Stratejik ak endikatè pou mezire siksè Fòs Represyon Gang lan (S/2026/554)

S/2026/554 United Nations Security Council Distr.: General 6 July 2026 English Original: French Letter dated 2 July 2026 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2793 (2025), I have the honour to transmit herewith the letter dated 29 June 2026 from the Special Representative for the Gang Suppression Force, Jack Christofides, which outlines the strategy and metrics for measuring the success of the mission (see annex). I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council. (Signed) António Guterres 26-09942 (E) 100726 *2609942* 270726 S/2026/554 Annex [Original: English] I have the honour to submit herewith the report of the Gang Suppression Force on the strategy and metrics for measuring the success of the mission, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2793 (2025) (see enclosure). The report has been prepared following consultations with the Government of Haiti, the United Nations system and other relevant stakeholders. It sets out the strategic framework that will guide the implementation of the mandate of the Gang Suppression Force. It identifies three core objectives: the removal of gang control over territory; the securing of critical infrastructure; and the strengthening of the capacity of Haitian authorities to contain gang violence. The benchmarks and metrics outlined in the report are intended to measure the impact of Gang Suppression Force operations, both independently and in coordination with the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Armed Forces. The baseline for the Gang Suppression Force framework reflects the situation in the mission area as at 31 May 2026, immediately prior to the commencement of Gang Suppression Force operations on 1 June 2026. The report further defines the desired end state of the Gang Suppression Force mandate implementation by 30 September 2028, namely the degradation of the ability of armed organized gangs to threaten the Haitian State and the establishment of minimum security conditions necessary for sustained international stabilization efforts and the gradual rebuilding of Haitian security institutions with international support. (Signed) Jack Christofides Special Representative 2/7 26-09942 S/2026/554 Enclosure [Original: English] In its resolution 2793 (2025), the Security Council requested the Special Representative to develop a strategy and metrics for measuring the success of the mission and concrete time-bound objectives, with benchmarks towards an end state. Pursuant to the Council’s request, the Gang Suppression Force consulted with the Government of Haiti, the United Nations system and other relevant stakeholders. These consultations informed the structure of the mission’s strategy, the formulation of three strategic objectives, and the scope of the metrics and benchmarks defined to measure progress. Three strategic objectives The three strategic objectives at the core of the strategy are based on the mandated activities identified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2793 (2025): • Objective 1: Gang control over territory is removed. • Objective 2: Critical infrastructure is secure, focusing on the impact of operations of the Gang Suppression Force to be conducted independently or jointly with the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Armed Forces, in line with subparagraphs (a) and (b). • Objective 3: Haitian authorities have the ability to contain gang violence, reflecting the understanding that the deployment of the Gang Suppression Force presents an opportunity for the Government of Haiti, the United Nations system and international partners to progress with medium- and long-term stabilization (subparagraphs (d), (e) and (f)). This includes improving the capabilities of the Haitian security and defence forces to fight and prevent gang violence (subparagraph (c)). In all its work, the Gang Suppression Force is committed to a policy of strict accountability for serious misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse, so as to gain and maintain the trust of the Haitian population. Measuring the impact of operations The metrics and benchmarks used in this mission strategy are defined to measure the overall success of Gang Suppression Force operations. They complement the Haiti benchmark framework with indicators requested by the Security Council in paragraph 24 of its resolution 2793 (2025) and presented by the Secretary-General in his report of 15 January 2026 (S/2026/31). While the Gang Suppression Force indicators will focus on areas where Force operations have taken place, the Haiti benchmark framework considers a broader approach, encompassing operations by the national security and defence forces without Force partic ipation, as well as other government-led stabilization programmes. The data used as a baseline reflect the situation in the mission area as at 31 May 2026. 1 The next comprehensive report will present the situation as at 31 August 2027. 2 __________________ 1 The Gang Suppression Force started operations on 1 June 2026; 31 May 2026 was chosen as a baseline to establish the “zero” point against which all progress is measured. 2 Regular updates will be provided by the Special Representative through his briefings to the Council. 26-09942 3/7 S/2026/554 Strategic objective 1: Gang control over territory is dismantled (or has decreased) At the core of the Gang Suppression Force strategy is a territorial approach in which operations focus on removing gang control over territory to help restore the State’s monopoly on the use of force. The Gang Suppression Force intends to regain control of territory through intelligence-led operations conducted either independently or jointly with the Haitian National Police and/or the Haitian Armed Forces. The map of Haiti below shows territory under gang control as at 31 May 2026, prior to the first Force operations on 1 June 2026. Source: Maps data: Google © 2026 Airbus. Imagery date: 25 June 2026, open source. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. In the forthcoming report of the Special Representative to the Council, a map displaying territory under the control of the State will illustrate the evolution of the security situation following Gang Suppression Force operations. To capture the factors that could account for its success, the Gang Suppression Force will collect the data in figure I to measure its impact on the security situation in a given territory. 4/7 26-09942 S/2026/554 Figure I Strategic objective 1: Gang control over territory is dismantled Abbreviations: FOBs, forward operating bases; GSF, Gang Suppression Force; HAF, Haitian Armed Forces; HNP, Haitian National Police. In addition, the Gang Suppression Force will track data on the number of weapons and ammunition confiscated or surrendered, and gang members arrested, while annotating the inherent advantages and limitations of this method of data collection, as it is known for a high ratio of replacement. Strategic objective 2: Critical infrastructure is secure The second objective will require coordinated efforts with the Haitian authorities to secure critical infrastructure in target areas. In many ways, this objective will be strategically decisive because the ability to control critical infrastructure shapes perceptions of state legitimacy and may become one of the clearest indicators of success in the eyes of Haitians. Figure II displays the benchmarks and metrics that will be used to measure whether the Gang Suppression Force is reaching this objective. 26-09942 5/7 S/2026/554 Figure II Strategic objective 2: Critical infrastructure is secure Abbreviations: FAA, United States Federal Aviation Administration; GSF, Gang Suppression Force; HNP, Haitian National Police. Strategic objective 3: Haitian authorities have the ability to contain gang violence This objective focuses on making the impact of Gang Suppression Force operations sustainable, first by improving the operational and planning capabilities of the Haitian security and defence forces. This will be done through the joint planning and conduct of operations by the Gang Suppression Force, the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Armed Forces (“learning by doing”). It will be complementary to the training programmes for Haitian security and defence forces provided by bilateral partners. Second, the momentum created through Gang Suppression Force operations presents an opportunity for the Government and its partners to fight gang violence, hold elections, provide humanitarian aid and address the illicit trafficking of arms and related materials. Coordinating the planning of Force operations with the work of the United Nations system and the leadership of the Government is therefore key to stabilizing the security situation and creating a safe environment for the civilian population affected by gang violence, especially children. 6/7 26-09942 S/2026/554 Figure III Strategic objective 3: Haitian authorities have the ability to contain gang violence Abbreviations: BINUH, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti; GSF, Gang Suppression Force. End state In line with the objectives and benchmarks identified above, the desired end state of the Gang Suppression Force mandate implementation is defined as follows: by 30 September 2028, the Gang Suppression Force will have degraded armed, organized gang ability that threatens the Haitian State and established the minimum security conditions necessary for sustained international stabilization efforts and the gradual rebuilding of Haitian security institutions with international support. Minimum security conditions are defined as those in which organized armed groups are unable to operate with freedom of movement and maintain very limited or no territorial control; gang information operations have been degraded; key infrastructure and supply routes are secure; and civilian populations can access essential services and humanitarian aid without persistent threat of violence. Reaching this end state is not intended to signify the complete stabilization of Haiti, but rather the attainment of minimum security conditions necessary to reverse current trends, restore public confidence and create the political and operational space required for longer-term recovery and international engagement. The current context presents a limited but important window of opportunity to achieve these conditions. 26-09942 7/7