Rapport d'achèvement de la mise en œuvre: Projet de Fonds économique et social d'Haïti

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No.: 18702 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT HAITI ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FUND PROJECT (CREDIT 2205-HA) December 15, 1998 Country Department III Latin America and the Caribbean Region Human and Social Development Group This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Gourde (G) (December 1990) US$1.00 = G 5.00 US$0.20 = G 1.00 (June 1998) US$1.00 = G 16.5 US$0.061 = G 1.00 FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER October 1 -September 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS DG Directeur General FAES Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale GoH Government of Haiti IDA International Development Association IDB Inter-American Development Bank MARNDR Ministere de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Developpement Rural MEF Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances MENJS Ministere de l'Education nationale, de la Jeunesse et des Sports MIS Management Information System MSPP Ministere de la Sante Publique et de la Population MTPTC Ministere des Travaux publics, des Transports et des Communications NGO Non-Governmental Organization PAHO Pan American Health Organization SAR Staff Appraisal Report SNEP Service National d'eau Potable Vice President: Shahid Javed Burki, LCRVP Director: Orsalia Kalantzopoulos, LCC3C Manager: Xavier Coll, LCSHD Task Manager: Elizabeth Waters, LCC3C FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table of Contents PREFACE ..................................... .3 EVALUATION SUMMARY .5 Introduction .5 Project Objectives .6 Implementation Experience and Results .7 Future Operations and Key Lessons Learned .8 PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT .10 A. Project Objectives .10 B. Achievement of Project Objectives .12 C. Key Factors Affecting Project Implementation .18 D. Project Sustainability .20 E. Bank Performance .22 F. Borrower Performance .23 G. Assessment of Project Outcome .24 H. Future Operations .24 I. Key Lessons Learned .24 PART II: STATISTICAL TABLES .25 A. Table I Summary of Assessment ........................................ 26 B. Table 2 Related Bank Loans ........................................ 27 C. Table 3 Project Timetable ........................................ 28 D. Table 4 Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual ............ 28 E. Table 5 Key Indicator for Project Implementation .............................. 29 F. Table 6 Key Indicator for Project Operation .................................... 30 G. Table 7 Studies Included Project ........................................ 30 H. Table 8A Project Costs ........................................ 31 1. Table 8B Project Financing ........................................ 31 J. Table 9 Economic Costs and Benefits ........................................ 31 K. Table 10 Status of Legal covenants ........................................ 32 L. Table 11 Compliance with Operational Manual Statements .................... 33 M. Table 12 Bank Resources: Staff Inputs ........................................ 33 N. Table 13 Bank Resources: Missions ........................................ 34 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfornance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. 2 PART III: APPENDIXES. A. FAES 11 pre-appraisal Mission Aide -Memoire* .................................... 35 B. Borrower's Contribution to the ICR .................................... 52 C. Geographic distribution of FAES Investments .................................... 57 D. Map of Haiti .................................... 58 *As all FAES funds were committed by April 1997, at the time of the last supervision mission, it was deemed appropriate to include in the ICR the Aide-Memoire from the December 1997 pre-appraisal mission for FAES 11. This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization,- 3 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT HAITI ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FUND PROJECT (Cr. 2205-HA) PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Economic and Social Fund Project in Haiti, for which Credit 2205 -HA in the amount of SDR 7,900,000 or US$11.3 million equivalent was approved on January 17, 1991 and the Credit Agreement was made effective on May 21, 1991. The loan was closed on June 30. 1998, three years after the original closing date of June 30, 1995. It is expected to be fully disbursed, and the last disbursement is expected to take place on October 31, 1998. Cofinancing for the project was provided by the Inter- American Development Bank (IDB). The ICR was prepared by Elizabeth Waters of the Caribbean Country Management Unit of the Latin America and Caribbean Region and reviewed by Orsalia Kalantzopoulos, Director of LCC3C, Xavier Coll, Director of LCSHD, Jamil Salmi, Country Sector Leader of LCSHD, and David Warren, Operations Specialist, LCSHD. Preparation of this ICR was begun after the Bank's final supervision mission in April 1997 and the Bank's pre-appraisal mission of FAES II in December 1997. It is based on material in the project files and interviews in Haiti. The borrower contributed to the 4 preparation of the ICR by commenting on the draft ICR, contributing views reflected in the FAES II pre-appraisal mission aide-memoire (Appendix A), and preparing its own evaluation of the project's preparation and execution (Appendix B). 5 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FUND PROJECT (Cr. 2205 -HA) HAITI EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction 1. Among the major challenges facing Haiti in 1990, after several years of political unrest and economic decline, were the need to instill hope among the Haitian people and to root democracy firmly in institutional practice throughout the country, while simultaneously addressing the urgent needs of the poor via quick relief efforts during the transition period to political and economic stability. 2. The Bank has supported economic and social sector projects in Haiti since 1956. Prior to the Economic and Social Fund (FAES: Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale) project, the Bank financed three projects in the health, education and water supply/sanitation sectors in Haiti: the Education IV-A Project (Cr. 1592-HA approved in 1985 for US$ 10 million), the Health and Population Project (Cr. 2085-HA approved in 1990 for US$28.2 million), and the Water Supply and Sanitation Project (Cr. 2052-HA approved in 1990 for US$15.2 million). The first loan helped finance the GoH's basic education reform, initiate a reform of the vocational/technical training system, and strengthen the management of the education sector. The purpose of the second project, which is still active, is to improve access to basic health care services and support interventions to address the impact of the TB and AIDS epidemic. The third project, which is also still active, is strengthening water management, improving the supply of drinking water in Port-au-Prince, and developing a sanitation plan for the capital's metropolitan area. 3. Concurrent with the Economic and Social Fund Project, the Bank-funded Emergency Economic Recovery Project (Cr. 2670-HA approved in 1994 for US$40 million) and Employment Generation Project (Cr. 2765-HA approved in 1995 for US$50 million) also supported the GoH's efforts to combat poverty. The former financed rehabilitation and maintenance for the agriculture, energy and infrastructure sectors, and provided employment and income opportunities for the poor. The latter provided short- term employment to people in extreme poverty, improved seriously deteriorated infrastructure, and strengthened the capacity of institutions to manage small projects. 6 Two projects currently under preparation will perpetuate such support to the GoH: the Basic Education Project (Cr. 29389-HA, for US$28 million), which will improve the quality and equity of basic education services; and FAES II (US$25 million), which will continue to finance small projects in poor communities, with an emphasis on promotion, targeting and the sustainability of investments (Table 2). Project Objectives 4. As defined in the Development Credit Agreement dated February 4, 1991, the main objectives of the Economic and Social Fund project (Cr. 2205. -HA) were to assist the Borrower in: (i) establishing FAES as a means of responding efficiently and in a decentralized manner to the basic needs of the nation's poor through non-governmental organizations, including cooperatives, organized community groups and other grass-roots organizations; (ii) strengthening health care, nutrition and education services (primarily for infants and pregnant and lactating women) and providing physical infrastructure addressing the needs of the poorest population; (iii) providing an effective channel for required donor financing and coordination of scattered domestic efforts; and (iv) strengthening the capabilities of FAES and delegated entities for project preparation and implementation. The project combined such diverse activities as: civil works; provision of equipment and supplies; support to epidemic control, immunization, and adult literacy training programs; construction of water supply systems, sewerage systems and latrines; and advisory services to communities, for a total project cost of US$23.7 million, of which US$ 1 1.3 million equivalent (SDR 7,900,000) were to be creditedL by IDA. 5. The project objectives, though clearly stated and consistent with the GoH's economic and social policies as well as with the Bank's country strategy for Haiti, were broad in scope and the strategies to achieve them resulted in a complex and very demanding project, considering that FAES was a new agency with limited capacities at the outset. 6. Key loan covenants expected to promote the achievement of project objectives included: (i) employing qualified fixed-term staff satisfactory to IDA; and (ii) identifying, appraising and implementing subprojects under terms set forth in the Operational Manual. Notwithstanding the fact that audits were consistently overdue, the Borrower's compliance with all loan covenants was highly satisfactory. No major gaps in key positions occurred during the project. The steering committee met regularly and fostered inter-institutional collaboration in addressing implementation obstacles, which was one of the few examples of successful public-private collaboration in Haiti. However, the targeting and impact studies were seriously postponed. 7 Implementation Experience and Results 7. As FAES was basically demand-driven, there were no quantitative targets for numbers of different kinds of projects at the outset. Nearly all civil works, equipment and supplies financed were completed or procured: out of the 349 projects financed by IDA at completion date, 310 were completed, 34 were in final stages, and only 5 had been abandoned. In the health and nutrition sector, 10 nutrition projects were implemented, 5 health facilities were rehabilitated and 9 were constructed, equipment was provided for 5 health centers, 4 preventive health programs were supported, and 24 small water supply systems as well as 69 small sewerage systems and latrines were built or repaired. In the education sector, 10 primary school facilities were rehabilitated and 24 were constructed, furniture and equipment were provided for 149 school facilities, education materials were provided for 21 schools and 2 training centers, and support was given to one literacy and one training program. In the infrastructure sector, 9 road projects (bridges) and 5 agricultural projects were implemented. Overall, the project had a positive impact on the welfare of most client communities. Technical assistance was provided to FAES for several key studies, as planned; however, funds for technical assistance to weak grass- roots organizations were not disbursed. 8. The project was implemented over a seven-year period, including a three-year extension due exclusively to a complete suspension of activities in October 1991 because of a military coup. Following the relaunching of the project in April 1995, smooth project implementation was affected temporarily by factors such as: (i) the limited institutional capacities of FAES; (ii) deficiencies of several firms contracted to manage civil works activities; (iii) delays in the disbursement of IDA funds; and (iv) the limited institutional capacities and commitments of key line ministries. However, as management systems rapidly became more efficient and effective, the project was able to disburse completely over a three-year period, faster than initially foreseen when the credit was reactivated in 1995, and FAES became a critical source of funding for poor communities. Overall, given the special circumstances of Haiti during the last seven years (the extreme poverty, the destructive impact of both the coup and the international embargo, the restoration of a fragile democracy, extremely weak institutional capacity at every level of the Government, etc.), the project has been quite successful. 9. Bank Performance. Overall, Bank performance was marginally satisfactory at the identification. preparation and appraisal stages, and highly satisfactory at the supervision stage. The Bank responded quickly and effectively to the GoH's request for assistance in identifying project components and procedures, and several characteristics of the project were the result of its conditionalities. While appraisal was thorough in some aspects, technical studies and cost estimates were weak, and insufficient attention was paid to (i) promotion and targeting strategies, (ii) subproject sustainability, recurrent costs and maintenance issues, and (iii) the need for intensive mronitoring and follow-up during project execution. The Bank paid a relatively high level of attention to the project after appraisal, with over 40 weeks of staff inputs in the 12 months between appraisal and 8 effectiveness. Supervision missions involving 101 weeks of staff inputs were consistently conducted from December 1994 until project completion; five missions were conducted in 1995 alone, during the relaunching period after the return of the legitimate Government from exile. Bank supervision was effective in diagnosing the most visible underlying constraints, and project inputs were closely monitored; however, funds were not always made available on time, and project impact and policy targets were unevenly evaluated. 10. Borrower Perbrmcance. The performance of the Borrower during project preparation was satisfactory, and initial commitment to the project was strong. With the arrival of President Aristide in 1991, however, the launching of activities was postponed due to a disagreement that arose concerning the position of DG. Borrower performance varied during the course of the project, but was generally satisfactory, as FAES was allowed to operate with a minimum of interference from GoH. While interinstitutional coordination improved gradually and FAES was able to sign memoranda of understanding with several line ministries and para-public bodies, it remained generally weak, and Board meetings focussed more on identifying and addressing common obstacles to the efficient delivery of project outputs and less on the linkages between the subprojects and achieving policy targets. 11. Project Outcome. The overall project results were highly satisfactory, as practically all output objectives were met. Although specific outcome/impact indicators were not built into subproject designs, there is evidence of reduced overcrowding and improved learning in schools, better health care due to upgraded facilities, reduced incidence of infectious diseases due to vaccination campaigns and new or rehabilitated water supply systems, and strengthened capacity of FAES to manage multisectoral initiatives. Future Operations and Key Lessons Learned 12. The GoH has retained FAES to act as implementing agency for several new projects, or project components. The IDB continues to support civil works and other activities under a US$23 million FAES II project, and some bilateral donors have also indicated interest. The Project Concept Document for IDA's FAES II Project has been prepared. It is recognized that there has been a total breakdown of social services in Haiti in recent years, and that institutional strengthening efforts to reconstruct the social sector ministries are likely to take years; in this context, FAES is now serving a vital need in Haiti as a large source of community-based financing and the only institution that directly addresses poverty. As a result, the rationale for a follow-up FAES project is clear. 13. Several key lessons emerge from the project: (i) project design must incorporate adequate institutional measures aimed at strengthening the implementing agency from the beginning ; (ii) thorough integration of project implementation units and activities (e.g., promotion, evaluation, control and monitoring) within the implementing agency increases the probability of objectives being achieved and sustained; (iii) given the poor 9 performance of several firms in implementing or supervising civil works, new options for the monitoring of works and ex-ante/ex-post evaluation of firms must be considered and piloted; (iv) specific project outcome and impact measures in addition to input and output indicators should be established during design, consistently monitored, and evaluated as part of the project to determine project achievement and impact; (v) project success in a community setting is consistently due to shared leadership at the project identification/preparation stage, strong community participation at all phases of the project cycle, and the capacities for self-reliance to be found within the community. 10 PART I -PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. Project Objectives I. Among the major challenges facing Haiti in 1990. after several years of political unrest and economic decline, were the need to instill hope among the I-laitian people and to root democracy firmly in institutional practice throughout the country. while simultaneously addressing the urgent needs of the poor via quick relie' ef'forts durilng the transition period to political and economic stability. In this context, the Economllic and Social Fund (FAES) was established by the Government of Haiti (GolI) as an administratively and financially autonomous project financing body to achieve a mission whichi, as stated in the decree creating the agency, is "to finance short-term projects with a highl labor component to improve the living conditions of low-income populations in urban and rural areas and increase their productive potential". 2. The FAES project was designed as a US$23.7 million operation, to include a subproject component (US$21.3 million) and an institutional development component (US$2.4 million). The project, for which Credit 2205-HA in the amount of SDR 7,900,000 (US$11.3 million equivalent) was approved on January 17, 1991 and signied on 1-F'ebruary 4, 1991 (three days prior to Presidenit Aristide's inauguration), sought to enable the newly-elected Gol-I to meet its poverty alleviation and political objectives. As definied in the Development ('redit Agreemlient dated February 4,1991, the objectives of the project were to assist the Borrower (Gol l) in: (i) establishing FAES as a means of responding efficiently and in a decenitralized maniner to the basic needs of the nation's poor through non-goverinmenital organiizationis. including cooperatives, organized communlity groups and othler grass-roots organizations; (ii) strengthening health care, nutrition and education services (primilarily lor intfants and pregnant and lactating women) and providing physical intrastructure addressing the needs of the poorest population; (iii) providing an effective channiel lor required donor financing and coordination of scattered domestic eltorts; and (iv) strenigthleniilng the capabilities of and delegated entities for project preparation and implemiientLationi. 3. Tlhe approaclhes outlinied ullder these objectives were broadly concordant with the Bank's country strategy tor 1-laiti, whiichi aimed to: (i) alleviate poverty by providing assistance via selected investmilenits in critical social services, such as health, nutrition and education directed towards the low-income population, emphasizing project management and institutional development; (ii) provide limited support for the productive sectors to arrest the decline in the productive base; and (iii) finance projects designed to prevent fuirther deterioration of physical facilities and the environment. However, the objectives, though clearly stated. were broad in scope and the strategies to achieve them resulted in a complex and very demanding project: in addition to an institutional development component, the project comprised a subproject component involving activities to be I1 implemented in several sectors by a new agency with limited capacities. This component combined such diverse activities as: civil works; provision of equipment and supplies; support to epidemic control, immunization, and adult literacy training programs; construction of water supply systems, sewerage systems and latrines; and advisory services to communities. 4. The IDA credit for the subproject component (US$10 million) was to finance the following: (i) health projects (subtotal: US$6.4 million), including construction and rehabilitation of health centers with an emphasis on primary health care facilities in rural areas, provision of equipment and essential drugs, support to epidemic control, immunization, day care and nutrition programs for preschool children and pregnant and lactating women, construction of small water supply systems, and small sewerage systems and latrines; (ii) education projects (subtotal: US$2.5 million) including primary school construction and rehabilitation, primary school furniture and equipment, textbooks, and support to informal training programs and adult literacy programs targeting women involved in businesses; and (iii) rural roads (subtotal: US$1 million) to provide access for poor communities to markets, schools and health centers. Advisory services (sub-total: US$0.1 million) were also to be provided to weak grass-roots organizations in the poorest communities lacking the institutional capacity to identify and carry out projects. No objective was stated relating to project sustainability, or more specifically to the establishment of user committees or recurrent cost financing. The estimated sectoral distribution in the project cost table reflected needs as demonstrated by the 182 proposals already received from requesting agencies at the time of project appraisal, as well as estimated institutional capacity in the various sectors to implement sound projects. Expectations were expressed not in terms of the number of subprojects to be implemented in each sector or subsector, but of average subproject or unit cost. The costs were estimated at US$45,000 equivalent in health and education; it was estimated that rehabilitation of rural roads would cost approximately US$ 1 0,000/km and that construction could vary from US$20,000/km to US$40,000/km depending on the technique used. 5. The portion of the IDA credit for the institutional development component (US$0.9 million) was to finance salaries and travel expenses of selected fixed-term FAES staff, consultant services, office equipment and supplies, vehicles and microcomputers. Technical assistance was also to be provided to FAES for: (i) the establishment of a price data base on unit costs for construction materials and labor, as a basis for procurement under direct contracting; (ii) the design and implementation of a management information system, including monitoring and evaluation systems; (iii) the completion of an operational manual including project evaluation criteria; (iv) the efirnement of poverty targeting mechanisms; (v) the design of an impact study; and (vi) the establishment of an accounting system. 12 B. Achievement of Project Objectives 6. The project gradually achieved its broad objective of assisting the GoH in: (i) establishing an effective mechanism -the FAES -as a means of responding efficiently and in a decentralized manner to the basic needs of the nation's poor through NGOs and grass-root organizations; (ii) providing an effective channel for required donor financing and coordination of scattered domestic efforts; and (iii) strengthening the capabilities of the FAES and delegated entities for project preparation and implementation. Efficiency was quite low during the first full year of operation, chiefly because of the limited promotion, evaluation and supervision capacities of FAES, and of the deficiencies of several firms contracted to manage civil works activities. Major constraints were subsequently overcome, however, as various departments were reorganized, capabilities for project promotion, preparation and implementation were developed, and major bottlenecks in the project production line were reduced. From an administrative organizational perspective, FAES did not respond in a decentralized manner to the needs of the nation's poor, as all promotion and evaluation activities and all operations were managed from Port-au-Prince, due to major telecommunication, transportation and other logistical constraints throughout the country. Because FAES was established by the GoH basically as an administratively autonomous body to finance short-term projects, it was never made responsible for the coordination of "scattered domestic efforts," as such coordination has understandably remained the responsibility of the GoHi itself, under close scrutiny from Parliament. 7. The extent to which sectoral objectives were achieved is difficult to assess for three main reasons: (i) specific outcome/impact indicators for the project were not described in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), nor measured during or subsequent to implementation, with the exception of sample surveys carried out in July 1996 by an outside IDB consultant and in the fall of 1997 at FAES' request by Quisqueya University's Institut de recherche, de fbrmation el d 'expertise-conseil en gestion d'entreprise (IRFEC); (ii) it is often difficult to isolate the effects of a project from those of other sectoral interventions; and (iii) implementation delays resulted in most activities being completed only in the last two years, and thus their impact cannot yet be accurately determined. With the above caveats, available information reveals that the project was increasingly effective in assisting the GoH with the provision of physical infrastructure and equipment addressing the needs of the poor population; despite implementation delays in the first full year of project implementation (1995-1996), nearly all civil works were completed, and almost all equipment and supplies were procured. However, funds earmarked for technical assistance to weak grass-roots organizations were not disbursed as envisaged. Health Sector (Original Base Cost: US$6.4 million; Actual Total Commitment: US$5.5 million) 8. Nutrition programs. The SAR envisioned support for an unspecified number of nutrition programs for preschool children, and pregnant and lactating women. Due to concerns about the complexity of administration, sustainability and accountability of 13 nutrition programs in Haiti, FAES decided to channel efforts into facilitating distribution and logistical support to school feeding programs, as well as nutrition programs within child care services. Projects (worth US$204,000) presented by a large religious NGO (Mission Alpha) specializing in literacy programs were implemented in all nine regions, and an NGO caring for the handicapped in Port-au-Prince was provided with kitchen equipment. 9. Health care facilities. The SAR anticipated the rehabilitation or construction of an unspecified number of primary health care centers in rural areas. At project closing, five facilities were rehabilitated (total cost: US$175,000) and nine were constructed (total cost: US$405,000). The rehabilitation and construction of the facilities were intended to provide access to modern health care and to reduce the demand for service at higher levels of care, thereby increasing efficiency and lowering overall costs. As no impact assessment was implemented, patient satisfaction with the upgraded or new facilities has not been confirmed. It can only be assumed that the heavy constraints to adequately staffing and managing new health facilities in rural Haiti were at least partly overcome, and that the civil works contributed to the improvement of primary health care in all selected areas. 10. Medical equipment and supplies. The project successfully procured and delivered furniture and medical equipment (worth US$228,000) to five health centers. Although an important contribution, the amount of medical equipment financed by the project was very small compared to the overall stock of old and obsolete equipment in need of replacement. The project also provided pharmaceuticals (worth US$39,500) to a large NGO in Port-au-Prince, and supported UNICEF (four projects worth a total of US$439,000) immunization programs in five regions. 11. Water Supply and Sanitation. Potable water supply has top priority, especially for rural communities, and sanitation measures are also considered to be very important in the prevention of communicable diseases. The main subsector objectives were to improve operation and maintenance of the existing water supply and sanitation systems, and to expand coverage. The project built or repaired 24 small water supply systems (total cost: US$1.135,212) and 69 small sewerage systems and latrines (total cost: US$2.9 million). Although impact of all these projects is difficult to assess as noted above, there is evidence of expanded coverage and improved quality of service. Inasmuch as maintenance plans are adhered to by the beneficiaries, the projects could contribute considerably to the prevention of waterbome and communicable diseases in the targeted communities. Education Sector (Original Base Cost: US$2.5 million; Actual Commitment: US$3.8 million) 12. Primary schoolfacilities. The SAR envisioned the rehabilitation or construction of an unspecified number of preschool centers and primary schools, especially in rural areas. At project closing, 10 facilities were rehabilitated (total cost: US$590,000) and 24 were constructed (total cost: US$1.7 million). The rehabilitation and construction of the 14 facilities were intended to increase access to primary education, with added space for approximately 8,000 students; satisfaction with the upgraded or new facilities, as well as increased enrollment, have not been confirmed, although there is reason to believe that the rehabilitation projects have significantly enhanced the quality of existing education services in selected communities, as overcrowding was reduced and learning environments were improved. As for the 24 new school facilities, it can only be assumed that some of the many constraints to adequately staffing and managing primary schools in rural Haiti were overcome. 13. Provision of equipment and supplies. The project successfully procured and delivered furniture and equipment (worth US$1.1 million) to 148 pre-school and primary school centers, in addition to one informal training center for teachers. It also provided pedagogic material and textbooks to 21 schools and two teacher training centers (total cost: US$260,000), as well as to the Ministry of Education for its adult literacy programs (US$150,000), and supported an informal training program for teachers. No impact evaluation of the textbook and training components was included in the project, but anecdotal evidence would confirm the positive benefits on student achievement. Infrastructure (Original Base Cost: US$1.0 million; Actual Commitment: US$243,000) 14. The SAR anticipated the rehabilitation and/or construction of rural roads and related drainage works, providing access for poor communities to markets, schools and health care facilities. Original base cost allowed for the repair or construction of up to 100 km of roads. Actually, at project closing, as few as nine small road projects were completed (total cost: US$107,000) and these were in the vicinity of Port-au-Prince and in the North-West only. All projects were aimed at repairing or constructing bridges. No project was envisioned at the outset, under IDA financing, in the agricuiltural sector; however, five projects (total cost: US$136,000) dealing with irrigation, soil conservation and stockage, were implemented in this sector. No impact study dealing with these subprojects was conducted. Advisory Services (Original Base Cost: US$0.1 million; Actual Commitment: US$300) 15. The SAR envisioned the provision of advisory services to weak grass-roots organizations in the poorest communities lacking the capacity to identify, prepare and carry out development projects. As it turned out, such services were provided to a certain extent in the course of regular FAES promotion activities, following the establishment of a mechanism for prioritizing subprojects, and the adoption of promotion strategies to target underrepresented regions and demanders requiring technical support. Practically no IDA financing was specifically allocated to such activities. Institutional Support (Original Base Cost: US$0.9 million; Actual Commitment: US$974,000) 16. The SAR depicted an institutional development component to finance salaries and travel expenses of selected fixed-term FAES staff, consultant services, office equipment 15 and supplies, vehicles and microcomputers. At project closing, all equipment, furniture and vehicles required for FAES to be optimally operational had been supplied as needed, although at a third of the cost that was envisaged at the outset. However, salaries paid to selected fixed-term FAES staff over the years were 28 percent higher than envisioned. 17. Technical assistance was provided to FAES for several key studies, as planned. An accounting system was established and developed, and gradually became operational. This task was very demanding, as several components of the initial financial management system were more adapted to institutional management than to project monitoring and management requirements. An operational manual including standard ex-ante project evaluation criteria was completed in 1993 and revised in 1995, and was under revision again at the time of project closing. A formal and quantitative management information system (MIS) was successfully set up in 1995 with support from the Ecuadorian Social Fund; all FAES staff received training on how to feed and use the information in the system, and the MIS was subsequently improved and adjusted by local technicians to meet the specific needs and conditions of the FAES; however, the system was expected to include monitoring and evaluation subsystems, and the Fund has not yet strengthened its capacity to use monitoring information on a regular and systematic basis. A unit cost study was conducted by a local engineering firm, and a dynamic price data base for construction materials and labor was established in March 1997 as a basis for procurement under direct contracting; the system allows for accelerated project evaluation, increased transparency, and better cost management. The establishment of a poverty map and the implementation of a planned targeting study were seriously postponed, which delayed important promotion activities aimed at ensuring a more equitable distribution of projects by sector, type, region and demander; the study was finally conducted by Quisqueya University and targeting mechanisms were designed and gradually refined as a basis for prioritizing projects. The impact study was also seriously postponed, and information on the impact of FAES-supported projects was not readily available until the report of a sample survey, conducted again by Quisqueya University (IRFEC), was finalized in April 1998; in addition, supervisors produced very few final project reports, and follow-up visits to confirm that FAES-supported schools and health centers are operational were not carried out. 18. The FAES was not in a position to conform its activities to the macroeconomic policies determined by the GoH, or even to the sector policies determined by the line ministries, as such policies had yet to be drafted and submitted to elected bodies for approval. ' At the time of credit approval, there was no broad social and economic program to combat poverty in Haiti, and both FAES and the GoH were acting as "ad- hocracies," long on short-term and incremental planning and short on long-term development strategy. FAES' financing remained exclusively demand-driven for well over a year, as targeting mechanisms based on poverty maps and indicators had yet to be The unelected Government's macroeconomic objectives at the time of loan approval were basically those of an IMF stand-by program. The Government's current macroeconomic objectives are still those of a stabilization program, and have not been approved by elected bodies. The Ministries of Education and Health were able to make their sectoral policies known only in 1997, and such policies have yet to be approved by Parliament. The MTPTC is still in the process of delineating its own policies. 16 used, and it could not reasonably be expected -in the short term, at least -to become an intrinsic part of a broad social and economic program to combat poverty. In addition, it is difficult to establish to what extent the composition of the Fund's project portfolio reflected -at least, until recently -community preferences, as opposed to the interests of religious leaders, politicians, NGOs, contractors, or even suppliers, as surveys of community needs, priorities and preferences, as well as needs analyses, were not conducted. The GoH's financial objectives were at least partially met, however, as no significant counterpart funding was required from the Ministry of Finance, and practically no commitment was required from the line ministries concerning the recurrent costs associated with maintenance of the facilities to be constructed or rehabilitated. 19. The project's contribution to the institutional development of FAES itself, and more specifically to its establishment as a mechanism capable of assisting the Government in responding flexibly and efficiently to the basic needs of selected poor communities through grass-roots organizations, was quite substantial. However, FAES' contribution to the institutional development objectives of line ministries was only partial, as this was not a specific objective of FAES. The Fund has managed to transfer some components of its operational technology to ministries such as MENJS and MTPTC, and -notwithstanding the fact that some of the country's ablest civil servants have found a "better" job with the Fund -there is no indication that the creation and expansion of FAES has undermined the capacity of government institutions. The fact remains, however, that while FAES has entered into formal agreements with four ministries as well as with SNEP, there has been little genuine coordination between the subproject programs of the Fund and those of the line ministries and of other public bodies. If only because the efficiency and effectiveness of their management teams are so weak, the Fund has been led to act, as a rule, on its own. In addition, FAES has implemented projects that GoH ordinarily would not. This is either because of a lack of resources, because the projects are requested by municipal governments, or because they are grass-roots projects requested by private sector entities such as NGOs, religious groups or community organizations, who have learned over decades how not to depend on the State. 20. Achievement of the physical objectives of the project was substantial. Whereas rough estimations at appraisal were that approximately 200 health and education subprojects could be implemented under IDA financing, subprojects in these sectors actually numbered 335, including 141 social infrastructure subprojects. In addition, 14 economic infrastructure subprojects were implemented. The quality of physical outputs (buildings and other structures) is variable, but in most cases it is acceptable, and in some cases (e.g., clean water supply systems) it is very high. Several problems stem from the fact that projects were often not comprehensive and had been planned in an incremental fashion, as components of larger projects. Some structures indicate negligence on the part of the contractors as well as a lack of vigilance on the part of the engineers hired by FAES to supervise construction. Some schools have ventilation and lighting problems which could have a negative effect on the health and learning abilities of children. Some still lack a proper water supply system. Some were equipped with electrical outlets, even when communities had no intention of using them or no power supply was to be made 17 available. Several dry latrines are mislocated, and lack of maintenance and/or proper drainage could generate health problems for user communities. 21. While poverty reduction was understandably negligible, as this was not an explicit objective, the project had a positive impact on the welfare of most communities where subprojects were executed, and succeeded in mitigating some of the most adverse effects of the economic crisis brought about by the military coup and the international embargo. It provided many poor communities with infrastructure, equipment and supplies. Short-term employment was quickly generated, and this allowed the communities to buy goods and services that were not readily accessible before. 2 Clean water supply systems and latrine have most probably contributed to a decline in the incidence of infectious diseases. Thousands of children were provided with better school facilities and basic school furniture and supplies. And thousands of farmers were provided with better feeder roads and protection against soil erosion. 22. Achievement of the objectives relating to gender issues was partial. The FAES has yet to identify and address women's issues within its programs, to adopt a policy regarding gender equity, to support deliberate initiatives aimed at increasing women's participation in various decision-making processes and improving women's income levels and socioeconomic conditions, and to build its institutional capabilities so that gender considerations are fully integrated into policies, programs, projects and activities. The employment-generating function of the infrastructure projects has tended to bypass women, who represented less than 10 percent of paid workers on a typical construction site. Characteristically, women have been expected to fetch pail after pail of water as required by paid laborers, without being paid the usual minimum daily wage granted to other men and women; this bias has been unfortunate, as women are usually hard workers, who also happen to head 50 percent of all households in Haiti, and are known to spend quite judiciously what earnings come into their hands. At least, women benefit more than men as users of the health infrastructure delivered; health centers are visited more by women, who need pre- and post-natal care and are responsible for their children's health. Clean water supply systems are also used primarily by women and girls, and it is expected that the new facilities will alleviate their hardships. 23. Achievement of environmental objectives was negligible. Current concern with environmental problems in rural Haiti is focused on the alarming rate of deforestation and soil erosion: no subproject was implemented with the objective of either protecting the remaining forests or increasing wood production. While two soil conservation subprojects were implemented, satisfaction with these projects was not documented, and no environmental impact assessment was conducted. Subproject proposals were to include environmental impact assessments in relevant areas; health facilities were to be designed so as not to contaminate the environment, and equipped with septic tanks or improved latrines; similarly, a plan for improvement of sanitation of schools was to be required, including latrines. However, no environmental impact assessment was ever 2 It is estimated that between 80 and 100 person/months of short-term employment were generated by each of the 155 infrastructure projects under IDA financing. Local laborers were paid minimum daily wage (currently, approx. US$2.25). 18 conducted, and this makes it difficult to establish the extent to which environmental objectives were achieved. While most latrines and drainage systems were built according to specifications, it was observed that some dry latrines are poorly located, and that lack of maintenance and/or proper drainage could generate environmental problems in several areas, especially near schools and health centers. 24. Achievement of objectives associated with public sector management was partial, as already discussed (para. 19). Achievement of the objectives associated with private sector development was also partial. FAES used a large number of small engineering firns or contractors, who earned supervision fees (5 percent) and profits (10 percent) estimated at well over US$ 1.0 million (IDA financing only). As the vast majority of project inputs were procured in the domestic market, employment generated directly or indirectly by the subprojects in the short-term (e.g., provision and transportation of local inputs) was significant, and a large proportion of the total income generated by these subprojects wound up in the hands of importers and traders. Local and international NGOs were also widely used as executing agencies, or as "intermediary agencies" in the case of three large organizations. However, FAES did not fund one single project belonging to the "directly productive" category (e.g., rotating funds for small enterprises, breeding stock projects, agricultural and marketing cooperatives). While directly productive projects were eligible for financing at the outset and as such appeared on the project menu, and over 150 requests were submitted by small farmers or entrepreneurs, this category was removed from the menu in the fall of 1995, as it did not fit with FAES' dominant "production-line" strategy. C. Key Factors Affecting Project Implementation 25. Project implementation was affected by two main factors: (i) a military coup, which led to a complete suspension of activities in October 1991, for a period of three years; and (ii) the limited institutional capacity of FAES during the first full year of activities (1995-1996), coupled with deficiencies of several firms contracted to manage civil works activities. Project implementation was also partially affected by (i) delays in the disbursement of IDA funds; and (ii) the limited institutional capacity and commitments of key line ministries. 26. Factors Not Subject to Government C'ontrol. FAES was established by the GoH in 1990, under the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), and a DG was named in June 1990 by the unelected Head of State, for a two-year period. The Credit Agreement was signed in February 1991 and pilot projects were soon envisaged, but with the arrival of President Aristide, the Fund's launching was postponed due to a disagreement that arose between the financiers and the President: the latter, in opposition to the IDB and IDA, wanted to name a new DG. By the time of the military coup in September, 1991, the Fund had not been able to begin operations. The project was suspended until the return of President Aristide from exile in the fall of 1994, and subproject activities started in April 1995. Because of the coup and the international embargo that followed, the 19 project was thus implemented over a seven-year period, including a formal three-year suspension, instead of the four-year period originally envisaged. 27. There were delays in the disbursement of IDA funds during the first half of 1996. The delays were so prolonged that FAES was forced to use IDB funds to cover some expenses that would have been covered by IDA financing under normal circumstances. Whereas approximately 70 percent of the funds allocated to the subprojects in the IDA agreement had been committed in June 1996, only 5 percent of the IDA funds for institutional development had been committed because the costs had been covered by IDB financing. A redistribution of IDA funds across categories became essential in order to enisure that the needed funds be readily available. In addition, problems related to the limits on the size of civil works contracts allowed under direct contracting hampered the flow of operations; in some cases, rural schools were left incomplete because of the limits on direct contracting. Amendments were eventually made to the Credit Agreement: the Special Account was increased from US$750,000 to US$1.5 million, and funds were redistributed across categories. 28. Faclors Subject to Government Control. The limited institutional capacities of the GoH, especially the MEF and related institutions, affected project implementation. A difficult socioeconomic environment combined with cumbersome budgetary and other administrative procedures disrupted the pace of project implementation by straining the smooth processing of subprojects. The uneven flow of funds to FAES resulted in delays in the signing of civil works contracts and the paying of contractors, which limited FAES' ability to obtain recourse in cases of contractor non-performance. These delays also led to the postponement of related activities. The problems were due largely to the slow turnaround time of the Banque de la Republique d 'Haiti (BRH) with regards to fund transfers and transmission of necessary information for replenishing the Special Account, and to problems with the Banque Nationale de Credit (BNC) regarding compliance of agreements on the amounts of the bonds required from contractors. 29. Factors subject to Implementing Agency Control. The limited institutional capacity of FAES during the year that followed the relaunching of operations in April 1995, coupled with the deficiencies of several firms contracted to manage civil works activities, affected project implementation in a significant way. While FAES increased its operations at a rapid rate, established an MIS and profited from various technical assistance and training activities, several problems relating to a general lack of internal coordination, the uneven distribution of subprojects by region, bottlenecks in the subproject cycle, insufficient attention to issues of impact and sustainability, irregular reporting of project progress and poor accounting practices were observed. These problems were resolved in the course of the two following years, however. 30. As of April 30, 1996, FAES management had approved 398 subprojects, all selected by the Promotion Department, recommended by the Evaluation Department, and forwarded to the Supervision and Monitoring Department for implementation. As FAES was eager to prove its effectiveness and efficiency through quick disbursment, priority had been given to infrastructure subprojects already prepared by the demanders, located 20 in easily accessible areas, and relatively simple to implement. However, the fact that 95 percent of all demands made by public institutions had been evaluated, while the proportion was only 19 percent for community organizations, was a clear indication of the need to provide the latter with support for project preparation. In addition, it was apparent from the uneven distribution of subprojects across the regions that FAES needed a strategy for prioritizing subprojects. In the following months, some actions were taken to ensure a more equitable distribution of subprojects by region and demander. The Fund entered into agreements with LJNOPS and UNICEF to help identify projects in areas of difficult access, and toyed with the idea of setting up regional offices in less accessible areas, and conducting surveys of community needs and priorities in selected areas. A promotion strategy was developed and projects were prioritized by taking into account data regarding unsatisfied basic needs for each region, the sector distribution of the budget, and the Fund's past commitments by sector and region; the results of these efforts were reflected in the changes that occured over the following year in the distribution of activities. At project closing, all 133 districts (Communes) have been visited and 129 have received at least one project, while projects are planned for the remaining four. 31. During the first year of operation, major bottlenecks were identified in the subproject cycle. At the promotion stage, a third of all the project proposals received remained incomplete, largely because of the difficulties some demanders faced at the community level in preparing proposals. As of May 31. 1996, some 548 subprojects (over 50 percent of all proposals submitted to the Evaluation Department) were pending evaluation and some had been pending for as long as six months; the main cause for this lag in project evaluations was the large number of small projects, and the lack of sufficient and/or specialised staff to cover the workload. In addition, there were two significant bottlenecks at the supervision and monitoring stage, that were subject to FAES control. These were encountered at project signing and when projects were pending a final supervision report in order to be officially completed. One of the key reasons for the accumulation of subprojects pending contract signing to begin implementation, or that required a final supervision report to be completed, was the lack of sufficient supervisors; the problems were compounded by an inefficient project document filing system and the use of traditional forms to communicate contract signing dates. All these bottlenecks at the evaluation and implementation stages were reduced or eliminated over the second year of operation, so that the "production line" could be made more efficient. FAES internal efficiency is now quite high, and makes it stand out among Haitian public institutions and even among local private development organizations. The Fund, with its 62 employees, is now capable of evaluating up to 50 projects per month, of approving up to 40 projects per month, and of implementing a typical infrastructure subproject in less than 500 days on average, from promotion to completion. Its ratio of operational costs to subprojects financed is currently in the vicinity of 10 percent, down from 12 percent two years ago. 21 D. Project Sustainability 32. Observations made in communities where one or several subprojects had been completed, or were well under way, indicate that subproject success can be attributed to a mix of factors such as: (i) shared leadership, obtained when formal and informal community leaders submit a project of theirs to discussion. listen carefully, and seek support from several community "influentials"; (ii) strong community participation in all phases of the project cycle, i.e., genuine community ownership of a project intended to meet what are perceived to be important needs; and (iii) the capacities for self-reliance to be found within a community -an obvious requirement for project sustainability. Insufficient attention was given by FAES to such sustainability issues. 33. The vast majority of projects funded by FAES have operational service components, and require maintenance. In cases where community organizations have applied for funding, these organizations are expected to cover all recurrent costs (e.g., salaries, supplies, maintenance), generally through the collection of tuition or user fees, and possibly with some support from an NGO. In cases where line ministries or NGOs have applied for funding, they are made responsible for ensuring that the corresponding services are committed following completion of the infrastructure works. However, FAES has not given consistent consideration to future operating costs. One-time arrangements have often been made for the Fund to provide schoolbooks or other supplies (social assistance projects), but long-term arrangements for the provision of such supplies or for the financing of recurrent costs -by the beneficiaries themselves, by the GoH. by NGOs or even by external donors -have not been an integral part of each project. However, the provision of small training or other enabling programs to community groups, to improve the sustainability of projects (e.g., maintenance of infrastructure), has been initiated. 34. It is too soon to determine whether or not the line ministries and the municipal governments, which in Haiti as in other developing countries face heavy budgetary constraints, will actually provide the required operational services and project maintenance in cases where subproject ownership rests with them. It is also too soon to establish how maintenance of FAES subprojects and follow-up education and health services will compare to those provided by line ministries to their own projects. Part of the answers will probably lie with those NGOs involved with FAES-funded subprojects who are known to generally abide by the terms of the commitments they make. The major problems will most probably be with those communities that have not claimed project ownership through heavy involvement at the planning and implementation stages, or with those religious leaders who have not paid sufficient attention to the viability of their pet projects. 35. In any case, while subprojects aimed at altering the resource base, promoting agricultural modernization and the like, could eventually be sustained solely with local resources, such self-reliance is not to be expected -at least in the foreseeable future - 22 in the case of projects aimed at improving basic health, nutrition and education services. For one thing, tuition and user fees are often hard to collect in very poor communities, even when they appear to be quite reasonable. Second, lasting improvements in the education sector cannot be achieved without improvements in the performance of teachers, and in the private sector, teachers' salaries alone should presently be tripled to approximately US$60 per month -conditional on training and performance -if this sector is to both retain its better teachers and make full-time teaching a real option for others. This would mean a payroll of US$540 per year per teacher, no more than a quarter of which could possibly be financed by school fees at their current levels. It is obvious that improved local services will be far too expensive for Haitian communities to finance out of local contributions, and that such services will have to be financed by foreign sources, either by charities, bilateral aid, multilateral grants and loans, or the remittances of Haitians abroad. E. Bank Performance 36. Overall. Bank performance was marginally satisfactory at the identification, preparation and appraisal stages, and highly satisfactory at the supervision stage. The Bank, which had played a major role in the establishment and orientation of the Fund itself, responded quickly and effectively to the GoH's request for assistance in identifying project components and procedures, and several characteristics of the project were the result of its conditionalities. The Bank determined at the outset that the disbursement ceiling would be set at US$50,000 per subproject, and that a subproject could not take more than 18 months to implement. Later, it determined that, while the requirement for local counterpart financing should be waived, beneficiaries and intermediary agencies would still be expected to contribute free labor and materials. The Bank, along with the IDB, also determined that three types of subprojects should be eligible for financing, and that disbursements could be made on the basis of narrowly defined subproject outputs. 37. Identification, preparation and appraisal were thorough in some respects, as evidenced by inclusion in the SAR of criteria for project eligibility in the health and education sector, as well as broad guidelines on subproject monitoring. However, technical studies and cost estimates were weak, and insufficient attention was paid to: (i) promotion and targeting strategies aimed at avoiding overconcentration of subprojects in a limited number of geographical areas, at the request of unelected local influentials; (ii) subproject sustainability, recurrent costs and maintenance issues; and (iii) the need for intensive monitoring and follow-up during project execution. In addition, the Bank did not adequately incorporate lessons learned from previous socioeconomic development projects in Haiti. Lessons included the importance of: (i) establishing a clear hierarchy of objectives and indicators to monitor impact; (ii) paying attention to institutional and bureaucratic arrangements, including possible conflicting interests and power sharing between such stakeholders as community groups, NGOs, local and central governments; (iii) addressing underlying constraints in addition to implementation symptoms; and (iv) paying attention to building strong institutional capacity during the first year of operation. It should be added that the 58-month delay between appraisal and project resumption in 23 1995, during which the project was not reappraised, meant parts of the SAR were outdated when disbursement began. 38. The Bank paid a relatively high level of attention to the project after appraisal, with over 40 weeks of staff inputs in the 12 months between appraisal and effectiveness. Supervision missions involving 1O 1 weeks of staff inputs were consistently conducted from September 1994 until project completion; five missions were conducted in 1995 alone, during the relaunching period after the return of the legitimate Government from exile. During supervision, the teams not only identified obstacles to implementation, but diagnosed underlying constraints and offered advice on how to overcome them, which was considered valuable by FAES management. Changes in task management between appraisal and effectiveness, and then during the project, had no clear negative effect on implementation. However, while project inputs were closely monitored, funds were not always made available on time, and project impact and policy targets were unevenly evaluated. F. Borrower Performance 39. The performance of the Borrower during project preparation was satisfactory. The GoH submitted a short proposal aimed at enhancing public sector efforts to alleviate poverty by way of job creation and social assistance, while rehabilitating and expanding the country's social infrastructure. The fact that the project was ambitious in scope and size was probably justified given the need to reverse the extensive deterioration of the social sectors. Initial GoH commitment to the project was strong. With the arrival of President Aristide, however, the launching of activities was postponed due to a disagreement that arose between the financiers and the President, who wanted to name a new DG. By the time of the coup in September 1991, the Fund had not received sufficient support from the Government to begin operations. Government commitment to the project resumed in 1995, long after President Aristide's return from exile, with the nomination of his former Prime Minister as DG. Equipment lists were prepared, and most of the school and health facilities to be built or upgraded were identified prior to the first disbursement. 40. The performance of the Borrower varied during project execution, with some cumbersome administrative procedures occasionally disrupting the pace of subproject implementation, but was generally satisfactory, as FAES was allowed to operate with a minimum of interference from GoH. Actually, FAES performed best in those areas where it exercised the most control over its activities, especially as the line ministries were weak and unable to provide the Fund with any guidance of a technical or administrative nature. While interinstitutional coordination improved gradually and FAES was able to sign memoranda of understanding with several ministries and para- public bodies, it remained generally weak, and Board meetings chaired by the Minister of Finance focused more on identifying and addressing conmmon obstacles to the efficient delivery of project outputs and less on the linkages between the subprojects and achieving policy targets. Finally, notwithstanding the fact that audit reports were 24 consistently overdue, the Borrower's compliance with all loan covenants was highly satisfactory (Table 10). G. Assessment of Project Outcome 41. The overall project results were highly satisfactory, as practically all output objectives were met. Although specific outcome/impact indicators were not built into subproject designs, there is evidence of reduced overcrowding and improved learning in schools, better health care in upgraded facilities, reduced incidence of infectious diseases among users of new or rehabilitated water supply systems, and strengthened capacity of FAES to manage multisectoral initiatives. H. Future Operations 42. The GoH has retained FAES to act as implementing agency for several new projects or project components, which in itself is an indication of the Fund's reputation as an efficient and effective institution to address poverty issues. The IDB continues to support civil works and other activities under a US$23 million FAES II project, and some bilateral donors have also indicated interest in providing financing. In May, 1996, the Bank prepared a Project Concept Document for a Second FAES Project, and revisited the concept following the midterm review of the current project. It was noted that social funds were originally envisioned as temporary institutions set up to address emergency situations, that would eventually close down as social sector ministries became more efficient and productive. It was recognized, however, that there has been a total breakdown of social services in Haiti in recent years, and that institutional strengthening efforts to reconstruct the social sector ministries are likely to take years. In this context, the FAES is now serving a vital need in Haiti as a large source of community-based financing and the only institution that directly addresses poverty. As a result, the rationale for a follow-up FAES project is clear. I. Key Lessons Learned 43. The key lessons learned from the implementation experience of this project are: (a) It is unreasonable to expect an investment project which disburses on the basis of narrowly-defined outputs and contributes a marginal amount to overall sector spending to effect wide-reaching policy reform. (b) Project success in a community setting is usually due to shared leadership at the project identification/preparation stage, strong community participation in all phases of the project cycle, and the capacities for self-reliance to be found within the community. 25 (c) Project design must incorporate adequate institutional measures aimed at strengthening the implementing agency right from the beginning. (d) Thorough integration of project implementation units and activities (e.g., promotion, evaluation, supervision and monitoring) within an implementing agency increases the probability of objectives being achieved and sustained. (e) Given the poor performance of several firms in implementing or supervising civil works, new options for the monitoring of works and ex-ante/ex-post evaluation of firms must be seriously considered and piloted. (f) Specific project outcome and impact measures in addition to input and output indicators should be established during design, consistently monitored, and evaluated as part of the project to determine project achievement and impact. 26 Table I: Summary of Assessments A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible N/Applicable Macro policies O O O O Sector policies O O O Financial objectives O * 0 O Institutional development ID O O Physical objectives * 0 0 Poverty reduction 0 El Gender issues * Other social objectives 0 O O D Environmental objectives 0 - 3 * Public sector management 0 * 0 0 Private sector development O * 0 O B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain Social Assistance O O Social Infrastructure l 0 U Economic Infiastucture 0 0 O C. Bank Performnance Highly Marginally Deficient Satisfactory Satisfactory identification and preparation Cl 0 Appraisal 0 * 0 Supervision * 0 0 D. Borrower Perfonmance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Preparation 0 U Q Implementation 0 U 0 Civil Works 0 0 Covenant compliance * 0 0 E. Assessment of Outcome Iy Margnaly Unsatisfacto Highly SatSatisfact oatisfactory Unsatisfactory 27 Table 2: Related Bank Loans Loan Title Purpose Year of Status Approval Preceding Operations 1. Education IV-A To help finance the GoH's basic 1985 Completed. Credit (Cr. 1592-HA) education reform, initiate a reform of closed in 1992 (21% the vocationalVtechnical training undisbursed) system, and strengthen the education sector management 2. Health & Population To implement a comprehensive heath 1990 Active (47% (Cr. 2085-HA) service model to better reach the poor, undisbursed) and to support a national AIDS and tuberculosis program aiming to decrease Haiti's high tuberculosis incdence 3. Water Supply & Sanit. To strengthen CAMEP, improve the 1990 Active (37% (Cr. 2052-HA) supply of drinking water in Port-au- undisbursed) Prince, and develop a sanitation plan for the capital" metropolitan area Concurrent Operatons 1. Education V (Cr. To maintain the gains made in basic 1991 Cancelled in 1994. 2264-HA) education and prepare for future Credit closed in progress, through sector policy and 1995 (100% investment policy and investment undisbursed) program development, quality improvement, and resource management 2. Emergency Economic To finance rehabilitation and 1994 Completed. Credit Recovery (Cr. 2670-HA) maintenance for agriculture, energy closed in 1995 (fully and infrastructure sectors, and to disbursed). provide employment and income opportunities for the poor 3. Employment To provide short-term employment to 1995 Completed. Credit Generation (Cr. 2765- people in extreme poverty, improve closed in 1997 (2% HA) seriously deteriorated infrastructure, undisbursed) and strengthen capacity of the institutions to manage small projects f Foilowing Operations 1. Basic Education To improve the quality and equity of Under preparation (Cr. 29389-HA) basic education services. 2. FAES II (Cr. ??) To finance small projects in poor Under preparation communities, with an emphasis on promotion, targeting and sustainability of investments. 28 Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in Project Cycle Date Planned Actual Date Identification n/a nla Preparation n/a April, 1990 Appraisal June, 1990 June. 1990 Negociations I n/a nla Board Presentation n/a 17 January, 1991 Signing nia 4 February, 1991 Effectiveness n/a i 21 Mav. 1991 ProjectCompletion 31 December, 1997(1) 30 June, 1998 Loan Closing 30 June. 1998 (2) i 30 June, 1998 (1) Initial date was 31 December, 1994, as per Credit A.2reement of 4 February, 1991. Chanoed as per kmendment of 19 July, 1995 (2) As formally revised on 15 June, 1995. Initial date was 30 June, 1995. Table 4: Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US$ million) IDA FY 91 92 93 94 95 1 96 97 i 98 Appraisal Estimate 0.6 3.6 7.1 9.3 11.3 i Actual i 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 4.1 9.5 | 10.7 Actual as%of Estimate 117% 19.4% i 9.9% 7.5% 6.2% I 36.3% 84.1% | 94.7% 29 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Key implementation indicators in Estimated at I Modified Actual committed SAR/MOP I Appraisal (IDA) (as of 07/97) (at project closing) l. Project Component US$10 MN US$9.8 M US$9.57 M a) Health and Nutrition i US$6.4 M ! US$4.5 M US$5.53 M * Nutrition programs for pre-school children, i 10 nutrition projects pregnant and lactating mothers 104 projects completed Rehabiliation and construction of primarv Numbers not specified x US$45,000 5 facilities rehabilitated health care infrastructure in rurai areas Approx. 142 projects j and 9 constructed * Provision of equipment/supplies (incl. drugs) (Average project cost Equipment provided for 5 • Support to epidemic control programs estimated at US$45,000) health centers and drugs * Support to immunization programs suoplied (1 proiect) * Support to lEC and training programs p preventive programs * Construction of small water supply systems '24 WSS built/repaired * Small sewerage systems and latrines 69 SS&L built/repaired b) Education US$2.5 million US$4.0 million US$3.8 M * Rehabilitation and construction of pre-schooi 10 facilities rehabilitated i centers and primary schools Numbers not specified and 24 constructed | Provision of primarv school furniture and Approx. 56 projects 100 projects urniwure:equipment equipment (Average project cost x US$45,000 orovided for 149 facilities |. Provision of pedagogic material i textbooks estimated at USS45,000) Materials for 21 schools |f* Support to informal training programs and 2 training centers f .Literacy and vocational training programs Support for I literacy and targeting women involved in businesses I urainung program l) Infrastructure US$1.0 m US$1.2 M US$0.243 M Rural roads (and related drainage works) giving Up to 100 km of roads I Up to 120 kn of 9 road projects (bridges) access of poor communities to markets, schools (Cost per km estimated at rural roads !and health centers US$10,000 -US$40,000 ; asrcultural projects d) Advisory services US$0.1 M US$0.1 M USSO.003 M Provision of advisory services to weak grass- Services provided in the roots organizations in the poorest communties course of regular ESF that iack the capacity to carry out projects promotion activities 11. Institutional Support Component US$0.9 M iUS$1.0 M US$0.974 M a) Fixed investment US$0.15 M US$0.1 M US$0.055 M Office equipment and supplies, vehicles. Iomputers b) Salaries and operating expenses US$0.64 M US$0.8 M US$0.822 M * Salaries of selected Fixed term ESF staff • Consultant services I c) Technical assistance to the ESF US$0.1 M iUS$0.1 M US$0.097 M * Establishment of a price data base on unit costs * Unit cost study done for construction matenals and labor and once data established Design and implementation of a management * IS implemented, with information system. including M&E systems skeleton of M&E svstem * Completion of an operating manual including *ooerating manual proJect evaluation criteria completedandrevised * Refinemenc of povertv targeting mechanisms * Targeting study done * Desi2n of an impact study ' Impact study conducted *F Establishrnenc of an accounting system * Accounting system established and functional 30 Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation 1. Indicators for project operations were not defined in the SAR. They were not required as standard procedure at the time of appraisal. Performance of FAES operations relating to: (i) financing; (ii) project flows; (iii) direct impact, and (iv) efficiency of operations, was to be monitored through the MIS. Some performance indicators have actually been incorporated into the MIS, a cost evaluation program has been completed, and the social evaluation process has reputedly been strengthened. j12. An effort was to be made to collect baseLine data on project impact at the community level through the MIS, and to provide additional baseline data by way of a targeting study. A targeting mechanism has actually been developed. which provides for baseline data at the macro level. Baseline data at the subproject level, although available, often lack validity and/or reliability.l Table 7: Studies included in the Project Study Status Impact of study 1. Poverty targeting srudy to provide means and Completed: 1996 Substantial ways for enhancing the targeting of the use of FAES resources, and to establish a svstem to evaluate the performance of FAES in reaching the poor in various sectors and subpopulations. The study was to be carried out during the preparation phase of the project 2. Study on impact of the approved subprojects Not done. Study was replaced by Negligible on the corresponding beneficiary communities. ex-post sample survey conducted bv IRFEC in 1997-1998, and dealing basically with project ownership and sustainability 31 Table 8A: Project Costs Appraisal estimate Actual Item (US$ million) (US$ million) (1) Local r Foreign Total Local Foreign Total i1. Institutional Support 1.999 .428 | 2.427 3.307 .261 | 3.568 (a) Fixed investmnent .022 .255 | .277 l .416 -.083 | .499 (b) Operating expenses 1.538 j .083 1.621 | 2.251 .048 i 2.299 (c) Technlical assistance i .239 i .090 1, .329 j .640 .130 .770 (d) Unallocated .200 1 --- i .200 1 - j- 2. Sub-Proj'ects 16.897 4.333 21.230 19.638 -- 19.6382 . _ _ S u -r o e t r__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (a) Health sub-projects 7.620 I 2.773 10.393 l 6.725 -- 6.725 * Water supply 3.214 2.143 1 5.357 1.381 --- 1.381 * Basic sanitation 2.392 .126 2.518 4.139 _ 4.139 * Primarv Health Care/Nutrition 2.014 .504 i 2.518 ! 1.205 i 1.205 (b) Education sub-projects 3.960 .990 4.950 1 7.956 --- 7.956 l (c) Economic infrastructure 5.130 .570 5.700 i 4.957 --- 4.957 I _ _ _____ __ ._ ______ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ (d) Technical assistance to orgs. .187 --- .187 | - -- --- TOTAL PROJECT COST 18.896 ' 4.761 23.657 i 22.945 .261 23.206 Table 8B: Project Financing Il II Appraisal Estimates (US$M) Actual (US$M) Source Local Foreign ! Local ! Foreign o Costs Costs I Total Costs I Costs i Total I1DA ln/a n/a i 11.325 | 10.635 .097 10.732 IDB n/a n/a 1 10.419 12.3 10 .164j 12.4741 |Beneficiaries n/a n/a 1.913 (1) (1) (1) TOTAL 18.896 % 4.761 23.657 22.945 .261 23.206 (1) Includes mostly in-kind contributions. Unaccounted for. Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits No economic rate of return was calculated at appraisal, as this was not applicable. Project benefits were expressed in terms of increased efficiency of social and other services, improved targeting of subsidies and I assistance, and formulation of strategies to protect vulnerable groups. 1. 32 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants I| Originl Revised Section Covenant Statn Fflfdnent Fulfilnt Description of covenant I Comments type .____ _______a d ____ Agreement: LIII Loan Number IBRD -220SO 3.01 (c)(A) | 03 C 06130 1991| Transfer proceeds of Creditto ESFtocaffy i None out the project 3.02 (a) | 05 | C 061301 1991 Fill all positions of Department Directors None i andiESF General Director withqualified staff acceptable to IMA; consult IDA before replacement of any personnel 3.02 (b) 05 C i06! 30i 199l1 Employ qualified fixed-term statT None i________ __ _ _ _ _satisfactory to IDA 3.03 09 C Borrower or ES F shaU inform IDA of anv None I - condition which interferes or threateas to | , ' l interfere with project or subproject objectives performance by ESF of its obligations under the ESF contractual arrangements or under Subproject Agreements. 3.04 (a) 10 C Subprojects will be identified. appraisted None and implemented under terms set forth in the Operational Manual unless amended by IDA. 3.04 (b) I 10 CD j09 30! Ml Borrower will ensure that ESF maintains iMlanual completed the Operational Manual until report in 1993 only. , referred to in nara. 9.06 (e) of General i because of project Conditions is received by IDA and not to !suspension in the amend the Operational manual without i wake of military IDA's approval, coup in SepL 1991 3.05(a) 1 09 C j1231' 1992 EndertakeajointBorrower/lDAiESF INone | , i ' review of project progress Ageement: LIV Loan .Nuber BRD -22050 4.01 (b) ! 1 CD I 1231 i 1991 HaverecordsandaccountsofESF i TheauditofFFY independently audited 1996 was presented to the Bank after some delay Key Convent Types: I I Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource 01 Accounts/audit allocation 02 Fuiancial performance/generate revenue from beneficiaries 12 Sectoral or cross-sectoral policy: regulatory! institutional 03 Flow and utilization of project funds action 04 Counterpazt funding 13 Other 05 Management aspects of the project or of its executing agency 06 Environmental covenants Status: 07 Involuntary resettlement C = covenant complied with 08 Indigenous people CD = complied with after delay 09 Monitoring, review and reporting _NC = not complied with 10 Subproject implementation CP = complied with partially 33 Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements There was compliance with all pertinent Bank Operational Manual statements throughout the project cycle. Table 12. Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Stage of Planned Revised Actal project cycle s40 Weeks US$ '000 Weeks US$ '000 Weeks I USS 000 Through appraisal n/a n/a n/a n/a 29.9 i 46.093 Appraisal -Board _ n/a n/a n/a n/a 19.1 45.712 Board -Effectiveness i n/a n/a n/a n/a 2113 45.172 Supervision nia n/a n/a n/a 101.1 274.175 Completion 5.0 12.2 ---- i 4.4 10.400 TOTAL n/a n/a n/a, n/a 175,8 i 421.552 34 Table 13. Bank Resources: Missions Perfomance I,'II R ag (1) !I I ! 1 ~~~~~~~~~~~Davs in Specialized Staff Stage of Project Cycle Month/ No. of F eld i Seills Staff De Types of Field I Skills .mp~~~Sl.s Oj Year Persons (total) Represented I Ob)s Problems (2) ldentification NO DATA AVAILABLE ! nia n/a n/a Preparaton 04/90 6 NO DATA AVAILABLE n/a aia ; n/a Preappraisal I NO DATA AVAILABLE n/a n/a n/a Appraisal i 06/90 5 NO DATA AVAILABLE ! n/a wia n/a Pre-Negoiations NO DATA AVAILABLE 1 n/a nla n/a Pre-Board NO DATA AVAILABLE n/a ma n/a F~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Pre-Effectiveness i NO DATA AVAILABLE I n/a n/a n/a Supervision: I 06/91 3 0 MIG; ED; PH 1 2 _ II 09/94 NO DATA AVAILABLE U -_ m1 101/95 2' 0 EC; MG U U -- rv 03/95 2 0 EC;MG U U -- V 05/95 NO DATA AVAILABLE II avl 108/95 NO DATA AVAILABLE ViI 09195 2 16 EC; OP S -- M vm i 01/96 1 6 EC -- -- Ex 1 06/96 4 24 EC; EC; EG; MGi S S D (vid-Term Review) X 10/96 21 8 MG;EC s s F .YI 1 04/97 2 12 MG; EC S I S Otherdonors XII 09/97 NO DATA AVAILABLE Completion 05/98 1 6 MG S S i Subproject ownership * AR = architect; D = Disbursement Officer: EC = economist; ED = education secialist: EG = enoineer: F = financial analvst: HF = health financing specialist ; L = legal ; MG = management specialist ; OP = Operations Assistant/Specialist ; P = procurement specialist ; PH = public health specialisL (1) Ratings: 1/HS = no problem; 2/S = moderate problems; 3/U = significant problems. (2) Types of Problems: L = legal; M = management performance ; F = availability of funds ; D = disbursement; PR = procuremenL 35 Appendix A Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale Second Credit de 'IIDA pour le FAES Mission de Pr&Evaluation (FAES II) Aide-memoire #1 Introduction 1. Une mission de la Banque Mondiale, composee de Mme Elizabeth Waters (chargee de projet), M. Jorge Alfaro (consultant ingenieur), Mlle. Julie Van Domelen (economiste), M. David Warren (economiste), et M. Daniel Boyce (specialiste financier) s'est rendue A Port-au-Prince du 7 au 18 decembre pour faire la pre-evaluation du projet "Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale II" (FAES II). La mission a eu des seances de travail avec la directrice generale, le directeur de promotion, le directeur d' evaluation, le directeur de controle et suivi et le directeur administratif et financier du FAES. Elle s'est egalement reunie avec les representants de la Banque Interamericaine de Developpement (BID), du Programme des Nations Unies pour le Developpement (PNUD), des Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'Enfance (UNICEF), et de la Cooperation Francaise. La mission a visite des projets a Gonaives, Saint-Marc, Arcahaie et Port- au-Prince. La mission voudrait exprimer ses remerciements a toutes les personnes rencontrees pour leur accueil et l'esprit de cooperation qui a caracterise les discussions. 2. Le FAES a fonctionne bien depuis la reouverture de ses operations en Avril 1995. Les premiers prets de la BID et d'IDA ont et decaisses rapidement, et le FAES a un personnel quaiifie et une base solide pour les operations. Le but de la mission a et de revoir les procedures operationnelles de l'institution, et chercher la maniere d'ameliorer la performance pour le second pret. La mission s'est concentree sur la participation comnmunautaire, les projets productifs, le ciblage, le << Monitoring et Evaluation >>, et a fait des suggestions pour les ameliorations. Des actions specifiques a prendre avant la mission d'evaluation sont en italiques dans le document. Promotion 3. Le volume de demandes a baisse considerablement au cours de la derniere annee, pour deux raisons principales: l'absence de fonds pendant neuf mois en 1996-97, et le volume de travail entrain6 par l'execution du Programme National de Construction d'Ecoles. Il faudrait reprendre le programme de promotion beaucoup plus active pour augmenter le nombre de demandes et assurer un flux permanent de demandes. L'institution devrait considerer la possibilite d'engager deux promoteurs de plus avec experience en participation communautaire pour aider a renforcer la strategie de promotion. Avant la mission d'evaluation ilfaudrait reviser et mettre Li jour les projets aux etapes 105 (check list incomplet), I'etape 202 (projet en observation), et en informer les communautes. 4. Meme avec les promoteurs additionnels, le FAES ne peut s'occuper directement de faire la promotion de l'institution et des projets dans toutes les localites du pays. Pour cette raison, il doit travailler en partenariat avec des ONGs qui peuvent faciliter l'identification des besoins et la 36 preparation de projets d'une facon participative et selon les definitions et procedures du FAES. Le FAES a organise deux colloques avec des ONGs l'et6 demier. II faudrait maintenant faire le suivi pour arriver a des actions concretes de partenariat qui donnent des resultats visibles. De plus, il existe des programmes finances par d'autres agences avec lesquelles le FAES est en discussion telles le Programme d'Appui Prioritaires aux Municipalites, Appui en Amenagement du Territoire du MPCE finance par le PNUD qui ont pr6ne l'approche participative dans l'identification et la priorisation des projets. II faudrait etudier les possibilites de coordination avec ces programmes. Pour le financement du 2nd Pret de la Banque Mondiale, il faudrait envisager et planifier une strategie permettant au FAES d'etre plus proche des beneficiaires. Avant la mission d'evaluation il faudrait arreter la strategie et determiner les ressources necessaires pour la mise en cewre. 5. Participation. La participation des beneficiaires demeure un des plus grands defis pour le FAES. L'institution doit continuer de s'assurer que les projets sont une reponse reelle aux besoins des beneficiaires, et que les beneficiaires participent au choix de la demande, a la presentation du dossier, a l'execution du projet et sa prise en charge. Pour garantir que les projets presentes au FAES sont le resultat d'un processus participatif de formulation, les documents et les rencontres de promotion devraient mettre l'accent sur ce point. Les recommandations venant du travail en cours sur l'evaluation sociale et l'evaluation de la prise en charge des projets doivent etre incorporees dans les strat6gies et actions futures de promotion. 6. Appui aux Communautes. La mission a etudie les propositions d'appui aux communautes dans le cadre de la strategie de promotion. A part des activites generales de promotion, commes les contacts avec les autorites locales et centrales et les campagnes publicitaires, deux activites prioritaires pour appuyer les communautes defavorisees ont ete identifiees: un processus de formation communautaire, et le financement des etudes de pre- investissement: formation communautaire: II est suggere que le FAES commence dans les prochains mois un programme pilote de consultation et appui aux comnmunautes ciblees. Cet appui devrait se concentrer sur : (a) l'identification et la priorisation des besoins des communautes; (b) le renforcement des aspects participatifs dans l'identification et la formulation des projets, (c) l'amelioration de l'acces au financement par les communautes defavoris6es, et (d) la coordination entre les autres agences et programmes au niveau local. Les resultats de ce programme pilote incluront la generation de projets dans des regions defavorisees, le developpement d'une methodologie pour continuer ces activites sous forme de projets 'formation communautaire', et la revision de la liste des projets eligibles pour voir s'il faut faire des ajustements au menu du FAES. La Banque Mondiale, dans son programme d'appui au processus de "Social Assessment', c'est a dire de consultation avec les beneficiaires pour mieux orienter les projets finances par la Banque, peut offrir une assistance technique pour aider a la realisation du programme pilote. Pour les autres ressources necessaires, l'appui communautaire disponible dans FAES II de la BID d6vrait etre applique a cette activite. Pour ce programme pilote, FAES choisira une commune dans chacun des trois departements les plus defavorises du pays (criteres a discuter avec la Banque). Le Dipartement de 37 Promotion presentera une premiere version des termes de references avant fin janvier 1998. Ce programme pilote se fera en utilisant des consultants ou des organisations locales ayant de l'experience dans le domaine. II serait preferable que la meme equipe travaille sur les trois communes suivant les orientations de la Direction de Promotion. etudes de pre-investissement: Pour renforcer la capacite technique des communautes defavorisees et pour assurer la qualite technique des projets, il faudrait mettre en place le financement des etudes de pre-investissment deja prevu mais pas encore utilise. Avant la mission d'e'valuation, la Direction de Promotion devrait: (a) finaliser les criteres d'eligibilite (type du projet, caracteristiques des communautis ou demandeurs, montant maximum des etudes, procedures pour les contrats des services, etc.); et (b) une estimation du nombre et montant pour lesprojets deja requs au FAES. 7. NMenu des Projets. En vue de preparer la mission d 'e'valuation, le FAES devrait revoir le menu des projets et proceder aux ajustements necessaires, y compris l'Flimination des types qui ne sont pas demandes et l'inclusion de nouvelles categories pouvant surgir du travail d'appui aux communautes. Evaluation 8. Bien que les procedures d'evaluation aient ete ameliorees, la Mission recomnmande de renforcer le processus d'evaluation dans les domaines suivant: (i) formation; (ii) evaluation sociale; (iii) evaluation economnique et prise en charge par la comrnmunaute. 9. Composante Formation dans les Projets. Le FAES a deja commence a exiger la presence et parfois la constitution, quand il n'existe pas, et la formation de comites de gestion. Pour assurer que ces comites sont aptes a remplir et remplissent effectivement leurs fonctions. L 'institution devrait developper des processus de promotion, d 'evaluation et de controle de cette formation, et des modeles de guide deformation pour chaque type de projet qui le requiert. 10. Evaluation Sociale. La mission s'est reunie avec le consultant sociologue embauche par le FAES pour ameliorer l'evaluation sociale. La Banque est tres satisfaite de l'initiative et l'interet montre par le FAES dans ce domaine. nI a ete convenu que le FAES enverrait le rapport du consultant ainsi qu'un plan d'application de ces recommandations dans tous les etapes du cycle des projets. 11. Evaluation economigue et prise en charge par la cornmunaute. La mission a revu les procedures et les parametres d'evaluation economique des projets presentes. II a et observe que le travail d'analyse des budgets des projets est tres solide et complet. Cependant, il y a quelques elements essentiels qui manquent ou ne se sont pas suffisamment refletes dans les fiches d'evaluation. La mission et la Direction d'Evaluation se sont mis d'accord sur la necessite de completer la methodologie et la mise en place dans les fiches d'evaluation des projets des aspects suivants: Definition et quantification lorsque c'est possible -- des benefices des projets. 38 * Definition des fourchettes acceptables de couits par beneficiaire. Dans l'annexe A, le tableau I presente les parametres actuels pour les projets FAES et reflete des variations importantes dans l'utilisation de cet indicateur par type de projet et parmi les memes types de projets. * Analyse financiere des couits recurrents generes par chaque projet, comme les couits d'entretien, les couits en personnel additionnel, et autres coats de fonctionnement. * Analyse de la gestion prevue pour l'operation et l'entretien apres l'intervention du FAES, y compris le niveau des tarifs applicables, la capacite des comites de gestion de generer les ressources necessaires, et l'engagement budgetaire des communes ou des minist6res. Le FAES devrait exiger un engagement du part de tous les groupes impliques dans les projets (ministere, communaute, gouvernement local, etc.), et non pas seulement de l'institution demandeuse. 12. Dans l'annexe A, le Tableau 2 presente une matrice de ces elements d'analyse economique pour les types de projets les plus importants. L'application de cette methodologie depend d'informations deja disponibles au FAES, comme les moyennes de couit par beneficiaire et par type du projet, ainsi que d'informations qu'il faut collecter ailleurs, comme les normes des coCits d'entretien d'infrastructure dans le pays. La mission considere ce travail d'amelioration methodologique tres important pour assurer la qualite et la durabilite des investissements finances par le FAES. Les fiches d 'evaluation revisee de maniere a incorporer ces aspects devraient etre presentes a la mission d 'evaluation de la Banque Mondiale. 13. Le FAES devrait considerer la possibilite d'engager quelques evaluateurs pour renforcer l'evaluation sociale, les composantes de formation dans les projets, et les projets plus complexes (projets agricoles, d'eau potable et d'assainissement). Avant la mission d'e'valuation, la Direction d 'Evaluation doit definir ses besoins en assistance technique prevus pour le FAES II. Controle et Suivi 14. Les Charges de projet sont responsables de l'administration des contrats avec les executants et les superviseurs aussi bien que du contr6le technique des travaux. Pour les projets finances A partir des deux lers Prets, la DCS n'a pas reagi de maniere suffisamment rapide et efficace vis-a-vis des retards d'execution. Cependant, recemment, le FAES a commence A penaliser les executants qui ne completent pas les travaux. De plus, la mise A jour des rapports aux differents etats devrait etre automatique. Les resultats de ces actions devront se refleter prochainement dans les indicateurs de performance. La Direction devrait realiser des seances de formation des charges de projets pour l'administration des contrats d'execution et de supervision la composante de formation des projets, la prise en charge par la communaute, et la durabilite des projets. Le FAES pourrait au besoin recourir A des professionnels pour se faire assister. 15. Pour pouvoir absorber le deuxieme pret IDA, ra Direction de Suivi devrait revoir le nombre de charges de projet, et d6terminer les besoins eventuels de recrutement en fonction de la charge de travail previsible, comme chacun est a la limite maintenant avec une moyenne de 23 projets. Le profil des charges de projets devrait prendre en compte la necessite de renforcer les 39 aspects de formation des comites de gestion et la participation des beneficiaires. La Direction doit aussi prendre des mesures pour elargir la liste des superviseurs et executants potentiels par type de projet et zone geographique, pour eviter les goulots d'etranglement qui pourraient r6sulter du volume augmente des projets dans les prochains mois. Administration et Finances 16. Decaissements. La Direction du FAES souhaiterait reouvrir un compte en monnaie locale (gourdes) pour les paiements locaux effectues avec les fonds de la Banque. Cette action avait ete recommandee par les auditeurs extemes du projet, comme un moyen d'augmenter la transparence des debits financiers et de simplifier ainsi la comptabilite et l'audit du projet. L'avis du Departement des Decaissements de la Banque sera transmis au FAES avant le 15 janvier 1998. 17. Systeme Financier. Un nouveau Directeur Financier a et nomme, et a commence a travailler le ler decembre. D'autre part, un nouveau Chef Comptable est engage. L'equipe de la Banque s'est mise d'accord pour chercher les moyens d'offrir un stage (peut-etre un seminaire de lancement pour le FAES II) a ces nouveaux responsables dans un futur proche. 18. Bien que le systeme de gestion informatisee ne presente pas de problemes notables, 1'equipe de la Banque et la Direction du FAES ont decide de convertir le systeme en version Windows, vu que la version DOS utilisee est demodee et peut presenter un probleme de "passage a l'an 2000" dans sa programmation. 19. Les manuels de procedures pour les finances et la comptabilite ne sont pas adequats. Un nouveau manuel plus detaille et contenant les principaux modeles de formulaires et de rapports financiers, sera redige par le nouveau Directeur Financier et le nouveau Chef Comptable dans les prochaines semaines, en vue d 'etre presente a la mission d 'evaluation. 20. Rapport Financier. La compagnie Turnier & Laurent a ete recontactee pour l'audit 1996-97. Le rapport 1996-97 est en preparation et est suppose etre expedie a la Banque avant la date limite. La premiere version du rapport a ete revue par la mission, qui a fait quelques observations et suggestions presentees dans I'Annexe C. Les Projets Productifs 21. Le FAES a finance des projets productifs, (systeme d'irrigation, de stockage, de sechage, marches). Compte tenu de la complexite de ce type de projets, avant de prendre la decision, l'institution devrait attendre les resultats de l'etude de Quisqueya pour ameliorer l'evaluation et les procedures de fonctionnement. Pour les projets (micro-credits), le FAES entreprendra une etude pour determiner l'eventualite de son intervention dans le secteur. 40 Ciblage des Fonds 22. Le but de la strategie de repartition budgetaire et de priorisation des projets mise en place au cours de la premiere phase garantit l'equite dans la transparence. La distribution budgetaire publique par departement devrait se faire avec 70-75% des fonds. FAES entreprendra une campagne active de promotion, sur lesquelles il n'est pas intervenu. FAES continuerait A accepter des demandes de toutes les communes du pays, mais il prioriserait l'evaluation (et le financement de pre-investissement) pour favoriser des communes "deficitaires". Cependant, le FAES ne devrait pas permettre que le budget pour un Departement se consomme par une commune dans un autre Departement qui a dejA utilise ses fonds, au moins pas avant la fin du programme. En plus de la repartition budgetaire, le mecanisme le plus efficace pour le ciblage des fonds vers les communautes et beneficiaires pauvres est une promotion proactive et un menu cible. "Monitoring and Evaluation" du FAES 23. Monitoring. A travers les indicateurs fournis par le systeme d'information, le FAES a les outils necessaires pour faire un suivi constant de la gestion du cycle de projet et du fonctionnement de l'institution. Un sous-groupe d'indicateurs, les 'key performance indicators' etaient utilises pour le projet FAES I. La mission a revu ces indicateurs et propose quelques ajustements sur la base de l'experience de la premiere phase et des objectives prevus pour le FAES II. Ces indicateurs de performance sont lies a: la couverture, la capacite, l'efficacite, le ciblage, la participation, et la qualite des operations du FAES. Ces indicateurs se trouvent dans l'Annexe B. Le systeme d'information est deja capable de fournir la majorite des indicateurs. Il y en a deux qu'il faut creer: (a) le pourcentage des projets avec evaluation sociale bonne/moyenne/avec problemes; et (b) le pourcentage des projets en execution classes bon/moyenne/avec des problemes. Les Directions d'Evaluation et du Suivi et Contr6le auront la tache d'etablir les criteres simples pour la classification de tous les projets qui sont en evaluation et exdcution a partir du fin janvier 1998. En plus, le FAES revisera la liste proposee et fera des observations pour arriver a une liste finale des indicateurs de performance. I1 faudrait que tous ces indicateurs soient tenus A jour, pour disposer regulierement de l'information correcte, et qu'ils soient etudies au cours des reunions hebdomadaires des directeurs. Ces indicateurs seront presentes a la Banque Mondiale sous forme de rapports semestriels, incluant une analyse des donnees, des informations sur la performance des projets, des recommandations pour resoudre des goulots d'etranglement, et un plan d'action. 24. Evaluation. En plus d'un systeme de suivi continu des operations du FAES a travers ces indicateurs, il faut prevoir le necessite d'evaluer des aspects ponctuels du programme aussi bien que l'impact des activites du FAES sur le terrain. L'etude de la prise en charge des projets en cours (l'Universite Quisqueya) represente un point de depart important. La mission s'est reunie avec l'equipe chargee de l'etude et a discute l'information A etre recueillie. Les resultats preliminaires de l'etude devraient etre envoyes a la Banqu'e Mondiale aussit6t que disponible. En plus du rapport, la mission recommande que la FAES obtienne une copie des donnees (fiches remplies, notes des entrevues) pour les archives du FAES. 41 25. Pour les evaluations qui seront effectues pendant le Second Pret de la Banque Mondiale, la mission et le FAES se sont mis d'accord sur les objectifs, les activites, un calendrier et un budget provisoire. L'analyse de l'impact couvrira les domaines suivantes:(a) le ciblage, ou bien le degre de succes du FAES au niveau de la couverture de la population la plus defavorisee, (b) l'impact des investissements du FAES du point de vue de l'amelioration de l'acces, l'usage et la qualite d'infrastructure et services, (c) l'effet sur le bien-etre de la population ciblee, (d) l'impact sur les institutions qui participent et la capacite des communautes a resoudre leurs problemes, et (e) la durabilite des benefices des investissements FAES. Dans ces domaines, la premiere chose a faire est definir ce qu'on va mesurer. II faudra ensuite etablir les indicateurs specifiques qui permettent de mesurer les dimensions d'impact. Cela permettra de creer une base de donnes qui servira comme ligne de base pour une comparaison ex-post. La mission recommande l'attente des resultats de l'evaluation de la prise en charge qui est en cours pour fixer les indicateurs d'evaluation d'impact, et pour profiter de l'experience sur le terrain de l'equipe de l'Universite Quisqueya. Le FAES engagera soit la meme equipe, soit un expert national ou international dans le domaine, soit une combinaison des deux pour aider les directeurs du FAES a determniner l'ampleur de l'evaluation d'impact, les methodologies a suivre et les sources d'information disponibles, et surtout d6velopper les indicateurs ex-ante qu'il faut recueillir au niveau des projets du FAES avant ou bien pendant l'execution. Ces indicateurs devraient etre deja instrumentalises dans les operations du FAES avant que le premier projet du FAES II soit finance par la Banque Mondiale. La Banque fournira des exemples de methodologies et d'indicateurs appliques dans les evaluations d'impact des autres Fonds Sociaux. 26. Pendant le Projet Second Pret de la Banque Mondiale, deux evaluations d'impact sont prevues, une a la moiti6 du projet et une a la fin. Cela permettra d'avoir les informations suffisamment t6t pour faire des ajustements pendant la derniere partie du projet, mais aussi d'observer le progres du FAES quant a la qualite et pertinence des ses investissements a travers le temps. On a aussi prevu la necessite d'autres evaluations ponctuelles, par exemple sur un type de projet specifique, ou bien un travail de rencontres avec les beneficiaires pour obtenir leur opinion sur les procedures et resultats du FAES. Un budget de US$ 100,000 est prevu pour chaque evaluation d'impact, plus US$ 100,000 pour les evaluations ponctuelles pour un total de US$300,000. Systeme d'Information 27. Bien que le systeme d'information soit en place et fournisse des informations et des indicateurs, la mission a remarque que les Directions ne l'utilisent pas de maniere optimale pour le controle de la gestion de l'institution. Le FAES devra recruter avant fin janvier une nouvelle personne ressource au niveau de l'Unite Systematisation pour assurer la continuite au niveau du systeme. Coordination avec les Ministeres Sectoriels 28. Les accords de cooperation avec les Ministeres de l'Education, de l'Agriculture, des Travaux Publics et le SNEP ont ete prepares, negocies, et signes. Les accords stipulent la communication ouverte entre les differentes parties au sujet des investissements d'infrastructure 42 et d' assistance sociale, et la responsabilite des institutions pour les couts recurrents des investissements. Le FAES devrait travailler avec le Ministere pour resoudre le probleme de retard dans la nomination de professeurs pour les ecoles construites ou reparees par le FAES. Montant du credit IDA 29. Le FAES a la capacite d'approuver entre 30-35 projets par mois, avec un couit moyen de US$ 50,000, ce qui represente US$ 1.5 -1.75 millions par mois et US$ 18 -21 millions par an. Compte tenu des ressources disponibles au titre du fmancement de la BID, le programme suivant a ete prepare a la Banque: Annie Fiscale BID LOCAL BM TOTAL Juin-Sept '97 $2,000,000 $200,000 $2,200,000 Oct. 97-Sept. 98 $14,000,000 $2,000,000 $2,000,000 $20,000,000 Oct. 98-Sept. 99 $8,000,000 $1,900,000 $10,000,000 $19,900,000 Oct 99-Sep2000 _ $1,800,000 $18,000,000 $19,800,000 2000 1 _ 1$18,000,000 $0 TOTAL $24,000,000 $5,900,000 $48,000,000 $61,900,000 *le montant correspond aux engagements en projets FAES, pas aux decaissements 30. II est donc propose un pret IDA de $48 millions de dollars et une periode d'execution de quatre ans. De plus, la mission a identifie certains besoins d'assistance technique et de depenses operationnelles pour lesquels le budget actuel du FAES, y compris la contribution BID, pourraient ne pas suffire. De plus, le FAES informera la Banque Mondiale aussit6t que possible de l'eventualite de demander un PPF pour prefinancer ces activites. Ces chiffres seront confirm6s au cours de la mission d'Evaluation en fonction de projections detailles. 31. La mission amis l'accent sur la necessite d'entreprendre les actions indiquees en italique avant ia mission d'evaluation prevue pour fin fevrier. I1 faudrait (i) nettoyer les projets dans le systeme; (ii) determiner la strategie de decentralisation du FAES; (iii) rediger les termes de reference pour le programme pilote de formation communautaire; (iv) finaliser la strategie de pre-investissement; (v) revoir le menu de projets; (vi) reviser les fiches d'evaluation; (vii) recruter une nouvelle ressource de l'Unite Systematisation et (viii) elaborer le nouveau manuel pour les finances et la comptabilite. 11 faudrait egalement determiner les besoins eventuels d'assistance technique sp6cifiques pour ces taches. Port-au-Prince, le 18 decembre 1997 43 Analvse Economique des Projets du FAES Infrastructure en Sante 2 -4 98 10 Mobilier Scolaire 56 419 85 1358 Agricuture (cons. sols, l drainage, irrig., stockage) 680 2 6 3 51 14097 Latrines 966 T 1073 229 1234 Curage des Canaux 1306 T 11 -§4 5569 Eau Potable 1507 11951 9 9379 Infrastructure Scolaire 3l549 l3375 1 30 32477 *NNE*7 Analyse Economique des Sous-Projets du FAES: Table 2 Type du Avantages Posibks Quantification des Indicateurs Analyse de Cofts Analyse de Ia Pour Determiner Projet Avantages Majeurs Economiques Recurrents Gestion AprAs le _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ P r o j ee Infrastructlre * Augmentation dans l'offre * Reduction dans les Minimisation des * Identification et Qui est responsable * Experience Scolaire educative (plus de places) coQts d'entretien a CoAts: quantification pour l'opdration de sectorielle des (IS/IOI-107; * Extension des niveaux cause de la (compare avec les des besoins du I'ecole? coOts d'entretien de AS/1Ol-IOS) disponbiles a l'ecolc rehabilitati6n parametres financieres personnel infrastructure pour * Amelioration dans la qualite FAES) additionel A Qui est le arriver au calcule physique de I'6co1e (plus * Extension de la vie cause de la responsable pour standard d'espace par eleve, utile du batiment * CoOtIm2 construction des 1'entretien de * Definition du disponibilit6 de muebles) * CoOt/salle de classe salles de classe I'ecole? niveau de * AmAlioration de la sante des * Recettes prevues por * Cofltlbanc scolaire rehabilitation eleves (meilleur hygiene, 1'ecole A cause de * Calcul de Comment vont-ils versus nouvelle meilleur ventilation) I'expansion dans le * Cott de nouveaux cofits asurer la dotage de construction * Moins de coAts de entretien nombre des dleves r6habilitation < ...% d'entretien de personel majeur A cause de la du coDt de nouvelle l'infiastructure necessaire? rehabilitation * Avantage de l'acces A construction par an * Extension de la vie utile de I'ecole ou la Est-ce qu'il y a I'ecole achevement de CoAt-EficacitA: deja une manque * Meilleur assistance des I'ecole primaire (compare avec les de rubrique 6leves (pour posibles parametres financi6res salaries? ameliorations comme FAES) cantines, bancs, etc.) Comment vont-ils * Meilleur gestion de I'dcole (A * CoOt par 6leve s'organiser pour cause du renforcement de assurer l'entretien I'area administratif et les Taux Interne de annuel? comites de gestion) Rentabilite: * Meilleurs taux d'apprendre Comment font-ils des eleves Applicable a l'analyse en ce moment? de l'economie sur coOts d'entretien et l'extention de la vie utile du batiment Type du Avantages Posibles Quantification des Indicateurs Analyse de Couts Analyse de la Pour Determiner Projet Avantages Majeurs Economiques Recurrents G(estion Apres le Projet Systemes de * Augmentation de la * Diference nette dans Minimisation des * Calcul de Qui est responsable * Experience I'Eau Potable consommation de l'eau les depenses de Coats: nouveaux cofts pour l'op6ration du sectorielle des (IS/301-305) * Economie sur les depenses de menages en eau (compare avec les d'entretien de systeme? coats d'entretien de menages, soit en temps parametres financieres I'infrastructure infrastructure pour epargne dans la collection ou * Calcule de la FAES) par an Qui est le arriver au calcule bien en evitant acheter de production des responsable pour standard 1'eau plus cher menages avec 1'eatu * CoOt/fontainc * Calcul des coOts 1'entretien du * Amelioration de l'hygiene et * Coat/citeruc d'operation systc611e? de la sante de la population * Economie sur les familiale (personnel, * Augmentation de la coats d'entretien * Coat/puit energie, chlior..,) Y'a-t-il un comite production de la nouriture de * Cout/reparation mi de gestion, la menage * Estimation du compose de qui? * Economie sur les coats Cofit-Eficacit6: coat total par d'entretien (pour les projets (compare avec les mois/an par Y'a-t-il le niveau 4 de rehabilitation) parametres financieres famille de connaissance U * Augmentation de la valeur FAES) technique economique de la zone necessaire pour * Co&t/beneficiare gerer le systeme * Coat/quantite localement? hebdomadaire livre par menage Comment c'est organize le systeme Taux Interne de de paiement des Rentabilite: beneficiaries? Applicable a l'analyse Est-ce que le de 1'economie sur coats niveau des coats d'entretien, sont dans les augmentation de la possibilite soit des production du menage et beneficiares soit la valeur economique de des institutions la zone locales d'en payer? Type du Avanlages Posibles Quantification des Indicateurs Analyse de CoGts Analyse de la Pour Determiner Projet Avanitages Majeurs Econoimiqucs Rctcurresits Gestion Apr6s le Projet Infrastructure * Reduction des taux de * Reduction nettes des Minimisation des * Identification et Qui est responsable * Experience et Equipment morbidite dans la zone coOts des services Cofits: quantification pour l'operation du sectorielle des en Sante * Reduction des taux de * Economie sur les (compare avec les des besoins du centre de sante? coits d'entretien de (IS/201-204; mortalite dans la zone co(ts d'entretien parametres financieres personnel infrastructure pour AS/20 1-208) * Expansion dans le rang des * Augmentation des FAES) additionel Qui est le arriver au calcule services de sante offerts dans revenues du centre * CoOt/m2 responsable pour standard la zone * CoAt/salle de * Calcul de 1'entretien du * Definition dti * Augmentation de la capacite consultation nouveaux coOts centre de sanit? niveau de des prestations de soins * Co0t/vaccini d'entretien de rehabilitation * Reduction dans les coGts des * Cot/nmeubles salle l'infrastructure Comment vont-ils versus nouvelle services, soit pour une de consultation par an asurer la dotage de construction reduction dans le temps d' * CoOt/paquet de personel attente dans le centre ou equipment * Calcul des autres necessaire? coGts de transport/temps pour * Coflt de cofts recurrents, 4> arriver aux alternatives ou rehabilitation < % par exemple Est-ce qu'il y a cofts des services prives du coOt de nouvelle dotage des deja une manque * Augmentation dans la qualite construction medicaments, de rubrique des services reparation des salaries? * Augmentation de la CoGit-Eficacite: equipments productivite de la population (compare avec les Comment ils * Ecoftomie sur les coOls paramrtres financieres assurent le d'entretien (pour les projets FAES) stockage de de rdhabilitation) medicaments CoOt/b6ndficiare essentielles? Taux Interne de Combien devraient Rentabilite: payes les Applicable a I'analyse utilisateurs des de I'conomie sur coOls services? d'entretien, cofits des services et revenues du centTe Type du Avantages Posibles Quantification des Indicateurs Analyse de CoQts Analyse de la Pour Determiner Projet Avantages Majeurs Economiques R&eurrents Gestion Apres le I'rojet Infrastructure * Economic sur les cofts * Economie stir les Minimisation des * Calcul de Qui est le * Experience Economique: d'entretien des voies et des coOts d'entretien des Coats: nouveaux coQts responsable pour sectorielle des Pistes, Ponts, routes voies et des routes (compare avec les d'entretien de 1'entretien du coats d'entretien de Passarelles et * Economie sur les coOts * Economie sur les parametres financieres l'infrastructure travaux? infrastructure pour Routes d'entretien des vdhicules coats d'entretien des FAES) par an arriver au calcule Secondaires * Meilleure circulation des vehicules * Coat/kilometre Est-ce que le standard (IE/001-008) vehicules, reduction dans le * Valeur economique * CoOt/m2 niveau des coQts temps qu'il faut pour pour les zones sont dans les traverser une tranche de route urbaines Colit-Eficacite: possibilite des * Augmentation dans I'acces (compare avec les institutions locales aux marches parametres financieres d'en payer? * Augmentation dans l'acces FAES) aux services sociales * Cout/beneficiaire (education, sante) * Coflt/vehicule/jour * Augmentation de ia valeur economique de la zone Taux Interne de * Reductions dans les coats de Rentabilite: transport Applicable a l'analyse de l'economie sur coats d'entretien des routes et des vehicules, peut-etre I'augmentation dans le valeur de la zone ou reductions dans les coats de transport Type du Avantages Posibles Quantification des Indicateurs Analyse de Cofits Analyse de Ia Pour Determiner Projet Avantages Majeurs Economiques R&eurrents Gestion Apres le Projet Infrastructure * Augmentation de la * Augmentation en Minimisation des * Tariffs Qui es responsable * Experience Economique: production de la zone b6nefices nets aux CoGits: d'utilization aux pour l'operation et sectorielle des coats March6s, * Amelioration en la producteurs (compare avec les producteurs I'entretien des d'entretien de Silos, Glacis commercialization des * Economie sur les parametres financieres * Coats d'entretien ouvrages? infrastructure pour de Sechage, produits, en volume, en prix cofits d'entretien FAES) des ouvrages arriver au calcule Conservation et en qualite (pour les projets de * CoAt/hectare * Besoins en Comment les standard de Sols * Augmentation en b6nefices rehabilitation) * Cotl/m3 stockc assislance producteurs sont-ils (IE/101-109) nets aux producteurs t&ciniqLue ct organizds? * Augmentation de la valeur Coat-Eflcacit6: 1'appui du economique de la zone (compare avec les personnel Qui a l'acces aux * Economie sur les coats parametres financieres d'operation avantages de d'entretien (pour les projets FAES) 1'investissement? de rdhabilitation) * Coat/benbficiare * Amelioration a Est-ce que le 1'environnement de la zone Taux Interne de niveau des coOts oD Rentabilite: sont dans les Applicable a I'analyse possibilites des de l'economie sur coats producteurs d'en d'entretien, payer? augmentation de production et revenus des producteurs * Comme la crdation de l'emploi n'est pas un but direct du FAES, on na pas inclu lees emplois generes parmi les avantages des projets 49 Indicateurs de Performance du FAES Couverture du FAES 1. Distribution des projets (demande et approuve) par region 2. Distribution des projets par type du projet Capacite du FAES 3. Nombre et valeur des projets demandds, evalues, approuves, en execution et termines 4. Decaissements mensuelles en projets 5. Coat moyenne des projets approuves 6. Nombre des projets en execution pour charge des projets Eficacit6 du FAES 7. Couits administratifs/budget total annuel 8. Nombre des jours moyennes entre: Demande presentee (95) et pret a passer a l'evaluation (115) Projet en evaluation (205) et projet presente au comite (218) Projet approuve (310) et projet en execution (510) 9. Pourcentage des projets termines au temps prevu 10. Nombre de projets qui ont depassds plus de 60 jours de retard 11. Cout actuel par beneficiaire par type du projet Ciblage 12. Montant approuve par commune/l'allocation indicative pour commune en function du niveau de pauvrete departemental Participation 13. Pourcentage de contrapartie des demandeurs et beneficiaires Qualite des Projets 14. Nombre des projets evalues/nombre des projets rejetes 15. Nombre des projets annules 16. Pourcentage des projets avec ordres des changes plus de 20 % du montant originalement approuve 17. Pourcentage des projets avec 6valuation sociale bonne/moyenne/avec problemes 18. Pourcentage des projets en exdcution classes bonlmoyenne/avec problemes 50 ADMINISTRATION FINANCIERE Decaissements La Direction du FAES est interessee A re-ouvrir un compte en monnaie locale (gourdes), pour les paiements locaux effectues avec les fonds de la Banque. Etant donne que le compte servirait de compte transitoire et serait dans la meme banque que le Compte Special, le risque de devaluation serait minime. Cette action avait ete recommandee par les auditeurs extemes du projet, comme un moyen d'augmenter la transparence des debits financiers et simplifier ainsi la comptabilit6 et l'audit du projet. Une requete avait et adressee A la Banque (Mime Waters) concemant une reallocation des diverses categories de prets de FAES I, afin que le surplus de ces fonds soit utilise et qu'aucune categorie ne soit mise A decouvert. Cette requete sera prise en consideration par la Banque et discutee avec la Direction du FAES, et s'il est juge necessaire et adequat, utne reallocation sera faite. Systeme Financier Des changements importants se sont produits recemment au sein du personnel financier du projet. Un nouveau Directeur Financier a ete nomme, et a cormence a travailler le ler decembre. D'autre part, un nouveau Chef Comptable sera prochainement engage parce que la personne travaillant A ce titre a recemment demissionne du FAES. Cette nouvelle direction sera indispensable pour le maintien et l'aamlioration du niveau du systeme comptable du projet, et l'equipe de la Banque s'est mise d'accord pour chercher les moyens d'offfir un stage (peut-etre un seminaire de lancement pour le FAES II) a ces officiels dans un futur proche. Un consultant engage recemment par la BID a effectute une revue de l'administration financiere du projet. Ses donnees et ses conclusions devraient etre serieusement prises en consideration par la Direction du FAES afin que des ameliorations soient apportees. Le projet utilise le programme comptable ACCPAC pour tenir ses livres. Le systeme facilite la preparation des rapports, la selection des donnees et la comptabilite multi-monnaie (dollars et gourdes), quoique la derniere est realisee de telle sorte qu'elle represente une duplication du travail deja effectue. Bien que le systeme ne parait pas comme presentant de serieuses difficultes, l'equipe de la Banque et la Direction du FAES admettent que le FAES devrait convertir son systeme en version Windows, vu que la 51 version DOS utilisee est demodee et peut confronter un "An 2000" probleme dans sa programmation. Les manuels de procedures pour les finances et la comptabilite ne sont pas adequats. Un nouveau manuel, qui sera plus detaille et qui contiendra les formats des formes les plus importantes et des rapports financiers, sera redige par le nouveau Directeur Financier et le nouveau Chef Comptable dans les prochaines semaines. M. Boyce a suggere qu'un brouillon de ce manuel soit redige avant la prochaine mission d'evaluation de la Banque, afin qu'il soit revu a ce moment. Rapport Financier Les cornmentaires de la Banque au sujet du rapport de l'audit 1995-96 ont ete discutes avec le Directeur du Projet et le Directeur Financier. Les principaux conmnentaires ont t&: i) le rapport a ete accepte par la Banque, mais certaines ameliorations doivent etre apportees; ii) il etait difficile de verifier les montants dans les rapports; iii) la Banque recommande que l'actuelle firme d'audit soit recontactee, si leur travail est juge satisfaisant par le FAES. La meme compagnie avait ete recontactee pour l'audit 1996-97. Le rapport 1996-97 est en preparation et est suppose etre expedie a la Banque bien redige avant la date limite. Le rapport a ete brinvement revise par M. Boyce, qui a fait les observations et suggestions suivantes: 1) Pour chaque section, un rapport intitule "Sources et Utilisations des Fonds" devrait etre prepare en lieu et place du Tableau de Financement. Ceci parce que le Tableau de Financement contient seulement des informations sur les depenses des projets, et ne permet pas une reconciliation entre les "cash balance" du debut et de la fin. Ce qui est necessaire c'est un rapport (Sources et Utilisations des Fonds) qui montrerait les entrees (financieres dans le cas des rapports consolides) aussi bien que les depenses effectuees au cours de l'annee. Au bas de ce rapport il y aurait une ecriture qui montrerait: Cash du debut + Sources des Fonds (fonds accordes) -Utilisations des Fonds (Depenses) = Cash de la Fin. 2) Le rapport du Compte Special (reconciliation) s'est amrliore comparativement a la version 1995-96, cependant dans chacun des cas il y a un fait inexplicable. Dans la version 1995-96, une ligne dans la section dep6t etait appelee "autres" et representait plus de US$500,000 dans le compte dep6ts. Or, ce "autres" categorie n'apparait pas dans le rapport 1996-97, et une somme de plus de $600,000 apparait comme "demandes 1991". Supposant que ceci n'etait pas une erreur, cette somme aurait du etre pleinement expliquee dans le rapport parce qu'il n'est pas clair que des demandes de remboursement faites en 1991 auraient un quelconque effet sur la reconciliation d'un compte ouvert en 1995. Appendix B 52 FONDS D'ASSISTANCE ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE Accord de Credit de Developpement Credit 2205-EA Rapport d'Achevement du Projet Le Projet -Objectifs et Composantes: Le 4 fevrier 1991, I'Etat haitien a signe avec I'Association Internationale de Developpement (IDA) un accord de credit d'un montant de 7.9 millions de DTS pour la creation d'un Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale (FAES) dont la mission serait le financement de sous- projets. Les objectifs de ce Projet etaient d'assister l'Emprunteur (la Republique d'Haiti) en: * Etablissant le FAES comme un instrument permettant de repondre de maniere efficiente et decentralisee aux besoins de base de la population pauvre par l'intermediaire des organisations non gouvernementales, incluant les cooperatives, groupes communautaires organises, et autres organisations de base; * Renforcant les services d'education, de sante et de nutrition (principalement en ce qui a trait aux nourrissons et aux femmes enceintes et allaitantes) et en fournissant des infrastructures physiques permettant de repondre aux besoins des plus pauvres; * Fournissant un canal effectif pour l'aide externe necessaire et pour la coordination d'efforts locaux disperses ; et en • Renfor,ant la capacite du FAES et des autres entites y associees en preparation et mise en ceuvre de projets. Le Projet se compose de trois parties (i) la partie A, les sous-projets approuves, (ii) la partie B, le developpement institutionnel, et (iii) la partie C, les etudes. Partie A: Sous-Projets approuves: Financer et mettre en cuvre des sous -projets approuves dans les communautes beneficiaires et des projets specifiques dans les secteurs, sante, nutrition, education et infrastructure fmances dans le cadre et selon les conditions du Pret de la BID. Partie B : Dveloppement Institutionnel: Renforcer la capacite du FAES entre autres par: * L'acquisition et l'utilisation de vehicules pour la supervision du projet, de micro - ordinateurs, d'equipement et fournitures de bureau ; et * La fourniture d'assistance technique pour permettre au FAES d'etablir (i) un systeme d'informations et une base de donnees (ii) un systeme comptable et (iii) un mecanisme d'evaluation de couts. Partie C : Etudes: L'execution d'etudes sur: * Les voies et moyens pour ameliorer le ciblage des ressources du FAES; * L'impact des sous-projets approuv6s sur les communautes beneficiaires. 53 Mise en (Euvre du Projet: Le demarrage du Projet: Le credit a ete mis en vigueur en f6vrier 1991 et en septembre 1991, 1'execution a ete interrompue par le coup d'etat. Le Redemarrage. L'institution a re-ouvert ses portes en avril 1995. Le credit a ete remis en vigueur peu apres. En aout 1995, le FAES a recommence a utiliser les ressources du credit pour financer une partie de ses activites. Au redemarrage, environ 600,000$EU avaient ete utilises pendant la periode 90/91 pour des activites preparatoires (y compris le PPF) et le financement de l'avance de d6marrage de deux projets. Situation au 31 mai 1998. Pendant la periode aout 1995 -mai 1998, 10.7NM$EU ont ete decaisses. Pour la partie A, un montant total de 9.5 Millions de $EU a permis de financer 349 sous-projets dans 88 communes. De ces investissements 66% ont et faits en milieu rural. Ces sous-projets se retrouvent principalement dans les secteurs: * Education -3.8 millions de dollars (39.6 % des investissements) pour des projets de construction/rehabilitation ecoles, de fourniture de mobilier et d'equipement etc; * Assainissement -2.9 millions de dollars (30.2% des investissements) pour des projets de construction de latrines familiales et de curage de systemes d'evacuation des eaux etc.; * SanteaNutrition -1.3 millions de dollars (13.6% des investissements) pour la construction / rehabilitation de centres de sante et le financement de campagnes de vaccination; * Eau potable -1.1 millions de dollars (12% des investissements) pour la construction / rehabilitation de svstemes d'adduction d'eau potable et de citernes familiales. Environ 425,000 $EU sont engages pour 32 sous-projets encore en execution. Douze d'entre eux, classes projets a problemes, sont arretes depuis dejA quelques mois. Les contrats seront probablement resilies. Au 31 juillet, seulement deux sous-projets seront encore en execution. La fermeture definitive de tous les comptes est prevue pour le 3 1 octobre. Pour la partie B, (D&eloppement Institutionnel) -Les objectifs ont ete pleinement realises. Le fonds est mis en place, vehicules, micro-ordinateurs et equipements ont ete acquis et servent au bon fonctionnement du fonds. Le systeme d'informations et la base de donnees sont en place et representent des outils de gestion essentiels. Le systeme comptable fonctionne, ainsi que le mecanisme d'evaluation des couts qui permet d'etablir les devis dans des delais tres courts. Pour la partie C, (Etudes) -Une carte de pauvrete a ete etablie et permet au FAES de distribuer le budget parni les communes en tenant compte d'un facteur de pauvrete etabli a partir des indicateurs existants. Un facteur tres limitatif de ce type d'etude est l'absence d'indicateurs sociaux de base au niveau communal en Haiti. Meme les donnees demographiques sont incertaines, le dernier recensement datant de 1982. Une evaluation ex-post de la prise en charge des projets par les communautes beneficiaires a aussi ete effectuee. Certaines des recommandations de l'etude sont deja en application vu que le FAES avait deja identifie certains problemes et y avait apporte des correctifs. D'autres seront mises en place dans les meilleurs delais. Le Projet est donc pratiquement acheve. Icr-22o5.doc 25/06/98 54 Etvaluation Finale Evaluation des objectifs, du montage et de la mise en ceuvre du Projet. En retrospective, les objectifs, le montage et les modalites de mise en ceuvre du projet tels que concus lors de l'evaluation etaient en general realistes. Evaluation du montage. Dans le montage du Projet, deux points essentiels ont ete mal evalues. II s'agit (i) des conditions precaires de communication dans le pays et (ii) des capacites techniques et de gestions de nos partenaires. Cette situation a eu des implications importantes dans le fonctionnement du FAES. Les difficultes d'acces aux differents sites des sous-projets rendent difficiles toutes les actions et augmentent considerablement les delais d'execution. De plus, les capacit6s techniques et de gestions de nos partenaires ont ete largement surestimees. Cette surestimation des partenaires, vu leur r6le essentiel dans la realisation des objectifs et dans le montage du projet, a ete un probleme serieux pendant le deroulement du projet. En ce qui a trait aux demandeursl, malgre la simplification des prerequis au montage des dossiers de projets, les demandeurs ont trop souvent et incapables de preparer leurs dossiers. De plus, s'ils arrivent A clairement identifier le probleme, la solution technique qu'ils proposent n'est pas toujours la mieux appropriee. Une troisieme faiblesse a ete l'impossibilite de financer des etudes techniques, obstacle majeur au financement de certains type de projets. Les Collectivites Territoriales en tant que demandeurs ont ete des partenaires privilegies vu que les elections locales ont eu lieu apres la reouverture du FAES et que le fonds a et un investisseur relativement important au niveau local. L'interet des nouveaux elus dans l'investissement local a et manifeste et le fonds a pu dans une certaine mesure les accompagner. Cependant, la encore, le FAES s'est heurte a la faible capacite de gestion au niveau local. Les Executants. Les petits entrepreneurs ont aussi fait montre de faible capacite technique et de gestion. Ils n'ont pas toujours et a meme d'organiser leur travail, de gerer un budget, de respecter un calendrier. La duree d'execution de la plupart des projets a et au dela du dMlai contractuel retard le plus souvent du A une mauvaise gestion des entrepreneurs. Un autre probleme qui devient de plus en plus crucial est la faible capacite fmanciere des petits entrepreneurs. Ils ont tres difficilement acces au credit bancaire, necessaire pour la presentation d'un bon de garantie. Les Superviseurs. Un autre probleme a et6 le manque de professionnalisme des superviseurs qui s'est traduit par une irregularite dans la presence sur les chantiers et dans la transmission des rapports. Un meilleur travail de leur part aurait permis de prevenir bon nombre de problemes. Le Partenariat avec les ONG n'a pas toujours marche comme souhaite malgre des tentatives d'approches globales (reunions d'ONG) et individuelles (contact direct avec des ONG specifiques). En effet, la plupart des ONG performantes gerent un programme fmance par l'aide bilat6rale ou par des institutions privees etrangeres. Elles ne sont interesses aux projets du FAES que moyennant des couts importants de gestion pour accroitre leur capacit6. Quant aux autres ONG, le probleme de renforcement institutionnel se pose egalement et de maniere beaucoup plus cruciale. ' Groupements communautaires et autres organisations de base Icr-2205.doc 25106/98 55 Evaluation de la mise en ceuvre Les objectifs tels que d6finis dans l'Accord de Credit ont ete realises de maniere globale. Les engagements au titre des sous-projets ont ete faits bien avant la date limite et le Projet a ete realise dans les delais impartis, abstraction faite de la periode du coup d'etat. Au point de vue geographique, la repartition des projets est equilibree. Si on les compare a leur population, les differents departements ont recu une part equitable des investissements. La repartition sectorielle des investissements reflete la repartition sectorielle de la demande. Au point de vue ciblage, une etude realisee en cours de financement a permis de repartir le budget. Des la mise en application de cette etude, des efforts considerables ont 6te faits pour reequilibrer la distribution des investissements en fonction du degre de pauvrete. tvaluation de la Performance de I'Emprunteur Bien que la performance de l'organisme d'execution ait et generalement satisfaisante dans la mise en cuvre du projet, un certain nombre de lecons peuvent etre tirees pour I'avenir. Une amelioration de la prise en charge des projets par les communautes locales est necessaire pour garantir la durabilite des investissements. Cette prise en charge demande une plus grande implication des communautes a toutes les etapes du projet et une meilleure adaptation des projets aux conditions locales. La participation des communautes dans leur developpement implique un investissement en temps et en ressources dans l'encadrement des beneficiaires pendant les differentes etapes du projet: l'identification, la priorisation, la preparation des dossiers et l'execution. Ce processus est trop souvent difficilement compatible avec (i) la mission et les modalites de fonctionnement du FAES; (ii) la proportion de ressources disponibles pour les couits de preparation de projets; et (iii) les delais d'execution prevus dans les accords de fmancement. Un effort pour ameliorer les conditions de participation des communautes est d'autant plus important que les actuelles structures de participation sont improvisees au gre des differents projets, intervenants et bailleurs de fonds. Une contribution importante au developpement local serait une assistance a la conception, la mise en place et le fonctionnement de structures de participation qui seraient integrdes statutairement aux communautes locales. Les contributions en nature ou en especes exigees des communautes locales en guise de participation pour la realisation des projets se sont revelees tres difficiles a gerer dans le cadre des contrats d'entrepreneurs generalement utilises au FAES. En effet, les entrepreneurs sont trop souvent penalises lorsque la communaute ne remplit pas ses obligations dans les delais prevus. Cette situation a pour consequence des surcouits qui dans bien des cas doivent etre assumes par les entrepreneurs (cout de travaux qui devaient etre fournis par la communaute, paiement d'interets sur bon de garantie ou de penalites a cause de retards qui ne leur sont pas imputables). La nature et/ou les modalit6s d' integration des contributions locales dans la realisation des projets devrait donc etre revisee. La formnation/encadrement des communautes beneficiaires doit etre se faire a toutes les etapes du Icr-22o5.doc 25106/98 56 projet, de l'identification, la priorisation, la preparation du document de projet et son execution. De plus, la preparation de la communaute a la prise en charge implique une formation technique et en gestion liee au projet specifique. Dans le meme ordre d'idees, les normes de conception techniques et le cout des interventions gagneraient a etre revise a la baisse ce qui permettrait a la fois l'augmentation du nombre des interventions et l'amrlioration des possibilites de prise en charge (techniques et financi6res) par les communaut6s locales. Etant donne les delais d'execution, les contrats forfaitaires sont souvent penalisants pour I 'entrepreneur. Evaluation de la Performance de la Banque / et des Autres Cofinanciers La Banque Mondiale. Du c6te de la Banque Mondiale, la performance a ete adequate. Les missions de supervisions ont aide a ameliorer la performance de l'institution. La Banque Interamericaine de Developpement (BID). En ce qui a trait a la BID, a une certaine epoque, les relations avec la Representation ont et mauvaises sans raison apparente. La gestion de ce probleme a grandement pris du temps et de l'energie de la direction du FAES, temps et energie qui auraient pu et du etre consacre A la consolidation des acquis de l'institution. Les relations se sont arneliorees depuis. Le Programme des Nations Unies pour le Developpement (PNUD). Le PNUD devait intervenir pour aider le FAES dans la mise en place du systeme informatise de gestion de projet. Pour des raisons budg6taires cette promesse n'a pas pu se concretiser. Monique Pierre-Antoine Directeur General Juin 1998 Icr-22M5.doc 25106/98 FAES Appendix C 57 REPARllTION GEOGRAPHIQUE DES INVESTISSEMENTS Credit 2205-HA -Prit 854-SF/HA -Trisor Public -4SEU) vepartement Fmnancement uepartement Financement uepartement 'inancement Commune #Projet FAES Commune #Projet FAES Commune #Projet FAES Artibonite Grande-Anse Ouest Gonawves 21 879.500 Jeremie 6 246,858 Port-au-Prince 70 3,140,718 Ennery 2 82,468 Des Abric6ts 5 167,436 PLtion-Ville 14 470,094 Estere 4 113,039 Bonbon 5 118,189 Kenscoff 8 2032385 Gros Mome 3 76,073 Moron 1 13,793 Gressier 1 2,825 Terre neuve 5 304,817 Chambellan 1 111314 Delmas 32 715,004 Anse Rouge 3 54,032 Anse d'Hainault 0 0 Carrefour 21 354,535 Saint-Marc 12 366,300 Dame-Marie 0 0 Leogane 3 9,172 Verrettes 13 482,624 Des Irois 0 0 Petit-goave 5 82.001 La Chapelle 4 99,372 Corail 5 201,795 Grand-GoAve 0 0 Dessalines 9 312,679 Roseaux 1 33,122 Cx-ds-Bouquets 6 143,421 Petite Riviere de 0 0 Beaumont 1 54.691 Thomazeau 1 2,153 Grande Saline 0 0 Pestel 1 71,318 Ganthier 6 301,930 Desdunes 3 147,S20 Miragoane 7 129,693 Cornillon 0 0 St-Michel 6 95;790 Petite Riviere de 3 92,874 Fds Verrettes 0 0 Marmelade 2 97.134 Anse-a-Veau 2 136,800 Arcahaie 6 137,556 Total Artibonite 87 3,111,648 Baraderes 4 109,824 Cabaret 1 178,928 Centre Petit Trou de Nippes 0 0 Anse-A-Galet 3 10.175 Hinche 5 152.026 L'Asile 0 0 Pte-A-Raquette 0 0 Maissade 4 101 S89 Total Grande-Anse 42 1,487,707 Total Ouest 177 5,751,897 Thomonde 1 16.,790 Nord Cerca Cavajal 4 S68,6 Cap Haitien 9 313,020 Sud Mirebalais 9 270 5;35 Quartier Morin 0 0 Cayes 8 132,318 Saut d'Eau 2 90,019 Limonade 1 47,862 Torbeck 29 856,853 Boucan Carre 3 131.1S7 AcuI-du-Nord 1 3,375 Chantal 3 138,391 Las Cahobas 1 48.27 Plaine du Nord 1 84,053 Camp-Perrin 2 126,679 Belladere 0 0 Milot 2 64,077 Maniche 5 124,443 Savannette 0 0 Grande Rivi6re du 2 73,662 Ile-A-Vache 0 0 Cerca-la-Source 1 89.214 Bahon 0 0 Port-Salut 0 0 Thomassique 0 0 St-Raphael 3 92,228 St-jean du Sud 0 0 Total Centre 30 986,303 Dondon 0 0 Arniquet 0 0 Nord-Est Ranquitte 2 110,659 Aquin 16 359,418 Fort Liberte 0 0 Pignon 5 206,014 St-Louis du Sud 7 179,378 Ferrier 1 34,717 La Victoire 3 119,988 Cavaillon 11 360,424 Perches 2 84.162 Borgne 0 0 C6teaux 0 0 Ouanaminthe 3 21.121 Port Margot 1 84,053 Port-A-Piment 1 2,763 Capotille 2 100j509 Limbe 3 70,296 R6che-A-Bateau 4 42,400 Mont Organise 6 265.7,8 Bas Limbe 0 0 Chardonnieres 4 77.838 Trou du Nord I 33 .o3 Plaisance 10 481,946 Des Anglais 2 72.284 Sainte-Suzanne 1 4,767 Pilate 3 222.190 Tiburon 0 0 Terrier Rouge 3 171,3j0 Total Nord 46 1,973,423 Total Sud 92 2,473,389 Caracol 0 0 Vallieres 2 89.775 Sud-Est Carice 4 179,34 Jaanel 17 731,678 Territoire Ntl 6 813,933 Mombin Crochu 1 52,891 Mangot 6 212,367 Total Nord-Est 26 1,038,747 Caves jactnel 4 140,360 Nord-Ouest La Vaille 2 25,538 Port-de-Paix 3 66,511 Bainet 5 152,288 La Tortue 0 0 Cdtes de Fer 3 120,583 Bassin Bleu 0 0 Belle-Anse 0 0 567 Projets/Activites Chansolme 0 0 Grand Gosier 0 0 US$ 19,936,235 engages St-Louis du Nord 10 389.197 Thiote 0 0 98 communes touchees Anse-A-Foleur 1 29,702 Anse-A-Pitre 0 0 M6le St-Nicolas 5 206.73 Total Sud-Est 37 1,382,814 Baie de Henne 0 0 bombardopolis 2 92,319 Jean Rabel 3 131,712 Total Nord-Ouest 24 916,174 May 31 1997 MAP SECTION IBRD 27091 U SA 73"30 -20L10 7 r A I 722 A LANTIC OCEAN __ -. 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