Ayiti: Twazyèm Revizyon nan Kad Pwogram Siveyans Anplwaye FMI a ak Demann Pwolongasyon — Kominike pou Laprès; ak Rapò Anplwaye a

© 2026 International Monetary Fund IMF Country Report No. 26/107 HAITI THIRD REVIEW UNDER THE STAFF -MONITORED PROGRAM AND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION —PRESS RELEASE; AND STAFF REPORT In the context of the Third Review under the Staff-Monitored Program and Request for Extension, the following documents have been released and are included in this package: • A Press Release. • The Staff Report prepared by a staff team of the IMF for the Executive Board’s information following discussions that ended on April 1, 2026, with the officials of Haiti on economic developments and policies underpinning the Third Review Under the Staff-Monitored Program. Based on information available at the time of these discussions, the staff report was completed on May 7, 2026. The IMF’s transparency policy allows for the deletion of market-sensitive information and premature disclosure of the authorities’ policy intentions in published staff reports and other documents. Copies of this report are available to the public from International Monetary Fund • Publication Services PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090 Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201 E-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C. May 2026 PR 26/164 IMF Management Approves the Third Review and Extends the Staff-Monitored Program with Haiti FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE A Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) is an informal agreement between an IMF member country and IMF staff to monitor the member country’s economic program. As such, SMPs do not entail endorsement by the IMF Executive Board. SMP staff reports are issued to the Board for information. • Management of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has approved the third review of the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) with Haiti, together with the authorities’ request for an extension of the program through June 19, 2027. All program targets were met as of end- December 2025. Reform progress continues, albeit at a slower pace than anticipated in some areas due to security conditions, capacity constraints, and political uncertainty. • The SMP extension will help anchor macroeconomic stability and sustain reforms during the political transition. The authorities continue to demonstrate ownership of the program and continue engaging with IMF staff through the high-level SMP Monitoring Committee. • Persistent insecurity, political fragility, and the recent increase in international oil prices are compounding the dire humanitarian and economic situation. The authorities are encouraged to use available buffers to mitigate shocks, protect the most vulnerable, and adapt policy implementation as conditions evolve. Washington, DC – May 21, 2026: Management of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved on May 5, 2026, the third review of Haiti’s Staff-Monitored Program (SMP), including the authorities’ request for an extension of the SMP through June 19, 2027. SMPs are informal agreements between country authorities and the IMF to monitor the implementation of the authorities’ economic program and build a track record of policy implementation that could pave the way for financial assistance from the IMF’s upper credit tranche (UCT). Haiti’s SMP is tailored to its context of acute security challenges, institutional fragility, and capacity constraints. It supports the authorities’ priorities of economic stabilization, improved governance, anticorruption, and strengthening the social safety net. Haiti continues to face a severe humanitarian and security crisis, compounded by recurrent shocks and a fragile political transition. Gangs continue to undermine state authority, leaving approximately 5.7 million people facing food insecurity and 1.45 million people internally displaced. The oil price shock stemming from the war in the Middle East has emerged as a major headwind, significantly raising the fuel import bill and implicit subsidy cost, and aggravating an already weak fiscal position. These pressures add to the impact of Hurricane Melissa in October 2025, which disrupted economic activity and exacerbated humanitarian needs. Haiti is also navigating a fragile political transition that is expected to culminate in 2 general elections later this year—the first in a decade. The UN-supported Gang Suppression Force began arriving in April 2026 and is expected to be fully deployed by October 2026, which could help restore security and support recovery. Economic conditions remain dire. Real GDP contracted for a seventh consecutive year in FY2025 and a further contraction is expected in FY2026. Inflation has eased recently but remains elevated. Against the backdrop of weak economic activity and heightened uncertainty, financial intermediation has continued to contract. Retrenchment in bank lending and financial disintermediation have contributed to improvements in non-performing loan ratios, while capital adequacy ratios remain well above regulatory minimums. Despite a deteriorating external environment, international reserve buffers remain adequate. Higher international oil prices are weighing on the external position, but strong remittance partly offset these pressures. The current account is expected to weaken in FY2026 but will remain broadly balanced. Gross international reserves are projected at US$3.4 billion at end FY2026—over seven months of prospective imports of goods and services. The nominal exchange rate has remained stable. Fiscal policy remains constrained by persistent security challenges, institutional weaknesses, and limited policy space. Revenue performance in FY2026 has been weak, due to disruptions to economic activity, administrative fragilities, and institutional paralysis triggered by the termination of the Transitional Presidential Council’s mandate. Higher international oil prices are expected to add further pressure through higher implicit subsidy costs, despite the authorities’ decision to increase domestic fuel prices in April. Budget execution has remained uneven, underscoring the importance of prioritizing spending while safeguarding support for the most vulnerable. Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside. A further deterioration in security conditions, together with persistently higher global oil prices, could further strain economic activity, aggravate humanitarian conditions through higher food prices, and intensify fiscal pressures. Potential shifts in foreign immigration policies could slow remittance inflows, with adverse implications for the external position. All program targets were met at end-December 2025. Reserve accumulation has been strong with net international reserves reaching USD 1.76 billion in December 2025. The revenue, primary balance, and social spending targets all remained on track. The monetary financing target was also met despite an increasingly constrained fiscal space. The reform agenda—covering governance, public financial management, safeguards, and data provision— continues to advance, albeit with delays in some areas. While security remains the top priority, the SMP will continue emphasizing: Strengthening governance and reducing corruption are critical to rebuilding trust in public institutions and overcoming fragility. Reforms anchored in the Governance Diagnostic Report aim to improve the integrity and effectiveness of public institutions, including more transparent management of public finances, stronger safeguards in revenue administration, and more effective mechanisms to deter and address corruption, organized crime, and illicit financial activities. Efforts to further strengthen the anti‑money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism framework—including through the publication of the recently concluded national risk assessment and closing remaining gaps—are also critical to reinforcing financial integrity and supporting Haiti’s exit from the Financial Action Task Force grey list. 3 Stepping up revenue mobilization efforts given Haiti’s low revenue base and large security and development needs. Higher international oil prices are straining fiscal space, reinforcing the importance of accelerating tax and customs administration reforms, including operationalizing the new tax code, strengthening the digital infrastructure, and improving compliance—particularly among large taxpayers. The fuel price adjustment will reduce foregone revenues resulting from the oil price shock. However, it is critical to complement these decisions with measures to protect the most vulnerable, including by leveraging the remaining resources from the IMF 2023 Food Shock Window. Improving budget execution to ensure that limited public resources are effectively directed toward priority social, humanitarian, and security spending amid rising needs. This requires stronger cash management, tighter commitment controls, and better preparation and prioritization of public investment projects. It is also critical to ensure the timely and effective delivery of public assistance, strengthen social spending execution, and safeguard support to vulnerable households. Together, these steps will help improve spending efficiency, strengthen the management of fiscal risks, and enable public spending to better support development and reconstruction efforts. Consolidating the central bank’s policy framework and credibility. Exchange rate stability has provided an important nominal anchor for the economy. In the face of the oil shock, preserving reserve adequacy while using available buffers in a temporary and carefully calibrated manner will be critical to managing external pressures. Fully operationalizing the new reserve management framework, including updated investment policies and guidelines will help strengthen governance at the central bank. Enhancing the regulatory and supervisory frameworks in the financial system. The authorities are making progress in strengthening risk‑based banking supervision, including through the continued rollout of on‑site inspections and enhancements to off‑site monitoring of banks’ risk profiles. Efforts are underway to operationalize the new supervisory framework, integrate risk‑assessment tools into the BRH’s supervisory architecture, and finalize a new chart of accounts for financial institutions. These reforms will safeguard financial stability and reinforce the resilience of the banking system. Improving data quality and timeliness. The Bank of the Republic of Haiti completed the FY2023 audit and financial statements and has initiated the FY2024 audit. Continued implementation of the safeguards assessment recommendations will strengthen central bank governance and risk management. Efforts continue to strengthen data reporting frameworks, including the International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity template, external sector and government finance statistics, and the reporting of financial soundness indicators. Collaborating with development partners to manage elevated fiscal risks and preserve macroeconomic stability, and the reform agenda. Amid heightened oil price pressures, there is an increasing risk that financing gaps could translate into domestic debt accumulation, undermining the public sector’s balance sheet. External support should be provided primarily in the form of grants rather than non‑concessional borrowing. Together with rigorous appraisal and transparency requirements for donor‑financed operations, this support would help safeguard the public sector balance sheet, consolidate progress achieved under the program, and support a durable recovery that improves living conditions for the Haitian people. In line with the Fund Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, IMF staff will continue to collaborate closely with Haiti’s main development partners, particularly on governance and strengthening institutional capacity. HAITI THIRD REVIEW UNDER THE STAFF -MONITORED PROGRAM AND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The security and humanitarian crises in Haiti continue to deteriorate, compounded by recurrent adverse shocks and an ongoing political transition. The oil price shock stemming from the war in the Middle East has emerged as a major headwind, raising the fuel import bill and implicit fuel subsidy costs, further weakening an already fragile fiscal position. These pressures add to the impact of Hurricane Melissa in October 2025, which disrupted economic activity and exacerbated humanitarian needs, and are taking place amid an ongoing fragile political transition, aimed at restoring governance, improving security, and paving the way for the first general elections in a decade. At the same time, the international community is prioritizing security and stability. The arrival of the Gang Suppression Force in April could help improve security conditions and renew momentum for international support. Economic conditions remain dire. Real GDP is expected to contract for an eighth consecutive year in FY2026. Real GDP fell by 2.7 percent in FY2025, and staff now project a deeper contraction in FY2026 reflecting higher international oil prices, the impact of Hurricane Melissa in October, and political uncertainty. Annual inflation rose to 31.9 percent by end-FY2025 but has decelerated in recent months. Higher international oil prices are weighing on the external position, but strong remittances continue to provide an important offset. As a result, the current account balance is expected to remain broadly balanced in FY2026, and gross international reserves are projected to remain adequate at over seven months of prospective imports of goods and services. Fiscal conditions remain extremely weak. Domestic revenues have declined and are projected at 4.3 percent of GDP in FY2026, reflecting continued security-related disruptions, administrative fragilities, and institutional paralysis triggered by the termination of the Transitional Presidential Council’s mandate. Moreover, higher oil prices are expected to add pressure through implicit fuel subsidy costs, while budget execution remains uneven amid capacity constraints and heightened uncertainty. These developments have sharpened policy trade-offs and underscore the importance of prioritizing spending while safeguarding support for the most vulnerable May 7, 2026 HAITI 2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside. A further deterioration in security conditions, together with persistently higher global oil prices, could further strain economic activity, worsen humanitarian conditions, and intensify fiscal pressures. Potential shifts in foreign immigration policies could slow remittance inflows, with adverse implications for the external position. On the upside, the deployment of the Gang Suppression Force—supported by the newly established United Nations Support Office for Haiti—could help restore confidence and support economic activity. The authorities remain committed to the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP). All end-September 2025 indicative targets have been met except for the fiscal revenues target, which has been missed by a narrow margin, reflecting continued security- related disruptions to tax collection. All end-December 2025 quantitative and indicative targets were met. Reserve accumulation has been strong. The revenue, primary balance, social spending, and monetary financing targets all remained on track, despite an increasingly constrained fiscal space. The reform agenda—covering governance, public financial management, safeguards, and data provision—continues to advance, albeit with delays in some areas. Three of the eight structural benchmarks assessed in this review were met, with delays concentrated in public financial management and resource mobilization. The authorities remain engaged in program implementation through the high-level Program Monitoring Committee. Policy discussions focused on maintaining policy implementation and reform momentum during the election year. Priorities included: (i) boosting revenue mobilization; (ii) strengthening budget execution; (iii) advancing core governance reforms, (iv) safeguarding monetary and financial stability; and (v) improving data adequacy. Despite the progress made so far, persistent insecurity, political fragility, an uncertain electoral process, and geopolitical developments pose increasing challenges to the SMP’s objectives going forward. The authorities have requested a nine-month SMP extension through June 19, 2027. This request reflects Haiti’s multidimensional crisis, heightened fragility— including a fragile political environment and exposure to large exogenous shocks— and aims to anchor the SMP objectives of macroeconomic stabilization and reform momentum during the transition. The extension would also provide a bridge to maintain close engagement with the authorities until a new government is elected, thus ensuring the country continues to build a track record of policy implementation. Staff supports the request and proposes adjustments to the structural benchmarks accordingly to reinforce public financial management and safeguards. HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 3 Approved By Dora Iakova (WHD) and Jay Peiris (SPR) Policy discussions were conducted remotely during March 23rd to April 1st, 2026. The team comprised Camilo E. Tovar (Head), Nathalie Pouokam, Gonzalo Huertas, and Maylin H. Sun (all WHD); Tatsuya Hasegawa (SPR); Abdoul Karim Sidibe (STA); Jinkyu Sung (FAD), and Gabriel Duvalsaint and Ralph Wata (Port-au-Prince office). Ben Aldersey (LEG) and Laurence Coste (LEG) provided support on governance and AML/CFT issues. Ms. Toyosi Ojo provided research analysis, and Madina Toshmuhamedova (all WHD) assisted with mission scheduling and the preparation of the report. Mr. André Roncaglia and Ms. Ludmilla Buteau Allien (both OEDBR) joined key discussions. CONTENTS GLOSSARY _______________________________________________________________________________________ 5 CONTEXT_________________________________________________________________________________________ 7 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS _______________________________________________________________________ 8 PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION UNDER THE SMP ____________________________________________ 13 OUTLOOK AND RISKS _________________________________________________________________________ 14 POLICY DISCUSSIONS _________________________________________________________________________ 15 A. Fiscal Policy ___________________________________________________________________________________ 16 B. Enhancing Governance and Transparency _____________________________________________________ 22 C. Strengthening the Monetary and Exchange Rate Frameworks ________________________________ 23 D. Safeguarding Financial Sector Stability ________________________________________________________ 24 E. Data Adequacy and Other Issues ______________________________________________________________ 25 PROGRAM ISSUES _____________________________________________________________________________ 26 STAFF APPRAISAL _____________________________________________________________________________ 27 BOX 1. Fuel Pump Price Adjustment Mechanism and Recent Development ___________________________ 12 FIGURES 1. Real Sector Developments, 2019–26 __________________________________________________________ 31 2. Fiscal Sector Developments, 2019–25 _________________________________________________________ 32 3. Monetary and Financial Sectors Developments, 2019–26 ______________________________________ 33 4. External Sector Developments, 2019–26 _______________________________________________________ 34 HAITI 4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND TABLES 1a. Quantitative and Indicative Targets, December 2024–September 2025 ______________________ 35 1b. Quantitative and Indicative Targets, December 2025–March 2027 ___________________________ 36 2a. Structural Benchmarks under the 2024 SMP _________________________________________________ 37 2b. Structural Benchmarks under the 2024 SMP—Proposed for the Extension ___________________ 38 2c. Schedule of Reviews__________________________________________________________________________ 38 3. Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2022–31 _________________________________________ 39 4a. Non-Financial Public Sector Operations, 2022–31 (In Millions of Gourdes) ___________________ 40 4b. Non-Financial Public Sector Operations, 2022–31 (In Percent of GDP) _______________________ 41 5a. Balance of Payments, 2022–31 (In Millions of U.S. Dollars) ___________________________________ 42 5b. Balance of Payments, 2022–31 (In Percent of GDP) __________________________________________ 43 6. Summary Accounts of the Banking System, 2022–31 __________________________________________ 44 7. External Financing Requirements and Sources ________________________________________________ 45 8. Financial Soundness Indicators, September 2023–December 2025 ____________________________ 46 ANNEXES I. Estimate of the Economic Impact of Hurricane Melissa ________________________________________ 47 II. Remittance Outflows __________________________________________________________________________ 50 III. Strengthening Public Investment Management _______________________________________________ 52 IV. Risk Assessment Matrix _______________________________________________________________________ 54 V. Adverse Scenario and Sensitivity Analysis of Global Developments ___________________________ 57 APPENDIX I. Letter of Intent _________________________________________________________________________________ 59 Attachment I. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies_____________________________ 63 Attachment II. Technical Memorandum of Understanding ___________________________________ 78 HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5 Glossary Acronym Definition AGD General Administration of Customs AML/CFT Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism ASYCUDA Automatic Systems for Customs Data BMPAD Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d'Aide au Développement BOP Balance of Payments BPM6 Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, Sixth Edition BRH Bank of the Republic of Haiti CA Current Account CD Capacity Development CCRIF Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility CERC Contingency Emergency Response Component CNLBA Commission Nationale de Lutte contre le Blanchiment d'Actifs CNMP National Commission for Public Procurement CPI Consumer Price Index CSCCA Council of the Superior Court of Accounts and Administrative Disputes DGB General Directorate of the Budget DGI Directorate of General Taxes DNFBP Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions DSA Debt Sustainability Analysis EDH Électricité d'Haïti EU European Union FAES Economic and Social Assistance Fund FER Fonds d’entretien routier FDI Foreign Direct Investment FSIs Financial Soundness Indicators FSW Food Shock Window FX Foreign Exchange GDP Gross Domestic Product GIR Gross International Reserves GSF Gang Suppression Force GOES Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite HELP Haiti Economic Lift Program Act HOPE Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership and Encouragement Act HURDAT2 North Atlantic Hurricane Database (HURDAT2) IMF International Monetary Fund IT Indicative Target LOI Letter of Intent MARNDR Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development MAST Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance HAITI 6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND MENFP Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training MJSP Ministry of Justice and Public Security MSPP Ministry of Public Health and Population ML/FT Money Laundering / Financing of Terrorism MPEC Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation MT/LT Medium Term / Long Term NEER Nominal Effective Exchange Rate NFA Net Foreign Assets NIR Net International Reserves NRA National Risk Assessment NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration OAS Organization of American States OEDBR Office of the Executive Director for Brazil OPEC+ Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and Partners PDNA Post-Disaster Needs Assessment PIMA Public Investment Management Assessment PIP Public Investment Program PIT Personal Income Tax PSUGO Universal, Free, and Compulsory Schooling Program PTIP Public Three-Year Investment Plan QT Quantitative Target RCF Rapid Credit Facility REER Real Effective Exchange Rate RMS Revenue Management System SB Structural Benchmark SDR Special Drawing Rights SIMAST Information System of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor SMP Staff-Monitored Program ST/MT Short Term / Medium Term ST/LT Short Term / Long Term SYDONIA Customs Automation System TA Technical Assistance TMU Technical Memorandum of Understanding TPC Transitional Presidential Council TPS Temporary Protected Status TSA Treasury Single Account UCT Upper Credit Tranche UCREF Central Financial Intelligence Unit UN United Nations US United States HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 7 CONTEXT 1. Haiti’s severe humanitarian and security crisis persists amid recurrent adverse shocks. Gangs continue to exert influence in several areas across the country, including Port-au-Prince, undermining state authority, and constraining access to basic services. Humanitarian needs continue to escalate: about 6.4 million people are expected to require emergency assistance in 2026, 5.7 million people (roughly half the population) face acute food insecurity, and 1.45 million people are internally displaced. The crisis has been compounded by recurrent domestic and external shocks, notably the oil price shock stemming from the war in the Middle East and Hurricane Melissa in October 2025 (Annex I). 2. Political uncertainty remains high amid a fragile transition process aimed at restoring institutional legitimacy, security, and delivering the first general elections in a decade. Following the expiration of the Transitional Presidential Council’s (TPC) mandate on February 7, executive power was transferred to Prime Minister Mr. Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, who appointed a new cabinet, including a new Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Serge Collin. The new executive has reaffirmed its commitment to the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) and signed a National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections with political parties and economic and civil actors. While the pact is intended to provide a framework for restoring order and preparing for elections, it has also raised concerns about adherence to the previously established electoral calendar. 3. The international community is prioritizing security and stability. The Gang Suppression Force (GSF) began arriving in April and is expected to be fully deployed by October 2026, while the UN Integrated Office in Haiti’s mandate has been extended through January 2027. Together with the Haitian-led Roadmap for Stability and Peace, supported by the Organization of American States, these efforts signal renewed international momentum to support Haiti’s recovery. In this context, the US administration in February 2026 approved a retroactive but temporary extension of the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) and Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension (HELP) Acts, which had expired in September 2025, restoring preferential access HAITI 8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND to the US market for Haiti’s apparel industry through end-December 2026. However, the subsequent February 20, 2026 decision by the US administration to apply a 10 percent import surcharge effectively eliminated the preferential treatment under HOPE/HELP. 4. Economic conditions remain dire. Real GDP contracted for a seventh consecutive year in FY2025, and the economic outlook for FY2026 has weakened further. Annual inflation rose to 31.9 percent by end-FY2025 but has decelerated in recent months. Remittances remain strong despite the adverse external conditions. However, the oil price shock has emerged as a major headwind, raising the fuel import bill and implicit fuel subsidy costs, 1 further weakening an already fragile fiscal position and sharpening policy trade-offs. Domestic fuel price adjustments—including a 29 percent increase in the price of gasoline—and the adoption of a decree to establish a more predictable framework for domestic fuel price setting have heightened social tensions. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 5. Economic activity contracted for a seventh consecutive year in FY2025. Real gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 2.7 percent in FY2025—slightly less than the 3.1 percent contraction projected at the time of the second review. This decline was broad-based. Agriculture, Haiti’s largest economic sector, declined by 4.8 percent, including a 19 percent rice shortfall vis-à- vis its five-year average. Manufacturing shrank by 4.3 percent, driven by an 8 percent decline in textiles as insecurity weighed on export-oriented assembly. Commerce and transport contracted by 7.7 percent and 15.4 percent, respectively. Annual inflation reached 31.9 percent by the end of the fiscal year (September 2025) and, after peaking in October, eased to 20.6 percent by March 2026. Core inflation reached 22.8 percent by end-FY2025 after a steady and broad-based rise throughout the year. Inflation trends reflect insecurity-related supply disruptions, including gang tolls and road blockades, which have raised distribution costs for goods and services. 1 Implicit fuel subsidies are defined as the quantity of fuel sold for consumption multiplied by the difference between cost-recovery prices and domestic pump prices. In Haiti, these subsidies are initially reflected in foregone fuel tax revenues, with any remaining gap covered through direct budgetary transfers. HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 9 6. On the external front, strong remittances more than offset the widening trade deficit. The current account delivered a surplus of 1.9 percent GDP in FY2025, reversing a deficit of 0.6 percent of GDP in FY2024. The surplus reflected a sharp increase in net remittances. Net remittances remain robust in FY2026: from October 2025 to February 2026, they increased by 15.8 percent relative to a year earlier, despite already being at historically high levels. The seasonal rise in December inflows was particularly strong, possibly reflecting precautionary behavior amid uncertainty surrounding the expiration of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian migrants in the US. 2 At the same time, higher oil prices are raising the import bill—estimated at about USD 180 million or about 0.45 percent of GDP—while exports remain subdued. Satellite-based port activity data indicates export weakness persisted through February following the non-renewal of HOPE/HELP in September, while imports continued to rise. 7. External financing has declined sharply over the past decade, although recent donor support has provided some near-term support. Compared to the historical peak in FY2010 (USD 1,840 million), the amount of budget support and grants received by the Haitian government had 2 The expiration of TPS for Haitian migrants was extended, through court order, to July 1, 2026. Text Figure 1. Haiti: Monitoring Economic Activity Through Satellite-Based Port Data Average daily cargo ship arrivals have declined sharply since mid-2025, and total trade activity remains well below pre- pandemic levels. Although import volumes have picked up, export volumes remain weak. • • Overall tanker and cargo ship arrivals remain subdued. Sources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations. HAITI 10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND declined over 80 percent by end FY2025 (USD 364 million). Against this backdrop, external donors— including foreign governments and international organizations—committed about USD 20 million to support Haiti’s recovery from Hurricane Melissa. Countries have also pledged about USD 35 million in new funding to the GSF trust fund to help restore security. 8. International reserves accumulation remains strong. The Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BRH) continued to purchase foreign exchange (FX), with cumulative net purchases since end- September 2024 exceeding USD 725 million, as of end February 2026. Gross international reserves exceeded USD 3.4 billion as of end-January—over seven months of prospective imports, bolstered by strong remittances. Despite these purchases, the nominal exchange rate has remained stable at around 130 gourdes per US dollar. The real exchange rate appreciated 31 percent during FY2025, and since then an additional 9 percent through February 2026. 9. Fiscal outturns in FY2025 were broadly balanced, but budget execution remained weak. In FY2025, the overall balance recorded a small deficit of 0.1 percent of GDP, while the primary balance (Indicative Target, IT) posted a surplus of 0.1 percent of GDP. Nominal domestic Text Table 1. Haiti: Net International Reserves - 2024 SMP Definition (In Millions of US Dollars, Unless Otherwise Indicated) • HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 11 revenues (IT) increased by 13.3 percent year-on-year, but the revenue-to-GDP ratio declined to 4.8 percent—its lowest level since FY2002. Grants of 1.2 percent of GDP helped counterbalance the weak domestic revenue performance. Total expenditure increased, concentrated towards the end of the fiscal year, but reached only 75.5 percent of the supplementary budget, with capital spending particularly low at 42.2 percent. 3 Social spending (IT) also increased, but delivery remains constrained by administrative and security bottlenecks. As of January 2026, about 90.2 percent of Food Shock Window (FSW) resources had been executed, leaving about 1.5 billion gourdes unspent. 10. In FY2026, fiscal conditions have weakened further. This reflects continued security-related disruptions to economic activity, administrative fragilities, and institutional paralysis triggered by the termination of the TPC’s mandate. FY2026 data as of February 2026 shows that domestic revenues (IT) have remained subdued—1.7 percent of projected GDP compared to an average of 2.6 percent over the past 10 years. Budget execution has also remained uneven, with total and capital spending reaching 25.2 percent and 12.2 percent of the budget, respectively (against 10- year averages of 25.5 and 7.1 percent). Spending peaked in December before easing in January and February 2026. 4 Grants received as of February 2026 were lower than in the same period of FY2025. Social spending reached 21.2 billion gourdes (0.4 percent of GDP) during October 2025–February 2026, but execution remained constrained (¶21). 11. Higher international oil prices are expected to add pressure through foregone revenues associated with higher implicit subsidy costs. In response the authorities increased pump prices for gasoline by 29 percent and for gasoil and kerosene by about 37 percent, equivalent to about a 40 percent pass-through of higher international prices (Box 1). The authorities have also adopted austerity measures in public administration, including a freeze on new vehicle acquisitions, reduction in fuel expenditure 3 Expenditures had a peak in September 2025, due to a temporary spike in cash payments and commitments. 4 The December expenditure increase reflected higher spending on wages and salaries, goods and services, and transfers and subsidies, partly due to year-end seasonality. HAITI 12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND allocations for public institutions, restrictions on official travel, and limits on security escorts for public officials. These measures should help contain part of the fiscal pressure from the oil shock, although fiscal space remains extremely limited. In FY2026, the oil price shock is projected to generate an excess fuel import bill of about USD 180 million and foregone fuel tax revenues of about HTG 14.2 billion. 5 12. Banking sector indicators have improved, reflecting financial disintermediation. Non- performing loan ratios, while elevated, declined from 14.2 percent to just under 9 percent between June and December 2025, and capital adequacy ratios (at 26 percent in December) have consistently 5 Implicit fuel subsidies—and related foregone revenues—arise from the gap between the domestic cost recovery prices and pump prices. The domestic cost recovery prices are estimated to have an elasticity of 1.89 with respect to increases in WTI prices, implying that higher fuel import costs do not translate one for one into revenue losses. Box 1. Fuel Pump Price Adjustment Mechanism and Recent Developments On March 27, 2026, amid surging global oil prices, the Haitian authorities issued a decree introducing an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism. Under the decree, calculated prices for gasoline, gasoil, and kerosene—defined as the cost-insurance-freight import price plus applicable direct and indirect charges and margins—are reviewed monthly and adjusted according to predefined thresholds. Specifically: • No adjustment when the calculated price varies by 3 percent or less relative to the last published pump price. • Automatic adjustments when the variation exceeds 3 percent, provided that the adjustment does not exceed 10 percent of the last published pump price. • For adjustments in excess of 10 percent, the pump price is set by the Government, following consultation with a Petroleum Market Consultative Council—a nine-member body composed of representatives from the public and private sector. Under the decree, pump prices are calculated and set monthly by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and the Ministry of Trade and Industry at the end of each month, and published on the first day of the following month through a joint ministerial notice. On April 1st, 2026, the authorities implemented the first price adjustment under the new adjustment mechanism. Effective April 2, 2026, pump prices increased from HTG 560 to HTG 725 per gallon for gasoline (a 29.5 percent increase), from HTG 620 to HTG 850 per gallon for diesel (a 37.1 percent increase), and from HTG 615 to HTG 845 per gallon for kerosene (a 37.4 percent increase). These adjustments are expected to reduce fiscal pressures from fuel subsidies and limit incentives for cross-border fuel smuggling. HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 13 remained well above the 12 percent regulatory minimum. These movements reflect a sharp retrenchment in lending and the reallocation of bank balance sheets towards central bank and sovereign claims, rather than strengthening capital. System-wide gross loans fell by 68 percent between March 2022 and December 2025, with a contraction of 22 percent in 2025. This broad- based decline across all commercial banks’ portfolios will continue to weigh on economic activity. Preliminary data for January-February 2026 suggests gross loans contracted an additional 4 percent in real terms. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION UNDER THE SMP 13. Program implementation remains on track, but reform momentum has slowed amid deteriorating conditions. The authorities remain committed to the SMP despite the challenging domestic and global environment. • Quantitative and Indicative Targets. End-September 2025 ITs were met except for the fiscal revenue target, which was missed by a narrow margin—0.04 percent of the target—reflecting continued security-related disruptions to economic activity and tax collection (¶10). All quantitative and indicative end-December 2025 targets have been met. Reserve accumulation has remained strong with net international reserves reaching USD 1.76 billion in December 2025. The revenue, primary balance, and social spending targets remained on track. The monetary financing target was also met despite an increasingly constrained fiscal space. The authorities confirmed no accumulation of domestic or external arrears and no plans to contract non-concessional loans. • Structural Benchmarks. Reforms continue to advance, albeit with delays in some areas, particularly in public financial management and revenue mobilization. Of the eight structural benchmarks (SBs) due for assessment at the time of the third review, three were met. (Table 2). The status of reforms assessed in this review is as follows: o Although procurement contracts have been published on the websites of the National Commission for Public Procurement (CNMP) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), publication has lagged since October 2025. (SB2—continuous, not met). o FSW monthly execution reports (SB3—continuous, met) continue to be published on the websites of the MEF and the General Directorate of the Budget (DGB). The quarterly internal expenditure audit for the use of FSW resources due in December 2025 was provided on time. (SB4—continuous SB, met). o The Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes (CSCCA) has conducted and published the financial and operational compliance audit of FSW spending for FY2022-23 HAITI 14 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND and FY2023-2024 with delay. The audit for FY2024-2025 remains ongoing (SB5—end-March 2026 target, not met). o The latest quarterly report on the operations and financial status of the Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES) is delayed but expected to be published soon (SB6—continuous, not met). o The digitalization of tax declarations and payments for large taxpayers is facing implementation constraints. (SB8—end-March 2026 target, not met). o The BRH has provided the full balance sheet on time (SB11—continuous SB, met). o Interconnection of the tax administration system and the customs automation system was not implemented, owing to operational constraints (SB12—end-March 2026 target, not met). OUTLOOK AND RISKS 14. Economic activity is expected to continue contracting in FY2026 amid heightened domestic and external shocks. Real GDP is projected to decline by 1.7 percent in FY2026, with the oil price shock stemming from the war in the Middle East compounding already difficult conditions. Staff estimates that Hurricane Melissa caused economic losses and damages in the range of 2 to 5 percent of GDP and will reduce GDP growth in FY2026 by about 0.2–0.4 percentage points (Annex I). In addition, the stop-and-go effects surrounding the extension of HOPE/HELP trade preferences and the US announcement of Section 122 import surcharges on February 20 has led firms to curtail production, investment, and employment. 6 Medium-term real GDP growth rates are expected to gradually converge to potential (1.5 percent), conditional on improvements in security conditions. End-period inflation is projected at 22.0 percent in FY2026— compared to the 24.1 percent envisaged in the second review—reflecting a recent easing in price pressures. Nonetheless, inflation is expected to remain elevated given the pass-through of higher international oil prices to domestic fuel prices, heightened political uncertainty, and fragile security conditions. Private credit is expected to begin a gradual recovery in FY2027, in tandem with a return to economic growth, with real credit growth expanding further in FY2028 as investment needs materialize. 15. The current account is expected to weaken in FY2026 despite the growth in remittances. Net remittances remain robust (¶6) and are projected to reach 11.2 percent of GDP in FY2026, despite the introduction of a one percent tax on cash remittances from the US. At the same 6 Textile exports have been affected by factory closures and damaged business relations, which may have resulted in international supplier rerouting. Exporting firms have also expressed concerns that the fifteen-month temporary extension of HOPE/HELP creates uncertainties that undermine investment. HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 15 time, higher oil prices are raising the import bill and exports are expected to remain subdued, amid persistent insecurity, supply disruptions, and the impact of US Section 122 tariffs—which have effectively offset the benefits of the HOPE/HELP Act. 7 As a result, the trade deficit is expected to widen (12.2 percent of GDP) and the current account to remain almost balanced (0.2 percent of GDP). Moreover, a recently signed border management and customs administration concession is expected to boost foreign direct investment in the near term. Gross international reserves are projected to remain adequate at over seven months of prospective imports through FY2028, before declining somewhat thereafter. Over the medium term, the current account is projected to revert to a deficit, reflecting the normalization of historically high remittance inflows and higher imports related to reconstruction and recovery. 16. Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside. Downside risks stemming from larger- than-expected declines in remittances and a further deterioration in security conditions, as well as higher global oil prices would weaken the external position and compress fiscal space (Annex V and ¶25-26). On the upside, the deployment of the GSF and the associated improvement in security conditions could have significant upside impact on growth. Staff estimates that a positive security shock that brings security conditions broadly back to pre-2017 average levels—when Haiti was in a relatively stable security condition (see figure in ¶2)—improves the probability of positive GDP growth in FY2026 from less than 1 percent in the baseline to more than 10 percent. This is captured by the rightward shift in the one-year ahead forecast distribution using the IMF growth-at-risk methodology. 8 POLICY DISCUSSIONS Discussions focused on implementation of the SMP. More specifically, boosting revenue mobilization, strengthening budget execution, advancing core governance reforms in line with existing recommendations, safeguarding monetary and financial stability and improving data adequacy. Recent developments, particularly the global rise in oil prices, and their impact on the macroeconomic framework, were also the focus of discussions. 7 The temporary import surcharge announced by the US under Section 122 of the Trade Act will be applied to products under HOPE/HELP. 8 See Prasad et al. (2019), "Growth at Risk: Concept and Application in IMF Country Surveillance", IMF working paper. International Monetary Fund (2017), "Financial Conditions and Growth at Risk", Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 3, October. HAITI 16 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND A. Fiscal Policy 17. Maintaining prudent fiscal management remains critical amid high uncertainty, oil price pressures, and the electoral calendar. The fiscal outlook has weakened relative to the second review, with domestic revenue projected at about 4.3 percent of GDP for FY2026—down from 4.7 percent projected at the time of the second review—reflecting weaker-than-expected collection and declining fuel tax revenues amid higher oil prices. Total expenditure for FY2026 is projected at about 5.8 percent of GDP, while the overall fiscal deficit is expected to widen to about 0.9 percent of GDP. The oil shock has further sharpened policy trade-offs by raising implicit fuel subsidy and narrowing the already limited fiscal space. In this context, maintaining a prudent stance based on stronger revenue mobilization and efficient spending execution— through strengthened cash and public investment management—is critical. The fiscal framework should remain realistic and transparent, closely linked to medium-term priorities—including resilience and reconstruction—and consistent with the SMP’s targets. Any supplementary budget should be supported by a clear financing table, approved through the appropriate legal channels, and remain fully consistent with the SMP’s objectives. Related spending should be executed through strengthened cash management and subject to enhanced transparency requirements. Text Figure 2. Haiti: Revenue Performance, FY2019–26 Sources: Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and IMF staff calculations. [... middle sections omitted for long document ...] HAITI 88 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND are equivalent to fully collateralized loans under which the obligor is required to repay the funds, and usually pay interest, by repurchasing the collateral from the buyer in the future (such as repurchase agreements and official swap arrangements); ii. suppliers’ credits, i.e., contracts where the supplier permits the obligor to defer payments until sometime after the date on which the goods are delivered or services are provided; and iii. leases, i.e., arrangements under which property is provided which the lessee has the right to use for one or more specified period(s) of time that are usually shorter than the total expected service life of the property, while the lessor retains the title to the property. For the purpose of these guidelines, the debt is the PV (at the inception of the lease) of all lease payments expected to be made during the period of the agreement excluding those payments that cover the operation, repair, or maintenance of the property. 27. For the purposes of this debt limit ceiling, public sector debt covers public and publicly guaranteed debt. Public sector is defined in paragraph 8 of this TMU. 28. Debt guarantees by the public sector. For the purposes of the program, a debt guarantee by the public sector means an explicit legal obligation to service a debt in the event of non-payment by the borrower (in return for payment in cash or in kind). 29. Concessional debt. For program purposes, a debt is concessional if it includes a grant element of at least 35 percent, calculated as follows: the grant element of a debt is the difference between the present value (PV) of debt and its nominal value, expressed as a percentage of the nominal value of the debt. The PV of debt at the time of its contracting is calculated by discounting the future stream of payments of debt service due on this debt. 733 For debts with a grant element equal or below zero, the PV will be set equal to the nominal value of the debt. The discount rate used for this purpose is the unified discount rate of 5 percent set forth in Executive Board Decision No. 15462-(13/97). 8 34 30. External debt. For the purposes of the ceiling on the contracting or guaranteeing of new non-concessional external debt, external debt is any debt contracted or guaranteed by the public sector on non-concessional terms with non-residents or denominated in foreign currency, i.e., currency other than Haiti’s currency. It includes, where applicable, debt issued domestically by the government and held by non-residents. 31. The public sector undertakes not to contract or guarantee any new non-concessional external debt. It also applies to any private debt guaranteed by the public sector that constitutes a contingent liability. Excluded from the ceiling are short-term (with a maturity of less than one year) import-related credits, rescheduling arrangements, borrowing from the IMF, non-resident purchases 7 The calculation of concessionally takes into account all aspects of the debt agreement, including maturity, grace period, payment schedule, upfront commissions, and management fees. 8 A tool to calculate the grant element of a wide range of financial packages is available at: https://www.imf.org/en/gecalculator HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 89 of treasury bills, and gourde-denominated BRH bills that are indexed to the exchange rate. This QT will be monitored continuously by the authorities and any non-observance will be immediately reported to the Fund. Public Sector External Arrears Accumulation 32. Arrears on external debt of the public sector. They include all debt-service obligations (principal and interest) on loans contracted or guaranteed by the public sector that are due to non- residents but not paid on the due date as set out in the loan contract; they exclude those arising from obligations being renegotiated with external creditors and (or) those that are litigious. For the purpose of assessing the QT on the non-accumulation of new external debt arrears by the public sector, arrears resulting from non-payment of debt service due to international sanctions preventing payments to the creditor are excluded from the previous definition. This QT will be monitored continuously by the authorities, and any non-observance will be immediately reported to the Fund. Domestic Arrears Accumulation of the Central Government 33. Arrears on domestic debt of the central government. They include all debt-service obligations (principal and interest) on loans contracted or guaranteed by the central government that are due to residents but not paid 90 days after the due date set out in the loan contract. The QT on domestic arrears accumulation will be monitored continuously by the authorities, and any non- observance will be immediately reported to the Fund. C. Reporting of Data for the Monitoring of the Program 34. To facilitate monitoring of the program, the government will provide IMF staff with the information set out in the following summary table. Any data revisions will be promptly communicated to IMF staff. 35. The authorities will inform IMF staff in writing at least 10 working days (excluding public holidays in Haiti) before any change in economic and financial policies that may affect the outcome of the program. Such policies include, for example, changes in tax or customs legislation, wage policy, and support for public or private enterprises. With respect to continuous QTs, the authorities will report any non-observance to the IMF promptly. HAITI 90 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND Attachment II. Table 4. Haiti: Summary of Data to be Provided to the IMF Sector Data Series Periodicity Timeliness Real Sector National accounts Annual Three months Quarterly economic indicators (economic cycle) Quarterly Two months Consumer price index (including breakdowns) Monthly Three weeks Public Finances Fiscal revenues (internal, external, other) Monthly Four weeks Expenditures on cash basis (wages and salaries, goods and services, external debt, current accounts) Monthly Four weeks Table of government financial transactions (TOFE) Monthly Two weeks Balance on current accounts and operation of projects Monthly One month Table underlying TOFE, which enables the determination of checks in circulation and balance on investment project accounts Monthly One month Table on budget implementation with breakdown by ministry and other bodies and by type of expenditure Monthly One month Total monthly amount of expenditure executed by transfer letters Monthly One month Report on revenue collection of DGI (progress report) Monthly One month Tables of revenue collection of AGD (port activity indicators, analytical report of customs receipts on import) Monthly One month Table of revenue collected and authorized expenditure (TEREDA) Monthly One month Detailed revenue and expenditures of BMPAD Quarterly One month Report on social protection expenditures Quarterly One month Table on the implementation of the PSUGO program Quarterly One month Dashboard of the state electricity utility EDH showing monthly information on the production of electricity, making explicit the composition of production by independent electricity producers, EDH, and by region. Monthly One month EDH commercial data allowing the calculation of EDH's billing and collection rates Monthly One week EDH cash data including all revenues and all expenditures (operating, investment, and other) Monthly One month Information on any off-budget claims presented for payment Monthly One month Stock of unpaid off-budget central government liabilities Monthly One month HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 91 Attachment II. Table 4. Haiti: Summary of Data to be Provided to the IMF (Continued) Sector Data Series Periodicity Timeliness Public Finances (continued) Data on all fuel shipments per product giving the CIF import price, the full price structure (including stabilization margin) and import and consumption quantities. Data on actual collections for each month with a breakdown per product and tax type. Monthly One week Table of import prices of petroleum products, by arrival Monthly One month Table of imported quantities of petroleum products Monthly One month “Stabilization margin” table of the Directorate of the Tax Inspectorate Monthly One month “Petroleum product tax” table of the Directorate of the Tax Inspectorate Monthly One month Details of the stock of all government borrowing and debt securities (interest rate, maturity, creditor if known) Annual Three months Full amortization table of domestic and external government debt Annual Three months Statement of stocks and flows of repayment of suppliers’ credits and payment arrears Monthly One week Expenditures made for Food Shock Window program-related expenses Monthly One month Monetary and Financial Data Exchange rate Daily One day Monetary base and sources thereof and currency in circulation. Weekly Two months Aide Memoire Table containing, inter alia: (i) stock of BRH bonds; (ii) deposits at commercial banks; (iii) credit to private sector (in gourdes and U.S. dollars); (iv) details of inflows and outflows of foreign exchange reserves, including budget support received; (v) volume of foreign exchange transactions, including BRH sales and purchases; (vi) gross and net international reserves; (vii) net BRH credit to central government and the non- financial public sector; and stocks and interest rates of BRH bills. Monthly One week Tables showing, inter alia, the average and weighted interest rates on gourde and U.S. dollar- denominated deposits and credit, and the excess reserves in the banking system. Monthly One month Monetary and financial statistics. Standardized reporting form, balance sheets of the central bank and other depository corporations. Monthly Two months Detailed balance sheet of the central bank (table de passage) with individual account granularity. Monthly Two months HAITI 92 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND Attachment II. Table 4. Haiti: Summary of Data to be Provided to the IMF (Concluded) Sector Data Series Periodicity Timeliness Monetary and Financial Data (continued) Information on the composition of gross and net international reserves (reserve template when available). Monthly Two months Banking supervision statistics and commercial indicators on commercial banks. Quarterly One month The calendar and planned placements of BRH gourde-denominated dollar-indexed bills, including in banks and nonbanks. Quarterly One month Audited financial statements of the BRH Annual Three months Balance of Payments and IIP Balance of payments (first version) Quarterly Six weeks Revised balance of payments Quarterly Three months after the first reporting BRH FX cash flow table; quarterly projections through end of fiscal year. Quarterly One month International Investment Position (IIP) Annual Three months External Debt External debt report prepared by the BRH showing monthly disbursements; debt service, debt forgiveness and rescheduling, arrears, and debt stocks. Monthly One month Details of any external public debt and debt guaranteed by the State Monthly One month Data on stocks, accumulation, and repayment of external arrears Monthly Six weeks Table of complete amortization of external debt Annual Three months