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Ces Perspectives macroéconomiques et pauvreté de la Banque mondiale (octobre 2022) projettent que le PIB d'Haïti se contractera pour une quatrième année consécutive, de 1,5 pour cent lors de l'exercice 2022, alors qu'une profonde crise politique et institutionnelle aggravée par l'insécurité des gangs déprime la confiance des investisseurs et pénalise les trois secteurs économiques. L'indice de l'activité économique a reculé de 1,9 pour cent en glissement annuel au deuxième trimestre de l'exercice 2022, l'agriculture chutant de 6,4 pour cent après de faibles précipitations, tandis qu'un déficit budgétaire monétisé (2,0 pour cent du PIB) a contribué à faire baisser la gourde de 21,6 pour cent face au dollar et à porter l'inflation à 30,5 pour cent, alimentée aussi par des subventions aux carburants atteignant 3,5 pour cent du PIB.
Le déficit budgétaire devrait se creuser à 3,2 pour cent du PIB en 2022, principalement à cause des subventions énergétiques, financé en grande partie par la banque centrale (BRH) et des bons du Trésor, la dette s'établissant à 27,7 pour cent du PIB. La croissance est projetée à -0,1 pour cent en 2023 avant un rebond à 2,0 pour cent en 2024, sous réserve d'une stabilité politique accrue après les élections de 2023 et d'une amélioration de la sécurité. L'inflation devrait clôturer l'exercice 2022 à 26,5 pour cent en moyenne puis reculer à moyen terme à mesure que le financement de la BRH est remplacé par l'émission de bons du Trésor.
La pauvreté reste élevée, le taux de pauvreté internationale (2,15 dollars, PPA 2017) atteignant 30,8 pour cent, et la croissance est jugée trop faible pour réduire sensiblement la pauvreté. Les perspectives sont marquées par des risques baissiers liés au processus politique et à la sécurité, la réforme du secteur énergétique et une meilleure gestion des risques de catastrophe étant jugées essentielles, l'insécurité alimentaire touchant 5,6 millions de personnes en août 2022.
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HAITI
Table 1 2021
Population, million 11.5
GDP, current US$ billion 20.9
GDP per capita, current US$ 1814.6
International poverty rate ($2.15)
a
29.2
Lower middle-income poverty rate ($3.65)
a
58.0
Upper middle-income poverty rate ($6.85)
a
85.8
Gini index
a
41.1
Life expectancy at birth, years
b
64.3
Total GHG emissions (mtCO2e) 11.2
Source: WDI, Macro Poverty Outlook, and official data.
a/ Most recent value (2012), 2017 PPPs.
b/ Most recent WDI value (2020).
GDPisexpectedtocontractfora
fourthconsecutiveyearin2022,against
thebackdropofacontinuedinstitution-
alandpoliticalcrisis.Increasedinsecu-
ritycreatesanuncertainenvironment
forbusinesses,whichwillfurtherham-
pergrowth.Beyondthesechallenges,
lowhumancapitalaccumulationand
highvulnerabilitytoshocks,including
naturalhazards,continuetohamper
growthprospects,andlimitsocialmo-
bilityandpovertyreduction,especially
giventhatthepooresttakelongertore-
coverafteradisaster.
Key conditions and
challenges
Haiti’s political and institutional crisis,
compounded by insecurity, continues to
hinder economic performance. Other key
challenges to growth include inadequate
infrastructure, limited human capital,
weak governance, and an unfavorable
business environment characterized by
uncertainty, under-developed finance
markets, and limited market contestability.
At below 6.0% of GDP, tax revenue is the
lowest in the LAC region, while govern-
ment spending priorities do not support
growth-enhancing activities. A large infor-
mal sector with low-quality jobs combined
with anemic growth makes escaping
poverty elusive. Limited access to quality
healthcare and education compounds the
difficulty of building human capital and
the ability to break the cycle of poverty.
The structural issues that have constrained
growth could rise in importance, including
low agricultural productivity hampered
by watershed degradation and land frag-
mentation. Vulnerability to natural hazard
shocks and climate change will likely con-
tinue to hinder growth, hurting the poor
and the vulnerable most.
Recent developments
The index of economic activity fell by 1.9
percent y-o-y in Q2 FY22, amid depressed
investor confidence due to continued po-
litical uncertainty and insecurity caused by
violent gangs. Nearly all sectors of the
economy contracted; the agricultural sec-
tor, where most poor households work
and live, was affected to a greater extent.
Agricultural output dipped 6.4% y-o-y in
Q2 FY22, following low rainfall which ad-
versely affected the spring harvest that ac-
counts for 60% of yearly sector output. In
the industrial sector, construction and elec-
tricity production, which are harbingers of
future growth, registered their fourth con-
secutive quarterly decline. Manufacturing
advanced slightly (1.0%), supported by a
weakened gourde and labor expansion in
the textile sector. All sub-branches of the
services sector contracted, except the bank-
ing sector and non-market services. Being
more directly impacted by increased inse-
curity, the decline in the hospitality sub-
branch has been particularly severe.
At the end of June, tax revenues were be-
low the indicative target under the IMF’s
Staff Monitored Program, as security is-
sues inhibited the normal operation of
Customs administration and forced some
businesses to close. Meanwhile, public
expenditures rose, driven by fuel subsi-
dies that reached 3.5% of GDP at the end
of July because of rising oil prices trig-
gered by the Russia-Ukraine war. The re-
sulting deficit (2.0% of GDP) was mon-
etized by the central bank (BRH), im-
pacting the gourde which depreciated by
21.6% against the USD at the end of Au-
gust. Inflation rose to 30.5% on deficit
monetization, higher food and fuel
prices, and insecurity that impeded the
seamless flow of goods across regions.
FIGURE 1Haiti/ Sectoral growth rates, year-over-year
-20-15-10-50510
Agriculture
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Construction
Water and Electricity
Commerce
Hotel and Restaurants
Transport and Communication
Financial institutions
Other market services
Non-market services
Tertiary = -1.1Secondary = -0.8Primary = -2.0ICAE = -1.9
Percent change
Source: Haiti Statistical Office (IHSI).
FIGURE 2Haiti/ Actual and projected poverty rates and real
GDP per capita
48000
50000
52000
54000
56000
58000
60000
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2012201420162018202020222024
International poverty rate Lower middle-income pov. rate
Upper middle-income pov. rateReal GDP pc
Real GDP per capita (constant LCU)Poverty rate (%)
Source: World Bank. Notes: see Table 2.
1
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The negative impact will be disproportion-
ately felt by the poor since they typically do
nothavetheassetstohedgeagainstinflation.
The BRH enacted a series of restrictive
measures to tame inflation, including
mopping up excess liquidity in the
banking sector through bond sales, hik-
ing the key policy rate by 150 basis
points, restrictions on forex transactions,
andcapitalcontrol.
In the external sector, despite export
growth, the current account ran a 0.3% of
GDP deficit due to low remittances and a
high fuel and food import bill. Foreign di-
rect investment was not enough to offset
the CAD. The resulting balance of pay-
ments deficit (0.4% of GDP) was financed
by an accumulation of arrears, debt write-
off, and a drawdown of foreign exchange
reserves. Net forex reserves are down by
39.2% in end-August, but gross reserves re-
main solid above five months of import.
Outlook
Uncertainty around the political process
and insecurity will continue to depress pri-
vate investment and hinder growth. The
restrictive policy measures taken by the
BRH in Q4 FY22 will affect the efficiency
of capital allocation and impair growth go-
ing forward. GDP is therefore expected to
contract by 1.5 percent in FY22, with all
three economic sectors receding, adversely
impacting jobs, especially for women. In
the baseline, growth is expected to firm up
into positive territory with a rebound in
2024, assuming a resumption of economic
activity should the political context follow-
ing elections in 2023 becomes more stable
and security improves. Growth, however,
will not be strong enough to make much of
a dent against poverty.
Despite tightening fiscal conditions under
the IMF SMP, the fiscal deficit is expected
to widen to 3.2% of GDP, mainly due to
high energy sector subsidies. The deficit
will be financed by the BRH at 2.4 per-
centage points of GDP and the remaining
by T-bills. The fiscal deficit will continue
to widen during the election year. But fis-
cal consolidation efforts are expected to re-
sume over the medium term, bringing the
fiscal deficit below the 3.0% of GDP mark.
Import volume is expected to contract but
the value will expand on a higher fuel and
food import bill. Concurrently, exports are
set to expand thanks to greater output in
the garment and apparel sector. Lower re-
mittances due to higher inflation, and re-
cession prospects in the major remittances-
sending countries in North America and
Europe mean that expectations for the
CAD are around 1.4% of GDP. Over the
medium term, this is expected to further
widen as investment picks up, provided
that security improves, and that elections
are held in 2023 and are not contested.
Sustained high fuel and food prices cou-
pled with low agricultural productivity
will continue to exert pressure on CPI in-
flation, which is expected to close the fis-
cal year at 26.5% on average. The widen-
ing of the CAD toward the end of the
FY will translate into increased depreci-
ation of the gourde, creating a feedback
loop between the exchange rate and infla-
tion. This may exacerbate food insecuri-
ty that affected 5.6 million people in Au-
gust 2022. Nonetheless, as BRH financing
is gradually replaced by T-bills issuance,
inflation is expected to trend down over
themediumterm.
The outlook is fraught with downside
risks and depends heavily on the political
process and the security context. Reforms
in the energy sector are critical for cre-
ating fiscal space to expand spending in
growth-enhancing sectors. Strengthening
the institutional framework for disaster
risk management, including better pre-
paredness and response is key to laying
the foundations for long-term, sustained,
andinclusivegrowth.
TABLE 2Haiti/ Macro poverty outlook indicators (annual percent change unless indicated otherwise)
2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22e 2022/23f 2023/24f
Real GDP growth, at constant market prices -1.7 -3.3 -1.8 -1.5 -0.1 2.0
Private Consumption -1.0 -4.0 1.2 -1.1 0.4 0.9
Government Consumption -8.6 11.1 9.7 5.2 8.3 9.0
Gross Fixed Capital Investment 7.7 -20.6 -21.8 -10.1 -8.1 15.9
Exports, Goods and Services 6.8 -39.7 1.4 2.0 4.0 2.0
Imports, Goods and Services 4.2 -18.3 2.7 -0.4 2.5 4.5
Real GDP growth, at constant factor prices -1.1 -2.9 -2.5 -1.2 -0.1 2.0
Agriculture -1.9 -2.5 -4.1 -3.1 0.4 2.0
Industry -6.8 -6.9 -2.5 -1.0 0.0 1.5
Services 2.1 -1.2 -2.0 -0.7 -0.3 2.2
Inflation (Consumer Price Index) 17.3 22.9 15.9 26.4 23.1 21.4
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -1.1 1.5 0.7 -1.4 -2.6 -2.5
Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflow (% of GDP) 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -2.0 -3.0 -2.5 -3.2 -3.3 -1.9
Debt (% of GDP) 26.2 24.4 25.6 27.7 22.4 23.8
Primary Balance (% of GDP) -1.7 -2.7 -2.2 -2.3 -2.5 -1.3
International poverty rate ($2.15 in 2017 PPP)
a,b
28.2 29.5 30.3 30.8 30.7 30.5
Lower middle-income poverty rate ($3.65 in 2017 PPP)
a,b
57.5 58.2 58.7 58.9 58.9 58.8
Upper middle-income poverty rate ($6.85 in 2017 PPP)
a,b
84.3 86.3 87.6 88.3 88.2 87.8
GHG emissions growth (mtCO2e) 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.0
Energy related GHG emissions (% of total) 36.6 36.0 35.4 34.8 34.6 34.7
Source: World Bank, Poverty & Equity and Macroeconomics, Trade & Investment Global Practices. Emissions data sourced from CAIT and OECD.
Notes: e = estimate, f = forecast. Poverty lines are expressed in 2017 PPP, resulting in changes from earlier editions that used 2011 PPP. See pip.worldbank.org.
a/ Calculations based on SEDLAC harmonization, using 2013-, 2019-, and 2012-ECVMAS. Actual data: 2012. Nowcast: 2013-2021. Forecasts are from 2022 to 2024.
b/ Projection using point-to-point elasticity (2013-2019) with pass-through = 0.87 based on GDP per capita in constant LCU.
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