Rapò sou jan pwojè a te aplike: Pwojè Kreyasyon Djòb ann Ayiti

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 17238 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT HAITI EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PROJECT (Credit No. 2765 -HA) December 18, 1997 Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Sector Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Gourdes (G) Average Exchange Rate: (As of June 20, 1997) US$1.00 = G16.70 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR OF THE BORROWER October 1 -September 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AGETIP - Agence pour la Gestion de Travaux d'Infrastructure Publics CASEC - Conseil d'Administration de la Section Communale CDS - Centres pour le Developpement et la Sante CECI - Centre Canadien d'lEtude et de Cooperation Intemationale CBF - Cooperative Housing Foundation EGP - Employment Generation Project GOH - Governrnent of Haiti 10 - Implementing Organization MARNDR - Ministry of Agriculture MDE - Ministry of Environment MDOD - Maitre-D'Ouvrage Del6gu6 MTPTC - Ministry of Public Works PMO - Prime Minister's Office PADF - Pan-American Development Foundation SDR - Special Drawing Rights UCG - Unite Centrale de Gestion UNDP - United Nations Development Program USAID - United States Agency for International Development Vice- President : S.J. Burki Country Director : 0. Kalantzopoulos Sector Director M. Koch-Weser Staff Member P. Werbrouck FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT HAITI EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PROJECT CREDIT 2765-HA TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE EVALUATION SUMMARY i PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT I Background 1 A. Project Objectives 1 B. Achievement of Project Objectives 3 C. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project 5 D. Project Sustainability 6 E. Bank Performance 7 F. Borrower Performance 8 G. Assessment of Outcome 9 H. Future Operation 9 I. Key Lessons Learned 10 PART H: STATISTICAL ANNEXES 11 1. Summary of Assessments 12 2. Related Bank Loans/Credits 13 3. Project Timetable 13 4. Loan/Credit Disbursement: Cumulative Estimated and Actual 14 5. Key Indicators for Project Implementation 15 6. Studies Included in Project 17 7A. Project Cost 18 7B. Project Financing 18 8. Status of Legal Covenants 19 9. Bank Resources: Staff Inputs 23 10. Bank Resources: Missions 23 APPENDIXES: A. Mission's Aide-Memoire B. Borrower Contribution to the ICR C. Executive Summary Final report This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT HArrl EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PROJECT CREDIT 2765-HA Preface 1. This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Employment Generation Project in Haiti, for which Credit 2765 -HA in the amount of SDR31.8 million (US$50 million equivalent) was approved on July 11, 1995 and made effective on July 13, 1995. 2. The credit was closed on April 30, 1997; the original closing date was March 31, 1997. Final disbursement took place on November 20, 1997. The balance of SDR565,732.58 was canceled on December 18, 1997. The project's final audit has not yet been received. 3. The ICR was prepared by Pierre Werbrouck, Sr. Agricultural Economist, and Garry L. Charlier (Rural Infrastructure Specialist), Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region. The ICR was reviewed by Messrs. Mark Cackler, (LCSES), 0. Kalantzopoulos, M. Donoso Clark and J. Panzer (LCC3C). The Borrower provided comments that are included as appendix B to the ICR. 4. Preparation of this ICR started during the Bank's final supervision/completion mission in May 1997. It is based on material in the project file. The borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by providing opinions reflected in the mission's aide-memoire and the project final report, the executive summary of which is attached as Appendix C. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PROJECT CREDIT 2765-HA HAITI EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction 1. The Employment Generation Project (EGP) originated during the Consultative Group follow-up meeting held in Haiti in May 1995. It was prepared on the basis of employment generation studies carried out for the Emergency Economic Recovery Credit (Cr. 2670-HA). The Project was conceived to bridge the transition from short-to medium-term economic assistance. It was to reach short-term poverty alleviation objectives during a politically volatile period and while democratic institutions were still fragile. It was estimated that nearly 1.6 million famnily members of unskilled workers in mostly economically depressed areas would benefit from income generated by the creation of about 487,000 person-months of employment. A. Project Objectives 2. The objectives of the Project were to: (a) create short-term employment for people in extreme poverty in support of the Borrower's program for poverty alleviation; (b) rehabilitate seriously deteriorated economic and productive infrastructure in the Borrower's country; and (c) strengthen the capacity of non-government and community organizations operating in the territory of the Borrower and the Borrower's central and local authorities to manage labor intensive small-scale development projects, including the establishment of a national non-government contract management entity and the development of a longer term strategy for poverty alleviation, employment and small infrastructure maintenance. 3. Comments on Project Objectives. Considering the political situation, the short-term objectives were ambitious. The longer-term objectives mentioned under (c) would have stood a better chance of being reached in an institutional development program than in a short-term action-oriented project. B. Implementation Experience and Results 4. The Project outcome is rated highly satisfactory. The employment creation component (92 percent) of the Project is rated highly satisfactory because: (i) the component reached the ambitious job creation objectives; (ii) project funds benefited the poorest layers of the population and provided the highly-needed cash to stimulate recovery from the economic hardships during the international embargo; and (iii) rehabilitation of crucial productive, economic and basic infrastructure along with protection/conservation of environmentally degraded or threatened areas meet or exceed appraisal expectations in most cases. -ii - 5. The institutional development component is rated satisfactory. The Project enhanced the managerial, administrative and operational capacities of UCG, participating municipalities and CASECs, NGOs, various community organizations and small rural private enterprises. The Project, however, fell short of developing a strategy for poverty alleviation through small-scale labor intensive investments on a more sustainable basis. The Project was closed one month after the original date in the Credit Agreement. 6. Among the key factors that affected the performance of the Project were: (i) strong Government support and excellent cooperation between the Bank and Government during project preparation and processing; (ii) UCG's pragmatic and effective management; (iii) excellent performance by NGOs and implementing organizations; (iv) a good project methodology; and (v) the Bank's flexible procurement and disbursement procedures and continuous follow-up. C. Summary of Findings Sustainability. 7. The sustainability of the Project is uncertain. Soil conservation and particularly irrigation works which directly concern the beneficiaries are likely to be maintained. Sustainability of sub-projects such as solid waste management and rural road rehabilitation is unlikely. They belong to the public sector domain and need specific funding. The Project strengthened national and local institutions with staff trained and experienced in labor-intensive infrastructure rehabilitation works at local levels. It did not establish a national non-government contract management entity to implement a longer term strategy for poverty alleviation, employment and small infrastructure maintenance. Bank and Borrower Performance 8. Bank performance is rated highly satisfactory. In addressing GOH's urgent need and request for assistance, the Bank showed swift responsiveness and extreme creativity and flexibility that led to a record-breaking short period for preparation, appraisal, Board presentation, effectiveness and first disbursement. To ensure success during implementation, the Bank dedicated a significant amount of resources to assist the Borrower. 9. The Borrower's performance is rated satisfactory. While the Borrower was very actively involved in project preparation, subsequent administrations have reduced their support for the Project and eroded its sustainability. Nevertheless, the Project has achieved significant job creation results. D. Future Operations 10. At present, an IDA-financed basic infrastructure project is being prepared. It is recommended that this project uses the private sector, which has been strengthened by the EGP, to act as a major player in project implementation. The possibility of bilateral donors using this approach also remains likely. -111 - E. Key Lessons Learned 11. The lessons to be drawn from the implementation of this Project comprise the highly successful cooperation between private and public sector, eligibility criteria of sub-projects, participation by the beneficiaries and institutional development. (i) a well coordinated partnership between public and private/non-governmental sectors can live up to tremendous challenges. NGOs have shown a substantial implementation capacity and drive, which the public sector cannot match. Future small infrastructure projects should take this experience into account and make use of this private implementation capacity; (ii) not all infrastructure rehabilitation sub-projects are suited for labor-intensive methods. Road construction and some other sub-projects requiring heavy-duty equipment need more capital inputs for satisfactory completion than were agreed upon under the 60- 40 percent rule for allocation of labor and capital expenditures. The type of sub-projects undertaken should be consistent with the type of resources available; (iii) substantial and time-consuming participation with beneficiaries and local authorities are necessary from the inception of sub-projects to ensure sustainable post- implementation maintenance and operation. This often conflicts with the pressure to disburse and achieve quick results. Although tradeoffs are unavoidable, higher beneficiary contributions and participation in the sub-project design would have increased the likelihood of sub-project sustainability; (iv) the Bank and the Government are able to move very fast when supported by senior officials. Fast project preparation need not to diminish quality. Moreover, flexibility in procurement, disbursement and intense supervision have ensured successful implementation; and (v) more realism is needed about what can be achieved in terms of institutional development in such a short time period and in an environment such as the one prevailing in Haiti in 1995-96. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PROJECT CREDIT 2765-HA HAM PART I -PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT Background 1. The Employment Generation Project (EGP) originated during the Consultative Group follow-up meetings held in Haiti in May 1995. The reinstated constitutional Government requested IDA's support to continue financing the USAID Jobs Creation Project which was soon to be completed. The 1991-1994 international embargo and economic decline caused great hardship for the rural and urban poor who were left with few prospects for short-term improvement. In the context of an aggravated economic deterioration, the Government attached high priority to the extension of this Jobs Creation Project to alleviate poverty. EGP's swift identification and preparation benefited extensively from the Jobs Creation Project's successful experience and from initial work done on employment generation as part of the preparation of the Emergency Economic Recovery Credit (Cr. 2670-HA). With unemployment hovering near 70 percent, the Project was seen as a critical component in the maintenance of political and economic stability during this period of transition and emerging democratic institutions. A. Project Objectives 2. EGP's objectives were to: (a) create short-term employment for people in extreme poverty in support of the Borrower's program for poverty alleviation; (b) rehabilitate seriously deteriorated economic and productive infrastructure in the Borrower's country; and (c) strengthen the capacity of non-government and community organizations operating in the territory of the Borrower, and the Borrower's central and local authorities to manage labor intensive small-scale development projects, including the establishment of a national non-governmental contract management entity along with the development of a longer term strategy for poverty alleviation, employment, and small infrastructure maintenance. 3. EGP was composed of two parts: employment generation and institutional development. Part A: Employment Generation 4. This component was to carry out high priority small-scale development activities (including labor costs and associated equipment, management and supervision thereof), especially in the areas of (a) productive and economic infrastructure, including the rehabilitation of roads, culverts, bridges, and irrigation and drainage canals; (b) environmental protection, including watershed management, erosion control and soil reclamation; (c) pollution control, including urban solid waste disposal and clearing of urban waste water drains; and (d) other activities. It -2 - was to create an estimated 487,000 person-months of short-term employment. This would generate an average income of US$70 (equivalent to about 6 months cash income) for approximately 325,000 extremely poor laborers supporting about 1.6 million family members. Part B: Institutional Development 5. This component was to provide technical assistance (including training, studies and auditing services, vehicles, furniture, staff and other incremental operational support) for the implementation of Part A and develop the Borrower's long-term employment and poverty alleviation strategy. 6. The Project would: (a) strengthen non-governmental and community organizations involved in the implementation of part A, as well as the Borrower's local authorities, by improving their capacity to identify, prepare, implement and maintain small-scale labor intensive economic development projects; (b) assess the experience of previous employment generation programs, and increase the maintenance of investments in rural roads, irrigation and soil conservation by developing maintenance strategies; and (c) support development and initial implementation of a longer term strategy to generate employment in economically depressed areas, including the creation of a national autonomous non-governmental entity able to provide delegated contract management services (e.g. as in the AGETIP model) ' especially for small-scale labor-intensive works. 7. The Government of Haiti was the Borrower and UCG (Unit6 Centrale de Gestion attached to the Prime Minister's Office) was the implementing agency. To carry out Part A, UCG made agreements with four MDODs (Non-Governmental Organizations) which in turn made sub- contracts with other implementing organizations (NGOs, local authorities or other private sector organizations) to implement sub-projects. 8. Comments on the Project Objectives. EGP's objectives were ambitious and challenging in terms of outcome and disbursement flow. Implementation has shown that the goals were reachable. With respect to the institutional development component, it is doubtful whether the longer-term strategy objectives could have effectively been reached within such short project period. More time is needed to fully accomplish such goals. B. Achievement of Project Objectives 9. EGP was an intense labor generation effort, with critical short-term benefits. It was also to form a bridge towards a more sustainable long-term approach. Accordingly, the primary goal AGETIP refers here to management agencies for small public infrasructure works. These agencies have been successful for the implementation of municipal infrastructure works on the African continent and have been sponsored by the World Bank. -3- of EGP was to address immediate poverty alleviation needs through job creation and income generation and to improve severely dilapidated economic and productive infrastructure. EGP made substantial contributions to immediate poverty relief mainly through the creation of a large number of short-term jobs, a substantial injection of money in the local economies, the improvement of infrastructure affecting the livelihood of the poor, and the protection/ rehabilitation of various environmentally degraded locations. EGP also strengthened communities and implementing agencies and financed several interesting but scattered institutional development activities. As was feared for in the Staff Appraisal Report, it fell short of ensuring long-term sustainability. Employment Generation Component 10. The main physical outcomes of the employment generation component are summarized below (Table 1). 11. EGP created 475,700 person-months of short-term employment in 18 months. The job distribution over the project period is irregular: about 25,000 jobs per month were created during the first project year (September 1995 -August 1996) and 60,000 jobs per month in the last quarter of 1996. This can be explained by the late recruitment of three MDODs whose contracts were only signed in the second quarter of 1996. Table 1: Summary of Project Outputs Outcome Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage estimate estimate (b/a) (a) (b) (b/a) A- Job Creation Jobs created (person-months) 487,000 475,691 98% Of which for women (person-months) 97,400 100,685 103% Total wages paid (US$ million) 27 22 81 % B- Infrastructure Rehabilitation Roads Rehabilitated (km) 1,100 763 69% Area under improved irrigation (ha) 62,000 Canals rehabilitated (km) 1,500 1,599 107% Garbage/debris removed ('000 m 3 ) 200 177 89% Erosion-protected area (ha) 8,000 13,000 163% Water supply (km) 14.5 TOTAL COST (US$ million) 51.4 47.4 92% 12. The arithmetic average of 26,500 jobs per month created by EGP over that period is to be compared with the 40,000 monthly jobs provided by the national assembly industry before the military coup in 1990-91. Twenty-one percent of the jobs have been carried out by women. The total wages paid to workers and directly injected into largely depressed local economies amounted to US$22.0 million (53 percent ofthe component's total disbursement). About 317,100 individuals supporting some 1.6 million household members (22 percent of the Haitian population of 7.2 million) were employed in the Project all over the country. An average laborer received over a six week working period an income of about US$70 (31 percent of per capita GDP). Some additional US$4 to 6 million of Project funds have been channeled to the local economies as wages for employees of the private sector providing the building materials. 13. Independent studies on a sample of workers indicate that 60 percent of the earned income went to consumption (food, closing, housing), and 40 percent to investment (education, livestock, small-scale trade, and farming). The Employment Generation Component (US$47.4 million, 90 percent of total costs) of the Project was disbursed in its entirety by March 1997. 14. EGP carried out 158 community sub-projects in 96 (out of 133) municipalities in the nine geographic departments. Average sub-project size was US$276,000. Most of the SAR quantitative physical goals have been exceeded. The quality of the works is generally satisfactory (in over 75 percent of the sub-project samples independently evaluated). Durability (especially for rural roads) appears uncertain due mainly to the lack of adequate post-project maintenance mechanisms. In addition to the three initial eligible categories of works (productive and economic infrastructure including the rehabilitation of roads, culverts, bridges, and irrigation and drainage canals; environmental protection; and pollution control), EGP financed also rehabilitation expansion of potable water supply. 15. EGP had also some secondary benefits. The following are two examples of the kind of indirect/secondary benefits brought by the Project. At Goyavier/St-Marc, savings generated through the implementation of a soil conservation project enabled the community to initiate the construction of a local school and to attract other funding and assistance for completion. Self-confidence and positive momentum built within the community of Desdunes/Artibonite from the successful implementation of a drainage/irrigation sub-project allowed the community to raise more than US$32,000 to rehabilitate the badly deteriorated access road to that locality. Moreover the employment generation component contributed towards: (i) the training of specialized laborers; (ii) the development of local enterprises; (iii) the strengthening of local training centers; (iv) the elaboration of a technical reference manual for labor-intensive projects; and (v) the improvement of the environmental impact assessment system. Institutional Development Component 16. Multiple diverse institutional strengthening actions were undertaken and their outcomes are generally satisfactory. EGP provided working experience in labor-intensive infrastructure projects to 135 implementing organizations (mostly local NGOs, community groups or associations, selected municipalities and small rural private firms). It provided sta training for municipalities, CASECs and selected central administration entities. It also financed: (i) basic office equipment and furniture for municipalities and CASECs; (ii) various urban studies (urban -5 - development master plan outlines, strengthening of municipal fiscal management, and socio-economic studies); and (iii) equipment for the ministries of agriculture and public works. Some actions, however, were somewhat dispersed and lacked cohesion which reduced their impact. 17. UCG was slow to start with the development of a long-term strategy and the creation of a national autonomous entity to provide infrastructure contract management services. When UCG finally began actively promoting the proposal in mid-1996, GOI's interest and support for the creation of such autonomous entity had diminished. GOH had become more favorable to a public sector management approach of employment creation and infrastructure development. As a result, EGP fell short of developing a long term national strategy to support and promote employment generation in poverty stricken areas. It did not establish an AGETIP-type national institution with the capacity to carry out such a strategy on a sustainable basis. C. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project 18. Overall, the employment generation component (Part A) of the Project was implemented with some delay. The initial objective was to disburse most funds in the first project year to address immediate poverty situations after the economic embargo and to revive the rural economy. Late contracting of three MDODs and intense sub-project (particularly environmental) screening by UCG has caused some bunching at the end of the project period. 19. The institutional development component (Part B) was more difficult to implement as it lacked a basic design. This resulted in a very late start (April 1996) and several months of negotiations between UCG and the Bank on the component's objectives, strategies and content. Time for implementation and quality control was consequently reduced. To accommodate completion of some elements of the component, the Project closed one month later than planned. About US$2.2 million for Part B was not used. The major determinants of project implementation are discussed below. 20. Government Support. EGP's quick start-up benefited largely from GOH's strong support and commitment, and from an already existing, fully operational USAID Jobs Creation Project implementation structure kept in place thanks to bridge financing from the "Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale" funded by the Interamerican Development Bank. Continuous support for the Project at the local level (municipalities, CASECs, NGOs) has been a key factor in EGP's overall success. At times, changes in the Central Government 2 , however, generated distractions and delays (specifically with respect to the institutional development component). 21. UCG Management. UCG's flexible and efficient administrative and operational management has been a decisive positive factor in achieving the job creation and physical targets. Nevertheless, late contracting of three MDODs and delays in approving MDOD work-plans resulted in a 4-month lag in reaching interim job creation targets. This reduced the time allocated 2 The Project was implemented under three different Administrations. -6- for maintenance of sub-projects and bunched a considerable part of the works in the second semester of 1996. UCG's financial management performance declined after the closure of the project. It is expected that the final project audit will be qualified. 22. EGP's management arrangement with three layers of entities (UCG, MDODs, IOs), each with different and well specified mandates and responsibilities clearly stated in enforceable performance-type contracts was also a key element in ensuring efficient, within budget and timely delivery of project outcomes. 23. MDOD Performance. The management capacity and experience of the MDODs, particularly the Pan American Development Foundation responsible for two-thirds of the works, has been the center piece of EGP's successful implementation. The three other MDODs (Centre Canadien d'ttude de Cooperation Internationale, Cooperative Housing Foundation and Centres pour le Developpement et la Sante) have also proven to be highly capable of fulfilling their contract and delivering outcomes in excess of expectation, in a timely fashion, within budget and up to agreed quality standards. The same considerations are also applicable to most of the 135 implementing organizations involved in EGP's implementation. This collaboration between public and private sector is exemplary in the region and should be continued. 24. Methodology. EGP's methodology was built on the main success factors of the previous USAID Jobs-Creation Project. In particular, the use of sub-project prototypes was key in speeding-up the whole sub-project cycle (from formulation to implementation). Nevertheless, the design and formulation of sub-projects in some cases suffered from technical shortcomings due to oversimplification or lack of in-depth studies. 25. Bank Procurement, Disbursement and Supervision. The Bank's flexible procurement and disbursement system which allowed a sole-source contractor for US$32 million, accepted relatively high thresholds for direct contracting, provided advances to MDODs exceeding US$20 million without requiring a bank guarantee and relied exclusively on ex-post control has significantly facilitated field implementation. Moreover, funds were transferred to MDODs without an intermediary account in the Central Bank, hence speeding up money transfers. 26. As shown in Table 10 of the Statistical Annexes, the Bank conducted 11 project supervision missions between August 1995 and February 1997, seven of them emphasized the status of MDOD's hiring, the institutional development component's start-up and initiatives to establish an AGETIP-type contract management agency. This intense pattern of assistance to the project has contributed significantly to its successful implementation. 27. Direct Payments to MDODs and Ols. Direct payments to well-screened, reliable, but overall well-trusted MDODs and implementation organizations has been key to timely payment for works and wages; a critical concern in a politically and socially sensitive environment characterized by the public administration's past inability to pay on time. 28. Foreign Exchange Fluctuations. Nine months after start-up, fluctuations in the SDR exchange rate resulted in a reduction of about 7 percent (US$3.5 million) of the US$ amount of the Credit available for the Project. Concurrently, a reduction in the Gourde/US$ exchange rate contributed to offset partially that loss. D. Project Sustainability 29. EGP's sustainability contains two aspects: (i) the sustainability of the infrastructure works and post-project maintenance by responsible sector line agencies, local authorities and communities; and (ii) the sustainability of the employment generation program itself as to whether and how such activities in the longer run would fit into a comprehensive poverty alleviation and economic development strategy. These two questions were to be addressed by studies and technical assistance in the Project's institutional development component. 30. Sustainability (or durability) of physical rehabilitation works varies a great deal depending on location but also on the category of works. An independent evaluation of sub-project samples, indicates that soil conservation and particularly irrigation works are most likely to be sustainable. Initiatives already undertaken by beneficiaries to maintain and/or operate the rehabilitated irrigation systems (in more than 50 percent of the cases) or to protect soil conservation works in many sites are positive indicators for sustainability. Sub-projects such as garbage collection, street and drain cleaning along with rural road rehabilitation is likely to be less sustainable. People consider such works part of the public sector domain and will not maintain them on a voluntary basis without being paid. Such maintenance requires public funding and management, still a scarce commodity in Haiti. 31. Concerning the sustainability of the employment program itself, EGP did neither define a strategy for poverty alleviation through small-scale labor intensive type investments at local levels, nor establish an AGETIP or similar private management unit to promote employment on a more sustainable basis through creation and training of small local private contractors. Recent GOH initiatives in basic infrastructure investment opt for program management through sector line Ministries. 32. The Project, however, left behind strengthened national and local institutions (UCG, selected central administration agencies, municipalities, MDODs, and 1Os) with staff trained and experienced in labor-intensive infrastructure rehabilitation works at local levels. Some of these MDODs could undertake large programs of small-scale infrastructure investments. EGP also left behind large quantities of tools and various type of office equipment and furniture. Those are very valuable and ready-to-use assets on which GOH has the option to keep building on. E. Bank Performance 33. Overall Bank performance is rated as highly satisfactory. The involvement of the Bank was justified at a time when it was critical that donor-financed projects generated income for the poor during the transition to political and economic stability, while private led employment and economic growth would pick up the slack in the economy. In addressing GOlfs urgent need and request for assistance, the Bank showed swift responsiveness and extreme creativity and flexibility. This led to a record-breaking time 10-week period for preparation, appraisal, Board presentation, effectiveness and first disbursement. This rapid turnover was the result of -8- tremendous cooperation and coordination within the Bank and between the Bank and GOH. EGP's design was based on the Borrower's extreme poverty situation, the judgment of in-country implementation capacity, risk assessment of success and sustainability that proved to be accurate. The Bank's performance during appraisal is thus rated highly satisfactory despite shortcomings in the preparation of sections of the institutional development component. 34. To ensure success during implementation, the Bank dedicated a significant amount of resources to assist the implementing agency. Eleven supervision missions took place over the 21-month implementation period. The Bank's responsiveness in addressing unforeseen implementation problems or issues was swift, and communication with UCG was steady. Close coordination between the Bank and UCG contributed to keeping the Project on track, and the required technical assistance was made available to UCG according to the implementation plan. Given the fast pace of project implementation, the change of task manager less than ten months before project completion caused some delay, but related negative impacts were eventually limited. The Bank has shown some inflexibility in the application of the rule of 60 percent (of sub-project expenditures for wages). It has maintained that UCG was to identify and finance sub- projects with a high labor content. It also feared that a reduction in the percentage of labor costs would make too many solid waste urban sub-projects eligible for financing under EGP. F. Borrower Performance 35. Overall Borrower's performance is rated satisfactory. While the Borrower was actively involved in project preparation, subsequent administrations have reduced their support for the Project and its sustainability. 36. The Borrower's performance during project preparation is rated highly satisfactory. Upon its re-establishment in October 1994, the Constitutional Government mapped a coherent economic and social rehabilitation program to face the problems and challenges ahead. The Prime Minister's Office took a leading role in coordinating major donor emergency programs. To underscore the importance of emergency actions, it created the Central Implementation Unit (UCG) in December 1994 to ensure and supervise the implementation of the Economic Emergency Program and the EGP. The GOH expressed its request for assistance under EGP with a clear focus and high level of priority, fully supported and was actively involved in all phases of project preparation. 37. The Borrower's performance in implementing Part A of the Project is rated satisfactory. UCG showed adequate leadership in building on the previous JOBS Creation Project experience, in improving and adapting EGP's rules, procedures and standards to the new environment of the national post-embargo period and kept the employment generation component on track. Participation and involvement of central and local government authorities at all steps of sub- project cycle were routinely sought. UCG found it difficult to manage EGP under the 60/40 ratio ( labor content over materials and other costs) mandated per sub-project. Nonetheless, MDODs and most IOs demonstrated a high level of flexibility, creativity and professionalism in carrying out their respective contractual commitments and in meeting (when not exceeding) outcome delivery targets. Despite widened positive response at local levels, active support of key central administrations and sector line ministries never materialized. -9 - 38. The Borrower's performance in implementing Part B of the Project is rated satisfactory. After initial enthusiasm, the Borrower demonstrated hesitation and at times noticeable lack of interest and support for the main long-term options of the institutional development component as agreed during project preparation. As a result, the institutional development objectives were only partially met and the Project's sustainability remains uncertain. G. Assessment of Outcome 39. The ICR rates the overall outcome of this Project as highly satisfactory. UCG's evaluation of the outcome of the Project is included as Appendix B. In general, UCG also considers that the successful outcome of the employment generation component should be the defining factor of the overall evaluation. 40. The employment generation component (Part A), amounting to 92 percent of the Project is rated highly satisfactory for the following reasons: (i) the Project reached the ambitious job creation objectives; (ii) project funds benefited the poorest layers of the population and provided the highly-needed cash to stimulate recovery from the economic hardships during the international embargo; and (iii) rehabilitation of crucial productive, economic and basic infrastructure along with protection/conservation of environmentally degraded or threatened areas meet or exceed appraisal expectations in most cases. 41. An independent evaluation of EGP's economic impact indicates that the rehabilitation of irrigation schemes has provided most economic benefits to the country. The rehabilitation of roads and water supply showed also substantial return on investment. The returns on the construction of new roads were not evaluated as being important. Data lacked to carry out an economic evaluation of the soil conservation projects. 42. The outcome of the EGP's institutional development component (Part B) accounting for about five percent of the Project cost is rated satisfactory for the following reasons. (i) the managerial, administrative and operational capacities of UCG, selected central Government bodies, participating municipalities and CASECs, NGOs, various community organizations and small rural private enterprises were significantly enhanced; (ii) the Project has supported punctual operations, which may not always have been internally coherent, but which have mostly supported ongoing long-term strategic programs (such as UNDP's urban development program) which may prove to be vital to the country's development; and (iii) communities have received large numbers of tools and equipment redistributed to beneficiaries after EGP's completion which they will be able to use for the maintenance of the works and completion of other works. -10- H. Future Operation 43. Despite various recommendations on ways to connect EGP's immediate poverty alleviation objectives with long-term development assistance, GOH decided not to create an AGETIP. It is however strongly recommended that future Bank-financed operations be carried out using the private sector capacity created under EGP. 44. During a project closing seminar future actions to build on EGP's positive achievements have been reviewed and discussed. UCG and the UNDP-funded technical assistance project HAI/94/003 "Priority Assistance to Municipalities" carnied out by the United Nations Conference for Human Settlement (UNCHS-HABITAT) have expressed their intention to follow-up on a wide diffusion and "marketing" of the main studies carried out under EGP, specifically the seven urban development master plan outlines and the socio-economic studies. I. Key Lessons Learned 45. The lessons to be drawn from the implementation of this Project comprise the highly successful cooperation between private and public sector, eligibility criteria of sub-projects, participation by beneficiaries, project ownership, institutional development, and realism in establishing project objectives. The lessons include: (i) a partnership between public and private/non-governmental sectors can live up to tremendous challenges. NGOs have shown a substantial implementation capacity and drive, which the public sector cannot match. Future small infrastructure projects should take this experience into account and make use of this private implementation capacity; (ii) not all infrastructure rehabilitation sub-projects are suited for labor-intensive methods. Road construction and some other sub-projects requiring heavy-duty equipment need more capital inputs for satisfactory completion than were agreed upon under the 60- 40 percent rule for allocation of labor and capital expenditures. The type of sub-projects undertaken should be consistent with the type of resources available; (iii) extensive participation with beneficiaries and local authorities are necessary from the inception of sub-projects to ensure sustainable maintenance and operation. This often conflicts with the pressure to disburse and achieve quick results. Although tradeoffs are unavoidable, higher beneficiary contributions and participation in the sub-project design would have increased the likelihood of sub-project sustainability; (iv) the Bank and the Government are able to move very fast when supported by senior officials. Fast project preparation need not to diminish quality. Moreover, flexibility in procurement, disbursement and intense supervision have ensured successful implementation; and (v) more realism is needed about what can be achieved in terms of institutional development in a short time period and in an environment such as the one prevailing in Haiti in 1995-96. -11 - PART H -STATISTICAL TABLES Table 1: Sumrary of Assessments Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits Table 3: Project Timetable Table 4: Loan/Credit Disbursement: Cumulative Estimated and Actual Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Table 6: Studies Included in Project Table 7A: Project Cost Table 7B: Project Financing Table 8: Status of Legal Covenants Table 9: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Table 10: Bank Resources: Missions -12 - Table 1: Summary of Assessments A. Achievement of objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Applicable Macro policies X Sector policies X Financial objectives X Institutional development X__ Physical objectives _ Poverty reduction X Gender issues X Other social objectives X Environmental objectives X Public sector management X Private sector development X NGO involvement X B. Project sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain x C. Bank performance Highly Satisfactory Deficient _______ _______ _______ ______ Satisfactory_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Identification X Preparation Assistance X Appraisal X Supervision X D. Borrower performance Highly Satisfactory Deficient Satisfactory Preparation X Implementation X Covenant compliance X Operation (if applicable) E. Assessment of outcome Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfactory x -13 - Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits Loan/credit title Purpose Year of Status approval Preceding operations 1. Road Maintenance and Road maintenance and small 1995 Active Rehabilitation infrastructure 2. Economic and Social Fund Construction of Schools and 1991 Active Health facilities 3. Emergency Economic Structural Adjustment 1995 Active Recovery Following operations 1. Basic Rural Infrastructure Small Municipal 1996 Under Infrastructure preparation 2. Rural Development Project Research and small rural 1998 investments Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in project cycle Date planned Date actual/ latest estimates Identification (executive Project 5/95 5/95 Summary) __ -Preparation 5/95 5/95 Appraisal 5/95 5/95 Negotiation 6/95 6/95 Board presentation 7/95 7/95 Signing 7/95 7/95 Effectiveness 7/95 7/95 -Project completion 9/96 4/97 Loan closing 3/97 4/97 -14 - Table 4: Loan/Credit Disbursement: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US$ thousands) I FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 Appraisal estimate 36,000 14,000 -- Actual 31,354 15,068 Actual as % of estimate 87% 108% Date of final disbursement November 20, 1997 -15 - Table 5.A: Key Indicators for Project Implementation I. Key implementation indicators Estimated Actual in SAR/President's Report [ A. Employment Generation Component A-1. Job Creation -Jobs created (person-month) 487,000 475,691 -Of which women (person-months) 97,400 100,685 -Total wages paid (US$ millions) 27.0 22.0 -Daily wages paid (Gourdes) 36.0 36.0 A.2. Improvement of Infrastructure and Public Services -Road Rehabilitated (km) 1,100 763 -Irrigation Canals rehabilitated (km) 1,500 1,599 Sediment removed ('000 m 3 ) 1,800 1,816 -Urban Pollution Debris removed ('000 m 3 ) 200 177 Canals cleared (km) 66 59 Sediment removed ('000 M 3 ) 190 178 Streets cleaned (km) 300 442 -Soil and Water Conservation Land protected (ha) 8,000 13,000 Contour canals built (km) 700 2.010 Terrace and hedge rows (km) 300 2,268 Drywalls (km) 90 788 Gully plugs (km) 60 242 Trees planted ('000 trees) 1,000 2,946 Gabions (m 3 ) 2,600 13,043 -16 - Table 5.B: Key Indicators for Project Implementation (Continued) I. Key implementation indicators Estimated Actual in SAR/President's Report B. Institutional Development Component -Training number trained UCG 3 2 MDODs 4 3 lOs 90 135 People 11,000 15,700 -Technical Assistance number receiving TA UCG 22 13 lOs 450 135 Participating Communes 9 129 Participating Communal Sections 36 458 -Maintenance Plans developed (number) 45 22 Work undertaken by Communes/NGOs 54 30 II. Other indicators A. Employment Generation Component -Irrigation Areas with improved irrigation (ha) 62,000 -Urban pollution Street pavement (km) 15 -Soil and Water Conservation Ravines corrected (km) 600 -Water Supply Ditch excavation (km) 106 Pipe laying (km) 14 Standpost (unit) 192 B. Institutional Development Component TA for Ministries/ other administrations 8 Dump site plans developed 3 Urban development master plan outlines 7 -17- Table 6: Studies Included in Project Study Purpose as defined at | Status Impact of study appraisal/redefined 1. Economnic Evaluation of Calculate the economic benefits Study was Study will help Project Investments from labor intensive small scale completed at the GOH in planning projects to identify those end of the Project. for future projects that contribute most to employment the local economy; serve as projects, in input to GOH's strategy for particular with employment generation. respect to economic eligibility criteria 2. Strategy for Work Development of a maintenance Study not carried Maintenance strategy for rural roads that out would benefit from relevant national and international experience and be consistent with sector guidelines 3. Development of Long Term Assist GOH to develop and Study not carried AGETIP-type Institutional Strategies implement long term strategies out, but seminar approach for building local institutions took place awareness with capacities to manage and implement labor intensive investments (in the AGETIP model). 4. Review of Haiti's Public Identify main issues, bottlenecks Study not carried l Procurement Act and options in view Haiti's out development needs and that GOH could include in revised Act proposal to be submitted to Parliament. 5. Urban Development Studies Provide the selected Completed Studies will help for 7 secondary cities (Jacmel, municipalities with the municipalities in J&r6mie, Fort-Libert6, Hinche, appropriate planing and planing urban Gonaives, Miragodne, management tools in development Saint-Marc anticipation of future local works and development investments needs investments 6. Dump site certifications Identify potential and suitable Completed certified dump site studies for 4 municipalities dump sites and provide selected should help (Cap-Haitian, Gonaives, St.- municipalities with technical municipalities Marc, and Jacmel) assessments needed to get MDE achieve better solid certification waste management and environmental urban pollution control -18 - Table 7A: Project Cost Appraisal estimate Actualllatest estimate (US$ million) (US$ million) Item l Local Foreign Local Foreign costs costs Total costs costs Total A. Employment Generation Component 1. Soil Conservation 14.5 0.8 15.2 11.1 11.1 2. Road Rehabilitation 14.5 0.8 15.2 10.9 10.9 3. Irrigation Works 9.6 0.5 10.1 10.9 10.9 4. Waste Management 9.& 0.5 10.1 9.9 9.9 4.bis. Potable Water Supply - - 2.2 2.2 5. MDOD's Management 0.07 0.6 .7 -- 2.4 2.4 Subtotal Employment Gen. Comp. 48.2 3.1 51.4 45.0 2.4 47.4 B. Institutional Development 1.7 3.3 5.0 2.7 -- 2.7 Project Administration 1.5 -- 1.5 TOTAL PROJECT COSTS 49.9 6.4 56.4 49.2 2.4 51.6 Table 7B: Project Financing Appraisal estimate Actual/latest estimate (US$ million) (US$ million) Source ll Local | Foreign | Local Foreign J _________ costs costs Total costs costs lTotal |IBRD/IDA 43.6 6.4 50.0 44.0 2.4 46.4 Beneficiaries 6.4 -- 6.4 5.2 -- 5.2 TOTAL 50.0 6.4 56.4 49.2 2.4 51.6 -19- Table 8: Status of Legal Covenants HAITI Employment Generation Project, Cr. 2765-HA Agree- Section Covenant Present Original Revised Description of Covenant Comments ment Type Status fulfillment fulfillment l _ date date _ Credit 3.01a 5 C "Due diligence covenant." None 3.Olb 5 C Borrower shall ensure that the UCG carries None out the Project in accordance with the Operational Manual and the Quarterly Work __________ Programs. 3.01c 5 C The Borrower shall comply with its None obligations under the UCG Agreement. 3.01d 5 C The Borrower shall ensure that the UCG None complies with its obligations under any MDOD Agreement. 3.02 10 C Procurement shall be governed by the None l_________ ___________ provisions of Schedule 3. 3.03 10 NYD The Borrower shall furnish to the None Association, no later than six months after the Closing Date, a plan for future operation of the Project, and carry out the plan with due diligence taking into account the Association's comments. 3.04a 5 C The Borrower shall ensure that the UCG None will conduct the overall planning and monitoring of the Project; review and approve the proposals for Sub-projects; prepare program reports; oversee the carrying out of Sub-projects; undertake procurement; administer the withdrawals of the proceeds of the Credit related records, accounts and audits; and comply with the _ _ _ _ _ __ _ obligations relating to insurance. -20 - 3.04a 5 C use of goods and services, plans and None (continue schedules, record and reports, maintenance d) and land acquisitions. 3.04b 5 C The Borrower shall ensure that the UCG is None headed by an executive director assisted by staff in adequate numbers. 3.04c 5 C The Borrower shall ensure that the UCG None retains one or several MDODs under agreements containing terms and conditions satisfactory to the Association 3.05 9 C The Borrower shall ensure that the UCG: (a) Progress report received for the period maintains policies and procedures adequate ending 9/95,12/95, 3/96, 6/96, 9/96, to enable it monitor and evaluate the Project; 12/96, and 4/97. (b) not later than January 31, April 30, July 31 and October 31 of each year firnishes to the Association a report on the progress of the Project, with regard to the preceding quarters. 3.06a 9 C The Borrower shall cause the UCG: (i) to The report of the third half-yearly prepare no later than Nov. 30 and May 3 1 of evaluation has been issued and each year, a report integrating the results of submitted in 05/97. monitoring and evaluation activities; (ii) to review with the Association not later than December 31 and June 30 of each year, the corresponding reports and, after, take all measures required to ensure the efficient Project completion and achievement of objectives. 3.06b 9 C The report and the review scheduled for no The first, second, and third half-yearly later than November 30, 1995 and December reports discuss these points. 31, 1995, respectively wili include an assessment of the sustainability of the Project, and an evaluation of the Borrower's policy options with the respect to ._______ _________ __ ____ _______ _ _____employment generation programs. -21 - 3.07 10 C The UCG may propose to the Association, At UCG's request, a new category for for its review and approval, the financing of rural water supply has been approved. other activities that have a high labor content and positive impacts on the Borrower's economy, social development and environment. 3.08a 9 C No later than 30 days before the beginning ..... of each calendar quarter, the Borrower shall ensure that the UCG will furnish to the Association a proposed Quarterly Work Program. 3.08b 9 C 08/13/95 08/13/95 Not later than one month after the Effective The first MDOD Agreement with Date, the Borrower shall ensure that the PADF, was signed in 7/95. MDOD UCG will: (i) furnish to the Association a Agreements with CDS, CECI, and Quarterly Work Program including the CHF were signed in April 1996. remaining of the current quarter and subsequent quarters; (ii) enter into a MDOD Agreement providing for the execution of such Program. 3.08b 6 08/13/95 (iii) contract an enviromnental assessment Specialists recruited as of 04/95. (continue specialist of experience and qualifications d) satisfactory to the Association. 4.01 1 Soon The Borrower shall cause the UCG to The first, second, third and fourth maintain records and separate accounts in audit reports for the periods ending respect of the Project, have them audited; 9/95, 12/95, 3/96, 6/96 and 12/96 and furnish to the Association, not later than have been submitted. The fifth audit two months after the end of each quarter, the for the period ending with the Project report of such audit. closing in 4/97 is expected shortly. 4.02 1 The Borrower shall have the records and None accounts for the Special Account for each calendar quarter audited; and furnish to the Association, not later than two months after the end of each such quarter a copy of the report of such audit, including a separate opinion on statement of expenditure. -22 - Covenant Types: Present Status: 1 = Accounts/audits 8 = Indigenous people C = Covenant complied with 2 = Financial performance/revenue 9 = Monitoring, review, and reporting CD = Complied with after delay generation from beneficiaries 10 = Project implementation not CP = Complied with partially 3 = Flow and utilization of Project funds covered by categories 1-9 NC = Not complied with 4 = Counterpart funding 11 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral 5 = Management aspects of the budgetary or other resource Project or executing agency allocation 6 = Environmental covenants 12 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral policy/ 7 = Involuntary resettlement regulatory/institutional action 13 = Other -23 - Table 9: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs (US$ thousands) Planned Revised Actual Stage of Project Cycle _ Weeks |_US$ Weeks US$ Weeks __US$ Preparation to appraisal 4.1 22.4 4.1 76.1 Appraisal 8.6 27.7 8.6 27.7 Negotiation through 9.3 18.4. 5.3 18.4 Board approval Supervision 22 89.9 45* 150.1 Completion 9 23.1 2.3 18.6 TOTAL 53 181.50 65.3 290.9 (*): about 20 additional staff weeks were funded by trust funds Table 10: Bank Resources: Missions Performance rating Stage of Month Number Days Specialized Types of project cycle / of in staff skills problems year persons field represented (*) 11__ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ Implement J Developm ation ent status | objectives Through appraisal 05/95 8 80 | | | Appraisal through 5/95 8 32 -- -- -- Board approval 7/95 1 Supervision 8/95 2 6 PM,IE HS HS None 9/95 4 26 PM,IE, MA 1HS HS to 10195 5 47 PM,IE,E, 1HS HS if ES,EC 11/95 2 16 PM,IE HS HS of 01/96 2 16 PM,E HS HS of 03/96 2 12 PM,E S HS Delay 04/96 3 25 AE,PM,IE S S to 06/96 1 10 IE S S 08/96 1 12 IE S S 10/96 2 16 AE, IE S S 02/97 2 15 AE, IE HS S Completion 05/97 2 11 AE, IE I -- -- (*): about 120 additional days in field for IE were funded out of trust funds. AE = Senior Agricultural Economist IE = Rural Infrastructure Engineer EC = Economist MA = Municipal Analyst ES = Environmental Specialist PM = Portfolio Manager Appendix A: Mission Aide-Memoire 16 Mai 1997 HAITI PROJET DE CREATION D'EMPLOI (PCE) Cr. 2765-HA Mission de Supervision et de Preparation du Rapport d' Execution de Projet (ICR) du 12 au 17 Mai 1997 AIDE-MEMOIRE 1. Une mission de supervision de la Banque Mondiale, constituee de MM. Pierre Werbrouck, et L.M. Garry Charlier a seJourad en Haiti du 12 au 17 mai 1997. Des s6ances de travail ont eu lieu avec le Directeur Genesal de I'Uniti Centrale de Gestion (UCG) et ses collaborateurs, les responsables du Pan- American Development Foundation (PADF), du Centre Canadien d'Etudes et de Cooperation Internationale (CECI), des Centres pour le D&veloppement et la Sante (CDS), de la Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF), du PNUD/HABITAT. La mission a egalement participe au Seniinaire de Cloture du PCE tenu les 15 et 16 mai 1997. La mission remercie l'ensemble des autorites et responsables nationaux rencontres pour leur assistance et pour ces rencontres de travail tres productives. EVALUATION DES ACOUIS DU PROJET 2. La mission et l'UCG se sont accorddes sur les -points suivants: 2.1- Cr6ation d'EmRlois: le Projet a atteint d'une maniere hautement satisfaisante les objectifs de creation d'emplois temporaires: 469,290 personne-mois cr6ees au total (soit 96% des objectifs initiaux de 487,000 du SAR). 2.2- Travaux: Le projet a atteint d'une maniere satisfaisante les objectifs de rehabilitation de l'infrastructure severement deterioree du pays. Dans ce sens, le projet a realise 158 sous- projets dans le domaine de la rehabilitation de petits perimetres imrigues, conservation de sols, rehabilitation de routes rurales, assainissement urbain et adduction d'eau potable. En termes de quantitd, les objectifs ont ete largement depasses. La qualite de travaux a et en general satisfaisante, bien que leur durabilite demeure incertaine, particulierement du fait du manque de mise en place de dispositifs d'entretien pour la periode post-projet. 2.3- Renforcement Institutionnel: Le projet a partiellement realise les objectifs institutionnels vises. Les activites entreprises et les resultats atteints sont g6ndralement satisfaisants: a) le projet a donne une experience de travail a 135 organismes de base d'execution (OE), a finance la formation de cadres des mairies, des OE et des minist6res centraux; b) le projet a finance: i) un appui aux inunicipalites et aux conseils d'administration des sections communales (CASEC) comprenant des equipements, des fournitures de bureaux: et des etudes urbaines (schemas d'amenagement urbains, renforcement de la fiscalite municipale, etudes socio-economiques), ii) des dquipements aux Ministeres de l'Inte'neur, de l'Agriculture et des Travaux Publics, iii) la formation des cadres de ces ministeres et de certaines municipalites; c) le projet n'a pas atteint l'objectif de developper une strategie nationale a plus long terme en vue de favoriser la creation d'emplois dans les zones economiquement defavorisees, ni de creer une agence nationale de maitrise d'ouvrage deleguie (genre AGETIP) a meme de mettre en oeuvre une telle strategie. EVALUATION DE LA PERFORMANCE DE LA BANQUE MONDIALE (Par l'UCG) 3. Malgr6 la rapidite avec laquelle le Gouvernement et la Banque Mondiale (BM) ont prepar6 le proj et (2 mois), la performance de la BM a dte hautement satisfaisante dans l'identification, la preparation et evaluation du.projet. Pendant l'execution du projet, elle a appuye fortement le suivi de la mise en oeuvre du projet Cependant, elle s t est montrie inflexible quant a l'application de la regle de 60% du contenu de la main d'oeuvre dans chaque sous-projet. EVALUATION DE LA PERFORMANCE DE L'UCG ET MDOD 4. En ce qui a trait a la composante Creation d'Emplois, la performance de ITUCG et des MDOD a ete hautement satisfaisante. Quant a la composante institutionnelle, elle a demarre avec un important retard, ce qui a reduit le temps d'execution, la performance et la qualite de cette composante. Toutefois cette composante a ete bien appreciee par les instances beneficiaires. IMACT DU PROGRAMME 5. Le projet a eu divers impacts socio-economiques: creation d'emplois, avantages econorniques de l'arneIioration de l'infastructure et services de base, injection de numeraires dans les economnies locales, appui au renforcement de la capacited'une vingtaine de mairies, appui au processus d'organisation de la soci6te rurale, formation d'ouvriers specialises et developpement du secteur prive rniral. AUTRES APPORTS DU PCE 6. i) constitution d'un cadre methodologique sur les travaux a haute intensite de main d'oeuvre; ii) developpement d'une experience locale dans 1'6valuation environnementale de sous-projets; iii) renforcement de trois MDOD dont une haltienne; iv) constitution d'un reseau d'OE crddibles et competentes; v) distribution d'outils aux organismes locaux; vii) renforcement au Cap-Haitien de Ia capacite de production et de distribution de composte a partir du traitement d'ordures menageres (dont 70% d'origine organique). RAPPORTS 7. Les rapports suivants sont encore a recevoir de l'UCG: i) rapport technique et financier final; ii) rapport d'audit de fin de projet; iii) rapport final de l'etude economique du PCE; iv) rapport final sur la disposition des outils, materiels et vehicules; v) rapport d'ivaluation des formations (composante de Renforcement Institutionnel); vi) rapport final du PNUD/HABITAT. AUDIT 8. La mission a re,u le rapport d'audit couvrant la periode se terminant au 30 decembre 1996 et date du 24 janvier 1997. Ce rapport recommande un certain nombre d'amrliorations dans la gestion administrative des MDOD et de la documentation des depenses. Recommandation: Le rapport final d'audit devrait inclure: i) une opinion sur les etat financiers; ii) une opinion sur les comptes sp6ciaux; iii) une opinion sur les Etats de Depenses (SOE) prepares par l'UCG; et iv) urne opinion finale sur I'administration comptable du projet. RECUPERATION DES AVANCES SUR TRAVAUX 9. Un montant approximatif de US$541,000 (soit environ 1.3°% du montant de la composant de Creation d'Emplois) reste Ajustifier ou a etre recouvre par lUCG avant le 31 juillet 1997, date de cloture du compte du projet a Washington. L'UCG s'engage a recuperer les pieces justificatives des d6penses eligibles ou tout montant non justifie pour remboursement a l'IDA. S'il averait impossible de recup&er ces montants des OE, l'Emprunteur (en l'occurrence, le Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances), aura la responsabilitd de rembourser le dit montant a l'IDA tel que specifie dans l'Accord de Credit 2765-HA (Annexe 4, paragraphe 6). L'UCG revesera dgalement dans les meilleurs delais a l'IDA les reliquats rcouvrds des MDOD ainsi que les balances des comptes speciaux moins les depenses justifi6es. PROGRAMME FUTUR DU PROJET 10. En accord avec la section 3.03 de I'Accord de Credit, I'Emprunteur a organisd un seminaire de cl6ture de projet pendant lequel des actions futures potentielles ont etd revues et d6battues. Les representants de l'IDA ont formuld des commentaires sur ces plans d'action. Cependant les actions demandent des financements suppilmentaires qui ne sont pas encore disponibles. RAPPORT D'EXECUTION DE PROJET (ICR) 11. L'UCG a ete informe de ces obligations de contribuer a la preparation de ce rapport (ICR). Cette contribution prendra la forme d'un r6sumd de son rapport final et qui devra couvrir les points inum6res en annexe 1 ci-jointe. L'IDA prevoit la finalisation du ICR pour le 31 juillet 1997. Fait i Port-au-Prince, le 16 mai 1997 Pour 1'UCG: Pour la mission: Monsieur Paul Latortue, :nsieur Pierre Werbrouck Directeur General Task Manager Appendix B: Borrower's Comments BUREAU DU PREMIER MINISTRE Z>06 Cunflale de GssUo, Delmas 60, rue Mercier-Laham #30, Musseau -Tel: (509) 57-9258 /57-9281 1 57-9355 -Fax: (509) 57-9370 No. 3798 a No. 3798 ~~~~~~SCANNED FILE CCe~ Accesston No. IBo N-. jP , N 1DATEZi4 1 Vl1 I Loga* October 16th, 1997 'Acto I CC FILE (CoP"nnmeor at # LrYCr GNTp ESW CoIRg Adm Proc ETPA 415 i / ar G'6S Monsieur Pierre WERBROOK Chief of Section ESSD Latin American and Caribbean Region THE WORLD BANK 1818 h. Street N. W. Washington, D. C. 20433 U.S.A. Dear M. WERBROOK: At the UCG we have read the english version of the Implementation Completion Report (ICR ) dated september 15, 1997. In general, we concur with the facts, ideas and opinions found in the report. We have, however, three (3) comments: i) Contrarily to what was noted in p.12, we believe this project had a considerable stabilizing effect not only on the short term macroeconomic situation but also on the short term political environnement. An average of additional 35.000 jobs over an 18 month period is considerable. This is equivalent to the number of jobs in the government sector and a multiple of jobs in the export industry sector. In september and october 1996, the project had 62.000 jobs. This coincided with the start of the school year (october), which is always a difficult time financially for people in a country where most families are poor and most schools are private because of a lack of public funding for education at all levels. As the program approached its end and the number of jobs started reaching very low levels, the country entered a period of political instability from which it has not emerged yet. 2) Today, the need of this type of employment program is more widely recognized. Elected officials. especially, have now acknowledged the important role played by small projects of high labor content. A program with a labor content of 40% on the average will now find a secure ground of acceptance among a wide range of policy makers. Organisme autonome plac6 sous la tutelle du Premier Ministre P.VERBROOK October 16. 1997 Letter# 3798 Page 2 3) The loss of dollar revenue from the loan due to the change in the SDR exchange rate was a surprise for us at the end of the program. This affected the budget of institutional development. Cuts had to be introduced at the last minute. We recommend that steps be made at the Bank to avoid these kinds of surprises. We thank you on behalf of the UCG. r_ Cordi Ily yours, Paul R LATORTUE Executive Director Appendix C: Executive Summary of Borrower's Final Report RESUME EXECUTIF Le Programme de Creation d'Emplais (PCE! a e n6goci6 entre la Banque Mondiale et le Gouvernement Haitien au cours des mois de mai a juililet 1995 dans un contexte de recent retour a l'ordre constitutionnel et de la nbcessite d'une intervention d'urgence au benefice des couches les plus d6favoris6eS de la population suite a la grave crise politique qu'a vecue le pays durant les trois (3) ann6es precedentes. Le Programme, qui comprenait une Comrosante de Creation d'Emplois et uns Composante de Renforcement Institutionnel, poursuivait deux (2) grands objectifs: Creation de 487.000 ,personnes-mois d'emplois a travers notamment des travaux de rehabilitation de certaines infrastructures locales * Renforcement de la capacite de certaines administrations nationales, municipales et locales L'Unite Centrale de GeVtion (UCG) a 6t6 choisie par le Gouvernement Haitien comme Agent d'Ex6cution du Programme. La strategie generale de mise en oeuvre :u Programme repose sur l'utilisation des services de Maitres d'Ouvrage Delegues (MOOD) pour a reaiisation de certaines operations-clefs telles notamment la realisation des etudes des prc;ets, 1'encadrement des organismes charges de 1'ex6cution des projets ainsi que la supervision ies travaux. L'execution des projets est assuree par des Organismes d'Exbcution (OE) qui sont eni grande partie des groupements communautaires et des organisations d'aide au developpement. En tant qu'Agent d'Ex6cution du PCE, I'UCG est responsable de la planification et du suivi de ('ensemble du Programme. L'Accord de Credit 2765-HA relatif a i'execution du PCE a e signe entre la Banque Mondiale et le Gouvernement Haitien le 13 juillet 1995. Le premier projet du Programme a demarre physiquement sur le terrain le 18 septembre 1995. La fin officielle des activites du Programme est intervenue le 30 avril 1997. L'exbcution des projets generateurs d'emplois s'est en principe etendue sur une p6riode d'environ 15 mois. Au niveau de la Composante de Creation d'Emplois, les projaets du PCE refirent aux cirq (5) categories de travaux suivants: i) Rehabilitation de Petits Perimetres Irrigues; ii) Conservation des Sols et des Eaux; iii) Assainissement et adoquinage de rues en milieu urbain; iv) Re aration de pistes rurales; v) Rehabilitation et extension de petits systemes d'Adduction d'Eau Pozable. Ces categaries de travaux ont ete retenues en raison de leur potentialite aoccuper une main d'oeuvre abandante. De fait, 1'exigence fandamentale du PCE est que chaque prajet doit allouer au moins 60% de son budget au paiement de la main d'oeuvre non qualifiee. Le PCE a permis la mise en oeuvre de 158 petits projets d'inter§t communautaire au niveau des 9 departements gbagraphiques du pays. Environ 96 communes ont ete touchees par les interventions du Programme. Un nombre total de 135 OE ont participe a la mise en oeuvre des projets du PCE sous la supersion de 4 MOOD: la PADF, le CECI, la CHF et le COS. Au cours de la p6riode d'execution du Programme, une quantite globale de 475.691 personnes-mois ont e crHes. Cela sous-entend qu'avec seulement la mise en oeuvre du PCE, le Gouvernement a, pendant une periode de 15 mois, cree des emplois temporaires pour une moyenne mensuelle de 32.000 personnes. Les extrants physiques globales des 158 projets du PCE peuvent etre synthetises comme suit: Curage de plus 2.000 km de canaux d'irrigation, ameliorant ainsi la situation de la presence de 1'eau sur plus de 62.000 hectares dissemines dans les 9 departements g6ographiques. -Amenagement de 13.000 hectares de terre dans les bassins versants les plus d6grad6s et traitement de 600 km de ravines a travers le pays -Adoquinage de 13.5 km de rue dans 10 villes importantes du pays, enlevement de 272.600 m 3 de dechets solides et amenagement de 4 sites de decharge dans 4 principales villes de province. * Rparation d'enviran 700 km de routes tertiaires au niveau des villages, bourgs et communautes rurales. -Rehabilitationlextension de 18 petits systemes d'adduction d'eau potable au niveau de plusieurs villes secondaires, en milieu rural et meme au niveau d'un grand quartier populaire d'une importante ville de province. Au niveau de la Composante de Renforcement Institutionnel, le bilan global des rbalisations peut se resumer comme indique ci-apres: -Etudes urbaines au profit surtout des 9 chef-lieux de departement et des 5 Mairies de la Region Metropolitaine dans la perspective du developpement futur de ces communes -Support logistique aux MARNOR et aux TPTC et leurs representants en province dans le cadre de la decentralisation des services de l'Etat (mat&riel roulant, o.rdinateurs etc.) * Appui a la formation de cadres de l'Etat Central, de l'Etat regional et de l'Etat local sur les aspects modernes de gestion administrative, gestion comptable et gestion des projets de developpement. * Appui a la formation des Maires et des caissiers-payeurs des toutes les Mairies du pays. * Appui a la formation de 1373 membres de CASEC au niveau du pays tout entier. * Oistribution d'equipements (bureaux, chaises et autres) a tous les 565 CASEC du pays et 132 Mairies. * Appui a l'assainissement et a I'am6nagement des sites de decharge dans 4 villes principales du pays. * Recuparation des biens entre les mains des MOOD et distribution de ces biens a des organismes d'Etat. En addition aux travaux realises, I'un des plus grands m6rites du PCE a ete de faire arriver I'argent au niveau des couches sociales les plus desheritees. Apres tout, c'etait le principal objectif du Programme. Les budgets des projets executes accusent un montant global de l'ordre de 525 millions de gourdes. De ce montant, pres de 347 millions de gourdes (environ 67%) ont e depensees sous forms de salaires au b6ndfice de la main d'oeuvre non qualifiee. Selon une etude d'evaluation independante, I'argent recu par les beneficiaires directs a ete d6pens6e a 60% pour I'achat de biens de consommation (nourriture, habillement, sante, loyer...) et A 40% pour l'achat de biens d'investissement (education, outillage, animaux, commerce ...) L'ex6cution du PCE nous a permis de degager les lecons suivantes: i) 11 y a dans le pays une tres forte demande pour les travaux de creation d'emplois ii) Le PCE represente pour l'Etat un ban outil pour atteindre les coins les plus recules du pays. 11 est particulierement bien adapte pour attaquer les problimes lids a l'environnement (curage, conservation de sol et de l'eau, stabilisation de ravines, reboisement etc...) iii) Le concept de MOOD introduit dans le PCE est positif; car, il permet A l'Etat d'agir avec plus de ceierite tout en augmentant sa capacite de coordination et de supervision iv) Une supervision serree des travaux ainsi qu' une bonne integration des autorites locales et des elus locaux constituent deux facteurs-clefs du succs d'un programme de ce genre v) L'exigence d'allouer au moins 60% du budget de chaque projet a la main d'oeuvre non quaiifiee doit etre abandonnee. Une moyenne de 40% sur l'ensemble de I'enveloppe apparalt plus realiste. La reduction dans les emplois crees serait largement compens6e par une plus grande durabilite des travaux et un plus grand soutien aux communautes pauvres des villes. vi) Une animation bien orientbe est une nbcessitb d'une extreme importance pour un progamme de ce genre. vii) Dans le meme ordre d'id6es, le renforcement institutionnel s'av6re une composante absolument indispensable du PCE.. viii) L'enveloppe de 50 millions de dollars US a depenser sur une periode d'une annee est acceptable mais en augmentant le nombre de MOOD. ix) L'adoption des mairies comme OE a constitub une bonne expbrience: on aboutit a de tres bons rbsultats chaque fois que la mairie est aidbe par un comitb d'appui technique. x) Compte tenu du faible niveau de profit des projets du Programme, les firmes priv4es dprouvent de grandes difficultbs A opbrer comme OE. Le secteur prive a caractere social (ONG, Cooperative, Groupement Communautaire ...) presente des avantages comparatifs dans ce sens. 11 est possible cependant d'apporter des changements au Programme de facon a mener les taux de profits a un niveau normal at ainsi attirer les firmes privees succeptibles d'§tre des mains plus expertes. Compte tenu de la 6eme journbe de travail apportee sous forme de contribution volontaire (contre partie locale), 1'exbcution du Programme aura coutb globalement la somme approximative de 52.000.000 de US dollars. De ce montant global, environ 90% ont tet apportes par la Banque Mondiale au titre de l'Accord de Credit 2765-HA. Les 1 0% restants ont e pour leur part apportes par les organismes d'bxecution des projets et les bbnbficiaires directs des travaux sous ia forme de cette journee volontaire de travail par semaine. IBRD 27091 USA 7330 73200' 72E307 1207' @\. -20 001 .Ild lo To.- 2 0- PORT-DE-PAIX St L.- CUBA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC leon-Rotel HAITI ! 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