Rapò Finisman Pwojè: Repiblik Ayiti Senkyèm Pwojè Enèji (Cr. 2053-HA)

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 19579 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF HAITI FIFTH POWER PROJECT (Cr. 2053-HA) July 29, 1999 Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Department Caribbean Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (As of December 1998) Currency Unit = Gourdes (G$) G$16.00 = US$1.00 G$ I million =US$62,500 FISCAL YEAR October I -September 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFD Agence Francaise de Developpement (French Development Agency) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CMEP Council of Modermization of Public Enterprises CIDA Canadian International Development Agency EdH Electricite d 'Haiti (Electricity of Haiti) GOH Government of Haiti GWh Gigawatt-hours ( 1 million kilowatt-hours) IDA International Development Association IDB Interamerican Development Bank KfW Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (Germnan Development Financing Agency) MAP Management Assistance Program MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance MTPTC Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications PAD Project Appraisal Document PMU Project Management Unit SAR Staff Appraisal Report TAP Technical Assistance Program Vice President: David de Ferranti Country Management Unit Director: Orsalia Kalantzopoulos Sector Management Unit Director: Danny Leipziger Task Manager: Philippe Durand IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REPUBLIC OF HAITI POWER V PROJECT (Cr. 2053-HA) TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ........................................................ i EVALUATION SUMMARY ........................................................ ii PART I. IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT ............................................... 1 A. Background .1 B. Statement/Evaluation of Project Objectives. 2 C. Achievement of Project Objectives. 3 D. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project. 5 E. Project Sustainability. 7 F. IDA Performance. 7 G. Borrower Performance. 8 H. Assessment of Outcome. 9 1. Future Operation. 9 J. Key Lessons Learned .10 PART II, STATISTICAL ANNEXES ........................................................ 12 TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS ............................................................... 12 TABLE 2: RELATED IDA CREDITS ................................................................ 13 TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE ................................................................ 13 TABLE 4: CREDIT DISBURSEMENTS ................................................................ 14 TABLE 5: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ................................ 15 TABLE 6: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION .......................................... 15 TABLE 7: STUDIES ................................................................ 16 TABLE 8A: PROJECT COSTS ................................................................ 16 TABLE 8B: PROJECT FINANCING ................................................................ 16 TABLE 9: ECONOMIC EVALUATION ................................................................ 17 TABLE 10: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS ......................................................... 18 TABLE 11: COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENTS ................... 20 TABLE 12: IDA RESOURCES -STAFF INPUTS ....................................................... 20 TABLE 13: IDA RESOURCES -MISSIONS ............................................................. 21 APPENDIX 1 -LAST MISSION'S AIDE-MEMOIRE .................................................... 22 APPENDIX 2 -BORROWER CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR ......................................... 27 MAP IBRD 30127 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. i IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF HAITI FIFTH POWER PROJECT PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Fifth Power Project in Haiti, for which Credit 2053-HA in the amount of SDR 18.6 million (US$24.0 million equivalent) was approved on June 27, 1989, and made effective on January 16, 1990. The Project was restructured in 1996. The credit was closed on January 31, 1999, compared with the original closing date of December 31, 1995. Final disbursement took place on May 5, 1999 for the amount of SDR 111,509.53 equivalent. A balance of SDR 532,942.43 will be canceled from the Credit, assuming full recovery from the Special Account (US$73,542.04 were pending as of 7/31/99). Cofinancing for the project was provided by CIDA. The ICR was prepared by Philippe Durand, Task Manager (LCSFP) with support from Marcelo Osorio (Consultant) and reviewed by Mrs. Marfa Victoria Lister, Quality Assurance Officer (LCSFP), Mr. Max Pulgar-Vidal, Sector Leader (LCC3C) and Mrs. Orsalia Kalantzopoulos, Country Director (LCC2C). Preparation of this ICR began during IDA's final supervision/completion mission in November 1998. The ICR is based on the Staff Appraisal Report, Credit and Project Agreements, supervision reports, field visits, discussions with the project staff, materials in the implementing agency files, and the project file. The Borrower and Electricite d'Haiti (EDH) contributed to preparation of the ICR by providing their own report, information for the statistical tables and comments on the draft ICR which have been taken into account. The Borrower's contribution is shown in Appendix 2. ii IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF HAITI FIFTH POWER PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction }. The Fifth Power Project was part of the Government's sector strategy aimed at bringing about improvements in the efficiency, reliability and quality of energy services. Project objectives were in line with IDA's objectives of reducing long-run cost of electricity, and improving EdH's institutional and financial performance. This was IDA's fifth operation in the power sector. The first, second and fourth previous operations in 1976, 1980 and 1985, respectively were satisfactorily implemented. The third previous operation in 1982 was rated unsatisfactory. Project Objectives 2. The main objective of the project was to support Haiti's economic development strategy by providing the reliable supply of power necessary for economic growth and, in particular, for industrial and commercial activities. More specifically, the project aimed at: (a) expanding the generating facilities in the city of Port-au-Prince in accordance with a least-cost expansion program; (b) supplying electricity to the cities of Hinche and Thomonde; and (c) improving EdH's efficiency through the execution of (i) a program to reduce non-technical losses; (ii) institutional improvements; and (iii) training programs to strengthen EdH's managerial and technical capacity. Implementation Experience and Results 3. The project was approved in June 1989 and became effective in January 1990. It was restructured in July 1996 after the credit disbursements suspension, imposed following the embargo on Haiti by the international community from 1991 to 1994, was lifted. The project was restructured taking into account the conditions of the country after the embargo and the assistance offered to the country by other donors. During the embargo, the electricity system deteriorated dramatically and EdH was in precarious financial condition. Consultants appointed to study a strategy to develop the power sector concluded recommending full privatization of EdH. Following this recommendation, AFD/CIDA from France/Canada funded a Technical Assistance Program to Electricite d' Haiti (EdH) to improve its operations, IDB approved a grant to finance consultant services to assist the Government in analyzing options for privatizing EdH, and IDA restructured the project to focus on expanding badly needed generation capacity in Port au Prince and improving EdH's efficiency prior to its privatization. 4. The project partially achieved its objectives. The power generating facilities were expanded by 31 MW and availability of electricity service at Port-au-Prince increased from four hours in 1995 to eighteen hours in 1998, a pilot loss reduction program was successfully implemented and a pre-feasibility study for the installation of a new 60 MW diesel plant was iii completed. However, EdH's overall efficiency was not improved. Electricity losses increased and EdH's financial conditions very greatly deteriorated. Electricity losses increased from 40% in 1989 to 55% in 1997. Rates of return have been negative: -6.2% in FY 96 and -9.66% in FY 97 and total accounts receivable at end of FY 98 were equivalent to 8.2 months of consumption. 5. The Government of Haiti (GOH) progressed slowly towards the concession of the electric utility (EdH) to a private operator. In 1996, the GOH implemented two substantive actions, the enactment of the Law of Modernization of Public Enterprises and the establishment of the Council for the Modernization of the Public Enterprises (CMEP). The Law permits the transfer of public enterprise operations to private companies under the modalities of concession, capitalization or management contracts. Following the enactment of the Law, the CMEP, assisted by consultants financed by IDB, conducted studies to assess options for private participation. However, the progress has been very slow, due to lack of high level decisions. It was not until January 1999, that the GOH decided to select the concession option. At present, IDB is preparing a project that would include consultant services to assist the GOH in the implementation of this option. 6. The major factors that affected project implementation were: (i) the three year economic embargo imposed upon the country; (ii) EdH's critical financial situation following the embargo; (iii) the critical economic situation of most of the country's population which aggravated the problem of payment arrears and electricity theft and was an obstacle to tariff increases that were necessary to allow EdH's financial viability; (iv) the country's political instability: there were seven governments during the project implementation period ; (v) government's intervention in EdH's technical operations, which mainly affected the decision on the type of generating units and their procurement process, and the contract for the technical assistance to EdH; and (vi) weak EdH's institutional capability due to lost of qualified staff. 7. Several covenants were not met, primarily those with regards to the financial position of EdH. These shortfalls were as follows: EdH's rates of return have been negative as compared to 4.0% covenant, level of electricity losses is 55% as compared to 35% covenant, and the customers per employee ratio was 78 in FY 1998 as compared to 80 covenant. Summary of findings, Future Operation, and Key Lessons Learned 8. The project outcome is unsatisfactory. Although the main project objective, the expansion and improvement of EdH's electricity-generating facilities in the city of Port-au-Prince was achieved, the deterioration of EdH's efficiency and the uncertain project sustainability makes the overall outcome unsatisfactory. EdH's electricity facilities in Port-au-Prince were expanded within the project cost estimates and availability of the other EdH's generating facilities improved. As a result of both the expansion of EdH's generating facilities and improved maintenance of the existing ones, generation increased from 466.5 GWh in 1995 to 663.0 GWh in 1998 and availability of electricity service in Port-au-Prince increased from four hours in 1995 to eighteen hours a day in 1998. However, given EdH's critical financial condition and inefficiencies, the maintenance of both the new and existing generating units is likely to decline unless the Government accelerates the actions required to transfer EdH's operations to a private investor. 9. Overall IDA performance was moderately satisfactory: IDA properly identified and prepared the project but failed to adequately assess the status of project readiness for iv implementation at the time of appraisal; during supervision IDA's performance was satisfactory but failed to achieve an improvement in EDH operational efficiency and financial situation. The Borrower's performance was unsatisfactory: it did not support EdH's actions to improve its commercial performance and it did not take timely decisions for the restructuring and privatization of EDH. The performance of the implementing agency was less than satisfactory: EDH efficiently contributed to project preparation but during project implementation, EDH was not sufficiently committed to reducing non technical losses of electricity and did not take timely measures to improve its financial management procedures or to balance its financial situation. 10. The discussions held under the project and the lessons learned from its implementation contributed to important Government actions that could permit the participation of a private investor in EdH's operations. Options for private participation in the power sector were discussed with CMEP in several opportunities in 1998, in coordination with IDB. A project to assist the Government with the concession of EdH to a private company is being considered by IDB. This project would also include a component to finance the purchase of the goods and spare parts required for the maintenance of EdH's facilities during a period of two years. Successful implementation of this project and the achievement of its objective are fundamental to the sustainability of the project and the development of electricity service. Finalization of the concession arrangements with a private investor is expected in 2000. 1I. EdH has prepared a scheduled maintenance program for all its facilities and quantified the costs to perform it until IDB's proposed operation is effective. The Council for the Modernization of Public Enterprises has prepared a schedule for the appointment of an investment bank, the preparation of documents to invite private companies to bid for the concession of EdH, and the finalization of the concession arrangements with the awarded company. 12. The key lessons learned from the implementation of the project are: (a) EdH is not financially viable under the present institutional arrangements that do not entail sufficient incentives, autonomy or private involvement. Its income is insufficient to meet its costs of operation and maintenance; (b) the main cause for EdH's low income is the high level of electricity losses which have not decreased but constantly grown since the First Power Project financed by IDA, despite the fact that four of the five power projects included the reduction of losses as one of their objectives; the magnitude of these losses is such that their reduction will require substantial investment and very different institutional arrangements, with a motivated management; (c) the lack of adequate maintenance to the power facilities is another crucial issue. EdH is neglecting the maintenance of its facilities due to both lack of financial resources to acquire spare parts and insufficient power capacity reserve to allow stopping operation of its facilities for their maintenance; (d) the Government has initiated actions to concession EdH to a private company. The private company should bring into EdH new capital which is indispensable for expanding the power facilities and drastically reducing electricity losses; v (e) the failure in achieving the loss-reduction objective in this project and in the previous ones, has been due in part to lack of an adequate preparation of a comprehensive program which include detailed design of its components, list of equipment, implementation schedule and complete cost estimates of the implementation and follow-up actions. The preparation of these elements should have been completed under project preparation, not during its implementation as was done in the project; (f) the SAR for the project did not include a political risk analysis. The analysis of this kind of risks should be made whenever the political environment is unstable. In the case of the project, the political environment was very unstable at the time of the SAR; (g) the risk analysis in SARs/PADs should include the preparation of the utility's financial projection based on historical levels of efficiency, not on expected and uncertain improved levels. In the case of the project, EdH's financial projections assumed substantial efficiency improvements, in particular an unrealistic drastic reduction of electricity losses; (h) the support from government, including use of public force, is essential to successful implementation of a loss-reduction program. The project pilot program for loss reduction showed that EdH's employees did not have safe access to many neighborhoods and that the resale of electricity by customers not paying EdH was a problem; (i) Technical Assistance Programs (TAP), and even performance-based management contracts, proved once more that they are ineffective and should be avoided. These arrangements lack accountability, incentives, power to implement measures and financial resources to implement such measures; IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF HAITI FIFTH POWER PROJECT PART I -IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. BACKGROUND 1. From 1986 to 1999 Haiti has passed through one of its worst political and economic crises. After a civil rebellion obliged President Duvalier to resign power in 1986, there were several military governments until February 1991 when a democratic government was elected. This government did not last long; in September 1991, following a coup d'etat, a period of dictatorship came with a military government. The international community did not recognize this military government and applied an economic embargo to the country. The embargo was lifted in December 1994, when the democratic Government of President Aristide was reestablished. Following the embargo decision, IDA suspended credit disbursements to Haiti. At the time when credit disbursements were suspended, only a few preliminary activities had been started and only about US$0.1 million of the credit had been disbursed. During the project implementation period (1989-1999), the country has had seven different governments. 2. The breakdown of civil discipline subsequent to the several changes of government and the political situation began to seriously undermine EdH's performance. Frequent changes in management, due to political considerations, shortage of qualified staff and inadequate coordination among the various departments, aggravated EdH's condition. Skilled professionals, attracted by higher salaries and more stability in developed countries, started to leave the country. The main problems confronting the sector were extremely high energy losses and poor conditions of the power thermal plants. Energy losses escalated rapidly, reaching an average of 35% of total production in 1987 compared to 30% in 1986. Electricity service was very unreliable, with frequent outages and breakdowns. The four thermal plants that served the Port-au-Prince area (Janvier, Delmas, Varreux and Carrefour, totaling 101.3 MW) were old and unreliable or poorly maintained. Extensive work was carried out under the Fourth Power Project, including complete overhauling of the Delmas' four units as well as maintenance and improvements of the Varreux and Carrefour plants. As a consequence of high electricity losses and the shortage of qualified staff, EdH's financial performance deteriorated dramatically. Rate of return on revalued fixed assets decreased from 5% in 1986 to 1.5% in 1987, and accounts receivable from private customers increased from an equivalent average of 60 days in 1986 to 75 days in 1987. 3. At the end of the embargo, the political, economic and social conditions of the country were critical. Politically, the government faced the need to restore political stability as its first priority. Economically, after more than three years of embargo, the country was devastated. The power sector was not the exception: the conditions of the power facilities, specifically the thermal plants, were catastrophic due to the extended period without spare parts required for their proper maintenance. Socially, the situation was calamitous. Poverty had dramatically increased and consequently, people's capacity to pay for basic services, including electricity, decreased. Four years after the embargo was lifted, the country has not been able to recover political stability. 2 Government has lacked a Prime Minister for almost two years and no Prime Minister has remained in power for more than one year 4. The project was appraised in June 1987 and negotiated in November 1987. After the change in government in 1988, it was updated in March 1989 and renegotiated in April 1989. The project was restructured in July 1996 following the lift of the international embargo. B. STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES Project Objectives 5. The main objective of the project was to support Haiti's economic development strategy by providing the reliable supply of power necessary for economic growth and, in particular, for industrial and commercial activities. More specifically, the project aimed to: (a) expand the generating facilities in the city of Port-au-Prince, in accordance with a least-cost expansion program, (b) supply electricity to the cities of Hinche and Thomonde; (c) improve EdH's efficiency through the execution of (i) a program to reduce non-technical losses; (ii) institutional improvements; and (iii) training programs to strengthen EdH's managerial and technical capacity. 6. The project was initially comprised of seven components: (i) installation of two 20-MW gas turbine generating units in Port-au-Prince; (ii) construction of a single-circuit, 42 km-long sub-transmission line of 23 kV from the Peligre hydropower plant to Hinche; (iii) procurement of equipment and tools for maintenance of distribution systems and a loss-reduction program; (iv) preparation of feasibility studies for future medium-speed diesel units; (v) a pre-investment study to assess the economic merits of serving the Ciment d'Haiti plant from EdH's main grid; (vi) preparation and implementation of a program to reduce non-technical losses; and (vii) a program to carry-out EdH's institutional development, including the implementation of a training program. 7. In 1995, after the lift of the embargo, IDA and the Borrower agreed to restructure the project taking into account the country needs for urgent addition of power capacity and to extend the closing date from December 31, 1995 to December 31, 1998. During the embargo, the electricity system deteriorated dramatically. Electricity service was only available four hours a day and EdH was in precarious financial condition. Consultants were appointed to study a strategy to develop the power sector; their recommendation was full privatization of EdH. Following this recommendation, several donors were willing to assist the Government in improving EdH's performance and its further privatization. In 1995, the French Agency for Development (Agence Francaise de Developpement, AFD) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funded a Technical Assistance Program to enable EdH to improve its operations. In 1996, IDB approved a grant to finance consultant services to assist the Government in analyzing options to transfer EdH's operations to a private company through concession, capitalization or management contract. Considering that EdH's institutional development would be widely covered by the support to be provided by other donors, IDA accepted Government's request to reallocate most of the credit funds in support of the institutional component to increase the category for the generating component and restructured the project accordingly. 3 8. The restructured project was comprised of five components; (i) installation of additional power generation capacity for EdH in Port-au-Prince, including the acquisition and utilization of medium-speed diesel power units at Varreux and a low-speed diesel unit at Carrefour; (ii) preparation and implementation of a program for the reduction of EdH's energy losses; (iii) a study on the site location and cost estimate of medium-speed generating plants to be constructed by EdH; (iv) a study to examine the current structure of EdH's tariffs; and (v) a reduced institutional development program limited to finance technical assistance for a loss reduction program, improvements of EdH's information, accounting and inventory control systems, and a training program for managers and high-level staff of EdH. The review of EdH's by-laws and the revision of its organizational structure were eliminated since the new goal was the privatization of EdH. Evaluation of Objectives 9. The project objectives were clear and similarly interpreted by the Borrower and the implementing agency at the time of project appraisal. Given the urgent need of the country for additional power capacity and the need for EdH to improve its efficiency, the objectives were also appropriate at the time of project appraisal and in line with IDA's objectives. IDA's objectives for the energy sector were to foster energy conservation, to reduce the long-run cost of electricity, and to improve EdH's institutional and financial performance. C. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES Overview 10. Overall, the project partially achieved its objectives. The objectives of expanding generating facilities at Port-au-Prince and supplying electricity to the cities of Hinche and Thomonde were achieved, but the improvement of EdH's efficiency was not achieved. Electricity losses have increased and EdH's financial condition has deteriorated dramatically. Sector Policies 11. The project did not include sector policy objectives. However, with the extreme deterioration of electricity service during the economic embargo, the need for substantial sector policy reforms was evident during project implementation as recommended by consultants appointed to study a strategy to develop the power sector. Based partly on the recommendations of this study, the Government prepared and enacted the Law of Modernization of Public Enterprises. This law permits the participation of private companies in the public enterprises under the modalities of management contracts, concession or capitalization. Additionally, the law created the Counsel of Modernization of Public Enterprises (CMEP) to promote private participation in public enterprises and carry out the transfer of operations of public enterprises to private companies. Financial Objectives 12. The financial objectives of the restructured project were not achieved and financial covenants were not met. EdH's financial performance has been very unsatisfactory. In FY 98, its financial losses amounted to US$ 5.0 million. Rate of return was -6.2% in FY 96 and it even 4 worsened in FY 97 to -9.66%. Accounts receivables are equivalent to 8.2 months of consumption. The auditor certified the project accounts and the SOEs without qualification, but issued a disclaimer of opinion for EdH's 1996 and 1997 financial statements. Audit report for FY 98 was not yet available at the time of the ICR preparation. Institutional Development 13. The institutional development objectives were partially achieved. Maintenance of the generating facilities improved considerably and availability of electricity service increased from four hours in 1995 to eighteen hours in 1998. However, these improvements were overshadowed by the extremely high electricity losses that reached the level of 55% in 1998. The causes for the increase of electricity losses are several: lack of the utility's commitment to this objective; lack of Government's support to enforce the cut of service to illegal customers; and lack of financial resources to implement a comprehensive loss-reduction program. The credit amount allocated to this program was intended to finance only consultant services, and not the large amount of equipment and goods required for this kind of program like meters, labs, vehicles and cable; thus, only a pilot program was financed from the project. Due to the high level of losses, EdH's operational deficits were also high, thus limiting its ability to financially afford loss control measures and to properly maintain its facilities. As a result, if no external financial resources are injected to EdH, it is likely that even the improvements obtained in the maintenance of generating facilities will be lost; this injection of resources would materialize if EdH was privatized. 14. The technical assistance provided under grants given by AFD from France and CIDA from Canada did not contribute much either to the improvement of EdH's performance. The program was provided during a three and a half year period, from July 1995 to December 1998 and was a positive factor in improving the operation of EdH's generating facilities. However, deficient terms of reference, lack of incentives for consultants' performance, lack of performance indicators and insufficient financial resources were the main constraints preventing better or lasting results from this assistance. 15. Some positive actions have been taken towards the concession of EdH to a private company, which would be the most effective long term solution for the power sector. The enactment of the Law of Modemization of Public Enterprises in 1996 was undoubtedly a substantive action. Following the enactment of the Law, the CMEP, assisted by consultants financed by IDB, conducted studies to assess options for private participation in the power sector and, as a result, has selected the concession option. At present, IDB is preparing an operation that would include consultant services to assist the GOH in the implementation of this option. Physical Objectives 16. The physical objectives were substantially achieved. The power generating facilities were expanded by 31 MW at the Varreux and Carrefour power stations, electricity generation increased from 466.5 GWh in 1995 to 663.0 GWh in 1998, the cities of Hinche and Thomonde have electricity service, a pilot loss reduction program was implemented, a tariff study was conducted and a pre-feasibility study for the installation of a new 60 MW diesel plant was completed. 17. The Varreux power station was expanded by six medium-speed diesel generating units with a total installed capacity of 21 MW. Out of the six units, four units totaling 15 MW were 5 financed by the Credit and the other two units, totaling 6 MW, were financed by CIDA from Canada. Installation of these units was completed by mid-1996, and the plant has been in operation since that date, but the units still have some problems pending of fixing by the contractor, namely defects in the speed regulation and steam generators. Final acceptance of the units is pending the repair of the above problems and successful completion tests that are scheduled for July 1999. 18. The Carrefour power station was expanded with a 10 MW low-speed diesel unit. Consultants prepared the technical specifications for this unit which was procured under ICB modality. This unit is under provisional operation since January 1999, but its final commission is scheduled for June 1999 in order to correct some deficiencies found at the rotor. 19. At the cities of Hinche and Thomonde, EdH installed small power generators financed from their own resources. The portion of the credit allocated to finance a transmission line to these two cities was reallocated to increase the category for power expansion capacity. 20. The pilot loss-reduction program executed under the project comprised a zone with some 10,500 customers. The program included the installation of new meters and the monitoring of the electricity supplied and electricity billed within the pilot zone. Electricity losses were reduced by some 16% in the pilot zone but this achievement was not sustained because EdH lacked the financial and human resources to continue monitoring the zone. 21. A pre-feasibility study on a new 60 MW diesel plant, including site selection, was completed satisfactorily. This plant will have to be developed soon to meet the country's needs for additional power. 22. Actions to improve environmental conditions, especially the recovery of liquid effluents, at the Carrefour and Varreux power plants were completed. D. IMPLEMENTATION RECORD AND MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT Implementation Record 23. The project was originally scheduled to be completed by June 30, 1995 and close on December 31, 1995. It was restructured after the suspension of credit disbursements was lifted in July 1996 and the closing date was extended to December 31, 1998. A further extension to January 31, 1999 was granted. Final project cost was US$ 26.8 million equivalent, compared to US$27.6 million estimated at appraisal. Total IDA disbursements amounted to US$25.4 million. 24. Implementation was not always satisfactory. Procurement of the generating units at Varreux was particularly troublesome. Due to the emergency situation the country was facing after the embargo, the Government requested, and IDA accepted, two modifications to the procurement of these units so as to hasten their availability. The first change was related to the type of generating units (small medium-speed diesel units instead of the gas turbine specified in the project description); the second change was on the procurement modality. A shopping modality was accepted instead of ICB. The results of these changes were negative. During project preparation and again in the first year of project implementation, EdH, assisted by consultants, had prepared bidding documents and technical specifications for the procurement of gas turbines. For the procurement of diesel units, EdH did not have bidding documents ready and 6 did not have consultants to assist them. Given the urgency of the requirements for the generating units, staff from the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications (MTPTC) and EdH prepared simplified, broad specifications and issued bid invitations to potential bidders by fax. Some problems developed because of this procedure. First, EdH received bids including equipment that met the broad specifications, but with substantial differences in design, thus making difficult the comparison of bids. Second, the award criteria was unclear for this kind of situation and, as a result, there were disagreements on the award recommendations between the MTPTC and the consultants appointed by EdH to assist them in the bid evaluation. Third, the Ministry of the MTPTC decided to terminate the contract with the consultants because of the above disagreements. Fourth, EdH's award decision made on the basis of the recommendations of a new consultant was materially contested by one of the bidders. Finally, the equipment supplied under this component has had technical and operational problems which have been due, in part, to incomplete specifications. 25. The Technical Assistance Program (TAP) financed by grants from AFD from France and CIDA from Canada was ineffective. This program was intended to assist EdH in improving the electricity service during the transition period after the lift of the embargo until EdH would be privatized. At that time, privatization of EdH was expected to be completed within one year. Since the expected duration of the TAP was short, AFD, CIDA and GOH agreed on very simplified terms of reference and contract with the consultants; they did not include any efficiency target nor performance indicators. However, since the process for the intended privatization of EdH progressed much slower than expected, at Govemment's request, AFD and CIDA extended twice the TAP from July 1996 to December 1998. Unfortunately, due to the unrealistic expectation on the quick privatization of EdH, the extensions of the contract with the consultants were made on the same terms as the initial contract and the consultants were unable to program their assistance with long-term objectives. The consultants focussed their assistance on short-term objectives only, mainly the increase of electricity service availability. The TAP had no impact on reduction of power losses nor on improvement of EdH's financial situation. 26. The extension of the credit closing date to December 31, 1998 followed the lift of the disbursement suspension, and was linked to project restructuring in July 1996. It reflected a revised project implementation schedule that had been prepared by EdH and reviewed by IDA. The extension of the closing date to January 31, 1999 was to cover the expected period to complete the installation of the 10 MW diesel unit at Carrefour. However, due to unforeseen problems encountered lately at this unit, final acceptance of this unit is still pending and the credit closed without making the expected final disbursement in the amount of US$ 0.7 million, equivalent to 10% of the contract amount. This payment is offset, however, by a penalty in an equivalent amount that was assessed by EdH for delay by the contractor in meeting the contractual implementation schedule. Major Factors Affecting Implementation 27. Factors outside the control of the Borrower and the Implementing Agencies. The major factors that affected project implementation were the political instability and the three-year economic embargo imposed upon the country and the multiple negative consequences derived from it. The first consequence was the suspension of disbursements of the IDA's credit which interrupted the procurement process of the generating units. A second consequence was the deterioration of the economic situation of most of the country's population, which reduced customer affordability and aggravated the problem of electricity theft and was an important 7 obstacle to tariff increases. This, in turn, aggravated the already critical financial situation of EdH and affected all its other operations, including implementation of the project. 28. Factors subject to Government control. These factors included: (i) lack of decision on the process for the privatization of EdH. The Government changed several times its decision on the modality of EdH's privatization, which caused a substantial delay on the process. This in turn, aggravated EdH's performance because of its uncertain future; (ii) the lack of public support, including the use of public force to EdH's actions devoted to reduce electricity thefts; (iii) the government's intervention in EdH's technical operations. The Government intervened extensively on the procurement process for the generating units at Varreux. The MTPTC disagreed on the award recommendation made by the consultant appointed by EdH and fired the consultant. This action put project implementation in serious danger. Another intervention that proved to be very negative was the preparation and agreement of terms of reference and contract for the TAP without participation of the power utility which had to deal with them. 29. Factors subject to implementing agency control. The main factors were as follows: (i) weak institutional capability. EdH had lost most of its qualified staff prior to project implementation due to lack of incentives, low salaries and political interference in the utility's management. During project implementation the job conditions were even less attractive for qualified staff; (ii) EdH did not make good use of the extensive consulting services made available to it through the Technical Assistance Program financed by AFD/CIDA (the Program included some thirteen consultants during a three and half year period). Much of the blame for this was the lack of EdH's supervision on the consultants work; and (iii) the Commercial and Financial Directorates lacked adequate management during most of the project implementation period. EdH's financial statements deserved a disclaimer of opinion by the auditor. E. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 30. Sustainability of the project achievements is uncertain. It is highly dependent on the availability of financial resources for the proper maintenance of the generating units. The most likely solution to this issue is the project IDB is considering in support of GOH's plans to concession EdH's to a private company. This project would include an investment component to meet the maintenance requirements for two years, after which time the private operator will be fully responsible for all maintenance costs. However, finalization of this operation is subject to (i) GOH's full support to the proposed concession of EdH's operations to a private company; and (ii) response from the private sector to the invitation to submit bids for the proposed concession agreement. At present there are no clear answers to either of these two conditions and, consequently, sustainability of the achievements of the project is uncertain. F. IDA PERFORMANCE 31. IDA's performance was satisfactory during the identification and preparation phases. At the identification phase, IDA properly assessed project objectives that were consistent with the GOH's strategy for development. At preparation, IDA rightly assessed the main project issues and the project components necessary to deal with these issues and assisted the borrower in the preparation of the project components concurrently with the supervision missions for Credits 1281--HA and 1527-HA. 8 32. At appraisal, IDA satisfactorily assisted the Government on defining project components consistent with the project objectives and properly assessed the least cost expansion program for the power sector, but failed to adequately assess the status of project readiness for its implementation. Completion of the bidding documents for the procurement of the gas turbines took more than one year after project appraisal. Preparation of the loss reduction program was still at a very incipient level. It did not include a plan of action to implement concrete measures, a list of equipment and goods, nor a detailed cost estimate of the entire program. It only included terms of reference for the appointment of consultants to assist EdH in the implementation of a loss reduction program. With that level of preparation in this program, the target to reduce losses from 40% to 16% was totally unrealistic. IDA had not learned from the previous three operations in which EdH had failed for similar reasons. 33. During supervision, IDA's perfornance was satisfactory, but ineffective. IDA was very sensible in its decision to restructure the project, taking into account the GOH's requests and the assistance offered by other donors, and to extend the closing date for three years at once. IDA was also sensible in approving an expedited procurement process for generating units in view of the urgently needed increase in electricity supply. The supervision documentation provides a good and realistic assessment of the status of the project, the environment in which it was being implemented, and the options IDA management faced. It also contributed with recommendations for permanent sector reforms, particularly with regards to a long-term solution -the privatization of EdH's operations. However, despite IDA's support, EdH's was unable to comply with the credit's financial covenants due mainly to the external factors mentioned above and IDA did not exercise the remedies available in accordance with the Credit Agreement. This lack of drastic actions by IDA was likely due to the fact that after the severe consequences the embargo had for the country, the general attitude of all international organizations assisting the country was one of leniency. 34. Overall IDA performance was moderately satisfactory: IDA properly identified and prepared the project but failed to adequately assess the status of project readiness for implementation at the time of appraisal; during supervision IDA's performance was satisfactory but failed to achieve an improvement in EdH operational efficiency and financial situation. G. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 35. Borrower's performance was unsatisfactory. Overwhelmed by the political and economic problems the Government faced after the embargo, its commitment to project objectives faltered. The Government was more interested in short-term results, such as the immediate increase of availability of electricity service at any price, than in taking unpopular measures for long-term results, such as supporting EdH's actions to cut electricity service to illegal customers and allowing the necessary tariff restructuring. However, the Government provided some financial support to EdH by arranging direct payments by the GOH of fuel procured by EdH, that were later settled towards Government electricity consumption. The main problem has been the slow progress in sector restructuring and the privatization of EdH, which was due to lack of high level decisions by Government, caused in part by the lack of a Prime Minister during almost two years. 36. The performance of the implementing agency was less than satisfactory. At preparation stage, EdH was diligent in taking actions and preparing all the information required for project 9 appraisal, including the appointment of consultants, review of consultant reports, preparation of a least-cost expansion plan and financial projections for the sector. However, during project implementation, EdH's performance was unsatisfactory. Specifically, its commercial performance has been highly unsatisfactory. The extremely high level of electricity losses at the beginning of project implementation not only was not reduced, but actually increased. It is true that this problem has several causes, but lack of EdH's commitment on attacking this problem was undoubtedly one of the causes. EdH's financial performance has also been unsatisfactory although has improved as of late, based on EdH's provisional financial results for 1998. The audit reports repeatedly issued disclaimer opinions in reference to EdH's financial statements, mainly due to problems with billing and customer receivables, asset accounting, long-term debt, deficiencies in financial management and accounting software and financial management procedures. In May 1998, based on the auditor's report, EdH prepared a detailed action plan to improve its financial management system. Implementation of the action plan was substantial in December 1998. H. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME 37. Overall, the outcome of the project is unsatisfactory. Although the main project objective, the expansion and improvement of EdH's electricity-generating facilities in the city of Port-au-Prince was fully achieved, the deterioration of EdH's efficiency and the uncertain project sustainability makes the overall outcome unsatisfactory. EdH's electricity facilities in Port-au- Prince were expanded within the project cost estimates and experienced a delay of only a few months with respect to the revised project implementation schedule. Additionally, the maintenance and availability of EdH's other generating facilities improved. As a result of both the expansion of EdH's generating facilities and improved maintenance of the existing ones, availability of electricity service in Port-au-Prince increased from eight hours to eighteen hours per day. However, given EdH's critical financial condition and inefficiencies, the maintenance of both the new and existing generating units is likely to be inadequate if Government does not accelerate the actions required to transfer EdH's operations to a private investor, which would allow the sustainability of project-financed investments.. 38. An ex-post analysis of the internal economic rate of return (IERR) for a time slice of EdH's investment program was conducted utilizing the same format as the analysis included in the SAR for a different period. Revenues derived from incremental sales were used as a proxy for benefits. The benefits attributed to EdH's 1995-1998 investment program was assumed at 10% of incremental sales, billed and non-billed, in 1995, 20% in 1996, 40% in 1997, 60% in 1998, 80% in 1999 and 100% from 2001 on. EdH's 1995-1998 investment program's ex-post IERR and NPV discounted at 10% were estimated at 8.0% and US$-10.6 million, respectively. Incremental sales were calculated as the total energy delivered by EdH's power plants less the technical electricity losses estimated at 16%. Non-technical losses (electricity thefts), which amounted to about 40% in 1998 were included in the sales as non-billed electricity, considering that although they were not paid to the utility, they still represent an economic benefit. ][. FUTURE OPERATION 39. The discussions held under the project and the lessons learned from its implementation contributed to important Government actions that could permit the participation of a private investor in EdH's operations. A project to help the Government to concession EdH to a private 10 company is being considered by IDB. This project would also include a component to finance the purchase of goods and spare parts required for the maintenance of EdH's facilities for a period of two years. Successful implementation of this project and the achievement of its objectives are fundamental to the sustainability of the project and the development of electricity service in Haiti. Finalization of the concession arrangements with a private investor is expected next year. 40. The Council for the Modernization of Public Enterprises has prepared a schedule for the preparation of documents to invite private companies to bid for the concession of EdH, to appoint an investment bank, and to finalize the concession arrangements with the awarded company. 41. Until the concession arrangements are finalized, EdH will continue monitoring customer connections to avoid further increase of electricity losses. 42. If the concession of EdH to a private company is successfully implemented, the Government should focus its efforts in rural electrification, in particular through the use of solar and other renewable energy, and in promoting the rational use of energy in the rural areas. Deforestation is one of the major energy issues in Haiti caused mainly by the inefficient production and use of charcoal and wood for cooking. It could be mitigated by the development of forest management schemes by rural communities and the dissemination of practices and private delivery mechanisms for the efficient use of woodfuels and their substitution with LPG and kerosene. 43. EdH has prepared a scheduled maintenance program for all its facilities and the budget required for its implementation until IDB's proposed operation is effective. EdH already procured under the project the spare parts for maintenance of the project units during 1999 and included the cost of the spare parts for its other generating units in its 1999 overall budget. 44. EdH will continue implementing the action plan prepared in May 1998 to correct the deficiencies signaled by the auditor. This implementation should be concluded by September 1999. J. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 45. The key lessons learned from the implementation of the project are: (a) EdH is not financially viable under the present institutional arrangements that do not entail sufficient incentives, autonomy or private involvement. Its income is insufficient to meet its costs of operation and maintenance; (b) the main cause for EdH's low income is the high level of electricity losses which have not decreased but constantly grown since the First Power Project financed by IDA, despite the fact that four of the five power projects included the reduction of losses as one of their objectives; the magnitude of these losses is such that their reduction will require of substantial investment and of very different institutional arrangements, with a motivated management; I1 (c) the lack of adequate maintenance to the power facilities is another crucial issue. EdH is neglecting the maintenance of its facilities due to both lack of financial resources to acquire spare parts and insufficient power capacity reserve to allow stopping operation of its facilities for their maintenance; (d) the Government has initiated actions to concession EdH to a private company. The private company should bring into EdH new capital which is indispensable for expanding the power facilities and drastically reducing electricity losses; (e) the failure in achieving the loss-reduction objective in this project and in the previous ones, has been due in part to lack of an adequate preparation of a comprehensive program which include detailed design of its components, list of equipment, implementation schedule and complete cost estimates of the implementation and follow-up actions. The preparation of these elements should have been completed under project preparation, not during its implementation as was done in the project; (f) the SAR for the project did not include a political risk analysis. The analysis of this kind of risks should be made whenever the political environment is unstable. In the case of the project, the political environment was very unstable at the time of the SAR; (g) the risk analysis in SARs/PADs should include the preparation of the utility's financial projection based on historical levels of efficiency, not on expected and uncertain improved levels. In the case of the project, EdH's financial projections assumed substantial efficiency improvements, in particular an unrealistic drastic reduction of electricity losses; (h) the support from government, including use of public force, is essential to successful implementation of a loss-reduction program. The project pilot program for loss reduction showed that EdH's employees did not have safe access to many neighborhoods and that the resale of electricity by customers not paying EdH was a problem; (i) Technical Assistance Programs (TAP), and even performance-based management contracts, proved once more that they are ineffective and should be avoided. These arrangements lack accountability, incentives, power to implement measures and financial resources to implement such measures; 12 REPUBLIC OF HAITI FIFTH POWER PROJECT (Cr. 2053-HA) PART II. STATISTICAL ANNEXES TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS Macro policies ._.__._= x Sector policies X Financial objectives X Institutional development X Physical objectives x Poverty reduction x Gender issues x Other social objectives x Environmental objectives Public sector management x Private sector development X Other (capacity building) x B. Project sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain C. IDA performance Highly Satisfactory Deficient satisfactory Identification x Preparation assistance x Appraisal X Supervision x D. Borrower performance Highly Satisfactory Deficient satisfactory Preparation x Implementation X Covenant compliance X Operation (if applicable) E. Assessment of Outcome Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Highly satisfactory unsatisfactory _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _X _ _ _ _ _ 13 TABLE 2: RELATED IDA CREDITS LoankNed1t t*U trpose I Ya of __ tvs_._:_ --:- : :LF ... - __ | a~~~~~~pproval--:: Preceding Operations 645-HA Partially finance the first stage of a 1976 Concluded on 03/31/1979 and two-stage development program for rated satisfactory 1976-1981, including installation of diesel generating units and distribution network expansion. 895-HA Finance expansion of diesel 1980 Concluded on 06/30/1984 and generating capacity and renovation rated satisfactory of the distribution network in Port- au-Prince. 1281-HA Finance expansion of thermal 1982 Concluded on 12/31/1986 and generation, renovation of the Port- rated unsatisfactory au-Prince distribution network. 1527-HA Finance expansion of thermal 1985 Concluded on 06/30/1989 and generation, renovation of the Port- rated satisfactory au-Prince distribution network. TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE sftps in piqd-~cyte tWy panne Identification 06/86 06/86 Preparation 09/86 09/86 Pre-Appraisal 03/87 02/87 Appraisal 06/87 06/87 Negotiations 11/87 11/87 Post-Appraisal 03/89 Board Presentation 03/88 06/89 Signing 06/88 08/89 Effectiveness 10/88 01/90 Project Restructuring 07/96 Project Completion 06/95 01/99 Closing 12/95 01/99 14 TABLE 4: CREDIT DISBURSEMENTS (CUMULATIVE) (In US$ Dollars) FY 90 0.8 0.0 0.0 FY 91 3.4 0.0 0.0 FY 92 7.8 0.1 0.1 FY 93 12.6 0.1 0.8 FY 94 16.8 0.1 0.6 FY 95 20.4 0.1 0.5 FY 96 24.0 9.9 41.3 FY 97 24.0 16.3 67.9 FY 98 24.0 23.2 96.7 FY 99 24.0 25.4a 112.5 a/ The Credit was for SDR 18.6 million, equivalent to US$24.0 million at the time of project appraisal and to US$25.4 million based on actual disbursements. 15 TABLE 5: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Estimaed Actual ey lmpkmenttino indicators In SAR 1995 199- Electricity Losses (%) 15.0 55.0 Annual return (%) 8.0 -9.6 Ratio of customers per staff 100:1 81:1 Accounts Receivable (days) 60 181 L .s .~~~~~~~EstimatdAta Modifit iad- et1rs at Projett Restr-tuljug 198 Electricity Losses (%) 35.0 55.0 Annual return (%) 4.0 -9.6 Ratio of customers per staff 85:1 81:1 Accounts Receivable (days) 60 181 TABLE 6: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION Key pefngtin diators in SAR - -_-_._: Electricity Losses (%) 15.0 Annual return (%) 8.0 Ratio of customers per staff 100:1 Accounts Receivable (days) 60 M~~~d.iiiators ~~~~~~~~~~~~~stwixnte4 Actnal Electricity Losses (%) 30 (in 2005) Accounts Receivable (days) 60 (in 2002) Maintenance on Varreux Project units (date) 06/99 Maintenance on other Varreux' units (date) 12/99 Maintenance on Carrefour Project unit (date) 06/00 Maintenance on Carrefour's other units (date) 12/99 Invitation to submit qualification for concession EdH 09/99 Invitation to submit bids for concession EdH 03/00 16 Finalization concession of EdH 06/00 TABLE 7: STUDIES Site location and cost estimate of Define the site: size and cost of a next Completed, Important for the future medium-speed diesel generating power generating project but final expansion of the power plants report is generating facilities pending Frequency conversion on the Feasibility of converting the frequency of Not The study was not needed Ciment d'Haiti Plant the Ciment d'Haiti plant from 50 hertz to Completed because the transmission line 60 hertz to feed the Cement plant was not constructed. Institutional development of EdH Review of EdH's by-law, revise its Partially Improvements to EdH's organizational structure and improve its Completed information, accounting and information, accounting and inventory inventory control system will control system positively contribute to the privatization of EdH Tariff Study This study was not included in the Completed Provided basis for the tariff appraisal increase implemented in 1997 and is providing elements for the concession of EdH. Training Program Implement a training program for manager Completed Helped to gain support from and higher-level staff EdH's management and high- level staff to the privatization of EdH but it did not contribute very much to improve EdH's performance TABLE 8A: PROJECT COSTS Generation Capacity 2.8 19.3 22.1 2.4 21.6 24.0 Subtransmission Line 0.3 I .I 1.4 Distribution Equipment 1.9 1.9 02 0.7 0 .9 Consultant Services 0.4 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.7 Training 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.2 Total 3.6 24.0 27.6 2.6 24.2 26.8 TABLE 8B: PROJECT FINANCING IDA 0.0 24.0 24.0 1.2 24.2 25.4 EdH 3.6 0.0 3.6 1.4 0.0 1.4 Total 3.6 24.0 27.6 2.6 24.2 26.8 17 TABLE 9: ECONOMIC EVALUATION Internal Rate of Return of EdH 1989-1999 Investment Program (In US$ million, 1998 constant prices) Incremental Costs Incremental Benefits Revenues Capital O & M Fuel Sales from Net Year Investment Costs Costs Total GWh Sales Benefits _~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1995 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 1996 28.5 0.4 3.3 32.2 14.0 2.0 -30.2 1997 15.1 0.6 6.3 22.0 24.0 3.4 -18.6 1998 6.9 1.0 4.9 12.8 38.6 5.4 -7.4 1999 3.7 1.6 4.9 10.2 61.5 8.6 -1.6 2000 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2001 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2002 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2003 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2004 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2005 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2006 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2007 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2008 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2009 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2010 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2011 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2012 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2013 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2014 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2015 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2016 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2017 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2018 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 2019 2.3 4.9 7.2 90.1 12.6 5.4 ROR= 5.3% NPV= -16.6 18 TABLE 10: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS Development Credit 4.01 12 Feb-98 CD The Borrower shall enable EdH Tariff increased by 5% in Feb to set electric tariffs as required 1998 (customer resistance in view to fulfill its obligations. of poor service quality). The results of tariff study will help to design a tariff structure in the modernization of EdH. 4.02 02 CD The Govemment shall settle Govemment arrears to EDH have outstanding electric bills to EdH been significant all along project by Gov. departments and implementation (e.g. the agencies. equivalent of 4 months of electricity consumption 09/30/98) but are usually settled every tear through cross-debt settlement (taking into account tax & debt due by EDH and fuel payments made by GOH). 4.04 01 CP Audit of SOEs, Special Account Reports for FY96/97 submitted on and Project accounts 4130/98. Reports for FY 97/98 are still due, because of EDH difficulties in closing its financial statements. Project ___X_= __ _ __ 2.02 05 C Procurement to be made in accordance with Schedule I. 2.05(c-i) 05 C EdH to fumish IDA quarterly reports 2.05(c- 05 C Progress reports on plan of Report prepared since 1996 by ii) action for Part C of the Project EDF/HQI Technical Assistance to EdH management 2.06(a) 05 12/30/98 CD Preparation of a program for EdH does not have the financial reduction of losses resources to implement this program. 2.06(b) 05 CP Employment of Consultants for TA under AFD/CIDA financing Part C of the project from Jun 1995 to Dec 1998. 3.01(a) 05 CP EdH's operations in accordance Some improvements under above with sound practices under TA but sector/EdH reform/ qualified management. privatization needed for adequate incentives and autonomy. 3.01(b-i) 05 C EdH's management positions The qualifications of Directors are filled by persons with generally adequate. Main problem qualifications satisfactory to is lack of incentive. ___________ IDA and Gov. 3.01(b- 05 CP Plan of action for recruitment or Completed: staff census, position ii) assignment of EdH's staff definition, staff assessment. Not done: job description, staff policy. 3.01(b- 05 NC Carrying out the action plan Action plan was not completed iii) _ _ _ and thus not implemented. 3.01(b- 05 NC EdH's ratios of customers per EdH's ratios are close to targets iv) staff not lower than 75 in 1996; 72 in 1996; 75 in 1997; 78 in _____________ ________ 80 in 1997 and thereafter. 1998. 3.02 05 CP EdH to operate and maintain its Plant maintenance is at risk facilities in accordance with (particularly in production) sound practices because of EdH's cash flow constraints. 3.03 05 NC Insure EdH's property Self insured 3.04 05 May-98 C Monitoring EdH's dams and 1998 inspection for five year associated structures by experts period is satisfactory once a year. 1 3.06 05 NC Reduce total distribution losses Total losses of 55% in 1996; 56% 19 to 50% in 1996; 42% in 1997; in 1997; 55% in 1998. and 35% in 1998 and thereafter. 4.01 05 CD Financial statements and audit Audit report for 1992 through report produced at the latest five 1995 submitted on 4123/97. months after the end of each Report for 1996 (disclaimer of fiscal year. opinion) submitted on 10/23/97. Report for 1997 submitted 4/30/98. 4.02 02 NC EdH's rate of return not less EdH's actual rate of return was than 0.5% in 1996; 1.5% in minus 4.0% in 1996, minus 9.6% 1997: and 4% in 1998 and on. in 1997. 4.03 02 NC EdH's net revenue at least 1.5 Debt service coverage was 0.23 in times its debt service. 1995, 0.15 in 1996 and -0.15 in ____________ 1997. 4.04 02 CP Unless agreed with IDA, EdH All capital expenditure over US$1 shall not make capital million were financed in expenditures that would exceed agreements with donors. Power by more than 1% the current net Purchase Agreement signed by value of its fixed assets in GPH/EdH for an IPP in Cap operation, nor enter into any Haitien (2x5.72 MW, 52.6 GWh) PPA for more than 10 MW of without being reviewed by IDA, capacity or 40 GWh/year. but agreement not made effective. 4.05 02 C EDH shall not use its resources Resources were insufficient but for any purpose other than to pay used for the specified purposes. the costs of its capital expenditures, total operating expenses and debt service I requirements 4.06 02 NC EdH to annually value its fixed No inventory has been carried out assets in operation. since 1989. File record for fixed assets is unreliable (transfer ongoing to new software, SAP). Index for asset revaluation not _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ published by GOH. Status: Covenant Class: C -Complied with I Accounts/audit CD -Compliance after Delay 2 Financial Performance NC -Not Complied with 5 Management aspects of the Project CP -Complied with Partially 12 Sectoral or cross-sectoral regulatory 20 TABLE 11: COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENTS ktt~flwb zed 'i'k AI gX I pio c t2 Gi2k o t No non-compliance TABLE 12: IDA RESOURCES-STAFF INPUTS Through Appraisal 26.5 51,530 Appraisal-Board 38.7 77,575 Board-Effectiveness 8.9 16,836.5 Supervision 81.1 290,358.5 Completion 6 17,312 Total 161.2 453,612 21 TABLE 13: IDA RESOURCES-MISSIONS Preparation Scp-86 2 5 FA,EE Pre-Appraisal Feb-87 2 1 1 FA,EE Post-Appraisal Jan-89 I 8 EE Appraisal Jun-87 2 10 FA,EE Supervision May-90 2 10 EE, EC 3 1 F, M Supervision Mar-91 1 15 EE 3 2 F, PR, M Supervision Aug-91 2 14 ES, EE 4 2 F, PR, M Supervision Nov-94 1 4 EE 4 2 F, PR, M Supervision Jun-95 2 5 EE, EC U S F, PR, M Supervision Feb-96 2 5 EE, EC U S F, PR, M Supervision May-96 I 4 EE U S F, M Supervision Sep-96 1 6 EE U S F, M Supervision Apr-97 2 5 FA, EE U U F, M Supervision Feb-98 2 5 ES,EE, SL U U F,M EE, FA, ES Supervision Jun-98 3 12 U U F,M FA, ES, Supervision/ICR Nov-98 3 7 CON U U F, M EE Electrical Engineer S Satisfactory F Financial problems ES Energy Specialist U Unsatisfactory PR Procurement problems EC Energy Economist I Highly satisfactory M Management problems FA Financial Analyst 2 Satisfactory SL Sector Leader 3 Unsatisfactory CON Consultant 4 Highly unsatisfactory 22 APPENDIX 1 Aide Memoire IDA Implementation Completion Mission to Evaluate the Fifth Power Project (Cr. 2053-HA) Port-au-Prince, Haiti, November 2-9, 1998 1. A mission of the International Development Association (IDA) comprised of Mr. Philippe Durand, Task Manager, and Mr. Marcelo Osorio, Consultant, visited Port-au-Prince on November 2-9, 1998 to: (a) assess the achievements obtained under the above project; (b) collect information for the preparation of the ICR Report; and (c) assist EDH in the preparation of its own Completion Report for the Power Fifth Project financed under Credit 2053-HA. The Mission wishes to express its gratitude for the efficient cooperation and the courtesies provided to the Mission both by Government authorities and by the officials and staff of EDH. Annex A included a list of the officials and staff with whom the Mission met. Following is a summary of the most important issues covered by the Mission and the corresponding agreements. The mission findings reflected in this Aide Memoire will be subject to the approval of IDA management and the final version of the Aide Memoire will be attached to the Implementation Completion Report. Project Objectives and Components 2. The objectives of the Project were: (a) to expand and improve EDH's electricity- generating facilities in the city of Port-au-Prince in accordance with a least-cost expansion program; (b) to supply electricity to the cities of Hinche and Thomonde; and (c) to improve EDH's efficiency. To meet these objectives, the Project included eight components grouped into three Parts: Part A: Physical Investments, Part B: Studies, and Part C: Institutional Development. The Credit was approved on June 27, 1989 and became effective on January 16, 1990. 3. The project objectives were consistent with the country economic objectives and development strategy, but the project components were not sufficient to meet those objectives, especially to improve EDH's efficiency. Project Restructuring 4. Project implementation was interrupted in 1991 at a very initial stage due to the suspension of credit disbursements that followed the political crisis in the country. In 1994, when the suspension was lifted, the electricity system had deteriorated dramatically, electricity service was only available during some six hours per day, and EDH was in precarious financial condition. Consultants were appointed to study a strategy to develop the power sector and they concluded recommending full privatization of EDH. In 1996, IDB approved a MIF grant to finance consultant services to assist the Government in transferring EDH to a private company. The Government requested IDA to eliminate part of the institutional development component from the project, specifically the review of EDH's by-laws and the revision of its organizational structure, while maintaining the project institutional sub-component for the improvement of EDH's information, accounting and inventory control systems. Funds from this component were reallocated to increase the installation of additional power capacity. Additionally, the Peligre- 23 Hinche transmission line was substituted by small power generators installed in the cities of Hinche and Thomonde, under EdH self financing. 5. In addition to IDA Credit, several donors have contributed to the development of the power sector during the period 1995-1998. USAID financed the consultants to advise the Government on a strategy to reform and develop the power sector. The European Union financed the installation of a 10 MW diesel unit at Varreux, the rehabilitation of existing power generating units at Varreux and some improvements at Peligre hydroelectric power plant. The Government of Canada financed the installation of small diesel units. KfW financed the installation of a 350 KW mini hydro plant. IDB financed some improvements of the electricity network. France and Canada financed a management assistance program to strengthen EDH's management during the transition period until its expected privatization. Project Evaluation and Achievements 6. The Government and EDH acknowledge that project objectives have only been partially achieved and that sustainability of the achievements obtained under the Project is uncertain at present. The power generating facilities were expanded, but conditions of the existing facilities have not improved. However, thermal power production increased from 220 GWh in 1988 and 203 GWh in 1995, to 409 GWh in 1997. The project had a positive impact on end-use customers, since electricity service was provided during 18 hours on average in 1998, as compared to only 8 hours in 1995. The supply of electricity to the cities of Hinche and Thomonde has been achieved through the installation of small generating units financed with local funds. Improvement of EDH's efficiency has not been achieved. On the contrary, EDH's efficiency has significantly decreased. Financial losses have consistently increased since 1994. Electricity losses increased from 29% in 1989 to 48% in 1994 and to 56% in 1995, although they remained stable at this level thereafter. Despite significant improvements in EDH's financial management since 1994, the auditor still expressed a disclaimer of opinion on the 1996/97 financial statements. 7. The main achievements obtained under the Project are: (i) installation of 31 MW of new power generation capacity, out of which 21 MW were co-financed be ACDI from Canada and were installed at the Varreux power plant, and a 10 MW diesel unit installed at the Carrefour power plant is expected to be commissioned by January 1999. Regarding the Varreux extension, the mission was informed by EDH that the schedule of completion tests will be agreed with the contractor by the end of November 1998 and that some claims presented by both the contractor and EDH are still to be settled in accordance with contract dispositions, (ii) preparation of pre- feasibility studies for the installation of a new 60 MW diesel plant, (iii) execution of a pilot loss- reduction program to be completed by EDH in 1999, (iv) preparation of a tariff study; (v) acquisition of new software for accounting. Implementation of this software and training of the corresponding staff would be completed by mid-1999, and (vi) implementation of a training program on management skills for EDH's staff. Privatization of EDH 8. The CMEP has conducted studies since 1996, under IDB financing, to assess options for increasing private participation in the power sector. Three options have been examined, as entailed in the Law that created CMEP: (i) capitalization; (ii) concession; (iii) management contract. The Mission was informed by CMEP that they are considering capitalization as the 24 preferred option and plans to consult the interest of potential investors early in 1999. If the response is favorable, the capitalization would be implemented during 1999 with support from a financial adviser or an investment bank. 9. Since the capitalization could require an extended period for its implementation, in the mission's opinion, strengthening of EDH's management during this period will be crucial to avoid further deterioration of its facilities and operations. A qualified and experienced small team with total management control could be appointed expeditiously. Additional resources will also be needed for proper operation of generation facilities and improvement of commercial performance. Factors that affected Project Implementation 10. In the mission's opinion, the main factors that affected negatively project implementation included the following; on the Borrower's side, (i) political instability that characterized the country during the period 1986-1995 which caused, in tum, instability in EDH's management and technical staff. The General Director was changed eight times, the technical staff left the utility or was moved from their posts without explanation, and unqualified staff increased for political considerations, (ii) deterioration of the country economic conditions during the embargo period (1991-94). This circumstance promoted a large exodus of the poorest population living in the rural areas to the capital and increased the number of electricity consumers well above EDH's capacity to control them. It also facilitated the establishment of fraudulent networks to steal electricity from EDH and resell to poor neighbors, (iii) poor EDH management with lack of delegation and incentives to improve performance. Management has been further weakened by Government's delay in taking decisions on EDH's future, (iv) an ineffective management assistance program, due in part to a poorly designed assistance contract without incentives linked to results, (v) lack of a legal framework that permits effective and timely sanctions to fraudulent consumers; and (vi) insufficient measures by the Government and EDH Board to address EDH's deteriorating financial situation; and on IDA's side, (i) changes in project supervision teams, (ii) complex procurement procedures, and (iii) design of project restructuring that underestimated the lead time necessary for power sector reform and EDH financial recovery. Borrower's Completion Report 11. In accordance with the Credit Agreement, the Borrower is committed to prepare a Completion Report at the end of project implementation. The mission advised the Government and EDH on the preparation of this report, which should include: (i) an assessment of the project objectives, design, implementation, and operation experience; (ii) an evaluation of the borrower's own performance during the evolution and implementation of the project, with special emphasis on lessons learned that may be relevant in the future; and (iii) an evaluation of the performance of IDA and any co-financiers during the evolution and implementation of the project, including the effectiveness of the relationship between the borrower, IDA, and co-financiers, with special emphasis on lessons learned. 25 12. A more detailed scope of the report is included in Annex B to this Aide Memoire. Preferably the report should be limited to ten pages. If it is more than ten pages, it should include a summary. The Borrower Completion Report will be sent to IDA by February 28, 1999 (see timetable in Annex C). 13. EDH informed the Mission that Mr. Jules Andre Joseph will be responsible for preparing EDH's contribution to the report and for coordinating with the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) for the preparation of the complete report. The MEF will inform IDA shortly of the name of a senior official that will be responsible for the report. Project Sustainability 14. In the mission's opinion, sustainability of the power facilities installed under the Project will be highly dependent on the success of the ongoing process to engage a private operator and investor for the electricity service. Given EDH's precarious financial situation, it will not be in a position to properly maintain the facilities installed under the Project solely with its own resources. If a private operator is not engaged soon, within an adequate legal and regulatory framework for the power sector, sustainability of the Project is unlikely. Operation Plan 15. The Mission discussed with EDH the preparation of an Operational Plan for the Project, which must be attached to the Borrower's Completion Report. It was agreed that this plan would include: (i) a five-year scheduled maintenance program for the Varreux and Carrefour Power Stations; (ii) a plan for the maintenance of the efficiency component achieved through two pilot loss- reduction programs during 1999; (iii) a plan of actions for the improvement of the environmental conditions of the Varreux and Carrefour Power Stations; (iv) annual cost estimates of the above maintenance programs; (v) EDH's budget for FY 1999 that includes the provisions for the above maintenance programs and a mechanism for actual mobilization and commitment of these funds; and (vi) a schedule for the privatization process of EDH's. Performance Indicators 16. It was agreed to adopt the following performance indicators to monitor future operations and development impact of the Project: (i) level of electricity losses; (ii) percentage of the population with access to the electricity service; (iii) availability, in percentage of time, of the generating units installed under the project; 26 (iv) number and duration of electricity outages; (v) average electricity tariff; (vi) actual vs. scheduled actions for EDH's privatization. Additional information 17. EDH agreed to provide IDA, by December 31, 1998, with the detailed information that is still required for the preparation of the ICR, in particular the necessary data for the assessment of project benefits. Claude Elisma Philippe Durand General Director Task manager EDH IDA 27 APPENDIX 2 REPUBLIC OF HAITI SECRETARIAT OF FINANCE FIFTH ENERGY PROJECT (Cr. 2053-HA) BORROWER CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR P. 2/9 Seme CREDIT PROJET ENERGIE HA-2053 REPUBLIQUE D'HAITI BANQUE MONDIALF RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT JuIN 1999 TABLEZ DES MATIERES PREFACE EVALUATION SOMMAIRE (i) Introduction............................................................................. (ii) Objectifs du projet ...................................................................... (iii) Experience de, la mise ouvre et resultats ............................................ (iv) Operation future et lecons apprises ....................................... PARTIE I EVALUATION DE LA MISE EN (EUVRE DU PROJET (i) Objectifs du projet (ii) Atteinte des objectifs .................. (iii) Facteurs ayant affecze la mise en ouvre du Projet ................................. (iv) Viabilite du Projet (v) Performance de la Banque (vi) Performance de l'Empruntsur (vii) Exploitation des resultats (viii) Operations ftures (ix) Le9ons apprises PARTIE II.- TABLEAUX RASUMtS (i) Sommaire des investissements. (ii) Cofinancement.. (iii) Ech6ancier des projets ............................................................... (iv) D6caissements de la Banqie: Curnulatif estime et reel ........................ (v) Indicateurs pour la mise en cuvre du Projet ..................................... (vi) Indicateurs pour l'exploitation du Projet .......................................... (vii) Etudes realisees dans le cadre du Projet .......... (viii) CoCits du Projet ...................................................................... (ix) Financement du Projet ............................................................ (x) Couits economiques et beneficos ................................................... (xi) Indicateurs de performance ............................... (xii) Concordance avec le manuel de procedures d'exploitation .................... (xiii) Ressources de la Banque: personnel .............................................. (xiv) Ressources de la Banque : missions .............................................. 2 PREFACE Le rapport intitule rapport d'ach4vemrnt est redige pour repondre aux ternes qui etaient convenus dans les accords de Credit et tie Projet d'une part, de I'autre pour dresser un bilan des actions qui ont ete entreprises dans le cadre de ce financement. C e rapport pr6sente une evaluation du projet qui tient compte dcs circonstances difficiles particulieres dans lesquelles il a evolue ces demieres annees- Afin de permettre d'appr6cier la port6e des rdalisations de ce financement, la Direction GJenrale de 1'Electricit6 d'Haiti s'asso sie au Gouvernement de la Rdpublique d'Haiti pour presenter ce rapport qui analyse les efforis, les faiblesses. ls attentes des divers partis associts dans 1'execution des difftrentes composantes du projer. 3 Sme CREDI7.. PROJET ENERGIE RA-2053 RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT EVALUATION SOMMAIRE.- (i) INTRODUCTION.- Dans le cadre du plan quinquennal d'investissements de l'Electricit6 d'Hayti, le Gouvernement de la Rpublique d'Haiti a signe avec la Banque mondiale un accord de Credit d'un montant de DTS 18 600 000 pouw financer le 5'O Projet d'Energie. Cet Accord visait particuli6rement a arn6liorer 1'efficience, la viabilite et la performance du secteur de l'energie electrique Deux accords auxiliaires furent ainsi signes pour expliciter les conditions d'utilisation du financement et faciliter la mise en oeuJre: le premier denomme Accord de Projet etabli entre l'unite d'execution Electriciti d'Haiti et la Banque Mondiale qui d6finit les modalites de decaissements, de passation des march6s, les indicateurs de performance et de suivi des activites, le second denomme Accord de prat subsidiaire etabli entre le Gouvernemeni Hai-lien et 1'Electriciti d'Hai' qui fixe les conditions de remboursement de ce financement fait sous forrne de pret a Electricit6 D'Haiti par le Gouvernement Le rapport qui suit dresse le bilan de s rda1isations et des objectifs atteints. (iH) OBJECTIFS DU P1ROJET. - L'objectif du Projet visait a contribuer A la croissance economique du pays par la foumiture d'une 6nergie electrique fi; ble pour 1'expansion de la production industrielle et commerciale, a arn6liorer la performance du secteur de l'energie electrique et a renforcer la capacite manageriale de EDH . A ce titre, plusieurs activit6s furent retenues, a savoir: * Installation de 20 MW de turbines a gaz * Etude de site pour une niouvelle centrale thernique * Construction d'une ligne de 42 kms a partir de Pdligre pour alimenter Hinche et Thornonde * Developpement de programmes ei acquisition de materiel pour la reduction des pertes * Conversion de la frtquence du courant de Ciment d'Haiti de maniere a pouvoir l'alimenter h partir du rdseau de EDH. (Fr6querce Ciment: 50 HZ, fr6quence EDH 60 HZ) * Renforcemnent institutionnel * Programme de formation sur 3 ans 4 En vue d'evaluer le niveau d'atteinte dec objectifs, des indicateurs de controle furent etablis et pr6sentds cormme suit: MICATMS 1Y 8 -199 19 9 9 1995 I$6 EMPLOYES 64 72 78 E R1 3g 92 TAUX DES PhAT4 MI . '-RETOUI 5U 7 l_ U4VESTISSENMES 3.5% 4 5% 55 5S5% 6% 7% 8% I (iii) EXPERIENCES DANS LA M)SE EN (EUVRE ET RESULTATS La mise en ceuvre du Cridit n'a pa; suivi exactement le profil qui etait planifie a la conception mneme du Projet Plusieurs modifications et ajustements furent operes pour tenir compte d'une part des donnees sociales, economiques et politiques qui ont de beaucoup change' comparativement aux pr6visions , de l'autre, des situations conjoncturelles particulieres pour lesquelles une urgenc ou une priorite se faisait sentir- Relafif a la difinition des composanles: L Les 20 MW de turbines i gaz ont dte remplac6s par la construction d'une centrale de 15 MW et l'installation d'une nouvelle unite de IO MW a Carrefour. * Le projet de ligne pour alimentey Hinche et Thomonde a partir de Peligre a dte annu.1e EDH a installe de nouveaux groipes Diesel dans ces deux villes * La conversion de la frequencc du courant de Ciment d'Haiti a ete annul6e, ce projet n'etait plus justifie en raison du projet de Reseau national qui a et discontinue par faute de financement promis par la BID * Une nouvelle activite a ete ajoutee: la mise a jour de 1'6tude tarifaire realisee par Monenco en 1986. * Relatif awx indicateurs: De nouvelles valeurs d'indicateurs ont Ft convenues et fixees A la baisse lors de l'amendement de 1996 et celles-ci figuient dans le tableau qui suit. Y sont 6galement inscrits les resultats obtenus pour chactn de ces indicateurs. INDICATEUWS M96 ,1997 199 1999 vAu.SUR VAL9Uf -VEUa A VALEUR VALEUR A VALIJUR VA.LEUR A EIUR A osTENUE OBTENIR OFTFEUE OBTENIR OTENUE OBTFNIR OITENUE OHTENIR tUENTS I Min tMPLOYES 75% 77% WAl_ 7_. %5Y R8% a._ _ TAUX DES rATES MW 50% 56 42% 50% JS% 35Y. 135% ___I RETOUKSUK Mu_ INVUSTISSEMENTS 0.5% (4%) iSV. (9.66 A) 4%1 ( %) >4Y. (13Y * Relatifa Ia rla4isation des compos*intes 5 * La composante construction de la centrale de Varreux (II) 15/21 MW, et celle de l'unitd de 10 MW a Carrefour ont occasionn6 des couts suppl6mentaires pour assurer une supervision plus soutenue en raison des retards occasionnes par une mauvaise evaluation des parametres de chantier et des conditions environnementales de la part des entrepreneurs. De meme, pour P etude de site de la nouvelle centrale thermique de 60 MW, les termes de r6f6rencc ont ete modifies pour prendre en compte l'execution du processus de modernisation. * Dans le domaine de la reduction des pertes, les interventions realis6es dans la zone pilote I ont permis de mesurer le degre de mobilisation et de supervision i consentir pour obtenir et conserver des res titats. Ainsi, dans le projet de la deuxieme zone, la strat6gie adoptee a k de prdfdrence la rehabilitation des branchements en mauvais 6tat et non de tous les branchements comme dans la premikre zone pilote . * La composante du renforcement institutionnelle n'a pas ete reprise au deblocage du Cr6dit. Toutefois, ce volet a ete pAis en compte dans Ic contrat d'assistance technique operationnelle signe avec le groupement EDF-HQI sous financement de I'AFD (Agence Fransaise de D6veloppement ) et de l'ACDI ( Agence Canadienme pour le Developpement International) pour le redressement. De plus, I'Etat Haytien, par l'intermediaire du CMEP ( Conseil de Modemisation des Entreprises Publiques ), prend en charge l'ensemble de la r6forrne du secteur. (iv) OPERATIONS FUTURES ET LECONS APPRISES Dans le domaine de la production, les 6 unites de la Centrale ihermique de Varreux If qui totalisent 21 MW et celle de 10 MW di Carrefour, sont programmees pour permettre leur exploitation normale. Toutes les pie :es d'urgence et d'entretiens prograrnmds sont commanddes ou en processus de commande. Le personnel d'exploitation a b6n6ficid d'une formation sur site, d'autres sont programmees chez les fournisseurs Caterpillar et Pielstick. L'etude de site de la nouvelle centrale d ', 60 MW a 6td soumise a certains bailleurs de fonds pour information et participation financiere eventuelle. Le programme de r6duction des pertes tcl qu'engage au niveau des zones pilotes I et II, a e6 repensd. Les approches retenues et appliqudes avaient implique de grandes mobilisations de ressources dans une aire concentree de commercialisation et de ce fait ont ralenti I'avancement des autres actions commerciales. Ainsi, de nouveaux programnmes moins contraignants en matiere de ressources et d'un impact plus 6tendu ont etd identifies et engages coimme le CCN (remplacement des compteurs a, consommation nulle), PREIPIREF (programme d'enl&vement intensif des prises illicites et de recup6ration des fraudeurs), numerotation des po:ieaux, reperage automatique des clients, compression des delais de satisfaction des demandes. Les resultats de i'etude de la revision tarifaire sont disponibles et la mise en application d'une premiere tranche de 10 % est soumise aux autorites de turelle pour approbation. Du point de vue du renforcement inst-tationnel, le programme de modemisation retient la priorit6; toutefois un nouveau plan d'azions a court terrne allant d'Avril 1999 a Mars 2000 est en application actuellement. 6 PARTIE I EVALUATION DE LA MISE EN ;EUVRE IDU PROJET (i) OBJECTIPS DU PROJET Les objectifs tels que pr6senids dans 'evaluation somnrnaire couvrent les domaines de la production, de la r6duction des pertes, du tarif, de la fornation. Les activites qui etaieut retenues en 1989 ont eti ajustees en cours d'execution pour adapter le Projet aux priorites des situations nouvelles commc en 1991 avec la realisation des elections democratiques nationales, et en 1996 le r6tablissement. de l'ordre constitutionnel. Le tableau suivant fait une presentation de ces activites: Objecif-s Descripition des diffirentes Remarques activites identifiees durant lc cycle du projet Augmenter et ameliorer la * Installation de 20 MW de * Cette activite a ete capacit6 de production de turbines a gaz remplacee par EDH l'installation de 25 MW Diesel, en deux tranches, c-a-d une tranche de 15 MW i VarTeux et une unite de 10 MW a la centrale de Carrefour. * Etude de site pour une * Cette etude a ete nouwelle centrale de 60 maintenue. Des options MW suppl6mentaires ont 6td prses en compte dans 1'6tude comme l'option barge, les divers types de financement * Conversion de la * Activit6 remplac6e frdquence du Reseau de Ciment d'Haiti * Alirnenter en tnergie les * Activit6 annulde villes de Thomonde et de Hinche Ameliorer la performance de * Rduction des pertes * Activit6 maintenue EDH * Revision de l'etude * Activite ajoutie tariiaire * Fornation sur 3 ans * Activite maintenue 7 Nouveau systeme de * Activite ajoutde comptabilite infornatis6 (ii) ATTEXNTE DES OBJECTIFS Les tableaux qui suivent decrivent le degre d'atteinte des objectifs fixes tant en mati6re de travaux realises qu'en matiere de niveaux d'indicateurs: OBJECTIFS VISES DESCRIPTION NIVEAU DE REMARQUES DES REALISATION COMPOSANTES JIUIN 1999 a) Augmenter et A-]-a-).- Installation REALISEE Des retards furent ameliorer la capaciIe de 15 MW Diesel a 100% enregistr6s dans la de production Varreux La centralc a une construction et la mise capacite de 21 MW en service (environ 8 dont 15 MW finances mois). L'entrepreneur par IDA et 6 MW par HQI-VIBEC a dt6 penalisd A cet effet. Les I'ACDI. Elle est en tests de performance ne service depuis 1996 et sont pas encore faits. Ils fonctionne au mazout sont prevus apr6s la et au gasoil avec une revision des 10000 h des puissance de 18 MW groupes qui doit prendre soit 85% des 21 MW fin d'ici AoOt 1999. installes. A-i-b).- InsWa11ation REALISEE L'entepreneur SEMT d'une nouvelle unite 100% PIELSTICK a dt6 penalisi de 10 MW a Carrefour L'unitt C6 est en A cet effeL service de.uis Avril Le rotor qui prisentait des service depuis Avril anomalies en Ddcembre 1999. soit 4 mois 1998 et qui a ete ripar6 & apres la date prevue la reception d'Avril 1999, pour la rdception sera remplacd par un rotor neuf d'ici Novembre 1999. provisoire. La banque refuse de payer le dernier paiement dlO%, raison: la date de ______ ______ ______ _ ____ _____ ______ ____ _ ______ ______ _____ cl8wure du crtdit a expirE. _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ B-l).- Etude de site REALISEE Les irsultats de pour une rpremi6re I 00%/ 1'etude ont ete tranche de centrale de La firme DECON a pr6sentes a certains 60 MW Diesel remis les rapports bailleurs de fonds qui pr6vus au contrat: avaient manifeste leur Analyse et choix du interet site, 6tude de 1'environnement, ddveloppement de la zone, faisabifit6 du projet. Le site retenu parmi une dizaine est celui de St Christophe. OBJECTIFS VISES DESCRIPKION NIVEAU DE REMARQUES DES REALISATION COMPOSANTES JUIN 1999 b) Alimenter en REALISE Projet abandonmn en energie electrique les AUTREMENT 1995, en raison d'une villes de Hinche et de sous-estimation des Thomonde coiats et dtlais de realisation de 1'6tude d'une pan, et d'autre part, des nouvelles unites de production qui ont ete instalIles dans ces villes par EDH a) Ameliorer la A-2).- Programme de VEALISEE Les resultats sont performance de reduction de pertes 100% appreciables: la EDH Deux programmes premiere zone a piloces ont ete accuse uDe baisse de executes: le premier 16% du niveau des finance par EDH, pertes, la deuxieme est AFD, BID, dans une en cours d'evaluation. zone du centre ville NdannoIns, iU faudra touchant 6000 clients, souligner que les le deuxieme dans une risultats obtenus dans autre zone du centre la premi6re zone n'ont ville et qui touche pas pu ere maintenus 5000 clients. a leur niveau en raison des moyens de suivi dnormes et complexes a mettre en place pour les garantir. 9 B-2).- Revision &tude REALISEE Cette composante tarifaire 100% remplace celle de la La revision de 1'dtude conversion de la tarifaire a etd realis6e frdquence Ciment par MONENCO. Les d'HaYti qui a dte rapports ont ete remis, abandonn¢e en raison pr6sentant la nouvelle du projet reseau structure du tarif a national qui n'a pas adopter en fonction du etd finance comrne contexte economique prevu. actuel et futur. OBJECTIFS VISES DESCRIPTION NIVEAU DE REMAERQUIES DES REALISATION COMPOSANT(ES JUIN 1999 c) Ameliorer la C-2).-Assistance REALISEE Les services de performance de EDH technique 100% supervision qui dtaient (suite) De l'assistance prevus au dernarrage technique a ite des contrats de engag6e au niveau de; construction de la • La reforme centrale de 21 MW et institutionnelle celle du groupe de 10 (courte periode en MW ont dte 1991) extensiorines en raison * L'unite de gestion des retards et des du 5eme credit ( 6 difficultds enregistres mois) dans 1'ex6cution des * L'execution du travaux. progrannme des pertes ( 2 ans) * La supervision des travaux de construction des contrales: 15/21 MW et 10 MW ( pendant toute la duree des travaux) 10 C-l).-Programime de -REALISEE D'autres programmes formation sur 3 ans 100% de formation avaient Programme de ete dgalement formation tenu en organises et finances HaYti ( 3 mois, 36 par EDH et touchaient cadres superieurs) et a tous les autres 1'exterieur (15 jours, 6 niveaux: 100 cadres cadres parmi les 36). internmdiaires. Le theme principal a dte la gestion modeme d'une enteprise d'energie electrique. (iii) FACTEURS AYANT AFFECTE LA MISE EN OEUVRE DU PROJET D'une manitre generale: a) Le choix des objectifs du Projet en 1989 par rapport aux r6alit6s socio-economiques dans la periode d'ex6cution b) La crise socio-politique qui a seccue le pays de 1991 aL 1994 c) Le faible niveau d'accompagnement de la police et des autorites judiciaires dans I'application des programmes de reduction des pernes d) Le gel des programmes d'6quipements dans le secteur sur la periode 1991-1999 e) L'effet dimotivanw du processus de privatisation sur le personnel f) La faiblesse des investissements par rapport aux besoins du secteur D'une mani6re specifique - Les modalites de gestion et de suivi du .,ofinancernent de la centrale de 21 MW par l'ACDI n$avaient pas ete c)airement definies, L'entrepreneur presentait directement les factures corr4latives directement i I'Agence, sans etre soumises au prcalable a une approbation du maitre d'ouvrage. Au niveau de l'installation' du groupe du 10 MW, les difficultes rencontr6es residaient particulierernent dans les mauvaises coordinations des activites des sous-traitants du constructeur. (iv) VIABILITE DU PROJET Tel qu'il a dte d6jh dit, 3es activites realisees dans le cadre de ce Projet sont toutes inscrites dans des programmes reguliers d'exploitation ou de gestion de l'entreprise Ainsi, les unites de production qui sont install6es a Varreux et i Carefour sont pourvues de pieces de rechange pour l'entretien. Le personnel suit pr6sentement une deuxieme phase de formnatior. Un plan d'ajustement salarial et de promotion inteme est en place pour naintenir la motivation i I'int6rieur de ces unites. L'6tude de site de la nouvelle centrale a ete realisee en prenant en compte toutes les options qui pourTaient se prdsenter tant du point de vue technique que financier telle option barge, 11 financement semi-prive avec ou sans participation de bailleurs de fonds. Aussi, les rdsultats peuvent -ils ere utilises par n'importe quel operateur qui aurait i gerer 1'entreprise. Les experiences effectuhes au niveau des zones pilotes I et 1I pour la reduction des pertes ont perrnis de retenir des approches plut6t simples qui ne necessitent pas de crop grandes mobilisations ; les ressources humaines qualifiees 6tant limitees. Le nouveau logiciel utilise pour la comptabilite inforrnatisee, le SAP-R3, est operationnel. Le personnel du departement informatique est forme a cet effer pour son exploitation et son entretien. La revision de 1'6tude tarifaire par Monenco prend en compte tous les aspects qui pourraient influencer la structure du tarif comme des tarifs moderxs ou forfaitaires pour les clients dans les zones marginales.... (v) PERFORMANCE DE LA BANQUE Dans son ensemble, la perforynance de la Banque mondiale est acceptable bien que certaines remarques soient a formuler, a savoir: * Les changements de cornportement de la Banque qui a fait montre de souplesse au d6blocage du Credit en 1995, et de rigidit6 i la fermeture du Credit en 1998 * Les delais enregistres dans le traitement de certains dossiers soumis pour approbation, comme les demandes de decaissements, les documents d'appel d'offres * Les changements de charge de projets sur la durie du Credit *Le non realisme de l'Accord tel que reconduit en 1996 en ce qui a trait particuli6rement aux indicateurs de performance (vi) PERF'ORMANCE DE L'EMPRUNTEUR Tels qu'inscrites dans les accords de credit, de projet et subsidiaire, les obligations de I'Emprunteur peuvent etre appreciees comine suit: Clause -MscP.PTION SO)MMAIRE Statut OBSERVATIONS C 4.01 Le (iouvememcnli doit auioriser EDH A fixer les Larir 7eFspeaF NDeux ajustemcnts ont Atd effYctuts par EDO et d'lecLricit6 A un niveau lui permteiant tde SacqutLer de paniallemeni approuv'6 par Ic Gouvcrnment tunde 25%cn 1995- ses obligations 1996 et un autre de 5% en 1997. Un troisiem de I'ordre dti 106% es! soumis aSux autorii6s pour ________ _ _____________________ ___________________________ _ Dapprobatinn. C 4.02 Lc Gouvecmencnt doit reglar ses factures d'Alceiricitd Rcspcctd Le (uouvarnerneni a convenu at respecti laceord qui a ct6 signi a cct efet. De plus, des protocoles d'accord onr ACe signcs entre EDH Ct le Ministre det Finances qui fixent des avanacs de piiernent du Gouvemcmcnt P 3.01 Les postes de Direction de I EDH dOivcnt eire cOmbils Respacte PRespcctc (b) (i) par des personnas sutx qualifications jugecs salishtisantes par I 71DA C. Ic Oouvcrnement 'P3.06 Ramener les penes totales i 35 / ecn 1998 Non respect6 Les r6ducLiOns des penes doivnth imp7iquer I'Etms aux plus hauts niveaux C 4.04 Audit annual du Comple spicial et des reliivs de Respecid Le demier en cours c--td pour 1'exercice 97-9k scm d6penses achcvt sou; peu. Une premicre pantic, celle du compic du Stnc Projet est dAjA tenminde et remisc s la Banque. P 2.02 Passaxion des marchcs conrtymnemen aux directives de In Rcspcctd Banquc Y 2-05 Founiturc dc rapporms crimcstriels Respecte Les rappons trinmestriels ont pas etr remis pourleS (c) (i) dcux demiars IrimeStres. Le rapport d'achevemenr avail Ia prioriti P Z.05 l'ouiture ae rapporis annuclt sur le voict rcnlb'ement Respecic 12 (a) ii) institutuonnel P 2.06 (a) Prepaition d'un proranmmc de r6duction de; penes dc Kespecte Les unn pu trc plus sa_isf6sants s'l y distribution ay avail eu des mesuros d'aecompapnament P 2.06 (h) Emploi de consulano pour Ie voleL rniborccment Respecte Assistanca founie par EFD et HiQI depuis 1996 SOUS institutionnel du projet Rinancement AFD et ACDI P 3.01 (a) DI)H doit mener ses opdrasions selon=l imitodos ReSpecid Amelioration constls6ed avec inaSisMance du appropri6es et Sous la superviiion de cadres quaiiliis pareiallernent Groupement EDF et H!Q. p 3.0 (b) Plan d'acion pour ia roerulament Ol raftectiun du Respecte En faison de la presion de modernisation, ii $*est (i) pcrsonnel d'EDH panicilcment avirt difflcile de convcnir une politique de carricre. Toutefois un plan d'acion a el6 mis en application comme le gel dcs embauches- Ic rodtploiemenr du personnel. la fonnadon. Y 3.01 (b) Lao r-atiaelicnzLmployes ne pew Cra infdrj;ur -a75% an Rcspeci en Cc rario esi de 85% en i9998 (iv) 1996, SO/o en 1997, 85% i parir de 1998 1998 P3.02 EDH doit exploirer at cnrotanir ses insialliOii. selon les Respeacr EMDH a cngagd environ 10% de SLS d6penses pour mdthodas appropriees I ' enLretien de ses installations P 3.03 rDH dolt assurer ses bitrs Non rcspecr Le conitri d'assurance a let discontinu6 en fiison des couts 6Ieves r6cIam4s. EDH assure eica-mrne ses biens -p 3.04 Controle du barrage et de ses strucwres cWrTepondanics RePecc; Coirdlo ii par la Societi Coyne et Beliar assure par des expcrts unr fois pat an P3.06 Edh daft ramanur Its panes ttl=es A 50% n 9W 6, 42¶4? Non rcspeet6 Lea Suppor anon us des autorit6sju ciaires, pur le en 1997. 35°/ en 1998 ct par la suite truliement dos ca5 de fraades ont 416 insuffisants. De plus, EDH n's pa pu tnaintenir utn stock minitnum regulier de mat6tiel de brnmchemcrts P 4,01 PrEparation dos cinaticrs at de rprd'audit Respectd Les at linanclcrs pour l'excic ?7-93 sont Pirvus dans les 5 mois suivrnx la date de cldture de chaquc avec retard pour Juin 1998 oxeraice (avaiti 1e i Mats) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ p4.02 La tauxc de rent3bllji de EDkI le doLt pas aftrte amains Non rcgpect6 oulairrletd ( I 5%F)-La quantiae d'6nergie dc 0.5% en 1996. 1.5% on J997. 4% en 1998 et par la produftc est encore insuffsanie pour garmtir les suite d6panses de fonctionnent et d'exploitazion d'une part et de I'autre permeuue dc sLabiliser Ih balance financiare,, DC plus le moniant dc la dete a *ti rcU6valu6 cn fonction du coOt de la devise. conlmirement aul montant des actirs qu i eux-m6mes n ont pas die rttvaluds. Un tel proccssus sous-eniend un cadre juridique approprit, P7 ,0 La revenu nct do EDil doit &c d'au m03 15% son Non rcspacl Aotucllament II cst dc 7 service de ia dettc P 44 A mons quil n'cn soti couivenu aucemont ava lIpDA epc Deux contrals fircnt sigies poiir l'ac0 dnergei. EDH ne dolt pas ctfcctuer des d4pcnscs d'-quipement panicallomnl I'un cn 1997 avec liitcrselect pour UIK puissance de d'un montant supdricur de plus dc 1% la valour acluelle 12 MW. I'auure avec West Indies Power en 1996 pour nette de sos immobilisslions en exploilatiow ni conclure 30 MW, Ces deux cokirats ne furent jamnais d'Accord d'Achat d'4ncrgie Electrique poti plus de 10 op6ratiorincls MW do capacile ou de Gwh /an -P 4.06 L E DII doit r4tvaluer annutclement ses iinmobilisations Non respciCI CeCte op6raiion iFplique ant dcision administraiive en exploitation ci juridique utis complexe & obtenir puisquelle modi flera It bilan financier de 1'entreprise (vii) EXPLOITATION ,ES RE;SULTATS Production La centrale de Varreux 11 (21 MW) mise en service depuis dejA un an fonctionne jusqtx'i date au mazout (40%) et au gasoil (60%), avec une puissance de 18 MW c-a-d 85% de la puissance maximale installee. Celle du 10.8 MW installee A Carrefour fonctionne depuis Avril 1999 avec une puissance disponible de 10 MW. Les dispositions financi6res et administratives sont prises pour 1'exploitation de ces unitds pendant les deux prochaines annees. Les resultats de l'etude du choix du site de la nouvelle centrale sont utilises dans l'etabLissement du plan d'equipement en vue de prochaines demarches de tinancement. 13 JUL 27 '99 04:48PM WORLD BANK HAITI. Reduction des pertes Les interventions effectuies dans les zones pilotes I et 11 ont permis de generaliser certains r6sultais obtenus dans le cadre de ces activites, a savoir - 1. Avec un programme soutenu de rxalisation, dans un delai raisonnable, des nouveaux branchements, la population fait davantage confiance au service offert par l'EDH plut6t que d'utiliser des entit6s paraileles parasites 2. A la fin des interventions dans la zone I, le rapport des energies mesurees comparees a 1'energie foumie a occasionne une reduction des pertes de 16%. Cette diminution n'a pas dure longtemps, les dispositifs de suivi et de controle etant insuffisants. Neanmoins, les experiences efTectuees ont permnis d'evaluer le niveau de mobilisation qu'il faut engager pour mener de pareilles activites. Ainsi, de nouvelles actions sont prograrnmees actuellement qui ne n6cessitent pas de grandes mobilisations de ressources humaines Environnement L'environnement a la Centrale de Varreuix a ete grandement am6liord avec l'installation sur le site d'un puisard muni d'un tambour cbdophile pour retenir les effluents qui dans le temps allaient directement dans les canaux a ciel ouvert traversant la zone de Cite Soleil. Du cbte de Carrefour, la recuperation a ete aussi -im6lior6e, le littoral no re,oit plus de deversements directs de residus huileux provenant du trop plein des fosses de recuperation qui ont ete rthabilites et agrandis- La niaintenance et 1'exploitation de ces installations sont assurees par le personnel regulier des centrales en question. Un comit6 de suivi dvalue r6gulierement la qualite des effluents ddverses apres filtrage. 2evision tarifaire Un ajustement de 10 % est programme pour la fin de l'exercice. Le dossier est soumis aux autorites de tutelle pour approbation. Formation Un plan de redaploiement du personnel est en application. Les embauches sont gelees. Le service de formation a etc restructurd en departement de formation de mani&re a renforcer cette action. (viii) OPERATIONS FUTURES Production Toutes les piees de rechange et d'entretiens preventifs sont budg6tees. Certaines sont deja commandees. Un programme de formation est planifie pour l'ensemble du personnel des centres de production. Reduction des pertes Plusieurs actions sont en cours actuellement pour maintenir la mobilisation amorcde dans le programme de reduction des pertes. (ix) LECONS APPRISES 14 Les exp6riences acquises tout au cours de la rialisation et de l'exploitation des installations electriques sont nombreuses et complexes. L'entreprise a du faire face a des situations contraignantes et difficiles en raison de conjonctures socio-politiques, et ces situations ont eu des incidences et sur les d6lais de realisation des composantes et sur I'atteinte des indicateurs. a) Bien que les pr6cautions majeures aient ete prises au niveau du contrat d'installation du groupe de 10 MW suite aux experiences enregistes au niveau de la construction de la centrale de 21 MW, des retards firent malgrd tout enregisris et firent l'objet d'applications de penalites. b) La conception d'un projer de financement ne devrait pas seulement prendre en compte les obligations du principal baillcur de fonds sur un secteur. Elle devrait aussi integrer l'impact des engagements des autres bailleurs qui participent sur le secteur dans la m8me periode c) Les conditions du Credit n'ont pas permis de prevoir un espace pour r6ajuster l'enveloppe budgetairc allou6e d) L'ajustement du tarif suivant les recommandations de la Banque n'a pas donne les r6sultats escomptes. Cette disposition a entraine en 1997 des attitudes negatives de la part des clients qui avaient deja des griefs contre la quaiite des services offerts par l'entreprise et de certains parlementaires qui en ont profite pour essayer de faire du capital politique. e) L'instabilit6 socio-politique affebre considerablement les resultats comnierciaux et financiers malgre les etTorts de redressement consentis f) Des resultats durables dans le commercial ne s'acquirent qu'aprds des periodes continues de corrections des faiblesses de gestion. La qualite des. services des domaines tels la production et le reseau influence 6nornmment les r6sultats des programmnes commerciaux et de gestion PARTIE Il: TABLEAUX RESUMES (i) Sommaire des investissements (ii) Cofinancement (iii) Ech6ancier des projets (iv) Dcaissements de la Banque: Cumulatif estime et reel (v) Indicareurs pour la mise en ceuvre du Projet (vi) Indicateurs pour 1'exploitation du Projet (vii) Etudes r6alis6es dans le cadre du Projet (viii) Coults du Projet (iX) Financement du Projet (x) Colats economiques et bendfices (xi) Indicateurs de performance (xii) Concordance avec le manuel de procedures d'exploitation (xiii) Ressources de la Banque personnel (xiv) Ressources de la Banque missions 15 ANNEXE (i) SOMMAIRE DES INVESTISSEMENTS DESCRIPTION DE LA MONTANT MONTANT MONTANT TOTAL COMPOSANTE FINANCE PAR IDA FINANCE EN DE (USD) + AUTRES CONTREPARTIE L'INVESTISSEMENT BAILLEURS PAR EDH Equivalent en $ USD Construction de la centrale de 21 IDA MW; 15 MW (isanc4 par IDA, 6 MW Cout de li centale: EDH fianca par ACDI USD 15 658 252 f USD 1 240 000 USD 21 281 021 Cou(t assistance technique + supervision OISD 152000 + ACDI CAN 5 500 000 Installation d'une uniti de 10 MW _ IDA IDH Carrefour FRF 33 930 000 USD 1 200 000 USD 7 378 000 + Coft assistance technique +supervision USD 523 494 Etude de site pour la nouvelle centrale IDA thermique USD 329 900 USD1 100 000 1USD 429 900 R6duction des pertes IDA EDH USD 2 000 000 USD 150 000 USD 3 310 000 BID USD 500 000 AFD [.SD 660 000 R6vision de l*ttide tanfaire IAD I_________________________ .USD 100 000 USD 20 000 USD 120 000 Formation IDAH USD 187 345 USD 1000 000 UStD 287 345 Renforcement institutionnel IDA EDH USD 830 000 USD 50 000 USD13 331 675 AF , FRF 60 000 000 +ACDI .___ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ _ CAN 2 451 675 . 16 ANNEXE (ii) COFINANCEMENT Le 56' Projet Energie n'a pas ete engage avec d'autres financements, J part la contribution de EDH qui a ete fixee a 15 % pour les depenses locales. Nanmnoins, la composante de la centrale de 15 MW a beneficie d'un cofinancement pour I'ajout de 6 MW additionnels. Le tableau suivant resume les montants de ces cofinancements: DESCRIPTION DE LA COFINANCEMENT REMARQUES COMPOSANTE Centrale de Varreux 15 /21 A Ce cofinancement concerne les 6 MW $CAN 5 500 000 MW additionnels EDH CONTREPARTIE IJSD 1 240 000 Installation unitd 10 MW a EDH La banque mondiale n'a pas Carrefour CONTREPARTIE paye un dernier paiement de USD 1 200 000 USD 700000 A Picistick. La date de cloture du Credit arrivait k termes .EDH devra le prondre en charge, malgr6 la lettre de cridit quli etait approuvee par la banque pour le paiement de ces travaux. Reduction des pertes EDH CGNTREPARTIE USD 150 000 BID Ces financements n '6taient pas USD 500 000 convenus dans l'accord de Credit de la Banque mondiale. Ils AFD concernent des programmes USD 660 000 d'accompagnement. 17 ANNEXE (iii) ECHEANCIER DES PROJETS LES COMPOSANTES 1989 1990 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 REMARQUES , ~~~~1994 TRIMESTRE I' 4 -I BL g I 2 i14 1 , I.I Centrale 15/21 MW Unit6 10 MW Carrefour Etude de site RMduction des pernes R6vision tarifaire ________ ___________ Imiplantation SAP R3 Formation 1m>E s^e r _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ j _ I ANNEXE (iv) DECAISSEMENTS DE LA BANQUE (VOIR TABLEAU SUR LES 3 PAGES SUIVANTES) 19 CONTRC)E BALANCE DES CATEGORIES TR4 WN043 604467 2610 11.0mmi06 140000 10.0I9 00 1200200e m IW I600 I00 4oo9 B1EM0F1CMIR( C09AAI" IAYrEOOL60 050I2 IPAYE IB1LANCE I IA II-H_ I HAL I-r I64A9 2 1 BAL 1 2 aAt. 4 81. B 5LI -A I AL I EN X074 I FiF 6566 01117T)0 1 21410954.3 6444,73 10005345, 050060 00000 130000 94W6473 e10540.17 ____ 50 441*00 0 6491, a 1)00 Wm00 6044706 AN40574,0 4110.40 IM502442 5301021420614 40.0 0002 __ 120000 003367. 50000 40000 N I46- C 21 PAW 4 U5 445 04D4 315001F45 67104,07 17700046, 0710V6 141040 1.4 _____ 0020 129000 _- c 1. snow 46000 0 64Q1-V265 21 PAW ( S USD WIM004, 5310413072 M1017100. U22600. 14205948,4 W262300 10142407 0000 ___ 13000 b0270000 __ 400 4106 IM 0 095D 40262. 460?1A54 1412642.1 25006.20 13974994.1 SW I200,6 10I2712.2 _ _ 000020 __ 126400 500227,0 ____ 00 40000 D__ iior-msc 21 PAN 7 12 1 1W401.1 1146212.27 Imo24327.2 741122,03 123709270 73621 0 0A0002M02.21 005W 2 __ 1200900 503267.5 sn0wo *___ 40 0 140MIVMC 2104AWd -T a USC "204. 72311730 1761491.0 00235.10 1208045-6 60225.04 6.7027.72, 00050 _ 120000 - 33T. 20000 400000 0 140-VUOC 21 4W O 09002 70630,2 ~~74MAI4 1779377.11 021112.2 12527042. 52602.1 0W4220.021 _____ 002 ____ 120000 500287.9 20000 ___ 430000 aI HW0.VIEC 21 mw c 10 MOt 71412. 3113.2 07771010.01 4A0wl SM308, 04.23,021 _____ Ca ____ 1230100 50 49 6451,620000 402900 0 C9OawI 71 MW 11 E000 W4343 011147,A1 177152023 211132,56 12441424,2 0024225,8 ___ 0001 ___ 120000 20672.50 465059,24 20W400000 e__ DEC0ONTAO 02 USC 02544.24 124020.2 104601.70 415040.1 11012040. 070040,01 U044614, _____ 0000 l3o_ 2000 4000024 200000 400000 0 1401-006021m Ex6 02 USC 203.3a 520401.701 Z2454M,11 22S540, 11805220. 22540.0 942!439,3 ____ 6000 .__ 120000 .4M09,24 50004000 0 I H00.4540071M :2 4 500) 54324.00 ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~23221.04 M27400,U 1000,44 1187024M, 042WN23, B200WO 120001..1 4 3070 _ _ _ 500 400 0 A04011 161 020D 9464 00417.5 407016.t4 20700,2 1154540,1 vz72,0 5452.5 00000 120000 44200253 02om00 40000 0 MW4Q1.V2 I 3MW 161 USD 61043.67 MUM790.2 14001A6 442015,32 113510464, 442270,2 7106201.5 00000 120000 4032020,0 90(00 400320 0 Hi04V10EC 2103 MW. II20 05.7 U.SD 4 145i.'11 ZOW004,005 112210614,0 20009,0 YAGSWU,06.0 60P00 120000 2622,43 0579 40200 7 HNNmVOBC 21 MW 16l 005 211620,4 1110 JIM171M6.14 145904,25 11174M004 1dO469.50 7221267.41 WNW0 ___ 120000 4053M.03 50W90 40000 0 MWAB0-52031 MW 191 uso 547476 V41111,4 114A7712, 241100,20 1060242 241100.20 240C031.16 0O0m= 120000 40202.6 600D000 40W0 0 6101400021mlW 20 0D61 2123 2402,2P. 12m43.34.2 1004514 10016524.3 3400021,1 00D00 120009 10044.4 4244.0,0 50300 40920 0 OECCNAO 20lMW 21 USD I 16104 16414,7 I44A1631,5 12604,0 506410,4 7400021.0 50000 nor__ 10)30 1"204.0 42290692 00000 40000 0 505 11044 22 U80C 7464.0 744012 "SUM03,2 5107.1 1009000.6 646002.1 14000W 0_ 5127,74 46197044 ____ 3003 4CO0 0 A20CHEF 14020W 22 US)) 0005 054006" 4441304,2 4152551.11 1174*5,g 052001,1 7021200.0 1400000 0 410770.44 201000 ___ 4~00 0- H064165021 AOOV 24 USD 41115A1 911T14,1 14M900144 20512.4 6640620M01 SW50014 7027121.05 14300W 00 __ 0 406170,44 ___ 200004002 0 NoI-012c 21 344V OEM04 74070 450562 13440.4 277.57 00216402 1521121,65 14000W 0 33767,01 30000,67 200000 400023 0 EI00004 0A010 f0W 20 0950 600010,6 4fntkv1 l2461140 41612,6 000402.62 7527121.55 1450.0 ____ 0 40192,4 249003,27 ___ 203000400 0 5056106605 2? 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MM0.4SUN1 V4 1D 1511100 100224004 10011%,0 S1172A22 530404362 1432072011 117I2*0 128000 0 -124100,8 20D000 40000 -733201.0 COGI02 44 0)00 I0*00.1 00010.20 76toEl.4012 410027,503 3310116.02 4321700,Sz 40WJ0278 1240040 0 -124609(2000 40001006 .3222811,6 UlCOo 44 0100 4100 41Y4,4632 20102012,211 2006157 s320021.70 4321720.012 M0om5 130 0 -14000_____ 000 _____ 00000 -722)10. 00.30 44 U118 474 074,310108 T1 0U.11,I1 001A3820 53M161741 4321720,02 306,0208 0233*42 0 -124003,0) 200000 44000 .72220.05 UTLIE OEURCOO. 44 USC 11Y44101 11701.016 122204112 2707001 0033020,6 278701 4042021,0- ___ 1220,44$ 0 -124I02.9 2C0001 40000 .72226,55 CAOIEZ2 44 FR8 0000 10102,000 12211.1if 10074.080 002214.52 1087.02a 41DR140,001 ____ 1230442 0 124102.1 ___ 200231 _____ 0 W -7201,65S 051E 44 uSC 1*0*2 20~~~~3400.016I A16071.7,44 16372,1132 M?2 400720122144)1 i__ 236443 0 26572,112 .14005 __ 201=1~ __ 40000 -72228025 AOI6AIAOHEICO 44 l0oom 073113 11COM110, 04041.40 0302712.2 49022146.01 ___ 1±30443 2 504340.49 .20*tpd.6 ___ _23000 *Dow_ 000 -7272281.0 00f$C0000* 44 1150 s14ow i10107,1 401003.1. 010a0.02 10362312 £032044.01 122443 0 -330100.6 01000.3 1101306 40000 ___ -722201.14 OIECCOTAI 40 FRF 11110100,1 w1101,04 16105111.11 2220012. 2820183,6 2220102.0 100200222 222043 (I -201614 1__1101120,6 8io 400000 -0122200,5! 42618TICK IOMW 48 70 6106021 140141,13 314"2113 11131017 MIMI0,0 111360,7 1404862.2,2 12304,43 0 .20011,0 _____ 110124. 440000 .7M0,60 PIELSYICK IOAMW 47 00F 401000.2 1612183 214400M 7684, 24041481.22 TZSH05416 15187774 1220443 0-20010,6 f____ 1010. 400061 .1222281. P183L51K 100A2W 46 FR! 000672, ¶0000. 300010021 I 167S442 2320262. 0670.62 S1000087.12 1230442 0 .206010,6 _____ 1113.8 440000o -722201.1.6 gO.LS1lCP(10 MW 40 2 327410 0014,10 53W341.13 84777.1 2202,424,0 t.3/73, %4VI10.A7 12.38443 a 284,. ____ 110036.1 400000 -722200,5119 EISIIK 10 WI so FRF I 00940, 1014311.0 3210100.2 1423.111 2121801,717 14M302.0* 1200396,20 1230443 0 220110,2. ___ 11013121 400200 11.16 PIEOSIIK ID0MV 0?. 70tF ¶10070.1 171000.73 W1.0*000 208107,03 1013U34.24 20014742 10022000 1231443 0 -2001000,6 ___ 011206 40000 .7322281.63 P.EUSTICI(IOM.W 52 USC ¶0101431 1014,015" 2010411.22 10K010) 103233)34 BOW100)01 10012129.06 1234043 0 -200100,0 110120.0 40000 .722201.03 CANEZ22 33 kmC 0,40.0`2 non,0 2024100.44 0440,32,11 16211100.7 0480122 10020011,34 1__ 238443 0 -200600,6 11011341 40001 .r22201,03 SAOATRANS 02 HIF 21002 W%3013,0 210100-.41 61074.100 1765701.61 00074,00? 84,23"0,02 4238443 0 a.20000 110 120,6aso' 40000 -722201,60 E01E 82 000S 2001.1 30113 20434.00 2i87.4733 17021104,24 217,4733- 9403.00,0 __ 1220443 0 .200100.5 118130,1 402001I 1.72=1S1 BRH1.A 12 UsD1 7mu 1040 2121400.1 0412,1810 I71401,68 140692000 ___ 1238443 0 ss2202161 2i14810.3 ilsi__ 31810, ___ 40000 1-233281.5 DAN4IEL St 110D Iwo1 11010 211l004.10 1001.028 174731.01 040000.004 123044 0 10081,01 .3303013 __ 110130,5 4___ 00003 -733281.63 AJ3RAMONENo04 82 110 l0100.10 1100.1 C201101 11171a,07 103008.36 04084.0 1101710,0 1124725 0 .2MI2012 118130.3 ___ 40000 .722201,206 1)10E3 02 USC .17640.01 400168ft1 26110405 -"27772,0 14343434 840300,8 ___ 1124122 a) -22121. ___ 11811200 _ 400000 -217700.0 .444500.7? C08P700SPECIAL 05 FRF 67270.41 "1.111 230010,014. 511110,61 100342.0 43481. 824007.16 1124723 0 .21630.2 118130. 4000 440,2 111C101 04 rFR 51040.01 101241,11 2011131.21 70004.0 1630104, 7700010 813151,32 0024720 0 -22231042 I 8132, 4~0= .44430873 0'iE0.S11C 10301 00, 0)61 7020.0 215400,401ft 20111244,116, 84404.607 1701102 062131,6 112472* 0 540400 .27410.0 _ _ 1T103,0 40023 .444000,77 DECOONAOEI-10 St 1100 6003 400C21.104 3210304,31 2040,002 1763200w.2 0032161. ____ 1124726 0 2045,602 400100* 110130.4 4000 -4446000,77 EICOO0AWI-00 06 USC 11111I "0¶,3 112120u.18 8088.00 100280,74 500004.80 100411,723 1124123 0 -3018,0 ___ 0111130,5 -4D0W _____ "445A077 CAM 62 so 1100 ¶400 111113% li 721,010010 11001,4 2203208.34 11021A 771314.233 ii__ 12473 a .200181, _____ 010206 __ 48000 .44430771 K431-VIBC21 N0W 00 1)31 4711.01 0721400 0134101,01 3404,3220 100380.81 34014,31201 075720,05 012412 aI .200181,0 110020. 0000 -44040,77 00141-A *0 O383 312106.3 104.16 72T412,04 ea090601, 001423031 S7372,005 040,0.01143000 a I200, __ 11820 40000 -444040,77 6282 08 USC 4100.5 4142,1 160210,400 2900f*07 1502430.41 07370,0 2600.000 110800 0 .00.01101312,0 400000 -444000.7 LUT0030 08 USC 2130 2008 116140641 187.104 44202 - 71721.0* IM1701011 1114505 0 .3004100 4181304 40400 4404177 C00G112 so6m tow 272 300 2111101331 26004172 1332100.5 07372,0.08 __ _ 0146000 6 21000.122 .32M44 I__ S1100,6 ___ 40000 .4445M1,77 AGROAO&OftIco a0 U732 1D 0700 no 00400.00 on1,0264 122822.4 wwzv6772.4gs _ 1104000 0 02-3000 43!!!!,0 I1010.0 __ 400000 -4446%1,77 DANIEL8 00 000 4060 4092 113421040.0, 2001,1.01 1407401,06 87372.80 __ 111400 ___ 0 2004.00 484374,0 _ _ 1000312.1_ __ 40000 .444300,7 DE00N AVEI 80 08 100 3204 1.1 11741.6 242011.410" 330120 1473874.28 07*2902___ 1101450 __ 0 21076.51 43070 A, 01`18i3,6 400000 .440900.7 1360011AVEI I 500 11 0 .o3 31220020 3WI3,00 14076WI,5 ___ 111T21800 il'10421 __ 0 -278 =4 I 500 02127.0 40000 .44460041T7 OOECEIAI 38 1130 .1011541341 .221241.34 20111134 .20 243300,68 1004200.87 01373100 11014101 a__ .3703. ___ 0 a ___ 4000 .242300.1 -2014201,71 COMPIOESCO6I. S7 U11D 2000 100 2114100,0 204.80204,1 007001,00 073730.01 ___ 0414404 a 2074.011 -206087 _______ 0.020,4, ______ 400040N2.0 2140 41 UjSC 0104 374 72M1.10 2802.421 1010434.64 28021,42290 0714)028,02 1$14008 41 4003076,56 4010001 1-20112S,?t 1101.'JIEC2I 001 17 401000.4 20044 Pe,4 1130.0 2,01 17102 3247 87030030 114100 0 .28006107 7 ,07 40022 1-01124711_ RRWA, B.i lE W.IIE Pon^13 104M040640 i 1422.24 116100.100001ww20 l4233,32411 W7! 1 0.? -3m 1127;n -21200213 If24 or usD 11177)4A I1I1T 1 260?"W'"2 709018,1 15820U.1 MOOMI 79t010.t0 191S02QI 0 -187 a 20r2 x 480 -20t2M.71 titF _ Frn 010A44484 too 080.#1 1138ne42 ea4126,0 li 870,92 O4 120,05 -2332n.77 10202t a0 4805 e20r1,w5 400 -201127t1 PIE"S,K 10MW 0 02 VMS D 2UM M 1 10510.8 688,0S -2424.1 1020311 0 -"ml t1s81okz H8wsA? -40 0 -201 128.71 NCCETrAI *0 USD 82 gum 1411A211? 8738M 8 11000.141 -23u2j7 t 102031W 0 o727r,608 -44783WI Qz"5,47 401 : -211t12d,71 DEC 0N IO0 MW ca. ONO BMW 141921r.039 _. B 73,sa 40_ -23=4,?11 1(0a1t= a 0 0a.e H04010, 6_ Q25so47 -_ _ 201128.71 DECONAVES-0 to USD "T 2_0 Itr21_ _130_ _ __ 7__ D 21300*8 -2St12 07188l4o 4 00 -Mt20 71 2 EOOAVE2 10 at usao lam SiMS 12aTIM.Ol 820s01 724302 80 i 4315531 17311 J o4AS,_ 028.4 410x -207128.71 Irc., h21MW Bt uSD *i11. 0810 12 i031 138.120 0814 7 -31531.3a 1028111 0e st3s *s52"8s3 e2iai,4M 400 1-20110 00 NO 88MW 82 UJ 10150 urJr7 13snA3 11a, 344451. -35881.30 1t0t1 0 107t0P10 4W701 02858047 I80080 . 2a1Q071 DOCONAWI4O 03 USD ISOMMI 110174.31 1r43,2 8H00mo 328I42.49 431,51 1100MP 100. 0 4 M;2 r 42GK47 4?_ -m 1124.71 UTU7O a4 USi 274,52 IY4,52 20I 18112 88740877 23,8034 -2173l3,2D 9088S a ° 4 115767.2 e2400M .4_g 2171 BIHA 84 001E 1n4 .4 470r2.2 IO1W l WM1485 4Ge.084 -11U33,233 34371.481 BS44t11 0 ° 8707*K 82 41 I 4 -2011387T1 Krm 84 USD0 81.8 lien0 1027,0?1 81529,411 41883081 3171t;0 074423.8 e 0820,411 414288.4 _ t tA7 4C) 8 7-201128,t7 DANIEL 84 USD 1340o D 211 0d8.017,1 3t002.,41 481X2a., -3173.235 17440e 0 30=041 452889,, 820841 4 -200287 t EFrLS VW 4L M.0 03100 uto 47U 24.705 4487248.041 .311_321 07420.8 _ -888834,5t *_ 5047 1 420wa _ 201720,7 ts0 SOUS _4 US1 614400 88 8 870t)2 410OM -2 -3173. - 448.8 _ a 4M314&2, __ _ ) -20123, O08 0MWV 94 USD n8014 E7 81.0 8,8 sw210k8 .573 0 2.0 IUtrola ps .110 8e8_ 82341 4800 928.71 000084 0013.38 84 Uf9D 'Ii 31tg 00D 240 142232 37047,m4 - 31133,232 3744z38 o 543212 7 3 _ 41 _ 080,4 -7 J32 ACRAMOHB4CO -u I-. 1,1 ANNEXE (v) INDICATEURS POUR LA MISE EN (EUVRE DU PROJET PARAMETRES, DE 1996 1997 1998 1999 SUIVI (P) R) (P) ( R) (P) (R) (P) (R) Clients/employes -7 7 F 78 15 8 >5 SS Taux des pertes 5U/ 637 42% 3s 6 35% 5 : 435% 55% Retour sur investissements 4 1.5% -1 1° 6W *4 Y /T l4 Ratio service dette/revenu net -".1.5 - <.S <1..5 7 Nombre d'heures d'alimentation lMiniS - Mini8 Is 18 IS -i i 15-18 Taux de recouvrement 80 " >100% 9IU 9S Si - (P): PRVU (R) :REEL ANNEXE (vi) INDICATEURS POUR l.'EXPLOITATION DU PROJET PARAMETRES DE 1999 2000 2 01 SUIVI Clients/empJoyes _ _0 __4 Taux des pertes _ 45 _ Retour sur investissements _ Ratio servc dette/rev;nu net _____ ____ Nombre d'heures d'alimentation Mi 18 Mi 1_ Taux de recouvrement >10oe/ >100%OR 20 ANNEXE (vii) ETUDES REALISEES DANS LE CADRE DU PROJET Les etudes suivantes ont et6 r6alisdes dans le cadre du Projet: 1) Etude de site pour une nouvelle centrale thermique Diesel de 120 MW dont une premiere tranche de 60 MW 2) Etude tarifaire 21 A1NNEXE (viii) COUTS DU PROJET Les d6penses suivantes ont ete effectuees dans le cadre du Proj et: DESCRIPTION DE LA MONTANT MONTANT MONTANT TOTAL COMPOSANTE FINANCE PAR IDA FINANCE EN DE (USD) + AUTRES CONTREPARTIE L'INVESTISSEMENT BAILLEURS PAR EDH Equivalent en S _USD Construction de la centrale de 21 IDA EDH MW: 15 MW finauc6 par IDA, 6 MW Cout de la centrale: financE par ACDI USD 15 658 252 + USD 1 240 000 USD,21 281 021 Coat assistance technique + supervision USD 152000 ACDI .____ ____ ____ _____ ____ _ _ _ CAN 5 500 000 Installation d'une unit6 de 10 MW h IDA EDH Carrefour FR? 33 930 000 USD 1 200 000 USD 7 378 000 + Cott assistance technique +supervision USD 523 494 Elude de site pour la nouvelle centrale IDA EDH thermique USD 329 900 USD 100 000 USD 429 900 Reduction des pertes IDA EDH USD 2 000 000 USP 500 000 USD 3 310 000 DID USD 500 000 AFD USD 660 000 Revision de l'dtude tanfaire IDA EDH _________ __ _ USD 100 000 USD 20 000 USD 120 000 Formation IDA EDH USD 187 345 USD 100 000 USD 387 345 Renforcement institutionnel IDA EDH USD 830 000 USD 50 000 USD 13 331 675 AFD FRE 60 000 000 + ACDI CAN 2 451 675 _ 22 ANNEXE (ix) FINANCEMENT DU PROJET Le 5eme Projet ENERGIE a e finance par la Banque mondiale au montant de DTS 18600000, c-a-d 1'6quivalent de USD 26 000 000 (ref taux 1998). Aucun autre cofinancement n'a Wt6 associe contractuelleinent a ct Projet, A part la contrepartie de EDlI qui etait officiellement fixee & 15% des depenses locales, et la mise a disposition de ressources froncieres ou d'infrastructures existantes. Le gouvernement Canadien a octroy6 un don au Gouvemement haftien d'un montant de CAN 5 500 000 pour la foumiture de 6 MW additionnels dans la composante du IS MW finance par IDA. ANNEXE (x) COUTS ECONOMIQUES ET BENEFICES L'augmentation de la capacite de production de 31 MW additionnels a perrnis: i) d'augmenter la quantite d'energie electrique fournie a la cIient6le industrielle qui de ce fait r6duit ses d6penses en autogeneration qui sont de l'ordre de 2.5 .3 fois le cotit unitaire de production de EDH 2) de r6duire les couts d'improductivi-t de EDH 3) d'augmenter le nombre d'heures de fonctionnement des ecoles du soir 4) d'augmenter le chiffrc d'affaires des comrnmerces de nuit 5) de reduire la tension d'inscurit6 pendant la nuit 23 ANNEXE (xi) INDICATEURS DE PERFORMANCE Le tableau suivant decrit les indicateurs de performance qui avaient te fixes au deblocage du Cr6dit en 1996- Les valeurs de 1989 etaient plus elevees, elles ont ete r6duites pour tenir compte de la situation post-embargo. INDICATEURS MIS = 1997 1998 199 VALEUR VALE!U-R VALEUR -VAMVrt VALEUR VALEUR VALEUR A A O6TENUE A OBTENUE A OBTENUE A OBIENUE OsTENIR , OBTENIR 08TENIM OBTENIR CLIENTS I Mill EMPLOYES 75% 72% 80% 78% 85% BPh >85% S5% TAUX DES PERTES Max _ 50% 56% 42% 56% 35% 55f% < 35% RETOURSUR Sin_ INVESTISSEMENTS 0.5h (4%/6) 1.5% (9.66%) 4% (%) >4% (15%) ANNEXE (xii) CONCORDANCE AVEC LE MANUEL DE PROCEDURES D'EXPLOITATION Les diverses r6alisations effectuees dans le cadre de ce financement sont toutes conques selon les normes en vigueur a Electricit6 d' Haiti. De plus, leur exploitation rentre dans la pratique habituelle de fonctionnement des divers intervenants et ne necessite aucune modification majeure de structures ou de proc6dures. 24 ANNEXE (xii) RESSOURCES DE LA BANQUE: PERSONNEL Au cours de l'exdcution du Proj et, le personnel suivant de la Banque a participe au suivi et A la gestion des activites: * Marcelo OSORIO : charg6 de Projet * Philippe DURAND : charge de Projet * Jorge GORR:IO • Max PULGAR-VIDAL : Chef division de credit * Varella : Avocat * Clive Harris : Economiste • Mac GAYE GAYE : Economiste * Martin Staab : Evaluation des offres * Carolle Carr : representant resident * Michael AZEFOR representant resident * P. Gregory Fazzari Expert * Gany Charlier : Expert ANNEXE (xiii) RESSOURCES DE LA BANQUE: MISSIONS Au cours de l'ex6cution du Proj et, les nmissions suivantes furent executees: * Mission de suivi et d'dyaluation : Ces missions ont eu lieu 2 a 3 fois par an. Un ou deux membres de la Banque composent g6n6ralement ces missions: le charge de Projet assist, d'un technicien ou d'un economiste a Visites de cournoisie: une visite du representant de la division decaissements, Ms Tua Nguyen, pour evaluer le bilan des ddcaissements et des montants engag6s * Mission de formation: sdminaire de 1 semaine organist par 2 representants de la division decaissements a l'Hlotel Christopher sur les operations de d6caissements * Rencontres de mise au point organisees par le representant du bureau resident en HaYti: deux rencontres, une au bureau resident, une autre au bureau de l'EDH 25 SA. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~73'30' 73'00 72'30'Ti o rdcd' h o M~ n fTeW.{&n a I 4s .8s ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Tortue S6udre,ournrilafnrnouErnorao -200' AThANTIC OCEAN -e ITodle - rontp,edqerton tihe toegl stoes of o, rrienso, ory ATLANTIC OCEAN ° - ndooenotoroccopfoerc of5tch oendaories. ~~~~~~. -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~PORT-DEPAI CUBAX < D C)OMINiCAN 2 ) TC1J{C. 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