(2024-09) Panel of Experts - Rapò final Gwoup Ekspè sou Ayiti soumèt dapre rezolisyon 2700 (2023)

United Nations S/2024/704 Security Council Distr.: General 30 September 2024 Original: English 24-14855 (E) 071024 *2414855* Letter dated 30 September 2024 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) addressed to the President of the Security Council The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) have the honour to transmit herewith the final report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 20 of resolution 2700 (2023). The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti on 16 August 2024 and was considered by the Committee on 11 September 2024. The Panel would appreciate if the present letter and the final report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council. Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) S/2024/704 24-14855 2/144 Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2700 (2023) Summary Both the political and security dynamics in Haiti shifted significantly during the reporting period of November 2023 to August 2024. Following weeks of anti-government protests across the country, and in anticipation of the long-awaited deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission, gangs from the two opposing coalitions – G9 and G-Pèp – activated the Viv Ansanm alliance in February 2024 and launched a series of coordinated attacks in Port-au-Prince. The reporting period saw a spike in gang violence. Since late February, gangs – including those led by the five individuals currently included in the United Nations sanctions consolidated list – staged repeated assaults against government facilities and critical infrastructure, including seaports, airports and police stations, as well as banks, businesses and private property. The two largest prisons in the country were attacked in March, and more than 4,600 inmates escaped, some of whom joined the ranks of the gangs. The attacks have not only had a substantial humanitarian impact, killing many, displacing thousands and leaving parts of the population without access to basic commodities, but have also further crippled the economy and the financial sector. This extreme violence contributed to the announcement of the resignation of the Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, on 11 March, during a meeting facilitated by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which established a new road map for the political transition. Since then, despite challenges in building cohesion between Haitian stakeholders, several significant steps have been taken to implement transitional arrangements, including the formation of the Transitional Presidential Council, the appointment on 29 May of Garry Conille – a former Prime Minister and senior United Nations official – as the interim Prime Minister and the installation of the new Government on 12 June. Despite those advancements, gang violence has continued to plague Haiti. Several parts of the capital remain under attack, and, at the time of writing, gangs control about 85 per cent of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. Gangs actively continue to undermine the political transition, including by relentlessly targeting police and judicial facilities and personnel, in particular in the West and Artibonite departments, thereby impeding the restoration of State authority and the future organization of elections. Against that backdrop, self-defence groups have proliferated, leading to a notable rise in extrajudicial killings and mob lynchings. The establishment of the Transitional Government and the coinciding initial deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission in June, signal a potential revival of State control and a more effective and coordinated response to the violence. In reaction, although gangs have called for dialogue in the hope of securing an amnesty, they have violently demonstrated their opposition to the mission and to any threat to their hegemony. Aside from some infighting, six months on, the Viv Ansanm alliance still holds, and gangs have expanded their territories to increase revenue from kidnappings, extortion and drug trafficking. They have engaged in an active recruitment drive, in particular of children, strengthened the protection of their strongholds and stockpiled arms and ammunition. S/2024/704 3/144 24-14855 Despite the strengthening of the arms embargo measures, arms trafficking continues unabated, as evidenced by the high levels of armed violence in the country and the new materiel displayed by gangs. Gangs have been increasingly procuring larger calibre weapons, resulting in more damage and a posing greater challenge to the police and the mission. In response to the security vacuum, more civilians have been purchasing weapons, and some private security companies, as well as units of the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées, have continued to procure firearms illicitly, further fuelling trafficking dynamics. The Panel of Experts is looking into several regional trafficking trends, and the main routes previously reported remain the same. The effective enforcement of the arms embargo by Haiti and Member States from the wider region remains critical to achieving any decrease in armed violence in the country. Serious violations of human rights persist on a large scale with total impunity. Gangs continue to launch indiscriminate attacks against the population, killing, raping, torturing and kidnapping civilians, notably in the West and Artibonite departments. The surge in the numbers of internally displaced persons and their dire living conditions exacerbate the risk of women and girls becoming victims of sexual assault and exploitation. The Panel is particularly concerned about children being victims of forced recruitment, sexual violence and malnutrition, as well as the deprivation of access to education and health services. At the time of writing, about 600,000 people were displaced within the country and hundreds of thousands had fled abroad, including through smuggling networks tied to regional criminal organizations. With many children and young people out of school and universities, and skilled people fleeing, the future of the country is at stake. The recent crisis has exposed connections between the actions of the gangs and other armed actors and the actions of certain political, economic and security individuals, and the Panel is looking into the activities of several of them. In addition, weak security and governance continue to be exploited by cross-border trafficking networks, involving gang members, to smuggle large quantities of goods into the country on behalf of Haitian businesspeople who finance the gangs. This deprives the State of import taxes and facilitates the trafficking of arms and ammunition, as well as drugs, thereby fuelling armed violence. For Haitian interlocutors, the sanctioning of these actors, who continue to back the gangs and threaten the peace and security of Haiti in total impunity, is a major priority. With the revival of the political process and the deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission, it is a crucial moment for the sanctions regime to effectively support the stabilization of Haiti. S/2024/704 24-14855 4/144 Contents Page I. Introduction ................................ ................................ ... 5 A. Mandate ................................ ................................ .. 5 B. Methodology ................................ .............................. 5 C. Development of the United Nations sanctions regime on Haiti ..................... 6 D. Evolution of the security situation and the political track .......................... 6 II. Information relevant to the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 2653 (2022) and 2700 (2023) and the potential designation of individuals or entities who may have engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti ................................ ................................ ....... 8 A. Gang dynamics ................................ ............................ 8 B. Transnational organized crime dynamics ................................ ....... 15 C. Acts that violate international human rights law or that constitute human rights abuses ................................ ................................ .... 26 D. Illicit financial flows................................ ........................ 31 III. Recommendations ................................ .............................. 37 Annexes ................................ ................................ .............. 39 S/2024/704 5/144 24-14855 I. Introduction A. Mandate 1. On 19 October 2023, the Security Council adopted resolution 2700 (2023), in which it renewed the sanctions regime on Haiti consisting of an arms embargo, as well as a travel ban and an asset freeze against individuals and/or entities designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) as being responsible for, complicit in or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Haiti. Currently, the sanctions list includes the names of five individuals. 2. The Security Council extended, for a period of 13 months from the date of adoption of resolution 2700 (2023), the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 21 of resolution 2653 (2022), and further decided that this mandate should also apply with respect to the measures imposed under resolution 2700 (2023). 3. The present final report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 20 of resolution 2700 (2023) and covers investigations conducted up to 9 August 2024. The Panel provides details concerning some of its analyses in the annexes to the present report. B. Methodology 4. The Panel conducts its investigations in a professional and technical manner, adhering to the principles of transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence. The Panel’s methods were in full conformity with the best practices and methods, as recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). The Panel placed particular emphasis on transparency and the use of reliable sources, including documentary evidence, independent verifiable sources and the opportunity to reply (see annex 1). The Panel takes great care not to disclose identifying information, when necessary, in order to protect sources, given the extreme levels of insecurity in Haiti. 5. Following the publication of its final report in September 2023 (S/2023/674), the Panel and the Chair of the Committee received information volunteered by and about a range of actors cited in the report. The Panel reviewed the material and shared it, along with its observations, with the Committee. 6. Since its appointment in October 2023, the Panel conducted investigations in Haiti, as well as fact-finding missions in Belgium, the Dominican Republic, France, Jamaica, Honduras, Mexico and the United States of America and is grateful for the support it received from the respective national authorities, as well as from non-governmental actors. The Panel’s ability to conduct some field inquiries has been affected due to budgetary constraints, as well as the security situation in Haiti, which had deteriorated severely since March 2024. 7. The Panel welcomes the continuous collaboration it has received from the Haitian authorities. In Haiti, the Panel met with representatives of Haitian institutions, including the Haitian national police; customs, financial and anti-corruption units; representatives of the political and private sectors; civil society organizations; former gang members; individuals living in gang-controlled areas; and other victims of gang- related violence, including sexual and gender-based violence. 8. The Panel has sent a range of requests for information to Member States. The Panel would like to thank those Members States that have responded to its requests and further emphasizes the critical importance of that information in supporting its work (see table of correspondence in annex 2). S/2024/704 24-14855 6/144 Cooperation with other entities 9. In line with resolution 2700 (2023), the Panel has continued to cooperate positively with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), from which it has received great support. The Panel has also engaged with representatives of CARICOM, including from the Eminent Persons Group and the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, as well as the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The Panel also met with the leaders of the Multinational Security Support task force to give them a briefing on the Panel’s work and the sanctions regime and to establish channels of cooperation. 10. In line with paragraph 25 of resolution 2700 (2023), the Panel supported the Secretary-General in his assessment of the progress achieved on the key benchmarks established in paragraph 24 of the same resolution. C. Development of the United Nations sanctions regime on Haiti 11. Following the designation by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) of four individuals on 8 December 2023, the sanctions list is now composed of five gang leaders from the West department of Haiti. 1 While that decision sent a positive message, the effect of the sanctioning remains extremely limited as gang leaders and the activities of their criminal groups are not directly affected by the measures. All gang leaders are involved in arms trafficking and/or violations of the arms embargo. The Panel is also monitoring the implementation of the asset freeze and the travel ban on those individuals and is currently looking into reports of potential violations of the measures. 12. By significantly enlarging the scope of the arms embargo, from one that only targeted sanctioned individuals and entities to a territorial embargo, the Security Council has adopted a key measure to contribute to tackling arms and ammunition trafficking. However, enforcement of the embargo remains weak, with regular violations (see sect. II.B.1). 13. The renewal of the sanctions regime in October 2023 was perceived positively by most of the Haitian population, who strongly expect the sanctioning of additional actors, in particular those who back the gangs and those involved in arms trafficking. D. Evolution of the security situation and the political track 14. Following the announcement at the end of February 2024 by the Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, that elections would be held no later than 31 August 2025, gangs from the two opposite coalitions (G9 and G-Pèp), including those led by the five United Nations sanctioned individuals, announced their intention to topple the Prime Minister. They reactivated the Viv Ansanm (living together) alliance (see S/2024/253, annex 1) to carry out coordinated attacks against critical infrastructure (see sect. II.A). These attacks resulted in the deaths and displacement of large numbers of individuals and cut off critical supply lines for the population (see sect. II.C). 15. On 3 March, the Government declared a state of emergency, and, the following day, international flights were cancelled while gangs attacked the airport, which prevented the return of Mr. Henry to Haiti after a visit to Kenya. __________________ 1 See https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/materials/summaries. S/2024/704 7/144 24-14855 16. In reaction to this extreme outbreak of gang violence, on 11 March, CARICOM convened an urgent meeting in Kingston with Haitian stakeholders and international partners. The same day, Mr. Henry announced that he would resign upon the establishment of the Transitional Presidential Council and the naming of an interim Prime Minister. All parties present in Kingston agreed to establish a transitional political arrangement that would facilitate a peaceful transition of power through free and fair elections. 2 17. The 3 April political agreement for a peaceful and orderly transition adopted in Haiti 3 and the issuance of the executive order of 12 April by the Government 4 set out the composition and the role of the Transitional Presidential Council, which includes a wider range of stakeholders than any previous transitional agreements, with seven voting members from the principal political parties and sectors (Groupe Montana, Fanmi Lavalas, Pitit Desalin, RED/EDE/Compromis historique, the private sector group, the signatories of the agreement of 21 December 2022 and the Collectif des partis politiques du 30 janvier 2023) and two observing members drawn from civil society and interfaith groups. Only one woman was included in the Council as one of the two non-voting members. 18. Mr. Henry resigned as Prime Minister on 24 April, in anticipation of the installation of the Transitional Presidential Council the following day. Despite the difficulties the Council has been experiencing in reaching an agreement around internal decision-making mechanisms, significant steps have been taken, including the appointment on 30 May of Garry Conille, a former prime minister and former senior United Nations official, as interim Prime Minister and the installation of the new Government, on 12 June. 19. While the initial deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission in June provides critical support to the Haitian authorities in moving forward the transition towards restoring security and paving the way to national elections, the nomination of the members of the Provisional Electoral Council, the next key step of the transition, remains a challenge. Security challenges to the political transition 20. Gangs continue to deliberately undermine the political transition, including by relentlessly targeting facilities of the Haitian national police in the West and Artibonite departments, 5 thereby preventing the restoration of any State authority and security, a critical prerequisite for free and democratic elections. They have openly and violently declared their opposition to the Transitional Presidential Council and the Multinational Security Support mission (see sect. II.A.4). In anticipation of the deployment of the mission, gangs have engaged in an active recruitment drive (see sect. II.A), procured weapons and ammunition (see sect. II.B.1 and annex 24) and expanded their territories to secure more revenue and establish “retreat zones” (see sect. II.A.4). 21. The initial deployment on 25 June of the Multinational Security Support mission, with the arrival of 200 Kenyan police officers, was received very positively, but its precise objectives and scope remain unclear for most of the population, with __________________ 2 CARICOM, “Outcome declaration of CARICOM, international partners and Haitian stakeholders”, 11 March 2024. 3 Available at www.haitilibre.com/docs/accord-politique-pour-une-transition-pacifique-et- ordonnee.pdf. 4 Available at www.haitilibre.com/docs/Decret-portant-creation-du-Conseil-presidentiel-de- transition.pdf. 5 As at 30 June 2024, 74 Haitian national police stations were not operational. United Nations police data. S/2024/704 24-14855 8/144 many hoping that the mission will deploy outside of Port-au-Prince and in the Artibonite department, to recover gang-controlled territory. At the time of writing, Haitian interlocutors expressed concern that the mission had yet to show results. 22. The arrival of the Multinational Security Support mission, coinciding with the establishment of the Transitional Government, signals a potential return to governance and a more strategic and coordinated response to violence. In reaction, gang leaders have oscillated between shows of force and calls for dialogue in the hope of securing an amnesty. 23. Interlocutors of the Panel shared their concerns and challenges on the way forward in addressing the gang phenomenon. They noted that negotiations with violent criminal groups mostly motivated by pecuniary objectives are extremely sensitive and risky and could be perceived both as a sign of political recognition and the promotion of impunity. Conversely, a purely hard security approach will hinder the recovery of Haiti. They also highlighted that the judiciary and the prison systems (see sect. II.C and annex 32) do not have the capacity to process potential mass arrests of gang members and that the conception of any disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration and/or community violence reduction programming are very much at the embryonic stage. II. Information relevant to the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 2653 (2022) and 2700 (2023) and the potential designation of individuals or entities who may have engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti A. Gang dynamics 24. Over the course of the reporting period, gang dynamics have shifted significantly, with the two rival coalitions – G9 and G-Pèp – activating the Viv Ansanm alliance on 29 February 2024 to establish a common front against the Government (see annexes 3 and 4). Since late February, the capital has witnessed unprecedented levels of violence, with coordinated gang attacks against key government buildings and critical infrastructure (see annex 5 and sect. II.D.2). 25. The West and Artibonite departments continue to be plagued by alarming levels of violence. In the West department, gangs have targeted communes such as Cité Soleil, Delmas, Tabarre, Port-au-Prince and Croix-des-Bouquets. They also expanded their control on the outskirts of the capital, notably over southern (Carrefour, Gressier and Léogâne), eastern (Ganthier) and northern (Cabaret and Arcahaie) communes, ahead of the commencement of the Multinational Security Support mission’s operations, to increase revenue. An estimated 85 per cent of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area is currently under gang influence and control (see annex 6). 6 __________________ 6 Interviews with gang analysts, June and July 2024. For definition of areas of gang control and areas of influence, see S/2023/674. S/2024/704 9/144 24-14855 Source: BINUH quarterly report on the human rights situation, April–June 2024. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 26. The lives of the inhabitants of the entire capital have been deeply affected by gang violence, hampering the functioning of vital sectors, including security, education, health, culture and transport. In the Artibonite department, the increased number of kidnappings, rapes, hijacking of trucks and killings 7 (see sect. II.C) have prompted renewed calls for the urgent deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission to the area. 8 Against that backdrop, self-defence groups have multiplied, as well as extrajudicial killings, including of minors, and mob lynchings. 27. The five sanctioned individuals continue to head the main gangs in Haiti, with 5 Segond, led by Johnson André (alias “Izo” – HTi.002) and Grand Ravine, led by Renel Destina (alias “Ti Lapli” – HTi.003), currently the strongest in terms of territorial control, headcount, firepower and revenue. While he might be the most notorious and vocal gang leader (see sect. II.A), Jimmy Chérizier (alias “Barbeque” – HTi.001) is not the most powerful. He has lost considerable influence over the G9 coalition (see annex 7), with his Delmas 6 gang weakened by ongoing police operations and loss of revenue. Of note, Viv Ansanm looted most of the businesses in Bas Delmas that used to pay Barbeque money in exchange for “security”. 9 28. Meanwhile, the Kraze Barye gang has been less prominent, weakened by the multiple clashes with an offshoot of the gang, led by “Didi”, who was killed in May 2024, who had opposed the gang’s leader, Vitelhomme Innocent (HTi.005). The gang was also weakened by several police operations. Kraze Barye has received support from the 5 Segond and Canaan gangs. The latter, led by Jeff Larose (alias “Jeff”), has grown in importance largely due to its closeness to 5 Segond and by the fact that the Canaan area was spared from Viv Ansanm attacks and police operations. In turn, the 400 Mawozo gang, headed by Joseph Wilson (alias “Lanmo San Jou” – HTi 004), has __________________ 7 Interviews with gang analysts and civil society representatives, June and July 2024. 8 United Nations police report, July 2024. 9 Interviews with gang analysts, May 2024 and United Nations confidential report, May 2024. S/2024/704 24-14855 10/144 strengthened its fighting capacity and boosted its revenue, in particular by extorting trucks carrying goods to and from the Dominican Republic (see annex 8). 10 1. Gang violence in downtown Port-au-Prince and nearby areas 29. As the capital’s main administrative, financial and commercial district, the Port- au-Prince downtown area has always been at the centre of gangs’ expansionary ambitions. Since late February 2024, the area had turned into a battlefield. Several strategic checkpoints were recently established from where gang members could keep watch and disrupt police operations, with snipers shooting from the tops of vandalized buildings. 11 For instance, gang members from 5 Segond and Grand Ravine opened fire, disrupting both visits of the interim Prime Minister to the country’s largest hospital after it was liberated in early July 2024 from gang control. 12 30. Over the course of the reporting period, the 5 Segond and Grand Ravine gangs – which in 2022 had started to move towards southern downtown – aggressively expanded into the areas surrounding the National Palace. Meanwhile, northern downtown has been under the control of the Krache Dife, Les Argentins and La Saline gangs since 2021. The area has been strategic for revenue collection through extortion, truck hijackings and the theft of goods, and kidnapping. Its proximity to the national port authority 13 also places it in a favourable location for drug trafficking activities (see S/2024/253). 14 31. The political aspirations of Viv Ansanm came to light through its support to Guy Philippe and anti-government stance (see S/2024/253). As the takeover of the National Palace would be a symbolic blow to Haiti, Viv Ansanm has launched at least 10 major attacks against the Palace since early March 2024. The offensives were backed by Dimitri Hérard, the former head of the National Palace General Security Unit from 2017 to 2021, who was imprisoned for his alleged involvement in the 2021 assassination of former president Jovenel Moïse (see annex 9) and escaped from prison together with 4,600 inmates in March 2024. Mr. Hérard tried to encourage others to shoot the security officers who were resisting the attacks and was in league with Guy Philippe, who reportedly tried to bribe police officers to allow the gangs into the Palace. 15 32. In a move to disrupt the political transition, Viv Ansanm also repeatedly attacked, inter alia, the Ministries of Justice, Defence and the Interior, the former building of the Cour supérieure des comptes et du contentieux administratif and the general hospital, as well as Haitian national police units, including the Unité départementale de maintien d’ordre and the Port-au-Prince police station. 16 In a nearby neighbourhood, Les Argentins (also known as the Bel Air gang), led by Kempes Sanon, repeatedly attempted to seize control of the Brigade of Operation and Departmental Intervention, strategically located high up in the national fort, which would enable the gang to control large parts of downtown. 17 __________________ 10 Interviews with national and international gang analysts, Haitian national police officers and individuals living in gang-controlled areas, 2024. 11 Interviews with a gang analyst and a Haitian national police officer, June and July 2024. 12 United Nations police report, July 2024 and interview with a gang analyst, a Haitian national police officer and a government representative working on anti-gang operations, July 2024. 13 The government authority that manages all of the country’s seaports. See https://www.mef.gouv.ht/directions/og_autonomes. 14 Interviews with a gang analyst and a government representative working on gang-related issues, June and July 2024. 15 Interviews with confidential sources, June and July 2024. 16 Interviews with Haitian national police officers and a gang analyst, July 2024. 17 Interview with a government representative working on gang-related issues, June 2024. S/2024/704 11/144 24-14855 33. In the neighbouring Solino, since February 2024, Barbeque has joined hands with his former rival, Kempes Sanon, to intensify raids to gain access to strategic routes connecting their territories to other areas and benefit from diversified streams of revenue (see S/2023/674). Gangs have clashed with the Solino self-defence group, leading to several casualties (see annex 10). In the past, Barbeque enjoyed some kind of informal arrangement with certain police officers in Solino. However, consistent attacks by Viv Ansanm against police premises and residences, as well as Haitian national police operations against Barbeque’s stronghold, have contributed to undermining that relationship. 18 As a reaction to the increased police pressure, on 9 June, Barbeque claimed responsibility for an attack in which three officers of the anti-gang tactical unit of the Haitian national police were killed as they were patrolling in lower Delmas (see annex 11). Barbeque blamed the officers for entering the area in a private capacity to support the Solino self-defence group. 19 2. Expansion over southern West department 34. Gangs have sought to expand their territories to increase revenue from kidnapping, extortion, drug trafficking and illegal tolls along route RN2, which connects the capital to the south. Ahead of the commencement of Multinational Security Support mission operations, control over southern communes of the West department provide gangs with rear bases and corridors to other departments (see annex 12). 20 35. Grand Ravine’s cell in Mariani, set up in the Carrefour commune in late 2023 (see S/2024/253), received reinforcements from the 103 Zombie group, led by Charlemagne Dorin (alias “Ti Bebe Bougòy”), to extend Grand Ravine’s control over the neighbouring Gressier commune. 21 Additional illegal tolls were established, and brutal gang violence broke out in May 2024. At least 25 civilians were killed between 28 June and 1 July 2024, 22 and the police lost control of the Gressier police station on 7 July 2024. 36. The southern communes of Léogâne, Grand Goave and Petit Goave are currently under threat from gang incursion. On 20 July, the 103 Zombie group published a video showing that they had entered Laferronay, a locality in the Léogâne commune, bordering the Gressier commune. Its mountainous terrain could serve as a strategic rear base for gang members, as the Police can only gain access to such areas using aerial capacity. In response, the population of the commune of Léogâne erected barricades to prevent further gang infiltration. 37. Since February 2024, the Ti Bwa gang, led by Christ-Roi Chery (alias “Chrisla”), has taken control of the Carrefour commune. There has been no police presence in the area since mid-May 2024, when two police stations were attacked. 38. As a result of gang violence in the Carrefour and Gressier communes, at least 233 individuals, including gang members and civilians, were killed or injured from April to June 2024. 23 __________________ 18 Interviews with a gang analyst and a government representative working on gang-related issues, June and July 2024. 19 Video on file with the Panel. 20 United Nations confidential report; and interview with gang analysts and Haitian national police officers, May, June and July 2024. 21 United Nations confidential document; and interviews with gang analysts and Haitian national police officers, July 2024. 22 United Nations data, May and July 2024. 23 United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, “Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti”, April–June 2024. S/2024/704 24-14855 12/144 3. Continued gang violence in the Artibonite department 39. Gran Grif, led by Luckson Elan, and Kokorat San Ras, led by Ferdens Tilus (alias “Meyer”), 24 continued to spread violence in the Artibonite department, including in the northern communes, which had been previously spared from violence (see annexes 13 to 15). 25 In a bid to expand territorial control, Kokorat San Ras attacked the commune of Terre Neuve for the first time in mid-June 2024, killing 11 civilians. The gang set up a new cell in Mapou Lagond, l’Estère commune, in January 2024. 40. The above-mentioned gangs are closely connected to the Viv Ansanm gangs that operate in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, notably G-Pèp. During the reporting period, they carried out indiscriminate killings, burned houses and attacked police stations. For example, on 11 January 2024, a man was murdered and dismembered after resisting Gran Grif assaults. Kidnappings are at alarming levels (see annex 33). On 18 February, Kokorat San Ras kidnapped 20 passengers travelling in the Gros Morne commune and demanded US $3,500 to return the bus, besides the ransom for passengers. Hostages are often tortured and killed if a ransom is not paid. In addition, gangs repeatedly loot farmland and steal livestock. In response, self-defence groups have continued to execute individuals allegedly associated with the gangs or suspected of common crimes. 26 41. Despite a warrant issued for the arrest of Youri Latortue in January 2024 for charges related to murder, criminal conspiracy and forgery, he continues to use the Raboteau and Kokorat San Ras gangs to exert control over Gonaïves and the wider Artibonite region with total impunity. Latortue has been using “National Security”, his private security company, to acquire firearms and has been providing materiel to gang members. 27 42. Police and judiciary facilities and personnel in the Artibonite region continue to be under threat by gangs and their backers (see S/2023/674). In early February, during anti-government demonstrations in support of Guy Philippe, members of Raboteau and Kokorat San Ras ransacked the courthouse. Members of the two gangs met with Guy Philippe, accompanied by armed agents of the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées, ahead of the demonstrations in Gonaïves. On that occasion, a number of weapons were distributed under the guise of recruiting Brigade agents. 28 Of note, some agents – who are required to possess a firearm – actively participated in anti-government demonstrations in support of Guy Philippe (see annex 26). 4. Strategy against Multinational Security Support mission operations 43. Gangs have largely concentrated their efforts on strengthening the protection of their zones in order to prevent security forces from entering, including by digging trenches and erecting barricades along the points of access to their strongholds and employing scouts and drones to track police movements. Within their zones, they have placed gas cylinders and prepared Molotov cocktails to use against police during __________________ 24 These individuals were recently sanctioned by Canada. See Canada, Global Affairs, “Canada imposes sanctions against Haitian gang leaders”, 21 June 2024. 25 BINUH, “Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti”. 26 United Nations confidential reports, 2024 and interviews with civil society representatives, June and July 2024. 27 Information provided by a Member State and interviews with confidential sources, 2024. 28 Interviews with confidential sources, January and February 2024. S/2024/704 13/144 24-14855 operations. To intimidate security forces, gangs have broadcast videos showing the weapons and ammunition that they have recently acquired (see annex 16). 29 44. Some gang members have either fled Port-au-Prince or relocated to hard-to- reach areas with a view both to creating new bases and increasing criminal revenue. While Grand Ravine has moved towards the southern communes of the West department (see sect. II.A.2), the 400 Mawozo gang has led brutal attacks over the eastern commune of Ganthier. 30 After the release of a video in which Lanmo San Jou (HTi.004) boasted about the new acquisition of weapons and ammunition (see annex 17), the gang took over the town of Ganthier, during a major attack on 21 July. Several properties were set on fire, including the town police station, which was further destroyed on 25 July. A new gang cell was set up, and Lanmo San Jou announced, on 28 July, that Fond-Parisien, a communal section of Ganthier, would be the gang’s next target. 31 Its aim is to take total control over route RN8 to extort drivers moving between Croix-des-Bouquets and Malpasse, on the border with the Dominican Republic, and to facilitate the smuggling of weapons, ammunition and other contraband across the porous Haitian border (see sect. II.D.3). 32 Of note, with Viv Ansanm, illegal tolls have multiplied not only along the main roads connecting Port-au-Prince to other areas, but also on secondary roads and streets in several neighbourhoods of the metropolitan area. 33 In the northern communes of the capital, the 5 Segond and Cannan gangs killed at least 10 people and burned several houses during attacks against the Arcahaïe and Cabaret communes on 6 August, in a bid to extend control along the Port-au-Prince bay area, presumably to facilitate the movement of drugs and access to other areas. 45. The fear of gangs extending their areas of control has triggered the spreading of messages on social networks encouraging the population to acquire machetes to undertake acts of mob justice against Viv Ansanm members (see annex 18). Acts of lynching are likely to increase, exacerbating community violence. 34 46. Gang leaders are using the population as human shields, including for potential upcoming anti-gang operations (see sect. II.C.3). They have organized cash handouts to ensure residents stay, 35 forbidden the population from leaving and even forced residents to remain in the houses they have invaded, in order to merge with the population. 36 Women and children have been installed at the entrances of gang zones to serve as a protective buffer during police operations. 37 On 24 July 2024, gangs in Cité Soleil commune, such as Belekou, Boston and Brooklyn, announced a peace pledge and dismantled the barriers separating their respective areas that had been __________________ 29 Interviews with international and national gang analysts, a Haitian national police officer, a government representative working in anti-gang operations, and an individual living in gang- controlled area, 2024. 30 400 Mawozo started launching attacks over the neighbouring areas of Croix-des-Bouquets commune, which the gang controls, to expand territory and increase revenue. After taking over the control of these areas and some sections of Thomazeau commune, in early October 2023, the gang started progressing over Ganthier commune, launching a deadly attack late November 2023, and has intensified its offensives since January 2024. 31 Video on file with the Panel. 32 Interview with a gang analyst, July 2024. See also, Jacqueline Charles, “What a gang attack in a rural Haiti town says about the Kenya-led security mission”, Miami Herald, 26 July 2024. 33 Interview with a representative of the transport sector, July 2024. 34 United Nations confidential report, June 2024; and interviews with international and national gang analysts and an individual living in gang-controlled area, 2024. 35 Interviews with gang analysts and an individual living in gang-controlled area, May 2024. 36 Interview with a political analyst, July 2024. 37 United Nations confidential report, May 2024; and interview with an individual living in gang- controlled area July 2024. S/2024/704 24-14855 14/144 restricting the movements of the population (see annex 18), reportedly to evade police operations by pretending to be civilians. 47. Gangs have also bolstered their ranks – to an estimated 5,500 members (see annex 4) – mainly with children, aiming at leveraging potential incidents against them to undermine the presence of the Multinational Security Support mission. 38 Children have taken part in attacks, including as scouts, by carrying weapons and ammunition and even participating in combat. 39 Of note, the current Grand Ravine leaders in Mariani (Bout Ba) and Gressier (Ti Bebe Bougoy) were recruited as children about 10 years ago, indicating that today’s recruits are likely to become the gang leaders of tomorrow. 40 48. In addition, escapees from the recent mass jailbreaks have added new skills to the gangs they have joined. For instance, Dimitri Hérard sought refuge in 5 Segond’s zone and helped organize, train and advise gang members on strategies for the coordinated attacks. He facilitated the acquisition of the firearms that were on display in the propaganda video of the so-called “Unité village de dieu” (see annex 24). 41 Alongside his involvement in drug trafficking, he also provides Izo with connections to large criminal organizations in the region. 42 49. Despite the increased levels of criminality and human rights abuses, Viv Ansanm gangs have stepped up their demands for dialogue and media presence, likely with the aim of improving their public image and articulating opportunistic social and political narratives to justify their violence. In the light of the announcement by the Government that firm action would be taken to regain gang-controlled areas, as well as changes in leadership in the Haitian national police and the deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission, gangs are motivated by the opportunity to secure an amnesty rather than pursuing genuine political aspirations. 43 50. The failure by Viv Ansanm to install Guy Philippe as head of the transition dashed any previous hopes of amnesty, despite the recurrent attacks against the National Palace (see sect. II.A.1). 44 In that context, on 25 June, the same day that Kenyan troops arrived in Port-au-Prince, Barbeque (HTi.001) – as the Viv Ansanm spokesperson – called for talks with the Prime Minister “as a first step to restoring peace in the country”. On 28 June, the interim Prime Minister urged gangs first to halt criminal activities, lay down arms and recognize the authority of the State before any other arrangement is made. 45 51. Despite their plea for talks, gangs continue their criminal activities, with violence at a record high. On 28 June, Barbeque showed up surrounded by armed __________________ 38 Interviews with government representatives, Haitian national police officers, national and international gang analysts, and an individual living in gang-controlled area, 2024. 39 Interview with an individual living in gang-controlled area, June 2024. See also, Jérôme Wendy Norestyl, “Ma vie comme enfant membre de 5 Segonn au Village de Dieu”, 16 June 2024. 40 Interviews with a gang analyst and an individual living in gang-controlled area, June and July 2024. 41 Interviews with confidential sources, 2024. 42 Interviews with gang analysts, Haitian national police officers, an individual living in gang- controlled area, and a representative of a Member State. See also, Maria Abi-Abib, “Haiti’s gangs grow stronger as Kenyan-led force prepares to deploy”, New York Times, 21 May 2024. 43 Interviews with international and national gang analysts, individuals living in gang-controlled areas, a Haitian national police officer and a representative of a Member State, 2024. 44 Interviews with gang analysts, individuals living in gang-controlled areas, Haitian national police officers and a government representative working on gang-related issues, 2024. See also, Stephen Eisenhammer, “Exclusive: Haiti ex-coup leader Guy Philippe demands PM resign, wants presidency”, Reuters, 8 May 2024. 45 United Nations confidential documents, June 2024. S/2024/704 15/144 24-14855 men, stating his readiness to fight the international mission. 46 Izo (HTi.002) has also posted on social media drone images of the Multinational Security Support mission’s patrols that started in July, in an apparent attempt to intimidate them (see annex 16). 52. The activation of the Viv Ansanm coalition demonstrates an evolution in gangs’ abilities to define, coordinate and operationalize strategies according to their agendas. The key role they played in the ousting of Mr. Henry is illustrative of this. Regaining gang-held areas will be a significant challenge for the new Government supported by the Multinational Security Support mission, but also a necessary step in the path to elections. B. Transnational organized crime dynamics 1. Violations of the arms embargo and domestic arms trafficking 53. Arms trafficking continues unabated, as evidenced by the high levels of armed violence in the country and the new materiel displayed by gangs. As a result of the security vacuum, a range of informal security provisions also fuel demand for weapons. This includes civilians increasingly trying to ensure their own security, as well as the use of private security companies and the multiplication across the country of units of the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées, which are not under the control of the Government (see below). 54. The Panel has been investigating multiple cases of trafficking from the United States, the Dominican Republic and South America, with the United States remaining the main source of illicit arms and ammunition in Haiti (see S/2023/674). (a) Transnational trafficking trends (i) Trafficking from the United States a. Trafficking by sea 55. Trafficking from the United States to Haiti is not a sophisticated process. Small trafficking networks are numerous and often based on family and social connections. The Panel has been investigating cases where gang leaders have either relied on accomplices in the United States or pressurized Haitian nationals originally from their neighbourhoods and now living in the United States to facilitate the acquisition and transfer of materiel. 56. Methods generally include the purchase of firearms by straw buyers and the concealment of limited quantities of materiel to avoid detection, including disassembled firearms, among piles of goods stacked in overpacked containers or break-bulk vessels (see S/2023/674, annex 29). In April, 26 firearms and 999 rounds of ammunition were seized in Cap-Haïtien, Nord department. This was the largest seizure of firearms intercepted at any port of entry in Haiti since the establishment of the arms embargo (see annex 21). Despite being brought into the country in small quantities, this recurrent “ant trafficking” quickly builds up, leaving the country awash with weapons. 57. Trafficking routes from the United States have shifted over the course of the reporting period due to the near cessation of activity at the main seaports in the capital since early March 2024, with seizures made exclusively in Cap-Haïtien. While Miami was the port of departure for most seizures previously reported by the Panel, all those conducted during the reporting period originated from Port Everglades, Florida, where some shipping lines provide services to Cap-Haïtien. The Panel visited Miami __________________ 46 Video on file with the Panel. S/2024/704 24-14855 16/144 and Port Everglades in June 2024 and spoke to a range of actors to better understand trafficking trends. 58. No seizures were reported from the Miami River during the reporting period (see S/2023/674, annex 29, for past seizures). This could be explained by the increased controls in Miami and the fact that only a very small number of shipyards are currently operating on the river. b. Trafficking by air 59. Evidence of trafficking by air from the United States is rare (see annex 21) but the Panel continues to investigate several leads. In May 2022, a seizure was made by the United States authorities of ammunition recovered from a private aircraft heading from Florida to Haiti. 47 The Panel has requested more information about this case. 60. The presence of multiple informal or clandestine airstrips in Haiti presents a real opportunity for traffickers, and these, along with flights operated by private aircraft, should be scrutinized (See S/2024/79, paras. 18–19). However, the limited aerial surveillance and capability of the Haitian security agencies prevents effective monitoring of the situation by the authorities. c. Outbound seizures from the United States 61. The Panel already highlighted some of the main loopholes exploited by traffickers in its previous final report (S/2023/674). As arms control experts further explained to the Panel, due to limited controls over the acquisition and possession of firearms in the United States, their purchase by malign actors, including straw-buyers, is very difficult to prevent or detect. Prosecuting traffickers and preventing illicit exports therefore provide the main starting points for combating transnational arms trafficking. 62. With regard to export controls, although increased resource-intensive searches are being applied for containers or break-bulk vessels travelling from South Florida to Haiti, 48 very few seizures were made between June 2023 and July 2024. These included some handguns and several rifles, as well as limited quantities of ammunition 49 (see annex 21). The vast majority of the 200 containers heading from South Florida to Haiti every week are not inspected, and trafficking continues. In addition, the use of freight forwarders for shipping allows traffickers to take advantage of a loosely regulated activity (see S/2023/674, annex 29). It is crucial to strengthen controls on outbound shipments for Haiti in order for the arms embargo to be more effective. __________________ 47 Data provided by United States Customs and Border Protection, 2024. 48 Interviews with a shipping line, a freight forwarder and a law enforcement officer, Florida, June 2024. 49 Interviews with a law enforcement officer and a confidential source, June and July 2024; and data obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request to United States Customs and Border Protection. S/2024/704 17/144 24-14855 d. Inbound seizures in Haiti from the United States Table 1 Cases of inbound seizures in Haiti from the United States Date Location/provenance Mode of transport Materiel 2 December 2023 Toussaint Louverture Airport from New York Commercial flight 265 rounds of ammunition 22 December 2023 Cap-Haïtien from Port Everglades Commercial vessel One 9mm handgun One 5.56x45mm rifle 179 rounds of ammunition 5 April 2024 Cap-Haïtien from Port Everglades Commercial vessel Nine 5.56x45mm rifles Three 7.62x39mm rifles 14 handguns 999 rounds of ammunition (7.62x39mm, 5.56x45mm, .40 S&W, 9x19mm) 29 April 2024 Cap-Haïtien from Port Everglades Commercial vessel Two handguns 13 rounds of ammunition 11 June 2024 Cap-Haïtien from Port Everglades Commercial vessel Conversion kit 150 rounds of ammunition 63. The Panel is in the process of investigating the various cases listed above (see annexes 22 and 23). In the course of its investigations, it interviewed law enforcement, customs and judicial officers, as well as representatives of shipping lines and freight forwarders. Since January, the Panel has issued 49 tracing requests to the United States authorities for details on firearms seized either from gang members or at ports of entry in Haiti for it to have a greater understanding of the chains of custody and identify the trafficking networks involved. At the time of writing, responses were still pending. In July, the Panel also submitted a request to the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain data about traces of firearms recovered in Haiti. The request was not granted. 64. Although seizures of materiel help to build an understanding of the profiles and modus operandi of some traffickers, their limited numbers reflect neither the levels of illicit weapons and ammunition entering Haiti in violation of the arms embargo nor the full range of channels through which traffickers bring weapons to Haiti. Discussions with senior Haitian customs and police officers indicate that a better enforcement of the arms embargo in the country requires an improvement of the security situation, which would make it possible to deploy units to all ports of entry, increase detection and investigation capabilities and fight corruption within border control agencies. (ii) Trafficking from the Dominican Republic 65. Gangs, as well as civilians and Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées agents (see annex 26), continue to procure illicitly firearms but primarily ammunition S/2024/704 24-14855 18/144 from the Dominican Republic (see annex 22 for details about seizures, and sect. II.D.3) despite the efforts of the Dominican authorities to curb arms trafficking into their country. From November 2023 to June 2024, 94 firearms and 571,798 rounds of ammunition were seized at Dominican ports of entry, 97.8 per cent of which came from the United States and 2.2 per cent from Europe and the Caribbean. 50 66. Although a number of past cases indicate that some limited materiel is trans-shipped directly through the Dominican Republic for end users in Haiti (see S/2023/674), most of the cases investigated by the Panel indicate that Haitian networks are procuring materiel from the quantities already circulating illegally in the Dominican Republic. (iii) Trafficking from South America 67. On 30 April, the President of Colombia made a public declaration about significant diversions of ammunition from Colombian Army stockpiles and mentioned that it was likely that some missing items had gone to Haiti. 51 Following a request for information by the Panel in May, the Colombian authorities responded that, after carrying out investigations, to date they were unable to corroborate the possible diversion of weapons and ammunition to Haiti. 52 68. In 2023, several AK-pattern rifles recovered in Haiti were traced back to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 53 Those rifles had been either brought into Haiti along with drugs or trafficked from the Dominican Republic, where recent seizures yielded weapons originating from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 54 The Panel has contacted the Venezuelan authorities to seek further information, and a response is still pending. 69. Reports of other trafficking activities from South America are currently being investigated by the Panel. (iv) Trafficking from Haiti to Jamaica 70. During the Panel’s visit to Jamaica in May 2024, the authorities explained that Haiti is a significant source of illicit firearms for the criminal groups operating in the country. There is a well-established system of exchanging cannabis from Jamaica for small arms from Haiti, with over 25 very active “guns for ganja” syndicates in Jamaica (see sect. II.B.2.1). Although prices remain the same as previously reported by the Panel (18kg of marijuana for a pistol and 40kg for a semi-automatic rifle), with the scarcity of essential goods in Haiti, guns have also increasingly been exchanged for food, including meat or charcoal. 71. While it is almost impossible to distinguish firearms transferred illicitly directly from the United States to Jamaica from those that transited via Haiti, seizures of firearms with Haitian national police markings provide a clear indicator that weapons from Haiti continue to fuel armed violence in Jamaica. Indeed, 47 firearms with such markings have been recovered in Jamaica to date, mostly handguns. The weapons, recovered from crime scenes, have been involved in a total of 13 murders. For __________________ 50 Data provided by the Dominican authorities, July 2024. 51 See www.orfetv.com/2024/05/02/luego-de-inspeccion-en-tolemaida-y-la-guajira-se-encontro- que-hay-mas-de-un-millon-de-municiones-explosivos-y-armas-de-las-fuerzas-militares-perdidos- presidente-petro/. 52 Official response from Colombia (16 July 2024), on file with the Panel (translated by the Panel). 53 Interview with an intelligence officer from a regional Member State, 2023. 54 Interview with an intelligence officer from a regional Member State, 2023. Interview with a security attaché based in the region, 2023. S/2024/704 19/144 24-14855 instance, one Galil rifle and two Taurus handguns from the Haitian national police stockpile were seized by Jamaican authorities in February 2024. 55 (b) Arms trafficking and non-State armed actors (i) Gangs 72. Interviews with eye witnesses and reviews of images and videos posted online by gangs indicate that they have been increasingly procuring weapons of larger calibres, including 7.62x39mm and to a lesser extent 7.62x51mm and 12.7x99mm, resulting in more significant damage, more severe wounds and more casualties, 56 and posing a greater challenge to the police and the Multinational Security Support mission. Grand Ravine, 400 Mawowo and 5 Segond continue to be the most prolific gangs in terms of their ability to procure materiel, the latter having benefited from the support of Dimitri Hérard (see sect. II.A and annex 24). Gangs have increasingly been deploying commercial uncrewed aerial systems (drones) to conduct reconnaissance, identify targets and coordinate attacks. See annexes 24 and 25 for more details on new materiel used by gangs. 73. Despite the levels of circulation of firearms in the country, demand continues to grow and prices remain very high, reflecting the amount of cash available to gangs. Prices are higher in Port-au-Prince than elsewhere in the country as demand there is stronger and the logistics of getting materiel into the capital adds costs. Table 2 Price of materiel in Port-au-Prince and other parts of Haiti Type of materiel Port-au-Prince Land border area/north of Haiti Firearms 9 mm handgun US $2 500–US $4 000 US $2 000 AR-type semi-automatic rifle (5.56x45mm) US $7 000–US $10 000 US $3 000–US $4 000 AK-type rifle (7.62x39mm) US $10 000–US $12 000 US $5 000–US $6 000 Ammunition 9mm round US $2–US $3 US $2–US $3 5.56x45mm round US $5 7.62x39mm round US $6 Sources: Estimates based on interviews with private security companies, police officers and Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées agents, June and July 2024. (ii) Private security companies 74. Despite the arms embargo, some private security companies operating in Haiti continue to procure weapons and ammunition. 57 Much of the materiel used by such companies is acquired illicitly and not registered nationally. 58 As with civilians, those companies that are willing to register their weapons with the police and obtain a __________________ 55 Interviews with Jamaican officials, May 2024. 56 Interviews with medical staff working in Port-au-Prince, July 2024. 57 Interviews with clients of several large private security companies, 2024. 58 Interviews with a Haitian national police officer, the head of a private security company and a former governmental official, 2023. S/2024/704 24-14855 20/144 formal license – even retroactively – do so easily and without being questioned about the provenance of the materiel. 59 During its investigations, the Panel noticed that, in order to bypass the United States restrictions on transfers of arms to Haiti, some companies tend to procure materiel directly from firearms producers from Asia. 75. A source who observed the stockpiles of several private security companies in his official capacity told the Panel about the mismanagement of stockpiles, the common possession of unregistered weapons, including semi-automatic rifles, which are both illegal in Haiti, and the number of firearms exceeding authorized limits. 76. According to the Panel’s tracing efforts, weapons registered to private security companies regularly turn up in the hands of criminals, confirming that those companies are fuelling the circulation of illicit materiel. While diversions from the stockpiles of private security companies occur mostly through loss and theft, the prominent figures that own the companies can also use their own unregulated stockpiles to arm gangs. (c) Arms trafficking and governmental entities (i) Diversions from Haitian national police stockpiles 77. Over the past four years, close to 1,000 firearms have been diverted from the relatively limited Haitian national police stockpiles. 60 In its previous reports, the Panel raised concerns about the lack of control over arms and ammunition belonging to the police and the regular diversions taking place that are fuelling armed violence (see S/2023/674, annex 33). The Panel also highlighted the challenges related to the management of seized materiel. 61 78. The Haitian national police has a deficient ammunition management system. Although the main storage facility in Port-au-Prince conducts record-keeping, there are insufficient accountability mechanisms down the distribution line. Sources within the police, as well as other first-hand witnesses, told the Panel that some officers sell their ammunition on the illicit market. 62 (ii) Diversions from National Palace stockpiles and abuse of official positions for illicit trafficking 79. Several police units are based at the National Palace to protect the President and the Palace. 63 Officially, these units fall under the control of the Central Directorate of Administrative Police, but in reality they are very much autonomous with very little oversight from the leadership of the police. 64 This autonomy is also reflected in the management of weapons and ammunition at the Palace, where the Haitian national police leadership has not been able to perform a stock-check for several years. Palace stockpiles have been a source of diversions in the past, and the lack of oversight continues to represent a risk. 80. In total, 54 Galil automatic rifles belonging to the Haitian national police were diverted from Palace stockpiles between 2013 and 2016, when Pierre-Leon Junior Saint Rémy, a close relative of President Michel Joseph Martelly’s wife, was in charge __________________ 59 Interviews with clients of various private security companies, 2023 and 2024; and interviews with Haitian national police officers, 2024. 60 Confidential source, 2024. 61 Between November 2023 and June 2024, the Haitian national police and the Haitian customs seized a total of 168 firearms, including 83 pistols and 41 rifles. United Nations police data. 62 Interviews with Haitian national police officers, 2023 and 2024. 63 Unité de securité presidentielle and Counter-ambush team. 64 Interviews with senior Haitian national police officers and current and former employees at the Palace, 2023 and 2024. [... middle sections omitted for long document ...] S/2024/704 24-14855 140/144 Annex 40: The blocking of the entrance to Varreux terminal by the 5 Segond gang using hijacked trucks (22 April 2024) During this period, people turned to informal fuel dealers (commonly referred to as “Sur le trottoir,”) 297 , despite cases of fuel adulteration. At the “Sur le trottoir,” outlets, some which are owned by gang members, a liter of gasoline sold for about 500 GD ($3.75 USD), up from the normal 200GD ($1.5 USD) per liter. 298 This yielded more revenue for gangs operating “Sur le trottoir,” and contributed to inflation. A customs official and two port agents informed the Panel that threats on Varreux are persistent and the failure of gangs to seize control of the installation has turned the gang’s focus on kidnaping the Port’s employees for ransom. A confidential report seen by the Panel indicated that on 23 May 2024, three employees were robbed, and their vehicle stolen. Four days later, 10 employees were kidnapped aboard a Varreux terminal vehicle. The port therefore remains at a constant danger of attack by gangs in their quest to maximize their revenue. __________________ 297 https://www.haitiprogres.com/news/2024/04/24/la-penurie-dessence-continue/. 298 Interview with a gasoline retailer, two drivers, living in Delmas 28 and Gressier suburbs, May 2024. S/2024/704 141/144 24-14855 Annex 41: Some of the strategies used by Les Argentins and Delmas 6 in revenue collection Since early 2023, Les Argentins gang, a member of the G-Pèp alliance operating from Haut Bel-Air region had been attacking Solino neighbourhoods with the aim of expanding its kidnapping territory. This contributed to the rise of the Solino self-defense group (which, according to a confidential report seen by the Panel, is made up of members of the local population and some active police officers assigned to police stations in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area) to counter Les Argentins. (see also Annex 10). However, when Les Argentins and Delmas 6 collaborated under Viv Ansanm, they invaded Solino. A HNP officer and a resident of Solino stated that whenever police operations intensified along the Route de Delmas and the Avenue John Brown, the two main roads leading into Solino, both Les Argentins and Delmas 6 gangs employed different tactics to guarantee revenue collection, demonstrating resilience and determination to generate revenue. For instance, Les Argentins would place coffins on designated roadside locations, in which residents of the area, including road users (mainly trucks and taxis) would ‘faithfully’ drop the toll fees. Failure to conform would attract the gang’s wrath down the road. Similarly, Delmas 6 gang would burn the house of those who failed to yield to the gang’s demands 299 . __________________ 299 Ibid. S/2024/704 24-14855 142/144 Annex 42: A Citibank notice for closing down of its operations in Haiti. Letter provided by a confidential source. Also available at: https://x.com/mbduvalier/status/1810416842592461022?s=48&t=2ohpW1VkksMbL54enFPvug. S/2024/704 143/144 24-14855 Annex 43: Banking and compliance On the financial compliance front, the fact that the bulk of the country’s economy is unbanked adds to the fragility of the banking sector. About 55.5% 300 of the country’s GDP operates mainly outside the formal banking network. This, to a certain extent poses several risks including those of compliance with international and regional financial bodies. A member of a recently closed bank in Haiti stated that to ensure the resilience of their operations in the current environment, banks in Haiti will need to implement comprehensive and multi-layered security measures ranging from physical security to due diligence measures such as knowing-your-customer (KYC), fraud prevention, compliance training, cybersecurity, risk management among others. These measures can only be onboarded by a bank when the country’s strategic environment shows optimism. __________________ 300 See, https://www.worldeconomics.com/National-Statistics/Informal-Economy/Haiti.aspx. S/2024/704 24-14855 144/144 Annex 44: Rony Celestin’s way of moving contraband Four sources highlighted that since 2016, the 400 Mawozo gang has been the dominant gang facilitating smuggling activities at the border, in support of Celestin’s businesses. 301 The sources explained to the Panel Celestin’s modus operandi. The same sources and a former staff of Celestin indicated how Celestin, through his border agents, pays the 400 Mawozo gang, his designated customs officials and other members of the criminal network a total of $3000-5000 USD per cargo truck of contraband commodities (depending on the nature and value of the goods). The money is meant to facilitate the circumvention of inspection, payment of duties and safeguarding against looting by other gangs while on transit to the destination in Haiti. Often the cargo is dispatched to Celestin’s home in Hinche through Los Palis town, in the Center Department for sorting before they are disseminated to various distribution outlets, among them the eight companies affiliated to him. According to three confidential sources, from Hinche, some BSAP agents take over the escort of the goods (where necessary) to ensure they reach undeterred to Celestin’s shops in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. A judicial official, a former customs officer and an anti-corruption investigator confirmed that Celestin’s activities are widely known within the business community, including how he uses his business influence to bribe and frustrate investigations and prosecutions of cases linked to him. __________________ 301 Interview with a former customs officer, a member of a governmental agency and two former gang members formerly based in Belladère, January and June 2024.