(2025) CRS - Ayiti nan Kriz: Devlopman ki gen rapò ak Misyon Miltinasyonal Sipò Sekirite a
Rezime — Rapò sa a analize sitiyasyon politik ak sekirite nan Ayiti ki ap deteryore nan ane 2025, malgre deplwaman Misyon Miltinasyonal Sipò Sekirite (MSS) ke Nasyonzini otorize a. Li egzamine orijin MSS la, sitiyasyon aktyèl li, ak politik ameriken anvè Ayiti, enkli konsiderasyon Kongrè a.
Dekouve Enpotan
- Sitiyasyon sekirite Ayiti a deteryore nan 2025 malgre deplwaman MSS la.
- MSS la ap fè fas ak defi tankou mank finansman ak mank pèsonèl.
- Konsèy Presidansyèl Tranzisyon an te mande pou MSS la transfòme an yon misyon mentyen lapè Nasyonzini, men sa pa konsidere kòm posib.
- Etazini te pwomèt gwo sipò finansye pou MSS la.
- Vyolans gang yo kontinye ap yon gwo pwoblèm, ak gang yo ki kontwole jiska 90% Pòtoprens.
Deskripsyon Konple
Rapò a konsantre sou kriz aktyèl la an Ayiti, espesyalman egzamine devlopman ki gen rapò ak Misyon Miltinasyonal Sipò Sekirite (MSS). Malgre deplwaman MSS ke Kenya te dirije e ke Nasyonzini te otorize an 2024, sitiyasyon politik ak sekirite Ayiti a kontinye ap vin pi mal nan ane 2025, avèk vyolans gang yo ak enstabilite politik k ap ogmante. Rapò a detaye orijin MSS la, defi li ap fè fas yo, ak politik gouvènman ameriken an anvè Ayiti, enkli sipò finansye ak konsiderasyon Kongrè a. Li mete aksan tou sou deba ki antoure efikasite MSS la ak altènativ potansyèl yo, tankou yon misyon mentyen lapè Nasyonzini oswa yon pi gwo wòl pou Òganizasyon Eta Ameriken yo.
Teks Konple Dokiman an
Teks ki soti nan dokiman orijinal la pou endeksasyon.
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress
INSIGHTi
Haiti in Crisis: Developments Related to the
Multinational Security Support Mission
Updated June 3, 2025
Haiti’s political and security situation has continued to deteriorate in 2025 despite the 2024 deployment of
a Kenya-led, UN-authorized Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) that the U.S. government has
helped train and equip. Between January and March 2025, 1,617 people were killed after 5,600 deaths
were recorded in 2024, most attributed to gang-related violence. The gangs—some of which are aligned
with political elites—amassed control over territory and illicit markets amid political instability following
the 2021 assassination of then-President Jovenel Moïse. Since April 2024, Haiti has been governed by a
Transitional Presidential Council (TPC). The TPC, tasked with governing until elections can be convened,
has been plagued by allegations of corruption and infighting.
The Biden Administration sought to support Haitian-led efforts to restore political stability and security
and the MSS; the Trump Administration has highlighted the increasing violence in Haiti and has
suggested options for regional bodies and countries to take the lead on combating gang violence. The
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Congress may consider options for addressing violence and instability in Haiti, including potential
appropriations for the MSS or other security efforts.
Origins of the Multinational Security Support Mission
In October 2022, then-Prime Minister Ariel Henry requested the deployment of an international force to
help the Haitian National Police (HNP) quell insecurity and facilitate humanitarian aid. Canada, Brazil,
and other Western Hemisphere countries, some of which participated in the UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH; 2004-2017), declined U.S. requests to lead such a force. MINUSTAH remains
controversial in Haiti due to alleged sexual abuse by some of its forces and its inadvertent introduction of
cholera into the country.
In July 2023, Kenya announced it would consider leading a multinational force in Haiti and sending up to
1,000 police, if authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Whereas U.S. and Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) officials praised Kenya, some analysts questioned the human rights record of
the Kenyan police and whether they could overcome language and cultural barriers. Others opposed any
international security force, arguing that previous foreign interventions in Haiti had failed.
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In October 2023, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2699 authorizing a non-UN-conducted multinational
force, financed by voluntary contributions, to provide security for critical infrastructure and operational
support to the HNP for 12 months; the mission’s mandate was extended, through Resolution 2751, until
October 2, 2025.
Current Status
Kenya’s deployment of the MSS was delayed until June 2024 amid debate in Kenya about the
deployment’s constitutionality and the need to conclude a court-ordered bilateral security agreement with
Haiti. Kenya also delayed deployment until the TPC replaced Prime Minister Henry.
MSS leaders have developed an operational plan and created an oversight mechanism to monitor the
mission’s conduct. Participating personnel are subject to UN vetting, and those receiving U.S. support are
to complete U.S. human rights vetting pursuant to the Leahy Laws (22 U.S.C. §2378d and 10 U.S.C.
§362).
As of May 2025, the United Nations reported there was $110.9 million—primarily from Canada—in the
Haiti MSS Trust Fund. As of March 2025, the MSS mission consisted of just over 1,000 personnel from
Kenya, Jamaica, Belize, Guatemala, and El Salvador.
Some observers suggest the MSS mission may need to be strengthened. In an October 2024 letter to the
Secretary-General, the TPC president requested that the MSS be transformed into a UN peacekeeping
mission; the Secretary-General asserted in February 2025 that such a transition is “not assessed as a
feasible option.” The Secretary-General specified that, “such a transition could be considered once
significant progress has been made in substantially reducing gang territorial control.” Reportedly, up to
90% of Port-au-Prince is controlled by gangs. In April 2025, the UN Special Representative to Haiti
stated that Haiti is on the verge of “total chaos.” Most recently, the TPC reportedly has begun using
drones to combat criminal gangs.
U.S. Policy
The Biden Administration sought to support Haiti, in part, by funding the MSS to help address gang
violence and promote security. Some Members of Congress have supported the MSS; others have
criticized what they view as inadequate planning for the mission. Almost a year after the first Kenyan
police officers arrived, experts assess that the MSS remains underfunded, understaffed, and unable to
quell gang-related violence.
On February 6, 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the United States “will continue to
support the mission” and that he had issued a waiver to allow approximately $40 million of security
assistance to flow to the MSS mission and the Haitian National Police amid the Trump Administration’s
foreign assistance “pause.” In May 2025, the Administration designated the Viv Ansanm gang coalition
and the Gran Grif gang as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists.
Further, in May 20 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Rubio suggested
that the Organization of American States (OAS) could play a larger role in Haiti and potentially
coordinate a security mission, asserting that the MSS “alone will not solve this problem.” The Secretary
also stated that the Trump Administration is “prepared to play a leading role” in supporting the OAS but
that buy-in would be necessary from other partners in the region.
Congressional Considerations
During the Biden Administration, the United States pledged at least $380 million to support the MSS.
That total included $100 million in foreign assistance and $200 million in Department of Defense
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enabling support. U.S. support for the MSS aimed to complement assistance provided to train and equip
the HNP through bilateral U.S. programs and the multi-donor UN Basket Fund.
Congress did not specifically designate any U.S. foreign assistance for Haiti to help quell insecurity or
support the MSS mission or the HNP in FY2024 or FY2025 appropriations legislation. Congress may
consider whether to designate funding for such activities during the FY2026 appropriations process.
Congress also may examine how the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance policies, including
allocations, reprogramming, and/or recissions of funds, may impact the situation in Haiti. Additionally,
Congress may consider legislation that could complement U.S. security assistance efforts, such as bills to
impose sanctions on those who collude with Haitian gangs (e.g., H.R. 2643, S. 1854).
Author Information
Karla I. Rios
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
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