(2026-08) Rapport flash - Haïti - Violences des gangs : 613 morts et 375 blessés dans la Plaine du Cul-de-Sac et à Cité Soleil entre mars et juillet 2026
Resume — Le Service des droits de l'homme du BINUH documente quatre vagues d'affrontements entre gangs dans la Plaine du Cul-de-Sac et à Cité Soleil du 6 mars au 31 juillet 2026, au cours desquelles au moins 613 personnes ont été tuées et 375 blessées, plus de 176 femmes et filles ont été violées et plus de 18 000 personnes déplacées. Un chapitre est consacré au poids économique de la zone : elle abrite de grandes entreprises et est traversée par la Route nationale n° 1 et la Route 9, corridors reliant le port à conteneurs et le terminal pétrolier de Varreux au nord, où les gangs tiennent des barrages illégaux et rançonnent les camions.
Constats Cles
- Au moins 613 personnes tuées et 375 blessées dans la Plaine du Cul-de-Sac et à Cité Soleil du 6 mars au 31 juillet 2026, les affrontements les plus graves documentés dans cette partie de la capitale depuis janvier-février 2024.
- Près d'un tiers des personnes tuées ou blessées n'étaient pas associées aux gangs, touchées par des balles perdues ou visées pour des liens supposés avec des gangs rivaux ou les forces de sécurité.
- Plus de 176 femmes et filles de 10 à 71 ans ont été violées, notamment lors de viols collectifs servant à punir les populations en zone rivale, et le rapport considère ces chiffres comme sous-déclarés.
- Plus de 18 000 personnes ont été déplacées et l'essentiel de l'activité commerciale, de la scolarisation et des services de santé a été suspendu dans les quartiers touchés.
- La Plaine du Cul-de-Sac est disputée pour des raisons économiques : elle abrite de grandes entreprises et est traversée par la Route nationale n° 1 et la Route 9, corridors reliant le port à conteneurs et le terminal pétrolier de Varreux au nord, où les gangs rançonnent les camions à des barrages illégaux.
- Au moins 20 opérations de police ont été menées entre le 28 mars et le 12 juillet, dont une par une société militaire privée avec des drones explosifs ; la Force de répression des gangs patrouillait sans participer aux opérations antigangs.
Description Complete
Ce rapport flash du BINUH porte sur la reprise des violences armées dans la commune de Cité Soleil et la Plaine du Cul-de-Sac voisine, du 6 mars au 31 juillet 2026. Le Service des droits de l'homme (SDH) du BINUH lie ces affrontements à la recomposition et à l'affaiblissement de la coalition Viv Ansanm, conjugués à la pression des forces de sécurité ailleurs dans la capitale, qui a repoussé des membres de gangs vers la Plaine et exacerbé la concurrence pour les revenus illicites. Le SDH a corroboré au moins 613 personnes tuées et 375 blessées : 64 pour cent des victimes étaient associées aux gangs et près d'un tiers ne l'étaient pas, touchées par des balles perdues ou visées pour des liens supposés avec des gangs rivaux ou les forces de sécurité. Quatre-vingt-dix pour cent des victimes relèvent de la violence des gangs, environ 9 pour cent d'opérations des forces de sécurité et 1 pour cent de violences populaires. Plus de 176 femmes et filles de 10 à 71 ans ont été violées, notamment lors de viols collectifs utilisés comme « punition » des populations vivant en zone rivale, et le rapport souligne la sous-déclaration probable de ces cas. Le document décrit quatre phases d'affrontements, cartographie les entreprises et la présence des gangs, et estime que plusieurs actes documentés pourraient constituer de graves violations du droit international des droits de l'homme. Un chapitre sur le poids économique de la Plaine du Cul-de-Sac détaille l'économie criminelle fondée sur l'extorsion, les taxes illégales sur le commerce et le contrôle des routes d'approvisionnement, et nomme les entreprises encore actives, dont la distillerie Rhum Barbancourt, les brasseries La Couronne et Séjourné, Comme Il Faut, Flamengo Import-Export, BPH Industries et le producteur privé d'électricité E-Power, ainsi que le Centre National d'Équipements. Sur la réponse des autorités, il recense au moins 20 opérations de police entre le 28 mars et le 12 juillet, dont une menée le 28 mars par une société militaire privée avec des drones explosifs, note que la Force de répression des gangs patrouillait sans participer aux opérations antigangs, et rapporte des allégations de liens entre membres de gangs et éléments de la Police nationale d'Haïti. Les recommandations portent sur le déploiement accéléré de la FRG, l'opérationnalisation de deux unités judiciaires spécialisées sur les crimes de masse et les violences sexuelles, l'assistance aux victimes, la mise en œuvre de la stratégie DDR-RVC de 2021, la protection sociale dans les quartiers marginalisés, ainsi que la conformité et la redevabilité des opérations de sécurité.
Texte Integral du Document
Texte extrait du document original pour l'indexation.
Photo: © Canvas
FLASH REPORT
Haiti – Gang Violence: 613 Killed and 375 Injured in the Plaine du
Cul-de-Sac and Cité Soleil Between March and July 2026
BINUH
AUGUST 2026
HAITI
FLASH REPORT
BINUH
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..............................................................................................
3
MAP OF BUSINESSES AND GANG PRESENCE IN THE PLAINE DU CUL-DE-SAC AND CITÉ
SOLEIL AREA ...........................................................................................................
5
TERMINOLOGICAL AND LEGAL CLARIFICATIONS...........................................................
6
1. CONTEXT ..........................................................................................................
7
1.1. Armed Violence Between 2024 and 2026 .......................................................................
7
1.2. Gangs Involved in the Clashes in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and Cité Soleil Between March 6
and July 31 ...............................................................................................................
9
1.3. Data on People Killed and Injured During Gang Clashes in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and Cité
Soleil Between March 6 and July 31, 2026 .....................................................................
10
1.4. Timeline of Incidents Between March 6 and July 31 .........................................................
11
2. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PHASES OF THE CLASHES ......................................
12
2.1. Phase 1: First Wave of Armed Violence, March 6 and April 18 ............................................
12
2.2. Phase 2: Second Wave of Armed Violence, April 19–May 9 ...............................................
15
2.3. Phase 3: Third Wave of Armed Violence, May 10–June 3 ..................................................
16
2.4. Phase 4: Fourth Wave of Armed Violence, June 4–July 31 ................................................
18
3. ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PLAINE DU CUL-DE-SAC ......................................
21
4. RESPONSE OF THE AUTHORITIES ..........................................................................
23
RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................ 25
Annex I: Data on Persons Killed and Injured and Main Locations of Gang Clashes in the
Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and Other Areas of the Commune of Cité Soleil, 6 March–31 July
2026 ...................................................................................................................... 26
Annex II: Methodology .............................................................................................. 28
Footnotes ............................................................................................................... 30
HAITI
FLASH REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Between 6 March and 31 July 2026, the commune of Cité Soleil, and in particular the area known
as the “Plaine du Cul-de-Sac”1, experienced a resurgence of armed violence linked to rivalries
between criminal gangs. These clashes occurred in a context marked both by the reconfiguration
and weakening of the Viv Ansanm gang coalition and by increased pressure from the security
forces in other parts of the capital. This pressure by the security forces led to the displacement of
gang members towards the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, exacerbating tensions and competition for
control over illicit revenue-generating opportunities in the area.
Taking place in several phases, these clashes involved at least two groups of gangs with shifting
alliances and resulted in a high number of casualties, affecting both persons associated with gangs
and persons not associated with gangs.
According to information collected and corroborated by the Human Rights Service (HRS) of the
United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), at least 613 people were killed and a further
375 were injured2 during the reporting period.
While 64% of those killed and injured were associated with gangs, nearly one third were not and
were struck by stray bullets or deliberately killed or assaulted on suspicion of having links with
rival gangs or the security forces. The data of the HRS also indicate that 90% of those killed and
injured were documented in incidents of gang violence, nearly 9% during security force
operations, and 1% as a result of acts of popular violence against persons suspected of being
affiliated with gangs.
In addition, more than 176 women and girls3, aged between 10 and 71, were victims of rape,
including gang rape, committed by gang members, often as a form of “punishment” against
populations living in areas under the control of rival gangs. Owing to fear of reprisals,
stigmatization and limited access to services, these cases are likely to be underreported.
The gangs also targeted public and private buildings, resulting in the suspension of most
commercial activities and basic services in the neighbourhoods affected by the violence, including
schools and health services4. The humanitarian and socio-economic impact was significant, with
more than 18,000 people forced to flee5.
3
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FLASH REPORT
BINUH
The available information indicates that several of the documented acts, including killings, gang
rapes, and the destruction of property and buildings housing providers of essential services, may
amount to serious violations of international human rights law.
This level of gang clashes and human rights violations had not been documented in this part of the
capital since January and February 2024, during territorial fighting between members of the G9
and G-PèP criminal alliances6.
In this regard, the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac area remains highly sought after by gangs, as it hosts
several commercial enterprises and is crossed by two strategic roads enabling trucks travelling
from the capital’s container port and the Varreux oil terminal to access the country’s main
highway to the north.
At the end of March 2026, security force operations were conducted in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac
and Cité Soleil, at times with the support of a private military company. However, these operations
remained limited in the face of the scale of gang violence in these areas. In addition, allegations
have been reported of links between members of these gangs and elements of the Haitian National
Police (HNP).
In this context, the continued high level of violence in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and Cité Soleil,
together with the absence of a sustained police presence, has had serious consequences for the
protection of the population, economic stability and State authority.
4
MAP OF BUSINESSES AND GANG PRESENCE IN THE PLAINE DU
CUL-DE-SAC AND CITÉ SOLEIL AREAS
5
HAITI
FLASH REPORT
BINUH
TERMINOLOGICAL AND LEGAL CLARIFICATIONS
The distinction made in this report between “persons associated with gangs”
and “persons not associated with gangs” is solely descriptive and does not
constitute a legal category carrying consequences for the legal status of
individuals.
This distinction is used for protection and analytical purposes, in order to
identify gangs’ modus operandi, measure the impact of violence on the most
vulnerable population groups not involved in criminal activities and, more
broadly, to understand patterns of violence with a view to making concrete
recommendations to address and prevent them.
In accordance with national law and Haiti’s international human rights
obligations, fundamental rights, in particular the right to life, must be
guaranteed to every person without discrimination, including regardless of
their actual or presumed association with a gang.
Violence perpetrated by gangs has resulted in killings, sexual violence, the
intentional destruction of property, restrictions on access to essential services,
and other serious human rights violations. The State remains under an
obligation, pursuant to its international obligations, to respect, protect and
fulfil the fundamental rights of the population, in particular the rights to life,
security of person and physical integrity. Accordingly, any use of force by law
enforcement officials, including where certain of their functions are delegated
to private actors, must comply with the principles of legality, precaution,
necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination and accountability7. These
principles strictly limit the use of potentially lethal force to situations where it
is unavoidable in order to protect lives against an imminent threat, and only
as a measure of last resort, when other less extreme measures, such as capture
or non-lethal incapacitation, have been exhausted or deemed inadequate8.
6
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FLASH REPORT
1. CONTEXT
The commune of Cité Soleil, and in particular the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac – an area of major
economic and strategic importance for both the businesses established there and the criminal gangs
operating in the area – had not experienced major armed violence since the beginning of 2024.
1.1 ARMED VIOLENCE BETWEEN 2024 AND 2026
At the beginning of 2024, the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac area, together with several neighbouring
localities in Cité Soleil, became the scene of violent clashes between the G9 and G-Pèp coalitions
of gangs amid territorial disputes. During January and February 2024, gang attacks in these areas
resulted in more than 402 people killed and 254 injured9, the majority of whom were persons not
associated with gangs, struck by stray bullets or targeted solely because they lived in an area
controlled by a rival gang. The gangs also attacked the premises of a distillery, killing a security
guard and setting fire to eight hectares of crops10. These attacks came to an end around 29
February 2024, when several local figures met with gang leaders and succeeded in negotiating a
cessation of the fighting to allow businesses in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac to continue operating.
At the same time, in the rest of the capital, as part of the Viv Ansanm coalition11, gangs changed
their tactics by reducing direct clashes and territorial confrontations among them in order, on the
one hand, to focus their attacks on public institutions and infrastructure (including ministerial
buildings, prisons and police stations), as well as private property, and, on the other hand, to
strengthen their criminal governance in areas already under their control.
7
HAITI
FLASH REPORT
BINUH
Victims of Killings and Injuries (Persons Not Associated with Gangs and Persons Associated
with Gangs) During Gang Attacks in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and the Commune of Cité
Soleil, 2024–2026
February 2024:
Activation of the Viv
Ansanm Gang
Coalition
People Killed and Injured
700
600
Late 2025 –
February
2026:
Intensification
of Security
Operations
Against
Gangs in
Lower
Delmas and
Port-au-Prince
500
400
300
200
100
20
JA
25
N
-F
EB
20
M
A
26
RM
AY
20
26
JU
N
-J
U
L
20
26
Q
4
20
25
Q
3
20
25
Q
2
20
25
Q
1
20
24
Q
4
20
24
Q
3
20
24
Q
2
20
24
Q
1
Q
4
20
23
0
The resumption of gang clashes in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac since March 2026 can be partly
understood in the light of the intensification of security force operations in several areas of the
capital under gang control, notably Bel-Air, downtown Port-au-Prince and Fort National
(commune of Port-au-Prince), as well as the neighbourhoods located between Delmas 1 and
Delmas 18, commonly referred to as “Lower Delmas” (commune of Delmas).
Conducted since the end of 2025, these operations, supported on certain occasions by a private
military company, caused numerous deaths and injuries among members of several gangs,
including the Delmas 6, Krache Dife, La Saline, Les Argentins and Tokyo gangs12.
They also forced these same gangs to abandon their bases and seek refuge in other communes of
the capital, such as Cité Soleil and Croix-des-Bouquets. This displacement generated tensions with
gangs already present in those areas.
8
HAITI
FLASH REPORT
1.2
BINUH
GANGS INVOLVED IN THE CLASHES IN THE PLAINE DU CUL-DE-SAC
AND CITÉ SOLEIL, 6 MARCH–31 JULY 2026 2026
The clashes involved different gangs, primarily grouped into two alliances with shifting
memberships.
Area
Gangs Allied Name of
During the the Leader Controlled by
the Gang
Clashes
“Obama”
Pierre VI
(real name (Cité Soleil)
Pierre VI
unkown)
Terre Noire
Terre Noire Jonel Catel
(Cité Soleil)
G-9
Name of
the Leader
400 Mawozo
Joseph
Wilson
Against
Boston
Mathias
Saintil
Boston
(Cité Soleil)
Wharf
Jérémie
Micanor
Altès
Wharf Jérémie
(Port-au-Prince)
Belekou
James
Edmond
(alias
“Bendji”)
Belekou
(Cité Soleil)
Claudy
Célestin
Croix-desMissions, Butte
Boyer, Marin
Shadda, Santo
(Croix-desBouquets)
Chen
Mechan
Gangs Allied
During the
Clashes
Canaan
Tokyo
me of the
NaLeader
Jeff Larose
Wooddensley
Saintilaire
Clashes Since 13
June
Chen
Mechan
Claudy
Célestin
Area
Controlled by
the Gang
Centre-ville
de Croix-desbouquets,
Ganthier,
Thomazeau
(Croix-desBouquets)
Canaan
(Croix-desBouquets)
Based in
Village de la
Renaissance
(Cité Soleil)
since February
2026
Croix-desMissions,
Butte Boyer,
Marin
Shadda,
Santo
(Croix-desBouquets)
Change of Alliance After
11 March
During the first months of 2026, several reports received by the HRS also pointed to alleged links
between some of these gangs and members of the Haitian National Police (HNP), notably in the
commission or facilitation of criminal activities. In this regard, according to the Central
Directorate of the Judicial Police (DCPJ), in February 2026, a criminal network composed of 17
individuals, including five police officers alleged to have supported the Tokyo gang and to have
been involved in kidnappings in the communes of Delmas, Pétion-Ville and Port-au-Prince, was
dismantled by its services. The arrested police officers, some of whom were also employed by
Haitian private security companies, allegedly acted as escorts for gang members or supplied them
with weapons and ammunition.
9
G-PèP
G-9
HAITI
FLASH REPORT
1.3
BINUH
DATA ON PERSONS KILLED AND INJURED DURING GANG
CLASHES IN THE PLAINE DU CUL-DE-SAC AND CITÉ SOLEIL, 6
MARCH–31 JULY 2026
During the gang clashes that took place, between 6 March and 31 July 2026, in the Plaine du Culde-Sac and Cité Soleil at least 613 people were killed and 375 others were injured13.
People Killed
Total
Persons Not Associated
with Gangs
613
214 persons
91 men, 74 women, 37
boys and 12 girls
139 people
People Injured
375
74 men, 37 women, 11
boys and 17 girls
Persons Associated with
Gangs
399 people
391 men and 8 women
236 people
All men
Among the victims, 90% were killed or injured as a result of violence perpetrated by gangs14 ; 9%
during operations conducted by the security forces and a private military company15; and 1% as a
result of so-called “popular justice” against individuals suspected of being affiliated with gangs16.
10
1.4 TIMELINE OF INCIDENTS BETWEEN MARCH 6 AND JULY 31
In early February, the Tokyo gang established itself in Village de la Renaissance after being
driven from its base in Delmas by security operations. This move was opposed by the Chen
Mechan, Pierre VI, and Terre Noire gangs, but was supported by the 400 Mawozo and Canaan
gangs, which sought to expand their influence in the area.
Between 6 and 11 March, the violence left at least 74 people dead and 76 others injured.
FIRST
WAVE OF
VIOLENCE
6 MARCH –
18 APRIL
Following these clashes, Chen Mechan joined the alliance with the 400 Mawozo and Canaan.
On 28 March, a private military company launched four explosive drones at a house where the
leader of the Canaan gang was staying, killing nine members of the gang.
A lull in the violence was observed between 12 and 18 April, following mediation efforts led
by businesses in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac.
During this first wave of violence, 111 women and girls, including the youngest, who was just
10 years old, were victims of rape and gang rape committed by gang members.
Between 19 and 22 April, the violence intensified once again, leaving at least 117 people dead
and 125 others injured.
SECOND
WAVE OF
VIOLENCE
19 APRIL –
9 MAY
THIRDWAVE
OFVIOLENCE
10MAY–
3JUNE
On 20 April, an UTAG patrol intercepted a minibus carrying members of the 400 Mawozo
gang in Sarthe, killing 12 of them during an exchange of gunfire.
Between 23 April and 9 May, the violence subsided. Nevertheless, at least 22 people were
killed and two others injured.
Between 19 April and 9 May, 46 women and girls, aged between 21 and 55, were subjected to
rape and gang rape committed by gang members.
Violent clashes resumed between 10 and 13 May, leaving at least 147 people dead and 75
others injured.
Between 14 and 21 May, a new lull in the violence was observed. However, 10 people were
killed, and six gang rapes were documented.
On 20 May, a purported “truce” was concluded between the gangs, although no agreement
was reached on the withdrawal of the Tokyo gang from Village de la Renaissance.
At the beginning of June, tensions between gangs continued.
On 13 June, at least 61 people were killed and 20 others injured in an attack on a “rara”
procession celebrating the FIFA World Cup match between Haiti and Scotland.
FOURTH
WAVE OF
VIOLENCE
4 JUNE –
31 JULY
A cycle of violence then took hold between gangs, leaving 45 people dead and 25 others
injured between 14 and 20 June, while 13 people were abducted by the Wharf Jérémie gang.
Several police operations were conducted from 15 June onwards. During these operations, 10
people were killed and eight others injured.
Nevertheless, clashes between the Belekou and Wharf Jérémie gangs continued and even
spread toward the Varreux fuel terminal. Between 19 and 22 June, the violence left 20 people
dead and 26 others injured, the majority of whom were struck by stray bullets.
Although the intensity of the clashes declined from 23 June onwards, tensions remained high.
From then until 31 July, 44 people were killed in Cité Soleil, most of them targeted because
they were suspected of supporting rival gangs or accused of violating rules imposed by the
gangs.
11
HAITI
FLASH REPORT
2. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF
THE PHASES OF THE CLASHES
2.1 PHASE 1: FIRST WAVE OF ARMED VIOLENCE, 6 MARCH–18 APRIL
The arrival of members of the Tokyo gang in the small locality of Village de la Renaissance (Cité
Soleil) at the beginning of February 2026 led to a shift in the alliances between the gangs operating
in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac. Until then, this locality had not been under the control of any gang
because of its relative isolation and the limited opportunities for generating illicit revenue.
One of the Tokyo gang’s first objectives was to restore its operational capacity and secure new
sources of illicit revenue after having been driven out of the Lower Delmas area by security force
operations. To that end, members of the gang quickly established an illegal checkpoint along
Route 9, at the southern entrance to Village de la Renaissance.
Established to extort cargo trucks and public transport vehicles travelling towards the northern part
of the capital, the checkpoint was opposed by the Chen Mechan, Pierre VI and Terre Noire gangs,
which operate nearby and also derive revenue from extorting trucks using National Road No. 1,
particularly in the Sarthe and Duvivier areas. By contrast, the 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs,
based in Croix-des-Bouquets, supported the establishment of the checkpoint, as they also sought to
expand their influence in the area.
The first clashes began on 6 March, following the killing of two members of the Canaan gang by
members of the Chen Mechan gang, and continued until 11 March. The clashes involved two
alliances: on one side, the 400 Mawozo, Canaan and Tokyo gangs; on the other, the Chen Mechan,
Pierre VI and Terre Noire gangs. The clashes were concentrated in the areas of Blanchard,
Duvivier, Fourgy, Terre Noire and Village de la Renaissance (Cité Soleil), as well as Bon Repos,
Lilavois, Moleya and Sicot (Croix-des-Bouquets).
During these six days, at least 74 people were killed (20 persons not associated with gangs and 54
persons associated with gangs), while 76 others were injured (40 persons not associated with gangs
and 36 persons associated with gangs)17.
12
HAITI
FLASH REPORT
BINUH
VICTIMS OF GANG ATTACKS
Documented Killings and Injuries, March 6–11
59 %
150
victims
40%
Persons Associated
with Gangs
41 %
Persons Not Associated
with Gangs
While the vast majority of persons associated with gangs (69) were killed or injured during
exchanges of gunfire18, others were executed after being overpowered and disarmed. For example,
on 8 March, 15 members of the Canaan gang were captured by the Pierre VI gang inside the
Duvivier secondary school, where they had been hiding, and were subsequently shot dead.
Among the persons not associated with gangs
(60), 37 were killed or injured inside their
homes or while attempting to flee through the
streets19. A further 2320 were executed or
severely beaten after being accused of
collaborating with rival gangs or the police, or
simply for refusing to join the gangs*.
Following these incidents, the Chen Mechan
gang, which had initially opposed the Tokyo
gang’s takeover of Village de la Renaissance,
changed sides and aligned itself with the 400
Mawozo and Canaan gangs. According to
community sources, the latter allegedly offered
*On 11 March, in Duvivier (Cité Soleil),
20 men residing in the Pierre VI
neighbourhood (Cité Soleil) were
severely beaten by members of the gang
controlling the area after refusing the
gang leader’s orders to join the clashes
and help erect barricades to protect the
neighbourhood against rival gangs. Two
of them later died from their injuries.
Source: HRS
to support Chen Mechan in taking control of the Pierre VI and Terre Noire neighbourhoods (Cité
Soleil).
Between 12 March and 18 April, a relative lull was observed. This was reportedly the result of
mediation efforts undertaken by businesses operating in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, an approach that
has been used since at least 2022 to prevent violence from paralysing their activities and putting
their staff at risk.
13
HAITI
FLASH REPORT
BINUH
Despite this lull, seven people21, were killed in the areas of Duvivier, Fourgy and Terre Noire (Cité
Soleil), including two 17-year-old boys. They were shot dead on 24 March by the leader of the
Terre Noire gang after being accused of passing information to the Chen Mechan gang.
Moreover, throughout this first wave of armed violence, the HRS was able to confirm with service
providers at least 111 cases of sexual violence, including gang rape, committed by masked and
armed gang members, particularly in the areas of Canaan, Duvivier, Pierre VI and Sarthe.
Victims interviewed by human rights
officers reported that they had been
attacked after assailants forcibly
entered their homes, usually in the
evening, taking them and their
relatives by surprise*. In several
cases, the armed men severely beat
children or other family members
before raping the victims.
Other survivors reported that they
were intercepted in the streets while
returning home and taken to bushy
areas, where they were raped.
Lastly, although the Haitian security
forces did not intervene during this
period, a private military company
launched four explosive drones in
the Canaan area (Croix-desBouquets), near a house where the
leader of the gang controlling the
area was staying, killing nine gang
members who were guarding the
building.
* On 11 April, one of the survivors, a 33-year-old
woman living in Pierre VI, was at home preparing a
meal for her three children, aged between four and
eight, when she heard people shouting in the street:
“Bandi yo anvayi nou!” (“The gangs are invading
us!”). She immediately fled her home with her
children and sought refuge in an open area in
Carrefour Trois Mains (Tabarre), where a large
number of displaced persons had already gathered.
At around 6 p.m., after gunfire had subsided and
believing that the gang members had left the area, she
returned home with her children. Shortly afterwards,
someone banged violently on the door. Thinking it
was her husband, she opened it and found herself
facing five armed, masked men. They asked why she
was still in the area, then severely beat her with the
butts of their weapons before gang-raping her in front
of her children.
The following day, the survivor went to a healthcare
centre, where she received medical treatment. After
the assault, she initially sought refuge with a friend in
the commune of Carrefour before moving once again
to a site for displaced persons.
Source: HRS
14
2.2 PHASE 2: SECOND WAVE OF ARMED VIOLENCE, 19 APRIL–9 MAY
From 19 April 2026 onwards, a new escalation of gang clashes was observed in several areas of
the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, notably Fourgy, Pierre VI, Sarthe and Terre Noire, driven by the Tokyo
gang’s determination to maintain its presence in Village de la Renaissance.
According to HRS data, in less than three days, between 19 and 22 April, at least 117 people were
killed (110 persons associated with gangs and seven persons not associated with gangs), while 125
others were injured (110 persons91%associated with 9%
gangs and 15 persons not associated with
22
gangs) .
All persons associated with gangs were killed or injured during exchanges of gunfire in the Pierre
VI and Terre Noire neighbourhood.
VICTIMS OF GANG ATTACKS
Documented Killings and Injuries, April 19–22
91 %
242
victims
40%
Persons Associated
with Gangs
9%
Persons Not Associated
with Gangs
Most of the persons not associated with gangs (19) were struck by stray bullets inside their homes
or at the site for displaced people located near the Sarthe municipal hall. The HRS also
documented the violent deaths of two men. One of them, aged 71, was shot dead on 19 April by
the leader of the Boston gang after approaching him to ask for food. The other was killed on 20
April by members of the Pierre VI gang after being accused of passing information to the Canaan
gang.
One of the first interventions by the Haitian security forces since the beginning of the clashes took
place on 20 April in the Sarthe area. Officers from the Temporary Anti-Gang Unit (UTAG), who
were patrolling Sarthe Road in an armoured vehicle, intercepted a minibus carrying members of
the 400 Mawozo gang. During the ensuing exchange of gunfire, at least 12 of them, all men, were
killed. No police officers were reported killed or injured.
After the peak of violence between 19 and 22 April, the intensity of the gang clashes subsided
again from 23 April onwards, although persons not associated with gangs continued to be targeted
by abuses23.
15
* On 25 April, a woman walking through
the Duvivier area from Fourgy was
intercepted by members of the Pierre VI
gang, who insistently questioned her about
the reasons for her presence in the area.
According to witnesses to the incident, she
was so overcome with fear that she was
unable to respond. The gang members then
accused her of being an informant for the
Chen Mechan gang and executed her on
the spot.
Source: HRS
Among the victims is a nine-year-old girl, killed
by a bullet to the head on April 29 in the Fourgy
neighborhood by members of the Chen Mechan
gang because she came from the neighborhood
controlled by the Terre Noire gang. The girl was
with her mother at the Duvivier intersection
when she was hit, while her mother managed to
escape. Four other people (three men and one
woman*) were also killed, either for having
refused to collaborate with gang members, or
because they were accused of gathering
information for rival gangs.
Like the first wave of violence, several cases of sexual violence were reported during this second
phase. Between April 19 and May 9, at least 46 women, aged between 21 and 55, were victims of
rapes, including gang rapes, by gang members. Among the cases documented by the HRS, on May
5, a woman was a victim of a gang rape in Fourgy, by a group of armed men. These men first set
fire to her home, causing the death of her husband and her little daughter, barely two years old.
They then raped her in the presence of her 10-year-old son, who had survived the fire.
2.3 PHASE 3: THIRD WAVE OF ARMED VIOLENCE, 10 MAY–3 JUNE
From 10 May 2026 onwards, a new outbreak of violence was recorded in several neighbourhoods
of Cité Soleil, notably Blanchard, Duvivier, Larousse, Pierre VI, Sarthe, Terre Noire and Village
de la Renaissance. This outbreak lasted four days, until 13 May, and resulted in at least 147 deaths
(114 persons associated with gangs and 33 persons not associated with gangs) and 75 injuries (68
persons associated with gangs and seven persons not associated with gangs)24.
82%
18%
VICTIMS OF GANG ATTACKS
Documented Killings and Injuries, May 10–13
82 %
222
victims
40%
Persons Associated
with Gangs
18 %
Persons Not Associated
with Gangs
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According to information collected by the HRS, all persons associated with gangs were killed or
injured during exchanges of gunfire. Persons not associated with gangs, however, were killed or
injured in different ways. First, eight people (five men, one woman and two boys) were struck by
stray bullets while inside their homes or in the streets. Another eight (five men, two women and a
two-year-old girl), who were attempting to flee the Larousse and Sarthe neighbourhoods, were
deliberately shot dead in the streets by members of the 400 Mawozo, Canaan and Chen Mechan
gangs. In addition, 24 people (including 18 children aged between 14 and 17) were executed by
persons associated with the Chen Mechan or Pierre VI gangs after being accused of collaborating
with rival gangs.
From 13 May onwards, a decrease in the intensity of the clashes was observed, notably as a result
of several security force operations. Between 13 and 20 May, at least five police operations were
conducted in Sarthe (Cité Soleil) and in Bon Repos, Lathan, Lilavois, Marin and Shadda (Croixdes-Bouquets), during which 11 persons associated with gangs were killed and 14 others injured,
all of them men. In addition, six persons not associated with gangs (three men and three women)
were killed, while another nine (three men, four women and two girls aged 12 and 17) were
injured by stray bullets.
Moreover,
several
incidents
involving
gang
members
continued to be documented.
Between 14 and 21 May, gangs
killed at least 15 people (three
women associated with gangs and
12 persons not associated with
gangs25). One man not associated
with gangs was also injured.
Among the persons not associated
with gangs who were killed was a
14-year-old boy. He was struck by
a bullet fired by members of the
Chen Mechan gang while
attempting
to
flee
his
neighbourhood with his family.
Seriously wounded, he died in the
street.
* Among the 18 victims were 17 boys aged between 15
and 17, who were executed on 11 May on the orders of
the leader of the Pierre VI gang. The incident began
when a gang member caught one of the boys talking on
the phone with a person suspected of being affiliated
with the Canaan gang. After apprehending the teenager
and searching his phone, gang members allegedly found
the names of several youths from the neighbourhood
involved in conversations referring to the possibility of
receiving money from the Canaan gang in exchange for
information. Members of the Pierre VI gang then went
through the streets and forcibly entered several homes to
bring out the teenager’s friends. They subsequently
executed the 17 boys: 11 of them in the Pierre VI area, in
the courtyard of a building used by the gang, and the
remaining six in the Simon Pelé neighbourhood, where
they were taken to an informal dumpsite and shot dead.
Source: HRS
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During the same period, six cases of gang rape involving five women and one 11-year-old girl
were also documented in the areas of Duvivier, Pierre VI and Terre Noire. The assaults were
committed while the victims were attempting to flee neighbourhoods affected by the clashes, or
inside their homes after they had returned to retrieve their belongings.
On 20 May, in an audio message circulated on social media26, a man identifying himself as the
leader of the Terre Noire gang condemned the attacks carried out in Cité Soleil by gangs affiliated
with the Viv Ansanm coalition against other groups belonging to the same coalition. He also
denounced the targeted attacks against persons not associated with gangs and the destruction of
buildings. According to local sources, following this message, several gang leaders reportedly held
a videoconference with a view to reaching a “truce”. However, no agreement was reportedly
reached regarding the withdrawal of the Tokyo gang from Village de la Renaissance, where it
remained established at the end of July.
In the days following this “truce”, in particular between 22 May and 3 June, no further major gang
clashes were reported in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and Cité Soleil. However, at least six persons
3.4
not associated with gangs (one man, four women and one girl) were killed in incidents involving
gang members. Some of these victims were executed because they were considered “hostile” to the
gangs or after being accused of collaborating with the police. For example, on 26 May, a 17-yearold girl was shot dead by the leader of the Pierre VI gang because she had sent messages to her
family stating that she wanted to leave her neighbourhood owing to the violence perpetrated by the
gangs.
2.4 PHASE 4: FOURTH WAVE OF ARMED VIOLENCE, 4–20 JUNE
At the beginning of June, tensions between gangs continued. For example, on 6 June, a woman
was shot dead by the leader of the Pierre VI gang because, during a conversation in the street, she
had expressed sympathy for the gang from the Brooklyn area, a neighbourhood where dozens of
families from Pierre VI had sought refuge to escape the violence.
It should be noted that, until then, the Brooklyn gang had not been directly involved in the gang
clashes. However, the appointment of several of its members to positions within the Cité Soleil
municipal administration during the month of June exacerbated rivalries with several other gangs,
in particular the Belekou gang27.
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In this highly volatile environment, on 13 June, at around 11:30 p.m., shortly after the FIFA World
Cup match between Haiti and Scotland, a gathering of more than 300 people from the Wharf
Jérémie neighbourhood (on the border between the communes of Port-au-Prince and Cité Soleil),
including members of a traditional “rara” musical group as well as persons associated with the
gang from that neighbourhood, proceeded along the road leading to the Belekou neighbourhood.
Upon reaching the entrance to the neighbourhood, the group was attacked by members of the
Belekou gang, some of whom were positioned on the rooftops of nearby houses. According to
local sources, the attack was allegedly ordered by the leader of the Belekou gang, who mistakenly
believed that the “rara” procession was a diversion orchestrated by the rival Brooklyn gang in
order to attack and kill him.
During the assault, at least 61 people were killed and 20 others injured. In an initial burst of
gunfire, 43 people28 taking part in the procession were killed, while another 20 were injured29.
Among the victims were at least seven children, the youngest of whom was only seven years old.
Subsequently, 18 other people30 were shot dead while attempting to flee the neighbourhood. The
leader of the Wharf Jérémie gang, who was participating in the rara procession, narrowly escaped
death by taking refuge in the neighbouring Boston neighbourhood.
In addition, following the shooting, at least 66 people (29 men, 19 women, 11 boys and 7 girls)
who had been part of the “rara” procession were held captive by members of the Belekou gang.
According to local sources, while in captivity, nine women and four girls were raped by members
of the Belekou gang, while seven men were executed. The remaining captives were released a few
days later.
From that point onwards, a cycle of violence took hold between the two gangs, marked by clashes,
kidnappings and executions. Between 14 and 20 June, at least 45 people were killed (8 persons
associated with gangs and 37 persons not associated with gangs) and another 25 injured (all
persons not associated with gangs)31 in Cité Soleil. In addition, on 14 June, members of the Wharf
Jérémie gang abducted 13 people (10 women and 3 men) from the Belekou neighbourhood while
they were travelling in a public transport vehicle in the Delmas A1 neighbourhood (commune of
Delmas). Five of these passengers (all women) were killed by members of the Wharf Jérémie gang
on 17 June. The reasons why they were specifically targeted could not be established.
The deployment of several armoured vehicles of the Haitian National Police (HNP) at the entrance
to the main road leading to Belekou, between 15 and 18 June, helped to limit the violence to some
extent. Upon their arrival, police officers exchanged gunfire with members of the Belekou gang.
Three persons associated with the gang were killed, along with two women not associated with
gangs who were inside the Belekou market. Three other women were injured.
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Despite this deployment, clashes between the Belekou and Wharf Jérémie gangs continued and
spread towards the Varreux oil terminal, preventing numerous trucks from supplying fuel to the
rest of the capital. Between 19 and 22 June, the violence claimed the lives of 20 people (three men
associated with gangs and 17 persons not associated with gangs) and injured 26 persons not
associated with gangs32. The majority of the victims were struck by stray bullets while inside their
homes, particularly in the Brooklyn and Boston neighbourhoods.
Although the intensity of the clashes declined from 23 June onwards, tensions remained high
between the different gangs.
Between 29 June and 31 July, at least 44 people, including 24 persons associated with gangs and
20 persons not associated with gangs33, were killed, while two women not associated with gangs
were injured, notably in the Belekou and Simon Pelé areas. The overwhelming majority of the
victims (44 of 46) were killed or injured in targeted attacks rather than by stray bullets during gang
clashes, which had largely subsided. They were targeted because they were suspected of
supporting rival gangs or accused of violating rules imposed by the gangs.
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3. ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE PLAINE DU CUL-DE-SAC
The Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, which spans the communes of Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets and
Tabarre, represents a major economic and commercial asset for the businesses established there, as
well as a key area for the criminal governance of gangs.
For many years, the gangs established in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, together with their supporters,
have operated through a criminal economy based primarily on the extortion of economic operators,
the collection of illegal taxes on commercial activities, and the control of certain transport and
supply routes. These criminal activities enable the gangs to generate substantial illicit revenue
while consolidating their territorial influence and operational capacity.
The economic operators that continue to operate in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac include the Rhum
Barbancourt distillery, the La Couronne and Séjourné breweries, the Comme Il Faut Tobacco
Company, Flamengo Import-Export (one of Haiti’s largest importers of construction materials);
BPH Industries (a manufacturer of food products and cleaning products), water treatment
companies; E-Power (a private electricity generation company), and the National Equipment
Centre (an entity under the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications responsible
for the construction of public infrastructure).
The Plaine du Cul-de-Sac is also crossed by two roads: National Road No. 1 and Route 9.
National Road No. 1 is a major transport corridor enabling trucks departing from the capital’s
main container port, operated by the National Port Authority (APN) and Caribbean Port Services
(the country’s leading private container terminal operator), as well as from the Varreux oil
terminal, to reach the northern part of the country.
Along one section of this road, in Marin (Croix-des-Bouquets), the Chen Mechan gang has, since
the beginning of 2025, operated an illegal checkpoint where it extorts vehicles, particularly cargo
trucks. Route 9, which runs parallel to National Road No. 1, also serves as an alternative route to
the northern part of the country. Along sections of this road in Sarthe and Duvivier, the Pierre VI
and Terre Noire gangs have operated two illegal checkpoints since 2023.
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Shortly after arriving in the Village de la Renaissance locality, the Tokyo gang established another
illegal checkpoint on the same Route 9. This triggered strong opposition from the other gangs,
leading to the recent clashes, while also contributing to the reconfiguration of gang dynamics and
alliances in the area (see section 1.2. Gangs Involved in the Clashes in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac
and Cité Soleil, 6 March–31 July 2026 2026).
In May 2026, the violence in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac prompted the heads of businesses operating
in the area to issue several public statements and engage with national and international
stakeholders to warn of the risks that the continued violence posed to their commercial activities.
For example, in a press release dated 10 May34, they denounced the gradual abandonment of this
strategic area, the deteriorating security situation and the threats to their economic and logistics
operations. A few days later, the heads of these same companies met with the Special
Representative of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) to share their concerns regarding the
deterioration of the security situation and the lack of a coordinated response by the authorities.
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4. RESPONSE OF THE AUTHORITIES
Since the outbreak of the clashes on 6 March 2026, at least 20 law enforcement operations aimed
at restoring security were carried out in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and Cité Soleil areas. These
operations took place between 28 March and 12 July. Most were conducted on the ground by
specialized units of the Haitian National Police (HNP), including the Motorized Intervention
Brigade (BIM), the Departmental Operations and Intervention Brigade (BOID), the Research and
Intervention Brigade (BRI), the Departmental Unit for the Maintenance of Order (UDMO), the
Temporary Anti-Gang Unit (UTAG) and the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit. One
operation was also conducted on 28 March by a private military company using explosive drones
to target a building housing gang members in Canaan (Croix-des-Bouquets). As the Gang
Suppression Force (GSF) had not yet been fully deployed, it carried out regular patrols in certain
areas of Cité Soleil but did not participate in operations against gangs.
During these operations, at least 55 people were killed (44 persons associated with gangs and 11
persons not associated with gangs), while another 41 were injured (22 persons associated with
gangs and 19 persons not associated with gangs)35.
While most persons associated with gangs were killed or injured during exchanges of gunfire with
the police or by explosive drones, most persons not associated with gangs were struck by stray
bullets while inside their homes.
It is important to recall that any use of lethal force by the security forces, including by private
companies acting on behalf of the State36, must comply with international human rights law and
respect the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination, precaution and
accountability37. The use of potentially lethal force is limited to situations where it is unavoidable
in order to protect lives against an imminent threat, and only as a measure of last resort, when
other less extreme measures, such as capture or non-lethal incapacitation, have been exhausted or
deemed insufficient38. The State remains responsible for any use of force carried out on its behalf
and has an obligation to ensure that all allegations of arbitrary, unnecessary or disproportionate use
of force are subject to prompt, independent, impartial and effective investigations, and that victims
and their families have access to protection, effective remedies and adequate reparation.
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To date, the HRS has received no information indicating that the authorities have opened
investigations to establish the circumstances and responsibilities relating to deaths and injuries
caused during security force operations, including in cases where children were affected.
In addition, these operations have given rise to concerns among local populations, which perceive
that they targeted only certain gangs operating in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac. This perception stems
in particular from incidents in which individuals allegedly observed police officers instructing
members of certain gangs controlling Cité Soleil, such as the Pierre VI and Terre Noire gangs, to
stay out of the clashes and allow the security forces to confront the 400 Mawozo, Canaan and
Chen Mechan gangs.
Furthermore, according to local sources, the Pierre VI and Terre Noire gangs, believing that they
would not be able to withstand sustained offensives by the 400 Mawozo, Canaan and Chen
Mechan gangs because of the latter’s superior manpower and weaponry, reportedly sought to
encourage the continued presence of the police in Cité Soleil in order to prevent further attacks by
their rivals. To that end, they would have instructed residents to clean the Duvivier sub-police
station, which had remained unoccupied since the police were forced to abandon the police
stations in Cité Soleil in 2023 because of gang violence. On 19 May, residents of Duvivier took
part in cleaning the building.
Between 14 May and 10 June, the Prime Minister also met on several occasions with
representatives of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) to discuss challenges related to the
deployment and operations of the force. On those occasions, he reiterated the need for increased
international support to ensure the rapid deployment of GSF personnel in Haiti in order to combat
armed gangs and restore security throughout the country39.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of these findings, the following recommendations are made:
To the international community: Accelerate the full deployment of the Gang
Suppression Force (GSF) in Haiti in order to strengthen support for the Haitian law
enforcement authorities in combating gangs and to contribute to the sustainable
restoration of security, in full compliance with international human rights law.
To the Haitian authorities, with the support of international partners: Expedite
the operationalization of the two specialized judicial units, one of which will be
responsible for investigating mass crimes, including killings and sexual violence
committed by gangs.
To the Haitian authorities, with the support of international partners and civil
society organizations: Ensure that all victims of abuses committed by armed gangs,
in particular survivors of sexual violence, have effective access to assistance tailored
to their needs, while ensuring their protection against threats, intimidation and
reprisals.
To the Haitian authorities, with the support of international partners:
Implement the 2021 National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration–
Community Violence Reduction Strategy (SNDDR-CVR), in particular its provisions
on voluntary weapons surrender and weapons buy-back programmes, with a view to
reducing the availability of firearms among gang members.
To the Haitian authorities, with the support of international partners: Deploy
social protection and social development programmes in marginalized areas of Portau-Prince in order to reduce recruitment into gangs, which are often perceived as the
only means of accessing economic resources and livelihood opportunities.
To the Haitian authorities: Ensure that operations conducted by the security forces
comply with applicable international standards governing the use of force; ensure
accountability by establishing or strengthening effective mechanisms to investigate
any human rights violations that may arise from security operations; and guarantee
victims effective access to justice, as well as to effective remedies and adequate
reparation.
To States in the region: Strengthen and increase inspections of cargo destined for
Haiti within their territories, including at seaports and airports, in accordance with
United Nations Security Council resolutions 2653 (2022), 2699 (2023), 2752 (2024)
and 2794 (2025), which impose an arms embargo.
25
Annex I: Data on Persons Killed and Injured and Main Locations of Gang Clashes in the Plaine du
Cul-de-Sac and Other Areas of the Commune of Cité Soleil, 6 March–31 July 2026
Commune
Localities
People Killed and Injured During the Clashes
Total
victims
Pierre VI and
Terre Noire
242 killed (15 persons not associated with gangs and 227
persons associated with gangs)
198 injured (20 persons not associated with gangs and
178 persons associated with gangs)
440
Belekou
132 killed (81 persons not associated with gangs and 51
persons associated with gangs)
31 injured (28 persons not associated with gangs and 3
persons associated with gangs)
163
Fourgy
48 killed (17 persons not associated with gangs and 31
persons associated with gangs)
56 injured (20 persons not associated with gangs and 36
persons associated with gangs)
104
Duvivier
57 killed (22 persons not associated with gangs and 35
persons associated with gangs)
20 injured (all persons not associated with gangs)
77
Brooklyn
26 killed (all persons not associated with gangs)
29 injured (all persons not associated with gangs)
55
Sarthe
41 killed (28 persons not associated with gangs and 13
persons associated with gangs)
3 injured (all persons not associated with gangs)
44
9 killed (4 persons not associated with gangs and 5
persons associated with gangs)
9
Cazeau
3 killed (persons associated with gangs)
2 injured (persons associated with gangs)
5
Drouillard
1 killed (person not associated with gangs)
3 injured (persons not associated with gangs)
4
Village de la
Renaissance
2 killed (persons associated with gangs)
2 injured (persons not associated with gangs)
4
Blanchard
3 killed (persons not associated with gangs)
3
Larousse
2 killed (persons not associated with gangs)
2
Boston
2 killed (persons not associated with gangs)
2
Martial
1 killed (person not associated with gang)
1
Carrefour
Vincent
1 killed (person not associated with gangs)
1
Cité Soleil
Simon Pelé
26
Commune
Croix-desBouquets
Localities
People Killed and Injured During the Clashes
Total
victims
Lilavois and
Marin
14 killed (6 persons not associated with gangs
and 8 persons associated with gangs)
13 injured (6 persons not associated with gangs
and 7 persons associated with gangs)
27
Shadda
6 killed (1 person not associated with gangs and
5 persons associated with gangs)
10 injured (3 persons not associated with gangs
and 7 persons associated with gangs)
16
Canaan
10 killed (1 person not associated with gangs and
9 persons associated with gangs)
10
Bon Repos
6 killed (4 persons not associated with gangs and
2 persons associated with gangs)
6
Marassa
1 killed (person associated with gangs)
4 injured (1 person not associated with gangs and
3 persons associated with gangs)
5
Doudonne
2 killed (persons associated with gangs)
1 injured (1 person not associated with gangs)
3
Moleya
3 killed (persons associated with gangs)
3
Lathan
2 injured (all persons not associated with gangs)
2
Santo
1 killed (1 person not associated with gangs)
1
Sicot
1 injured (1 person not associated with gangs)
1
Total
988
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ANNEX II: METHODOLOGY
The data collection process for this report followed a rigorous documentation and verification
procedure, in accordance with the United Nations methodological standards on human rights
monitoring and fact-finding.
The methodology used to verify the information collected relied on a rigorous triangulation
process, enabling the different persons killed and injured to be distinguished. This methodology
draws on multiple independent and complementary sources. Information was collected from a
range of sources, including victims, witnesses, open sources, service providers, and reports by
national and international human rights organizations. The team assessed the reliability of the
sources and the credibility of the information collected.
First, information gathered from community sources, eyewitnesses to the incidents and family
members of victims made it possible to identify by name gang members known to operate in the
areas affected by the attacks. In some instances, funerals were held, providing an opportunity to
confirm certain deaths.
Analysis of the circumstances surrounding the incidents also constituted an important element of
the verification process. Persons associated with gangs operated in groups during attacks and
clashes. As a result, deaths among gang members frequently occurred in groups. By contrast,
except during large-scale attacks (such as the attack in Belekou on 16 June), persons not
associated with gangs were generally killed or injured individually by stray bullets.
Distinctive identifying features observed during the clashes also helped refine the identification
of victims. Persons associated with gangs often wore identifying markers, such as red ribbons,
handkerchiefs tied around their arms, or clothing in the specific colours of their gang.
All of this information was cross-checked against information obtained from independent third
parties, including service providers not directly connected to HRS sources but who had access to
persons affected by the events.
Finally, an additional layer of verification consisted of analysing and corroborating the data
collected against reports produced by partner organizations in order to ensure the consistency and
accuracy of the information. The team assessed the reliability of the sources and the credibility of
the information collected. The team applied the reasonable grounds to believe standard to
determine that the incidents occurred as described and, where legal conclusions were drawn, that
the facts met all the constituent elements of a violation.
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The team considered this standard to have been met when it was satisfied that it had collected a
body of reliable and consistent information, corroborated by other sources, on the basis of which a
reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would have grounds to believe that the incident or
conduct had in fact occurred.
In some cases, the corroboration process takes time. Consequently, as new information becomes
available, the findings relating to victims may be revised and the number of victims may change.
The team paid particular attention to the principle of “do no harm”, ensuring that all interactions
with sources were carefully assessed in order to avoid any risk of adverse impact on individuals
and organizations. In addition, measures were taken to ensure the confidentiality of all exchanges.
29
FOOTNOTES
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[1] The area known as the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, located to the east of the Port-au-Prince
metropolitan area, comprises the localities of Duvivier, Pierre VI, Sarthe and Terre Noire (Cité
Soleil); the town centre of Croix-des-Bouquets and the areas of Bon Repos, Canaan, Carrefour
Marassa, Cité Doudoune, Duval, Lilavois, Marin, Santo and Shadda (Croix-des-Bouquets); and
Cazeau, Clercine, Croix-des-Missions and Damien (Tabarre).
[2] 613 people were killed (214 persons not associated with gangs, including 91 men, 74 women,
37 boys and 12 girls; and 399 persons associated with gangs, including 391 men and 8 women)
and 375 people were injured (139 persons not associated with gangs, including 74 men, 37
women, 11 boys and 17 girls; and 236 persons associated with gangs, all of them men). Victims
among children, particularly those recruited by gangs, remain difficult to document, notably owing
to the difficulties in establishing their age with precision in certain circumstances. Consequently,
the HRS disaggregation may not be exhaustive.
[3] 137 women and 11 girls; the age of the remaining 28 survivors could not be established at the
time of publication of this report.
[4] Médecins Sans Frontières (12 March 2026). « Haïti : MSF contrainte d’évacuer son hôpital de
Cité Soleil et d’y suspendre temporairement ses activités », available at Médecins Sans Frontières
(12 mars 2026). « Haïti : MSF contrainte d’évacuer son hôpital de Cité Soleil et d’y suspendre
temporairement ses activités », disponible sur https://www.msf.fr/communiques-presse/haiti-msfcontrainte-d-evacuer-son-hopital-de-cite-soleil-et-d-y-suspendre-temporairement-ses-activites. Les
activités de l’hôpital de MSF ont repris le 1er juin 2026. MSF resumed the activities of its hospital
on 1 June 2026.
[5] International Organization for Migration (IOM) (23 May 2026). “Haiti — Emergency Tracking
Tool 93.2 — Updates on displacement following armed clashes in Cité Soleil (10 - 22 May
2026)”, available at Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) (23 mai 2026). « Haïti
— Suivi des Urgences 93.2 — Mise à jour sur les déplacements liés aux affrontements armés à
Cité Soleil (10 - 22 mai 2026) », disponible sur https://dtm.iom.int/node/64796
[6] Between 2022 and 2024, the main gang violence revolved around two rival alliances. The first
alliance, known as the G9 an Fanmi e Alye (G9), was a coalition whose spokesperson was Jimmy
Chérizier, leader of the Delmas 6 gang. It included the following gangs: Belekou, Boston, Pierre
VI, Terre Noire and Simon Pelé (commune of Cité Soleil); Delmas 6 and Tokyo (commune of
Delmas); Ti Bois, Base Pilate, Krache Dife, La Saline and Wharf Jérémie (commune of Port-auPrince); and Chen Mechan (commune of Tabarre). The second alliance, known as the G-PèP,
comprised the following gangs: Brooklyn (commune of Cité Soleil); 400 Mawozo and Canaan
(commune of Croix-des-Bouquets); Grand Ravine, Les Argentins and Village de Dieu (commune
of Port-au-Prince); and Kraze Baryè (commune of Tabarre).
[7] United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (1990). “Basic Principles on
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials”, adopted by the Eighth United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba,
available at firearms-law-enforcement
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[8] Ibid., Principle 9; and Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36, para. 12.
[9] Among the 402 persons killed were 247 persons not associated with gangs, including 163
men, 81 women, one boy and two girls; and 155 persons associated with gangs, all of them men.
Among the 254 persons injured were 119 persons not associated with gangs, including 73 men,
45 women and one boy; and 135 persons associated with gangs, all of them men.
[10] France Info (14 February 2024). « Haïti : la distillerie Barbancourt contrainte à suspendre
ses activités bénévoles », available at France Info (14 février 2024). « Haïti : la distillerie
Barbancourt contrainte à suspendre ses activités bénévoles », disponible sur
https://la1ere.franceinfo.fr/martinique/haiti-la-distillerie-barbancourt-contrainte-a-suspendre-sesactivites-benevoles-1464966.html
[11] Although the creation of this coalition was announced in September 2023 by Jimmy
Chérizier, the leader of the Delmas 6 gang, in a video broadcast on social media, Viv Ansanm
does not appear to have become fully operational until February 2024.
[12] Between 1 December and 31 March 2026, 932 persons associated with gangs were killed
(917 men and 15 women) and a further 307 were injured (293 men, 12 women and 2 boys)
during security force operations in the communes of Delmas and Port-au-Prince.
[13] See Annex I for a detailed disaggregation by victim category and location of the incidents.
[14] 557 persons killed (203 persons not associated with gangs, including 87 men, 68 women, 36
boys and 12 girls; and 354 persons associated with gangs, including 346 men and 8 women), and
334 persons injured (120 persons not associated with gangs, including 67 men, 27 women, 11
boys and 15 girls; and 214 persons associated with gangs, all of them men).
[15] 55 persons killed (11 persons not associated with gangs, including 4 men, 6 women and 1
boy; and 44 persons associated with gangs, all of them men) and 41 persons injured (19 persons
not associated with gangs, including 7 men, 10 women and 2 girls; and 22 persons associated
with gangs, all of them men).
[16] One man.
[17] 74 persons killed (20 persons not associated with gangs, including 10 men, 5 women, 2 boys
and 3 girls; and 54 persons associated with gangs, all of them men) and 76 persons injured (40
persons not associated with gangs, including 27 men, 5 women, 3 boys and 5 girls; and 36
persons associated with gangs, all of them men).
[18] These clashes took place primarily in the areas of Blanchard and Fourgy (Cité Soleil), as
well as Marin and Sicot (Croix-des-Bouquets).
[19] 116 persons killed (six men, five women, two boys and three girls) and 21 persons injured
(nine men, four women, three boys and five girls).
[20] Four persons killed (four men) and 19 persons injured (18 men and one woman).
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[21] Five persons associated with gangs (all men) and two persons not associated with gangs (two
17-year-old boys).
[22] 117 persons killed (110 persons associated with gangs, including 105 men and five women;
and seven persons not associated with gangs, including four men and three women) and 125
persons injured (110 persons associated with gangs, all of them men; and 15 persons not associated
with gangs, including eight men and seven women).
[23] Between 23 April and 9 May, at least 22 people were killed (13 men associated with gangs
and nine persons not associated with gangs, including five men, two women and two girls). Two
persons not associated with gangs (one man and one woman) were also injured.
[24] 147 persons killed (114 persons associated with gangs, all of them men; and 33 persons not
associated with gangs, including 6 men, eight women, 18 boys and one girl) and 75 persons
injured (68 persons associated with gangs, all of them men; and seven persons not associated with
gangs, including four men, one woman and two boys).
[25] Six hommes, deux femmes, trois garçons et une fille.
[26] Facebook, available, as of 25 May 2026, at Facebook, disponible, au 25 mai 2026, sur
https://web.facebook.com/reel/907906748942514
[27] During the month of June, at least five men, identified by local sources as members of the
Brooklyn gang, were appointed to the municipal council or the Department of Social Affairs of the
commune of Cité Soleil.
[28] 113 persons associated with the Wharf Jérémie gang (all men) and 30 persons not associated
with gangs (nine men, 14 women and seven boys).
[29] 20 persons not associated with gangs (15 men, three women and two boys).
[30] Seven men associated with the Wharf Jérémie gang, and 11 persons not associated with gangs
(seven men and four women).
[31] 45 persons were killed (8 persons associated with gangs, all of them men; and 37 persons not
associated with gangs, including 21 men, 13 women, 2 boys and 1 girl) and a further 25 were
injured (all persons not associated with gangs, including 5 men, 6 women, 4 boys and 10 girls).
[32] 17 persons not associated with gangs were killed (6 men, 6 women, 3 boys and 2 girls) and a
further 26 persons not associated with gangs were injured (9 men, 5 women, 4 boys and 8 girls).
[33] 44 persons killed (24 persons associated with gangs, all of them men; and 20 persons not
associated with gangs, including 11 men, eight women and one girl).
[34] Delphine Gardère (10 May 2026), publication on X : Delphine Gardère (10 mai 2026),
publication sur X : https://x.com/DelphineGardere/status/2053512117047713886
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[35] 55 persons were killed (44 persons associated with gangs, all of them men; and 11 persons not
associated with gangs, including four men, six women and one boy), and a further 41 were injured
(22 persons associated with gangs, all of them men; and 19 persons not associated with gangs,
including seven men, 10 women and two girls).
[36] According to the United Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries, States are
responsible for the conduct of private security and military companies to which they delegate
governmental functions, such as the use of force or detention, or which act under their instructions,
direction or control. Companies exercising such functions are subject to the same international
human rights obligations as the national police or other State security forces. States therefore have
a duty to prevent, investigate, punish and provide remedies for summary executions and other
serious violations committed by companies operating under their jurisdiction. See Working Group
on the use of mercenaries, A/HRC/51/25.
[37] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2020).
United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, available
at HCDH (2020). « Lignes directrices des Nations Unies basées sur les droits de l’homme portant
sur l’utilisation des armes à léthalité réduite dans le cadre de l’application des lois », disponible sur
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/Guidance-on-Less-lethalWeapons-HR_PUB_20_1_FR.pdf
[38] Ibidem.
[39] Haïti Libre (15 May 2026). “PM of Haiti visited the base of the Gang Suppression Force”,
available at Haïti Libre (15 mai 2026). « PM of Haiti visited the base of the Gang Supression
Force », disponible sur https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-47517-pm-of-haiti-visited-the-base-ofthe-gang-supression-force.html
33