Rapport de fin d'exécution - Projet de restructuration et de développement industriel

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 21165-HA IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (TF-21551; IDA-20710) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 9.1 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI FOR INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT October 31, 2000 Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Department Caribbean Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their I official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective October 31, 2000) Currency Unit = Gourde G I = US$ 0.043 US$ 1 = 23 G FISCAL YEAR September 30 October 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AAN Autorite Aeroportuaire Nationale APN Autorite Portuaire Nationale BRH Banque de la Republique d'Haiti CMEP Conseil de Modernisation des Entreprises Publiques FDI Fonds de Developpement Industriel G. Gourde Haitienne IDB Interamerican Development Bank SAR Staff Appraisal Report TELECO Les Telecomunication d'Haiti SAM TA Technical Assistance USAID United States Agency for International Development Vice President: David de Ferranti Country Manager/Director: Orsalia Kalantzopoulos Sector Manager/Director: Danny Leipziger Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Heidi Mattila/Jyoti Shukla FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data I 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 7 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 12 6. Sustainability 14 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 15 8. Lessons Learned 17 9. Partner Comments 18 10. Additional Information 19 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 21 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 22 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 24 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 25 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 27 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performnance 28 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 29 Annex 8.A Borrower Contribution -CMEP 35 Annex 8.B Borrower Contribution -FDI 39 Annex 9. Cofinancier Contribution -USAID 74 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed without World Bank authorization. Project ID: P007309 Project Name: INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING & DEVELOPMENT Team Leader: Jyoti Shukla TL Unit: LCC3C ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: October 31, 2000 1. Project Data Name: INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING & LIC/TFNumber: TF-21551; IDA-20710 DEVELOPMENT Country/Department: HAITI Region: Latin America and Caribbean Region Sector/subsector: DB -Business Environment; DI -Private Infrastructure KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 12/15/86 Effective: 08/02/90 08/02/90 Appraisal: 03/15/89 MTR: 12/10/97 Approval: 12/05/89 Closing: 06/30/95 03/31/2000 Borrower/lmplementing Agency: GOVERNMENT OF HAITI/FONDS DE DEVELOPPEMENT (FDI), CONSEIL DE MODERNISATION DES ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES (CMEP) Other Partners: UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID) STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: David de Ferranti Shahid Husain Country Manager: Orsalia Kalantzopoulos Ping Loh Sector Manager: Danny Leipziger John Page Team Leader at ICR: Heidi Mattila, Jyoti Shukla Kanella Vasiliadis ICR Primary Author: Patrick Tardy; Dana Rysankova 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: U Sustainability: UN Institutional Development Impact: N Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: U QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: U Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The original objectives of the Project, as defined in the Development Credit Agreement, were to: (i) Assist in financing, through a line of credit, such productive facilities and resources in the territory of the Borrower as will contribute to the economic and social development of such territory; (ii) Support the Borrower's private industrial sector in undertaking the adjustments required to become export oriented and competitive; (iii) Assist the Borrower in carrying out the Trade Policy Reform Program; (iv) Assist in the further strengthening of BRH (Banque de la Republique d'Haiti), FDI (Fonds de Developpement Industriel) and Financial Intermediaries; and (v) Improve the regulatory framework of the Borrower's industrial sector. Assessment: The original objectives were justified at the time the Project was identified and prepared Haiti had just embarked on an ambitious trade liberalization program supported by an Economic Recovery Credit, financed by IDA. Haitian private enterprises, long shelteredfrom competition, especially those producingfor the domestic market, needed to adjust to the new environment. Furthermore, the regulatory and supporting institutional structure needed to be strengthened The Project was designed as a follow-up to a previous IDA Credit (Credit 1131 HA), under which the Fonds de Developpement Industriel (FDI) was created as a financial intermediary and performed reasonably well. 3.2 Revised Objective. These Project objectives were modified in December 1997. In 1991, Project implementation was negatively affected due to a military coup and a subsequent default on the country's international financial commitments. As a result, an economic embargo was imposed on Haiti and all donor aid, including this Credit, was suspended for more than 3 years between October 1991 and December 1994. When the embargo was eventually lifted and international lending resumed in 1995, the economic situation had changed completely. Real GDP had dropped by about 30%, and industrial output and investment had fallen dramatically. In order to respond to these changed circumstances, the Project was first reformulated in September 1995 within its original development objectives, and subsequently restructured further with revised development objectives in December 1997. The revised development objectives were to: (i) Assist in financing such productive facilities and resources in the territory of the Borrower as will contribute to the economic and social development of such territory; (ii) Support the Borrower's private sector in undertaking adjustments consistent with the Private Sector Development Program; (iii) Assist in the further strengthening of BRH, FDI, CMEP (Conseil de Modernisation des Entreprises Publiques), the Ministry of Economy and Finance and Financial Intermediaries; and (iv) Improve the regulatory framework of the Borrower's public services. The amendment eliminated some of the original, pre-embargo objectives that had become either outdated, such as support for the Haitian trade reform which had largely been implemented, and others such as the improvement of the regulatory framework of the industrial sector, as more substantive technical support was being made available through other multilateral agencies such as the Inter-American Development -2 - Bank. More importantly, however, new objectives were added to support privatization of the state-owned enterprises (objective (ii)), institutional strengthening of the privatization agency CMEP (objective (iii)) and development of an appropriate regulatory framework for public services (objective (iv)). At first glance, the revision of the Project objectives might appear minor. In reality, however, the focus of the Project shifted considerably from the restructuring of private enterprises towards the privatization of state-owned utilities, although privatization was not mentioned directly in the revised objectives. Instead, the Private Sector Development Program was defined as "the Borrower's program for increasing participation of the private sector in economic activities by means, inter alia, of the modernization of the state-owned enterprises pursuant to the Borrower's Law dated October 2, 1996". Assessment: For allpracticalpurposes, this amendment effectively changed the entire Project as the line of credit component closed within six months of this amendment, and the remaining activities were focused entirely on privatization and regulatory reform. An alternative course of action would have been to close the Project on its revised Closing Date of June 30, 1998 and prepare a separate operation to support privatization. This, in fact, was the option first explored by IDA management and a TA operation to support civil service reform, tax reform and privatization was prepared and approved by IDA's Board in September 1996 (Second Technical Assistance Credit -- TAC II). This operation, however, as well as several other operations, could not be made effective as Haitian law required all external credit to be approved by its Parliament, and such parliamentary approval could not be obtained in the prevailing political situation ofpoliticalfragmentation. At the same time, the Government's requestfor assistance with implementation of its privatization program was highly time-sensitive. An extension and amendment of the existing Project, which did not require parliamentary approval, were seen to be the most expedient solution to respond to the country's needs and political constraints. 3.3 Original Components: The original Project comprised two major components, a credit component and a technical assistance (TA) component. The credit component, in an amount of US$10 million equivalent (88% of Project costs), consisted of: = Sub-loans for restructuring private enterprises (US$4.8 million equivalent) and * A "regular credit line" (US$5.2 million equivalent) including sub-loans and guarantee mechanisms for "non-restructuring" private enterprises. FDI served as a rediscounting institution for the line of credit, providing medium and long-termn loans to eligible financial intermediaries, with IDA reimbursing 65% of the approved FDI sub-loans. These fnancial intermediaries then on-lent to private enterprises. FDI charged a fixed interest rate calculated to reflect the average cost of funds to the banking sector, with the interest varying between 8% for large and medium enterprises and 7% for on-lending to small-sized enterprises. The final interest rate charged to the enterprise was set by the financial intermediary. The design of this component was based on experience with a similar credit line that had been supported by IDA's previous Credit 1 131 -HA and a survey of 62 restructuring enterprises undertaken during project preparation. The survey had indicated that there was a significant demand for term credit to finance restructuring and investment as Haitian financial institutions were generally reluctant to lend other than short-term. The credit line was sub-divided into loans to restructuring and non-restructuring enterprises. Restructuring enterprises were defined as enterprises undergoing specific industrial restructuring plans. Initially 10 enterprises were selected on the basis of the above-mentioned survey, with more enterprises expected to be -3- included during project implementation. The remaining credit line was for FDI's "normal lending", financing fixed asset investment for viable existing firms and new export-oriented firms, that needed financial assistance but no restructuring. This component also included a modest guarantee sub-component. The TA component (US$1.4 million equivalent, 12% of project costs) covered a wide range of activities, including: * Strengthening of FDI and of financial intermediaries to improve their project evaluation and supervision capabilities (US$800,000); * Strengthening of the Supervision Department of BRH (Central Bank) to improve regulation and supervision of the banking sector (US$100, 000); * Improvement of customs administration (US$350, 000), and * Studies to be undertaken by the Ministry of Economy and Finance on banking legislation and regulations, restructuring needs of the banking, non-banking and informal credit sectors. (US$150,000). These activities were included to support industrial restructuring and development effectiveness of the industrial credit, based on the experience of the previous credit line. Specifically, improvement of customs administration was considered important as domestic private enterprises were being hurt by large illegal imports. Also, the banking sector was poorly regulated and needed restructuring, as a fair portion of credit appeared to be delivered by the informal sector. Additionally, it was felt that supervisory and regulatory functions of the Haitian Central Bank should be strengthened. Assessment: Project preparation was diligent in identifying term credit as a constraint to enterprise growth. Preparation also identified significant shortcomings in the overall institutional and policy environmentfor private businesses and the financial sector. It is questionable, however, if the inclusion of a line of credit and a limited TA component, with a number of small activities, were the appropriate instruments to address problems of such complexity. Many of these issues clearly required a strong policy dialogue, considerable technical analysis and commitment at the highest levels to undertake the requisite policy reforms and support the complementary institutional strengthening. A line of credit with some TA components could not have provided the necessary input and leverage to achieve this. At the same time, it was not clear what the ultimate outcome of these TA initiatives was expected to be and no benchmarks ofpolicy improvement were identified. At the implementation level, this design made the Project complex, involving many implementing agencies and stretching the limited implementation capabilities of the public administration. In the end, with the exception of the TA to strengthen FDI and financial intermediaries, which represented a direct and logical link to the credit line, none of the other TA activities were implemented. In retrospect, a credit line and small TA components without clearly defined outcomes and political commitment could not have been sufficient to overcome the significant policy and institutional constraints in Haiti. It should, however, be noted that this Project design was not uncommon at the time that the Project was identified and appraised, and IDA's own assessment of best practice has developed considerably since that time. 3.4 Revised Components: Project components were revised twice, in September 1995 and in December 1997. In 1995, the main objective was to simplify and streamline the Project in the context of the changed circumstances after three -4 - years of embargo. Within the credit line, the difference between restructuring and non-restructuring enterprises had largely disappeared and the original enterprise restructuring plans had become outdated. Many of the TA activities foreseen under the original project design were also dropped to reduce project complexity and restore focus. The new Project configuration became as follows: * Under the credit component, (i) the total amount for enterprise restructuring was reduced to US$1.1 million equivalent, and (ii) financing available for FDI's regular lending and guarantee mechanism was increased to US$8.8 million equivalent. * Under the TA component, funds allocated to institutional development and consulting services of FDI increased to US$1.5 million. The other components -- support to BRH Supervision Department, to the Customs and to Ministry of Economy and Finance -- were eliminated to focus the Project almost completely on the credit line and the institutional strengthening of FDI, the implementing agency. The Project was restructured more deeply in December 1997, when a new privatization component was added. * Under the credit component. (i) financing available to support enterprise restructuring was further reduced to US$0.5 million equivalent; and (ii) financing available for FDI discounting facility and guarantee mechanism was also reduced to US$7 million. * Under the TA component the amount allocated for the institutional development, training and consulting services of FDI remained about the same at US$1. 5 million equivalent. • A new privatization TA component (US$2.4 million equivalent) was added, including: (i) Technical assistance to the newly created CMEP (Conseil de Modernisation des Entreprises Publiques) -privatization agency -to prepare privatization of a group of Haitian public enterprises; (ii) Development and implementation of a comprehensive communication strategy for the Private Sector Development Program; (iii) Preparation of a reform program to modernize the utilities legal and regulatory framework; (iv) TA to Ministry of Economy and Finance for the preparation of a legal and regulatory framework conducive to the implementation of the Private Sector Development Program. The credit component closed as planned on June 30, 1998, only six months after the date of the amendment, and uncommitted funds were transferred to the privatization component. The Project activities then focused solely on privatization activities. As a result of this expansion of Project objectives and scope, the Project closing date was extended three times -- to June 30, 1998, June 30, 1999 and finally to March 31, 2000. The last two extensions related only to the privatization/regulatory reform component. Assessment. As discussed earlier, the inclusion of this privatization/regulation component was a practical response on IDA 's part to be responsive to the Government's request for assistance in this area, and its inability to get Parliamentary approval to new Credits. This approach was responsive and flexible, and helped Haiti maintain its allocation of scarce IDA resources which it would otherwise have lost. It also provided thefledgling Government a vote of confidence and an avenue for improving infrastructure services in the economy. For IDA, this was clearly a high risk component, but it was felt that despite the risks it was importantfor the international community to offer support. -5 - 3.5 Quality at Entry: ICR rating: Marginally Unsatisfactory Credit and initial TA components As mentioned earlier, the original objectives seemed to be justified at the time of Project appraisal. The FDI credit line was also a useful, albeit limited, instrument to provide long-term credit to Haitian private enterprises during a period of difficult economic adjustment, and the inclusion of the TA components addressing several constraints of the policy and institutional environment reflected an appreciation of the complexity of the constraints to the business environment. Such a Project design was not atypical of similar projects at the time that this Project was appraised. Nevertheless, with the benefit of hindsight, the design had some key deficiencies that contributed to its unsatisfactory implementation and slow disbursement of the credit component: * With regard to the line of credit component, appraisal was diligent in assessing the demand for term credit, but the Project did not adequately address the more systemic constraints to term credit and enterprise growth such as unreliable judicial system and lack of procedures for the use of loan collateral that made it very difficult for banks to foreclose on delinquent loans. ( On the implementation side, credit line procedures were cumbersome and slow. In addition to FDI procedures, all sub-loans required prior approval of the IDA. As a result, many financial intermediaries came to the conclusion that accessing FDI resources was not worth the trouble. * FDI term resources were not sufficiently attractive to induce Banks to overcome the above mentioned constraints. Initially, FDI charged PFIs a flat 7 or 8 percent interest rate, depending on the size of the loan. Banks would then charge market rates. After the 1995 credit amendment, FDI retained from 40 to 70 percent of the interest rate charged to the final borrower, even as it was not taking a commercial risk (it took the banking risk). At present, SOFIHDES, FDI's largest client, typically charges enterprises an interest rate in the range of 20 to 25 percent, of which SOFIHDES pays back 60 percent to FDI. * With respect to the TA component, its objectives and scope were very broad with many small TA activities that made the Project complex. Many of these activities involved major policy issues and restructuring, which could not reasonably have been addressed through limited technical assistance, without high level Government attention and intensive policy dialogue and supervision on IDA's part. This problem was eventually resolved in part in 1995 by dropping many of these secondary TA components, which were also being addressed through complementary technical assistance from other sources. In retrospect, the Project might have been more effective if key policy issues were better defined during preparation and corresponding policy reform benchmarks and actions identified and monitored during Project implementation. The design of the Privatization component, seems to have been adequate and its key components --- privatization transactions; regulatory environment; and public communication program properly identified and funded. Considerable work was done by IDA staff in close cooperation with Haitian counterparts in early 1997 to design a strong implementing agency (CMEP); establish an ambitious privatization agenda and timetable; and garner support from the Government and other donors. What may have been overlooked was an appropriate exit strategy in case that political support for privatization vanishes. Given the high level of political uncertainty in the country, and the intrinsic political nature of this component, Project -6 - design could have included clearer performance benchmarks and corresponding triggers to be applied in the case of a weakening of the Government's commitrnent to privatization. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: Project objectives supported two broad areas of reform: (i) private enterprise restructuring and development, represented by the first two objectives and partly by the institutional strengthening included in the third objective, and (ii) privatization and improved regulation of public services represented by the second and fourth amended objectives and partly by the third objective. In both cases, Project achievements were partial. Though many of the individual activities were implemented with some success, their overall impact in the context of a volatile political situation and waning government commitment was only marginal, thus leading to an Unsatisfactory rating for overall impact. a) Enterprise restructurine and investment. The Project had limited influence on restructuring and financing of private enterprises. The availability of term resources did not change the behavior of banks. They remained risk adverse and most would lend only short-terrn and for trade activities. In fact, overall term lending by Haitian banks has decreased since the early '90s. According to information received from various banks, term lending used to represent around 25 percent of bank lending but is now down to 10 to 15 percent. Ultimately, FDI became a small player in the Haitian financial sector. As of September 20, 1999, FDI's loan portfolio amounted to G109 million (around US$5.7 million equivalent), i.e. around 1.2 percent of aggregate outstanding credit extended by the banking sector in Haiti. Further, the economic embargo, political uncertainty and endemic institutional weaknesses of the economy continued to have a significant negative impact on the overall business environment, commercial and political risks and the ability of enterprises to become more competitive. FDPs line of credit, however well implemented, had little chance of significant impact in the face of these highly adverse circumstances. b) Privatization and Resulatorv Reform After its restructuring in December 1997, improving the efficiency of a few state-owned industrial firms and of the main utilities through privatization of management or of sale of their equity, became the main focus of the Project. Two significant industrial public enterprises were privatized and most of the technical work for privatization of three utilities completed. However, the privatization of these three utilities stopped just short of issuing bidding documents as Government commitment to privatization waned. Considering that the ultimate outcome of this component was supposed to be a transfer of the management and/or the ownership of these enterprises to private operators, the component must be rated partially Unsatisfactory. In addition, the regulatory reforms implemented by the Government were also only half-hearted. Although some progress has been achieved towards establishing independent regulators and sound legal and regulatory framework, several of the key laws, drafted under the Project, could not be enacted due to absence of the Parliament in the period from January 1999 until the closure of the Project. Other important activities, such as public information campaign, were also not implemented. It is important to see the Unsatisfactory rating for this Project in the context of the particular country situation during its implementation. The Project was implemented during an especially difficult period of Haitian history. Following the ousting of President Jean Bertrand Aristide in September 1991 by a military coup, a 3-year embargo was imposed on Haiti. The economy deteriorated dramatically. During the embargo years, GDP fell by 30%, the currency depreciated by a factor of 3.6 and more than half industrial jobs were lost. Even after the restoration of the constitutional regime, the political environment remained unsettled, with frequent changes in Govermment. Altogether, there were 14 successive governments during -7- the lifetime of the Project. Since 1995, most of the IDA projects in Haiti have been evaluated as unsuccessful and/or have encountered majors delays. Projects sponsored by other agencies have had similar results. Since 1997, the paralysis of Government and the conflict between executive and legislative created new uncertainty and further delays in implementation. The Parliament was dismissed in January 1999 and a new one was not elected before the end of the Project. In the final years of the life of this Project, the momentum for reform all but evaporated and the incumbent Government became reluctant to take decisions. As a result, donors' support was sharply curtailed in all sectors. This Project -- particularly the politically sensitive privatization program -- was severely affected by the Govermment's lack of action. PROJECT LIFE POLITICAL EVENTS 1990 August 90 -Project becomes effective 1991 September 91 -October 94 September 91 -military coup, followed by 3-years Project suspended embargo September 94 -military government steps down 1995 September 95 -First restructuring, project components Embargo lifted and donor aid resumed simplified 1997 October 97 -flour company privatized March 97 -resignation of Prime Minister Decemnber 97 -second Project restructuring, Privatiation objectives and components added From mid 1997 on -continued political instability and institutional crises 1998 June 1998 -credit component closed 1999 November 99 -cement company privatized January 1999 -Parliament dismissed 2000 March 2000 -Project closed 4.2 Outputs by components: Credit component. Initially, US$10 million equivalent was allocated for the credit line. Eventually this allocation was reduced to US$7.5 million equivalent. Disbursements under the Project remained slower than expected through most of the implementation period, although one of the main causes for this situation (embargo and its economic consequences) lay outside the control of the implementing agency and the Government. At Project Closing, a total of US$7.6 million was utilized for both lines of credit (76% of the initial estimate) during 4.5 years of component effectiveness, i.e. an average of US$1.7 million per year, while appraisal estimate was US$2.5 million per year. Financial intermediaries largely continued being uninterested in long-term lending and had excess liquidity in most years, except in 1996 when the Central Bank increased the reserve requirement to 53 percent of lending. For the enterprise restructuring sub-component, initially, US$4.8 million equivalent was earmarked to finance restructuring of 10 enterprises identified during project preparation. Eventually, only four restructuring enterprises received financial support for a total of US$1 million, all disbursed within a few months of effectiveness, after which the program stopped for lack of interest from other firms. Input from financial intermediaries and beneficiary enterprises indicates that its procedures were seen as excessively cumbersome, bureaucratic and slow. US$5.2 million equivalent was earmarked for FDI to finance new -8 - investment and working capital for the non-restructuring enterprises. During the 1995 Project amendment this figure was increased to US$8.8 million equivalent and then again reduced to US$7 million in 1997. In total, the line of credit contributed to financing of 61 loans and 124 micro-loans during 1990-91 and 1995-97 period. The total costs of these investment projects was approximately G650 million (US$45 million equivalent), to which the IDA Credit contributed approximately 17 percent. These investment projects are estimated to have created around 3,000 jobs. Of these 61 loans, 21 went to large enterprises, 26 to medium-sized and 14 to small enterprises. The loans were concentrated primarily in three sectors: agriculture and food processing, construction materials and services followed by export assembly and chemical sectors. Half of the loans were channeled through a single financial intermediary -SOFIHDES specialized in term credit, although an additional 10 private banks participated in this loan scheme. Additionally, FDI financed approximately 30 other loans that were not refinanced by IDA. (More details on FDI sub-loans are included in Section 10 -Additional Information) FDI also offered credit guarantees, amounting to G36.7 million (about US$2.3 million equivalent), i.e. 35 percent of its loan portfolio. FDI is the only financial institution in Haiti to provide such guarantees. The guarantees are considered by Haitian bankers as a useful product, which should have been marketed more aggressively. However, the relatively small size of FDI lending, and the obligation that guarantees should stay within a 40 % limit of its loan portfolio, precluded any further expansion of this instrument. FDI also played a useful role in assisting banks in assessing enterprise investment proposals, as well as the training of their staff and the provision of computer software. Overall, FDI appears to have been a relatively well run institution given the overall weak institutional capacity in Haiti and has continued to survive under very difficult circumstances. As of September 20, 1999, FDI's loan portfolio amnounted to G109 million (around US$5.7 million equivalent), i.e. around 1.2 percent of aggregate outstanding credit extended by the banking sector in Haiti. Despite its small presence in the financial sector in Haiti, it remains profitable and self-financing and has been able to weather the embargo and the interruption of IDA funding. Given the environment in which it operates, it takes only limited commercial risk -- only on its guarantee portfolio and with banks -- and its loan portfolio is presently quite healthy (default rate is 3.5%). However, its portfolio is excessively dominated by one financial intermediary -- SOFIHDES (64% of current loan portfolio and 54% of guarantee portfolio), which poses high risks due to lack of diversification. SOFIHDES is the only financial intermediary in Haiti specializing in industrial long-term credit. The Project has also financed several TA activities within the credit component. Initially, the Project was supposed to finance a series of technical assistance activities to support regulatory and institutional frameworks of financial and industrial sectors, involving a number of institutions, including the Central Bank, Customs Administration and Ministry of Finance and Economy. These sub-components, however, had never been implemented and eventually were dropped during the 1995 restructuring. TA to FDI and financial intermediaries was the only original TA component that survived both amendments and even was increased from US$0.8 million to US$1.5 million equivalent. Eventually, however, only $0.84 million was utilized. This component financed a wide range of activities, including training for FDI and financial intermediaries in areas such as project evaluation, microcredit, guarantee management, internal studies on FDI's operational efficiency and strategic options and a seminar for credit evaluation staff of financial intermediaries. These activities were clearly related to Project objectives and had positive impact on institutional strengthening of FDI and financial intermediaries. The majority of resources, however, (US$0.6 million) were used to finance external studies, such as a study on rice and sugar cane industries and a feasibility study for establishing an international port in the south of the -9- country. The relationship between these studies and the Project's credit component were not very clear. In any case, this TA component does not appear to have had a significant impact on Project outcome. Privatization TA Component. Work on public enterprise privatization started soon after the passage of the Privatization Law (Loi de Modernisation des Entreprises Publique) in September 1996, i.e. more than a year before fnancial support was made available under this Project. This work was mostly financed by two successive Project Preparation Facilities for a new TA operation for support of privatization being prepared by IDA. When it was decided to support the privatization activities through the undisbursed funds in this Credit, US$2.4 million equivalent was allocated for this purpose, of which US$1.2 million was eventually spent. In addition, USAID also approved a Trust Fund of US$3.55 million, administered by IDA, to co-finance technical assistance for the privatization of port, airport and telecom utilities. Of this trust fund, approximately US$2.9 million was spent. Eventually, two state-owned industrial firms were privatized, using the capitalization method. Consultations with private sector representatives involved in the bidding indicate that in both cases the process was transparent and professionally managed: * In October 1997, 70 percent of the equity of a flour companv was awarded to a consortium of foreign and local investors, through an open, transparent and competitive bidding process, in exchange for US$9.1 million to be invested in the company. This flour plant is now working at full capacity and appears to be a success story. As a result of increased efficiency and restructuring, the price of bread in Haiti has decreased by around 8 percent while consumer prices increased by an estimated 15 percent. In addition, the plant now produces around 4,000 to 5,000 metric tons of wheat shaft a month, which is in very strong demand by animal breeders to supplement other sources of food (particularly at a time of severe drought in Haiti). It employs 280 full time workers and 50 part-timers and also generates jobs in related sectors, such as transport. 3 In May 1999, sixty-five percent of the stock of a cement comoany was awarded to a consortium of foreign and local investors, for an amount of US$15.6 million, also to be kept in the company for much needed investment, as the cement company ceased operation in 1993. Work is presently under way to rehabilitate the plant. The new management is optimistic about future prospects and expects operations to resume in January 2001. Also in this case the bidding process was open, transparent and competitive. In addition, CMEP has mostly completed the preparatory work for the privatization and associated legal and regulatory reformns of the public utilities in the three sectors included in the credit -- ports: Le Port Public International de Port-au-Prince de l'Autorite Portuaire Nationale (APN); airports: L'Aeroport International de Port-au-Prince de l'Autorite Aeroportuaire Nationale (AAN); and telecommunications: Les Telecommunication d'Haiti SAM (TELECO). The Government, however, has postponed the decision on their privatization and the legal and regulatory frameworks have largely not been enacted. In addition to these three utilities, CMEP has been involved in discussions on privatization of the water company of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (CAMEP), the national power utility (EdH) and the two state-owned banks, assisted by he Inter-American Development Bank. In none of the cases, has there been any significant progress on privatization. * Ports: The preparatory work for privatization of Port-au-Prince port was completed including diagnostics and rehabilitation plans, information memorandum, tendering papers and process, draft management contract, as well as the preparation of the draft law and regulations. The technical -10- studies recommended a three to five year management contracts followed by a long term concession once harbor operations were spun off to a port authority. APN would be transformed into the regulator of the harbor and maritime sector -- a draft Law has been prepared to that effect. However, this law still needs to be presented to the Parliament. * Airports: The preparatory technical work for privatizing the management of the airport of Port-au-Prince and the accompanying legal and regulatory reforms was also largely completed by the consultants financed by the Credit. The technical studies recommended a similar approach of an initial management contract, to be followed at a later stage by a long-term concession. However, the resolution of a number of problems remained pending before the transaction could go ahead, including: (i) enactment of the legal and regulatory framework for the sector, (ii) decision on airport tariffs, (iii) rationalization of excess labor; (iv) defining the future status of other Haitian airports; and (iii) resolving the issue of assumption of AAN income by the Treasury. Significant improvement has been achieved in case of OFNAC, ('Office National de l'Aviation Civile), the technical/safety regulator of the sector. The staff of OFNAC has been retrained and the new Code de I 'Aviation Civile drafted. Most importantly, the safety and security of the airport of Port-au-Prince have improved significantly and the airport is no longer rated unsafe by the US Federal Aviation Authority. _ Telecoms: The preparatory work to privatize TELECO was also undertaken through Project activities. Technically the company could soon be taken to the market. Under the proposed privatization strategy, a significant portion of the equity -- 40-50 percent -- would be transferred to a strategic investor, using the capitalization mechanism. However, there remains resistance to privatization and reform, partly due to public fears of labor rationalization. Some sector reform, however, has taken place de facto with increased competition as new licences have been granted to mobile operators. Also, the telecommunications sector is already regulated by an agency, CONATEL, although the regulatory framework is outdated. A new telecommunication law and regulations were drafted under the Project, addressing sector liberalization and privatization, including tariffs, inter-connection pricing, frequency management, and design and responsibilities of the regulatory agency. The Government is currently organizing a forum to discuss this draft law with ali relevant sector entities, after which the draft law should be presented to the Parliament. However, despite considerable technical work, political support for sector reform and privatization, which was strong in 1997, has wavered in recent years. Faced with the decision to take these utilities to the market and to address the various issues mentioned above, the Government decided to postpone the transactions. The regulatory reform is also incomplete, particularly in ports and airports sectors. Laws have been drafted to establish modem regulatory systems with independent regulators, but they could not be enacted, since the Parliament was dissolved in January 1999. Although the Parliament has now been elected in July 2000, it is uncertain whether such legislation would be passed any time soon. Another deficiency of the privatization process was an absence of public consultation and an information campaign, which was envisaged as an integral part of the Project design under the revised project components. The campaign was supposed to support consultation, mitigate negative public perceptions of privatization and address some of the public concerns related to the privatization process. Although eventually some information programs took place, with active participation of CMEP, CMEP never received an authorization of the Government to launch a full-scale communication campaign, potentially the first sign of the Government's waning commitment to the privatization process. Overall, the component is rated partially Unsatisfactory, considering that the ultimate outcomes of the transfer of the management and/or the ownership of the public enterprises to private operators were -11 - achieved only partially for the flour and cement companies. It must be acknowledged, however, that the technical preparatory activities for the privatization of the three utilities were implemented satisfactorily. The privatization process could still go forward if the political commitment was restored. Unfortunately, considering recent deterioration of the political enviromnent in Haiti after the Parliamentary elections were criticized internationally for irregularities and lack of transparency, mounting political tensions before the Presidential elections and constrained availability of assistance from international donors, an early decision to resume the privatization process is considered unlikely. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: Not applicable 4.4 Financial rate of return: Not applicable 4.5 Institutional development impact: The institutional impact of the Project is considered negligible over the longer run. During the Project, the staff of the two main implementing agencies, FDI and CMEP, received extensive training and built up strong competencies in their respective technical fields, with significant personal human capital formation. CMEP, in particular has been exposed to world class consultants and its management and staff have clearly acquired a stature and understanding of privatization strategies, methods and processes which would facilitate any possible further work in this field. The Project also introduced new standards of transparency and professionalism in the work practice of Haitian agencies. However, despite these positive outcomes at the level of personal human capital formation, both institutions have experienced a certain degree of marginalization by the end of the project. Particularly in the case of the CMEP, with the end of this Credit, its future existence itself remains uncertain. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: The Project was strongly affected by political events and uncertainty in Haiti: * The military coup of September 1991, followed by a 3-year embargo, had a detrimental impact on the economy, overall investment and business environment and the demand for long-term credit. * The unsettled political environment after 1997 had a strongly negative impact on the decision-making process of the Executive branch of the Government. * Absence of a functioning Parliament after January 1999 prevented passage of legislation drafted under the Project and hindered implementation of the regulatory reform objective of the Privatization component. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: * In the years after the lifting of the embargo, deteriorating macro-economic conditions, lack of public investment in infrastructure and growing insecurity led to a further deterioration of the business environment. -12 - * The Government never addressed some of the deep-rooted obstacles that negatively affected the credit line component, in particular an unreliable judicial system and the lack of proper enforcement of contract and collateral legislation. * FDI faced difficulties in 1995-96 in providing required counterpart funds (35 percent of financing). This was mainly due to a 3-fold depreciation of the currency against the US$ since mid-199 1. * As mentioned earlier, CMEP was not authorized to go ahead with the planned public communication campaign which could have helped the Government to mitigate some of the negative perceptions, misconceptions and concerns about privatization. * More fundamentally, the privatization program was critically affected by the reversal in support to privatization at the highest levels of Govermnent. As a result, the privatization program was put on hold in the summer of 1999 and never resumed. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: e It might be argued that CMEP should have been more forceful in involving the Government institutions (Ministries and the Central Bank), regulators (particularly CONATEL), utility management and the unions in the privatization process. However, it is likely that without strong and continuous Government support, CMEP would not have had much success on that front. 5.4 Costs andfinancing: The total costs of the projects to be supported by the credit line were estimated at appraisal to be US$23.2 million, of which US$10 million was supposed to be financed by IDA, US$5.3 million by FDI and US$7.9 million by financial intermediaries and final borrowers (enterprises). Eventually, the total costs of FDI sub-loans supported by the IDA Credit was higher than expected, US$45.2 million, to which IDA contributed with US$7.6 million, FDI US$4.3 million, financial internediaries approximately US$12 million and the rest was financed by enterprises or alternative financing sources. The higher costs mean that a higher proportion of individual project costs was financed by alternative means, outside the FDI discounting scheme. In addition US$0.8 million has been spent in Technical Assistance for FDI and financial intermediaries. As far as the privatization component is concerned, only 50% (US$1.2 million) of the amount earmarked for the privatization TA was disbursed, partly due to the unfinished privatization agenda, partly due to the fact that a US$3.553 million Trust Fund was also made available by USAID to fnance privatization TA, that made the amount available under Credit 2071-HA higher than necessary. Final disbursements under the Project amounted to US$9.6 million equivalent (SDR 6.9 million), resulting in a cancellation of US$2.8 million equivalent. (SDR 2.2 million)') Due to the change in US$/SDR exchange rate, the total of disbursed and undisbursed funds in US$ amounts to US$12.4 million equivalent, while the original Credit amount was US$11.4 million equivalent. -13- 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Project sustainability is unlikely. FDI has now been in operation for twenty years. It has successfully weathered three years of economic embargo and the suspension of IDA funding and has remained profitable and self-financing. However, there are questions about its present role and usefulness as a stand-alone financial institution. FDI's share in the overall lending of Haitian financial institutions is minor. In addition, FDI's portfolio has been declining since June 1998, when the credit component of this project closed. As of September 30, 1999, the FDI portfolio arnounted to G104 million (around US$6.5 million), and was down 27 percent from the previous financial year. The portfolio is also becoming increasingly concentrated on SOFIHDES. Only two other banks borrowed from FDI in the financial year of 1998-99, down from an earlier peak of eleven banks. Privatizing FDI and possibly merging it with SOFIHDES are solutions which should be explored further. The privatization transactions that already have been completed (flour and cement company) are considered success stories and are expected to be sustainable. In the case of public utilities, sustainability depends on Government's political will to proceed with sector reforms and the privatization transactions. While the technical work for the privatization of the three utilities in ports, airports and telecoms has been completed, Government action on proceeding with these transactions is seen to be unlikely in the short run. Delays of more than one year would probably necessitate that a considerable amount of the analysis need to be redone. CMEP is a competently staffed agency, which is still operating, and is available to provide support to Government in areas such as future privatization transactions, representing the State as the owner of a portion of the stock of privatized enterprises, assisting regulatory agencies in getting organized or monitoring implementation of management contracts and concessions. However, in the absence of donors' funding, there are questions about the willingness and the capacity of the Government to continue financing its operations. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: In the case of FDI, it is likely to continue to maintain itself for some time as it is relatively self-financing. However, as noted, its portfolio is on the decline. Over time, alternatives involving its privatization should be considered. The objective of improving the quality of infrastructure and the performance of public utilities remains as crucial as ever. Actual progress on the reform process, however, depends on Government's decision to resume privatization. Unfortunately, recent deterioration of the political environment in Haiti make significant progress in finalizing these reforms in short-to-medium term very unlikely. -14 - 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: Project identification was thorough and the staff provided a good analysis of past performance, trends and needs of the sector. The Staff Appraisal Report was of good quality, very detailed, with Project objectives, components and risks well identified. Demand for restructuring credit was reconfirmed through a survey of 62 enterprises. There was also a good description of the financial sector and of its failings (e.g. risk adverse behavior of banks). However, project design suffered from the key flaw, typical of many Projects designed at that time, in assuming that the availability of long term financing through a second tier institution could stimulate term financing by financial intermediaries, and that such financing would in turn stimulate private enterprise in a sustainable fashion. In the case of Haiti, not only were other institutional and policy constraints more important, but the basic pre-conditions of political and macroeconomic stability were also not met. With the benefit of hindsight, most IDA projects would now address the basic policy and institutional constraints to private sector development as an integral and key part of their operations. Instead, the Project design contained a number of very small TA activities that could not have resolved these important issues, and, at the same time, they complicated Project implementation. The restructuring of the Project in 1997, was based on the preparatory work of a Second Technical Assistance Project, which was approved by the Board in September 1996 but never made effective. The activities of the privatization component were well designed, in close cooperation between CMEP, IDA and other donors. What was not clearly identified was the expected outcome of the Project and performance indicators. Given the fragility of Haiti's political stability, the component design should perhaps have been conceptualized more in terms of improving sector performance in the infrastructure sectors, with privatization included as one of the altemative strategies, especially considering that much of the sector reform and privatization activities supported by the Project required Parliamentary approval, and the political situation in Haiti made this a very difficult prospect. The restructuring should have acknowledged the significant risks involved with a more explicit set of indicators and alternatives in case the Government's commitment to sector reform and the privatization was abandoned or the passage of respective sector reform laws became virtually impossible in the prevailing political situation. Therefore IDA performance during lending must be rated marginally Unsatisfactory. 7.2 Supervision: Supervision of the Project is rated marginally Satisfactory. IDA supervision persisted despite very difficult country circumstances, frequent changes in Government, and the economic embargo. During several periods, mission travel was precluded due to security issues and much of the work was undertaken through a resident consultant. After 1995, as the embargo was lifted, IDA restructured the Project twice. The purpose of the second restructuring (1997) was to accommodate a whole new set of activities for which a separate Project was fully prepared and approved by IDA's Board but could not be passed by the Parliament in the country. After this restructuring, supervision was intensive. IDA supervision missions were frequent and IDA provided in-house expertise in several areas, such as telecommunications, water, ports and airport management and privatization. -15- Nevertheless, supervision could have benefited from greater continuity of task managers on IDA's part. Eight different Task Managers managed the Project over its long implementation period. The frequent changes of the task managers, particularly in the first years of the Project, had some negative effect on the Projecfts continuity, commitment and communication with the implementing agencies. While it is not the intention to minimize the problems that could have emerged due to frequent changes in task managers, such changes were also partly due to the disruption of the Project implementation by the embargo and several periods of political instability that resulted in periods of relative inactivity of the Project, during which the Project passed along to different task managers. Finally, supervision and IDA management was particularly deficient in maintaining a good record of project developments. The ICR team was not able to locate a consistent set of supervision reports and other project documents for the preparation of this ICR. Again, this was likely due to several changes in task managers and the reorganization of country departments responsible for Haiti. 7.3 Overall Bankperformance: The Bank performance varied over the life of the Project, from marginally Unsatisfactory during lending to Satisfactory during the last two years of the Project. The overall management is rated marginally Satisfactory. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: So much time has elapsed since preparation of the Project that the ICR team was not able to assess the Borrower's initial contribution to Project preparation. However, at the time of the restructuring of the Project in 1997, the CMEP worked in close relation with the Bank to design its strategy and work program and its performance was satisfactory. 7.5 Government implementation performance: Government implementation performance was one of the major weaknesses of the Project, particularly in the case of the privatization and regulatory reform component. Over time, Government commitment to the Project has been lukewarm and shifting and once the technical work was completed, the Government finally balked at taking the decision to go ahead when privatization dossiers were ready to be taken to the market. In the case of the credit line, the Government was not able to create conditions that would be conducive to investment, restructuring and long-term financing, thus reducing the potential development impact of FDI's activities. 7.6 Implementing Agency: As mentioned earlier, FDI did a diligent job in a deteriorating business environment and a substantial part of the credit line was eventually disbursed. FDI, however, may have been too timid in marketing its credit line. CMEP has also been a good performer and is now widely recognized as a well run agency, which has introduced rather novel standards of transparency and professionalism in Haiti's public service. It did conclude two significant privatization deals and prepared three other transactions to the point of being ready to go to the market. In the absence of Government commitment, it could not have achieved more in this area. -16- 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: Despite certain achievements that were registered in both the credit and privatization components, the Project eventually failed, mainly because of the lack of a sustained commitment of the Government to privatization. This is the main rationale behind rating the Borrower's performance as Unsatisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned On the Line of Credit and TA Components * For sustainable development impact, more attention should be paid to fixing the business environment in parallel with offering a line of credit. This may require reforming the financial sector, improving the legal and judicial framework, in particular dispute resolution mechanisms and collateral system and developing modem standards of financial accounting and reporting. A credit line could potentially offer leverage to get policy reforms in these areas, and such leverage could have been used more effectively. * In the absence of a good policy dialogue, specific policy reform benchmarks and government commitment, small TA components with no clear benchmarks and links with other lending activities are unlikely to be effective. * For the success of a line of credit operation, interested financial intermediaries should be identified early on and involved in the design (-sets of incentive; delivery mechanism; pricing; etc.) of the credit line. Additionally, demand for the credit should be reassessed periodically, to assess continued relevance of the credit line. This is particularly true of projects with a long implementation period. * Provision of technical assistance (e.g. training for loan officers; consulting services for enterprises) should ensure an effective synergy between the credit and any attached TA component. On the Sector Reform and Privatization Component * Projects developed in countries with unstable political environment (particularly in the post-conflict countries) should be more explicit in their design and appraisal on the associated risks. In particular, they should include benchmarks indicators of progress and appropriate alternatives and exit strategies under different assumptions of the political environment. In this Project, the component on infrastructure sector reform followed a fairly singular strategy of privatization and legal and regulatory reform similar to that applied in other countries, even though many of the reforms it supported required Parliamentary approval of laws, which had become virtually impossible. In such a situation, the Project could also have experimented with some community based infrastructure programs, the implementation of which would not have required Parliamentary approval. * More importantly, and perhaps as a lesson of broader application, the Project highlights the need to engage Government in a dialogue from the point of view of needs in a particular sector based on the pros and cons of different policy options rather than from the viewpoint of privatization per se. Privatization should be seen as one of the means to an end, and project outcomes should be defined more in terms of final benefits, such as percentage of population with access to the infrastructure -17- service, and similar quality and cost indicators rather than privatization per se. A more explicit articulation of project objectives as sector outcomes may have facilitated re-examination of strategy in the reform of the infrastructure sectors sooner. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: Comments on the ICR draft were received from FDI and CMEP and incorporated in the final ICR. Borrowers' contributions were also received from FDI and CMEP and are attached. (1) Cofinanciers: USAID contribution was received and is attached. (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): Not applicable -18 - 10. Additional Information IDA contribution to FDI credit line prolects By year Value Number of projects thousands USS % ° 1990 1,763 22 6 10 1991 31 0 1 2 1992 0 0 0 1993 0 0 0 1994 0 0 0 1995 754 10 14 23 1996 2,267 29 19 31 1997 3,116 39 22 34 1998 0 0 0 0 124 microenterprises are considered as one project By sector Value Number of projects thousands US$ % Agriculturelfood 2,584 34 18 30 Artisan 88 1 1 2 Assembly 521 7 5 8 Chemical 412 5 4 7 Construction materials 1,513 20 14 23 Fishing 45 1 1 2 Metal 523 7 2 3 Services 1,381 18 10 16 Tourism 147 2 1 2 Other 334 4 5 8 Excluding microenterprises -19 - By financial intermediary Value Number of projects thousands US$ % % SOFIHDES 2,916 37 27 44 Bank of Boston 2,302 29 15 25 Banque de l'Union Haitienne 867 11 6 10 Citibank 74 1 2 3 Promobank 1,488 19 9 15 Sogebank 223 3 2 3 Direct Intervention 61 1 1 2 124 microenterprses are considered as one project By enterprse size Value Number of projects thousands US$ % % Large enterprises 3,917 49 21 11 Medium-sized enterprises 2,852 36 26 14 Small enterpnses 773 10 14 8 Microenterprises 393 5 124 67 -20 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: N N/A N/A Output Indicators: N/A WNA N/A End of project No performance indicators were identified in SAR -21 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Com onent in US$ million e uivalent) !CREDIT COMPONENT____ Total cost of operations to be discounted 23.20 45.20 195 Technical assistance 1.40 0.84 60 PRIVATIZATION TA COMPONENT (added in 0.00 6.66 JDecemberl 997) Total Baseline Cost 24.60 52.70 Total Project Costs 24.60 52.70 Total Financing Required 24.60 52.70 _ Project Costs by Procurement Arrangaements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) ,1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000.00 l________________________ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) '52. Goods 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 1.40 0.00 1.40 (0.00) (0.00) (1.40) (0.00) (1.40) J4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 11.10 0.00 11.10 jCredit line -restructuring (0.00) (0.00) (4.80) (0.00) (4.80) lenterprises 5 Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 12.10 0.00 12.10 1,Credit line -non (0.00) (0.00) (5.20) (0.00) (5.20). irestructuring enterprises 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ___ ___________________ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 0.00 0.00 24.60 0.00 24.60 (0.00) (0.00) (11.40) (0.00) (11.40) -22 - Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (ActuaULatest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 2. Goods 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 5.20 0.00 5.20 (0.00) (0.00) (2.00) (0.00) (2.00) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 6.50 0.00 6.50 Credit line -restructuring (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (1.00) enterprises 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 38.70 0.00 38.70 Credit line -non (0.00) (0.00) (6.60) (0.00) (6.60) restructuring enterprises _ 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 2.30 0.00 2.30 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 0.00 0.00 52.70 0.00 52.70 (0.00) (0.00) (9.60) (0.00) (9.60) "Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies. 2 Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units. Project Financin b Com ponent in US$ million equivalent) CREDIT COMPONENT CREDIT LINE 10.00 5.30 7.90 7.60 4.30 33.30 76.0 81.1 421.5 of which restructuring 4.80 1.00 20.8 enterprises of which non restructuring 5.20 6.60 126.9 enterprises TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TA to FDI and financial 0.80 0.84 105.0 intermediaries TA to BRH 0.10 0.00 0.0 Customs 0.35 0.00 0.0 adiministration TA to Ministry of 0.15 0.00 0.0 Economy and Finance PRIVATIZATION TA 1.16 2.70 2.80 COMPONENT (added in December 1997) -23 - Annex 3: Economic Costs and Benefits Not applicable -24 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g 2 Economists, 1 EMS, etc.) Implementation Development MonthYear Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 2/15-21/1987 4 1 Operations Officer, I Economist, 2 Consultants 9/14-18/1987 1 1 Operations Officer 11/16-28/1987 4 1 Operations Officer, 1 Economist, 2 consultants 5/23-28/1988 4 1 Operations Officer, I Economist, 2 Consultants Appraisal/Negotiation 4/16-22/1989 4 1 Operations Officer, I Economist, 2 Consultants Supervision 10/25-11/02/1990 1 1 Financial Analyst S S March/1991 I I Disbursement Analyst S S Embargo: October 91-December 94 February/1995 Information not available U S May/1995 2 1 Task Manager, I Consultant U S 02/20-26/1996 2 1 Financial Sector Specialist, I S S Consultant 01/26-02/01/1997 2 1 Financial Sector Specialist, I S S Consultant 03/31-04/05/1997 2 1 Task manager, I Consultant U U November/1997 2 1 Task Manager, 1 Economist U U 05/11-15/1998 4 1 Airport Specialist, I Sea Port U U Specialist, I Consultant -Port Sector Regulatory Specialist, I Task Manager September/1998 Information not available S S March/1999 2 1 Task Manager, I Private S S Sector Development Specialist 05/10-12/1999 3 1 Task Manager, 2 Private S S Sector Development Specialists 06/28-30/1999 1 1 Task Manager S S ICR 04/24-05/04/ 2000 2 1 Task Manager, 1 Consultant -25 - (b) Staff Stage ofPject Cycle Actual/L;testEstimate No. Staff weeks ~~ ~~~US$ (,OO) Identification/Preparation 75.7 157.4 Appraisal/Negotiation 7.9 18.0 Supervision 149.9 417.6 ICR 15.5 38.9 TotCl 249.0 631.9 -26 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Ncgligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating L Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NA N Sector Policies O H OSUOM * N O NA D Physical O H OSUOM O N * NA F Financial O H OSUOM * N O NA F Institutional Development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA 3 Environmental O H OSUOM O N * NA Social L Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N * NA Fli Gender O H OSUOM O N * NA O Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA X Private sector development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA O Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA DOther (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA -27 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bankperformance Rating N Lending OHS OS *U OHU 2 Supervision OHS OS Ou OHU F Overall OHS OS 0 u O HU 6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating • Preparation OHS OS OU OHU • Government implementation performance O HS O S O U 0 HU • Implementation agency performance O HS O S O u HU N Overall OHS OS * u O HU -28 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents Attached: List of major studies and reports completed under the Privatization TA component. -29 - SOMMAIRE DES ETUDES ET RAPPORTS PRODUITS DOSSIER I CONSULTANT ETUDES ET RAPPORTS PRODUITS * Rapport final de phase I: preparation des actifs du port (version interm6diaire sept. 98 et 'ersion finale o;iobre 98 : M* Memorandumii dInformation (version pre[imninaire et finale mars 2000) * Avis de prequalification (versioni finale -mars 220TIhO Contrat de gestion (finale) * Liste des soumissionnlaires poteitiels (p-oxvisoire) ,* Istructions pour la prequaliicaiion des sou -nssionnair s U' .= ' (version finale -inars 2000) | j W < * TIermes de Reference a lintention des souLInissionnaires (version finale -mars 2000') * Plan de preparation et d'Zx&ution de la inansa,t U Or. (etudes sur ledotraissage desefiectifs -Plaia d'anilioration du port -Restructuration dc I AP IUif l PORT 1999) * Progranirie informatise de licencielenllt dcs Cti. -li1s (JUIr ' 9n =CQ * Rapport final (pr6Iimiiiairc) aoit 1999 * Rapport final -septembre 1999 * Rapports sur les elements essentiels a I elahlissement d'ui ! j Tn 5' contrat de Tiestiolo suin 1999) * Rapport introductif au projet de koi sur le seeleur Portuail-e (decernbre 1999) * cj cF * Rapport sur I-ellsemble des tache., des Ternics Lie ..- : ~ Reference (fevrier 1999) -E t X > .* Projet de l,,I portant reforme du secteur des port; et dei ia t i _ Cj Tiz '. lnaviLation. et crtant une autorite de re'gulatioio pOr-LrtTair-. ji30e199% -30- SOMMAIRE DES ETUDES ET RAPPORTS PRODUITS (suite) DOSSIER CONSULTANT 'ETUDES ET RAPPORTS PRODUITS F ^ , * Due diligence ldgale (14-01-99' !~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~i ! *l,iste des iivestissetirs (14-01- 99 * Comparaison internalionale (14-01-99) * Evaiuation &onomique. techniique et financiere 14-01-99) | Diagnostic des ressources humaines et plan de domina(eineent (14-01-99) * Plan d'actionnariat des salaries (14-01-99) II Projet de synthese du rapport de diagnostic et de stratIie sur la capitalisation de la Teleco (14-01-99) * Audience-cible et plan de communication (05-0(3-99) F ' ; 'a @Liste des documents ndeessaiies a la Daia Room( 12-03-99) :C , * Document de questions -reponses( 12-03-99) a Retraitement des informations financiers (1 '-03-9() T TELECO ' ; =: , * Rapport sur le programne d'investissemeint de la 'Telec-o (05- 04-99) C -@ E * Rapport de valorisation de la TELECO (08-04-99) , , nemorandLni d'infornation preliminaire I 15-07-99) Memorandum d'information(\x-05-99) a Rapport de strategie de moderiiisationi 105-07-'9) * Projet de contrat de capitalisation et d'acquisition d'actions des Telecommunications d'Haiti (16-08-99) * Projet de contrat d'autorisation relatift' la moderiiisation des Telecommunicationis d'Ha-ti (I 6-08-99) ! Avis d'appel d'offres international pour la selection d'uii investisseur strategique (21-08-99) .I * Convention enire les actionnaires pour I[Adminiistration et 1'exploitation des Tdlecommunicatioiis d'iliti SENM i3 1-08- 99) * Convention d'etablissemenit de la Societe d'economie mixte TELECO SEM (06-08-99) J31 -31- SOMMAIRE DES ETUDES E IRAPPORTS PRODUITS (suite) DOSSIER iCONSULTANT .ETUDES ET RAPPORTS PRODUITS I Rapport de situation. (22/12'98) Ver.fin.: 19/03/99. * Plan de r enforcement de I'autorite de regulation du secteur (25/0 199) Ver.fin.: 19,/03199, * Resume executif premiere phase (I 9-04-99) Projet de loi pooiant reforme dii secteur des telecoms. .(10/5/99) Ver.fin.: 10/09/99. Projet de loi portant organisation et fonctionnement de i lautorite de regulation (1 0/09I'99) Ver.fin.: 1 5/0 IU.. i Projet de texte portant creation dune Comimission nationiaie aux nouvellesteclinologies. (10/09199) Ver.fin.: 15/]O]! 0. F* Fourniture du service universel .(10/09/99) Ver.fin.: 1 5/01/00. I-.; j * Modalites d'toinologation des equipements term ilaux. (10/09/99) Ver.fin.: 15/01/00. * Modalites de gestion des frequences .(1I0/091)99) Ver.fin.:15/O1 /00. Plain de numerotation et ainuaire. (10/09/991 Ver.f in.: 15/01/00. 5 liilercoiiiexicniiet liaisons loLUees. (I 0/09/99 TELECO Ver.fin.:15/01/00. * Tarification des services de tWI&ommmuications. (23/07/99) Ver-fin.: 15/01 /00. * Modalites de financement de lautorite de regulation .(10/09/99) Ver.fin.: 15!/01 /00. * Arbitrage entre consommateurs et operaleurs (2'J1 2/98) Ver.fin.: 19/U03/99. * Modalite d'octroi. de r6glemilentation et de contr6le des autorisations, permis et declaration. (04/10/991 Ver.fin.: 15/01/00. * Presentation des Standards de cahiers des Clharges. Ver.fin.: 1 5/01/ 0. * Accord d'interconnexion standard. Ver.fin.: 1 01)00 * Cahiier des Char,-es. Statuts revises et autorisation de la |ELECO) Ver.fin.: 15/01/00. -32- SOMMAIRE DES ETUJDES ET RAPPORTS PRODUITS (suite) DOSSIER iCONSULTANT 'ETUDES ET RAPPORTS PRODUITS ' *4 Z 1' * ~~~a rrojection de trafic I . .n s , * ~~~~~~~~Plan d affaires I , ;' 'S i *~~~~~~~ Planid'investissenient i i _ * Memorandum d'lnformation * Draft du Document d'Appel d Offres | Analvse juridique des lois gouvemant lAviation C ivile a * Analyse des titres de propriete des terrains appartenant a !'Autorite Acroponuaire Nationiale * Analyse juridique des contrats de concession de I'AN.F\kN avec des particuiliers I AEROPORT n j * Analyse du 1D6cret gouvernant la structure des prix potiu les | e c , services aeroportuaires et son impact stir levolution de la I -@ 3 reglementation economique c) , * Proposition d'un draft de contrat de gestion a court etvou a O . Iong terme * Rapport sur le cadre institutionnel (AANN & OFNAC) * Rapport sur le Code de l Aviation Civile * Audit de l'infrastructure existanteen imati6re de navigation aerienlle __ a | *Rapport sur les nonnes et procedures techniqucs * Politique de fa-Luration aeronautique * Politique de facturation de la navigationi a6rielilne * Procedures operationielles pour l'valuation des taux et fiais R * apport sur les normnes de perfornance op4rationrrelles = * zi ! .Normes de performance Definition et applicalion des sanctions -Fornationtechlique -33- ANNEX 8 Borrowers contribution: 8A: CMEP contribution 8B: FDI contribution -34- ANNEX 8A CREDIT 2071-HA COMPOSANTE B2-B3-B4 (CMEP) CONTRIBUTION DE L'EMPRUNTEUR AU RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DU CREDIT OBJECTIF DE LA CO-MPOSANTE DU CREDIT RELATIVE AU CMEP L'objectif de la composante privatisation des Entreprises Publiques du Credit 2071 -HA est tout a fait compatible avec les objectifs vis6s dans la loi du 26 septembre 1996 sur la Modernisation des Entreprises Publiques Haitiennes. Cette composante visait a: * inclure une provision d'Assistance Technique, a travers le CMEP, en appui au processus de modernisation des Entreprises Publiques; * developper et executer une campagne de sensibilisation des differentes couches de la population au programme de modernisation des Entreprises Publiques; -assister le Gouvernement dans la preparation des modifications et mises a jour du cadre 1lgal et reglementaire indispensable a l'intrusion du secteur prive dans les secteurs consideres strategiques jusqu'a present. Dans ce contexte, un certain nombre d'activites ont e entreprises allant du diagnostic de l'ensemble des entreprises faisant objet de la modernisation jusqu'au recrutement des Banques d'Affaires; firmes specialisees pour assister le CMEP dans rex6cution du processus de modernisation. Ce programme touchait les neuf principales entreprises publiques haitiennes evoluant dans tous les secteurs de la vie 6conomique du pays: du secteur industriel (cimenterie et minoterie) aux secteurs des services (Electricite, Telephone, Eau Potable, Banques etc...) en passant par les secteurs d'infrastructures de services publiques tels: Port et Mroport. De tous ces projets seuls ceux du secteur industriel ont abouti avec la signature de deux accords de capitalisation avec des consortiums multinationaux associes a des partenaires haitiens. Les autres projets se sont r6duits a la preparation des documents de diagnostic, d'appel d'offres et de projet de reforme de cadre 1lgal pour les differents secteurs. -35- Globalement, les resultats obtenus jusqu'ici peuvent etre qualifies de negligeables si l'on se donne uniquement pour but la privatisation de ces entreprises. Par contre, si l'on considere 1'ensemble des travaux realises dans chaque secteur, on peut arguer que les r6sultats sont significatifs puisque ces travaux permettront de lancer l'semble des transactions sur le marche lorsque les conditions favorables seront realisees. Il est evident egalement que les travaux preparatoires A la modernisation des secteurs economiques, s'ils sont pris en consideration, soumis au parlement et votes, contribueront a creer les conditions objectives pour la participation des operateurs prives dans la vie economique du pays. Du meme coup, ils faciliteront l'arrive de capitaux etrangers tant necessaires dans l'economie nationale. Cette composante du Credit a ete d'une grande utilite puisqu'elle a permis au CMEP de finaliser un certain nombre de travaux qui permettra au Gouvernement Haitien de lancer veritablement le processus lorsque le moment sera favorable. CONCEPTION DE LA COMPOSANTE CMEP DU CREDIT 2071-HA Les composantes B2 -B3 -B4 du Credit 2071-HA etaient concues de maniere A: 3 Renforcer les capacites techniques et institutionnelles du CMEP a conduire le processus de modemisation des entreprises publiques; 3 Effectuer les travaux preparatoires A la participation du secteur prive dans la gestion des entreprises publiques; * Preparer la reforme des cadres 1lgaux et reglementaires des differents secteurs concernes par le programme de modemisation des entreprises publiques. Elles ont permis au CMEP, pendant pres d'une annee, de disposer des moyens pour engager des specialistes locaux, entreprendre un projet d'evaluation des entreprises publiques et para-publiques non encore considerees pour etre modernisees, lancer un projet de preparation de documentaires sur les neuf (9) entreprises publiques afin d'informer et de sensibiliser le public en general sur la situation des entreprises a moderniser et sur la n6cessite du programme de modemisation des entreprises publiques, d'engager les meilleurs Banques d'Affaires et Consultants Internationaux pour conduire les transactions et la modemisation des differents cadres legaux. -36- IMPLEMENTATION ET EXPERIENCE Le programme a ete execute suivant la methodologie suivante: I.- Mise en Place i) Definition des strategies de mise en place du programme, en consultation avec la Banque Mondiale et les autres partenaires; ii) Mise en place d'une structure technique et administrative iii) Mise en place de Comite ad hoc, pour chaque entreprise publique a moderniser, forme de quatre (4) responsables de 1'entreprise et du responsable sectoriel charge du dossier au CMEP. iv) Recrutement des Banques d'Affaires et Consultants Internationaux par appels d'offres intemationaux. UI.- Execution i) Diagnostic de chaque entreprise et etudes de reforme de cadre legal ii) Choix de la modalite de modernisation iii) Evaluation et valorisation des Entreprises Publiques a moderniser. iv) Lancement des appels d'offres de maniere transparente et competitive. HI.- Adjudication et Signature de Contrat LECONS APPRISES Sur le plan des transactions, il n'y a pas eu beaucoup de resultats. Par contre aui point de vue de preparation pour un bon programme de privatisation, les resultats sont appreciables. Cependant certaines lecons meritent d'etre retenues qui pourraient ameliorer la performance de I'agence d'execution. * Savoir profiter du mementum politique * Le temps mis par la Banque Mondiale et les autres bailleurs a observer et a reconnaitre la credibilite de l'agence d'execution a eu pour effet de retarder le decaissement des fonds necessaires a 1'execution du programme; -37- * Les ressources necessaires a l'ex6cution du programme doivent etre disponibles avant le lancement dudit programme; * Trouver par tous les moyens une participation active de tous les secteurs et responsables d'institutions impliquees dans le processus. PERFORMANCE DE LA BANOUE ET DES AGENCES DE CO-FINANCEMENT La performance de la Banque Mondiale peut etre consider6e comme appreciable puisqu'elle avait mobilise des ressources considerables en terme d'Assistance technique et des ressources financieres tout au long du processus. Toutefois, on peut simplement noter que si les ressources financieres avaient ete mobilisees plus t6t, et que sa comprehension de la volonte de I'agence d'execution a executer proprement les activites du programme etait faite plut6t, ceci aurait permis, bien sfire, au cours de la 1 ere annee de realiser plus de deux transactions. A c6te, il faut reconnaitre l'apport non moins consid6rable de la USAID, de 1'ACDI, de la BID particulierement dans les secteurs de l'Electricite et de I'Eau Potable. Toutefois, une des le,ons retenues est que certains sectorialistes de ces institutions confondent les objectifs d'un programme de privatisation avec ceux d'un projet d'etudes de travaux d'infrastructures au point d'exiger que le Conseiller ou Banque d'Affaires 6tudie dans les moindres details tous les aspects techniques et proposent 1'ensemble des demarches que l'operateur prive doit prendre en consideration pour developper l'Entreprise. Ceci retarde le processus et temoigne qu t ils ignorent que l'operateur. prive est mfi par des consid6rations beaucoup plus pratiques et disposent d'expertise beaucoup plus pointue pour apprecier l'entreprise et son environnement. -38- FONDS DE DEVELOPPEMENT INDUSTRIEL (F.D.I.) CREDIT 2071-HA -RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DE PROJET Resume des conclusions Les rdsultats obtenus et les principales conclusions du rapport sont r6sumrs comme ci- dessous. => Grdce aux ressources du deuxieme (2e) credit de l'IDA (2071 HA) le FDI a octroye 220 millions de gourdes de prets et 36.1 millions de gourdes de garantie a travers huit (8) intermediaires financiers et en faveur de 218 entreprises dont 124 micro, 22 petites, 45 moyennes et 27 grandes. -. Toutefois une certaine concentration est remarquee au niveau des operations par exemple: 84% des operations de credit du FDI sont realises a travers trois (3) intermediaires financiers; 50% des projets finance's a partir des ressources du "Second Credit " (les micro-projets sont exclus) sont des projets d'expansion qui accaparent 50% du montant du credit alloue par le FDI; trois (3)sous-secteurs partagent 60% de la production cumulative du FDI (industrie de la construction, industrie alimentaire, services). Au niveau Assistance Technique, le FDI a fait des interventions remarquables dans les domaines des infrastructures, de la promotion de I'agro-industrie. Par ailleurs le FDI a utilise une bonne partie des ressources de I'assistance technique dans le renforcement de sa capacite institutionelle. => L'analyse du degre de reussite du projet se mesure selon trois (3) approches: 1) Les retombees socio-economiques 2) Le taux d'utilisation des ressources 3) La continuite operationnelle Sur le plan des retombees socio-economiques, le deuxieme credit de l'IDA (2071 HA) a dtt un succes, en raison du nombre de nouveaux emplois durables cree's, de la somme des valeurs ajoutees ge'nerees, de son impact sur les devises, sur la creation des revenus dans des milieux defavorises, de la positivitei de son impact sur l1environnement a travers la valorisation de certaines matieres premieres locales (grain de bayahonde, sable de riviere) et la modernisation des unites de transformation de la canne a sucre qui ne devraient plus utiliser le bois comme source d 'energie. 39 L 'analyse des resultats selon l'approche du taux d'utifisation des ressources indique le succes du programme egalement, puisque les conditions difficiles dans lesquelles le FDI opeirait et la priorite qu'elle donnait a la qualite' au detriment de la quantite' ne l'ont pas empehe d'atteindre un taux d'utilisation global des ressources de pres de 80% pour la composante "Cre'dit" (soit 7.9 millions de dollars amiricains sur un total de 10.0 millions initialement prevus) et de 60% pour la composante "Assistance Technique" Ainsi, le faible taux d'utilisation des ressources de la sous-composante "Credit aux entreprises restructurees" (20Yo) n'a pas affecte grandement le taux d'utilisation global des ressources, puisqu'une bonne partie des fonds non utilises pour cette sous-composante a ett utilisee dans les operations regulieres de prets du FDI En ce qui concerne la capacite du FDI a assurer la continuite de ses operations d la fin de l'assistance technique etfInanciere de l'IDA, l'on peut considerer egalement le credit 2071 HA comme un succes. Le FDI est dote 1) d'une capacite institutionnelle qui en fait une reference en matiere d'jvaluation et de suivi de projets industriels; 2) d'une surface financiere nde de sa capacite de preservation patrimoniale grace a son pouvoir de generation d'excedents operationnels, qui lui permet de se passer des ressources externes; 3) d'une capacite d'attraction d'autres ressources externes, en cas de besoin et de diversification de ses ressources grace a la credibilite dont ilfaitjouit aupres des bailleurs de fonds internationaux autre que l'IDA et des autres institutions de l'Etat. => Ce succes du projet obtenu dans des conditions tres difficiles est a mettre a l'actif de tous les intervenants, notamment: -Le FDI qui a eu le courage de prioriser la qualite au d6triment du volume de prets ddcaisses, meme si ce dernier semblait etre le critere d'evaluation de sa performance par l'IDA. Il est a noter le FDI etait en mesure d'utiliser l'integralite des ressources de l'IDA dans des projets ne presentant aucun risque de credit. Cependant les beinefices socio-economiques de ces projets n 'etaientpas evidents pour la Direction du FDI. * l'IDA qui n'a jamais marchande son appui au FDI a travers les differentes missions de suivi et de contr6le operationnel du projet. la BRH qui n 'a jamais hesit'i a intervenir quand le besoin se fait sentir et qui s'est beaucoup efforc6e ces derniers temps pour assainir le paysage financier haitien, cr6ant ainsi un environnement favorable aux activites du FDI. * les intermediaires financiers, dont bon nombre d'entre eux, ont change leur philosophie et politique de credit en commen,ant a considerer les PME et les micro-entreprises comme des elements de leur strategie. 40 = Quatre lecons sont a tirer de cette deuxieme experience du credit industriel de l 'IDA en Haiti. 1) En matiare de credit industriel, les banques commerciales sont plus interessees a se prdmunir contre le risque de taux et de liquidite que contre le risque de d'insolvabilite du debiteur. 2) Les banques commerciales sont tres sensibles aux delais de re4ponse d'un partenaire. En consequence les procedes de decaissement de I'IDA sont loin d'etre adaptes aux existences des partenaires du FDI. 3) L'amendement d'un accord de cr'dit suite a l'arrit des operations pour cas de force majeure, doit aller au-dela d'une simple prolongation mecanique des delais. 4) Les institutions financieres publiques de developpement ne sont pas vouies a l 'echec. Le FDI (institution publique ) est I 'une des institutions financieres les mieux gerees du pays et les plus solides financierement. La qualite des ressources humaines et le mode operatoire sont les principaux determinants du succes d'une institution qu'elle soit privee ou publique. 41 Credit 2071-HA -Rapport d'ach&vement deprojet FONDS DE DEVELOPPEMENT INDUSTRIEL (F.D.I.) CREDIT 2071-HA -RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DE PROJET FDI -Mai 2000 42 Crddit 2071-HA -Rapport d 'ach vement de projet TABLE DES MATIERES INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 46 PRESENTATION DES PRINCIPAUX RtSULTATS OBTENUS ....................................................... 51 LA COMPOSANTE "CREDIT" ........................................................; 5 1 LA COMPOSANTE "ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE" ....................................................... 3 ANALYSE DES PERFORMANCES DES PRINCIPAUX INTERVENANTS ..................................... 54 LES PERFORMANCES DU FDI ....................................................... 54 Le taux d'utilisation des ressources ...................................................... 54 Le "Cr6dit aux entreprises restructur6es .............................................................. 54 Le "Credit a des entreprises non restructur6es" .............................................................. 55 La composante Assistance Technique .............................................................. 57 Le taux global d'utilisation ...................................................... 57 Performance financire ....................................................... 59 Qualite du portefeuille ............................................................... 59 L'autosuffisance operationnelle .............................................................. 60 Situation financiere du FDI .............................................................. 61 LES PERFORMANCES DE L'IDA ....................................................... 62 La forte rotation du personnel de l'IDA affecte au Credit 2071 HA .................................................... 62 Pertes tropfrequentes de dossiers ...................................................... 62 LES PERFORMANCES DE LA BRH ....................................................... 62 ANALYSE DES PRINCIPALES RETOMBEES DU CREDIT ....................................................... 63 IMPACT FINANCIER ....................................................... 63 Renforcement de l'autonomiefinanciare du FDI ........................................................ 63 Amdlioration de laprofitabilite du systeme bancaire ...................................................... 63 Amelioration du ratio de solvabilite des banques ...................................................... 64 IMPACT SOCIO-tCONOMIQUE .................. : 64 Injections importantes de capitaux dans le secteur industriel ....................................... 65 Cration d'emplois ........................................ 65 Promotion des PME et des Micro-Entreprises ....................................... 66 Valorisation des matieres premieres locales ....................................... 66 Debut de deconcentration des activitis economiques ........................................ 67 Gen6ration de devises ........................................ 67 FDI -Mai 2000 43 Cre'dit 20 71-HA -Rapport d'ach vement de projet IMPACTM INSTITUTIONNACT............................N....................................T................................................ 68....... 66 L'ANALYSE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT DE FONCTIONNEMENT DU PROJET .69 LES FACTEURS DEFAVORABLES .69 LES tLtMENTS FAVORABLES DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT .70 CONCLUSIONS ET RECOMMANDATIONS FINALES .71 FDI -Mai 2000 44 CrddI 2071-HA -Rapport d'achNvement deprojet LISTE DES TABLEAUX Tableau No Contenu 1.1 Couits et sources de financement du PR I 1.2 Plan de fmancment des projets a etre finances dans le cadre du Cridit IDA 2071 hA 1-3 Ventilation des ressources IDA (Credit 2071 HA) 2-1 Ventilation selon plusieurs criteres des operations de prets du FDI 2-2 Taux d'utilisation de la sous-composante A-1 (credit aux entreprises restructurees) 2-3 Taux d'utilisation de la sous-composante A-2 (credit aux entreprises non restructurees) 2-4 Taux d'utilisation de la sous-composante A-2 reajust6e 2-5 Analyse du taux d'utilisation de la composante "Assistance Technique" (B) 2-6 Analyse du taux d'utilisation globale des ressources du credit 2071 HA 2-7 Evolution de la qualite du portefeuille du FDI (risque-bancaire) 2-8 Evolution de la qualite du portefeuille de garantie du FDI (risque- entreprises) 2-9 Evolution des resultats d'exploitation du FDI (1991 -1999) 2-10 Evolution de la structure financiere du FDI 3-1 Evolution de la marge d'interet et du PNB de l'ensemble du systeme bancaire haitien et impact du credit 2071 HA 3-2 Origine des ressources utilisees dans l'industrie haitienne sous l'impulsion du credit 2071 HA 3-3 Ratio cofit/emplois par intervenant 3-4 Ventilation des projets fmances selon la destination des produits finis. FDI -Mai 2000 4S CrddU 2071-HA -Rapport d'ach&vement deprojet Introduction Durant les premiers mois de l'annee 1986, juste apres le depart des Duvalier, le gouvernement militaire preside par le General Namphy, a decide de lib6raliser l'6conomie. Les premieres mesures de liberalisations ont ete: * La publication en date du 23 juin 1986 d'un decret faisant passer de 111 A 35 le nombre de produits contingentes. * La publication au journal officiel (le moniteur du 10 juillet 1986) d'un decret portant modification A la baisse du tarif douanier. * Le choix de facto d'une structure tarifaire nominale comprise entre 20% et 40% ad valorem et l'abandon de la taxation specifique. Cet abaissement substantiel de barrieres tarifaires, l'e1imination progressive des restrictions quantitatives et surtout la contrebande favorisee par la reouverture des ports provinciaux, n'ont pas manque d'affecter n6gativement la situation des entreprises haitiennes orientees principalement vers des produits de substitution A l'importation et habitu6es A un systeme de protection A outrance instaur6 par l'ancien regime. Ces mesures ont souleve les protestations d'industriels haitiens et de certains analystes qui les ont trouvees penalisantes pour I'activite industrielle haltienne. Le gouvernement haYtien a alors decide de mener une etude visant A analyser la coherence de ces premieres mesures de liberalisation et leur impact sur les entreprises haYtiennes. Cette etude a e menee par une firme fran9aise SEMA METRA CONSEIL et a abouti A la conclusion que les nouvelles mesures douanieres etaient penalisantes pour bon nombre de sous- secteurs de l'industrie nationale, en raison du caractere discriminatoire du tarif en faveur des produits finis import6s et au detriment des intrants. En effet, le taux de douane sur certains articles entrant dans la fabrication locale de bon nombre de produits finis, pouvait reprdsenter 1.5 A 2 fois celui sur les produits finis concurrents importes, negativisant ainsi le taux de protection effective. Cependant, les consultants avaient fait remarquer que le nouveau tarif n'etait pas le seul, ni le principal obstacle A la competitivite de l'industrie haitienne et que les explications A cet etat de fait devraient etre surtout recherchees a travers des facteurs intemes A chaque entreprise. Ces conclusions de SEMA METRA ont ouvert la voie a un programme plus cible, baptise dans un premier temps: Programme d'Amelioration de la Competivite de l'Industrie Haitienne ( PAC) pour devenir plus tard: Programme de Restructuration Industrielle (PRI) Le PRI etait divise en deux (2) phases: La premiere phase consistait A faire le diagnostic general (inteme et externe) des entreprises industrielles haitiennes inscrites au programme afin d'identifer les contraintes qui les emp8chaient de travailler selon les standards intemationaux de competitivite. Le consultant avait aussi, dans cette phase, pour mandat d'identifier les entreprises qui devaient faire l'objet d'une etude en profondeur et elaborer les termes de reference de cette derniere. FDI- Mai 2000 46 Crddit 2071-HA -Rapport d'achivement deprojet La deuxieme phase consistait a etudier en profondeur les entreprises recommandees par les consultants de la premiere phase. II s'agisait d'entreprises tres affectees par les mesures de liberalisation et confrontees a des problemes intemes, mais ayant un fort potentiel de generation de profits dconomiques et financiers moyennant une restructuration importante. Le mandat des consultants de la deuxieme phase consistait a orienter de fa,on coherente la restructuration de ces entreprises, a evaluer les ressources materielles, humaines et financieres requises par cette restructuration et a analyser l'impact a court terme et a long terme de cette restructuration selon differentes approches operationnelles et differents scenarios de financement. Le Fonds de Developpement Industriel (FDI) a ete designe comme agence d'execution du PRI. A ce titre, le FDI devait recruter et selectionner les intervenants (les firmes de consultation), recevoir les inscriptions des entreprises desireuses de participer au programme, signer des accords avec les firmes de consultation et des entreprises participantes et selectionner les consultants locaux devant appuyer les intervenants dtrangers, assurer la coordination du programme et gdrer les ressources materielles et financieres affectees au programme. Le cofit global a dtd de 3.5 millions de dollars amdricains, ventilds et financds selon le tableau suivant: Tableat u 1.1 ( ou t csour'ceN (it^ finamuenetint (IU PRI Rubriques Sources de financement IDA FDI Binificiaires Total Diagnostic et activitd 1.2 - - 1.2 connexes Etudes en profondeur 1.7 0.3 0.2 2.2 Autres 0.1 - - 0.1 Total 3.0 0.3 0.2 3.5 Le financement de l'IDA a et6 octoye sous forme de credit au gouvernement haitien: le credit 1786-HA dont l'accord a etd signe le 20 mai 1987. La premiere phase du programme a dtd rdalisde par la firme fran,aise Sema Metra Conseil et les dtudes en profondeur par une autre firme francaise: Developement Finance Consultants. Sur les 75 entreprises attendues, 62 se sont inscrites a la phase I du programme (phase de diagnostic). Des soixante-deux-(62) entreprises ayant fait l'objet d'un diagnostic, vingt cinq (25) ont ete retenues pour une etude en profondeur dont huit (8) devaient, d'apres les reconmiandations des consultants, investir dans un projet de modernisation et/ou de renforcement de l'appareil productif. Les huit projets de restructuration et les autres projets hors-restructuration necessitaient une injection directe globale de capitaux prives de 23.2 millions de dollars americains et devaient etre finaneds selon le plan suivant: I~l~in (ICfi,iani~encnt des ro jetsu 1.2 Plan de fln.ancenment dles projets a etre financ& dains le cadre dlu credit )MA 24171- ll. FDI -Mai 2000 47 Crddit 2071-HA -Rapport d'ach&vement de projet Apports des Fonds externes Total fonds Grand interm&diaire externes total s financiers (En millions de dollars) IDA FDI Intermndiaires financiers Projets de restructu- 2.6 4.8 2.6 1.1 8.4 11.1 ration des 8 grandes entreprises Projets des entreprises 2.8 5.2 2.9 1.2 9.3 12.1 non restructurdes Total 5.4 10 5.5 2.3 17.6 23.2 Le financement de l'IDA a fait l'objet d'un accord de credit avec le Gouvernement haitien: I'accord de credit 2071-HA ou "le Second Credit"sign6 le 2 fevrier 1990. Cet accord portait sur une enveloppe globale de US$11.4 millions ou 9.1 DTS et comprenait deux grandes composantes: une composante "crddit" (USD 10 millions) et une composante Assistance technique( USD 1.4 millions) En ce qui conceme la composante "Assistance Technique" (B), elle est divis6e en quatre (4) sous-composantes ou rubriques: B-1 Assistance technique au FDI B-2 Assistance technique a la BRH B-3 Assistance technique a la Douane B-4 Assistance technique au Ministere des Finances Sous la rubrique "B-1" (Assistance technique au FDI), la Banque Mondiale a prevu un montant de USD 800 000 (640 000 DTS) destin6s a financer une assistance technique au FDI dans le cadre de l'ex6cution du projet. Ce montant devait financer: -Les honoraires d'un consultant expatrie aupres de la Direction Generale don't l'engagement 6tait une condition "d'effectiveness" du credit (2071 H-A) * La formation du personnel du FDI et des intermediaires financiers en vue de renforcer leur capacite d'evaluation et de supervision des projets. * Des etudes portant sur les possibilites d'elargissement du champ d'activites du FDI. Par ailleurs, en 1995 le FDI a e autoris6e a utiliser une partie des ressourses de cette sous-composante poUr financer certaines etudes sectorielles. L'assistance technique a la BRH (Rubrique B-2) consistait a renforcer, par la formation, la capacite de la Banque Centrale a remplir son role de supervision des banques commerciales et institutions financieres. L'enveloppe prevue pour cette rubrique etait de USD 100 000 (80 000 DTS) - L'assistance technique a la Douane (B-3) consistait a: FDI -Mai 2000 48 Crddit 2071-HA -Rapport d'achevement deprojet * mettre en place un systeme informatise de verification. * L'entrainement du personnel douanier et d'autres matdriels necessaires a la manipulation du systeme * L'acquisisiton d'ordinateurs et d'autres materiels necessaires a la mise en place et a l'exploitation du systeme. Le montant prevu dans le credit 2071H-A pour cette assistance technique 6tait de USD 350 000 (280 000 DTS) L'assistance technique au Ministere des Finances devait etre fournie dans 1'execution des etudes suivantes: * L'examen de la legislation bancaire haitienne en vue de sa mise A jour ou de son adaptation avec la realite actuelle. * L'examnen du secteur "Banque de Developpement" en vue de determiner ses besoins de restructuration ou de consolider, si c'est necessaire, les institutions appartenant a ce dit secteur. * L'examen du secteur financier non bancaire et du secteur informel ( au niveau du credit). Le tableau suivant fait un recapitulatif des composantes et sous-composantes du Credit 2071-HA ainsi que leur cofit: ..~~~~~~~~~. .... .. ......... .. .......... ...... .... ... ..... ... ... .. Tt'ihelem1.3t e \Vellt iil 'io '. IdcN,{vsilCrecs dv ]II);% ( crcd t 2it -Ilf \ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..... . ......,..... .- ,.... ... ..... ..... ...... ....... Compo- En millions de En millions de sante Dollars DTS Financement des entreprises restructurees A-1 4.8 3.8 Financement des entreprises non-restructur6es - A-2 5.2 4.2 Programme de cr6dit regulier du FDI Assistance technique au FDI etfou a gerer par le B-I 0.8 0.64 FDI Assistance technique a la BRH et/ou a gerer par la B-2 0.1 0.08 BRH -Renforcement de la capacite de supervision Assistance technique au Ministere des finances B-3 0.35 0.28 et/oua gerer par le Ministere des finances (MEF) Assistance technique au MEF/ou a gerer par le B-4 0.125 0.10 MEF -Amelioration de la legislation et le rdgulation bancaire. Total A&B 11.375 9.1 Les principales clauses de I'accord de crddit (2071- HA) peuvent se resurner comme suit: * Les instruments financiers d'intervention du FDI dans le secteur industriel devaient 8tre: le reescompte (pr8t aux banques A des fins de sous-prets aux entreprises), la garantie. FDI -Mai 2000 49 Cr&dil 2071-HA -Rapport d'achihement deprojet * Le montant maximum des prets du FDI aux intermediaires financiers ne devait pas depasser US$ 800 000 par entreprise venant du PRI et US$ 500 000 par projet des entreprises non restructurees. * La garantie du FDI par ben6ficiaire ultime (entreprise) ne pouvait pas depasser US$ 200 000. * La part des ressources de l'IDA ne devait pas depasser 65% du montant approuve de la requete de pret (Pret-FDI) de l'intermrdiaire financier. * La composante A (A-1 et A-2) du credit IDA etait un credit au gouvernement haftien que ce dernier s'engageait A retroceder au FDI A 50% A titre de dotation au capital et A 50% A titre de pret remboursable en monnaie locale. * Les projets eligibles aux ressources de l'IDA etaient ceux qui accusaient un taux de rendement interne superieur ou egal A 12% en termne reel. Cependant ce critere du FDI etait valable seulement pour les projets recherchant un fmancement bancaire de plus de US $300 000. * A l'initiative de la BRH un comite consultatif devait etre cree en vue d'aider A une meilleure orientation des activites du FDI. * La date de cloture du projet etait fixee au 31 octobre 1995 Moins d'une annee apres la mise en vigueur du credit, le pays allait connaitre une grave crise politique avec le renversement, par les militaires, du president elu. En application des sanctions imposees par l'ONU a Haiti, l'IDA avait decide de bloquer ce credit. Cette situation allait durer trois (3) ans (1991-1994). Ce qui a porte 1'IDA A prolonger de 3 ans le d6lai d'utilisation du credit en fixant au 30 juin 1998, la nouvelle date de cl8ture du projet. Par ailleurs, certaines autres modifications avaient ete apportees A l'accord de credit dont: * La possibilite pour le FDI d'operer A travers des institutions financieres autres que bancaires (tel que les institutions de micro- credit). * L'introduction d'un nouvel instrument d'intervention financi&re: la participation directe au capital des societes. * La recomposition du comite consultatif comme prevu dans l'accord de credit amende. Les demandes d'autorisation de decaissement se sont effectivement arretees depuis juin 98. Le present document est le rapport d'achevement du projet. Il est divise en cinq (5) parties. 1) La presentation de 1'ensemble des resultats obtenus. 2) L'analyse des performances individuelles des differents intervenants 3) L'analyse des principales retombees directes du projet 4) L'analyse de l'environnement dans lequel le projet a e execute en terines de contraintes et d'opportunites. 5) La synthese des principaux enseignements tires du Projet FDI -Mai 2000 50 CrHdit 2071-HA -Rapport d'ach&vement de projet Presentation des principaux resultats obtenus La Composante "Cridit" A partir du "Second Credit" (2071 HA), le FDI a octroye 220 millions de gourdes de prets et 36.1 millions de gourdes de garantie en faveur de 218 entreprises dont 27 grandes, 47 moyennes 22 petites et 124 micro. La repartition des operations du FDI en fonction de la taille des beneficiaires est presentee en annexe 1. La SOFIHDES est la principale beneficiaire directe des operations du FDI realisees a partir des ressources du Second Credit, avec 50% du total. Viennent tout de suite apres, la Banque intercontinentale ( achetee actuellement par la Sogebank) et la Promobank avec respectivement 20% et 14% du total. Tandis que six (5) autres intermediaires financiers partagent le reste, (soit les 16%). II est donc evident que les operations du FDI dans le cadre du "Second Credit" sont tres concentrees, meme si tous les intermediaires financiers agrees en activite, a l'exception de la Unibank, ont participe au programme de prets du FDI. Le secteur de la construction (materiaux de construction) est le principal beneficiaire des interventions financieres du FDI dans 1'6conomie avec 25% de 1'ensemble des injections effectuees par le FDI. En seconde et en troisieme positions l'on retrouve le secteur secteur alimentaire et le secteur des services avec respectivement 20% et 15% du total. Tandis que les huit (8) autres secteurs eligibles partagent le reste (soit 40%). Ces chiffres indiquent que si au niveau des intermediaires financiers les operations du FDI sont tres concentrees (3 intermediaires partagent 84% de l'ensemble de la production du FDI a partir du Second Credit), elles sont par contre suffisamment diversifiees au niveau sectoriel. La ventilation sectorielle des operations est presentee a I'annexe 3. En ce qui conceme la nature des projets finances, une certaine 'concentration est observee. La repartition du financement du FDI par nature des projets finances indique que 76% vont a deux (2) types de projets: Expansion (50%) et creation (26%). Tandis que le BFR post embargo et les projets de Modemisation partagent egalement la difference ( voir annexe 4). Une ventilation des operations du FDI en fonction de la motivation des ben6ficiaires et/ou des intermediaires financiers indique que: 1) 60% des prets octroyes par le FDI sont generes par le fait que ce dernier offre aux intermediaires financiers des ressources a long terme a taux d'interet variable et par les possibilites pour les intermediaires financiers de reduire certains cofits de transaction lies a la mobilisation en amont des ressources fiancieres necessaires pour une operation de credit; 2) 21% par le fait qu'il offre des garanties de credit (reduction des risques d'insolvabilite du beneficiaire ultime); 3) 9% des prets sont attribuables a 1'existence d'un programme d'assistance technique; 4) 10% FDI -Mai 2000 5i Crddid 2071-HA -Rapport d'achavement deprojet sont a mettre a l'actif d'autres facteurs tel que les possibilites de prendre un gage sans d6possession sur les equipements industriels Une analyse chronologique des operations du FDI a montre une forte concentration des operations du FDI sur 3 exercices (95-96; 96-97; 97-98), ce qui prouve la correlation des activites du FDI avec la situation socio-politico- economique. En effet, c'est seulement durant ces trois exercices que le FDI a pu fonctionner dans un environnement stable oui les anticipations des acteurs etaient des plus optimistes. Maiheureusement cet environnement propice a l'investissemnt n'a pas dure, vu que le pays a connu a partir de 97 une crise politique qui a entraine la disparition de l'une de ses principales institutions democratiques. La ventilation chronologique des operations du FDI est presentee en annexe 6. Tandis que le tableau suivant presente de fa,on simplifiee les principales ventilations des activitds du FDI. Avant la Pendant Apres la 1997- 1998 a total crise de la crise crise de (94- 1998 nos 1991 91-94 97 ours FDI -Mai 2000 52 Crndil 2071-HA -Rapport d'achivement deprojet La composante "Assistance Technique" Au niveau de l'assistance technique, le FDI a entrepris des actions internes et des actions externes. Sur le plan interne, le FDI a profite des ressources de l'assistance technique pour assurer la formation et recyclage de son personnel. C'est ainsi que tous les cadres de l'Instutition ont ete tour a tour envoyes en formation a l'etranger dans le domaine de 1'evaluation de projets industriels, du credit aux micro-entreprises, de la gestion des fonds de garantie, et de 1' evaluation et la gestion de projets d'infrastructures pour ne citer ceux- la. Par ailleurs, le Fonds a realise avec l'assistance de consultants nationaux et internationaux (ARTHUR ANDERSEN) un ensemble d'etudes dont les resultats devaient l'aider a mieux orienter ses choix stratageques et operationnels Sur la plan externe, les principales interventions externes ont et les suivantes: * Une etude approfondie des filieres riz et canne a sucre * Une etude de faisabilite de la creation d'un port international dans le Sud. * Un seminaire de formation pour l'ensemble des officiers de credit des banques commerciales. Le FDI a partage les resultats de ces etudes avec tous ces partenaires nationaux et internationaux et des actions conjointes sont actuellement en cours. FDI -Mai 2000 Crddit 2071-HA -Rapport d'ach&vement deprojet Analyse des performances des principaux intervenants Cette section du rapport fait une evaluation de la performance particuliere des differents intervenants dans l'operationalisation du Credit 2071-HA. Les principaux intervenants sont: le FDI, lIDA, la BRH, les Intermediaires Financiers et le Gouvernement. Les performances du FDI Les performances du FDI sont evaluees en terme de taux d'utilisation des ressources du credit, d'autosuffisance operationnelle, de la qualite de son portefeuille et de resultats socio-economiques de ses interventions. Le taux d'utilisation des ressources Le Credit 2071 HA avait, rappelons-le, deux (2) grandes composantes: une composante "Credit" et une composante "Assistance Technique". La composante cr6dit avait deux (2) sous-composantes: le Credit a. des entreprises restructurees (A-1) destine aux entreprises du PRI et le Credit A des entreprises non restructurees (A-2) destine au financement des entreprises n'ayant pas participe au PRI, en vue de permettre au FDI de continuer ses activites nornales de reescompte et de garantie. La composante "Assistance Technique" avait quatre (4) sous-composantes: Assistance technique geree par le FDI, I'assistance technique A la BRH, I'assistance technique A la Douane et l'assistance technique au Ministere de L'Economie et des Finances (MEF). Le taux d'utilisation des ressources sera analyse separement pour chaque composante et sous composante du credit et selon differentes approches: I'approche-Gourdes, I'approche-US Dollars et l'approche DTS. Le "Crddit aux entreprises restructur6es" Le montant prevu pour cette composante etait de 29.5 millions de gourdes ou 4.8 millions de dollars americains (au taux de 7 gourdes pour 1 dollars, taux en vigueur durant les pdriodes de n6gociation). Ces 4.2 millions de dollars representaient A l'poque 3.8 millions de DTS (au taux de 1.25 dollars americains pour 1 DTS). Le montant utilise pour cette composante est 5.3 millions de gourdes ou 1.0550 millions de dollars ou encore 0,744 millions de DTS. Ce qui correspond A un taux d'utilisation des ressources de cette composante de 18%, de 25% et de 20% respectivement. FDI -Mai 2000 54 Crddit 2071-HA -Rapport d'achhvement deprojet Tablet'au 2.2 lanA1. d1,ltilikolIu'1 I1, hI I ilt(*f)sU I-I (credia ux eflrhISF1Ce Montant en Montant en Montant en millions de millions de millions gourdes dollars DTS Montant initialement alloue 29.5 4.8 3.8 Montant utilise 5.3 1.05 0.744 Taux d'utilisation 18% 25% 20% Le faible taux d'utilisation des ressources de la sous-composante A-1 du credit (credit restructuration industrielle) est dui A plusieurs facteurs. 1) le retard pris par les autorites haitiennes et les responsables de l'IDA pour mettre en place le credit. Certains dossiers de restructuration d'entreprises etaient prets depuis 1988, alors que le credit est entre en vigueur en 1990. Ce qui a oblige certains promoteurs a laisser tomber leur projet, ou A recourir A d'autres sources de financement. 2) l'intensification de la contrebande et le climat politique ont egalement decourage certains chefs d'entreprise, promoteurs de projets de restructuration. Ils ont choisi d'abandonner leur projet ou de reduire considerablement leur taille A un niveau tel qu'un financement externe n'etait plus necessaire. Le "Credit a' des entreprises non restructurkes" Le montant prevu pour la sous-composante "credit A des entreprises non restructurees s'est eleve A 36.4 millions de gourdes, soit 5.2 millions de dollars americains au taux de change du marche A la date d'approbation du credit. Ce qui donnait un total de 4.2 millions de DTS A cette meme date. Les decaissements de l'IDA pour cette composante se sont eleves A 80.4 millions de gourdes, soit un total de 6.9 millions de dollars americains ou 4.9 millions de DTS. Cela correspond A un taux d'utilisation des ressources de 221%,133%, et 117% selon que l'on utilise l'approche-gourdes, dollars ou DTS. Tah,let'it 2.3 sfaUx /I (filfsitiiJ dI r cliss l Ie (le 1.t w IIJ A .%WJ-t W3OA[f1.te COC rdit UI A CUIfIVsWi.Se * f roructurtI l'. 1( -) ................... .. .... ... .......... ............. . Approche-Gourdes Approche-Dollars Approche-DTS Montant allou6 (en 36.4 5.2 4.2 millions Montant utilise (en 80.4 6.9 4.9 millions) Taux d'utilisation 221% 133% 117% FDI -Mai 2000 55 Credit 2071-HA -Rapport d'achevement de projet A remarquer que la partie non utilisee de la sous-composante A-I du credit a e en 1995 ajoutee aux ressources de la composante A-2 (credit aux entreprises non restructurees) sans qu'il y ait une demande formelle du FDI en ce sens, et sans une evaluation des possibilites de leur utilisation, ou de la capacie d'absorption des potentiels beneficiaires des differents sous-secteurs industriels. C'est la raison pour laquelle d'ailleurs, ces additions unilaterales ont et exclues dans le calcul du taux d'utilisation des ressources de la sous-composante (A-2). II est vrai que l'IDA avait prolonge la duree du projet de trois (3) ans pour recuperer les trois (3) annees de blocage du Projet occasionne par la crise, mais il est evident que ce n'etait pas tout A fait rationnel de demander au FDI d'injecter dans l'industrie haitienne, A travers un systeme de reescompte, pendant trois (3) ans oi l'on anticipait un taux de croissance de 4% en tennes reels, presque le double des ressources initialement prevues, apres que le pays ait connu trois (3) annees consecutives de croissance negative, reduisant le PIB a 70% de ce qu'il etait avant la crise. Cependant, ceci n'a pas empehe malgre tout le FDI, d'utiliser 45% de ces ressources additionnelles qui ont ete forfaitairement octroyees A cette sous-composante, apres avoir utilise l'integralite des ressources initiales qui y ont et affectees. Ce qui ferait un taux d'utilisation global de 77% de la sous-composante A-2 reajustee, si l'on considerait un taux d'utilisation de 100% pour la sous-composante A-1 reajustee pour tenir compte du reamenagement budgetaire opere par l'IDA. Rdallocation du solde de la 3.8 3.1 sous-composante A-i Total des ressources aprAs 9.0 7.3 r(allocation Utitisation -montant initial 5.2 3.7 -montant rdallou- 1.7 1.2 Total Utilisations 6.9 4.9 Taux d'Utilisation -ressources initiales 100% 88% -ressources reallouees 45% 39% Taux global d'utilisation de la composante A-2 reajustie 77% 67% FDI -Mai 2000 56 Crddit 2071-HA -Rapport d'achavement deprojet La composante Assistance Technique Du budget de 1.4 million de dollars initialement prevu pour l'assistance technique, 0.8 million venant exclusivement de la composante B-1 ont e utilises. Ce qui correspond A un taux d'utilisation global de 60%. Cependant ce r6sultat doit etre analyse avec beaucoup de prudence vu que toutes les sous-composantes de l'assistance technique n'etaient pas sous la responsabilite du FDI. Il convient donc d'analyser le taux d'utilisation par sous-composante en vue d'evaluer la vraie performance du FDI en matiere de gestion des ressources d'assistance technique. P~~~~~~~~~~.__ .. _._.. ._. _ ...., .......... ...I...... ........... ._ -.. .. ._ .. ,_........ . .. _. ... _..__..........._ Teib1cau 2.5 '' ~~~~~~~~~~(ciit mEilianl.~ {Ie dPiIav.#s} Compo- Compo- Composante Compo- Total sante B-1 sante B-2 B-3 (MEF) sante B-4 (FDI) (BRH) (---) Montant Prevu (Millions .800 .100 .350 .125 1.375 USD) Montant prevu (Millions .640 .080 .280 .100 1.1 DTS) Utlisations * Consultants internes .090 0 0 0 .090 * Consultants extemes - .616 0 0 0 .616 Etudes * Formationpersonnelle .119 0 0 0 .119 du FDI * Formation de personnel .013 0 0 0 .013 des banques Total US$ .838 0 0 0 .838 Equivalent en DTS .627 0 0 0 .627 Taux d'utilisation DTS 98% 0 0 0 60% Taux-d'utilisation $ 105% 0 0 0 57% Le tableau 2.5 indique que la sous-composante B-1 dont le FDI avait la responsabilite a e utilisee a 105%. Ce qui veut dire que le taux relativement faible d'utilisation de l'assistance technique est du A la non-utilisation par les autres institutions des fonds qui avaient e prevues pour elles. Le taux global d'utilisation Globalement les ressources du credit 2071 HA ont ete utilisees A 162% selon I'approche- gourdes (assistance technique comprise), A 76% selon 1'approche-dollars et A 67% selon FDI -Mai 2000 57 Cr,dit 2071-HA -Rapport d'ach&vement de projet l'approche-DTS. Mais alors quelle approche reflete mieux la performance du FDI en terme d'utilisation des ressources? La meilleure approche pour analyser la performance du FDI en terme de taux d'utilisation des ressources consiste A comparer la valeur en dollars des tirages effectues a l'6quivalent en dollars du montant global du credit initialement approuve. Cette approche est justifiee par les faits suivants: a) L'approche-gourde contribuerail a une surrevaluation des performances. En effet, le calcul du taux d'utilisation en traduisant en gourdes les ressources initiales du crddit au taux de change A la date d'approbation consisterait a surevaluer considerablement la performance du FDI, vu la perte de valeur de la gourde durant la periode d'utilisation du credit (passant de 7 A 17 gourdes pour 1 dollar) et de la predominance de la composante "dollar" dans les besoins de financement des entreprises .Par ailleurs les besoins des entreprises sur la base desquels le montant du Credit-IDA a ete determine etaient effectivement des besoins en dollars, en raison de l'origine des 6quipements et matieres premieres utilisees dans l'industrie haitienne. b) L'approche DTS contribuerait a une sous-evaluation des performances effectives du FDI, etant donne la baisse du dollar par rapport au DTS et la stabilite des besoins en dollars des entreprises haitiennes. En effet, la baisse du dollar par rapport au DTS passant de 1.25/1 a 1.41/1 a automatiquement augmentW les ressources totales du credit de 1.5 millions de dollars soit 13%. Ce qui a contribu6 A dispropritionner les ressources du "Credit-IDA" par rapport aux besoins reels du secteur-cible. A noter que pour utiliser USD 1.5 million de l'IDA, il faudrait des projets additionnels d'un cofit total de 4 millions de dollars environ vu que 1) le financement de l'IDA ne pourrait pas depasser 65% du pret-FDI, 2) le pret-FDI ne pourrait pas depasser 90% du montant du pret de l'intermediaire financier, alors que ce dernier n'excede pas generalement 75% du cofit total du projet. Montant Allou6 Montant utilise Taux (en millions de USD) (en millions de $ d'utilisation A COMPOSANTE CREDIT 1. Credit aux entreprises restructurees 4.8 1.0 21% 2. Credit aux entreprises non 5.2 6.9 133% ______ restructurees SOUS TOTAL CREDIT 10.0 7.9 79% B B. ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE 1. AT geree par le FDI .800 .838 103% 2. AT geree par la BRH .100 0 0% 3. AT geree par le MEF (a) .350 0 0% 4. AT gere par le MEF (b) .125 0 0% SOUS-TOTAL AT 1.4 .838 60% GRAND TOTAL 11.4 8.7 76% FDI -Mai 2000 58 Cr&dit 2071-iA4 -Rapport d'achkvement deprojet Performance Financiere La performance financiere du FDI est analysee en terme de la qualite de son portefeuille, de son coefficient d'autosuffisance operationnelle et de sa situation financiere globale. Qualite du portefeuille Pendant toute la duree du credit, le FDI a su maintenir un portefeuille de pr8ts de bonne qualite, en depit d'une conjoncture difficile, de l'existence de nombreux projets de "start-up" et de nombreuses petites entreprises dans son portefeuille de garantie. La qualite du portefeuille du FDI peut 8tre aussi analysee a la lumiere du montant total des garanties payees durant la periode de validite du Credit de l'IDA. En effet, les pertes cumulatives materialisees de garantie du FDI n'ont pas depasse 3.2 millions de gourdes pendant toute son existence, et 2.2 millions durant la periode allant de 1990 a nos jours. I1 convient de souligner qu'au FDI le classement du portefeuille se fait selon deux (2) approches: une approche financiere et une approche economique. Selon l'approche financiere les dossiers de pr8ts du FDI sont classes en prets improductifs, prets restructures et pr8ts reguliers. Les premiers sont les prets sur lesquels le FDI ne percoit plus d'interet en raison de l'incapacite du beneficiaire ultime (cas des pr8ts beneficiant dc la garantie du FDI); les seconds sont des prets ayant fait l'objet d'un ou de plusieurs reechelonnements en raison des difficultes financieres passageres des beneficiaires; les derniers sont des prets ayant toujours respecte le calendrier de remboursement initialement etabli. Selon l'approche economique, les prets du FDI sont classes en fonction de la situation economique des beneficiaires. On distingue 1) les prets" verts" qui sont des prets aux entreprises en bonne sante economique (forte valeur ajout6e, emploi, devises, fiscalite, part de march6, technologie, profit, etc...) 2) les prets "jaunes", c'est a dire les prets aux entreprises eprouvant certaines difficultes a s'adapter a leur environnement, mais dotees d'une bonne capacite de survie; 3) les prets "rouges" c'est-a-dire des prets a des entreprises en difficulte et ayant une tres faible chance de survie. Vu que le risque assume par le FDI est un risque bancaire et non un risque entreprise sauf en cas de garantie octroyee a cette derniere, il est tres frequent de trouver un dossier qui est classe en meme temps comme "rouge" et dans la categorie des prets reguliers. Le tableau suivant analyse l'evaluation de la qualite du portefeuille du FDI pendant la periode d'utilisation du credit (2071 HA). FDI -Mai 2000 59 Credit 2071-HA -Rapport d'achevement deprojet Demarra riode de crise Priode Post-crise Post- ge 1991 date cl6ture ___1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Prets reguliers 20.3 11.7 18.1 18.6 29.7 60.7 104.3 137.4 100.5 Pr6ts 3.3 - - - - 2.7 - - - restructures Pr8ts 0.7 7.5 1.1 2.8 1.4 1.2 1.3 3.7 3.7 improductifs I_I Total porte- 24.3 19.2 19.2 21.4 31.1 64.6 105.6 141.1 104.2 feuille de prets Demar- Periode de crise Periode Post-crise Post- rage 1991 date En millions de gourdes En millions de gourdes cloture 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Portefeuille de 2.5 2.4 2.5 5.8 6.7 9.9 20.9 27.6 24.9 garasntie Titre de partici- - - - - - - - 1.5 1.5 pation I_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ Total risque 2.5 2.4 2.5 5.8 6.7 9.9 20.9 29.1 26.4 entreprise Provisionspour 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.5 2.5 5.2 6.9 8.5 perte__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ Taux de provi- 52% 58% 58% 19% 22% 25% 25% 24% 32% sions _ _ _ _ _ L 'autosuffisance operationnelle Depuis 12 ans, si l'on excepte l'annee 1994-1995, le FDI degage regulierement des resultats d'exploitation positifs avec un coefficient d'autosuffisance operationnelle depassant son seuil d'admissibilite, et ce, meme en periode de grande crise. Cette performance du FDI est due a plusieurs facteurs: 1) le maintien de la bonne qualite du portefeuille 2) le controle des charges administratives 3) I'amelioration de la gestion des liquiditds en etant plus actif sur le marche des placements 4) la diversification des activites generatrices de revenus 5) la competence du personnel compose d'une petite equipe dont le nombre n'a pas varie depuis 17 ans , soit 5 cadres et un personnel de soutien compose d'une dizaine de personnes. FDI -Mai 2000 60 Cridit 2071-HA -Rapport d'ach?vepment de projet Le tableau suivant analyse l'evolution des resultats d'exploitation et du coefficient d'autosuffisance operationnelle du FDI de la date d'entree en vigueur du Credit a nos jours. Tahleaji 2.9) Eolnulimd d,itwftdiz tf 'exp/liithtiowil thi [DI e 1991 -1999 En millions de gourdes Produits Charges Resultats Coefficient d'exploitation d'exploitation Apres provision d'autosuffisance Exercice 90-91 3.3 2.6 .7 1.27 91-92 2.9 2.3 .5 1.26 92-93 3.0 2.5 .5 1.20 93-94 3.0 3.0 0 1.00 94-95 3.3 3.3 .03 1.00 95-96 3.9 5.0 -1.1 .78 96-97 10.1 7.4 2.8 1.36 97-98 13.1 8.2 4.9 1.60 98-99 19.4 11.2 8.2 1.73 Total 10 ans 62 45.5 16.5 1.36 Situation financiere du FDI Le FDI a toujours maintenu une situation financiere tres saine. Les capitaux permanents ont toujours predoniine sa structure financiere et les fonds propres ont ete toujours preponderants dans la structure de ses capitaux permanents. Ce qui est ideal pour une institution dont la garantie de credit represente l'une des activites principales. ti ble a 2 .MV l'tvuluutim ('h. /tl tll iJ/u tfil 1d 1- 1[ 1 lUl tll h i (yjiuod /c f hi I'alidjil (hI seowil (Credit .......... .. ....... ....... Ressources Ressources a Ressources a Fonds Ratio des fonds totales Court Terne Long Termne Propres Propres Ann6e 90-91 38.3 .3 38.0 38.0 99% 91-92 38.7 .3 38.4 38.4 99% 92-93 93-94 39.1 .3 38.8 38.8 99% 94-95 41.0 1.8 39.2 39.2 96% 95-96 75.0 .5 74.5 69.8 93% 96-97 114.9 1.5 113.4 98.8 86% 97-98 162.2 4.2 158 107.9 66% 98-99 176.1 3.0 173.2 126.2 72% FDI-Mai 2000 61 Credit 2071-HA -Rapport d'achivement de projet Les performances de l'IDA Le support de l'IDA au FDI dans l'execution du crddit a e tres appreciable. Les differentes missions envoyees en Haiti par l'IDA ont touj ours ete tres attentives aux problemes rencontres par le FDI dans l'exdcution du credit et n'ont jamais menage leurs efforts dans la recherche de solutions viables a ces problemes. Cependant, les faits suivants ont s6rieusement affecte les activites du FDI et ses relations avec sa clientele directe et indirecte. La forte rotation du personnel de l'IDA affecte au Credit 2071 HA Le personnel de l'IDA affect6 aux projets a etd trop souvent changd. L'impact des changements trop repetes a 6te plus ressenti au niveau des decaissements. En effet les demandes de decaissements du FDI a 1'IDA trainent parfois pendant des semaines, voire des mois, avant qu'une premiere demande d'informations additionnelles de la part de la section "Ddcaissements" de l'IDA, panrienne au FDI. Cette situation a decourage certains intermediaires financiers qui trouvent trop longues et trop compliquees les procedures du FDI. Pertes trop frequentes de dossiers Il arrive tres souvent que des dossiers volumineux envoyes a l'IDA notamment pour decaissement soient egares et que le FDI soit oblige d'en reexpedier une autre copie, quelques semaines plus tard. Une situation qui alourdit les charges opdrationnelles du FDI et prolonge considerablement le delai de reponses a ses interlocuteurs. Les Performances de la BRH Le FDI a, pendant toute la durde d'execution du projet, beneficie du support de la BRH que ce soit en terme d'adaptation des procedures et politiques du FDI aux nouvelles donnees de l'environnement, ou dans 1'elaboration de son plan stratdgique ou encore au niveau financier. En ce qui concerne ce dernier point, la BRH est intervenue en deux (2) occasions pour aider le FDI a surmonter ou a prevenir une penurie de liquidites due a une augmentation rapide de ses opdrations de prets, apres la crise de 1991 -1994. Cependant la BRH n'a pas pu faire face a certains engagements prevus a l'accord de projet notamment; * la mise sur pied d'un comite consultatif au FDI et la prdsidence de ce comite; * la mobilisation de ses ressources humaines pour permettre au FDI de travailler avec les petites institutions financieres non bancaires, ce qui devrait lui offrir la possibilitd de diversifier son portefeuille d'activites et contribuer davantage a l'emergence d'une nouvelle classe d'entrepreneurs. FDI -Mai 2000 62 Crddlt 2071-HA -Rapport d'achivement de projet Analyse des principales retombees du Credit Cette section du rapport analyse les principales retombees directes du credit sur les plans financier, socio-economique, et institutionnel. Impact Financier Le projet (credit 2071 HA) a contribue a ameliorer considerablement la performance et la position financiere des differents participants. Les principales retombees fmancieres du projet sont: le renforcement de facon durable de 1 'autonomie financiere du FDI, l'amelioration de la profitabilite du systeme bancaire, l'amelioration du ratio de solvabilite des banques. Renforcement de I'autonomie financiere du FDI De 1990 a 1999 le Credit 2071 HA a permis au FDI de generer de 62 millions de gourdes de revenus bruts contre 45.5 millions de charges operationnelles. Ce qui lui a perrnis d'ameliorer sa situation financiere par l'accumulation de 16.5 millions de gourdes de profit, renforcant ainsi ses capitaux permanents et sa structure fmanciere globale. Amelioration de la profitabilite du systeme bancaire Le Credit 2071 HA a permis au systeme bancaire de generer 212.7 millions' des revenus bruts d'interets cumulatifs sur prets (1990 -1999). Ce qui correspond a une marge nette d'intdr8t de 134 millions de gourdes pour le systeme bancaire generee par le Projet, soit une moyenne annuelle de 13.4 millions. Considerant la marge nette d'interet gener6e annuellement ces derniers temps par l'ensemble du syst6me (390 millions de gourdes en moyenne sur les 10 dernieres annees) et le poids de l'industrie dans le portefeuille des banques (20%), l'on peut estimer a 17.5% (13.4/(390*0.2) la contribution du FDI a la marge nette d'interet gen6ree par le portefeuille industriel de l'ensemble du systeme bancaire. '. Les revenus bruts generes pour le systame bancaire par le Credit-IDA est calculi en utilisant la relation entre les interets globaux gagnes par une banque sur une operation de pret et la part de ces int'rets revenant au FDI. Ceffe relation est la suivante: Y = I/ Pp, oiu Y represente les revenus bruts gagnes par la banque; P, le rapport entre le pret-FDI a la banque et le prgt de la banque au bene'ficiaire ultime ou le pourcentage du pret reescompte par le FDI (soit 53% en moyenne durant ces 10 dernieres annees en excluant l'operation << t6liphonie cellulaire ))) ; p, le rapport entre les taux d'interets sur le pret-FDI et le pret bancaire (soit 55% en moyenne); et I, les interets gagnes par le FDI (62 millions). Ce qui donne un total de 212.7 millions (62 / 0.53 *0.55) FDI -Mai 2000 63 Crddit 2071-HA -Rapport d'achhvement de projet L'evolution de la marge nette d'interet de 1'ensemble du systeme bancaire est presente au tableau 3.1. Revenus Interefts Depenses Marge Autres Produit d'interets sur bons d'interets neffe revenus net surprePts BRN d'intirets (change) bancaire (PNB) 93 364.4 135.9 228.5 160.5 389.0 94 428.9 163.3 265.6 195.3 460.9 95 556.8 - 202.2 354.6 244.2 598.8 96 939.7 38.3 434.1 453.9 325.4 869.3 97 1156.2 176.5 541.9 790.8 325.7 1116.5 98 1504.8 327.1 810.6 1021.3 413.2 1434.5 99 _ __ _ _ Total 4950.8 541.9 2288.0 3114.7 1664.3 4869.0 Amelioration du ratio de solvabilite des banques Les banques, grace a la garantie du FDI, ont la possibilite d'ameliorer leur ratio de solvabilite en raison du caractere admissible de la garantie du FDI pour le calcul des provisions pour pertes sur prets (circulaire no 83) et d'un coefficient de ponderation de risque de 20% retenu pour le calcul du ratio de solvabilite. A noter que ce dernier ratio passera a 0% prochainement, grdce a une intervention de la Direction du FDI aupres du Conseil de la BRH, attirant I'attention de ce dernier sur le caractere penalisant de ce traitement prudentiel de la garantie du FDI generalement assortie d'une operation de reescompte et la n6cessite d'harmoniser les circulaires no 83 et 88. Impact socio-e&conomique Les ressources mises a la disposition du FDI a partir du credit 2071 HA ont favorise l'injection d'importants capitaux dans le secteur industiel, cree de milliers d'emplois, durables, promu les PME et les micro-entreprises, contribue a la valorisation des matieres premieres locales, a la decentralisation des activites economiques et a la gen6ration de devises etrangeres. FDI -Mai 2000 64 Crddit 2071-HA -Rapport d'ach&vement de projet Injections importantes de capitaux dans le secteur industriel Les 8.7 millions de dollars ou 123 millions de gourdes (soit 14 millions d'Asssitance technique et 109 millions pour les operations de prets) tires par le FDI du Credit de l'IDA ont contribue a mobiliser 701 millions de gourdes dans l'industrie haitienne, si l'on fait abstraction des projets finances par le FDI durant la periode du coup d'etat oul les ressources de l'IDA etaient bloquees et de ceux finances apres le 30 juin 1998, date de cl6ture du Credit. Si l'on inclut les projets finances durant ces deux (2) periodes, les ressources globalement mobilisees par les fonds de l'IDA (nouveaux decaissements + reutilisation des decaissements anterieurs) s'elevent 1.8 milliards de gourdes. Ainsi l'on peut conclure que chaque gourde decaissee par l'IDA mobilise une moyenne de 6 gourdes en moyenne en faveur de l'industrie pendant la periode oiu le credit est vigueur. En excluant le projet de t6lephonie cellulaire 2 qui sort d'ailleurs de l'ordinaire des operations du FDI, les injections dans l'economie haitienne provoquees par le Second Credit de l'IDA sont ramenees a 778 millions ventiles par source de fmancement selon le tableau 3.2. Tablcau.3.2 Ori~,'il,e de~~ re% ~aurce8 111ohilisesit i t dte dunit P I'iniawrie hi ailiennie an- tCrLdjti 2uJ 71111.,I Montant (en millions Pourcentage de gourdes) IDA 110 14.1% FDI 110 14.1% Banques Intermnddiaires 217 27.9% Bdndficiaires ultimes (Entreprises) 341 43.1% Total 778 100 Cre'ation d'emplois Les interventions du FDI dans le secteur industriel A partir du credit 2071 HA a cr66 3.600 nouveaux emplois directs dans le pays (en excluant le gros projet de 1.02 miliard mentionn6 pr6c6demment), a stabilis6 ou pr6serv 5 500 autres., soit un nouvel emploi pour chaque 0.2 million de gourdes d'investissement total, ou un nouvel emploi pour chaque 0.06 million de gourdes d'injections combine'es du FDI et de l'IDA. Le tableau suivant analyse le ratio cofit Iemploi par intervenant. 2. Les injections d ecapitaux dans l'conomie haitienne (1.8 milliards de gourdes) grdce au Crddit 2071 HA contiennent un projet d'un coait total de 1. 02 milliards de gourdes, finance de fa9on exceptionnelle par le FDIjusqua'~ la hauteur de 3 millions. FDI -Mai 2000 65 Cr&dit 2071-HA -Rapport d'achtvement deprojet IDA FDI Banques Entreprises Total PartieducoOtfmanc (en 110 110 217 343 780 millions de gourdes Nouveaux emplois 3 900 3 900 3 900 3 900 3 900 Emplois preserves 5 500 5 500 5 500 5 500 5 500 Total d'emplois crdds et/ou 9 400 9 400 9 400 9 400 9 400 preserves Ratio cofltemploi cred G. 28 200 G. 28 200 G. 55 650 G. 88 000 G. 200 000 Ratio coft/emploi pr6servi G 20 000 20 000 39 500 62 400 142 000 Ratio cout/emploi crd6 etlou prdservd G 12 000 12 000 23 000 36 500 83o000 Promotion des PME et des Micro-Entreprises Des 218 beneficiaires ultimes des operations de prets et de garanties du FDI durant ces dix (10) dernieres annees, 67 sont des petites et moyennes entreprises (31%) et 124 sont des micro-entreprises (57%). Les grandes entreprises (27) ne representent donc que 12% du nombre des beneficiaires ultirnes des operations de credit du FDI. La plupart des PME beneficiaires ultimes des prets-FDI etaient jusqu'alors inconnus du secteur bancaire et n'auraient jamais eu acces au credit bancaire sans I'assistance technique, ou la garantie du FDI ou encore les ressources a long terme .S'il est vrai que les grandes entreprises representant 12% du nombre ont beneficie de 43% de la valeur du cr6dit octroye par le FDI, il n'en est pas moins vrai que 75% de nouveaux emplois cres viennent des PME. Valorisation des matieres premieres locales La ventilation des operations du FDI en fonction de l'origine des intrants utilises par les entreprises beneficiaires indique que 35% des prets du FDI vont finalement a des entreprises utilisant des matieres locales et 35% egalement vont a celles utilisant une combinaison de matieres locales importees, alors que seulement 25% vont a des entreprises utilisant une matiere premiere exclusivement importee. Les autres 5% vont a des micro-entreprises a activit6s tres diversifiees. A noter que les entreprises utilisant une matiere premiere totalement ou partiellement locale et consommant 70% des injections du FDI contribuent seulement a 35% a la creation des nouveaux emplois mentionn6s precedemment et elles figurent a 82% dans la categorie des petites et moyennes entreprises. Autant dire que les entreprises beneficiaires des operations du FDI et utilisant des matieres totalement importees sont dotees d'une plus forte capacite generatrice d'emplois directs. Cependant, celles utlisant des matieres locales se recrutent au rang des PME, ayant peu acces au credit bancaire , donc repondant mieux aux objectifs prioritaires du FDI. FDI -Mai 2000 66 Cridit 2071-HA -Rapport d'achavement deprojet Debut de deconcentration des activites economiques Les ressources de l'IDA (credit 2071 HA) ont permis au FDI d'etendre ses activites en dehors de Port-au-Prince. Actuellement le FDI est la seule institution financiere du pays dont le portefeuille de prets est etendu a sept (7) departements geographiques et dont le pipeline compte des projets pour les neuf (9) departements geographiques. En effet, les trois (3) departements (Nord-Ouest, Nord'Est et Centre) qui n'ont pas encore beneficie de l'intervention financiere du FDI seront tres prochainement atteints, vu les chances de realisation et le stade d'avancement des projets presentes par les entrepreneurs residents. Ces projets localis6s en province, quoique peu nombreux representent une performance remarquable du Credit 2071 HA, en raison de la reticence des intermediaires financiers a etendre leur credit en province. Ils ont egalement un impact significatif en terme de valorisation des matieres locales, de generation de revenus dans des secteurs defavorises, et de promotion des PME, et des micro entreprises. Cependant, ces projets creent beaucoup plus d'emplois indirects que directs, car 1'ensemble des projets finances en province ne generent que 250 nouveaux emplois directs sur un total 4000 environ. Generation de devises Des 218 entreprises beneficiaires ultimes du Credit 2071 HA, 124 sont des micro- entreprises informelles s'adonnant a toutes sortes d'activites. Des 94 entreprises formelles beneficiaires, 20 sont des entreprises dont la production est tournee vers l'exportation, 31 fabriquent des produits de substitution a l'irnportation dans une 6conomie caracterisee par l'absence de protection et 43 produisent des biens et services non echanges. Les entreprises d'exportation consomment 12% de ressources totales injectees dans l'economie et 19% de la quote part de l'IDA dans le total des injections. i ,, .. ... ... ... .. .. .., ........ .................. ........... , .. .. " .. ... .~~~~~~~~~~~.. ........ .... ...... Fel~if 101)ol dc fSebli hu dc,SiIuriUoll dIc prdiiJfi Nbre % CoTat total % Financem % d'entrepri des ent IDA ses projets Produits destines a 20 9% 210.2 12% 21.1 19% l'exportation Produits de substitution 31 14% 228.4 13% 32.2 29% a l'importation Biens et services non 43 20% 1 347.3 75% 50.1 46% echanges Micro-entreprises 124 57% 12.5 - 6.5 6% Total 218 100% 1 798.4 109.9 100% FDI -Mai 2000 67 Crddit 2071-HA -Rapport d'ach&vement de projet Impact Institutionnel Aujourd'hui le FDI est une reference en matiere d'evaluation de projets industriels. Les entrepreneurs sont automatiquement referes au FDI par les banques commerciales pour tous projets industriels notamment les "start-up". Le FDI doit en grande partie cette notoriete aux possibilites offertes par le Projet (composante B-1 credit) d'assurer la formation continue de son personnel. Le FDI a aussi etendu cette possibilite aux banques commerciales en organisant des s6minaires et rencontres a l'intention de leur personnel de credit. L'impact de telles d6marches et des autres programmes de formation que le FDI compte lancer, a de bonnes chances d'etre durable vu que la rotation du personnel constate depuis quelques temps dans le secteur bancaire est interne (les employes laissent une banque pour aller travailler a une autre banque). Le savoir-faire que le FDI s'est d6veloppe grace au credit 2071 HA a augment6 sa c6te aupres des instances gouvemementales et des bailleurs de fonds internationaux. Le FDI est avantageusement positionne pour etre l'agence d'execution de certains programmes du Gouvemement, et/ou de bailleurs de fonds internationaux ayant un volet "cr6dit". Actuellement, le FDI gere un programme de credit pour la reconversion des anciens fonctionnaires de 50 millions de gourdes, et le programme binational de crddit du Bureau de l'Ordonnateur National de Lome et de l'Union Europeenne d'un montant de 18 millions de gourdes dans la zone frontaliere. Le FDI est aussi designe pour etre le gestionnaire de ressources d'un programme de credit du FIDA et d'un programme de credit a lPexportation cafeiere. FDI -Mai 2000 68 Crddit 2071-HA -Rapport d'achhvement de projet L'analyse de 1'environnement de fonctionnement du projet Cette section du rapport fait une analyse des opportunites qui ont e offertes par l'environnement socio-politique, economique, legal et reglementaire et egalement les principales contraintes auxquelles le FDI a dui faire face dans 1'ex6cution du projet. Cette analyse des conditions dans lesquelles les resultats mentionnes precedemment ont et obtenus permettra une meilleure appreciation de ces demiers. Lesfacteurs defavorables Les principaux facteurs defavorables au deroulement normal des operateurs du EDI dans le cadre du credit sont les suivants: * Instabilite politique: de 1990 A nos jours le pays a connu une dizaine de gouvemements differents. Depuis plus d'une annee, iA fonctionne sans parlement. Une situation qui n'est pas favorable A la cooperation intemationale. * Climat peu propice a l'investissement: La persistence ds troubles sociaux (gr6ves, manifestations des rues, etc) a contribue A eloigne les investisseurs 6trangers et d6courage les investisseurs nationaux. * Faible croisance 6conomique: Apres que le pays ait connu trois andes consecutives de croissance negative, son taux de croissance annuel oscille entre 2 a 4 %: Un taux evidemment trop faible pour ramener l'economie A son niveau d'avant crise. * Forte concentration du portefeuille des banques: Le portefeuille des banques commerciales est tres concentre. Cette concentration se fait: -au niveau des emprunteurs ( 2 000 emprunteurs pour 400 000 deposants) -au niveau sectotriel (60% du portefeuillle des banques vont au commerce et A des operations A court terme). -Au niveau geographique (99% des prets vont A des clients operant aux environs de la capitale haitienne) * Caractere penalisant du mode operatoire des compagnies d'assurance (ces demieres n'assurent pas les biens se trouvant A 1'exterieur de Port-au- Prince. Ce qui prive les entreprises localisees en province de l'acces au credit, vu qu'elles ne peuvent pas couvrir adequatement les biens gages par une police d'assurance) FDI -Mai 2000 69 Crddit 2071-HA -Rapport d'achhvement deprojet * Absence de regles prudentielles pendant la majeure partie de la duree du Projet. A noter que la concentration actuelle du portefeuille des banques sur quelques clients residant A Port-au-Prince est l'une des sequelles d'absence pendant longtemps de regles prudentielles sur la concentration du credit * Etat de surliquiditi du systeme bancaire. Cette situation combinee avec l'tat de concentration du credit bancaire sur le commerce n'etait pas de nature A faciliter la tache A une institution de r6escompte de prets industriels. Les e'limentsfavorables de l'environnement * Restrictions legales au niveau des gages sans deplacement sur les equipements industriels: Cette restriction favorise les activites du FDI etant donne que des dispositions Iegales n'autorisent 1'enregistrement de gage que pour les prets ayant fait l'objet d'un reescompte ou d'une garantie du FDI. 3 Politique monetaire restrictive au cours des quatres dernieres annees: Cette politique qui s'est materialisee dans un premier temps par l'augmentation du taux de reserves obligatoires (48%) et dans un second temps par l'introduction des bons BRH A taux variable a eu un double impact sur le FDI: a) Elle a cree en 1995-1996 de bonnes conditions pour que fonctionne normalement une institution de reescompte en cas d'amelioration du climat d'investissement. A noter que les banques n'ont pas d'obligations de reserves sur les ressources du FDI b) Elle a contribue le plus souvent A augmenter les taux d'int6rets sur les dep6ts. Ce dont le FDI a profite pour rentabiliser ses surplus de liquidit6s FDI -Mai 2000 70 Crddit 2071-HA -Rapport d'ach&vement deprojel Conclusions et recommandations finales Le second credit de l'IDA (2071 HA) peut-etre consid&e comme un succes et ce, pour trois (3) raisons principales: 1) Grace a la bonne utilisation du Credit, aujourd'hui le FDI n'a besoin ni de I'assistance technique ni des ressources financieres de l'IDA pour intervenir de maniere efficace dans le secteur industriel, soit sous forme de credit aux PME, soit sous forme d'assistance technique. En effet, l'institution s'est dotee d'une capacite beneficiaire qui lui permet de preserver sa capacite d'octroi de credit et d'autofinancer ses programmes d'assistance technique A l'industrie et A ses intermediaires financiers, en depit d'une conjoncture difficile. Par ailleurs le savoir-faire developpe dans le domaine de l'evaluation, du suivi de projets industriels dans la gestion des programmes de credit intermedie, confere a l'institution un grand pouvoir de negociation vis-a-vis d'autres bailleurs de fonds nationaux et intemationaux. Ainsi l'on voit mal le FDI faire face, meme a moyen terme, a des problemes de ressources financieres, meme en cas d'une augmentation de la demande de credits industriels. 2) Le FDI, en depit d'une conjoncture difficile, est arrivee a utiliser l'essentiel des ressources initialement prevues, dans le cadre du Credit. Le taux global d'utilisation des ressources est de 76% . 3) Les retombees socio-economiques du credit sont tres positives. Le projet a cree des milliers d'emplois directs, genere des devises pour le pays, rehabilite de nombreuses entreprises industrielles, genere d'importantes valeurs ajoutees, contribue a la valorisation des matieres premieres locales, A la decentralisation des activites economiques, A la promotion des petites et moyennes entreprises et a l'amelioration de la performance du systeme bancaire. Le seul point du projet qu'on pourrait qualifier de negatif est le retard mis dans sa mise en place. Ce retard a l'entiere responsabilite du faible taux d'utilisation de la sous- composante "credit aux entreprises restructurees". Heureusement, une bonne partie de cette sous-composante a ete utilisee dans le financement des PME n'ayant pas participe au programme d'etudes de restructuration. Ce qui n'est pas d'ailleurs une mauvaise chose: les entreprises restructur6es qui n'avaient pas pu attendre la mise en place du credit de l'IDA et qui ont eu recours A d'autres sources de fmancement, ont tout simplement prouve que les financer ne serait pas le meilleur moyen d'utiliser les ressources rares du pays. Elles ont donc contribue a liberer des fonds au profit des PME (les beneficiaires directs de leur desistement ) qui n'auraient pas vu le jour ou survecu sans l'intervention du FDI. FDI-Mai 2000 71 CrOddJ 2071-HA -Rapport d'achavement de projet Le credit 2071 HA, en plus d'etre un succes, est riche en enseignements pour les decideurs au cas ou un programme similaire devrait etre entrepris a nouveau en Haiti ou ailleurs dans un environnement similaire. Le premier enseignement A tirer du Projet (le Credit 2071 HA) est que les banques haitiennes en matiere de credit industriel sont preoccupees par trois types de risque: Le risque de taux, le risque de liquidite et le risque de defaillance au debiteur. L'experience du FDI dans la gestion du Credit 2071 HA a montr6 que les banques, dans la recherche d'une couverture institutionnelle de ces risques privilegient les deux (2) premiers (le risque de taux et le risque de liquidite) contrairement A ce que l'on A tendance A croire. En effet, le FDI doit plus de 50% de sa production cumulative au fait qu'il disposait des ressources A long terme et que son taux d'interet est indexe au taux charge par la banque aux beneficiaires ultimes. Cette situation peut s'expliquer par la predominance des depenses en capital dans la structure des investissements industriels. Cette predominance des imniobilisations dans la structure de leur actif, dote les entreprises industrielles d'une plus forte capacite de fourniture de garantie extrinseque, que les entreprises commerciales qui recherchent la plupart du temps, du credit pour financer leur fond de roulement. Le second enseignement est que les banques commerciales sont tres sensibles au delai et au degre de complexite du traitement des dossiers. C'est la raison pour laquelle d'ailleurs certaines banques ont e peu enthousiastes a utiliser les services et les produits du FDI. Elles reprochent A ce demier le long delai de remboursement par l'IDA de fonds avanc6s en devises. Ainsi, la modification du processus de decaissement de l'IDA integrant le systeme du Compte Special serait indispensable, si un projet similaire devait etre entrepris en Haiti. Le troisienme enseignement est que l'arret d'un programme de credit pendant un certain nombre d'annees ne peut pas etre suffisamment compense par sa prolongation nmcanique pour un nombre igal d'annies. En effet, P'experience du FDI a montri que la prolongation de la date de fermeture du credit jusqu'en juin 1998 au lieu d'octobre 1995, en vue de compenser les 3 annies d'embargo (92-94) itait unefacon trop simpliste de voir les choses. Le quatrieme enseignement est que contrairement A certains prejuges, tout projet d'institution financiere publique de d6veloppement n'est pas voue A l'6chec. En effet, l'experience du FDI, l'une des institutions financieres les plus sainement ger6es du pays, les plus solides financierement, vient de prouver que le statut (public ou prive) n'est pas un determinant de 1' avenir d'une institution financiere de developpement. II s'agit d'une question d'hommes et de mode operatoire. FDI -Mai 2000 72 Crddk 2071-HA -Rapport d'ach&vemuat deptoje Liste des sigles et abr6vations BRH Banque de la R6publique d'HaYti FDI Fonds de Developpement Industriel IDA International Developpement Association DTS Droits de Tirages Sp6ciaux G. Gourde HaItienne $ Dollar Americain MEF Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances AT Assistance Technique PIB Produit Interieur Brut US$ Dollar Am6ricain PME Petites et Moyennes Entreprises FDI -Mai 2000 73 ANNEX 9 USAID/HAITI COMMENTS WORLD BANK IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT HAITI INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING PROJECT PRIVATIZATION COMPONENT FINANCED BY USAID GRANT General Conclusion: USAID is very satisfied with the quality of the technical work of all the parties involved -- i.e. the World Bank Privatization Unit, the GOH's Council for the Modernization of Public Enterprises (CMEP), and the consultants and advisors selected to support CMEP and the Bank -- in the financial, legal and regulatory, marketing and other technical preparations for the privatization of the assets and/or management of the Port-au-Prince International Airport, the Port-au-Prince Seaport, and the National Telecommunications Company (TELECO). Administration of the Grant has left something to be desired, however: (i) sounder financial management and projection of financial needs by the Grantee would have assured the more timely flow of funds and prevented some of the occasional delays incurred; (ii) and program reporting requirements specified in the Grant Agreement between USAID and the Grantee have for the most part not been adhered to. Elaboration: On June 27, 1997, USAID awarded a Grant to the World Bank, in the amount of $2,295,000, to assist the GOH's Council for the Modernization of Public Enterprises (CMEP) in the technical work for the privatization of the assets an/or management of the Port-au-Prince International Airport and the Port-au-Prince Seaport. The Grant Amendment of August 7, 1997, increased the amount to $3,553,000 to include the National Telecommunications Company (TELECO). The GOH had requested that USAID finance this support to CMEP in a Letter of Execution to the bilateral Grant Agreement between the GOH and USAID, the Policy and Administrative Reform (PAR) Project. USAID has through its own channels followed closely the work among the World Bank (its Grantee), CMEP and the consultants and advisors, and has found the output of their collaboration to be first-rate. All technical work required for the launching by CMEP of the Requests for Bids have been completed satisfactorily. It is hoped that the GOH would find the political resolve and determination to instruct CMEP to proceed once again with the "Modernization" that the GOH halted just as all the technical work of the World Bank, CMEP and the advisors was culminating in the bid documents. It would perhaps have been useful to the World Bank (and to all other involved) that the World Bank had committed full-time resident technical assistance to assure the smoother and more rapid implementation of the program, particularly as relates to CMEP's knowledge and application of Bank standards and criteria in the procurement of goods and services. On the administrative side, the following shortcomings must be noted: i. Although it was the Grantee that had turned down USAID's proposal for a Letter of Credit under the Grant and had opted instead for periodic advances as needed, the Grantee never was able to submit the necessary requests for advances, as specified in the Grant Agreement, in time to avoid delays in its own payments to contractors. ii. Although the communication between Bank personnel directly working on the program and USAID has been steady and productive, no Quarterly Program Reports, as specified in Sections 1.5.4 and 1.5.5 of Attachment I to the Grant Agreement, "The Schedule," have been submitted to USAID by the Grantee. iii. Similarly, the Final Performance Report, specified in the above sections as due from the Grantee ninety (90) days after the expiration of the award -- i.e. March 31, 2000 -- has yet to be received by USAID. GV. 74