(2026-03) Situation des droits de l'homme en Haïti - Rapport du Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme

GE. Human Rights Council Sixty-first session 23 February–2 April 2026 Agenda items 2 and 10 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General Technical assistance and capacity-building Situation of human rights in Haiti Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights* Summary The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 58/32. Haiti continued to face alarming levels of gang violence, affecting the enjoyment of human rights. While gang violence remains endemic and expanded out of the capital, other sources of violence by self-defence groups and non-organized members of the population are also concerning. Unnecessary or disproportionate use of force by Haitian and other security forces were also documented. Strengthening democratic institutions, with the support of the international community, will be key to pave the way for Haiti’s security and progress. * The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information. A/HRC/61/74 Advance unedited version Distr.: General 23 March 2026 Original: English A/HRC/61/74 2 I. Introduction 1. In its resolution 58/32, the Human Rights Council requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to provide to the Council, within the framework of an interactive dialogue and with the participation of the Designated Expert (expert) on the situation of human rights in Haiti, an oral update on the situation of human rights in Haiti at its sixtieth session and a report on the subject at its sixty-first session. The present report also contains an analysis of progress made in the implementation of recommendations from previous reports 1 . 2. The present report is built on information from a wide range of sources, including government entities and officials, other United Nations entities and agencies, non- governmental organizations, victims and witnesses, and in particular on the findings from monitoring activities conducted by the Human Rights Service of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) from 28 February 2025 to 15 January 2026. The report also draws on findings of the expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti. In accordance with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) human rights monitoring methodology, findings are included in the report where they meet the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard. II. Legal framework 3. The applicable international legal framework, including international human rights law, remained unchanged since the previous report of July 2025 2 . III. Impact of the violence on human rights A. Dynamics of armed violence 4. Gangs continued to use violence to assert their criminal control over populations living in areas under their influence in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. They targeted individuals perceived as collaborating with the police or with self-defense groups, or as defying gang-imposed ruling. Some victims were subjected to “trials” organized by the gangs and held in captivity in buildings under their control, at times required to pay fines as a condition for their release. Others were “sentenced” to death and shot dead, with their bodies often set on fire using gasoline. Women and girls were also subjected to sexual violence as a form of punishment. Despite the persistence of human rights abuses in areas under their control, the gangs’ ability to launch attacks on other localities, and expand their territorial influence in the capital, was significantly curtailed by security forces operations 3 . 5. However, gang violence has spread to the outskirts of the capital, as well as to other departments, notably the adjacent Artibonite and Centre. This expansion has enabled gangs to fortify strategic corridors and maintain dominance over critical maritime and overland trafficking routes that sustain their financing and operational resilience 4 . In late January 2025, gangs attacked Kenscoff, a mountainous area near Pétion-Ville and a secondary alternative route – laying outside of gang control – which connects Port-au-Prince to the southern region. Subsequent security forces operations to dislodge gangs from this area were deployed. These operations were led by national law enforcement, sometimes with the support of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission or a private military contractor using explosive drones. Despite these operations, gangs managed to establish cells in the area and continued to engage in criminal activities and human rights abuses. In March, gangs based in 1 A/HRC/54/79, A/HRC/55/76 and A/HRC/58/76. 2 See A/HRC/58/76, and see https://indicators.ohchr.org/. 3 For the purpose of this report, “security forces operations” means law enforcement operations carried out by the Haitian National Police, the Haitian Armed Forces and/or the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission alone or jointly. 4 S/2025/642. A/HRC/61/74 3 the capital attacked Saut-d’Eau and Mirebalais (Centre department), rapidly taking control of both localities and causing the displacement of most of the population. Despite security operations, at times supported by self-defense groups, gangs remained entrenched in the area, launching further attacks to expand eastward, toward Lascahobas. In Artibonite, gang attacks multiplied. In September 2025, the communes of Arcahaie and Cabaret – located north of the capital and bordering the Artibonite department – were also targeted by gangs. Although the police repelled the attacks, they underscored the growing risk of gangs expanding their reach toward Saint Marc, one of the principal cities in Artibonite and home to one of the main ports of the country. 6. Security operations against gangs resulted in a high number of casualties not only among gang members but also among residents, who were killed or injured by stray bullets and by drone strikes. These operations took two main forms: first, law enforcement operations, conducted by the Haitian National Police on the ground, sometimes with support from the Haitian Armed Forces and the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission. Second, it was reported that since March 2025, operations by air, characterized by drone and helicopter gunfire, conducted by a foreign private military company, Vectus Global, which was reportedly hired by the Haitian Government to support efforts led by security forces to curb gang activity 5 . Some operations involved both the national security forces and the private military company, while others were led solely by the company. 7. Self-defense groups and mobs continued to carry out so-called “popular justice”, acting in the context of the Bwa Kale movement. These actors – often armed with stones and machetes, and increasingly with high-calibre firearms – lynched to death individuals suspected of gang affiliation as well as other people perceived as committing common crimes, such as petty theft. The perpetrators often burned the victims’ bodies. In some cases, the victims were women and girls accused of being the intimate partners of gang members. Some killings were allegedly encouraged, supported, or facilitated by police officers. 8. This violence – primarily perpetrated by gangs – is fuelled by the use and threat of firearms 6 . OHCHR estimates that approximately 90% of the victims of killings resulted from firearm use. As Haiti does not manufacture weapons or ammunition, these are predominantly illegally trafficked from abroad, despite the arms embargo imposed by UN Security Council resolutions 7 . Regional links to transnational arms trafficking were highlighted in June 2025, when the Jamaican authorities reported the country’s largest-ever firearms seizure 8 . The cache – 233 rifles and handguns along with more than 40,000 rounds of ammunition – was believed to be part of a trafficking network involving multiple foreign jurisdictions and supplying gangs across the Caribbean, including Haiti 9 . B. Impact of gang-related violence on the enjoyment of human rights 9. Gang-related violence continues to severely affect the enjoyment of a wide range of human rights. Between 1 March 2025 and 15 January 2026 (latest available reporting cut- off), at least 5,519 people were killed and 2,608 others injured. Such violence involves three interrelated dynamics. First, most casualties occurred during security operations conducted against gangs. Second, gang activities and attacks themselves accounted for 27 percent of the casualties. Third, acts of “popular justice” carried out by self-defense groups and non- organized members of the population were responsible for a further 8 percent. In addition, the use of unnecessary and disproportionate lethal force and summary executions involving officers of the Haitian National Police (HNP) accounted for 3 percent of the victims, while summary executions perpetrated by the Government Commissioner (Public Prosecutor) of Miragoâne (Nippes Department) represented a further 1 percent. Geographically, the vast majority of casualties (killings and injured) – 78 percent – continued to occur in the 5 The New York Times (28 May 2025). “A Desperate Haiti Turns to Erik Prince, Trump Ally, in Fight Against Gangs”, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/28/us/haiti-erik-prince-blackwater- gangs.html; https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/haiti-military-companies-organized-crime-gangs/. 6 A/HRC/58/76. 7 2653 (2022), 2699 (2023), 2700 (2023), 2752 (2024) and 2794 (2025). 8 S/2025/642, para. 30. 9 Ibid. A/HRC/61/74 4 metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince and its periphery (West department), followed by the Artibonite and Centre departments, which accounted for 16 percent and 5 percent of casualties, respectively. Most kidnappings involving gangs were documented in the Artibonite (60 percent), followed by the West (35 percent) and Centre (3 percent) departments. Men continued to represent the majority of victims of killings and injuries (86 percent), followed by women (12 percent) and children (2 percent). In relation to kidnappings, men constituted 56 percent of victims, followed by women (38 percent) and children (6 percent). 10. Gangs have also continued using sexual violence to spread fear among, subjugate and punish the population. Between 1 March 2025 and 31 December 2025, the Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangement (MARA) – which was launched in August 2024 and is guided by UN Security Council Resolution 1960 to respond to conflict-related sexual violence – documented 1495 incidents of sexual violence committed by armed actors, involving 1578 survivors (1412 women, 159 girls, 6 boys, and 1 man). Gang rape was the most prevalent form of sexual violence, accounting for 81 percent of reported incidents. Most victims were attacked either inside their homes or in public spaces. Some of the victims were shot dead after being raped. Sexual violence has also been perpetrated randomly or against victims of kidnapping during their captivity. Others, including children, were coerced into so-called “sentimental relationships” with gang members and subjected to prolonged sexual exploitation. Women and girls remained the primary victims; however, underreporting likely obscures the full extent of the impact on men and boys. 11. OHCHR has also observed that gangs continue to inflict violence on children, although the full extent of this violence is difficult to determine due to underreporting. A recent OHCHR/BINUH report, published on 20 February 2026, underlines the growing prevalence of child trafficking in Haiti 10 . Lack of access to education and other safe spaces for children; limited social protection programmes for families; a lack of socio-economic opportunities, along with the absence of effective rehabilitation and reintegration programmes are among the root causes of the growing trafficking of boys and girls by gangs. According to testimonies gathered by OHCHR, the widespread availability of weapons among gangs, including high-calibre firearms, also fosters a false sense of protection. This, in turn, drives children from dysfunctional family and social environments – often themselves a consequence of gang‑related violence – to seek “safety” within gangs. Boys are used for activities ranging from surveillance and extortion collection to other violent criminal activities such as killings, kidnappings, and armed clashes with the police. Girls are typically subjected to sexual violence, exploitation, and slavery, forced domestic labour, and, in some cases, coerced participation in criminal activities. 12. In May 2025, members of the Wharf Jérémie gang executed 15 elderly men, presented as “sacrifices” during a purported Vodou ceremony, by slashing their throats on the orders of the gang leader. Two similar incidents were documented in January 2026, in which six women were killed by having their throats slit during purported Vodou ceremonies in Wharf Jérémie and Cité Soleil. In recent years, Christian missionaries and members of the clergy have also been targeted in kidnappings for ransom. More broadly, manifestations of religious, spiritual and cultural practices have been disrupted as communities have been displaced by gang violence. In late March 2025, gangs attacked the locality of Saut d’Eau, in the Centre department, which hosts a sacred site for Vodou and Christian practitioners. Members of the population have at times also engaged in killings of individuals suspected of practicing witchcraft and other spiritual rituals. For instance, in January 2025 in Les Cayes, members of the population lynched a Vodou priestess with machetes, accusing her of practicing witchcraft and mummifying another community member. 13. Gang-related violence is also a factor that impedes the conditions necessary for the exercise of the right to political participation and the possibility to hold free and fair elections. 10 United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (20 February 2026). “Children Trafficked by Gangs in Haiti: Rethinking the Responses”, available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/children-trafficked-by-gangs- rethinking-responses-en.pdf. A/HRC/61/74 5 Persistent insecurity, especially in the West and Artibonite departments, has impeded access to some areas. In the West department, insecurity has restricted access to five of 20 communes 11 . It is estimated that one in four people live in areas controlled by armed gangs 12 . According to local interlocutors, vote-buying and gang‑imposed coercion to support certain candidates are pervasive features of the Haitian political landscape, as some political actors have established networks of corruption with armed criminal gangs to maintain their hold on power 13 . In addition, gang-related violence has further exacerbated the chronic weakness of State authorities in delivering identity documents to citizens, notably by forcing the closure of civil registry offices and thereby excluding many individuals from participating in electoral processes. According to estimates, as of November 2025, approximately 1 million people were still awaiting their identity cards. 14. Populations living under gang control continue to face systematic extortion, severe movement restrictions, and the imposition of criminal control structures by gang networks. The already dire humanitarian situation – including limited access to food, water, health care, housing and education – remains critical due to both conjunctural and structural challenges, including pervasive gang violence and the absence of effective state governance and accountability. This impedes the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. 15. Gangs continued to destroy and ransack public and private property, extort money from businesses, and demand payments from private and public vehicles at numerous illegal checkpoints established along main roads in the capital and manned by heavily armed gang members. They also restricted access to the few essential services available, severely undermining the enjoyment of the rights to education, health, and adequate food. By the end of August, 1,606 schools were closed – 1,087 fully and 519 partially – affecting more than 243,000 children, mostly in the West and Centre departments 14 . Approximately one in seven children in Haiti is out of school, and an additional one million are at risk of dropping out 15 . By January 2026, only 10 per cent of national health facilities with inpatient capacity were fully operational, and in Port-au-Prince, only 41 per cent of facilities with beds remained fully functional, undermined by insecurity, damaged infrastructure, medicine shortages and the departure of an estimated 40 per cent of medical personnel 16 . Between March and April 2025, Médecins Sans Frontières suspended its work at an emergency medical centre in Turgeau (Port-au-Prince commune) 17 , before announcing the permanent closure of the centre in October 18 . In January 2026, Médecins Sans Frontières also closed its clinic in Bel Air (Port-au-Prince) 19 . The March 2025 attacks on Mirebalais resulted in the partial ransacking of the city’s hospital, and all its activities have ceased since then. In the Artibonite and Centre departments, gangs robbed farmers, destroyed agricultural assets, and restricted the delivery of products to local markets by controlling the main roads, severely undermining agricultural production, local economies, and food security. According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 5.7 million people now face acute food insecurity 20 . 16. According to the displacement assessment carried out by the International Organization for Migration 21 , as of September 2025, Haiti recorded 1,412,199 internally displaced persons – representing a 36 percent increase since November 2024. This surge was primarily driven by escalating gang violence in the Centre and Artibonite departments, which 11 S/2025/641, para. 10. 12 https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166059. 13 A/HRC/55/76, and https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/prophane-victor. 14 S/2025/641. 15 Education under attack in Haiti (UNICEF - Feb. 28, 2025). 16 S/2026/31, para. 65. 17 Médecins sans frontières (international), “Haiti: MSF withdraws from two medical facilities in Port- au-Prince as widespread violence intensifies,” 8 April 2025. 18 Médecins sans frontières (international), “MSF announces permanent closure of our Turgeau emergency centre in Port-au-Prince” 15 October 2025. 19 "Haïti : escalade de violence dans le quartier de Bel Air, à Port-au-Prince", 8 January 2026. 20 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, “Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September 2025 - February 2026 and Projection for March - June 2026”. 21 International Organization for Migration, “Haiti – Report on the displacement situation in Haiti – Round 11”, September 2025. A/HRC/61/74 6 saw significant increases in displacement of 35 percent and 32 percent, respectively. Children accounted for 53 per cent of those displaced. IV. Strengthening of the democratic State 17. Despite some improvements registered in some areas, most issues related to the State obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights are not being met. Corruption, impunity and poor governance continue to cripple Haitians’ institutions, erode the rule of law and remain a barrier to people’s enjoyment of their human rights. A. Political agreement providing for a democratic transition 18. The Haitian political process entered its final phase under the transitional governance framework established in March 2024, which envisioned the transfer of power to elected authorities by 7 February 2026. During the period covered by the report, Fritz Jean and Laurent Saint-Cyr successively assumed the six-month rotating coordination of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) in March and August 2025, respectively. While the TPC and the transitional Government worked to organize the upcoming elections, public criticism mounted over persistent insecurity, perceived delays in electoral preparations, and unresolved allegations of corruption against three members of the Council. By midyear, the Provisional Electoral Council had assessed voting centres in nine of ten departments, identifying 1,309 centres for approximatively 6.2 million voters 22 . 19. On 1 December, the TPC approved an electoral decree paving the way for presidential and legislative elections to be held in late August 2026, followed by local elections in December 2026, with results expected in January 2027. The Provisional Electoral Council has advanced preparations for the presidential elections: approximately 460 electoral staff received training, and new departmental and municipal officials were appointed, ensuring 30 percent women’s representation in line with constitutional requirements 2324 . By the end of 2025, doubts emerged among electoral authorities and political parties about meeting the proposed timeline due to continuing security, logistical and institutional challenges. On 7 February 2026, the mandate of the TPC expired. B. Law enforcement 20. The Haitian National Police continued making important strides, in particular to contain the expansion of gang violence in the capital, despite serious obstacles. The Police operational capacity improved with international assistance. The Champs de Mars police station (Port-au-Prince) was refurbished, and the force received 34 vehicles (including ten armored vehicles) and eight ambulances, along with protective equipment. Police stations in Kenscoff (West department) and Borgne (North department) were rehabilitated 25 . Nevertheless, the police still face multiple challenges, including insufficient capacity to deter, arrest and disarm armed gangs – many of which possess superior equipment – as well as difficulties maintaining a sustained presence and control in areas from which gangs have been expelled. As of 30 November 2025, the Haitian National Police numbered 13,414 officers, including 1,770 women 26 , representing about 1.13 officers per 1,000 inhabitants, or 51 per cent of the recommended ratio of 2.2 officers per 1,000 inhabitants. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented the killing of 18 police officers (16 men and 2 women) and the injury of 34 others (all men). In addition, fifty of the 116 armored vehicles 22 S/2025/641, para. 10. 23 S/2025/641, para. 10. 24 CEDAW General Comment No. 40 on the equal and inclusive representation of women in decision- making systems. 25 S/2025/641, para. 21 26 S/2026/31, para. 18. A/HRC/61/74 7 in the police fleet were either non-operational, destroyed, or in the possession of gangs, and 79 of the 413 police stations across the country remained non-operational 27 . 21. Between 1 March 2025 and 15 January 2026, information verified by OHCHR indicates that at least 3,301 people were killed (3,080 men, 170 women and 51 children) and 1,691 injured (1,471 men, 182 women and 38 children) during security forces operations against gangs. On-the-ground police operations – supported in some instances by on-the- ground personnel from a private security company – accounted for 61 per cent of the casualties 28 . While most victims were gang members, killed or injured during exchanges of fire with the police, 22 percent were members of the population with no affiliation to gangs struck by stray bullets while inside their residences or in the streets. The number of casualties indicates a lack of an imminent threat to life or serious injury and, therefore, unnecessary or disproportionate use of force. 22. Allegations persisted regarding the involvement of police officers, most of them belonging to specialized units, in incidents of unnecessary or disproportionate use of force and in the summary execution of suspected gang members or individuals accused of providing support to gangs. Between 1 March 2025 and 15 January 2026, OHCHR documented 247 cases which occurred outside anti-gang operations, resulting in 196 killings (169 men, 24 women and three children) and 51 injuries (44 men, five women and two children). The Government Commissioner (Public Prosecutor) of Miragoâne (Nippes department) was reportedly involved in the summary execution of at least 34 men suspected of gang affiliation or committing crimes such as theft. 23. Since the vetting process of the Haitian National Police began in June 2023, the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police has opened investigations into 334 police officers; however, none of these cases has been finalized 29 . Between 1 March 2025 and 8 January 2026, the General Inspectorate opened investigations into 222 incidents involving the possible unlawful use of force by the police. These incidents resulted in the deaths of 110 people and injuries to 16 others. These cases were referred by BINUH and OHCHR to the General Inspectorate through a dedicated information-sharing mechanism. As of January 2026, investigations had been opened into 174 cases, none of which had been finalized, while the remaining cases were still awaiting the opening of investigations. Police authorities continued to cite resource constraints and logistical challenges linked to gang-related insecurity as the main reasons for delays in investigations and accountability measures for alleged human rights violations committed by police forces. 24. Vectus Global’s first operation took place on 1 March 2025. Since then, it began conducting a series of drone strikes and firing from helicopters targeting gang members in the capital, particularly in Cabaret, Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas, Kenscoff, Léogâne, Pétion Ville, Port-au-Prince, and Tabarre. Between 1 March 2025 and 15 January 2026, among the casualties documented during these drone and helicopter operations – primarily targeting gang members – were 60 persons not affiliated with gangs killed (28 men, 19 women, seven boys and six girls), and 49 injured (nine men, 30 women, seven boys and three girls). These individuals were struck in proximity to the targeted locations. For instance, in September 2025, four children playing in a street in Simon Pelé (Cité Soleil) were killed by explosive blasts from drones launched at a nearby party attended by gang members. 25. Starting on 31 December 2025, the private military contractor reportedly began providing on-the-ground personnel in support of operations led by the Haitian National Police. These joint operations, documented between 31 December and 15 January in Delmas and Port-au-Prince, resulted in the killing of at least 28 individuals not involved in violence (including three children) and the injuries of at least 70 others (including five children) by stray bullets while they were inside their homes or in the streets. 26. Some, or even most, of these drone strikes and helicopter operations could be described as targeted killings, given the apparent predetermined, intentional, and deliberate 27 S/2025/641, para. 20. 28 2,065 killed (1,890 men, 141 women and 34 children) and 956 injured (800 men, 137 women and 19 children). 29 S/2025/641, para. 23. A/HRC/61/74 8 use of lethal force against individuals specifically identified in advance, whereas the sole objective of targeted law enforcement operations against individuals should be their arrest and detention. During the reporting period, no investigation appears to have been opened by the judicial authorities to establish the legality of these operations and the circumstances in which the killings and injuries occurred. In addition, no accountability mechanism appears to have been put in place to enable victims and members of the population to access effective remedies and justice. 27. All law enforcement operations, including those delegated to private actors, are governed by international human rights law, including the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials 30 . This framework provides that any use of force by law enforcement must comply with the principles of legality, precaution, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination and accountability 31 . It strictly limits the use of potentially lethal force in situations where it is unavoidable to protect life facing an imminent threat and as a last resort when other less extreme measures such as capture or less lethal incapacitation have been exhausted or deemed inadequate 32 . Failure to comply with these principles during law enforcement operations, including through the use of targeted killings, violates the right to life and constitutes extrajudicial executions by the State. 28. According to the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, States are responsible for the conduct of private and military security companies that they empower to exercise governmental authority, such as the use of force or detention, or that act under their instruction, direction, or control 33 . Companies performing these functions are bound by the same international human rights obligations as national police or other state security forces. States therefore have a duty to prevent, investigate, punish and remedy summary executions and other serious violations committed by companies operating under their jurisdiction 34 . C. Justice system 29. OHCHR observed some progress in the functioning of the justice system during the reporting period. In March, the Court of First Instance of Port-au-Prince reopened in a new building in Puits Blain (Delmas), after its operations were severely disrupted when the Justice Palace in the Bicentenaire area (Port-au-Prince) was attacked and vandalized by the Grand Ravine and Village Dieu gangs in 2022. To support the resumption of its activities, OHCHR provided office and computer equipment for magistrates and judicial staff. On 14 April, the Government established, by decree, two specialized judicial units (“Pôles Judiciaires Spécialisés”) to prosecute mass crimes – including sexual violence – as well as financial crimes, with support from OHCHR and UNODC. Ten public Government Commissioners (prosecutors) have already been selected, but their appointment has been delayed due to setbacks in acquiring the building designated for the units. 30. The Anti-Corruption Unit (ULCC) advanced several major investigations into corruption and gang financing. It submitted seven reports to the judicial authorities alleging corruption by former senior officials and their relatives, which resulted in three arrests. The ULCC also issued recommendations for further investigation of a former highest-level official for an alleged false declaration of assets. In addition, the Unit pursued at least five other investigations involving high-ranking officials. 31. Separately, the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police finalized a report linking a former State official to individuals providing support to gangs in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. In July, senior State officials, former officials, and an individual listed 30 https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-use-force-and- firearms-law-enforcement. 31 OHCHR, Guidance on less-lethal weapons in law enforcement, 2020. 32 Ibd 39, principle 9 and Human Rights Committee, General Comment no 36, para. 12. 33 Working Group on the use of mercenaries, A/HRC/51/25. 34 Ibid. A/HRC/61/74 9 under the United Nations Security Council sanctions 35 were interrogated by investigating judges in connection with allegations of corruption and gang financing. The Central Directorate of the Judicial Police also continued cooperating with the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate a cross-border network trafficking firearms and ammunition into Haiti’s Central Plateau. This investigation builds on arrests made in March 2025, when six members of the network were detained. Transferred to the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police on 18 April, they remain in custody. 32. Nevertheless, judicial progress in cases involving corruption and gang financing remains limited. In July, the Port-au-Prince Court of Appeal held hearings in the 2022 arms- trafficking case involving the Episcopal Church of Haiti. This followed a June 2025 ruling that overturned an earlier decision clearing the Church and its leaders of responsibility and ordered the investigation to resume under a new judge. After the case was reopened, authorities carried out new arrests in August, including officials of the Ministry of Worship and the Customs Franchise Service. As of 31 December, seven individuals remained in pre- trial detention while the investigation continued. By contrast, no progress was recorded in the 2022 “Miss Lily” arms-trafficking case in Port-de-Paix. The case file has remained with the Government Commissioner (Public Prosecutor)’s Office at the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance since June, instead of being transferred to the Port-de-Paix Court of First Instance, where the trial should proceed. 33. On 23 December, the Transitional Presidential Council and the Council of Ministers approved a decree establishing the organization and functioning of the High Court of Justice, presenting it as an instrument to combat impunity. However, the decree drew criticism from civil society and justice actors, who argued that assigning cases against senior officials to the Senate – which currently does not exist – undermines accountability by shielding those officials from prosecution. Critics described the measure as a form of “self-amnesty”, noting that only Parliament has the constitutional authority to grant amnesty. 34. Impunity for human rights violations and abuses continues to prevail. No progress has been made in the cases concerning the massacres at Grand Ravine (2017), La Saline (2018) and Bel Air (2019), nor in the investigation into the murder of Monferrier Dorval (2020), the former head of the Port-au-Prince Bar Association. The investigation into the 2024 Wharf Jérémie massacre in Port-au-Prince, in which at least 207 people were killed by a gang, is ongoing. 17 witnesses and relatives of victims have testified before the investigating judge, but no arrests have been made yet, pending the issuance of arrest warrants. In the case of the October 2024 Pont-Sondé massacre, in which 100 people were killed by another gang, complaints were filed and arrest warrants issued; however, the case remains with the investigating judge at the Saint Marc Court of First Instance. No concrete action has been taken, and survivors have received no support. In the case of the murder of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, the Port-au-Prince Court of Appeal decided in July 2025 to annul the referral order issued by investigating judge Walter Wesser Voltaire in February 2024. 35. Although national authorities have taken steps to combat impunity for sexual violence, significant challenges remain. According to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security’s commission – created in 2024 to guarantee that the prosecution of sexual-violence cases is prioritized – 110 cases of sexual violence had been submitted to the Commission as of September 2025. Of these, 29 cases had been resolved (all outside Port-au-Prince), while one case was closed without further action. D. Penitentiary system 36. Some progress was made in 2025 to improve the functioning of the penitentiary system, in particular to reduce prison overcrowding. In May, July, and September, criminal hearings with and without jury assistance were organized in Les Cayes and Port-au-Prince, with the support of OHCHR. Across both jurisdictions, the hearings addressed a total of 79 cases, involving 139 defendants. In July, the Government Commissioner (Public Prosecutor)’s Office, the Dean’s Office of the Cap Haitian Court of First Instance, and the 35 https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/prophane-victor. A/HRC/61/74 10 local Bar Council adopted a joint resolution to help reduce prison congestion by reconstructing missing case files and expediting judicial proceedings. The resolution also established a joint technical unit – bringing together the Deputy Government Commissioner (Public Prosecutor), the President of the Bar Council, and the Office de la Protection du Citoyen to coordinate efforts, prepare periodic reports, and encourage the holding of special criminal and correctional hearings. 37. As of 31 December 2025, Haitian prisons held 7,448 individuals (6,724 men, 442 women, 253 boys and 29 girls). Pre-trial detainees continued to represent the vast majority of the prison population (82 per cent). Detention conditions remained inhuman and degrading, largely due to inadequate medical care, unsanitary facilities, insufficient food, and limited access to drinking water. Between March and December 2025, at least 118 inmates died, primarily from health conditions linked to these degrading detention conditions. In the capital, the 2024 mass escapes from the National Penitentiary and the Croix-des-Bouquets Prison for adults – facilitated by gang attacks that rendered both facilities inoperable – continued to exacerbate overcrowding in police cells and at the Center for the Reintegration of Children in Conflict with the Law (CERMICOL), the only remaining functioning detention facility. As of December 2025, CERMICOL, originally established as a reintegration center for boys in conflict with the law, was holding 112 children (95 boys and 17 girls) and 605 adults (452 men and 153 women), despite having a maximum capacity for 93 detainees. 38. Prolonged detention of children in conflict with the law remains pervasive, despite national and international standards requiring inter alia that it be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period 36 . This is largely due to limited awareness among competent authorities of the standards governing juvenile justice and the absence of viable alternatives to detention. Delays in prosecuting cases, linked to shortages of judicial personnel and resources, mean that many juveniles spend much of their childhood in prison, in harsh conditions and without access to adequate education or rehabilitation programmes. V. Support from the international community A. Ensuring security 39. In its resolutions 2699 (2023) and 2751 (2024), the Security Council authorized the formation and deployment of a Multinational Security Support Mission to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to re-establish security in Haiti and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections, in strict compliance with international law, including international human rights law. As of 31 December 2025, the Mission was composed of 981 police officers, 40 percent of its planned complement of 2,500 personnel. The insufficient resources and operational capabilities of the Mission on the ground, along with the spread of gang violence beyond the Haitian capital since early 2025, have yielded mixed results to thwart gang violence 37 . Support provided by the Mission to operations led by the Haitian National Police enabled the partial reopening of National Road 1, which helped secure access to the port and the airport. However, despite sustained security operations, the lack of sufficient Mission’s personnel hampered efforts to restore security in areas such as Kenscoff and the Artibonite department. 40. On 30 September, the Security Council adopted resolution 2793 (2025), which established a Gang Suppression Force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for a period of 12 months. The resolution provides for up to 5,550 uniformed personnel and 50 civilians to substitute the Multinational Security Support Mission established in 2023. The Gang Suppression Force, which will receive logistical and financial support from the new United Nations Support Office in Haiti, is mandated to “neutralize, isolate and deter gangs” and is 36 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 40; CRC/GC/2005/6, para. 53; CRC/C/GC/10; CRC/C/GC/24; A/80/166, para. 32; A/HRC/56/60, p. 12; https://www.ohchr.org/en/detention/international-standards-detention. 37 S/2025/597. A/HRC/61/74 11 authorized to “take all necessary measures” to carry out its mandate. Its responsibilities include conducting intelligence-led counter-gang operations, securing infrastructure, supporting the Haitian National Police and Haitian Armed Forces, facilitating elections and humanitarian access, and addressing child recruitment by gangs and their disengagement. 41. OHCHR consolidated and scaled up its support to the Compliance Mechanism of the Mission, even as the security environment in Haiti continued to deteriorate and the Mission transitioned towards the Gang Suppression Force. Regular strategic and operational engagement with the Mission’s leadership ensured sustained integration of human rights considerations into joint operations with the Haitian National Police, including through continued advisory support, participation in the review of operational frameworks, and preparation of a lessons-learned exercise on the implementation of the Compliance Mechanism. A major achievement was the full operationalization of the Complaint and Reporting Mechanism. Its Steering Committee was formally established in May 2025, with participation from the Mission, the Haitian National Police, civil society, OHCHR and other United Nations entities. These developments strengthened community access to accountability mechanisms by providing a safe and accessible channel for reporting alleged abuses linked to joint operations by the Haitian National Police and the Mission. In this context, the State should conduct thorough, independent, and impartial investigations into such allegations, in line with applicable international standards. 42. OHCHR considers that, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2793 (2025), and building on the experience of the Mission, it is vital to ensure that implementation of the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy is informed by BINUH’s monitoring and reporting mandate, in a consistent and mutually reinforcing manner. This approach should cumulatively strengthen the efforts to identify and prevent human rights violations and abuses. Similarly, as provided in resolution 2793, the implementation of a robust compliance mechanism to prevent, investigate, address, and publicly report on potential human rights violations and abuses – including sexual exploitation and abuse by GSF personnel – and an accompanying oversight mechanism to prevent such violations or abuses, particularly sexual exploitation and abuses, will be crucial. These safeguards and mechanisms will strengthen the effectiveness of the GSF’s operations and enhance its overall contribution to stability in Haiti. B. Tackling Impunity 43. The Gang Suppression Force’s effectiveness will also depend on actions beyond its purview, such as increased measures against those who finance, lead, and enable the gangs’ operations. Such measures could include Security Council sanctions, prosecutions, arms trafficking controls, and other political measures. Successive Security Council resolutions 38 reactivated the sanctions framework first established in the 1990s. These resolutions impose a territorial arms embargo, travel bans, and asset freezes on individuals and entities destabilizing Haiti. 44. As of December 2025, nine individuals and two entities were listed under the sanctions regime for their involvement in acts that threaten peace and security in Haiti, or for their direct or indirect responsibility for human rights abuses, including killings, kidnappings, sexual violence, and child recruitment. These measures should be complemented by strengthened efforts to curb the illicit trafficking of weapons into Haiti 39 , as well as by robust judicial prosecutions. The UN Panel of Experts on Haiti has expressed concern about the slow progress in implementing the sanctions regime, attributing it not only to a lack of awareness but, more significantly, to the limited capacity of State institutions and insufficient political will of certain actors 40 . Efforts by the United Nations to further bolster the rule of law, particularly in the justice and detention sectors, must remain a priority to support Haiti’s path toward lasting peace and stability. This includes the operationalization of the two specialized judicial units (“Pôles Judiciaires Spécialisés”) established by decree in April 38 2653 (2022), 2699 (2023), 2700 (2023), 2752 (2024) and 2794 (2025). 39 See A/HRC/57/418/76. 40 S/2025/597. A/HRC/61/74 12 2025, with OHCHR support – representing a landmark step in the fight against impunity and corruption in Haiti. These units could help transform Haiti’s justice landscape by providing specialized capacity to handle sensitive and complex criminal cases 41 . C. Prioritizing prevention and protection, including community-based approach to countering violence 45. As highlighted in previous reports, the violence in Haiti is intrinsically linked to economic, social and cultural inequalities 42 . Prevention and protection policies should include community-based processes to restore social cohesion and include support for reduction of community-based violence, disarmament, demobilisation, recovery and reintegration efforts 43 . 46. Measures should prioritize protecting children and strengthening the capacities of families to manage risks through social protection programmes and access to financial services that create sustainable socio-economic opportunities. They should also ensure access to inclusive and quality education and other child-friendly spaces. In addition, justice measures must comply with national and international frameworks that recognize children victims of trafficking as victims entitled to comprehensive protection, physical and psychological recovery, and social reintegration and assistance – rather than punitive measures. 47. The thorough implementation of the Protocol on the transfer, reception and care of children associated with armed gangs encountered during territorial security operations – signed between the United Nations and the Government of Haiti in 2023 – is a critical tool in this context. However, as of February 2026, the Task Force 44 provided for in the Protocol – which is responsible for overseeing its implementation by the competent authorities – has not yet been established. VI. Conclusions and recommendations 48. Gang violence continues affecting the enjoyment of human rights of the population in Haiti. Gangs continue to use violence, including killings, injuries, kidnappings, human trafficking, rape and sexual exploitation, to exert their dominance over a population that is bleeding dry. Approximatively 12 percent of the population, mainly women and children, is internally displaced in makeshift camps, and 5.4 million Haitians are in need of humanitarian assistance. The consolidation of gangs’ criminal governance in the capital – and their territorial expansion into other regions, notably the outskirts of Port‑au‑Prince and the neighbouring departments of Artibonite and Centre – is unprecedented. Despite the United Nations Security Council embargo, the illicit trafficking of weapons and ammunitions through porous borders has continued to provide a reliable supply chain for gangs, fuelling violence and human rights abuses. 49. In response, security forces increased their operations – sometimes with support from self-defence groups and a private military company – which helped prevent gangs from expanding their control to other neighbourhoods of the capital. However, these efforts did not stop their expansion into rural areas of the Artibonite and Centre departments, nor into the outskirts of the capital. 50. During the period under review, at least 61 per cent of all casualties were documented during security forces operations. Of these, 16 per cent were members of 41 S/2025/642. 42 A/HRC/54/79. 43 A/HRC/55. 44 As per paragraph 38 of the Protocol, the Task Force is mandated to facilitate and promote the implementation of the provisions of the Protocol. It is composed of the ISWR (Institute of Social Welfare and Research), the police Child Protection Brigade (CPB), the Border Police (POLIFRONT), the Government Commissioner (Public Prosecutor)’s Office, the juvenile judge, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, and the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training. If necessary, the Task Force may also be expanded to include other stakeholders. A/HRC/61/74 13 the population not involved in the violence, including young children. The involvement of a private military company – in particular through the use of armed drone strikes and helicopter gunfire – raise serious concerns, as such conduct could be characterized as targeted killings, inconsistent with international human rights law. 51. Efforts deployed by the Haitian authorities to address impunity and corruption are encouraging. Nevertheless, shortcomings continue hindering respect for human rights, including the rights to life and personal integrity, as well as economic, social and cultural rights. The lack of governance and accountability also contribute to emboldening criminal networks, enabling them to pursue increasingly aggressive territorial expansion. Ensuring security while respecting human rights, tackling corruption and impunity, and focusing on comprehensive prevention, protection and community-based approaches – with particular attention to children – are paramount. 52. The international community’s endeavor to support Haiti’s path towards peace and security, enabling the holding of free and fair elections, is key. These efforts need to be commensurate with the gravity of the situation to achieve immediate and long- term impacts. 53. Despite some limited progress on the implementation of previous recommendations, most of the challenges remain. The High Commissioner therefore reiterates his previous recommendations and urges Haitian authorities to: (i) Continue making progress towards the establishment of the transitional governance arrangements providing for a democratic transition, leading to free and fair legislative and presidential elections, ensuring women’s participation, and in strict compliance with international law, including human rights law; (ii) Strengthen the ability of the Haitian National Police – including through the provision of adequate resources and equipment – to respond effectively to gang violence, while upholding human rights standards in their conduct, notably the rights to life and personal integrity; protect and secure roads and public buildings, in particular those used to provide essential services to the population; ensure and accelerate the vetting process of police officers; and hold accountable all those involved in human rights violations, including those described in the present report, as well as acts of misconduct or criminal behaviour, in accordance with international human rights norms and standards; (iii) Ensure that all law enforcement operations, including those delegated to private actors, fully comply with international human rights law, including the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. (iv) Carry out independent, prompt, and thorough investigations into killings and injuries that occur during security forces operations, and if violations are found, hold those responsible to account and provide full reparations to the victims and their families. (v) Strengthen independent oversight mechanisms to ensure that judges and other judicial personnel discharge their functions in accordance with the law and high standards of professionalism and integrity, including by continuing with the process of certification of all judges; (vi) Accelerate the establishment of the specialized judicial units to address mass killings and crimes related to sexual violence, as well as corruption and financial crimes, with the support of the international community; (vii) Establish an integrated protection system to provide comprehensive gender- and age-sensitive support to victims of gang violence, including survivors of sexual violence. This should include access to immediate and long-term medical care, psychological counselling, legal assistance, social reintegration programmes, and access to inclusive, and quality education; (viii) Address the trafficking of children and young people by gangs by improving risk mitigation and child protection strategies for affected communities A/HRC/61/74 14 through enhanced coordination with the national human rights institution, community- level actors and civil society, including the provision of educational and socio-economic opportunities for children and their families. (ix) Establish mechanisms to ensure children’s safe, meaningful and systematic participation in the design, implementation, and monitoring of prevention, protection, recovery, and accountability measures, so that all responses are grounded in a child-centred perspective. For children who have already been trafficked, ensure that responses do not rely on criminalization but instead prioritize comprehensive rehabilitation and social reintegration. This should include establishing a youth corps, supporting transit centers for children who are victims of trafficking by gangs – such as the center currently run in Port-au-Prince by the Institute of Social Welfare and Research (IBESR - Institut du Bien-Etre Social et de Recherches) and the additional centre in the South department that has been secured but not yet funded – and creating the Task Force provided for in the “Protocol on the Transfer, Reception, and Care of Children Associated with Armed Gangs Encountered during Security Operations on National Territory” to oversee its implementation by the competent authorities. (x) Relocate immediately all internally displaced persons living in squalid conditions to safe and appropriate facilities, in line with international human rights norms and standards. 54. The High Commissioner calls upon Member States to: (a) Continue making progress on the deployment of the Gang Suppression Force, and the establishment of the UN Support Office in Haiti, as authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 2793 (2025), to re-establish security in Haiti in strict compliance with international law, including human rights law and integrating a gender-responsive approach, and to grant the Force with the necessary resources to carry out its mandate; (b) Support the Haitian authorities to elaborate and implement public policies to tackle corruption and impunity, and to focus on building up community- based protection networks; (c) In the light of Security Council resolutions 2653 (2022), 2699 (2023), 2700 (2023), 2752 (2024) and 2794 (2025) to: (i) Take urgent and stricter measures to prevent the direct or indirect illicit supply, sale, diversion or transfer of arms and related materiel of all types to Haiti, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft; (ii) Continue to update the list of individuals and entities subject to the Security Council sanctions for engaging in or supporting criminal activities adversely affecting human rights.