(2006) Ayiti: Rezilyans Sosyal ak Frajilite Leta an Ayiti - Yon analiz sosyal peyi

April 27, 2006Document of the World Bank Report No. 36069-HT Haiti Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti Caribbean Country Management Unit ESSD Sector Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Region Report No. 36069-HT HaitiSocial Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti A Country Social Analysis Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ASEC AIDS ANAMAH APENA CASEC CASER CAMEP CCHCF CID CIMO CT DHS EBCM ECD ECVH EDH EMA EU FAd’H FAES FAFO GDP GIPNH GNI HIV/AIDS HLCS HNP HRW HTG IACHR ICF ICG ICLAC IDB IFS IG IHSI ILAC IMF IMR LAC LCR LICUS MAST Assemblte de la Section Communale Syndrome Immuno-deficitaire acquis Association des juges haitiens Administration Nationale De Prison Le Conseil administratif de la section communale Conseil d’administration de la section rurale Centrale Autonome Mttropolitaine d’Eau Potable Cadre de Cooptration Interimaire Le Conseil Interdtpartemental Compagnie d’Intervention et du Maintien d’ Ordre AutoritBs locales Enquetes dtmographiques et de santt Enqu6te budget-consommation des me’nages Developpement de la petite enfance Enquete sur les Conditions de Vie en Haiti Electricite d’Haiti Ecole de la Magistrature Union Europtenne Anciennes forces armies d’Hditi Fonds d’ Assistance Economique et Sociale Institut pour les sciences sociales appliqutes Produit national brut Groupe d’htervention de la Police Nationale d’Haiti Virus Humain D’Immunodtficit (HIV) et syndrome acquis d’immunode’ficit (SIDA). Enqu6te sur le mode de vie en Haiti Police Nationale Haytienne Surveillance de Droits de l’homme La Commission Inter-Amtricaine sur des droits de l’homme Cadre De Cooptration D’Inttrim Groupe des crises internationals D’Instituto canadiense de laminas en Construcci6n de La de Para. d’acero Banque Interamtricain de De’veloppement Institut pour des e’tudes fiscales Inspecteur Ge’ntral Institut Haytien de Statistique et d’hformatique Consortium Aide Ltgale Internationale Fonds Monttaire International Taux de Mortalite infatilt Pays 6 faible Revenu etdifficulte’s Ministbre des affaires sociales et d’emploi Assembly of the Section Communale Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Association of Haitian Judges National Penitentiary Administration Administrative Council of the Section Communal Board of Directors of the Rural Section Metropolitan Autonomous Drinking Water Station Interim Cooperation Framework Interdepartmental Council Company for Intervention and the Maintenance of Order Local authorities Demographic and Health Surveys Household Budget-Consumption Survey Early Childhood Development Inquire into the Living conditions in Haiti Electricity of Haiti School of the Judiciary European Union Former Armed Forces of Haiti Economic and Social Assistance Funds Institute for Applied Social Sciences Gross domestic product Intervention Group of the National Police of Haiti Gross national income Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Haiti Living Conditions Survey Haitian National Police Human Rights Watch Haitian gourde (currency unit) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Interim Cooperation Framework International Crisis Group Instituto canadiense de laminas en acero para la construcci6n Inter-American Development Bank Institute for Fiscal Studies Inspector General Haitian Institute of Statistics and Data Processing International Legal Consortium Assistance International Monetary Fund Infant mortality rate Latin America and the Caribbean Latin American and Caribbean Region Low Income Countries Under Stress Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment MICIVIH MINUSTAH NCHR NGO NSPs OAS OPS PAHO PCHI PPP PREM PRSP PO P1 P2 RI RNDDH RSF RDNP UN UNDP UNICEF UNMIH UNPOL USD USAID VAT VSNNNS WBI WDI WFP La Mission Civile Internationale de la L’OEA et la mission internationale des Nations Unies Mission de stabilisation des Nations Unies en Ha‘iti Coalition nationale pour les droites humains en Haiti Organisation nonne gouvernementale (ONG) Non Secteur D’Etat Dans La Disposition De Service Organisation des ttats amtricains Organisations Populaires Organisation Pan-Amtricaine de la Sand Paritt du pouvoir d’achat Papier De Stxattgie De Rtduction de Pauvrett Rtfugits Internationaux Le Rtseau National De la Dtfense de Droits de l’homme Reporters sans Frontieres Rassemblement des Democrates Nationaux Progressistes Les Nations Unies Programme des Nations Unies pour le dtveloppement Le Fonds des Nations Unies pour l’enfance Mission des Nations Unies en Hayti Force de police de 1’ONU Dollars des Etats-Unis Agence des Etats-Unis pour le dtveloppement international Taxe B la valeur ajoutte (TVA) Volontaires de la SCcuritt Nationale Institut de la Banque Mondiale Indicateurs pour le Dtveloppement Programme mondial d’ l’alimentation The OASAJN International Civilian Mission United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti National Coalition for Haitian Rights Nongovernmental organization Non-state service providers Organization of American States Popular Organizations Pan American Health Organization The Distribution of Per Capita Household Income Purchasing Power Parity Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Headcount Poverty Ratio Poverty Gap Index Squared Poverty Gap Index Refugees International The National Human Rights Defense Network Reporters without Borders United Nations United Nations Development Programme The United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations mission to Haiti UN Police force United States dollars United States Agency for International Development Value Added Tax National Security Volunteers World Bank Institute World Development Indicators World Food Program Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti Table of Contents FOREWORD ........................................................................................................................... iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ i 1 . INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................ 3 2 . SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES AND RISKS ....................................................................... 6 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS ............................................................................................................. 6 Population, Population Growth and Density, Age Structure, and Urbanization ................... 7 Household Size and Fertility ................................................................................................. 8 HAITIAN POVERTY AND WEQUALITY ......................................................................................... 9 Household Income and Income Generation .......................................................................... 9 Poverty ................................................................................................................................ 13 Poverty Correlates: Does Rural Poverty Differ from Urban Poverty? ............................... 17 Simulation of the Effect of Economic Growth on Poverty in Haiti .................................... 19 MIGRA~ON .............................................................................................................................. 19 Human Capital .................................................................................................................... 23 Access to Basic Infrastructure Services .............................................................................. 25 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: ORIGINS OF THE RURAL-URBAN DIVIDE ....................................... 1 THE HAITIAN PEOPLE: DEMOGRAPHICS, POVERTY, AND ENDOWMENT AND DISTRBU~ON OF ASSETS AND RESOURCES .............................................. 23 Employment ........................................................................................................................ 27 Unemployment .................................................................................................................... 30 SOCIAL COHESION AND VIOLENCE ........................................................................................... 31 CONFLICT RISK ........................................................................................................................ 36 GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS ....................................................................... 37 HAITI’S FRAGILE STATE ........................................................................................................... 39 A Legacy of Public Sector Corruption ................................................................................ 40 An Unfinished Decentralization .......................................................................................... 41 The Role of the Non-State Sector in the Provision of Basic Services ................................ 44 Basic Services: Access, Quality, and Equity ...................................................................... 46 The Problem of State Regulation and Coordination ........................................................... 48 Institutional Capacity and Accountability ........................................................................... 50 Police Reform ...................................................................................................................... 52 JUSTICE AND RULE OF LAW ...................................................................................................... 53 CONCLUSION: DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIOECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR VIOLENCE AND 3 . INFRASTRUCTURE AND BASIC SERVICES .................................................................................. 43 SECUrZrrY ................................................................................................................................. 49 The Haitian National Police ................................................................................................ 49 Judicial Independence and Accountability .......................................................................... 53 Access to Justice ................................................................................................................. 54 The Criminal Justice System ............................................................................................... 55 Lessons Learned 1994-2004 ............................................................................................... 56 CONCLUSION: RESTORING THE CAPACITY OF STATE INSTITUTIONS ......................................... 58 POLITICAL FORCES AND ACTORS ......................................................................... 60 A HISTORY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE ....................................................................................... 60 A DIFFICULT DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION. 1990-2004 ............................................................... 62 POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND ENTREPRENEURS OF VIOLENCE .............................................. 63 4 . CHECKS AND BALANCES IN HAITI’S POLITICAL PROCESS ........................................................ 65 CONCLUSION: STRONG NATIONAL LEADERSHIP IS CRUCIAL TO BREAKING THE CONFLICT- POVERTY TRAP ........................................................................................................................ 66 5 . CONCLUSION: BREAKING OUT OF THE CONFLICT-POVERTY TRAP ........ 67 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 73 APPENDIX A: COUNTRY AT A GLANCE ............................................................................ 81 APPENDIX B: DEMOGRAPHY ............................................................................................... 83 APPENDIX C: DATA AND METHODOLOGY ...................................................................... 85 APPENDIX D: INCIDENCE OF EDUCATION LEVEL AND POVERTY CORRELATES ........................................................................................................................................................ 89 APPENDIX E: POVERTY PROFILE ....................................................................................... 91 APPENDIX F: ACCESS TO BASIC SERVICES IN HAITI .................................................. 97 APPENDIX G: COHESION AND VIOLENCE IN HAITI ................................................... 100 FOREWORD Dorte Verner and Willy Egset (task team leaders and the main authors of this report) led the report team. The work was based on the findings of various missions that visited Haiti during 2005, and on additional research undertaken during 2004. The task team includes Stephanie Kuttner, Michael Justesen, Gillette Hall, Dan Erikson (consultant, Inter-American Dialogue), Katherine Bain, Emma Grant, and Franka Braun. The report does not reflect developments since February 17,2006. This report is the result of collaboration among several Bank units. Funding for the study was contributed by the Haiti Country Management Unit, the Social Development Department, the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, the LICUSBragile State Unit, and the PREM Civil Society Group in Latin America. The funding is gratefully acknowledged. Background papers, notes, and direct input to the report were prepared by Gillette Hall (social protection), Dan Erikson (political situation), Willy Egset and Mark Mattner (urban violence), Michael Justesen and Dorte Verner (youth), Stephanie Kuttner (governance), Dorte Verner (poverty, growth, and labor markets), Katherine Bain, Emma Grant, and Franka Braun (non-state service provision), and Nathalie Lamaute, Gilles Damai, and Willy Egset (rural governance and local institutions). Andrew Crawley edited the report and Vivian Callaghan provided administrative support. The report was produced under the supervision of Caroline Anstey, Director, and McDonald Benjamin, Sector Manager. The members of the team would like to thank other Bank staff and individuals from outside the Bank for support, guidance, and comments. Special thanks are due to Joelle Dehasse, Senior Country Officer, for her support throughout the process. Several other people helped the team, including Christian Lotz, Per Wam, Antonella Bassani, Estanislao Gacitua-Mario, Garry Charlier, Pierre Werbrouk, Mark Mattner, John Redwood, Mark Schneider (International Crisis Group), Jocelyn McCalla (National Coalition for Haitian Rights), Jim Dobbins (RAND Corporation), and John Horton (Inter-American Development Bank). In Haiti, Nathalie Brisson Lamaute, Gilles Damais, and Dominique Mathon supervised data collection and analysis for some of the background papers under very challenging and sometimes dangerous conditions. The views expressed in this report are exclusively those of the authors. Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. Haiti is a resilient society whose rural communities in particular have developed coping mechanisms in response to a long history of underdevelopment and political instability. The country’s religious, cultural, and artistic life is highly diverse and vibrant. Like other fragile states, however, Haiti is also beset by widespread poverty and inequality, economic decline and unemployment, poor governance, and violence. This Country Social Analysis’ examines Haiti’s conflict-poverty trap from the perspective of the triangle of factors that have been identified as its main components: (a) demographic and socioeconomic factors at the individual and household levels; (b) the state’s institutional capacity to provide public goods and manage social risks; and (c) the agendas and strategies of political actors. The report’s three main sections explore the nature of these components, and a closing section considers the linkages among them. The Haitian People: Demographic and Socioeconomic Outcomes and Risks 2. This section addresses the main demographic and socioeconomic factors that contribute to Haiti’s conflict-poverty trap. The population growth rate is highest in the cities, and in the metropolitan area in particular. Port-au-Prince now scores highly on known demographic risk factors for violent conflict, including a very young population profile, high population turnover because of high in- and out-migration, and poverty. New migrants continue to be attracted to the area by higher levels of infrastructure and services, greater access to formal and skilled jobs, and lower poverty levels than all other parts of the country. Demographic Trends 3. Haiti’s rapidly growing population is increasing competition for scarce resources in a poor country where such resources are limited. At Haiti’s current population growth rate of 2.2 percent a year, the number of inhabitants, now about 8 million, could reach about 12.3 million by 2030. The country’s rapid rate of population growth, combined with poor economic performance, is lowering per capita GDP, which has fallen by about 50 percent to $332 in the last two decades. Of all sectors, agriculture has been the hardest hit. 4. In the last two decades there has been a very raid rate of urbanization in Haiti, especially in the metropolitan area. Some 40 percent of Haitians lived in urban areas in 2003, up from 25 percent in 1982. Moreover, Haiti is still far from achieving a demographic transition, since children and youth still account for roughly 50 percent of the population. Extremely poor households have about twice as many children as do the nonpoor. Most Haitians lack pensions, social security and savings, and thus children are often the only security for old age. The Country Social Analysis (CSA) is a new analytical instrument launched by the World Bank to provide a country-level understanding of the social, economic, and institutional context of development. The CSA analyzes two principal dimensions of development: (i) social diversity, assets, and livelihoods; and (ii) power, governance and institutions. The specific foci and relative emphasis of these components are determined by the country context and Bank portfolio. 1 Poverty and Inequality 5. In 2001, 49 percent of all Haitian households lived in extreme poverty, with wide differences among localities and regions. On the basis of a US$1 a day extreme poverty line, 20, 56, and 58 percent of households in metropolitan, urban, and rural areas, respectively, were extremely poor. Most of the approximately 3.9 million who are extremely poor live in rural areas. Poverty is especially extensive in the Northeast and Northwest regions. Income inequality partly explains why Haiti’s poverty indicators are worse than those in countries that have similar per capita incomes. Income distribution is extremely unequal in Haiti: in 2001, the Gini coefficient for the country as a whole was 0.66, which is among the highest in the world. 6. Social indicators such as literacy, life expectancy, infant mortality, and child malnutrition also reveal that poverty is widespread. About 4 in every 10 people cannot read and write; some 20 percent of children suffer from malnutrition; nearly half the population has no healthcare; and more than four-fifths do not have access to clean drinking water. The good news is that poverty measured by these non-income poverty indicators has declined in the last three decades. Nonetheless, the gap between the rich and poor, and among regions, remains wide. 7. Residence in rural areas does not in itself affect the probability of being poor, and those engaged in agriculture are not more likely to experience poverty than those engaged in services and industry. The likelihood of falling below the poverty line in rural areas depends on educational attainment, skills and so on. Female-headed households in rural areas are more likely to be poor than male-headed households. Poverty, moreover, is more prevalent among those with low levels of education. Social capital protects against poverty in rural areas but not to a statistically significant degree in urban areas. In rural, urban and metropolitan areas, migration and education are the factors that most reduce the likelihood of falling into poverty. Migration and the Endowment and Distribution of Assets and Resources 8. Livelihoods in Haiti are determined by three key factors: assets, which can be sold to smooth out consumption when the household is adversely affected by a natural disaster or economic slump; access to labor markets, infrastructure, and services that can improve the opportunities for income generation; and migration. Poor households have very little or no access to many of these livelihood-improving factors. 9. For a large proportion of Haitians, migration is a coping mechanism in the face of poverty and a lack of opportunities. Many move to the capital, which absorbs more than 75,000 migrants every year despite grim living conditions in the slum areas. Most migrants in Haiti are self- selected economic migrants. On average, migrants have more education than those who stay behind. Moreover, migrants have a higher probability of finding jobs than non-migrants, and are more likely to find work in the higher-paid nonfarm sector. 10. International migration has affected the Haitian economy and the welfare of Haitian households for decades. Haiti is the world’s most remittance-dependent country as measured by remittances’ share of household income and of GDP. Remittances from the diaspora constitute the most important private risk management and social protection system for Haitian households. Some 30 percent of all households and 44 percent of metropolitan households receive remittances from expatriates. These transfers total about US$SOO million annually and account for about 30 percent of household income. Although remittances are an important source of income for many 11 families, emigration also gives rise to lack of qualified workers or a brain drain. For youth, the lack of parental role models (particularly fathers) caused by emigration leaves an even bigger gap. 11. Access to assets such as education and infrastructural services is highly unequal and strongly correlated with poverty in Haiti. The rural poor in particular lack access to potable water, electricity, and roads. Although overall educational attainment has increased in recent decades, there is substantial variation in attainment and school attendance across regions; children and youth in the poorest regions lag behind their peers in richer regions. Moreover, the children of poor households have less education than their nonpoor peers. Access to safe water and electricity is another significant challenge. Only 7.9 percent of the rural population has access to safe water, compared to 28 percent of those in the metropolitan area. Electricity supply is the public service most marked by unequal access between rural and metropolitan areas: most (91 percent) of the urban population have access to electricity, but the figure falls to 10 percent among the rural population. Moreover, only about 8 percent of Haitians have access to a paved road, and just 3 percent have a telephone. Finally, the extremely poor have much more restricted access to services than do the nonpoor. 12. Labor is poor people’s most abundant asset and it accounts for most of their total income. Nonetheless, the poor are constrained in their labor use in several ways: lack of jobs, low wages, and wage discrimination, especially for women. Many Haitian workers are poor despite working full time, and thus it is important that the quality of jobs, as well as their quantity, is raised. The challenge of job-creation, therefore, is to increase worker productivity and increase opportunities in the labor market for competitive wages, so as to lift workers and their households out of poverty. 13. Employment analyses suggest that the three key determinants of access to higher-paid employment in Haiti are education, gender, and migration status. Unemployment and underemployment are serious problems, particularly in urban areas. The unemployment rate is highest in urban areas: 49 and 37 percent in metropolitan and other urban areas, respectively, compared to 36 percent in rural areas. 14. In total, each year more than 100,000 job-seekers enter a metropolitan labor market where there are very few opportunities and a high rate of unemployment. The capital’s labor market has fewer total wage jobs than the number of new entrants every two years, and fewer skilled jobs than one year of new entrants. Migration and remittances have spurred expansion in areas such as home-building and banking, which has created jobs for construction and business workers. But most new entrants to the labor market join the estimated one million Haitians in the informal sector who are engaged in a multitude of occupations, from self-employed traders and artisans to casual laborers. Very few formal sector jobs are available. 15. Haitian youth face a number of challenges, such as unemployment and HIV/AIDs. Youth who leave school are likely to end up being inactive or unemployed. The youth unemployment rate is 47 percent, the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and nearly three times that of the older cohort (the 35-44 age group). The unemployment rate is highest among women across the country and among youth in Port-au-Prince. In many households, youth face the challenges arising from the absence of the father or both parents, drug abuse, early childbearing, and domestic violence. Haiti also has the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the LAC region, and health services are weak or inaccessible for much of the population. ... 111 Social Cohesion and Violence 16. Rural Haiti remains relatively peaceful and has a tradition of strong social cohesion. Especially in fragile states, the ability of communities and households to work and live together is essential to maintaining people’s livelihoods, security, and welfare. Social capital indicators that measure levels of trust and reciprocity suggest that robust cohesion on the community level has been crucial in preventing Haiti’s institutional-political crisis from deteriorating into broad social collapse or civil war. There are, however, sharp urban-rural differences: people in rural areas feel far safer in their daily lives than do urban residents. 17. In conjunction with state fragility, political tensions and widespread poverty, rapid urbanization can compound an explosive social situation. Data show that metropolitan residents live in fear of crime and violence, despite higher material living conditions than in rural areas. Respondents in urban slum areas have pointed to multiple causes of violence but concur on the importance of unemployment as a fundamental driver. 18. A direct indicator of trust and social cohesion is whether people feel safe or afraid in various social situations. As many as 58 percent of residents in the metropolitan area feel unsafe “often or most of the time” in their own home, compared to 15 percent in rural areas. While a significant minority in rural areas also expresses fear of visiting markets and other towns, the data show that fear is not a major and daily concern for three-quarters of the rural population. 19. Violence is undermining development in Haiti. Domestic violence against women and children is the most prevalent form of violence: 35 percent of women over the age of 15 have been victims of physical violence. As regards homicide rates, Haiti is estimated to have 34 homicides per 100,000 citizens, which is somewhat higher than the regional average of 22.9 per 100,000. 20. Unconsolidated democratic institutions and “entrepreneurs of violence” have undermined political leadership. Within a year of the country’s 1990 elections, democracy was brutally repressed by the army and its supporters, using armed paramilitary groups that have been a feature of Haitian politics since Duvalier’s tonton macoutes. After President Aristide’s return in 1994, democratic consolidation was undermined by deep conflicts among erstwhile democratic allies. The result was a political stalemate that lasted until his departure in 2004 and that stalled progress in poverty reduction, economic growth and state building. Moreover, the stalemate transformed important parts of the democratic movement-elements within the urban popular organizations-into violent government enforcers and criminal gangs that struggled for control of territory and state favors, particularly in urban slums and “popular areas”. 21. The pool of potential recruits for crime and violence thus continues to grow, while the opportunity costs of participating in illegal activities or political violence are low. As the population shifts from rural to urban areas, the robust social cohesion that has characterized rural areas becomes less effective in mitigating social dislocation. This places a heavy burden on state institutions to provide basic services that alleviate demographic and socioeconomic pressures, and to mitigate the negative outcomes of crime and conflict. But the state’s institutional capacity to provide basic services, and to establish security and the rule of law, will require significant strengthening if Haiti is to break out of its conflict-poverty trap. iv Governance and Institutions 22. Institutions matter for social and economic development, and are crucial for state building. Institutions have the potential to mitigate the risk factors of violence and conflict that emanate from the socioeconomic and demographic context. The Haitian state, however, has only a limited capacity to establish law and order, or to create conditions for economic growth and poverty reduction. Progress in breaking out of the conflict-poverty trap demands attention to the restoration of core state functions in these areas. 23. To understand the Haitian state’s capacity to be a driver of development, its financial constraints must first be noted. Haiti’s GDP is extremely low and has been in decline since 1980. In 2005, central government revenues were only 9 percent of GDP, compared to an average of 18 percent among other low-income countries. Only 1.8 percent of revenues derive from taxes on income, profits, or capital. Central government expenditures have fluctuated sharply-between 9 and 16 percent of GDP in recent years-largely as a result of volatility in external assistance. That volatility stems from difficult partnerships with donors who have periodically withdrawn or redirected development assistance in response to political crises and insecurity. Thus a weak domestic revenue base, unstable external flows, and poor expenditure targeting have left spending on education, health, and infrastructure in Haiti below the average of low-income countries. 24. The state’s territorial outreach is limited. The 1987 constitution provides for an elaborate regional and local governance structure. This has never been implemented, however, except at the lowest levels (section communal, commune), where many local councils have been active despite a lack of financial and material resources. Infrastructure and Basic Sewices 25. In response to the extremely limited public sector provision of infrastructures and basic services throughout the country, the non-state sector has expanded rapidly to attend to unmet needs, especially for health and education services. This may account for the observed improvement in some social indicators. Yet critical gaps in coverage persist in terms of access for the poorest and the overall quality of services for the majority. 26. The role of the Haitian state in primary education is uniquely low from a global perspective. Of the world’s 20 poorest countries, Haiti is the only one in which more than 50 percent of children are enrolled in non-state schools. A snapshot of the education sector reveals an elite category of private schools (usually religious and urban-based) that have established themselves at the top of the pile, but are affordable to only a small segment of the population. These are followed by a large group of public schools that occupy the middle of the range, and then by the vast majority of private schools at the bottom. Public schools exist mainly in urban areas and 92 percent of all schools are non-state, the vast majority of which do not receive public subsidies. Among all primary and secondary school students, 82 percent attend private, fee-paying schools. 27. State health service provision is similarly limited. Only about 30 percent of health facilities in Haiti are public, and most of them are in urban areas. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provide an estimated 70 percent of health services in rural areas and focus in particular on primary health care, including reproductive health, drug counseling, infant care, and HIV/AIDS screening. There are a number of hospitals run by private foundations but the state retains the main responsibility for secondary and tertiary care, as well as for overall oversight and referral. V 28. Recent surveys examining the role of non-state service providers in rural areas and poor neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince have found a strong presence of community organizations in areas such as sanitation, drinking water, healthcare, education, and even electricity provision. Public utilities are the main providers of water and electricity but that circumstance does not ensure equal access. The diverse and unregulated nature of basic service-provision can be exploited by political interests that use access as a means of bestowing patronage, garnering support, and gaining leverage. Access to services is patchy, unstable, and unequal, reflecting political considerations in initial provision, poor maintenance capacity, a low level of coordination, and the violence and crime that affect service supply and demand. Given the state’s limited resources and capacity to provide services directly, development efforts should focus on improving the policy guidelines, coordination mechanisms, and regulatory frameworks for public-private partnerships. Security and the Rule of Law 29. Security and the rule of law are not only crucial to ensuring justice and safety; they are also essential in creating an enabling environment for investments, economic growth, and development. However, private systems of violence linked to political and criminal activities have become decentralized and widespread; Haiti now has more private security personnel than police officers. The institutions responsible for establishing security and the rule of law-the police, judiciary and prisons-have largely collapsed, and to some degree they have become a source of insecurity themselves. Political interference and corruption have undermined previous reform efforts and brought about the rapid withdrawal of international assistance, with further destabilizing effects. 30. Haiti has one of the world’s weakest police forces. There are 63 police officers per 100,000 people, less than a quarter of the regional average of 283 per 100,000 and only a third of the average for sub-Saharan African countries. Moreover, a significant number of members of the Haitian National Police (HNP) are alleged to be involved in criminal and violent activities, including direct involvement in the past year’s wave of kidnappings, according to human rights organizations and police officials themselves. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is mandated to support national authorities in the reform of the HNP, but it has not had executive authority over the national police force for the purposes of overseeing and monitoring the latter’s activities. There are increasing calls within Haiti and among the international community for MINUSTAH’S mandate to be strengthened in this regard. 31. Haiti’s judiciary is similarly weakened by corruption and frequent political interference, which have undermined the institution’s independence and constrained the success of previous reform efforts. The justice system suffers from the obsolescence of many laws, the absence of basic guarantees, poorly trained and paid judicial officers, and the advanced state of deterioration of its physical infrastructure. As a result, access to law and justice is difficult and random. Moreover, there is only limited integration of the police, judiciary, and prisons into a functioning criminal justice system or chaine pknale. Communication breakdowns between the investigative “judicial police”, the prosecutor’s office, court clerks and the prison administration result in long delays in the administration of justice and a pretrial detention rate of almost 80 percent. 32. The state’s ability to provide basic public goods has thus been undermined by a history of neglect, political capture and corruption, and compounded by difficult donor partnerships As regards the state’s administrative capacity, the territorial reach of state institutions is minimal vi outside major urban centers, decentralization has not been implemented, and the state has been unable to provide basic services or infrastructures to large portions of the population. A diverse and vibrant non-state sector has filled some of the gaps in health and education, but these efforts have been largely uncoordinated and unregulated. The result has been a substantial variation in the quality of the services provided and significant gaps in services for certain regions and vulnerable groups. The institutions responsible for providing the essential public goods of security and the rule of law (namely, the police and judiciary) are largely ineffective and suffer repeated problems of political interference and corruption. Above all, core state institutions remain weak, and the impacts of past technical assistance programs have been largely lost. Before beginning large-scale capacity building programs, government and donors must establish firm oversight and mutual accountability mechanisms to obviate the recurrence of practices that weaken institutions and perpetuate the conflict-poverty trap. Political Actors and Strategies 33. Twenty years have passed since the 1986 ouster of Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier created a window of opportunity to establish a more stable and democratic form of governance. But Haiti’s highly polarized politics has complicated efforts to address the country’s complex and deeply rooted development challenges. 34. The 1987 constitution provides for a clear separation of executive, judicial and legislative powers, as well as decentralized governance structures. In practice, however, politics in Haiti lacks a predictable system of rules. Political stability will remain illusive without the establishment of an equilibrium among the competing forces within society-including class forces that historically have pitted a small political and economic elite against the vastly larger urban and rural poor. Haitian politics swings between two key dangers: capture by privileged elites who harness government to protect their dominant position in society; and populism that neglects the country’s long-term institutional and economic development while paying lip service to the poor. The 2006 elections do not themselves ensure national reconciliation, but Haiti’s return to elected rule does create opportunities for the consolidation of democratic institutions and processes. 35. Strong national leadership is crucial to achieving a turnaround in Haiti. Entrepreneurs of violence have taken advantage of political instability and weak state institutions to manipulate popular grievances for political and criminal ends. Breaking free of Haiti’s poverty-conflict trap will require capable national political leadership that is committed to the consolidation of democratic institutions and processes. In a context of very difficult socioeconomic conditions, high social risks, defunct state institutions, extremely limited budget resources, and political polarization, Haiti’s leaders face enormous challenges. The 2006 electoral process, however, has created new opportunities for reform, reconciliation and partnerships. Conclusion: Breaking the Conflict-Poverty Trap 36. Haiti’s social resilience and social capital, its vibrant cultural life and improvements in social indicators are keystones to draw upon in breaking the conflict-poverty trap. Haiti’s deep and widespread poverty results from a long history of failure to establish even basic enabling conditions for broad-based social and economic development. The state has struggled to provide basic services to the population and has been dominated by a small elite that has made limited investments in infrastructure and basic services. Development, poverty reduction and conflict vii prevention will not be possible without a focus on strengthening the state’s capacity to provide basic public goods, including security and the rule of law. Its financial and managerial resources must be used with an exceptionally strong sense of priority. In the past, however, efforts to restore state functions have been undermined by political interference and corruption, which in turn prompted the withdrawal and redirection of donor support. 37. A reduction in violence and an improvement in security conditions are of paramount importance in fostering sustainable development in Haiti. Very poor urban neighborhoods are explosive points of conflict in the country’s development crisis, combining demographic, socioeconomic, institutional, and political risk factors. Violence and insecurity in the Port-au- Prince slums in particular have undermined the political process, fuelled conflict, and negatively affected development and reconstruction efforts. Joint multisectoral interventions in key urban areas (including CitC Soleil) that combine security and poverty reduction objectives will be essential for creating the conditions necessary for broad-based national development strategies. 38. The most important factor for breaking out of Haiti’s poverty-conflict trap cannot be provided by donors but only by Haitians themselves: good leadership. Donors can support good leadership by establishing incentives that reward good governance and penalize the opposite. Because of the centrality of corruption in undermining good leadership, transparency in public finances should be a foundation for the Bank and other donors’ assistance to a new Haitian government. 39. Haiti’s development crisis is so multifaceted, and the country’s needs are so many, that prioritizing reconstruction efforts and development assistance has proven difficult. This report argues that the focus should be on the restoration of core state functions-the provision of the public goods of security and the rule of law, infrastructure and basic services. Among the triangle of risk factors in the poverty-conflict trap, institutional capacity building is a key entry point for breaking the cycle; improving demographic and socioeconomic outcomes and supporting political dialogue remain longer-term objectives. Institutional reform itself, however, requires a long-term engagement. National planning and international assistance should build on the existing International Cooperation Framework by prioritizing resources and monitoring progress, such that both donors and government can be held accountable for results. ... Vlll 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Haiti holds a unique place in modern world history as the first independent black republic, established in 1804 following the only successful slave revolution against colonial rule. Undoubtedly, this historic accomplishment has helped build national pride and solidarity across economic and social distinctions in Haiti, and is reflected in the country’s vibrant cultural life. But as a stark reminder of the republic’s troubled history, the bicentennial of independence was overshadowed by violence and political instability that resulted in the fall of President’s Aristide’s government in February 2004. The sources of both Haiti’s strong social resilience and the recurrent political instability can be located in the country’s difficult independence process, which is discussed briefly below as a backdrop to this report’s more contemporary focus. Today, the report argues, poverty, institutional weakness, and urban violence continue to sustain Haiti’s conflict-poverty trap in ever shifting ways. Yet Haitians continue to cope by means of informal social mechanisms and migration abroad. This report analyzes these challenges and opportunities in Haiti’s development trajectory and proposes strategic development priorities to reinforce strengths and mitigate weaknesses. The analytical approach is described in more detail below, following a brief historical introduction.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: ORIGINS OF THE RURAL-URBAN DIVIDE 1.2 The Republic of Haiti emerged from a colonial order that established economic and social conditions for its post-independence development. Haiti is more known for its early colonial-era dominance in sugar production, but the rapid growth of coffee production in the second part of the eighteenth century transformed Haitian society in several ways (Trouillot 1990). The expansion of coffee production to meet soaring international demand attracted a new class of French migrants with more humble backgrounds than the traditional French sugar aristocracy. Together with freed people of mixed ancestry, they established small coffee estates in the country’s mountainous interior, thereby providing a basis for peasant production outside the sugar plantations of the coastal plains. This development reinforced another practice, whereby slaves were given garden plots for small-scale farming on land that was unfit for larger- scale production and that was more amply available in the interior. Coffee production made the interior a significant economic locus and helped turn an increasing number of producers against French colonial rule. France’s trade monopoly cut off producers from valuable markets in other European countries and the United States. Haitian nationalism was also growing, forging a sense of identity that-with the independence process-came to be seen as essentially black, even among the lighter skinned economic elite.3 1.3 Despite this growing nationalism, Haiti’s political and economic leaders and most of the population were set on different courses. The revolutionary wars destroyed much of Haiti’s physical and human capital. Plantations were ruined; a third of the slave population was killed, and many escaped to the mountains or enrolled in revolutionary armies; almost the entire white administrative class disappeared; and foreign trade practically came to a standstill. Slavery was abolished but the wars had a disastrous impact on the country’s economy from a fiscal perspective. Hence Haiti’s new leaders, from L’ Ouverture during the wars and continuing under The historical background section is based largely on Trouillot (1990) and Lundahl(l979). The grand blancs, petits blancs, and the affranchislgen de coleur. 1 Dessalines fro,m 1804, were determined to re-establish large-scale export-oriented plantations to restore the country’s economic strength. Former plantation land owned by whites was confiscated by the state, which led efforts to restore the plantations. But the availability of land in the interior, and the former slaves’ aversion to plantation work, made it impossible to secure the necessary voluntary labor. Hence the introduction of the fermage system, whereby every person who was not in the army or in urban trade was attached to a plantation under strict supervision and control. This re-establishment of export production through coercion met with some initial success, but for a number of economic and political reasons4 the restoration policy proved futile and land was gradually redistributed into peasant plots. By the end of the nineteenth century, Haitian agriculture was characterized almost entirely by smallholding peasant production geared to subsistence and local market^.^ The country’s financial situation remained weak throughout the century as a result of the loss of export revenues, an international diplomatic boycott,6 a heavy indemnity levied by France against its losses in Haiti, and declining terms of trade. 1.4 These circumstances solidified a widening breach between the rural, peasant majority and the increasingly urban, political and economic elite (Lundahl 1979). The peasantry, having acquired land and freedom, had no incentive to engage with the authorities and withdrew to a relative seclusion that was interrupted by sporadic rebellions when either their land or liberty were perceived to be threatened. The rural economy, which accounted for more than 90 percent of the population, entered a low or zero-growth equilibrium and attracted little private investment. The elite lost material interest in an agricultural sector that produced no significant farm-level profit, and instead taxed the sector as a whole via the state administration. Former landowners and other members of the economic elite thus turned away from a productive engagement in agriculture and focused on political and administrative positions. As political conflict and corruption intensified during the first century after independence, there was a further decline in incentives to develop rather than tax the rural sector. Since those living in the countryside were politically excluded and economically exploited through the public tax system, they avoided the political violence that was mostly concentrated in the capital, Port-au-Prince, and other major towns.7 1.5 The nature of this political-economic system was always shifting but some basic aspects of the spoils system remained unchanged throughout the US occupation (1915-34) and subsequent administrations. The system was taken to extremes by the Duvalier regime (1957- 86). As discussed later in this report, the regime was not only more brutal than earlier governments; its repressive capacity was also used to secure personal gain on an unprecedented scale, thereby contributing to the legacy of corruption that besets Haiti to this day. 1.6 This report will show that many legacies of Haiti’s past have continued to pose challenges to its post-authoritarian development, both politically and economically. Poverty is greater in rural areas, reflecting a history of government neglect that is evident in a lack of basic public goods (notably physical infrastructure), law enforcement, judicial institutions, Land was amply available, terms of trade unfavorable. New attempts were made to restore plantation production during the US occupation (1915-34), resulting in a broad France and the United States withheld recognition until 1825 and 1862, respectively. The exception was peasant participation in the so-called cacos rebellions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth peasant uprising (Lundahl 1979). centuries. 2 environmental protection, and regulatory frameworks. Basic healthcare, education, and other services are supplied by a patchy system of public and private (for profit) providers and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), largely without government oversight. As a result, large parts of the population lack access to quality primary education and health services (see Section 3). Today, two-thirds of Haitians still live in rural areas and most of them make their living directly or indirectly through small-scale farming. As a result of population pressures, environmental degradation and land erosion, increased education, and a lack of opportunities to escape rural poverty, agriculture is becoming a less attractive choice. 1.7 Inequality is almost equally high within the rural and urban sectors, but most glaring are the enormous differences between rural and metropolitan areas in income and poverty levels; social indicators (literacy, malnutrition, infant mortality); and access to services (education, healthcare) and infrastructure (water, electricity, roads, telephones)-see Section 2. Living conditions in the capital area’s many large slums are harsh, but these urban-rural differences and the concentration of jobs and opportunities in the metropolitan area attract vast numbers of migrants every year. Poverty, inequality, and the absence of social and economic opportunities spawn frustrations that can be exploited by those willing to undermine the formal political process in order to gain power. Haiti’s state institutions have only a limited capacity to manage conflicts, address grievances, and deter the violent potential that arises from these socioeconomic conditions. The state’s capacity is further constrained by a very weak domestic revenue base and the volatility of aid flows. The transition from dictatorship in 1986 offered an opportunity for change, but progress has been thwarted by recurring conflict, political instability, and resource constraints. In 2004, Haiti again underwent a violent regime change, followed by a period of increased violence and insecurity, particularly in Port-au-Prince. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 1.8 Fragile states such as Haiti are characterized by widespread poverty and inequality, economic decline and unemployment, institutional weakness and poor governance, violence, lawlessness, and persistent conflict. This report will explore how the links between these factors affect Haiti’s development challenge, and provide the empirical underpinnings and strategic priorities for poverty reduction and conflict prevention. Violent internal conflicts are statistically concentrated in poor countries, but poverty alone does not cause conflict. A large body of recent research concurs that the relationships among economic, institutional, and political factors in conflict are complex, interdependent, and context-specific.8 In most cases, violent conflict is a symptom of multifaceted development and governance malfunctions. In such fragile environments, the design and timing of international development assistance can play a critical role in addressing the root causes of conflict. But economic assistance may also be ineffective and counterproductive if it is not adapted to a country’s specific cir~umstances.~ 1.9 The report therefore examines Haiti’s situation from the perspective of a triangle of factors that have been identified as critical determinants of the development trajectory of fragile See, for example, Elbadawi (1992); Collier (1999); Collier and Hoeffler (2000); Easterly and Gatti (2000); Berdal See, for example, Vallings and Moreno-Torres (2005). 8 and Malone (2001); and Collier et al. (2003). 3 states,” including: (a) demographic and socioeconomic factors at the individual and household levels; (b) the capacity of core state institutions to provide basic services, including security and the rule of law; and (c) the agendas and strategies of political actors. It also examines the interaction of these three factors, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Figure 1.1 Components of a Conflict-Poverty Trap Demographic and socioeconomic outcomes and risks Institutional capacity (public goods) Political actors and strategies 1.10 The report discusses these factors in its three main sections and the conclusion. Following an overview in the introduction, Section 2 addresses socioeconomic and demographic factors” in an effort to further understanding of trends in population, poverty, and employment by identifying the characteristics of the poor and analyzing the determinants of poverty. These socioeconomic and demographic outcomes are further analyzed with a view to explaining how, as direct and indirect risk factors, they contribute to crime and conflict. On the demographic front, population growth and density, as well as migration, are important conflict risk factors if they are not matched by equal or preferably higher rates of economic growth. Among economic factors, inequality appears to be a crucial element that increases crime (both violent and otherwise), but that has only indirect effects on violent political conflict. The opposite is true for poverty: poverty reduction (that is, higher per capita income) significantly reduces violent conflict risk but does not have a measurable effect on reducing criminal violence.12 These economic variables themselves are negatively affected by conflict, contributing to the self- perpetuating nature of conflict-poverty traps. l3 1.1 1 Section 3 addresses public governance functions that are considered essential for reconstruction and development in fragile states, mainly the core state functions of providing the lo See, for example, Collier et al. (2003). The authors of this landmark study identify key causes of violent conflict as a “lethal cocktail” of “low and declining incomes, badly distributed, [that] create a pool of impoverished and disaffected young men who can be cheaply recruited by ‘entrepreneurs of violence’. In such conditions the state is also likely to be weak, non-democratic, and incompetent, offering little impediment to the escalation of rebel violence, and maybe even provoking it” (Collier et al. 2003). l2 Collier and Hoeffler (2002). l3 Ominously for Haiti, Collier (1999) finds that long conflicts tend to produce a post-conflict recovery effect, whereas short and recurrent conflicts-which are typical of Haiti-lead to continued economic decline. Buvinic and Morrison (n.d), Collier et al. (2003), Kelly (2000), Collier (2000). 4 [... middle sections omitted for long document ...] c) f e 8 8 3 g 4- Y 0 d 4 2 APPENDIX G: COHESION AND VIOLENCE IN HAITI Table G.l Confidence in Selected Institutions by Region All Confidence or great Metropolitan Other urban Rural confidence in ... Area Schools 94 97 94 95 Churches 91 96 94 94 Public health services 68 82 84 80 Police 55 70 71 67 Radio 54 63 63 61 NGOs 50 58 63 59 International org. 46 60 63 58 Civil service 37 62 60 55 Municipal adm. 23 45 54 45 Popular org. 20 33 38 33 Houngan, Voodoo 6 7 12 10 Parliament 21 33 39 34 Political parties 14 19 21 19 N 1268827 798959 3281743 5349529 Uwn 993 1159 4949 7101 Table G.2 Indicators of Fear of Crime by Region Wn Uwn Metropolitan Other Area Urban Rural All Feel safe or unsafe at home? Always save 8 45 49 39 2016530 3048 Most of the time safe 33 40 36 36 1857953 2448 Often unsafe 43 9 10 18 930851 1004 Most of the time unsafe 15 5 5 8 406405 440 Feel afraid to go to... Neighbors? Often or sometimes 25 21 19 21 1104445 1382 Never 67 , 74 76 74 3916095 5304 Not relevant 8 5 5 6 294141 363 People in this town or area? Often or sometimes 35 23 22 25 1328150 1667 Never 57 72 73 69 3664587 4914 Not relevant 9 5 5 6 326680 408 Local market? Often or sometimes 38 23 22 26 1388025 1710 Never 57 73 73 69 3698732 5036 Not relevant 5 4 5 4 235838 308 ................................................................ -. ................................................................................................................................. ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................Z
Nearest larger town? Often or sometimes 47 27 24 30 1579350 1923 Never 49 67 67 63 3316999 4559 Not relevant S 6 9 7 393212 536 Port-au-Prince? Often or sometimes 54 31 24 32 1690005 2069 Never 43 52 45 45 2378538 3129 Not relevant 4 17 31 22 1112743 1742 Total 100 100 100 100 5241286 6940 100