shelter Sector Response government, for its part, had no platform ready Plan” that was drawn up was supported by both to assume these responsibilities. the Haitian government and the international community. The plan had three clear objectives, Several factors undermined the transition including providing emergency shelter within from the emergency phase to recovery. These three months, a goal that was largely met. included the absence of shelter or housing sector policies prior to the disaster; the lack Soon after the initial emergency phase was of a reconstruction framework and common, completed, it became evident that Haïtians and clearly defined goals; wrong assumptions about international actors Were not working in concert. reconstruction funding; and the failure to define There was lack of familiarity with the cluster an exit strategy from the emergency phase. system by Haïitian actors, a failure to adapt it to Haïitian requirements, and friction from language Ultimately, the shelter response consisted and cultural differences. Government was not almost exclusively of camp support and a successful at coordinating the international massive T-shelter program. The T-shelters actors and there was turnover and instability supported property owners more than renters, in the cluster system. À further difficulty was by committing disproportionate funding to maintaining continuity during the nearly year- T-shelters, which required access to land, long election and early post-election period. and alternatives, such as rental subsidies and hosting arrangements, were underfunded. As the transition from shelter to housing programming lagged, a fragmentation of effort became evident. Significant differences in Housing Recovery capacity from one cluster to another and weak Government had no housing policy inter-cluster coordination contributed to the framework on which to base the housing reconstruction strategy. There was also no 28 The general election was held in November 2010 after months agency of government responsible for defining of campaigning Michel Martelly won the March 2011 runoff housing recovery policy. Among national and and was inaugurated in May 2011. President Martelly's first . . . prime minister was approved by parliament in October 2011. international agencies there was near-consensus [page 146] 122 / IV A. Summary of Findings on the issues that the reconstruction strategy nor strategic in its purposes. The Housing and needed to address. However, no individual Neighborhood Reconstruction Support Program agency or group felt it had the mandate or (HNRSP) provided support to key agencies, influence with government to help develop but its impact was blunted by institutional a strategy that could be promulgated as the culture in both the United Nations (UN) and the roadmap that all should follow. Even the Interim government. Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was not capable of serving this role, in spite of the Disaster Risk Reduction involvement of major donors in the commission. Most rebuilding in the first two years was Data for planning housing reconstruction were done informally, with no building permit or also lacking. Systematic data collection in inspection, using the materials and practices affected neighborhoods did not begin until late that led to the damage and mortality from 2010. Creation of a government platform for the earthquake. Guidelines for repair and sharing data took well into 2011. Census data construction were developed, but not very were out of date and didn't cover most informal widely distributed. Efforts to improve the quality settlements. Agency-collected enumeration of construction materials were limited. Training data from neighborhoods were essential for became widespread later, but did not affect most local planning, but difficult to aggregate in a of what had been rebuilt early on. useful way. In the absence of other information, . . y . . An agency that could lead the effort to establish internally displaced person (IDP) camp tracking se : DE dat d the buildi fety (habitability) disk risk reduction (DRR) as a priority in 21a ano te DuroIng satety 2 1ta Ioty recovery was never designated. Without this, assessment became the two principal sources : ! | k …. . k government policy on DRR in recovery was of information for decision making. Even so, it : ape ‘ unclear in the first two years, even within the was more than a year before it became clear : | government, and the all-important agreement on that access to safe rental housing would be what constituted “acceptable risk” in the Haïtian the principal constraint on reducing urban reconstruction context was never reached. displacement, and that access had both physical and economic dimensions. The building safety assessment process : demonstrated that, with adequate assistance, The lack of an overall reconstruction strategy a high-quality assessment process can be caused the reconstruction effort to fragment. conducted even when technical experience Having no strategy both simplified and is limited. While speed and consistency were complicated agencies’ work. While there was the priorities, social communication and the no need to conform to government standards collection of additional information would have or priorities, each agency had to find a place to been useful additions to the process, given the work on its own and define its own approach. multiple uses for which the data were later used. The results were a proliferation of unique . : : : Late The government carried out work on projects and an inequitable distribution of the : nn . reconstruction guidelines, building codes, available resources. . . . | and training with external assistance during The lack of a reconstruction strategy and a recovery, but what resulted was rarely housing sector reconstruction lead agency disseminated as guidance or rules. Government's also meant that the technical assistance to technical capacity improved, but its enabling support government’s housing-related policy and regulatory roles were not strengthened by and decision making was not well coordinated, these efforts. [page 147] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 123 DRR approaches and policy were determined at At first, urban economic realities and their the project level. These were generally based impact on recovery were not well understood. on good international standards, but they were Agencies were not initially equipped to handle product driven, not holistic, and benefitted only such situations as the vulnerability of many a small percentage of the affected population. urban families, their dependence on the cash Much more emphasis should have been put economy, and the prevalence of crime and on activities with a multiplier effect, such as intimidation. In some cases, these challenges communicating DRR messages, regulating the caused the abandonment of projects. The need quality of construction inputs, and promoting for urban assessments was not recognized until self-enforcement of safe building practices. donors were already designing interventions. Significant work on disaster risk management Larger-scale planning and urgent recovery (DRM) had taken place in Haiti before the timelines were incompatible. Government earthquake, but the sense of urgency grew and external agencies agreed on the strategic to increase capacity in areas such as: () risk importance of recovery, but not necessarily on reduction and recovery Gin addition to disaster the cost of delaying recovery for planning. Many response); (ii) civil society and scientific plans were prepared, such as for downtown community engagement m DRR policy; (fi) Port-au-Prince, and old ones were resurrected. norms and capacity for risk-informed urban Disagreements also resurfaced on who had planning: and (iv) safe building practices, . planning responsibility. The most important gap enforcement of building codes, and construction : . 7. in the first two years may have been a planning Supervision. framework that could have increased the Ultimately, post-disaster DRR policy needed to coherence of planning and interventions at the have been decided in advance. The post-disaster community and local levels. Unfortunately, this period is not the right time for DRR research or was never developed. olicy making; it must be done before a disaster . ee . P . d Bi . cr . Community planning in informal neighborhoods strikes. In addition, responsibility for it must be . . . . : : . was carried out for the first time ever in clearly assigned. While the disaster motivated ects. Earlv pilot ded donors to provide more support for DRR, there cab proJects: a un os Pr U ; is still no agency that has the mandate for Tepica € communt yp anning mo € : 2 . ue was used in the government’s Rehabilitation recovery policy. Haiti accumulated some good ‘ : of 16 Neighborhoods and Voluntary Return DRR practices from the earthquake recovery, but EResid $ | these need to be codified in national policy and ° Resi ents rom 6 Camps (16/6) Project. . Agencies involved in community planning regulations. L : coordinated well among themselves and with municipalities, and established relatively Urban Development standard procedures. An institutional and Land Regulation framework is needed for these activities, so . | that the capacities developed and data and Weaknesses in systems for urban planning, . outputs produced are not lost. land management, and development regulation became strikingly evident as a result of the The weakness of land regulation in Haïti may earthquake. These gaps, as well as the urban have contributed more to the disaster than nature of the earthquake, had wide-ranging poverty. Dealing with informal ownership and effects on the pace of recovery decision making lack of records also affected both the quality and implementation. and the timeliness of housing-related recovery [page 148] 124 / IVA. Summary of Findings interventions and wasted resources that could costs often rose significantly, so the number of have gone to affected households. Addressing potential beneficiaries declined, but these changes this situation should be a national priority, were not registered or responded to. easily viewed as a disaster risk mitigation : . : . strategy, Systematic tracking was carried out only until the beginning of the recovery period. This . . tracking was focused mainly on monitoring Recovery Financi ng T-shelter production and the mobilization of Confusion on housing financing strategy began recovery funds. With no systematic tracking of with the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment expenditures or outputs, local accountability (PDNA). The donor-led PDNA and the for the use of these funds was lost, as was government-led Action Plan for National the opportunity to learn from project results. Recovery and Development of Haiti (APNRDH) National audit agencies such as the Government reflected radically different ideas of what Accountability Office and Cours des Comptes government’s role would be in financing housing reported to legislatures and taxpayers, but in recovery. The former assumed government Haïti reporting was ad hoc and, in the press, would take responsibility for much of the oriented toward pointing out donor and contingent liability of housing reconstruction government failures.##* for low-income Haitians, whereas government None of the conditions for success existed in assumed a combination of humanitarian funds Haiti for developing new credit programs for and credit would be used. housing reconstruction. Worldwide post-disaster The APNRDH was not translated into a recovery experience would discourage such initiatives, plan by either the government or the IHRC. especially for very low-income households, but Because of that, no strategy was agreed on and this did not keep numerous agencies from trying the differences between the PDNA and APNRDH to create such programs. The results of these were never reconciled. initiatives should be analyzed as guidance for future recovery programs. The IHRC and the Haïti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) provided only limited guidance to The leveraging of private investment was project sponsors seeking financing. Early on, minimal in the housing sector. Little effort was the IHRC and the HRF were viewed as a system made to co-finance housing reconstruction for approving and financing projects, but HRF with households or neighborhood groups or resources were very limited ($386 million out to co-finance projects with nongovernmental of an estimated $10.8 billion committed to organizations (NGOs) (including local NGOs recovery, approximately 3.6 percent). Rather or diaspora groups) or private sponsors. Most than passively reviewing all submitted projects, public funds (including HRF funds) went to the IHRC should have worked to improve projects that were completely publicly funded. housing projects and to find financing for those Housing recovery became project-based, that were feasible. rather than programmatic, guaranteeing that Agencies needed direction on programming their the results would be more unequal. À few own reconstruction funds. They should also have high-quality, high-cost reconstruction projects been obligated to report their progress. Without resulted and will result from the housing a housing reconstruction policy or recovery plan, recovery model utilized in Haiti. Some set new agencies designed housing interventions and Hi Cour des Compies, 2013, Lait française à Haïti après le programmed funds using their own criteria. Agency séisme du 12 janvier 2010. Rapport public thématique." [page 149] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 125 standards that may be applied in the future. For human rights law, including the Universal example, the 16/6 Project demonstrates for the Declaration of Human Rights and codified in first time the improvements that can be made the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (TASC) in informal urban neighborhoods, and created a Operational Guidelines on the Protection of replicable model. Others were much too costly to Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters.'#5 ever be replicable. These guidelines emphasize that the state has the primary duty to provide assistance While some households beneñted from the P . Yeuu To P . . . . and protection to persons affected by natural windfall that these high-priced projects : nos ee k ! . disasters, but that humanitarian organizations represent, most received no financial assistance . . . . . : will offer their services to those in need when for recovery. Households receiving no assistance . ce : k the state is unable or unwilling to do so. In the recovered on their own, often returning to . . . . . absence of state cooperation, the imperative housing no safer than where they lived before . É remains to protect those affected. the earthquake. Had housing recovery been carried out with the idea that available funds Haïti is a signatory to the Universal should be used to “acquire” the most safety Declaration of Human Rights and the country’s overall and an equitable distribution of benefits, constitution lists a wide range of human rights. the outcome might have been quite different. Nevertheless, the rights-based approach would have set an unattainable standard for : : : recovery. À significant gap existed between Capacity, Coordination, Je A SIBMINCANT BeP ENsteC 2e ce the quality of housing and basic services and Accountability of average low-income Haïitians before the Institutional issues are often blamed for earthquake and the minimum standards many of the challenges encountered in the (such as the Sphere standards) promoted by recovery process in Haiti. This included the humanitarian sector. Haïtian authorities, not just shortcomings in organizational being fiercely protective of their sovereignty, capacity, but lack of clarity about or gaps in at times resisted the “rights-based” debate laws, policies, regulations, and governance. and the expectations it created in recovery. Because the existing sector frameworks were À debate also arose within the international incomplete (for example, in the case of the community, since not all development agency housing sector, there were no parameters for interventions are equally oriented by the slum upgrading), there needed to be a unified humanitarian principles. With no consensus recovery framework composed of a mixture of on the relevance of humanitarian principles, existing and stop-gap elements. But without reaching agreements among agencies on any prevailing institutional framework to guide certain standards was nearly impossible. recovery, various frameworks coexisted and the Governmental framework. The Haitian differences among them created confusion and government confronted institutional challenges slowed decision making. in recovery overall and at the sector level. Humanitarian principles. Humanitarian These included, in particular: (i) defining sector agencies promote a “rights-based approach recovery policies and standards, including for to disaster relief” with a “protection housing where no sector framework existed, perspective.” During an emergency and (ii) deciding how to manage and coordinate humanitarian agencies operate under a set the entire recovery process. Partner agencies of rules based on tumanitarian principles 25 JASC, 2011, ASC Operational Guidelines on the Protection of drawn from international humanitarian and Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters. [page 150] 126 / IV A. Summary of Findings sought government guidance to clarify policies, The earthquake revealed both the strengths regulations, and enforcement under existing and weaknesses of this bifurcated institutional laws, and institutional roles and responsibilities. framework. Without an enforced building Partners also needed government to either code (formal system) and little memory of support decisions made by special entities (such prior earthquakes to affect behavior patterns as the Interministerial Housing Commission (informal system), there was little incentive to UHC] and the IHRC) or provide alternative build seismically resistant housing. Yet without leadership. Government did its best to be an accessible land market, a regulated urban responsive, but the guidance it provided did not plan, or enforcement against land invasion comprise an adequate policy framework, and (formal systems), people acquired land in the special entities operated to limited effect. land market that exists in the metropolitan area Close coordination of agency actions, whether and emerged at Canaan (informal system). by ministries or special entities or through External agencies became overly concerned government chairmanship of coordination about eliminating informality. They felt more bodies created within the humanitarian formality would provide more certainty to structure, would have mitigated some of the . : | | affected households, even though the agencies risks associated with the lack of a recovery . . themselves were frequently stymied by the framework. For the first two years, this did not formal systems that could not respond or adapt take place. : to the emergency. Agencies also developed International system. Shortcomings in quasi-formal mechanisms such as enumeration coordination by government were mirrored that may add to uncertainty in the long run. in the donor community. International donor a. . Accountability framework. Ultimately, the support was called on to help finance recovery, | | . : imperative to account to the Haitian people and the response was generous. But donors in | ns . . . should have motivated a more disciplined the housing sector were not effective at working h neth together with the government to coordinate approach to managing t e lÉCOVEry process, the recovery effort so that it reflected good but accountability mechanisms were lacking. practice and produced the results sought by This was due partly to the lack ofa TECOVEry Haïitian society. Bilateral agendas, rigid rules framework and of the recovery principles and governing funding, the need for quick results, benchmarks it should have contained. But it and especially the inability of donors to speak was also due to the fact that the practice of with one voice to the government and to accountability was largely missing in Haïti, and advocate for good humanitarian and recovery agencies did very little to strengthen it. practices all conspired to undermine this effort. Civic engagement was low before the In many ways, the organizational weaknesses earthquake, as was a relationship of trust ofthe donor community, which was present to between government and the general public. help ensure a successful recovery, were not that Le Le dissimilar to th f ! Accountability between government and citizens 1SSIMTar 10 MOSE of government. functioned only at the local level, and even there Informal systems. Informal systems are the in extremely limited ways, given the lack of principal institutional framework in which lower- municipal resources. Mechanisms that bolster income households survive in Haïti. Informal accountability, such as consultation, polling, land titles, contracts, and lending arrangements referenda, and the press, were present to some fill gaps created when access to formal systems degree (especially during the election period), is blocked. but had little effect on official decision making. [page 151] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 127 Accountability was further weakened when À system that provides accountability between elected mayors were replaced by appointees the government and the Haïitian citizenry may of the Martelly administration, and municipal be the most important tool needed to build elections were continuously postponed. resilience. Had citizens been empowered . to demand better living conditions and risk Governments often make exaggerated promises . Lou . un . reduction measures as the urbanization process following major disasters, from which they . took place over the last 20 years, the earthquake may backpedal once the recovery plan is . : . might have had much less impact. prepared. In Haïti, the government made no such commitments, to no surprise of its To fully recover from the earthquake, and to citizens (especially the low-income population), address the conditions under which urbanization nor did it present a recovery plan. Agencies is occurring, will require a level of citizen made project-specific commitments that were engagement and government accountability that frequently not met, but neither were those is hard to imagine for Haïti, but which must be agencies held responsible for not meeting aspired to, as some leaders in Haïti do. Some them. Government monitoring was minimal. partners recognized this, and incorporated Reporting on recovery progress was localized, engagement activities (community planning and sporadic, project-specific, and rarely included community platforms were good examples), but comparisons to original commitments. The they must be plugged into a larger engagement affected population lacked benchmarks against system. which to hold government and agencies . 8 . ee 8 As a group, however, development partners did accountable, nor did the citizenry have the . . diras . not recognize the importance of institutional motivation or the means to do so. As a result, the Le it what th dinth weaknesses related to accountability and a Izenry NEW ON°Y Wal Ney read In NE paper, engagement, felt that addressing this situation saw with their own eyes, or “learned” through ; . k bility: ; | was outside the realm of their projects, or Dre secoue itity in any formal sense was realized that they did not have the resources argely absent. to build these capacities. Nor did they model Strengthening resilience was established as a good accountability by stepping in when goal by many agencies in Haiti. Resilience in this government failed to monitor and report on context means having the resources, systems, donor and government activities. Agencies and governance mechanisms that increase a instead concentrated on implementing their society’s capability to recover from shocks, at own interventions, while working around the both the local and national levels. Whether this underlying political conditions that in many happened, and the degree to which the systems ways led to the disaster and the demand for built up during recovery are sustainable, is their assistance. difficult to measure. Diverse efforts were made to engage local actors (mayors and neighborhood residence and groups) and to build local capacity, including through community platforms. Until decentralization advances considerably, the sustainability of these efforts will depend on continued external support. [page 152] [page 153] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 129 PE e e B. Recommendations from the First Two Years f Response and Recovery in Haïti Haïti embodies many of the factors that contribute to global vulnerability: It is rapidly urbanizing, low-income, hampered by fragile governance mechanisms and institutions, supported by an economy that is largely informal and that exhibits extreme disparities, and highly dependent on its external partners for both social and economic support. But it is not unique. Worldwide, population growth and unplanned urbanization in the fragile cities of developing economies, combined with the impacts of climate change, are causing a concentration of urban risk. The Haïti earthquake may have been a harbinger of the crises countries will face as disaster risks increase in parallel with this rapid urbanization. The shelter response and housing recovery experience in the first two years provide fertile ground for considering what may or may not work in future large- scale, urban housing recovery programs, remembering that what was successful in Haïti may not successful elsewhere, and vice versa. This section is an attempt to universalize the Haiti experience into recommendations that will help countries most at risk and their partners identify what they can do before disasters to develop recovery arrangements and after disasters to ensure that each recovery experience leaves vulnerable countries and cities increasingly more resilient. Recover resiliently humanitarian and housing recovery actors. “ Strengthening problem solving capacity is Plan recovery so that it serves as a bridge 8 . 18 P he B Cap y ns . key to building resilience. Reconstruction between humanitarian action and development nn . . n L . can take many years, so building capacity in and accelerates this transition. Maintain social . . . _. . government and civil society helps ensure that capital and minimize urban displacement by . . . . . . . resilient development continues in the future. reopening neighborhoods and adapting to informal . . : “ To reduce displacement, help households systems. Commit to a goal of strengthening : Le : reenter the housing market that they are resilience through recovery and give preference . | familiar with and can afford. For the rental to approaches that accelerate recovery from ket. b both the current disaster while leaving central and market, it may € necessary to support ot . the “demand side” (rental subsidies) and the regional governments, local governments, and . un . ns us . “supply side” (landlord subsidies) and provide communities more capable of coordinating with : : . technical assistance. each other and managing future events. # Consider registering affected households in "Base shelter and housing strategy on the public buildings or former neighborhoods, concept of a “one housing sector approach” not in internally displaced person (IDP) to reinforce the link between relief, camps, since some who are affected are not rehabilitation, and development. displaced. Put a priority on expenditures that " Develop humanitarian shelter and housing maintain social capital and facilitate safe recovery strategies jointly, so that they return and reoccupation of neighborhoods, can reinforce each other, and address such as rubble removal, risk reduction, basic gaps in coordination and funding between infrastructure, and repairs. [page 154] 130 / IVB. Recommendations from the First Two Years of Response and Recovery in Haïti “ The plan for housing recovery should offer with government to identify whether multiple shelter options, especially in the weaknesses in these systems contributed to urban context, and favor enabling housing the disaster and how to strengthen them and self-recovery. Funding and management model good accountability during the course systems must provide the flexibility needed of the recovery effort. to implement this approach. Subsidies should be structured to incentivize good choices, Recover strategica LLy such as safer reconstruction, and to leverage private and local resource mobilization. Clear government direction on lEcovery “ Households attempting self-recovery should not both informs the affected population and be left completely to their own devices; they ensures that partner investments contribute should be supported and monitored to ensure to strategic housing and urban development that they succeed. Transfer more financial goals. Early designation of a lead agency for resources directly to eligible households housing and urban recovery is key. À housing or landlords, ideally in tranches and on a recovery plan provides a necessary framework conditional basis, and support the expansion of for collaboration between central and local the owner-driven reconstruction model. governments and partners. Recovery policies = Projects should take advantage of the and arrangements established before a disaster . . make strategic recovery more likely. adaptability of urban systems, and avoid simply replacing lost assets or substituting # Ensure that a lead government agency for for local capacity. Governments and agencies housing recovery and reconstruction is should try to play an enabling role, guiding designated early on, with a clear mandate and and adding value to the efforts of local actors. the authority and ability to ensure delivery of = The “learning by doing” approach that an efficient, effective, and equitable housing international agencies practice should be recovery program. Technical assistance encouraged in local initiatives as well. Put to support the lead agency should be local agencies at the center of the housing coordinated among donors. recovery strategy to help build resilience and m The lead agency must immediately prepare ensure capacity exists to manage recovery a recovery plan for housing, informed by from future disasters. Work is needed in post-disaster assessments. The plan should advance of future urban disasters to develop be realistic, take the legal and organizational better models for urban self-recovery. context into consideration, and identify “ The international community may need to potential risks and mitigation measures. The consider how to better manage the transition plan should be developed in consultation between humanitarian action and recovery for with the affected population and be major disasters in weak states like Haïti. The endorsed by donors and the humanitarian cluster system may also need to be evaluated community, in situations where they will so that incentives between humanitarian and have a significant role. recovery agencies can be better aligned and # The housing recovery plan should be specific funding mechanisms can be rationalized. and strategic about roles and responsibilities # Building resiliently means, among other and about how available resources are to things, strengthening systems of engagement be allocated. An exit plan and schedule for and accountability between the government humanitarian and recovery actors can help and the population. Agencies should work ensure that a sense of urgency is maintained. [page 155] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 131 “ The success of recovery may dependonthe # Social media and other information tools capacity of levels of government to work should be used by governments to inform together. Understanding how to optimize their the housing strategy, to monitor the quality roles may require outside expertise. and acceptability of the housing solutions m Coordination can make recovery more produced, and to ensure that the intended efficient, but only if coordination entities beneficiaries are assisted. The international have the leadership, expertise, and systems community should analyze how humanitarian to function effectively. Coordination entities and reconstruction planning tools, such as can help integrate cluster and other agency the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) interventions; manage cross-cutting issues; and the disaster recovery framework, can and address common recovery impediments, be used to help governments plan recovery such as debris management and land issues. programs that also contribute to national # Inthe case of urban disasters, engage urban development goals. experts to analyze how physical, social, “Haiti and other countries should receive economic, and institutional factors will affect technical assistance to codify pre-disaster recovery. The analysis should cover housing, housing recovery arrangements, including land, and financing systems, both formal and policies and protocols, and to maintain data, informal, and identify assets (systems, skills, systems, and tools that will allow more effective institutions) that can be leveraged. planning and implementation of future disaster " Governments should exercise caution before recovery programs. launching ambitious physical planning “ There is a pressing need for an agreement on exercises for recovery; it may be more useful protocols or minimum standards for recovery to strengthen the regulation of existing land- planning and national-level coordination. use plans or to provide frameworks that The potential for the Shelter Cluster Strategic improve the coherence of reconstruction Advisory Group (SAG) to play an integrating activities on the ground. However, new plans policy role in those instances where are needed for greenfield sites and where government is unable to do so should be damage is extensive. assessed by international agencies. Initiatives =“ Promote urban recovery initiatives that such as the disaster recovery framework, a contribute to strategic urban development joint European Union (EU)/United Nations objectives. Strategic interventions are Development Programme (UNDP)/Global those that facilitate future investment and Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery contribute to desired development goals, such (GFDRR) effort to improve the planning and as quality infrastructure in low-risk target management of individual recovery programs development zones. and establish policies and organizational "In programming funds for housing, agencies arrangements in advance of a disaster, should analyze demand and consider long- should continue to advance and become term outcomes. Many larger-scale post- international standards. disaster housing projects built by government are abandoned over time or never occupied . because they don't satisfy beneficiaries” Recover equitably needs. The challenge is not to build houses, Governments should seek equity in recovery but to provide housing options that are programs and favor approaches that encourage economically and socially sustainable for both self-recovery and build up local institutions and owners and occupants. solutions that can reach scale. This may mean [page 156] 132 / IVB. Recommendations from the First Two Years of Response and Recovery in Haïti discouraging “showcase” projects until minimal “ Even where government does not control all assistance for priority affected households is the financial resources for housing recovery, fully funded. Empower households and local it should promote equity with partners and actors by supporting informed problem solving establish minimum and maximum standards. instead of providing ready-made solutions that However, uniformity should not be equated limit options. with lack of choice or involvement of households in their own recovery. # Use funding to recreate pre-disaster housing . Le . . . m Use the media and communications to status and improve housing construction . k ractices. while avoidine unfamiliar inform and motivate affected households. P ’ 8 Communications should be two-way so approaches. Governments should not . . : that the government can receive feedback. promise that recovery will make everyone . . homeowmner, or let donors do 50; the goal Messages should effectively explain recovery a ; ; Lu : should be to restore housing status policies, help manage expectations, and Un . oo. encourage self-recovery. Because ill-informed " Before piloting innovative housing designs, media can undermine support for the recovery construction methods, or credit mechanisms strategy, develop a communications strategy fr ouinene ren ans should for the media as well. make sure t Y wi not greaty increase costs " Communications should also be used to or draw agencies or government outside their . fields of expertise. Minimal modifications promote better recovery practices. Where to existing practices are more likely to be building standards are not widely enforced, or replicated and create less risk for affected many households will not receive assistance households to rebuild, use communications to promote ° self-enforcement of good building practices. “ Avoid recovery projects that create “islands : Lo . : . Avoid turning information on disaster risk of excellence,” but are too costly to reproduce reduction (DRR) into a “private good” without high subsidies. Concentrating . . ; | d : d available only in donor-sponsored projects. assistance re uces equity, coverage, an Instead, make DRR a “public good” widely sustainability. In contrast, area-based : : | Nu accessible to all. interventions led by local authorities or Le, . communities produce economies of scale “ The global humanitarian community should P . work to reach a common understanding of and create synergy among sector-specific . . . interventions on the ground urban shelter options and standards, including ‘ the applicability of the Sphere standards. An “ Leverage the distinct dynamics of . pe un _. h Le have di agreement is needed within the humanitarian cities, w . PEoP € ” Me response framework on a clearer set of shelter COping mec anIsms an leady access to options or approaches for urban settings and information, while being alert to conflicts and . LR ne on the country level in the context of the pre- discrimination and the situation of vulnerable ; . disaster recovery framework. groups. Cities operate on cash; create incentives for families to mobilize their own resources for recovery. Recover safely # Housing recovery should contribute to shared Understand the urban context and build on its prosperity, rather than foster resentment and dynamism. Promoting safe construction when further inequity among social groups. Seek a most housing is provided by the market does not measure of uniformity in eligibility rules and mean government becoming a homebuilder, but levels of housing financial assistance. rather government focusing on removing barriers [page 157] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 133 to safe construction practices. Disseminate Governments should focus first on providing guidance on reducing risk to acceptable levels information on risks and safe construction, widely and, if regulation is weak, encourage self- regulating market supply chains, and ensuring the safety of sites. enforcement. Le. “ Develop risk information in advance of “ Designate a lead agency for DRR early so it can disasters and complement it by post-disaster establish and communicate standards for DRR assessments conducted according to proper and coordinate their utilization in recovery. guidelines. While involving communities in The lead agency should coordinate but not risk assessments improves understanding of usurp the role of ministries and other agencies risks, the high-quality, low-scale hazard and to promote DRR in their respective sectors. exposure information needed for recovery = The lack of standards early on should not planning needs to be gathered and analyzed paralyze reconstruction planning or discourage before the disaster. self-recovery. Define standards incrementally # Use reconstruction to promote “reformative” as an understanding of the damage and its processes rather than just “restorative” ones. causes grows. Addressing the root causes of vulnerability m Carry out large-scale, continuous may require reform of organizations, legal communication to educate the public on best and regulatory frameworks, land-use practices for more resilient reconstruction. policy, markets, and supply chains. While Repeated, large-scale communication is these institutional changes cannot be fully critical to inform the public about risks, addressed during recovery, a commitment explain the importance of construction to “reformative reconstruction” by all codes and standards, and promote training stakeholders should be promoted. opportunities. “ Set policies for DRR and resilient Recover (cost) effectively reconstruction taking into consideration . . : how people perceive risks and how their Think holistically about recovery financing and vulnerability changes over time. use scarce public and donor resources in ways . that leverage private investment, including that of # Households are exposed to risks other than ep . 7. 8 . . . households. Public investments in risk reduction natural hazards (economic, security, etc.). The and basic infrastructure are often enough to government must understand the tradeoffs : : in housine. f that households and communities make and encourage private investment mn lousIng, or . : : example. Seek consistency in eligibility rules use its resources strategically to reduce risks | . associated with both its direct liabilities and and levels of financial assistance. Encourage all contingent liabilities such as housing. funding sources to align programming with the . a recovery plan, and—to ensure accountability— # Reconstruction should capitalize on the . track and report on results. short-term awareness of risk to permanently shift the risk culture. Engage universities, the " Donors must coordinate with the government private sector, and civil society organizations on programming financial resources for in identifying how to reverse the processes recovery and ensure that their programming that lead to extreme vulnerability. is consistent with the recovery framework. “ Agencies should recognize that promoting This may mean helping prepare the recovery safe housing does not necessarily mean framework or reconstruction plan, which must building safe homes, but rather removing be done in a neutral manner, without favoring the barriers to safe construction practices. to any particular partner. [page 158] 134 / IVB. Recommendations from the First Two Years of Response and Recovery in Haïti # Use the financial plan as a reality check, low-income borrowers, in the early stages of to ensure that the goals of the recovery recovery. Realize that households are more framework are attainable. The tracking system risk-averse after a disaster due to economic should use feedback loops, including with uncertainties and trauma, and agencies are beneficiaries, to adjust activities, costs, and better off dedicating their efforts to their core projection of disbursements over time. areas of expertise. “ Recovery resources are a gift to the affected "The recovery financing framework has to country; even if many agencies control their balance equity, coverage, and the need own funds, they should report them to the for scale. Rehousing extremely vulnerable government and financial tracking should populations is likely to cost the most, so include them. identify options and compare their cost- . effectiveness. Engage the affected population = Track all reconstruction resources and Le. k 828 POP in this analysis. Governments should progress centrally, and report results regularly ! | . . . Le . accumulate information over time that will to the public. Evaluate whether existing public . . allow them to evaluate the cost-effectiveness financial management systems are adequate : . : . . . of alternative post-disaster housing or a specialized monitoring or tracking system : . : : . | L . interventions and prepare disaster risk is required. Consider the option of hiring a f : : . . Fe nancing and insurance strategies to prepare third party to conduct monitoring. . for future disasters. " Public communications on the use of # Use public and donor funding strategically to reconstruction funds should be continuous leverage private financing, including that of and substantive so that the public knows households, and to incentivize good practices funding is being properly used. This helps like safer reconstruction. Seek household avoid suspicions about misuse of funds, and private sector input to the financial plan which can undermine governance at a crucial to identify how these funds will be spent time. and where public sector leveraging is really “ Avoid financial experiments, such as creating needed. Full public financing is often not new credit programs for reconstruction by required. [page 159] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 135 PE e e C. Final Questions There is a risk that this report presents a series of recommendations for action in future disasters that are already fully understood yet are as equally difficult to implement in new situations as they were in Haïti. This does not invalidate the recommendations, but may not help government officials and experts decide how to prioritize their policy making, decision making, and coordination efforts in a disaster context. It is heartening to see significant improvements in institutional approaches and recovery strategies in certain aspects of disaster response and recovery since the Haïti earthquake. It demonstrates that while the “international community” does not always act in concert, as a community, member organizations do apply what they have learned from their own interventions and those of other agencies over time. What is important is that this new knowledge be tested, validated, and incorporated into standard operating procedures. Many questions arise from the Haïti experience that are worthy of debate. À few critical questions are posed and answers proposed below, to conclude this recommendations section. Is there a minimum standard for government manner with the affected population. participation or ownership of an effort such 5. À presumption of good faith, and a as the Haïti reconstruction effort? willingness by government to provide The findings from this analysis suggest that there reasonable accommodation to the pressures should be minimum standards in order for the international agencies themselves are under, international community to provide significant in particular, to program their resources in a support to a recovery effort. These standards timely manner and to show results. could include: 1. Involvement by the government in What is the minimum standard of developing a recovery framework or plan performance that governments should that provides guidance on policy, financing, require of the humanitarian agencies and and implementation, and a commitment international community? from the government to oversee its It is reasonable for governments to expect a implementation. standard of performance from international 2. Agreement with the government on an agencies, which may vary between humanitarian equitable assistance strategy, at a minimum and recovery activities. These standards could for the vulnerable population. include that: 3. Action by the government to address, at 1. Agencies provide adequate, coordinated least in an interim manner, key recovery support to the government so that it can impediments, such tenancy issues, access to exercise its due leadership to develop and land, and defining what is acceptable risk. oversee the recovery framework. Agencies 4. Agreement on and participation in an should avoid creating expectations in the accountability framework to engage and affected population that governments will communicate honestly and in a timely later have to fulfill. [page 160] 136 / IV C. Final Questions 2. International agencies provide financial be addressed and so that government and support to the recovery plan, or at a agencies have feedback on the impact of minimum to align their interventions with their interventions. the recovery plan, and to participate in 2. The population should have the coordination and accountability mechanisms. accountability system agreed with the Agencies should consider accountability to government explained to them, including the government and the affected population how it will be administered and accessed. to be at least as important as accountability . . . . : 3. Assistance should not contribute to existing to their funding sources. Lu. . . : social inequities. The more vulnerable 3. Agencies work collaboratively, are well within the affected population deserve informed of the context and relevant good f jal dentification of . d id competine with one preferential treatment. Identification o pare an avol fi N dk dvi these individuals should be carried out in a 2nomer or giving conricting pocy aCVIcE. culturally knowledgeable manner. 4. Agencies maintain an adequate level of 4. Ifthe recovery program creates continuity and professional capacity in ne : opportunities for funding, employment, agency staff. Lo . training, or other forms of involvement, 5. With the government, agencies agree how the affected population, existing local they will use their interventions to build organizations, and/or groups formed by or sustainable local capacity and engage local for the affected population should be given governments and the local private sector, preferential access. Outside agencies should and define the timing of and conditions not do for people things that they can do for for the winding down of international . themselves. assistance. 6. Donors give deference to national Should conditions ever be put on sovereignty and provide reasonable humanitarian or recovery assistance? accommodation to the political pressures | | | : governments are subjected to, including Post-disaster interventions are rarely subject to at times having to respond to regional and the same types of conditionality as development partisan interests. projects, that is, that the funding is provided once certain conditions are met by the What is the minimum owed to the affected government. The need for urgent action, and the population? humanitarian imperative itself, generally makes it infeasible and even unethical to do so. The affected population deserves the consideration of both the government and At the same time, the response in Haiti international agencies with respect to the demonstrated that the timeliness, effectiveness, following: and sustainability of recovery interventions in . particular can be seriously undermined by the 1. The affected population deserves to be : : . La L | failure to make specific policy decisions or to put informed about what they can expect in . Lu ni . . . in place interim measures that address critical terms of assistance and what is required LC . bottlenecks. of them, through regular, authoritative communications. Communications with Even when the need is obvious, ît can be very the affected population should be two-way, difficult for governments to make important so that their questions and grievances can policy or regulatory decisions in the post- [page 161] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 137 disaster context. The international community The United Nations Office for the Coordination should perhaps consider whether there are of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is promoting any situations in which relief and recovery the development of pre-disaster arrangements assistance would be held back until key for humanitarian interventions through its government decisions are made. Minimum Preparedness Package initiative and other activities. Ample opportunity also exists A more constructive approach is to work with . . P . PP y . for international agencies to work together governments before a disaster to develop . : .. . . with governments to support the design and recovery policies and strategies that provide . . : . implementation of recovery frameworks that a framework for post-disaster planning and . . . . . . include pre-disaster arrangements for recovery, implementation. Pre-disaster recovery planning . . . as a Way to encourage more efficient, effective, and arrangements are essential elements of the Le . and resilient recovery programs in the future. recovery framework concept. [page 162] [page 163] Re “ D. Fat RE ei # A 7 «AC \ ] Le nn. é 139 [page 164] [page 165] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / 141 Case Study 1: . . Katye Neighborhood Upgrading and Recovery Program . . in Port-au-Prince Well-planned investments in planning, site infrastructure, and disaster risk reduction (DRR) have both immediate and longer-term benefits at the neighborhood level. Background The Katye Neighborhood Upgrading and Recovery Program (Katye means “neighborhood” in Haitian Creole) was a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (0FDA)-funded effort that aimed to meet the basic humanitarian needs of earthquake- affected households in Ravine Pintade by providing a safe, habitable neighborhood and creating the conditions for the upgrading of essential services. OFDA has promoted neighborhood-level interventions in post-disaster response worldwide. The program was implemented by Global Communities (GC) (formerly known as CHF International) and Project Concern International (PCI). Ravine Pintade is situated between downtown Port-au-Prince and Pétionville. The primary area of implementation was about seven hectares bound by Rue Nord Alexis (west), Avenue Martin Luther King (east), Avenue Poupelard (north), and Ravine Pintade (south). The land slopes steeply toward the ravine (see irregular line on map). An estimated 574 households lived in the primary area, and an estimated 2,000 households lived in the extended impact area.15 About 90 percent of the Ravine Pintade Location of Ravine Pintade population was displaced by the earthquake, > à most to the Champ de Mars camp 2 km $ away and others to informal camps along S Avenue Poupelard. The building habitability u - | À assessment designated 56 percent of homes : . P as “red” and 37 percent as “yellow.”1#8 20 NE | GC and PCI had both worked in Haiti J Re 4 previously. Since the early 19905, GC à EL / Ê had worked on urban redevelopment : Br 5i + ie and reconstruction, community-based =. Pam # L- infrastructure, waste management, employment generation, and emergency response. GC's practice was to partner with municipalities, governments, communities, and the private sector. At the request of OFDA, GC began working in Port-au-Prince immediately after the earthquake to clear roads and carry out demolition. PCI, which implements humanitarian and disaster risk management (DRM) programs in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, also responded to the earthquake with funding from OFDA. Before Katye, PCI had already worked for nine months in Ravine Pintade and surrounding areas. 18 Other Katye partners included Cordaid, PADF/Miyamoto, and J&]. See Table CS1.1 for a full accounting of partner contributions. 37 The extended impact area was bounded by Rue Nord Alexis, Avenue Martin Luther King, Avenue Poupelard, and Avenue John Brown Enumeration, mapping, DRR, and shelters were not provided in the extended area. 18 The Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications (MTPTC) program for assessing the habitability of houses and coding them by color is described in Section IIL.C. [page 166] 142 | Annex L: Case Studies Approach The Katye program combined humanitarian response with the establishment of a platform for longer- term recovery. Katye’s neighborhood approach to internally displaced persons (IDP) return reflected the following principles: # Use a community-driven, neighborhood-level approach to providing earthquake-affected households with healthy, habitable, and secure living space “ Recognize land-use norms and the “law” of communities, even if they are informal “ Decrease vulnerability to natural hazards and water-borne disease “ Involve and reinforce the local government and the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications (MTPTC) and link them with community leaders “ Prioritize the most vulnerable and integrate protection principles in settlement planning and management? Katye employed a participatory process to plan and rebuild the project area, providing investments in improved services and risk reduction. The program also provided jobs and other economic beneñits, clinical health services, cholera prevention and referral, and protection. In all, 1,984 families were directly assisted by Katye. The project components were the following: Enumeration Land-use maps were developed and demographic information was collected. (This information passed to the municipality at the end of the project.) Participatory Community members participated in mapping, enumeration, planning, and making decisions planning and about placement of shelters, retaining walls, footpaths, drainage lines, and lighting, among other engagement of issues. property owners Planning included negotiation of concessions from nearly 400 individual property owners, which resulted in: Reconfiguration of property boundaries and creation of easements to accommodate septic tanks, DRR infrastructure, expansion of plots that didn't meet minimum requirements, and wastewater and drainage lines Donations of land to enable widening of footpaths, and installation of communal sanitary blocks and water points Rubble clearance Both heavy machinery and manual labor were used. Terracing and About 2.5 km of retaining walls were built to stabilize and redefine the landscape. Terracing retaining walls converted slopes into stable platforms for residential uses, footpaths, benches, solar lighting, sanitary facilities, community water points, and vending/market space. Storm drainage Underground drainage lines that emptied into the ravine were installed to prevent standing water and stabilize land, as recommended by a geotechnical survey conducted for the project. Footpaths, steps, Footpaths and stairs were built to improve interior circulation in the neighborhood. and footbridges 1 According to the Inter-Agency Steering Committee, Protection in the humanitarian context refers to activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of all individuals in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law, regardless of their age, gender, social ethnic, national, religious, or other background. [page 167] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / 143 Neighborhood Five city streets that entered the neighborhood were rehabilitated (a high priority for the access community), providing escape routes, storm drainage pathways, and access for services such water delivery and rubbish collection. (Weekly trash collection began within one month of completing the project.) These investments were also expected to increase property values. Shelter solutions Two hundred “yellow” houses were repaired. Two hundred sixty one-story T-shelters designed by the Dutch nongovernmental organization (NGO) Cordaid were installed, with enclosed areas that ranged from 12 m° to 24 m°. Seventy-five two-story metal-framed T-shelters were built with exterior staircases and a floor area of 11.9 m2 on each floor (24 m° of total interior livable space). Two-story shelters allowed families to combine very small parcels and receive a larger living area. Water, sanitation, Five permanent water points were installed, and community water committees were and hygiene establishment and trained. (Water price from the points was 20 percent below retail price.) (WASH) À sanitation system with 100 bucket flush toilets was installed and connected to septic tanks and soak pits. Rainwater harvesting was installed to provide low-cost, non-potable water. Protection The short-term needs of vulnerable populations were addressed. Health À primary care clinic was rehabilitated and staffed with Haïitian doctors and nurses and community health workers. Project Costs Table CS1.1 shows the contributions of all partners by component. The shelter and settlements component included costs for mobilization, enumeration and mapping, site reconfiguration, geotechnical survey, and shelter solutions!” The average direct shelter solution cost per beneñciary household in the primary impact area was $2,575. Table CS1.1. Katye Program Costs by Component and Partner, in US$ million Shelter and Rubble DRR Intervention Partner settlements removal infrastructure WASH Protection Health Total Multiple USAID/OFDA 2.07 115 2.50 1.50 0.75 0.63 8.60 interventions Single-story : Cordaid* 0.60 0.60 shelters PADF/ House repairs Miyamoto* 0.30 0.30 Impasse 138 Office of neighborhood Transition 0.09 0.09 Initiatives (USAID)* Sanitation J&] 0.07 0.07 Total investment 2.97 1.15 AT) 1.57 0.75 0.63 9.66 31% 12% 27% 16% 8% 7% 100% * Numbers were provided by partners and do not include overhead. 10 Site preparations for shelters, including retention walls, leveling, drainage, and 75 foundations, are included in DRR costs. [page 168] 144 | Annex I: Case Studies The Katye program served as a successful proof of concept of the integrated neighborhood approach (INA) to IDP return. At the same time, there are important cost management issues that should be kept in mind when considering project replication. # In analyzing the cost-effectiveness of a project such as Katye, full opportunity costs should be considered, including transaction costs associated with having separate agencies implementing project components. GC and PCI took advantage of partnership opportunities, while maïintaining the integrity of the overall process. (It should be noted that Table CS1.1 does not include all overhead costs of partner organizations.) # Project costs should be compared to the full cost of keeping these families in camps, including both the out-of-pocket costs of service provision in camps and camp management plus the opportunity costs for the family of living in a camp. Project costs are likely to be much lower, especially over the medium term. m Lastly, the Katye model’s costs and benefits could be benchmarked against other slum upgrading initiatives, which are often much more expensive and time-consuming. At the same time, there may be opportunities for cost management in this type of project, such as the following: “ Putting more emphasis on leveraging community resources, through technical assistance and housing finance, although timeliness of results might be compromised. # Limiting the number of organizations intervening in a particular neighborhood, or at aminimum sharing certain tasks. For example, at least four other organizations worked in Ravine Pintade in activities unrelated to Katye, each collecting data on the population. “ Avoiding subdividing infrastructure projects by neighborhood. Working with one construction firm over a larger area would have reduced costs significantly. “ Realizing that the most vulnerable populations live in the densest areas with the highest slopes. Mitigation in these areas is more costly, especially if relocation is not an option, but these interventions also have the greatest impact in terms of risk reduction. Accomplishments Among the most successful aspects of the Katye program were the following. “ Reconfiguration of neighborhood. Land concessions provided 1,892 m2 of space for drainage, pathways, cooking, washing, and other uses. Retaining walls increased available Land by 17 percent. Reconfiguration provided space for additional rental structures. À previously chaotic settlement was provided with identifiable streets and plots, which should facilitate future efforts to regularize property. # Infrastructure improvements. Retaining walls, stairs, and drainage canals provided safe living spaces and increased resiliency to future disasters. Investments in water quantity and quality provided nearly universal access to potable water. The sanitation system enables access to latrines and disinfection of waste in a community that previously relied on open defecation. Footpaths and alleys facilitate the provision of public services, including solid waste removal, water delivery, and law enforcement. [page 169] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 145 Corvington Neighborhood of Ravine Pintade During and After Reconfiguration Process ! | _ k = "1 pr ; Ê = m'y Te L| &i [Te n : LE Va” | ee | | RÉ æ PB." , | L— N Ve E “ Public health improvements. In addition to providing primary health care locally, community- based behavior change models led to adoption of healthy practices, such as hand washing. Cholera incidence in the community was minimal, with no fatalities during the nationwide epidemic. # Increase in livelihood opportunities. Improved access and neighborhood safety increased economic activity. Public investments stimulated household investment in housing and businesses. # Community, local government, and MTPTC involvement. MTPTC provided input on all plans, the municipality of Port-au-Prince received enumeration data for the neighborhood, and the project led to a strong sense of community ownership and positive recognition. “ Serving as a demonstration area-based project. Through site visits, and sharing of methodologies and cost information, the project served as a demonstration site for donors and practitioners in the sector. Subsequent projects by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the American Red Cross, the World Bank, and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), among others, cited the guidance provided by Katye. Lessons Learned Rely on informal practices in the absence of formal law or documentation. Given the lack of cadastral data and documentation of residents, and a vague legal framework, and after a previous attempt at mapping the neighborhood by a local company had failed, Katye opted to verify land ownership through participatory mapping and consensus when ownership documentation was inadequate. Community familiarity with the area and careful removal of rubble enabled Katye to efficiently reestablish land claims with a high degree of accuracy. Build trust by demonstrating immediate results. The relationships and bona fides of the project team (due especially to PCTS previous work in the neighborhood), and the rapid start-up of the first phase, provided early tangible examples of what residents could expect from the project. Have zero tolerance of manipulation by community members. When benefñciaries tried to pit agencies against each another, and even used threats or acts of disruption, to exact more assistance, a policy was established that work would stop in any sub-neighborhood where threats or extortion were [page 170] 146 / Annex I: Case Studies experienced, while activities in other sub-neighborhoods would continue. Residents in the affected neighborhood were responsible for managing these situations before work could restart. Be flexible. Katye technical staff, contractors, and community leaders made modifications when rubble removal and construction exposed previously hidden features and issues. OFDA also remained flexible, which provided significant room for GC and PCI to respond to the realities on the ground. Crowd-source the community for solutions. Knowing that the construction would temporarily displace families as their plots were under construction, the project proposed creating on-site “hotels.” When it was not viewed as a viable solution, Katye “crowd-sourced” the relocation task to community members, who made arrangements with friends, family, and each other for temporary housing at no cost to the program. Temporary relocation proved to be easily handled when done in partnership with community leaders. Don’t expect existing norms, standards, or “best practices” to provide guidance in a densely populated urban area. Plot sizes in Ravine Pintade ranged from 8 m2 to 40 m°. The smaller plots, where the majority of the neighborhood’s most vulnerable population resided, compelled the readjustment of shelter designs below the 3.5 m2 per person reference provided by Sphere standards. Conclusion Although post-disaster humanitarian assistance necessarily focuses on immediate needs, the Katye experiences suggests that the definition of a humanitarian intervention should be expanded in urban settings to include area-based disaster risk reduction and mitigation through strategic investments in infrastructure. The Katye program also demonstrates the value of taking a comprehensive, participatory approach that creates the conditions for longer-term, community-driven, sustainable neighborhood recovery. Material for this case study was contributed by Ann Lee, who worked for Global Communities in Haïti as the Program Director of the Katye program from 2010 to 2013. [page 171] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 147 Case Study 2: . . . . Experience with Rental Assistance Programming A delayed but coordinated effort between the government and the humanitarian community that successfully reintegrated thousands of camp residents Background Rental assistance was included as an emergency sheltering option in the Shelter Cluster Response Plan for Haïti distributed in January 2010, but was not implemented in earnest until July 2011. Based partly on experience in other humanitarian responses, some humanitarian organizations voiced concerns that promoting this option created risks that were not easily mitigated, including: “ Price pressure on the rental market m Lack of sustainability “ Difficulty of ensuring the safety and decency of rented accommodations " Contribution to the rise of new informal settlements Despite these concerns, it became evident over time that rental assistance programming would be an essential and necessary tool for helping families move out of unsafe emergency shelter conditions in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. Approach First 18 months. Rental assistance was first implemented in mid-2010, following a request from the government to the Haïitian Red Cross and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to help households in the Carradeux and Terrain Toto camps find better housing options." À series of options were identified from which families could choose, depending on their preferences and situation. These options included: (i) the construction of a Tshelter on their own land and/or land made available to them for a minimum period of two years, (ii) repairs to make their previous living quarters habitable, (iii) return to their province of origin outside of Port-au- Prince, and (iv) one year of rental support in Port-au-Prince. Each household was also offered a modest resettlement grant to help them address their most pressing needs, such as the purchase of furniture, payment of school fees, or paying off debts. In recognition of the fact that restoring housing and livelihoods go hand in hand, a livelihood grant was also provided to help people establish or reestablish a livelihood activity, so that they would be able to pay the next year’s rent.” Households were asked to arrange their preferred shelter solution, whether finding a rental unit and negotiating the rent with the landlord or arranging to move in with a family member. À monitoring 21 [FRC, 2013, “Return and Relocation Programme: Study of the programme’s impact on the lives of participating families opting for cash grant rental support, 12 months after moving out of internally displaced persons camps,” http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info/2013/ download/Final_Return-Relocation-Impact-study-2(1).pdf. 12 Alternative Shelter Solutions video explains IFRC's self-sheltering program in Haiti, http://wwwyoutube.com/watch?v=ktoCRc-iqqg 23 Rental payments in Haïti are normally made in advance for a 6- or 12-month lease period. [page 172] 148 / Annex I: Case Studies program was set up, from which teams were dispatched to check on building safety and to ensure access to sanitation in the rental locations identified by the households. Regular follow-up visits were scheduled during the first year after the household relocated to the housing unit. The IFRC expanded this approach to other camps and informally helped other agencies define their own rental subsidy strategy. By the end of the first 18 months, fewer than 2,000 households had been relocated to durable solutions in this way. Second 18 months. Beginning in mid-2011, rental assistance started to be recognized as an effective strategy for helping families move out of IDP camps. The new Martelly administration took an interest in the approach, and, in July 2011, the Interim Haïti Recovery Commission (IHRC) approved and the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) funded the government-led Rehabilitation of 16 Neighborhoods and Voluntary Return of Residents from 6 Camps (16/6) Project that scaled up the use of rental subsidies to six camps. In October 2011, the Inter-Agency Return Working Group was established in Port-au-Prince to provide a forum where agencies implementing camp closure programs could discuss the challenges they were encountering and work together to establish good practices."* Once the Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics (UCLBP) (Housing and Public Building Construction Unit) was created in late 2011, it jointly chaired the Return Working Group with the Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster. À toolkit was developed to guide efforts to scale up rental subsidies. Nearly all agencies provided a $500 grant to cover one year of rent and other incentives.1% The use of a “keep the change” policy for the rental grant created an incentive for households to negotiate the lowest possible rent with landlords. Through this coordinated effort, rental subsidy and camp closure initiatives were implemented in the camps targeted by the 16/6 Project and others, particularly those identified as priorities by the new administration, such camps located in the Champs de Mars in downtown Port-au-Prince. Accomplishments While the rental assistance programming was aimed principally at helping IDPs move from emergency shelters in camps to durable housing solutions in urban neighborhoods, it also helped support the upgrading of the rental housing stock, by serving as a demand-side subsidy to the rental housing market. The external evaluation of the program found that 77 percent of the landlords had made upgrades and investments in their property to comply with rental subsidy program requirements. According to the evaluation, this showed that the program had economic, safety, and quality of life impacts." As of early 2013, more than 30,000 households had benefited from rental subsidies and Left the IDP camps." At that point, funding was committed to support more than 25,000 additional subsidies. 1% Catholic Relief Services, Concern Worldwide, IFRC, the International Organization for Migration (I0M), J/P Haitian Relief Organization, and World Vision were the key agencies in the Return Working Group 25 Fitzgerald, Emmett, 2012, “Helping Families, Closing Camps - Using Rental Support Cash Grants and Other Housing Solutions to End Displacement in Camps. À Tool Kit of Best Practice and Lessons Learned Haiti 2010-2012.” 2% Jeremy Condor, Charles Juhn, and Raj Rana, 2013, “External Evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach Applied to Return and Relocation Programs in Haïti.” 197 UICLBP and Shelter and CCCM Clusters, 2013, “Fact Sheet,” http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info/jl/pdf/2013/Cluster-CCCMShelter_ Avril-2013.pdf. [page 173] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 149 Findings The rental assistance programming was one of success stories of the Haïti earthquake response, despite its late launch and slow start-up. Below are some of the findings from the first 36 months. Strength and opportunities “ Rental subsidies were effective at reaching some of the most vulnerable households, that is, urban renters who lived in informal neighborhoods at the time of the earthquake.!°# m Rental subsidies helped families find safe and dignified housing solutions of their choice outside of IDP camps, whether in their prior neighborhood or in another part of the city or country. “ This option helped reintegrate households into the preexisting rental housing market with which they were familiar. “ Rental subsidies treated affected individuals as agents in their own recovery, able to make realistic decisions about “acceptable risks,” and thereby supported self-recovery. “ Rental assistance also injected cash into local markets, and created a powerful stimulant to private investment in construction and rehabilitation in affected neighborhoods. Threats and weaknesses “ The rental subsidy program couldn’t guarantee that people were rehoused in safe housing. There was evidence that some renters occupied yellow- or red-tagged houses with painted-over Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications (MTPTC) safety tags, but reinspecting houses as part of the program was not feasible.1?? “ The program also couldn’t guarantee that people stayed in the homes where they were rehoused. After one year, 75 percent of the families were not in the rental accommodation approved under the subsidy scheme.2° (On the other hand, once the year ended, families were free to move.) “ Rental subsidies may have contributed to the creation of new informal settlements, when beneficiaries used the cash to acquire housing or land in settlements such as Canaan. À related but unsubstantiated concern was that existing renters were evicted because subsidy recipients could pay more. # Because much had happened during the first 18 months with T-shelters, rental subsidies became almost the only rehousing solution offered during the second 18 months. “ There was no technical assistance on the “supply side,” that is, to optimize the use of subsidy funds by landlords or to encourage investment in repair or construction of rental units to absorb the new demand. Delays in starting the program likely created excess rental supply, but there probably should have been an effort to support the production of new rental housing stock. “ The program had high transaction costs, including from inspections and monitoring, which were necessary to address the requirements of donors.22! 2% CARE Shelter Need Evaluation, 2010. 2% Fitzgerald, Emmett, 2012, “Helping Families, Closing Camps - Using Rental Support Cash Grants and Other Housing Solutions to End Displacement in Camps,” p. 52. . perl evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach Applied to Return and Relocation Programs in Haïti.” [page 174] 150 / Annex I: Case Studies Conclusion Rental subsidy programming was slow to evolve into a viable, scalable approach to rehousing displaced households in Haiti, but once launched, demonstrated the power of cash programming in an urban environment. At the same time, the implementation delay may have been necessary to allow the rental market to revive. Future recovery programs should investigate whether the revival of the rental market can be accelerated and how assisting the supply side (rental unit owners) can be helpful. Material for this case study was contributed by Xavier Genot, consultant to the IFRC in Haïti from 2010 to 2011. [page 175] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 151 Case Study 3: . . The Canaan Settlement in Croix-des-Bouquets-: The spontaneous development of a new Haïtian town SALES Ne SPORE He. UE Se Braugete DAS Me 4 no :$ & VAE A di: PE À ., A. PP LE MRC Sophie L 27 2% j PTS RARES PMR AT - pi Saintehars ” DT. Bien Aime Le ue ssa 1 | A? AO = : 15; ait O Gui} Gares fie see = s ss pue 2 2) . : i ane = OC 'epon 6 Terre] à pee TA PR dr 4 a 3avéne Che Lalteau Ÿ ET FAT RCE | or he PA ed > sde CSA el PS No L - » A1 MS re 4 Zone Covered by the Declaration of Public Utility Background In 2010, Croix-des-Bouquets was home to the largest not-yet-urbanized zone in the vicinity of the Port- au-Prince metropolitan area and probably the area that experienced the greatest changes following the January 2010 earthquake. This happened when the new city of Canaan arose from the dry, vacant cul-de-sac plain over a period of less than two years.2% Following the earthquake, the government was pressured to identify land where displaced urban households from Port-au-Prince could be relocated. The United States (U.S.) military and the US. Agency for International Development (USAID) were involved in the decision making, along with the Interim Haïti Commission for Shelter and Reconstruction, a Haïtian committee created by then- President Préval in January 2010. An agreement was reach that the government should take a zone of private land that had been envisioned as a tourist area (in 1971) and later as a modern mixed residential and industrial area (circa 2000), but which had never been developed. On March 22, 2010, the government issued a Declaration of Public Utility (equivalent to a declaration of eminent domain) over 7,450 hectares of private land between Bon Repos and Cabaret, along National Route 1. The next month, the “official” Camp Corail opened in a portion of this land. 202 This case study is based on: Noël Richener, 2012, “Reconstruction et environnement dans la région métropolitane de Port-au-Prince: Cas de Canaan ou la naissance d’un quartier ex-nihilo.” 293 For the purpose of this document, “Canaan” refers to the area encompassing Canaan, Jerusalem, Onaville, and Saint Christophe. [page 176] 152 / Annex L: Case Studies Approach Camp Corail-Cesselesse, conceived originally as a temporary settlement for 5,000 people including many who needed to be evacuated from unsafe conditions at the Pétionville Club, was the first sanctioned occupation of the public land. Camp Corail originally offered shelter in tents and basic temporary services. Over time, just over 2,100 Tshelters were constructed, as were facilities for more permanent services, including schools and a market. United Nations (UN) agencies (UNICEF, the International Organization for Migration [IOM]) and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (Oxfam, World Vision) delivered this construction. The availability of services and the presence of international agencies attracted a population to the zone other than the households officially selected to live there. Initially, informal settlers located just outside the formal camp and were able to access some of the camp's services. Canaan, in contrast, was a spontaneous appropriation of space. Similar in many ways to informal permanent settlements throughout the metropolitan area, it was settled originally with tents and temporary structures built with tarps, which were slowly replaced using the normal Haïtian version of confined masonry construction. Unlike those living in Camp Corail, however, the residents of Canaan understood it was a “neighborhood in the making.” Even though occupancy in Canaan was not formally recognized by Haïitian authorities, there was safety in numbers and therefore a low probability that anyone would be evicted from the area. The settlement of Canaan was driven by both the need for relocation after the earthquake and opportunism. Some settlers were fleeing internally displaced person (IDP) camps and chaotic post- earthquake conditions in Port-au-Prince and were willing to settle in Canaan even though it lacked formal infrastructure, since the conditions were not that different from those in many informal neighborhoods in the metropolitan area. Forced evictions from camps contributed to Canaan's growth. For renters (including some who anecdotally bought the land with their rental subsidies), Canaan offered an unprecedented opportunity to become property owners. Some of those who have constructed in Canaan never intended to live there, but came looking for a speculative investment and had the means to mobilize resources for construction, allowing them to become home “owners” and possibly to rent out the house. Shortly after the land became public domain, areas were marked out by people most likely not from camps. Gangs took over zones, which they then “resold” to people looking for single plots. There was speculation that some of these groups were raising funds for political candidates during the 2010-2011 campaign period. In 2012, the cost of a plot was reported to range between 1,500 and 150,000 Haitian gourdes (approximately $37 to $3,700 at that time). One buyer paid $2,440 for 400 m°? (one-tenth of an acre).24 Of the 28,500 plots counted in October 2013, approximately 50 percent were occupied. AI but a few were considered “sold.” Accomplishments In February 2011, an inter-cluster report estimated that 10,000 households, over 100,000 people, were estimated to be living in Canaan. In addition, the Corail Camp housed 8,900 people in 2,100 households. (Although when Canaan, Onaville, and Jerusalem were removed from the I0OM 204 Groupe UL.R.D. 2013, “How does one become the owner of a plot of land in Canaan?” [page 177] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 153 displacement report in October 2013, a census of these three areas in September 2013 counted more than 64,000 individuals in just over 14,000 households.2) Plans for the development of the northern edge of the city had been proposed for years before the earthquake; however, the location, scale, and speed of development outpaced the government’s ability to either respond to the uncontrolled land grab or frame the growth that was taking place. No part of the Haitian government-not Ministère de la Planification et de La Coopération Externe (MPCE) (Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation), not the Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire (CIAT) (Interministerial Committee for Territorial Planning), and not the Municipality of Croix-des-Bouquets—intervened in a substantive manner in the first two years after the earthquake. The most forceful, and necessary, response from the government was the establishment of a police station near the site. While the international community recognized what was happening at Corail, no donor proposed an intervention strategy for the zone, nor effectively supported government to do so. (Agencies could not have intervened without a mandate from the government.) The focus of donor interventions after the earthquake was on either repair and reconstruction in damaged neighborhoods or development of proprietary small-scale new settlement projects (20-200 houses). While the informal urbanization of Canaan met some conditions of effective recovery (having been financed exclusively by households and reaching significant scale, for example), and would have benefited from technical assistance on planning and disaster risk reduction (DRR) and from public investment in basic services, such interventions did not fit easily into the assistance plan of any donor or group of donors. At Canaan, local organizations arose to fill a range of functions. They controlled and facilitated the distribution of land and carried out such functions as water management, road “design” and rehabilitation, conflict management, sanitation, and reforestation. They also fought against densification of the site and for the protection of the environment. Basic services provided by communities or through private initiatives included electricity distribution, water kiosks, and markets. Canaan quickly became a new city, unregulated by any urban development or construction norms, with a mix of shelter and housing types ranging from temporary shelters to permanent construction. By late 2011, over half the sites had at least started permanent construction. By October 2013, the census counted 134 churches, 126 schools, and 242 wholesale and retail locations. Findings Canaan symbolizes both the ability of a population “to build the city on its own” and the disappointments of the reconstruction process. The new city provided the opportunity of land occupation to tens of thousands and they have taken up the offer. However, the city was created without prior planning; offers no security of tenure; lacks water, sanitation, and other public services; exists on an environmentally fragile site with significant disaster risks; offers limited opportunities for livelihood; and is accessible to Port-au-Prince only by expensive motor vehicles operating on imported leaded gasoline. While Haïitians will mobilize when opportunities are presented, what they have created demonstrates almost none of the characteristics of a good urbanization site. 205 [OM, 2013, “Displacement Tracking Matrix, V2.0 Update, 30 September 2013.” [page 178] 154 / Annex I: Case Studies Canaan, with Corail Camp on Horizon, 2013 -p ani à , LR = _ per nn L —. — re EN 1 : Ne Ts prenne nie rom, . = és 7 = 2e bass \ : PR Ds © ve ET it PET er mn RARE LE LE mn SU De 5 AE ia = Re Sn rase de ER. — D “0 RE ET Photo credit: UN-Habitat The future of Canaan is still in flux. Government authorities are well aware that it is not possible to go back, but they are also aware that any movement forward could serve to legitimize future illegal occupations. The cost of a proper urban development program on the site is estimated at more than $50 million. Given the cost, and the fact that the site is now occupied and is being managed by those who have settled there, it is clear that establishing an effective and sustainable development process for Canaan will require broad consensus on objectives by a range of national and local authorities, as well as by potential donors and assistance agencies. The development of Canaan reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the informal system in Haïti, including the ability to organize and mobilize resources. Understanding what has taken place there provides useful insights on informal recovery and development processes in Haiti and elsewhere. In a country frequently described as aid dependent, it demonstrates that much happens without external assistance, based solely on choices made by individuals and groups. It also demonstrates the limits of what people can do for themselves. Certain responsibilities necessarily fall to the public sector, such as the ordering of public space, the provision of standards, and the construction of public infrastructure. Conclusion Canaan's development is both the unintended consequence of a hasty decision made in a post-disaster environment and a missed opportunity for government and donors, once set in motion. While government intervention has been almost nonexistent in most areas of the country undergoïng incremental urbanization, Canaan presented a clean slate. Yet even though all donor post-disaster housing reconstruction efforts combined probably do not equal the number of housing units built at Canaan, neïther the government nor donors were able to redirect their efforts to provide support to the Canaan project. Material for this case study was contributed by François Grünewald, Executive and Scientific Director of Groupe U.R.D. Groupe U.R.D. ran the Observatoire Haïti from 2011 to 2015. [page 179] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 155 Case Study 4: The Rehabilitation of 16 Neighborhoods and Voluntary Return of Residents from 6 Camps Project The Government of Haiti’s successful multi-agency experiment in post-disaster urban slum upgrading Before and After Circulation Improvements in 16/6 Neighborhood 'S ce Er ST ANR k R — ; 27 |. Lo 12 | & ; mm : EMEA : F5 l R HR) Background The Rehabilitation of 16 Neighborhoods and Voluntary Return of Residents from 6 Camps (16/6) Project was the first and largest government-led post-earthquake neighborhood reconstruction project in Haïti. The first phase of the project was originally funded by a $30 million grant from the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). À second phase was funded with a $8 million grant from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Planning for the project started in August 2011; completion was scheduled for December 2013. Four agencies assisted the Haïitian government in the implementation of the project: the International Organization for Migration (I0M), which managed camp closure and relocation; the United Nationsl Development Programme (UNDP), which focused on local economic development; the International Labor Organization (ILO), which provided vocational training in construction practices; and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), which was in charge of housing repair and reconstruction and the rehabilitation and construction of infrastructure. Other partner agencies included UN-Habitat, Chemonics, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Architecture for Humanity, GOAL, and Emergency Architects. The target areas were the neighborhoods of origin of the occupants of the six target internally displaced person (IDP) camps in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. These neighborhoods were heavily damaged in the earthquake, and contained a mixture of building types and income levels, with the lowest-income residents generally living in informally built slum dwellings. Many of these dwellings were located in high-risk areas, such as ravines prone to landslides and flooding. Little or no urban planning had preceded the settlement of these neighborhoods, and infrastructure and services were deficient or nonexistent. Much of the damage from the earthquake was due to poor construction materials and practices. [page 180] 156 / Annex L: Case Studies UNOPS was allocated $16.35 million of the initial $30 million budget, and this case study focuses principally on its work. Approach The goal of UNOPS’s work in the 16/6 Project was to provide safe, sustainable, and replicable housing solutions in neighborhoods. Yet housing in an urban context cannot be viewed simply as shelter:; it needs to be seen as a dynamic process involving infrastructure, basic services, mobility, public space, and social services (education, health, etc.), as well as employment, tenure security, and finance, among others elements. Housing. UNOPS saw “housing construction” as an opportunity to generate productive, self- sustainable environments and communities. To this end, it used a flexible approach that incorporated urban planning and explored the use of alternative technologies relevant to Haiti. UNOPS employed four housing strategies: # Rehabilitation and repair " Insitu reconstruction on individual sites " Reconfiguration and development in collective sites (where adjacent houses were destroyed and could be redesigned and rebuilt collectively with infrastructure and urban amenities) " Densification and development (mid-rise developments on adjacent, vacant land) Infrastructure. In neighborhoods, infrastructure priorities were determined through a community planning and evaluation process. For collective sites, the infrastructure was part of the site design. Investments were aimed at improving living conditions, basic services, connectivity, and safety, and reducing risk, and included: m Road infrastructure and drainage (including roads, trails, stairs, sidewalks, and retaining walls) m Recreational areas m Electricity # Public lighting = Potable water (installation and rehabilitation of water fountains) " Sanitation (latrines, or a septic system and sump in the case of new construction) Site and beneficiary selection. The Risk Prevention Plan prepared for the 16/6 Project neighborhoods by the engineering firm Ingénierie des Mouvements de Sols et des Risques Naturels, as well as geotechnical and soil studies, were used to define safe zones for intervention and to design intervention strategies. Preliminary selection was based on possession of a red-tagged house.2% Sites were further screened based on lot size (over 22 m?), location, accessibility, and the tenure and occupation status of the occupants. Government involvement. UNOPS worked closely with the Unité de construction de logements et de Bâtiments Publics (UCLBP) (Housing and Public Building Construction Unit) and ensured that the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications (MTPTC) validated construction practices. 2% See Section IIL.C for an explanation of the MTPTC tagging system. [page 181] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / 157 Progress and Completion of Mont Hercule Pilot Project = = "a : EME) | 2% LE. dd = dé! i— * ue, = n | - AE äi> : CRE CE « 3 : NÉS 7. = | 2 : Les», el Ë DINEPA, municipalities, and the Boards of the Communal Sections were also involved. As a result, the 16/6 Project method is fully understood and has been appropriated as a government strategy, which provides greater likelihood that it will be replicated in the future. Joint monitoring and evaluation. UNDP established a centralized monitoring system to share project data and other information and to coordinate work among the agencies. Other project activities. À number of ancillary activities that helped ensure delivery of project objectives are described below. Other Project Activities Addressing land In an effort to provide security of tenure to beneficiaries, UNOPS investigated the tenure situation tenure of neighborhoods, in collaboration with a local law firm, Juris Excel. Beneñci UNOPS and its partners used surveys, focus groups, a call center, an information center, and a enenciary social mobilization team to involve benefciaries and residents. communication Le . . . Luc . . Lo d Benefciaries were required to provide sweat equity, assist in carrying out tenure investigations, an ticipati and participate in focus groups and training sessions. articipation p P UNOPS trained community committees in each neighborhood to maintain infrastructure. : À 3-5 year grant-loan scheme was designed, but was not launched in time to finance housing units Housing finance : supported by the project. Allbids for construction services and materials purchase were carried out through formal UNOPS procurement guidelines. Winning bidders participated in UNDP's Private Company Training Program, which provided Improving support during project implementation. construction UNOPS, ILO, and the government trained more than 150 construction workers. skills and UNOPS technical teams worked with local suppliers to ensure the quality of materials and materials conducted materials inspections. UNOPS engineers developed a guideline on building inspection and oversaw work carried out by subcontractors. Final construction inspections were conducted by government authorities, especially MTPTC. [page 182] 158 / Annex L: Case Studies Project Accomplishments The first phase of the project activities managed by UNOPS benefñted more than 1,600 households. Project accomplishments by component and phase are summarized below. Summary of Accomplishments of the 16/6 Project Housing Reconstruction, Housing Repair, Housing Reconstruction, Phase I Phase I Phase II Duration 24 months 15 months 24 months Location Morne Hercule, Nérette, Morne Morne Hercule, Nérette, Morne Fort National Lazare, Bois Patate, Morne Ebo, Lazare, Bois Patate, Morne Ebo, Jean-Baptiste Jean-Baptiste Unit cost $6,000 per household for core $1,500 per housing unit TBD house and basic site preparation Number 350 individual expandable 729 houses. Every house inthese Integrated collective of houses core houses and 50 houses in neighborhoods that could be was sites and/or multifamily collective sites repaired and reinforced. housing and services, to optimize space and infrastructure investment Beneficiaries 400 households 1,209 households, often in Many are previous multifamily housing. 10% of occupants of Champs- houses were green-tagged, 63% de-Mars IDP camp yellow-tagged, 27% red-tagged. Other Establishment of community Households received basic Due to extensive committees that will be in training on good construction damage in this zone, charge of maintenance and practices. most buildings were repairs Six local construction companies demolished and : Lu ! ! Le cleared soon after the 74 focus groups in four districts hired and given training and earthquake support. Total project cost $5,796,671 $3,006,748 $8,145,837 (HRF, Paroles et Action) (HRF) (CIDA) Job creation. 16/6 Project activities led by UNOPS created more than 15,000 working days for local communities and helped develop local capacity by training construction workers and contracting local companies. Local construction firms hired 75 percent of their staff from the local neighborhoods. UNOPS itself hired 95 percent of its workforce from the local neighborhoods, 45 percent of whom were women. More than 150 construction workers were trained. Lessons Learned Importance of having a master plan, overall vision for the city, and coordination. The project sought to engage at different levels (city, neighborhood, clusters, unit), but the lack of a master plan for the city limited the impact of interventions, leaving them fragmented and without external reference points. Similarly, when efforts are dispersed, a system is needed to share approaches and strategies. Need for diverse options and models. Households in urban neighborhoods are diverse and have differing resources and aspirations. For example, projects should provide options not just for homeowners but for renters (who may predominate) and landlords as well. Some residents may need to be moved, so having support for relocation is important (whenever possible, within the same neighborhoods). [page 183] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 159 Need for a balance between providing and enabling. Sustainability requires that households continue replicating recovery on their own, rather than expecting the solutions to be provided. Pilot projects help create a vision of what can or should be done. Strategies are needed that encourage self- regulation and provide incentives rather than policing and reprimanding. Usefulness of both enhancing existing practices and innovating. UNOPS emphasized improving existing systems and skills by using mostly confined masonry construction in the 16/6 Project, but also introduced bamboo in windows, awnings, and verandas. Innovation needs to be appropriate and timely. Aiming for improved security of tenure, not legal title. The lack of clear and efficient regularization procedures and support for them from the government was a major impediment. Discussions about the need for a complete reform of the regularization process served as a diversion from what was needed for the reconstruction process. Significantly more leadership was needed on this matter from the government. Need for flexibility as local realities are understood. It is critical to assess behaviors and understand the logic and the socioeconomic realities behind them before finalizing criteria or operational approaches. When local construction contractors submitted very high bids to adapt housing designs to diverse sites, designs for contractors were substantially simpliñfied, and UNOPS undertook direct implementation on sites with complex problems. Need to address issues that discourage private housing finance. Traditional credit and microcredit programs were not accessible to the majority of the target population. Yet delivering highly (or fully) subsidized housing solutions disrupts local housing markets and is impossible to carry out at scale. Itis critical that Haiti resolve its land regulation problem, understand strategies adopted by other countries to provide social housing, and put policy and institutional changes in place that would support development of credit instruments for low-income families. Changing behavior through communications, repetition, and incentives. Communication is key to including and informing beneficiaries, as well as the general population. It helps control rumors, manipulation, and misunderstandings. Messages need to be repeated in different ways and at different times. Better construction practices were promoted through a redundant system that included focus groups, training, flyers, graphic displays, and participation in house construction, among other strategies. Conclusion The 16/6 Project is one of the success stories of Haïti post-earthquake recovery. It represented a radical shift in the thinking by the government and Haïtian civil society about what to do with the Port-au-Prince slums. It successfully demonstrated that quality of life and safety could both be significantly improved, making these informal neighborhoods more attractive, safe, and viable places for low-income families. However, the fully subsidized approach was a luxury that is not usually available through post-disaster recovery funding. The challenge for Haïti is to adapt the 16/6 model over time so that it is more financially sustainable and can be expanded into the hundreds of other neighborhoods that deserve similar treatment. This case study was contributed by Claude André Nadon, Senior Project Manager, UNOPS, and Adriana Navarro-Sertich, Housing Advisor, UNOPS. [page 184] 160 / Annex I: Case Studies Case Study 5: . . . The Logement-Quartiers (Housing-Neighborhoods) . Working Group An experiment in housing sector coordination for reconstruction, within the cluster framework Background The Logement-Quartiers (Housing-Neighborhoods) working group was created in April 2010 by UN- Habitat under the Early Recovery (ER) Cluster in agreement with the Shelter Cluster. The working group's objectives, as stated in its terms of reference, were to promote and coordinate actions to enable affected populations to return to their homes and neighborhoods and to ensure that reconstruction improved living conditions and reduced risks in informal and squatter settlements. The working group's activities were guided by certain principles, specifically to: = Promote equity # Focus on urban poverty and the most vulnerable populations # Empower individuals and communities to be the principal agent of the rehabilitation and reconstruction process "Work at the neighborhood level (and primarily in precarious and informal settlements) # Contribute to establishing or strengthening relationships between communities and municipalities and between municipalities and the central government Accomplishments The working group met every two weeks until mid-2011. Generally, between 50 and 80 participants took part. Those attending included representatives of a large number of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOSs), some national NGOSs, bilateral donors, international finance institutions, and other United Nations (UN) agencies and clusters (mainly Shelter and ER). Some meetings were chaired by government officials (e.g., the Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe [MPCE] [Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation]). The working group discussed such topics as: “ Returninitiatives by government and partners “ Reconstruction experiences from other countries # Use of local building material and promotion of vernacular architecture # Guidelines and approaches for housing repair programs # Approaches for housing reconstruction support, including owner-driven reconstruction = Disk risk reduction (DRR) in reconstruction ” Roles and involvement of major groups (youth, disabled, women) in reconstruction # Community contracting # Urban planning efforts at city and metropolitan levels UN-Habitat coordinated the working group, but had no dedicated resources. As a result, the working group operated principally as a platform for exchanging information, experience, and expertise. [page 185] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 161 Nevertheless, the working group strengthened UN-Habitat’s standing as a convener in the sector and facilitated its efforts to provide policy advice to government and support to strategy development. Government agencies supported by UN-Habitat included, among others, the Ministry of Sociual Affairs and Labor (MAST); the Ministry of Interior and Local Government (MICT); the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications (MTPTC); and MPCE; the governments of Presidents Préval and Martelly; the Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire (CIAT) (Interministerial Committee for Territorial Planning); the Interim Haïti Recovery Commission (IHRC) and the Haïti Reconstruction Fund (HRF); and local governments. The working group also played a significant role in promoting the “return strategy” and the “neighborhood approach.” The information gathered from the meetings was used by various agencies to design and implement neighborhood projects, including Ravine Pintade (Global Communities [GC]/ Project Concern International [PCI]), Villa Rosa and Ti Souce (Cordaid), Bristout Bobin (Emergency Architects), and Simon Pelé (Habitat for Humanity International [HFHI]). Findings Despite extensive efforts, the working group did not have the necessary convening power to bring together all the main partners to define joint approaches, develop an overarching program, or agree on an efficient coordination mechanism. In particular, the main housing donors did not participate. In retrospect, it might have been advisable to create a strategic advisory group (SAG) for the working group, led jointly by the Haïtian government and a strong international agency. The SAG might have been more successful at establishing a coordinated dialogue among the main international partners and the government. It was not until early 2011 that a housing donor group was created, under the leadership of the World Bank. The lack of funding to monitor housing and neighborhood initiatives, as well as self-recovery efforts, was another major weakness in the recovery effort. As a result, information was exchanged, but it was difficult to objectively measure the relative effectiveness of return, recovery, and reconstruction approaches, or to evaluate the relative equity of their impact. Conclusion The Logement-Quartiers working group was an outgrowth of the cluster system, but operated somewhat outside of the formal institutional structure. In one respect, this was logical, given the humanitarian purposes of the cluster system. At the same time, the experience demonstrates the need for official mechanisms that support government efforts to coordinate and ensure effective engagement of local and international agencies during the recovery period, particularly for large-scale disasters. Ideally, such a mechanism would support the implementation of the recovery plan or framework. In the case of Haïti, UN- Habitat's efforts to create this mechanism were hampered not only by the lack of an agreed concept of the recovery coordination function, but also by the lack of a recovery plan. This case study was contributed by Jean-Christophe Adrian, Program Coordinator for UN-Habitat in Haiti from 2010 to 2013. [page 186] 162 / Annex I: Case Studies Case Study 6: Haut Damier New Settlement Project in Cabaret A high-quality suburban rent-to-own development project Background Immediately after the earthquake, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) committed to building 15,000 new housing units for earthquake-affected families. USAID's “New Settlements Project” was registered with the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) in early 2011 for $53.3 million, which was later increased to approximately $90 million. Projects in the program included the 750-unit Caracol-EKAM site near the Northern Industrial Park, as well as projects in the municipalities of Cabaret, Quartier Morin, Terrer Rouge, and Titanyen. Approach USAID partnered with the Haïtian government and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to develop the Haut Damier project in the commune of Cabaret, along National Route 1. The development includes 156 housing units for displaced families and other vulnerable households. The land for the community was provided by the government, and both national and local officials were extensively consulted during the siting and design of the project. Each house is built on a 112 m? plot, has a gross area of 42.8 m2, and can be expanded with another room and a second floor. The site includes flush sanitation, piped water into each home (serviced by an on-site well and water tower), solar street Lighting, electrical infrastructure to facilitate household- level electrical connections, and roads and footpaths. The houses were occupied beginning in September 2013. The residents of the Haut Damier project include former residents of internally displaced person (IDP) camps managed by the IFRC and earthquake-affected families living in the vicinity of the site. The IFRC, in conjunction with Entreprise Publique pour le Logement Social (EPPLS), assisted with final beneficiary selection and provided social, economic, and governance support to the families for approximately 18 months after they moved in. Together, EPPLS and the IFRC ensured that residents understood and complied with arrangements for payment of rent and utilities. EPPLS is charged with collecting rents and providing maintenance on the site until residents become homeowners (currently proposed to take place after five years). The arrangement is similar to the “rent-to-own” scheme in other EPPLS projects. [page 187] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 163 Findings In June 2013, the United States Government Accountability Office reported that the projected number of houses to be built under the New Settlements Project had decreased by over 80 percent, from 15,000 to 2,649. Average cost had increased from USAID's original estimates of $1,800 per plot and $8,000 per house to $9,598 per plot and $23,409 per house, for a total unit cost increase from $9,800 to $33,007.27 These cost differences stem from various factors, including underestimating the costs associated with the original project design and responding to Haitian government requests for design changes. The Haut Damier site layout and house elevation are shown below. The photographs below show houses at the Haut Damier site. Conclusion Haut Damier is a successful new settlements project that was complicated to implement and costly relative to initial estimates. Vet because it was designed specifically to encourage owners to invest in the expansion and maintenance of their homes, it is likely to be a relatively stable project over time. Haut Damier Housing Units 5 AE — 7% à Sr LA ce : (l 4 = | ! ‘ re } K" LC : } _ ae a Il Re LR à Ce, E EE + I SL 7 | ME Sue — — < h Œ > — ER = > — 5 Be RES 4 s FRONT ELEVATION Na Grass 2 AT TE % LE mm | Cu This case study was contributed by Christopher L. Ward, Shelter Team, USAID. 207 US. Government Accountability Office, June 2013, “Haiti Reconstruction: USAID Infrastructure Projects Have Had Mixed Results and Face Sustainability Challenges.” [page 188] 164 / Annex I: Case Studies Case Study 7: Urban Neïghborhood Upgrading Projects PRODEPUR and World Bank urban projects in post-earthquake Haïti: the need to be flexible in an evolving environment Background The World Bank funded two urban projects in Haïti: the Urban Community-Driven Development Project (PRODEPUR) and the Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project (PREKAD).28 The projects had some common objectives and implementation arrangements, but differed in their origins, funding sources, and locations. Both projects were complex and combined “soft” activities, such as community mobilization, with “hard” interventions, such as housing and infrastructure construction. Both PRODEPUR and PREKAD were restructured during implementation to ensure that the projects’ objectives were met in a timely and cost-effective manner, to take advantage of new developments in the Haïitian housing sector, and to incorporate lessons learned on the ground. The World Banks experience illustrates the complexity of community-driven projects in Haïti and the need to be flexible in an evolving environment. Financing Mechanisms The financing approaches of the World Banks two urban projects were different. PRODEPUR provided additional financing to an existing project. Initially, PRODEPUR was funded at $15 million that was approved by the World Bank Board on June 3, 2008, with a completion date of March 31, 2014. The initial objective of PRODEPUR was to improve the access of impoverished populations in targeted urban neighborhoods to infrastructure, basic social services, and income-generating activities. When PRODEPUR was restructured, its activities were funded by $30 million in additional grant financing and included housing repair and reconstruction. The additional financing approach was used to accelerate approval. The additional financing was approved on October 26, 2010; was signed with the government on November 23, 2010; and became effective for disbursement on February 21, 2011. PREKAD is a new $65 million project financed from a contribution of the United States to the Haïti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) earmarked for in situ housing reconstruction. Like all projects funded by the HRF, it required a “partner entity,” as stipulated in the HRF bylaws. The World Bank agreed to serve as the partner and to implement the project in a manner similar to PRODEPUR. It was approved by the World Bank on May 4, 2011; was signed with the government on May 10, 2011; and became effective on July 28, 2011, with a closing date of July 30, 2015. 28 The operational documents for PRODEPUR and PREKAD on which this case study is based are located at http:/mwwworldbank.org/en/ country/haiti/projects/all. [page 189] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 165 Project Objectives and Costs With the additional financing, PRODEPUR objectives were modified to: (i) basic and social infrastructure and services, including housing repair, reconstruction, and community infrastructure improvement needed as a result of the earthquake; and (ii) income-generating opportunities for residents of selected disadvantaged urban areas. The locations for the post-earthquake activities were Delmas 32 and Carrefour-Feuilles. The PRODEPUR budget increased from $15.7 million to $45.7 million with the addition of a new component that covered housing repair and reconstruction (35%), community infrastructure repair (24%), debris removal (9%), advisory services (25%), and government operating costs (3%). PRODEPUR Original and Additional Financing Project Cost, in US$ Project Components Financing Financing Project Cost 1: Community subproject funds, management and support 12,700,000 13,500,000* 2: Capacity building and technical assistance 900,000 900,000 3: Project administration, monitoring and evaluation 2,100,000 3,000,000 Incremental Project Coordination Unit/Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d'Aide au Développement (BMPAD) (Office of 900,000 Monetization of Development Aid) operating costs 4: Housing repair and reconstruction 29,100,000 29,100,000 (a) Debris removal 2,600,000 (b) Housing repair and reconstruction 10,560,000 (c) Community infrastructure repair 7,300,000 (d) Advisory services 7,640,000 (e) Unallocated 1,000,000 * Includes $800,000 of in-kind contributions by beneficiaries. The objective of PREKAD is to help residents of selected Port-au-Prince neighborhoods severely affected by the earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and improving basic community service infrastructure. The components were similar to those of the PRODEPUR after the additional financing and included: housing repair and reconstruction cash grants (37%), repair and improvement of community infrastructure (31%), social mobilization and technical support (14%), debris removal and demolition (8%), institutional support and studies (8%), and project management (3%). [page 190] 166 / Annex L: Case Studies PREKAD Project Cost 1: Financial Support for Debris Removal and Housing Repair and Reconstruction: 38,000,000 1.1 Debris Removal and Demolition 5,000,000 1.2 Housing Repair and Reconstruction Cash Grants 24,000,000 1.3 Social Mobilization and Technical Support 9,000,000 2: Repair and Improvement of Community Infrastructure 20,000,000 3. Institutional Support and Studies 5,000,000 4. Project Management 2,000,000 PREKAD could be implemented in any area affected by the earthquake where there were strong and efficient community organizations, including the target neighborhoods of PRODEPUR, or those supported by other donors. The neighborhoods eventually selected for implementation were Simon Pelé and Nazon-Christ Roi-Pouplard. Management and Implementation Arrangements PRODEPUR with its additional financing and PREKAD had implementation arrangements that are participatory at the community level and incorporate the local authorities, while ensuring that safeguards and other rules and regulations are understood by all the parties involved and included in all project activities. Both projects were implemented on behalf of the government by BMPAD under the Ministère de l'Economie and des Finances (MEF) (Ministry of Economy and Finance) through a dedicated Project Coordination Unit. BMPAD is responsible for overall project coordination and oversight and delegates project execution to the Maîtres d'Ouvrage Délégué in PRODEPUR and Project Management Contractors (PMCs) in PREKAD. PRODEPUR's structure includes community-based organizations (CBOs) and Project Development Councils whose purpose is to identify, select, implement, and manage priority development subprojects. Municipalities occupy seats on each council and can submit project proposals in association with a CBO. PREKAD was designed to include a steering committee of ministries, but, instead, Neighborhood Development Councils (NDCs) became the primary interlocutors for the coordination of project activities with neighborhood residents. Project implementation included households, NDCs, community organizations, municipalities, PMCs, government agencies, and other entities whose involvement was required, depending on the project. The responsibilities and administrative arrangements with these entities were similar to those of PRODEPUR, including the contractual arrangements with BMPAD. [page 191] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 167 PREKAD included a new mechanism that allowed BMPAD to transfer funds directly to the NDCSs for debris removal, housing repair and reconstruction, and advisory services, based on signed contracts. The PMCs transferred grants directly to beneficiaries whose housing reconstruction projects had been approved. PREKAD also financed Community Reconstruction Centers in project neighborhoods, which served as one-stop shops for project-related consultation and training. They were staffed by experts seconded by the PMC and the municipality, and carried out the following functions: (i) provision of technical advice on housing repair and reconstruction, (ii) identification and preparation of community infrastructure improvements, (ii) planning and coordination of debris removal, (iv) implementation of urban planning and community mapping exercises, and (v) responses to social and legal issues related to the project. Project Restructuring The World Bank made an ongoing effort to support and align its projects with evolving reforms and with new actors in the housing sector. For example, it supported the Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics (UCLBP) (Housing and Public Building Construction Uniot), when it was established with the mandate to guide reconstruction policy and create norms and guidelines for implementing agencies. Studies began to show that renters represented at least 50 percent of the affected population, depending on the neighborhood, and, as of January 2012, made up 78 percent of those still registered in camps. As a result, the government asked the World Bank and other donors to increase support to renter households that would accelerate return to neighborhoods and safer housing. PRODEPUR and PREKAD were restructured to reflect this and other changes in national housing policy, to capture lessons learned, and to align financial incentives in housing interventions in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. In particular, PRODEPUR was modified to include rental and relocation grants in the project’s definition of “cash grants.” PREKAD was restructured to allow the financing of “reconstruction and return cash grants” and to reallocate $4.8 million from other components to neighborhood investments, to reflect the increased need for neighborhood investments.209 The PREKAD modifications were approved in October 2012. Conclusion The success of the PRODEPUR and PREKAD projects depended on policy and operational support from the government. As a result, they contributed to the institutional strengthening of the central and local governments and to the establishment of new policies and methods for reconstruction and community redevelopment in informal neighborhoods. PRODEPUR and PREKAD also demonstrate both the challenges and the significant rewards of using community-driven development approaches in the urban post-disaster context. This case study was prepared by Sylvie Debomy, Lead Urban Development Specialist, World Bank. 2% Return cash grants include a rental subsidy; livelihood subsidy and transportation assistance; and an associated package of services, including health, psycho-social, protection, water, sanitation and hygiene assistance, and vocational training. [page 192] 168 / Annex I: Case Studies Case Study 8: e e Fa A Santo Development Project in Léogâne Providing core houses and community opportunities in a greenfeld site Santo Development Project, Léogâne, Haïti HN (A P nm re = = é 20) D S 4 = Fe En, ‘+ ht = £ | © Background Following the 2010 Haïti earthquake, Habitat for Humanity Haiti (HFHH) initiated a core house reconstruction program for 300 families within the peri-urban community of Santo in Léogâne. This project took a community-based approach, through active participatory engagement and development processes, to construct a model sustainable community that included of housing, water, sanitation, and social and economic facilities on a greenñeld site. While the project successfully provided new livelihood and economic opportunities to more than 1,500 beneficiaries, the experience provides lessons about developing housing and community recovery projects that aim to achieve broad development objectives in a developing country context and within the post-disaster time frame. The epicenter of the earthquake was located in the area of Léogâne, 18 miles southwest of Port-au- Prince, and consequently a large number of residents in this rea were displaced. The Santo community is situated just outside of Léogâne, and it was here that HFHH was provided a 14 hectare site to develop a core house project. Given its location close to the internally displaced person (IDP) camps of Modsol, Parc Mont Pelier, and La voix des sans voix, and to various T-shelter settlements, the site was subject to significant development pressure from surrounding areas. However, the size of the site and its proximity to the city center and national highways made it an ideal location for a new settlement- type reconstruction project for displaced, landless Léogâne families. [page 193] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / 169 Approach HFHH initially envisioned the Santo Development project as a 500-unit project, with core houses, water and sanitation infrastructure, and facilities for social and economic activities. While community development was the ultimate objective, a funding gap converted this long-term goal to development of a community vision and plan that could evolve and develop over time as resources permitted, referred to as an “upgradable settlement.” To build a long-term community vision for the settlement, HFHH actively engaged the local community through participatory processes and design workshops. In addition to project design, participants considered beneficiary selection criteria and discussed water, sanitation, and community management structures. These activities focused on both the technical and social aspects of the project. While community engagement and participation began early in the development of the project, rumors that a large-scale housing project was to be built catalyzed the migration of potential beneficiaries to the site. This influx undermined local governing structures within the Santo community, complicated beneficiary selection, and led to invasions of demarcated land, all of which caused logistical and financial setbacks. Faced with the challenges of increased construction material costs, the encroachment of new settlers, and the difficulty of finding common ground among new and old community residents, HFHH decided to reduce the first phase of the program from 500 to 300 households. Accomplishments Community engagement and planning began in early 2011, and construction of the first 160 houses was completed by May 2012. By February 2013, all 300 houses and latrines were completed, and the Santo Development project was occupied by 1,500 beneficiaries. The 300 expandable core houses measured 26 m2 and had an open floor plan with a single, enclosed bedroom and space for another. They were built to withstand hurricane force winds from a mixture of masonry and timber. À significant effort was made to provide families with floor plans that could be expanded later as their needs evolved. The covered front porches have already been converted by beneficiaries to additions or to business locations. Each house included a latrine and space for a toilet and bathing. Both latrines and houses were supplied with rainwater harvesting systems. HFHH also dug 29 water points and installed 32 solar-powered street lamps. In an effort to provide economic opportunities and skills needed to earn an living, HFHH trained 100 local construction contractors as team leaders and hired more than 400 temporary laborers throughout the construction process. It also built a community market for more than 120 vendors, including individual storage lockers, permanent tables, and public latrines; established livelihood programs; and set up an agricultural co-op called “Bon Jaden” (“Good Garden” in Creole) implemented through a Habitat partnership with TBT/IsraAID to grow high-value cash crops. Importantly, an elected council was also created to govern the project's activities. Lessons Learned The decision to build core houses on a peri-urban greenfeld site produced a housing settlement built at scale close to a disaster location, rather than in a distant relocation site. But this required extra [page 194] 170 / Annex L: Case Studies efforts to acquire land and to ensure the projects sustainability. These challenges are not unique to the Santo Development project, and may offer useful Lessons for other similar efforts. Obtaining land. Acquiring land in Haïti is complicated by the difficulty of determining ownership and defending boundaries. The mayor of Léogâäne played a major role in helping HFHH identify and survey the Santo site. But once transferred through proper procedures, the land became subject to other land claims that had to be resolved. Site encroachment, which eventually reduced the size of the project, also required extensive intervention by community engagement teams to determine the eligibility of those involved and to address the concerns of other displaced families. Community conflicts. Encroachment also affected community governance and social structures and produced conflict between old and new members. New local leaders mobilized community support, sometimes using threats of violence. Protests, which arose without notice from local leaders and gangs, affected project milestones and caused concern for staff and contractors. This necessitated the establishment of new conflict mitigation and mediation measures. Sustaining off-grid services. Public services for water, sewage, and electricity were not available at the Santo site, so off-grid solutions had to be developed. Among these were rainwater harvesting, solar installations, and composting of human waste. While these systems offer the Santo community sustainable hygienic solutions and new livelihood opportunities, they require management and governance capacity. À particular challenge is the need to collect and manage user fees. Extensive training and support were provided to the governing council and the wider community, but managing community expectations, defending against negative influences, and keeping the community united are ongoing challenges. Creating employment. Ensuring the availability of livelihood opportunities is one of the biggest challenges of sustaining a peri-urban community. À portion of the population was temporarily employed in construction, but unemployment increased once internationally funded construction activities ramped down. Lack of employment increased the risk that homeowners would leave or rent out their homes, thereby undermining the stability of the community. HFHH incorporated income generation throughout the project, including livelihood and training programs, construction of a market, and establishment of the agricultural co-op. Whether stable employment has been provided is a question that should be monitored in the years to come. Conclusion The Santo Development project provided more than 1,900 local beneficiaries with quality housing, basic services, and employment opportunities. To overcome the constraints of the site and address the needs of the population, it also followed a development model that depends on a level of community collaboration rarely encountered in Haïitian urban and suburban neighborhoods. Ultimately, HFHH found that the resources to continue to support this community-building experiment were extremely limited. This seems to illustrate that housing and community development projects built in a post-disaster context, to the extent that they attempt to offer better living conditions to affected households, may create obligations for implementing agencies and funders that extend well beyond the normal timeline of disaster recovery. This case study was prepared by Jared Mercadante, consultant to HFHH on the Santo Development project in Haïti during 2014, and Mike Meany, Chief Operating Officer, HFHH. [page 195] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 171 Case Study 9: 0 P 0 0 0 Simon Pelé Project in Port-au-Prince The neïghborhood approach in a complex, informal urban settlement Simon Pelé Project, Port-au-Prince, Haïti k Ar Fr] L Im = | CS & 65 LL M |: VAN M vcs "M © f] , = |: à Fr k " | FE £ ” » si ne 2 V3 à * #5 Background Over the past 28 years in Haïti, Habitat for Humanity has concentrated its efforts in rural communities. But after the January 2010 earthquake left Port-au-Prince nearly destroyed, Habitat shifted its focus to informal settlements in a dense, urban environment. This context required a different approach. Simon Pelé, an informal, densely populated settlement with approximately 30,000 people, was selected as the target community. Approach Community-based enumeration, as this term was used by Habitat for Humanity Haïti (HFHH), is a participatory planning process that entails mobilizing members of the community to collect data about themselves and then using the data to develop a community action plan. The entire process is participatory, from inception through design, management, and implementation to analysis and use of the data. As a community-based process, it can gain transparency and trust, improve the data gathering, empower the community, and ensure that all segments of vulnerable groups are included. In Haïti, this was the best way to ensure security for the staff and reduce risks to the project. The community-based enumeration process included the steps shown below. [page 196] 172 / Annex I: Case Studies Activity Description À local enumeration team is selected through engagement with community representatives, Building a team community-based organizations (CBOs), and camp committees. This team includes members of the target community, local authorities, academics, and support professionals. The enumeration team meets with local community leaders and city officials to “rough map” the : settlement, identifying toilets, water taps, public services, and transport systems. This exercise Rough mapping : : : : provides a general sense of issues to be addressed by the enumeration process and informs the preparation of a questionnaire. Trainin Community members build their skills and capacity to complete the survey form by conducting a 8 trial run in a sample section of the settlement. Launch The enumeration exercise is launched at a public ceremony. Ministers, mayors, and local leaders attend to add political credibility. À survey of each household is carried out, and staff members begin to assess and compile the data. Household À verification process enables areas of disagreement to be identified and mediated by community surve members. Detailed documentation—graphs, charts, and narratives—is prepared by the support y organization and given to the community, city officials, and other stakeholders. The data are then used by the settlement in future negotiations for resources. With clipboards, pencils, tape measures, and global positioning system (GPS) units, enumerators Household create a qualitative and quantitative map of their settlement. Their work is twofold: first, to survey mapping each household, and then to number and measure every structure. This information gathering underpins the development of a physical and narrative picture of community-level challenges. Community mapping sessions further develop the initial rough mapping of the neighborhood. The focus remains on the bigger-picture elements of physical mapping, such as the mapping of social Community services or water and sanitation facilities. Several iterations of community mapping take place, mapping creating a more comprehensive view of the neighborhood, and different versions of a community map are produced that highlight different key themes within the community. Each map may be laid over another as required to build up a fuller picture of the neighborhood as a whole. Elements of (i) the household and (ii) the cadastral survey are combined with (iii) the community mapping to provide a more in-depth and comprehensive view of the neighborhood. From these Community three elements, the community makes informed decisions on what is needed and desired in the master planning community, how these things can be prioritized, and what can be sacrificed. Through further community workshops, this is worked into a physical and spatial master plan developed by the community. The results of the enumeration are tabulated and presented to the community in a “validation” Reporting back event designed both to test whether the results seem plausible to community members and to cement relationships with politicians and others initiated during the launch event. The main goal of this process is to get to a position in which the community has an action plan that Action plannin has been developed through its own participation. This allows it to advocate for members’ rights, p B to invite investments into the community, and in many cases to use their members’ skills and capacities to address the issues identified. [page 197] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 173 Accomplishments With financial support from UN-Habitat, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Habitat for Humanity Canada, and the World Bank, the Simon Pelé Project mobilized the community to: m Train 30 engineers to conduct 625 detailed damage assessments, giving guidance to families on house repairs “ Hire 40 enumerators from the community (65 percent of whom were women) to complete more than 6,500 household surveys and map 2,700 houses and land boundaries m Complete 36 detailed maps of the community, representing such topics as security risks (for men and women), community capacities, critical infrastructure, flooding risks, and fire risks “ Draw up a community action plan prioritized by the community “ Train 50 certified masons in disaster risk reduction (DRR)/construction techniques providing private sector consultancy, 35 DRR trainers deployed through the local civil protection system, and 277 households in technical construction best practices # Provide repair and retrofitting to more than 200 households and install community sanitation systems # Issue 10 community contracts managed by a committee to address the critical issues identified in the action plan, including street lighting, drainage, road infrastructure, street signage, youth sports facility, a health clinic, and water kiosk improvements In addition, Habitat for Humanity acted as a catalyst to bring health services to the community, which resulted in 3,716 children and adults immunized against various diseases, 5,000 hygiene kits distributed alongside replacement medical records, 15 community health workers trained and a committee formed to continue providing services to the community, and 5,000 emergency kits pre- positioned for future disasters. Lessons Learned The original focus area in Simon Pelé was expanded into neighboring areas with the support of the World Bank. From the initial work, it was possible to identify a number of lessons. Timing of the intervention. This type of programming is labor-intensive and requires the development of a long-term community strategy. Institutional donors are often willing to support these types of interventions as part of recovery; however, in future recovery programs, these activities should start earlier. Using technology effectively. Technology is a great asset, especially for the collection and analyzing of data. However, strong geographic information system capacities are needed to ensure that the most benefit is derived from this technology. These types of projects also require carefully designed impact indicators and long-term monitoring to show results beyond simple project “outputs.” Importance of community relationships. Building a relationship based on facilitation rather than aid provision takes time with the community and careful messaging and programming. Being embedded in the community with a Habitat Resource Center was critical to building trust and relationships. Even so, local security issues at times limited access to the community. At these times, the local community kept the project moving without direct supervision. [page 198] 174 / Annex I: Case Studies Managing local agendas. Determining who the real “community representatives” are means navigating agendas that are often not clear. Filling key project management roles from outside the community, while filling operational positions from within the community, helps ensure decision making is not affected by local conflicts. Generating useful data. Data can be a powerful tool for advocacy and mapping and for informing decision making at a city-wide level. It is important to establish common standards and to harmonize data collection efforts among nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and/or CBOs running similar projects so that data can be consolidated. It is also essential to establish rules for ownership and access to the community data, given its sensitive nature. Working with the community. À focus in the project on the involvement of women and youth ensured that a wider range of perspectives was considered. Using public spaces (e.g., municipal buildings, community centers, schools) helps ensure access and comfort for community participants. Training and capacity building is highly valued by community participants. Community contracts need to start small. As experience is gained and trust is built, these contracts can increase in size. Building local partnerships. Strong partnerships with local elected officials and service providers helps ensure an integrated approach to development, since these agencies can bring complementary resources to the table (e.g., for health, education, livelihoods). Conclusion The experience of Habitat for Humanity in Simon Pelé has highlighted that this approach can successfully bridge the gap between relief and development programming, ensuring that initial investments within the humanitarian phase of a response can be a platform for long-term development. This case study was prepared by Mike Meany, Chief Operating Officer, HFHH. [page 199] es à | a : Eh L ns Eh > ] | LI'a d = PAAE RE EL. ' . S | }. : Photo credit: UN-Habitat V D Timeline Period: January 2010-November 2011 175 [page 200] 176 / Annex Il: Haiti Shelter and Housing Timeline 1 Earthquake of magnitude 7.3 hits Haiti at 16:53 local time (21:53 UTC). 1/12/2010 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) tells lead agencies to activate five clusters, 2 including Shelter and Camp Coordination/Camp Management (CCCM) clusters, both led by 1/14/2010 International Organization for Migration (I0M). 3 IOM begins issuing joint Shelter/CCCM updates. 1/15/2010 Ministère de la Planification et de La Coopération Externe (MPCE) (Ministry of Planning 4 and External Cooperation) is designated lead agency for Post-Disaster Needs Assessment 1/16/2010 (PDNA). United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) launches Haiti SEE Appeal for $562 million. DAC 2010) 6 First national Shelter Cluster meeting is convened. 1/22/2010 7 Two-day Montreal Preparatory Conference is held, hosted by Canadian government. 1/24/2010 President Préval establishes Interim Haïti Commission for Shelter and Reconstruction 8 (IHCSR) and names Patrick Delatour its chair. 1/26/2010 9 Shelter Cluster issues draft “Shelter Sector Response Plan” to IHCSR for government 1/26/2010 review. 10 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 1/26/2010 Assistance (OFDA) issues United States (U.S.) shelter and settlements sector strategy. Emergency Shelter and Camp Coordination/Camp Management (CCCM) Clusters issue 11 “Emergency/Transitional Shelter and Camp Coordination and Camp Management Strategic 1/28/2010 Framework for Haiti, Version 5.” First Shelter Cluster Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) meeting is held. Cluster will support 12 Haïtian government in developing strategy for shelter and housing reconstruction. Haïti 2/2/2010 military is given responsibility of providing rubble removal plan. Shelter Cluster holds meeting to discuss T-shelters: 24 organizations commit to total of 1 116,100 Tshelters. 2/5/2010 Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications (MTPTC) announces permissible 14 building codes for reconstruction—ACI-318 Euro Code 8 IBC and NBC of Canada—and 2/9/2010 limits use of certain building materials. Shelter Cluster coordination is transferred from I0M to International Federation of the 15 Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Shelter Cluster and government issue final 2/10/2010 “Shelter Sector Response Plan.” 16 UN-Habitat submits “Strategic Emergency Plan” to Prime Minister Bellerive. 2/10/2010 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issues draft debris management plan, which estimates 17 debris at 20 million cubic yards (15 million cubic meters). (Updated version reissued in 2/10/2010 July 2010.) 18 OFDA announces host family support program (which eventually supports 26,500 hosting 2/10/2010 arrangements, of which 18,000 reportedly become permanent). 19 Government approves $164 million in projects from Petrocaribe funds, including $129 2/11/2010 million for road repairs and $12 million for shelter. 20 OCHA launches Revised Flash Appeal for $1.4 billion (CCCM Cluster: $73 million; Early 2/18/2010 Recovery [ER] Cluster: $158 million; Shelter Cluster: $119 million). x Shelter Cluster issues “Transitional shelter technical guidance,” which states that shelters 2/19/2010 should last three years and cost no more than $1,500. [page 201] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake / 177 22 Government makes decision to create Corail Cesselesse and Tabarre Issa camps. 2/25/2010 MTPTC creates Bureau Technique d’Evaluation des Bâtiments to conduct building safety 23 assessments, with support from World Bank, United Nations Office of Project Services 3/1/2010 (UNOPS), and others. 24 Building safety assessments are launched. 3/1/2010 25 First Shelter Cluster sub-hub meetings held in Léogâne, Petit Goâve, and Grand Goâve. 3/10/2010 Government issues Decree 22, Order of Public Utility (déclaration d'utilité publique) for 26 more than 7,450 hectares of land between Bon Repos and Cabaret north of Port-au-Prince 3/22/2010 that includes area for Corail camp. Government issues Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (APNRDH) 2 and PDNA, attached as annex. 3/30/2010 Donor pledging conference entitled “Towards a New Future for Haïti” is held at United 28 Nations (UN) in New York. Over $5 billion is pledged for Haiti’s recovery for 2010 and 3/31/2010 2011, and $10 billion for next 10 years. 29 First Shelter Cluster sub-hub meetings are held for Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and 4/10/2010 Jacmel. 30 Shelter Cluster issues “Host Family and Community Needs Assessment Guidelines.” 4/10/2010 31 Presidential Préval issues decree creating Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), with 4/21/2010 18-month mandate. Shelter Cluster issues “Transitional Shelter Parameters,” which restates that shelters 32 should last three years and cost no more than $1,500. 4/21/2010 3 Logement-Quartiers working group holds its first meeting to discuss terms of reference 4/22/2010 under ER Cluster. 34 Shelter Cluster issues ‘Advocacy Document, which advocates for risk and building 4/26/2010 assessment, transitional shelter funding, and resolution of land tenure issues. Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MAST) holds brainstorming session on housin 35 Le tirs Ë Ë 4/27/2010 reconstruction. 36 IASC issues “Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haïti: 3 Months after the Earthquake.” 4/30/2010 37 MAST holds second brainstorming session on housing reconstruction. 4/30/2010 38 Shelter Cluster goal for distribution of emergency shelter before onset of rainy season is 5/1/2010 achieved. 39 Prime minister’s office holds meeting on permanent housing with G11 and UN Resident 5/5/2010 Coordinator that focuses on startup of IHRC. 40 First Shelter Cluster sub-hub meeting is held in Carrefour. 5/10/2010 UN Stabilization Mission in Haïti announces completed relocation of 4,900 people from 4 Pétionville Golf Club and 2,400 people from Vallée de Bourdon to Corail Cesselesse and 5/10/2010 Tabarre Issa camps. 42 President Préval creates committee for Champs de Mars return. 5/10/2010 53 Haïti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) is established upon signature of first Administration 5/11/2010 Agreement with Brazil. 44 President Préval establishes Secretariat for committee on Champs de Mars return. 5/20/2010 45 President Préval declares that time for camps in city squares and tents is over. 5/24/2010 [page 202] 178 / Annex Il: Haiti Shelter and Housing Timeline Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire (CIAT) (Interministerial Committee 46 Le | ! : 6/1/2010 for Territorial Planning) organizes workshop on Corail camp and Canaan. 7 Prime minister establishes ad hoc working group under CIAT to prepare strategy on return 6/1/2010 and reconstruction. 48 Working group on repairs is established, led by MTPTC. 6/1/2010 49 CIAT publishes “Haïti Demain” on its website. 6/10/2010 Clinton Foundation and Malcolm Reading issue request for proposals for “Building Back 50 Better Communities” competition on behalf of government. Proposals are due June 25, 6/16/2010 2010. 51 First official meeting of IHRC is held. 6/17/2010 52 Deadline for proposals for “Building Back Better Communities” competition is extended to 6/25/2010 July 5, 2010. MPCE and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) endorse plan for transition 53 en 7/1/2010 from ER Cluster to government-led recovery coordination. S4 Coalition of Caribbean Urbanists holds three-day workshop on reconstruction of Port-au- 7/8/2010 Prince in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Ad hoc working group presents “Government of Haïti Strategy to Support the Return of 55 Populations to Safe Habitats and the Rebuilding of Homes and Neighborhoods” to prime 7/10/2010 minister. (See item 47.) 56 MPCE holds three-day workshop on urban planning for Port-au-Prince. 7/29/2010 57 CIAT and international agencies hold first meeting to discuss common enumeration 8/1/2010 approach. 58 Prime minister’s office holds meeting on housing reconstruction. 8/6/2010 59 First Shelter Cluster sub-hub meeting is held in Tabarre. 8/10/2010 60 HRF approves $16.95 million for Debris I Project, to be implemented by the UN. 8/17/2010 61 Second IHRC meeting is held. 8/17/2010 62 Government approves $107 million from Petrocaribe funds for various projects, including 8/24/2010 $10 million for debris management. 63 Government issues Order of Public Utility (déclaration d'utilité publique) for Port-au- 9/2/2010 Prince city center. 64 CIAT and international agencies hold second meeting on common enumeration approach. 9/14/2010 65 OFDA approves neighborhood project in Ravine Pintade neighborhood of Port-au-Prince. 9/28/2010 Housing Land and Property Working Group (HLPWG) presents paper on forced evictions to 66 UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). 10/1/2010 Prime minister establishes Interministerial Housing Commission (IHC), headed by MAST 67 and including representatives from MTPTC, Ministry of Interior and Local Government 10/1/2010 (MICT), MPCE, Ministère de l'Economie and des Finances (MEF) (Ministry of Economy and Finance), and MAST. 68 UNDP relaunches ER Cluster. 10/1/2010 69 IHRC Housing and Neighborhoods team organizes workshop with government and 10/4/2010 organizations working on housing. 70 Third IHRC meeting is held. 10/6/2010 71 IHRC co-chairs Prime Minister Bellerive and former U.S. President Clinton request that 10/6/2010 housing and neighborhood strategy be prepared based on October 4 workshop outcomes. [page 203] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 179 IHRC distributes first draft of Neighborhood Return and Housing Reconstruction 72 Framework (NRHRF) for comments. 10/8/2010 73 Ministry of Health confirms cholera epidemic. 10/21/2010 74 IHRC staff distributes final draft of NRHRF to IHRC Board. It is never approved. 10/28/2010 75 ER Cluster reactivates with four working groups: Debris Management, Logement-Quartiers, 11/1/2010 Livelihoods, and Host Communities. 76 European Community/ECHO provides funds for Shelter Cluster coordination. 11/1/2010 77 IFRC reports first instance of households receiving rental subsidies. 11/1/2010 78 Shelter Cluster coordination is transferred from IFRC to UN-Habitat. 11/10/2010 79 CIAT and international agencies hold third meeting on common enumeration approach. 11/22/2010 80 Presidential, parliamentary, and senatorial primary elections are held. 11/28/2010 gl OCHA issues 2011 Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal (CHAP) for Haiti for $907 million 11/30/2010 (CCCM Cluster: $93 million; Shelter Cluster: $92 million). 82 Preliminary election results are announced. 12/7/2010 83 Fourth IHRC meeting is held in Santo Domingo. 12/14/2010 84 HRF approves $25 million for Debris II Project, to be implemented by UN. 12/15/2010 HRF approves $65 million for Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction 85 Project (PREKAD). 12/15/2010 Municipality of Port-au-Prince and Centre Haïtien de Recherche en Aménagement et en 86 Développement hold meeting on “Strategic Urban Planning for Port-au-Prince and the 12/17/2010 Metropolitan Area.” 87 Debris figures revised from 20 million cubic meters to 10 million cubic meters. 1/1/2011 88 Organization of American States starts recount and investigation of primary elections. 1/9/2011 89 First anniversary of earthquake. 1/12/2011 90 Week-long urban planning workshop is convened by Prince Charles Foundation for Port- 1/17/2011 au-Prince city center. o1 Inter-Cluster Coordination adopts “Return and Relocation Strategy” (later endorsed by 1/18/2011 HCT). 92 IHC meeting is held at MAST. 1/27/2011 93 MTPTC launches “Guidelines for Repairs” and “Good Practice Guidelines for Construction.” 1/31/2011 94 Clinton Foundation’s “Building Back Better Communities” conference is held. 2/1/2011 OCHA issues Inter-Cluster Assessment of Canaan, estimating that 15,000 households were 95 q 2/11/2011 present, almost all in temporary structures. European Union (EU) organizes meeting on establishing common framework for donors 96 that are funding housing repair and reconstruction. This becomes housing donor group, 2/15/2011 coordinated by World Bank. 97 MTPTC issues “Règles de calcul intérimaires pour les bâtiments en Haïti.” 2/15/2011 98 IHC meeting is held at MAST. 2/18/2011 99 MPCE holds workshop on urban planning for earthquake-affected secondary cities and 2/23/2011 regions. 100 Fifth IHRC meeting is held. 2/28/2011 101 CIAT and international agencies hold fourth meeting on common enumeration approach. 3/1/2011 [page 204] 180 / Annex IL: Haiti Shelter and Housing Timeline 102 World Bank holds first housing donor group meeting [date approximate]. 3/1/2011 103 Housing and Neighborhood Reconstruction Support Program (HNRSP) is approved by 312011 IHRC. 104 UN-Habitat initiates consultation for Port-au-Prince urban planning forum: Vil Nou Vle A. 3/1/2011 105 Presidential election runoff is held. 3/20/2011 Martelly Transition Team begins discussions of Rehabilitation of 16 Neighborhoods 106 and Voluntary Return of Residents from 6 Camps (16/6) Project with UN and other 4/1/2011 stakeholders. iti 0} 107 UN Office of the Envoy to Haiti (OSE) reports that 37% of donor pledges have been ahpou disbursed. 108 Election Commission announces that Michel Martelly has been elected president. 41/4/2011 109 French Caisse des Depôts presents final report on National Housing Policy for Haïti. 4/4/2011 110 IHC holds meeting at MAST. 4/6/2011 an Sixth IHRC meeting is held, which includes thematic roundtables on housing and other 4/15/2011 sectors. Government approves $109 million in projects from Petrocaribe funds: $15 million for 112 debris, $22 million for Fort National (later used for Morne a Cabrit), and $22 million for 5/12/2011 Bowen Field (reallocated to other projects). 113 Michel Martelly is inaugurated as 56th president of Republic of Haiti. 5/14/2011 14 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Fund for Economic and Social Assistance 6/13/2011 (FAES) launch IDB “400 pour 100” housing project in Oranger. 115 President Martelly and IHRC Co-Chair Clinton open Building Back Better Communities 6/16/2011 Expo in Zorangers. 116 Housing donor group meets with Martelly team at UNOPS to discuss 16/6 Project. 6/24/2011 117 HRF approves $30 million for HNRSP. 6/28/2011 118 2011 CHAP reduced from $907 million to $382 million, of which $199 million (52%) has 6/30/2011 been received. 119 Seventh IHRC meeting is held. 7/21/2011 120 IHRC Board approves 16/6 Project. 7/21/2011 wi Banque Nationale de Crédit launches “Kay pam” mortgage program to help those with 72hoù legal title buy or repair homes. 122 Last Shelter Cluster meeting under UN-Habitat coordination (25 agencies in attendance). 8/16/2011 123 HRF approves $30 million for 16/6 Project. 8/30/2011 124 Shelter Cluster is merged with CCCM Cluster; coordination is transferred to IOM. 9/1/2011 125 UNDP issues press release saying more than 50% of 10 million cubic meters of rubble has 10/1/2011 been cleared. 126 IHRC reaches end of its 18-month mandate and closes. 10/21/2011 127 Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics (UCLBP) (Housing and Public 11/1/2011 Building Construction Unit) is created. 128 Second anniversary of earthquake 1/12/2012 [page 205] D PA LE L | | : Photo credit: UN-Habitat e e Report Bibliography 181 [page 206] 182 / Report Bibliography ALNAP. 2010. “Evaluating the Haïti Response: Encouraging Improved System-wide Collaboration.” London: ALNAP and UNEG. http://www.alnap.org/current/Haitilearningportal/meeting. AlterPresse. “Haïti-Séisme-Un an: Population de Fort National en colère.” Perspectives, AlterPresse, January 12, 2011. http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article10516#VVooqCLwtNI. American Red Cross. 2010. Standards, Design, Permitting, and Inspection of Building Construction in Urban Reconstruction and Rehabilitation. Washington: American Red Cross. Andrews, Christopher Robin and Seth Wachtel. 2010. Kreyol Living Wisdom and Haïti Regeneration: Using Indigenous Environmental Patterns. San Francisco. Related references: http://galrigroup.com/index.htm and http://www. slideshare.net/chrisrandrews/galri-powerpoint-1206222-kreyol-living-wisdom. Anglade, George. 1982. Atlas Critique d'Haïti. Montréal: ERCE et CRC. http://classiques.uqac.ca/contemporains/anglade_ georges/atlas_critique_haiti/atlas_critique_haiti.html. Applied Technology Council. 1989. “Procedures for Post-Earthquake Safety Evaluation of Buildings.” Redwood City: Applied Technology Council. https://store.atcouncil.org/index.php?dispatch=products.view&product_ id=35. Ashmore, Joseph. 2010. “Review of Emergency Shelter Solutions in Haiti.” Port-au-Prince: Shelter Cluster. http://www. humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/fles/2014/02/haiti-sheltersolutionsreview-final.pdf. Banque de la République d'Haïti 2011. Rapport Annuel 2010. Port-au-Prince: Banque de la République d'Haïti. Belizaire, Roland. 2010. Politiques publiques en Haïti: À quand la rupture avec la dépendance? Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie Lakay. http://www.papda.org/article.php3?id_article=664. Bell, Beverly. “ ‘We Bend, but We Don't Break’: Fighting for a Just Reconstruction in Haïti” MACLA Report on the Americas, July/August 2010. https://nacla.org/news/%E2%80%98we-bend-we-don%E2%80%99t-break%E2%80%99- fighting-just-reconstruction-haiti. Bhattacharjee, Abhijit and Roberta Lossio. 2011. “Final Report: Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haïti Earthquake.” Port-au-Prince: OCHA. https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Evaluation%200f%200CHA%20 Response%20to%20the%20Haiti%20Earthquake.pdf. Boaz, Desir and Alexandra Jackson. 2012. “Dealing with Land Barriers to Shelter Construction in Haïti: The Experience of the I0M Haïti Legal Team.” Geneva: International Organization for Migration. http://www.globalprotectioncluster. org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Haiti/files/HLP9%20AoR/Haiti Land_Barriers_ to Shelter_ Construction_2012_EN.pdf. Braun, Carl F. 2011. “Pour dynamiser l'offre de financement de l'immobilier en Haïti.” PowerPoint presentation for Mercredi de Réflexion, June 29, 2011. Port-au-Prince : Unibank, S.A. http://www.hofinet.org/upload_ docs/Pour%20 dynamiser%20loffre%20de%20financement%20de%20limmobilier #%20en%20Ha%C3%AFti.pdf. Brookings Institution. 2012. “When Internal Displacement Ends.” Washington: Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, and Norwegian Refugee Council. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/20020924_ displacement.pdf. Brown, Courtney. 2012. “The 21st Century Urban Disaster.” Global Communities Issue Brief. Silver Spring: Global Communities. http://www.globalcommunities.org/publications/21st century urban disaster-global-communities. pdf. Butterfield, Alan, Ronaldo Reario, and Robert Dolan. 2010. “The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Response to the Haïti Earthquake.” Humanitarian Exchange, 48: 13-15. London: Overseas Development Institute. 2010. http://www.alnap.org/resource/8832.aspx. Calais, Eric. 2011. “Termes de Référence pour des Plans de Prévention des Risques dans les Quartiers du Projet 16/6.” Port-au-Prince: UNDP. Unpublished document. Calais, Eric. 2012. “Les Plans de Prévention/Réduction des Risques: Expérience du Projet ‘16 Quartiers/6 Camps.’ ” Port-au-Prince: UNDP. Unpublished Powerpoint presentation. [page 207] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 183 Calzadilla Beunza, Alfonso and Ignacio Martin Eresta. 2011. “An Evaluation of the Haïti Earthquake 2010, Meeting Shelter Needs: Issues, Achievements and Constraints.” Geneva: IFRC. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ resources/HTShelterClusterReview11.pdf. Camp Coordination/Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster. 2011. “Return/Resettlement of IDPs: Standard Operating Procedures for Updating Displacement Register.” Document of IOM-led CCCM. http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info/ j/pdf/Registration UPdate Return Resettlement SOPs FINAL.pdf. CDA Collaborative Learning Project. 2010. “Lessons Learned from Past Experience for International Agencies in Haiti.” Reflecting on Peace Practice Program. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. http:// cdacollaborative.org/publication/lessons-learned-from-past-experience-for-international-agencies-in-haiti/. CHF. 2012. “Community Livelihoods and Economic Assistance through Rubble Removal and Shelter (CLEARS); Haiti Neighborhood Rebuilding Program (Katye); Clearing Land to Provide Accessible Neighborhoods (CLEAN).” Silver Spring: CHF. Unpublished documents. Clermont, Carine, David Sanderson, Anshu Sharma, and Helen Spraos. 2011. “Urban Disasters - Lessons from Haïti.” London: Disasters Emergency Committee. http://www.alnap.org/resource/9263. Cocking, Jane and Andy Bastable. 2010. “Water, Sanitation and Public Health in Post-Earthquake Haiti: Reflections on Oxfam's Experience.” Humanitarian Exchange 48: 20-22. London: Overseas Development Institute. http://www. alnap.org/resource/8832.aspx. Collins, Sam, Tom Corsellis, and Antonella Vitale. 2010. “Transitional Shelter: Understanding Shelter from the Emergency through Reconstruction and Beyond.” London: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). http://www.alnap.org/resource/5840. Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire (CIAT). 2010. “Haiti Demain : Objectifs et Stratégies Territoriales pour la Reconstruction.” Port-au-Prince: CIAT. http://www.oas.org/en/ser/dia/docs/HAITI DEMAIN.pdf. Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire, UN-Habitat, World Bank, et al. 2010. “Stratégie du Gouvernement d'Haïti pour appuyer le retour des populations au foyer dans habitat sûr et reconstruire les logements et Les quartiers.” Port-au-Prince: UN-Habitat. Unpublished document. Commission Intérimaire pour la Reconstruction de Haïti (CIRH). 2010. “Cadre de Travail du Retour des Déplacés dans leurs Quartiers et de la Reconstruction des Logements: Un Plan de Relance pour Les Familles Haïtiennes.” Port-au- Prince: CIRH. Unpublished document. Condor, Jeremy, Charles Juhn, and Raj Rana. 2013. “External Evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach Applied to Return and Relocation Programs in Haïti.” Geneva: The WolfGroup. http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/ uploads/2013/06/Haiti-Rental-Grant-Evaluation-the-WolfGroup.pdf. Corbet, Alice. 2012. “The Community-Based Approach in Haïti: Clarification of the Notion of ‘Communities’ and Recommendations.” The Haïti Observatory Newsletter, # 5, November 2012. Port-au-Prince; Groupe URD. http:// www.urd.org/Communities-and-the-community. Corvington, Georges. 1991. Port-au-Prince au Cours des Ans (4 Volumes). Port-au-Prince: Henry Deschamps. Cour des Comptes (France). 2013. L'aide française à Haïti après le séisme du 12 janvier 2010. Rapport public thématique. Paris: Cours des Comptes. http://www.ccomptes.fr/fr./Publications/Publications/L-aide-francaise-a-Haiti-apres-le- seisme-du-12-janvier-2010. Crawford, Kate. 2010. “Interim Assessment: Shelter at 10 Months and Scenarios for 2011.” Unpublished document. Crawford, Kate, Emily Noden, and Lizzie Babister. 2010. “Coordination and the Tenure Puzzle in Haïti.” Humanitarian Exchange 48: 7-10. London: Overseas Development Institute. http://www.alnap.org/resource/8832.aspx. Crenn, Bernard. 2012. “Evaluation of the AgeUK/DEC funded HelpAge project in Haïti Phase 1 and Phase 2.1: Emergency response and ensuring inclusion of the needs and capacities of older people in Haïtis reconstruction.” Port-au- Prince: HelpAge and DEC. http://www.alnap.org/resource/7088.aspx. [page 208] 184 / Report Bibliography Davidovici, Victor. 2010. “Rapport d'Expertise des Bâtiments.” Paris: Dynamique Concept. 2010. http://ciat.gouv.ht/ sites/default/files/docs/rm_davidivici.pdf. Davidson, Sara. 2011. “A Review of the IFRC-led Shelter Cluster: Haiti 2010.” Geneva: International Federatio of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies. http://www.alnap.org/resource/7474.aspx. Davis, Ian. 2011. “Critical Recovery Issues following the Haïti Earthquake.” Port-au-Prince: UN-Habitat. Unpublished document. Davis, lan. 2012. “What is the Vision for Sheltering and Housing in Haïti?” Port-au-Prince: UN-Habitat. http://www. alnap.org/pool/files/1379.pdf. Deprez, Simon and Éléonore Labattut. 2011. La Reconstruction de Port-au-Price: Analyses et Réflexions sur les Stratégies d'interventions en Milieu Urbain. Clichy: Solidarités International. http://www.alnap.org/resource/6994. DesRoches, Reginald, Mary Comerio, Marc Eberhard, Walter Mooney, and Glenn J. Rix. 2011. “Overview of the 2010 Haïti Earthquake.” Farthquake Spectra. Volume 27, Issue S1, October 2011. Oakland: Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI). http://dx.doi.org/10.1193/1.3630129. Dilley, Maxx, Robert S. Chen, Uwe Deichmann, Arthur L. Lerner-Lam, Margaret Arnold, et al. 2005. “Natural Disaster Hotspots: À Global Risk Analysis.” Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/621711468175150317/Natural-disaster-hotspots-A-global-risk-analysis. Eberhard, Marc, Mimi Sheller, Reginald DesRoches, and Marjorie Greene, eds. 2010. “The 12 January 2010 Haïti Earthquake: Emerging Research Needs and Opportunities.” Workshop Report. Oakland, CA: Earthquake Engineering Research Institute. http://www.eqclearinghouse.org/co/20100112-haiti/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Haiti- Workshop-Report_FINAL2.pdf. 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Fierro, Eduardo and Cynthia Perry. 2010. “Preliminary Reconnaissance Report - 12 January 2010 Haïti Earthquake.” Reconnaissance and Report partially supported by the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center (PEER). Berkeley: BFP Engineers, Inc. http://peer.berkeley.edu/publications/haiti 2010/documents/Haïiti Reconnaissance.pdf. Fitzgerald, Emmett. 2012. “Helping Families, Closing Camps: Using Rental Support Cash Grants and Other Housing Solutions to End Displacement in Camps: À Tool Kit of Best Practice and Lessons Learned, Haïti 2010 - 2012.” [page 209] WHAT DID WE LEARN? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haïti Earthquake / 185 Port-au-Prince: IASC Haiti Emergency Shelter/ Camp Coordination/Camp Management Cluster. https://www. sheltercluster.org/sites/default/fles/docs/Helping Families_ Closing_Camps2.pdf. 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Grünewald, François, Andrea Binder, and Yvio Georges. 2010. “Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haïti: 3 months after the earthquake.” Groupe URD and Global Public Policy Institute. http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/Haiti-IASC_RTE final report_en.pdf. Grünewald, François, Domitille Kauffmann, Béatrice Boyer, and Julie Patinet. 2011. “Real-time evaluation of humanitarian action supported by DG ECHO in Haïti.” Plaisians: ECHO DG and Groupe URD. http://ec.europa.eu/ echo/files/evaluation/2011/Groupe-URD_evaluation Haïti en.pdf. Haar, Rohini J., Sassan Naderi, John R. Acerra, Maxwell Mathias, and Kumar Alagappan. “The Livelihoods of Haïtian Health-Care Providers after the January 2010 Earthquake: À Pilot Study of the Economic and Quality-Of-Life Impact of Emergency Relief.” International Journal of Emergency Medicine 5:13, 2012. http://www.intjiem.com/ content/5/1/13. Habitat for Humanity International (HFHI). 2012. Disaster Response Shelter Catalogue. http://www.habitat.org/disaster/ work worldwide.aspx. Americus, GA: HFHI. Haïti Grassroots Watch. 2011. “ ‘Transition to What?’: Special Report on Haiti’s Housing and Shelter Crisis.” Haïti Grassroots Watch, August 23, 2011. Port-au-Prince: Haïti Grassroots Watch. http://haitigrassrootswatch. squarespace.com/9ontleng. Haïti Property Law Working Group. 2012. Haiti Land Transaction Manual, Vol. 1: À How-To Guïde for the Legal Sale of Property in Haiti. Port-au-Prince: Habitat for Humanity Haïti, et al. http://www.habitat.org/gov/public_policy/ Haïti land manual.aspx. Haver, Katherine. 2011. “Haiti Earthquake Response: Mapping and Analysis of Gaps and Duplications in Evaluations.” London: ALNAP and UNEG. http://www.alnap.org/resource/6063. Hays, Daniel. 2010. “Haïti Quake Loss Has Little Insurance Cover, Modeler Says.” Property Casualty 360°, January 13, 2010. 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Washington, DC: World Bank. http://data:worldbank.org/data- catalog/world-development-indicators [website] and http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/WDI-2013- ebook.pdf [publication]. Zéphyr, Dominique, Abby Cérdova, Hugo Salgado, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2011. Haïti in Distress: The Impact of the 2010 Earthquake on Citizen Lives and Perceptions. Tabarre: U.S. Agency for International Development and Vanderbilt University. http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/haiti/2010-Haiti-in-Distress-English.pdf. [page 218] [page 219] [page 220] |: Ys | lé en =” <. - te" , nn ! rx 4 Er +. ES", Dee Fa te « f al A RE r ge F CR. " 07 ù // L ie, v } \ NA y VA | ‘ ET 4 ’ \ TA f > ME . | 4 £ LU à VE © | Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) is a global partnership that helps developing countries better understand and reduce their vulnerabilities to natural hazards and adapt to climate change. Working with over 400 local, national, regional, and international partners, GFDRR provides grant financing, technical assistance, training and knowledge sharing activities to mainstream disaster and climate risk management in policies and strategies. Managed by the World Bank, GFDRR is supported by 34 countries and 9 international organizations.