Bilten Risk: Obsèvatwa Vyolans ak Rezistans nan Ayiti - Nimewo 2

RISK BULLETIN CLICK HERE TO VIEW THE Global Organized Crime Index ISSUE OBSERVATORY OF VIOLENCE AND RESILIENCE IN HAITI 2 NOVEMBER 2024 Summary highlights Gangs’ expansion and the pressure on public The centrifugal dynamics of violence in security strategies. Port-au-Prince. Gang attacks carried in and out of Port-au-Prince are The territorial facets of violence in Haiti are marked by a putting immense pressure on the Haitian National Police strong centrifugal dynamic. Since July 2024, gang (HNP) and the Multinational Security Support (MSS) violence has risen at the limits of the Port-au-Prince forces. Since its deployment in June 2024, the mission metropolitan area, particularly in Ganthier, under attack has faced challenges as great as the expectations it has by the 400 Mawozo gang, and Gressier. In October, the raised among the Haitian population and the importance spread of violence was dramatically accentuated by a it has assumed in the eyes of the international massacre committed by the Gran Grif Gang in community. Although it is still too early to draw Artibonite. The gangs’ attacks show a desire to expand definitive conclusions, the MSS has not yet enabled the their reach for strategic reasons, including territorial HNP to reverse the balance of power with the gangs. By control, arms and drug trafficking, and greater influence land, the capital remains just as isolated from the rest of over larger populations and resources. Faced with this the country, with gangs controlling the main highways challenge, the MSS mission and the HNP are still unable and having driven up the cost of extortion on the to respond to the opening of multiple fronts or to transport of goods, particularly in the Canaan area, an occupy the field over the medium term. These essential passageway to the north and centre of the operational shortcomings benefit the gangs who country. Meanwhile, the total closure of the Gressier continue, to a large extent, to play cat-and-mouse with area, a unique gateway to the south, has isolated a third the forces of law and order. of the country, which now depends on coastal shipping for its supplies. Homicides are falling, but gang pressure especially in areas that remain under gang control. In keeps rising. qualitative terms, gangs in Haiti continue to exert The current state of violence in Haiti offers two hard enormous pressure on the communities living under truths. While data from April to June shows a 45% their control, a dynamic illustrated in particular by the decrease in homicides compared with the previous large increase in rape and gender-based violence quarter, this has not resulted in improved living figures, as well as population displacement. conditions or long-term stability for Haitians, ABOUT THIS ISSUE The second issue of the Risk Bulletin of Violence and Added to this logic is the renewed territorial expansion Resilience in Haiti aims to highlight the geographical and of violence outside the capital. While gangs, vigilante social evolution of gang violence and the challenges it groups and other armed entities have been present and poses for the responses of national authorities and the active outside Port-au-Prince for several years, this international community. It also shows that, despite the dynamic has taken a new turn in recent months. Since statistical decline in violence between March and July 2024, gang violence has increased considerably on September 2024, the structural conditions that underpin the outskirts of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, it, namely the social dominance of gangs and their ability particularly in Ganthier, towards the Dominican to resume fighting, remain intact. Republic, and in Gressier, an obligatory gateway to the south-west of the country. In October, the spread of Since the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support violence was dramatically accentuated by a massacre

(MSS) mission deployed to Haiti in June 2024, it has committed by the Gran Grif gang in Artibonite. Attacks faced challenges on a scale commensurate with public by gangs reflect a desire to expand their hold for expectations of the mission and its growing importance strategic reasons: control of territory and local on the world stage. In particular, the issue of funding populations, arms and drug trafficking, influence and and logistical support remains a key obstacle to the control over larger legal markets and resources. mission’s full operational capability. Although it is still too early to draw conclusions, and while reinforcements This territorial evolution poses an enormous operational are expected to arrive soon, the MSS mission has not challenge for the public forces. Indeed, neither the MSS yet enabled the Haitian National Police (HNP) to reverse mission nor the HNP seem capable of responding to the the balance of power against the gangs. The main opening up of simultaneous fronts scattered across the reason for this is the lack of financial and technical country. This is due to human, technical and logistical support from UN member states — with the exception shortcomings, as well as to the difficulty of the public of the US, Canada and, to a much lesser extent, France. forces to project themselves quickly, inside or outside Without financial support, it is impossible for the mission the capital, and to occupy the terrain in the medium or to accomplish the task for which it was deployed. long term. These operational shortcomings benefit the gangs, who continue to play a game of cat and mouse The gangs still control more than 80% of the Port-au- with the public forces, catching police operations off Prince, as well as the main roads leading to the capital, guard or nullifying their efforts by retaking disputed isolating it from the rest of the country and making the territories as soon as the officers leave. smooth transport of goods or the movement of people dependent on the collection of extortion money and the These developments reveal a country locked in a dual goodwill of armed groups. If the latter decide to close reality. Although data from April to June shows a 45% down certain routes or block certain infrastructure drop in homicides compared with the previous quarter, nodes, as was the case with the international port of and while we await future consolidated figures, this has Port-au-Prince between September and October 2024, not translated into improved living conditions or long- it is illusory to think that the public forces will be able to term stability for Haitians. This is even less the case for prevent them. those living in areas still under gang control. While some areas of the country have been able to take advantage of RI S K BU LLETI N #2 – NOV EM BER 2024 2 the relative calm to return to a more normal life — with communities living under their control, as illustrated by schools reopening, some commercial and economic the sharp increase in rape and gender-based violence, as dynamism returning, and freedom of movement regained well as population displacement. — the rest of the country suffers from direct or indirect gang pressure, and the devastating impact of violence on These lines of analysis illustrate how the Observatory of social, economic and professional life. Finally, even in Violence and Resilience in Haiti strives to offer a political areas controlled by criminal groups, where clashes may economy panorama of violence in the country, in a have subsided in the last six months, in qualitative terms, context of high political tension and uncertainty. the gangs continue to exert enormous pressure on the RI S K BU LLETI N #2 – NOV EM BER 2024 3 Gangs’ expansion and the pressure on public security strategies. Gang attacks carried out far from downtown Port-au- area, a unique gateway to the south of Haiti, has

Prince are putting immense pressure on the Haitian isolated a third of the country, which now depends on National Police (HNP) and Multinational Security Support coastal shipping for its supplies. (MSS) forces. Since its deployment in June 2024, the mission has faced challenges as great as the expectations From an operational and tactical point of view, the it creates among the population and the importance it police and the MSS are faced with several decisions. assumes in the eyes of the international community. First and foremost is their capacity — or inability — to deploy men, which has been singled out for criticism, Although it is still too early to draw definitive particularly during the gang attacks on Ganthier (see conclusions, the MSS has not yet enabled the HNP to story 2). Public security forces are still not in a position reverse the balance of power with the gangs. By land, to deploy and maintain a constant presence in order to the capital remains just as isolated from the rest of the hold the territory. This is due to the dangerous nature country, with gangs controlling the main highways, of the environment, the lack of human and technical while having driven up the cost of extortion on the resources available to the HNP and the MSS, and the transport of goods, particularly in the Canaan area, an strategy adopted by the gangs, especially since March essential passageway to the north and centre of the 2024, of systematically destroying public country. Meanwhile, the total closure of the Gressier infrastructure — mainly police stations and barracks — Port 1 Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission Base 3 Port Lafito HAITI Parliament International Airport Canaan CANAAN 3 1 Port-au-Prince Bay CROIX-DES-BOUQUETS N Pierre VI Brooklyn Terre Noire Nan Boston Belekou Simon Pelé Waf Jérémie 1 International port (CPS) International port (APN) Parliament Thor terminal 2 GRAND SALINE 5 Segond The area is not under the uniform control of a single gang. It is divided between the influences of Gang Mariani (led by Boutbas), and Gang Gran Ravine (led by Ti Lapli). Recently, the area has also been disputed by the National Police, who is seeking to regain control. MSS TABARRE Baz Nan Chabon D E L M A S Delmas 6 Bel-Air Baz Krache Dife 2 CARREFOUR 8 Carrefour Drouillard Terminal Varreux GRESSIER Chen Mechan CITÉ SOLEIL 6 km 0 3 1 Baz Pilate Gran Ravine M A R T I S S A N T Nan Ti Bwa 400 Mawozo 8 400 Mawozo PORT-AU-PRINCE GANTHIER 101 PÉTION-VILLE Kraze Baryé KENSCOFF 101 L L L G Nan Ti Bwa G Gran Ravine G Baz Pilate L L G Baz Nan Chabon G Brooklyn G Pierre VI G Delmas 6 G Carrefour Drouillard G Kraze Baryé G Waf Jérémie G Terre Noire L Gressier (Area of conflict) Note: Gangs are sometimes named after the zones they control G 5 Segond L G Simon Pelé G Canaan G Baz Krache Dife L G Belekou G Chen Mechan G Gang name G Bel-Air L G Nan Boston G 400 Mawozo L Specific location L FIGURE 1 Expansion of gangs in Haiti. Sources: Field information collected by the GI-TOC and data produced in collaboration with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime RI S K BU LLETI N #2 – NOV EM BER 2024 4 in controlled or conquered territories. The public the town several times, carrying out further expulsions forces have nowhere to settle in safety. of the population and extensive urban destruction. They then started to construct a double barrier wall on the In this context, the MSS mission and HNP are forced national road leading to Ganthier with the aim of into offence–defence operations with gangs, without preventing public forces from advancing into the area. being able to occupy the terrain for more than a few Although the HNP seems to have succeeded in days at a time. These operational shortcomings benefit intervening and destroying the encroaching wall, it the gangs, who continue to challenge public security

remains to be seen how the situation develops, and forces. In Ganthier, for example, the gangs returned to what the gangs’ attitude will be to the public forces. KEY FIGURES Number of homicides or injuries, January to March Rate of internally displaced persons: 60% increase, 2024: 2 500. March to June 2024. Between 1 April and 30 June 2024, at least 1 379 Number of individuals facing emergency levels of food people were killed or injured. This represents a 45% insecurity: 1.64 million. drop in killings and gunshot wounds and a 2% drop in kidnappings compared with Q1 of 2024.1 Percentage of children active in gangs: 30%–50%. Between 1 January and 30 June 2024, OHCHR Proportion of households that lack macro- and micro- documented that at least 2 652 people had been killed nutrient requirements: 65%. (2 221 men, 363 women, 52 boys and 16 girls) and 1 280 others injured (920 men, 295 women, 47 boys and 16 girls) as a result of gang violence in the country. Meanwhile, media outlets have pointed to difficulties in in the country. In terms of overall coordination of coordinating between the HNP and the MSS mission. operations, it is essential that the HNP and Haitian This is said to be due to language and communication government, embodied by Prime Minister Garry Conille problems, with Haitian sources complaining of Kenyans in his additional role as minister of the interior, have the speaking English or Swahili during operations. There is capacity to draw up short- and medium-term strategies, also, apparently, resentment among some Haitian troops and implement them on the ground, with their partners. towards the foreign agents’ better living conditions and higher pay.2 In this context, several sources have This appears to have been more the case in the interior emphasized the importance of making efforts to better of Port-au-Prince since late August and early September. coordinate between the HNP and the MSS mission, The government had made a point of launching including at the police agent level, on top of senior operations against gangs in the particularly tense Solino officer or management level. district. These operations, carried out over several consecutive days in September, seemed to have Difficult as it may be, it is essential to build trust and stabilized the front against the gangs in Bel Air, in the collaboration between the HNP and the MSS. This is heart of the capital. During a field visit, the GI-TOC especially important at times when other countries are observed that the police had created a buffer zone preparing to deploy forces to Haiti, adding to the mix of between Bel Air and Solino - destroying numberous nationalities, languages and operational cultures present houses in the process - and thus eased the pressure on RI S K BU LLETI N #2 – NOV EM BER 2024 5 Solino exerted by the criminal groups. This buffer zone strategic communication that had existed since the did not, however, prevent stray bullets from being fired previous government, and into which the gangs in September and October, resulting in several victims, rushed, saturating social networks and certain media followed by massive gang attacks on the Solino district with videos and interventions by their leaders. To from 17 October onwards, displacing over 5 000 people. counter this phenomenon, the HNP, the government and the MSS mission have stepped up their Finally, the HNP, the government and the MSS mission communication efforts. This is a positive development. continue to be caught up in a communication war Institutional communication cannot mask or replace against criminal groups. Until mid-July, it was difficult the victories, however modest, that the HNP and MSS to discern a coordinated communication strategy need to turn the tide against the gangs, but better among the various public institutions, as each seemed communication on the objectives and results of their

to be pulling its own strings. This contributed to police operations is essential to establish their exacerbating the vacuum created by the lack of legitimacy with the Haitian population. Notes 1 UN Integrated Office in Haiti, Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, April–June 2024. 2 Wethzer Piercin and Widlore Mérancourt, Tensions entre la police haïtienne et les Kényans, 4 September 2024. RI S K BU LLETI N #2 – NOV EM BER 2024 6 The centrifugal dynamics of violence in Port-au-Prince. The territorial nature of violence in Haiti exhibits a entering the Dominican Republic and then being strong centrifugal dynamic. Since July 2024, gang transported to Haiti using formal and informal border violence has risen outside the limits of the Port-au- crossings, including the Jimaní-Malpasse crossing.9 Prince metropolitan area, particularly in Ganthier, 30 kilometres east of the capital, under attack by the The events in Ganthier expose the ongoing struggle 400 Mawozo Gang, and in Gressier, 20 kilometres west between Haitian security forces and the 400 Mawozo of the capital. 1 gang, highlighting the complexities and limitations of current intervention strategies. Despite a planned In early October 2024, this dynamic took an even more operation on 25 July 2024 that involved both Haitian dramatic turn when the Gran Grif Gang carried out one police and Kenyan officers from the MSS mission, they of the largest massacres the country has seen in failed to establish lasting control over the area. The decades. In the commune of Pont-Sondé, a commercial gang’s rapid reoccupation of Ganthier, coupled with their hub of Artibonite, 100 kilometres north of the capital, subsequent assaults, demonstrates their strategic the gang executed men, women and children, looted and adaptability and emphasizes the challenge that Haitian destroyed houses, and forced more than 6 000 and international security forces face in sustaining inhabitants to flee the area. Estimates put the death toll security gains. This scenario underscores the need for a 2 at around 109. According to initial reports, the Haitian reassessment of tactical approaches, more robust national police, stationed just 20 kilometres from Pont- support and deeper community engagement to counter Sondé, failed to intervene during the attack. 3 the gang’s entrenched presence and mitigate its impact on local populations. These gang attacks show a will to expand influence for strategic reasons related to territorial control, drug and Meanwhile, to the south, gangs have continued to arms trafficking, and to increase their influence over expand their control over areas in Gressier and larger populations and resources.4 Carrefour. These attacks have displaced more than 4 400 people since May 2024.10 Additionally, 46 On 29 July 2024, the 400 Mawozo gang launched an women and girls have been sexually abused, with police assault on Ganthier that resulted in widespread rescuing 23 of them during an operation in July.11 destruction, including of the local police station. Another attack by the group on 15 August 2024 Ganthier and Gressier are strategically important locations forcedly displaced 6 000 residents amid house for the gangs. Situated on the western edge of Port-au- 5 burnings, kidnappings and robberies. The group’s Prince, Gressier provides a critical gateway to the capital, assault followed a failed attempt by Haitian forces on making it an asset for controlling movement in and out of 25 July to curb the 400 Mawozo gang’s influence in the city. The town’s location on National Route 2, a major neighbouring Croix-des-Bouquets, illustrating their transport route, allows gangs to exert influence over trade resilience and strategic planning. 6 and logistics, and to facilitate the smuggling of goods.12 The southern departments are also critical drug and Ganthier is a rural community located on Road 8, around

firearm trafficking routes for the gangs.13 20 kilometres from the Malpasse border crossing with the Dominican Republic and on a key axis to the Despite promises to act, state interventions have been country’s south. The roads there, and the region in minimal, and the gangs have taken control of public general, are used for smuggling weapons, drugs and markets, businesses and transportation, imposing tolls other contraband, such as firearms.7 In 2023, the United on a short stretch of road. Nations Office on Drugs and Crime identified Malpasse as a critical passage for drugs out of the country due to Aside from the intense violence in Artibonite and its poorly monitored, mountainous terrain bordering the Carrefour, gang attacks in Gressier and Ganthier Dominican Republic.8 Firearms have been tracked illustrate the expanding reach of criminal groups. Such RI S K BU LLETI N #2 – NOV EM BER 2024 7 attacks are helping to transform the landscape of exploit. Controlling these areas allows gangs to clashes and population displacements. By expanding generate more income through extortion, taxation or into other departments, gangs seek to control more direct involvement in local economies. territory, which allows them to exert influence over larger populations and resources, and make them more The timing of these attacks also shows how gang formidable players in Haiti’s economic and political factions use offensive tactics to test the Haitian National spheres.14 Moreover, the gangs usually expand to Police and Multinational Security Support mission’s regions that offer resources such as agricultural capacity to respond. products, trade routes and other economic assets to Notes 1 Juhakenson Blaise, Gangs continue to rule and expand their grip on Haiti as authorities promise action, The Haitian Times, 26 August 2024. 2 Death toll rises to 109 after Haiti gang attack, official says, RFI, 10 October 2024. 3 Jean Junior Célestin, Massacre de Pont-Sondé : le bilan s’alourdit, Le Nouvelliste, 4 October 2024. 4 David C. Adams and Andre Paultre, Sidestepping deployed Kenyan forces, Haiti gangs continue reign of terror, The New York Times, 11 August 2024. 5 The Soufan Center, Recurrent gang violence proving a difficult cycle to break in Haiti, 15 August 2024. 6 7 David C. Adams and Andre Paultre, Sidestepping deployed 9 UN Integrated Office in Haiti, Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, January–March 2024. 10 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Haiti emergency situation report No. 23 (as of 16 May 2024), 17 May 2024. 11 Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, Murders, rapes, looting, and arson in Carrefour and Gressier under the indifferent gaze of the new state authorities, 15 August 2024. 12 UN Integrated Office in Haiti, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Security Council, 15 January 2024. 13 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Haiti’s criminal markets: Mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking, 2023. 14 David C. Adams and Andre Paultre, Sidestepping deployed Kenyan forces, Haiti gangs continue reign of terror, The New York Kenyan forces, Haiti gangs continue reign of terror, The New York Times, 11 August 2024. Times, 11 August 2024. UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Haiti’s criminal markets: Mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking, 2023. 8 Ibid. RI S K BU LLETI N #2 – NOV EM BER 2024 8 Homicides are falling, but gang pressure keeps rising. The current state of violence in Haiti, and to a larger to criminal governance, replacing the fragmented and extent in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, offers conflictual regulation enforced by individual gangs. two hard truths. While April to June country-level statistics show a 45% decrease in homicides compared 1 Secondly, the number of direct confrontations between to the previous quarter, this has not translated into gang members and Haiti’s police has also decreased.

improved living conditions or long-term stability for the Following the cat-and-mouse dynamic of confrontations, entire population of Haiti, or the capital. this can be seen as a tactical decision on behalf of the gangs. By reducing the number of direct attacks against In Port-au-Prince, two territorial and social realities law enforcement, gangs may lessen the immediate threat coexist almost in parallel. The metropolitan area is of retaliatory operations, which can destabilize their divided in two, between those living under the direct control over the territories they dominate. This allows control of the gangs and the rest of the population. In them to focus on consolidating their power within these qualitative terms, gangs continue to exert enormous zones without drawing much attention from national pressure on the populations living under their control, a and international actors. dynamic illustrated in particular by the explosion in rape and gender-based violence (GBV) figures, as well as Thirdly, Viv Ansanm’s strengthened territorial control has population displacement. allowed the gangs to expand their ability to extort and impose protection rackets, further embedding the gangs In fact, gangs’ control over populations and territories within Haiti’s socio-economic and political structures. cannot be measured solely by homicide rates or attacks. Moreover, the long-standing installation of checkpoints, Criminal groups can maintain order and, to a certain as well as the imposition of rules that regulate people’s extent, calmness, within the territories they control, movements, demonstrate the gangs’ ability to assert thereby reducing the number of deadly attacks, while their authority over daily life. This system is part of a the systemic effects of their domination persist or even larger territorialization effort, where violence is deployed expand. Therefore, while the decline in homicides is to maintain order and build sovereignty. encouraging, there are several dynamics that need to be studied to better understand the situation. Additionally, there has been a shift in the patterns of violence in several gang-controlled zones. While the First, the decline in homicides during Q2 is linked to the underlying issues that perpetuate instability and absence of inter-gang violence since the February 2024 suffering remain unresolved, truces have been brokered relaunch of Viv Ansanm (Living Together, in Haitian in the past months. On 25 July 2024, a ceasefire was Creole), a gang coalition that seeks to present a unified reached between rival gangs in the neighbourhoods of criminal front. Unlike previously, when gangs operated in Brooklyn, Belekou and Boston, in the Cité Soleil area in continually conflicting capacities, Viv Ansanm has united Port-au-Prince.3 The July 2024 truce marked a multiple factions under a shared agenda. Since its temporary cessation of hostilities and slightly improved revival, Viv Ansanm has fuelled gangs’ capacity for living conditions for local residents.4 mutual collaboration and institutionalization.2 The agreement principally led to the destruction, by the Despite reported tensions and confrontations between gangs themselves, of roadblocks, walls (called VAR, in certain groups, particularly in September, the end of the Haitian Creole) and checkpoints, and a public and clashes has enabled gangs to shift their strategic focus, private effort to collect garbage and sanitize improve the management of their members and resources neighbourhoods, allowing residents greater freedom of — particularly weapons and ammunition — and exert more movement. The isolated neighbourhood of Brooklyn, in extensive and coordinated control over larger areas. The particular, has regained easier access to water supplies revival of Viv Ansanm has led to a more unified approach

and food. Before the removal of the roadblocks, residents were unable to leave and were forced to rely RI S K BU LLETI N #2 – NOV EM BER 2024 9 on people from surrounding neighbourhoods to bring in left dozens dead, with no final official toll having been supplies, often at great personal risk. made public. Interviews conducted with local residents also mention the tracking down of residents in the hours However, the situation in Cité Soleil remains precarious. following the clashes, as well as displaced persons. Previous truces, including one in July 2023,5 collapsed shortly after they were established. Despite the relative These acts of violence demonstrate the fragility of the calm, the area faces serious challenges, including the situation and the gangs’ ability to reactivate violent presence of active gangs and harsh living conditions in practices from one moment to the next. The system of the aftermath of widespread destruction — some areas social control imposed by gangs is not arbitrary — it is part still resemble urban war zones. In an interview in of a broader strategy of territorialization, where violence September 2024, a resident of Cité Soleil reported that is used to enforce discipline and order. Violence is also the area has remained relatively calm since the July used as a deterrent, creating an atmosphere of fear and 2024 truce, although residents still lack humanitarian unpredictability. Public displays of violence, such as access and resources, such as safe drinking water and massacres and the mutilation of bodies, are particularly food, which can only be found outside the community. A effective in enforcing control, leading to mass coordinator of a Haitian non-governmental organization displacements and migration. Kidnappings, extortion and referred to the current state of affairs as ‘a negative public executions are often used to maintain order within peace’, indicating the reduction of direct violence while their territories. These extreme acts of violence not only the underlying causes of the conflict and the absence of terrorize the local population, but also demonstrate the a reconciliation and justice process remain unresolved. 6 gang coalition’s power to rival factions and public authorities altogether, reinforcing its dominance. In fact, violent clashes broke out on 12 September between the Simon Pelé and Boston groups. In the context of the end of a soccer tournament, and under conditions that are still unclear, armed men allegedly opened fire.7 The crossfire and executions reportedly 300 250 200 150 100 2019 2020 2021 Incidents AU JUN FEB APR DEC AU 2023 OCT JUN FEB APR DEC AU 2022 OCT JUN DEC FEB APR AU OCT JUN FEB APR DEC AU OCT JUN FEB APR DEC AU OCT JUN FEB APR DEC AU 2018 OCT JUN 0 FEB APR 50 2024 Deaths FIGURE 1 Gang violence in Haiti, 2018–2024. Source: José Luengo-Cabrera, with data from ACLED RI S K BU LLETI N #2 – NOV EM BER 2024 10 100 80 60 40 20 0 JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP JAN MAY SEP –20 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 14 15 2019 2020 2021 2022 19 20 2023 2024 FIGURE 2 Trends in food inflation in Haiti. Source: José Luengo-Cabrera, with data from the World Bank 350 000 300 000 250 000 200 000 150 000 100 000 50 000 0 03 20 20 04 20 05 20 06 7 0 20 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 Refugee 20 20 20 16 20 17 20 18 20 20 20 21 20 22 20 23 IDPs FIGURE 3 Haitian refugees and internally displaced people in Haiti, 2003–2023. Source: José Luengo-Cabrera, with data from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) RI S K BU LLETI N #2 – NOV EM BER 2024 11 In this way, the Viv Ansanm coalition has effectively

churches and sports fields, suffer from shortages of positioned itself as a criminal institution, and a water and sanitation facilities, such as latrines, creating mechanism for the regulation of violence. Viv Ansanm perilous living conditions that heighten the risk of members have used violence not just as a tool of waterborne diseases. repression, but also as a means to establish and maintain a social order that benefits their interests. Through a More than 30 medical centres and hospitals have shut combination of coercion, economic regulation and public down owing to vandalism and looting.9 The largest displays of power, the coalition has created a controlled hospital in the area, the State University of Haiti Hospital, environment where it can more easily dictate the terms was closed until efforts in June 2024 by the Haitian for inhabitants. National Police helped resecure it, allowing it to reopen.10 Meanwhile, press reports say that only about 20% of hospitals in Port-au-Prince are operating normally.11 This increase in community-targeted violence has enormous social and humanitarian implications. Mass displacement occurs as people flee danger, which Médecins Sans Frontières (or Doctors Without Borders), disrupts local economies and exacerbates poverty. The has highlighted the severe impact of gang violence on violence also weakens the community’s trust in the state mental health and access to social services in gang- and its law enforcement agents, as the perceived controlled areas. In these areas, often referred to as ‘red absence or ineffectiveness of the police contributes to a zones’, residents face significant barriers to accessing sense of abandonment and vulnerability. essential services as a result of the constant threat of violence, fear and stigma.12 This environment exacerbates Currently, over 578 000 people are displaced across mental health issues, as individuals are frequently exposed Haiti, with a 60% increase between March and June to traumatic events and chronic stress. Additionally, the 2024; of those, more than 112 000 are living in 96 presence of rival gangs can make it nearly impossible for informal sites scattered throughout the Port-au-Prince people to reach healthcare facilities, further isolating them metropolitan area.8 These sites, often located in schools, from necessary medical and social support. Port-au-Prince Delmas Cite Soleil Jacmel Carrefour Les Cayes Jeremie Tabarr Gonaives Boucan Carre Anse-a-Pitre Thomonde Grand Gosier Croix-DesBouquets 0 20 000 60 000 40 000 Female 80 000 Male FIGURE 4 Internally displaced people in Haiti, by location and gender. Source: José Luengo-Cabrera, with data from UNHCR RI S K BU LLETI N #2 – NOV EM BER 2024 12 The past few months have also seen a marked increase Victims of GBV may also choose not to report the crime in rapes and instances of GBV. According to a GI-TOC to the authorities, but rather to local gang leaders whom interview with a humanitarian officer, before the onset they view as the authority in their neighbourhoods, of violence in February 2024, international health invested with more power than the formal judicial facilities treated an estimated 10 rape cases per month. process.16 The impact of GBV on the community is That number has increased to more than 40 victims per profound, as pervasive fear and trauma disrupt social month since then, with many patients having previously cohesion, hinder economic activities and perpetuate a been treated for GBV. 13 cycle of violence and instability. These figures should be treated with caution. According Given these complex, intertwined dynamics of violence, to several humanitarian sources consulted in Port-au- the fall in reported homicides cannot be considered a Prince, victims under-report instances of sexual violence, sign of systemic progress in securing the capital. On the

as they often fear retaliation or lack trust in the justice contrary, it accentuates the capacity of Haitian gangs to system, 14 which is weakened by attacks on justice dominate and govern, and underscores the urgent need personnel and a minimal police presence. Under- to deal with structural conditions, direct support, reporting also indicates a form of social violence that smuggling networks and the politico-criminal relations perpetuates control even after the initial attack, and that support them. affects mental and physical health. Access to treatment for GBV survivors is severely limited, exacerbating the physical and psychological trauma they experience.15 Notes 1 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Haiti 10 Emmanuel Saintus, L’Hôpital de l’Université d’État d’Haïti (HUEH) est emergency situation report No. 30 (as of 2 August 2024), 5 toujours sous contrôle des agents de la Police Nationale d’Haïti, Haiti August 2024. 2 Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Risk Bulletin, Issue 1, GI-TOC, July 2024. 3 Santana Salmon, Haiti’s rival gangs sign truce, Caribbean National Weekly, 26 July 2024. Progres, 17 July 2024. 11 Lucnise Duquereste, Port-au-Prince’s last public hospital overwhelmed with patients, AyiboPost, 2 September 2024. 12 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Haiti emergency situation report No. 28 (as of 5 July 2024), 7 July 4 Ibid. 5 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Haiti: 13 Interview conducted in Port-au-Prince, July 2024. Humanitarian response overview, situation report — July 2023, 14 Summer Walker, Gang control and security vacuums: Assessing 14 August 2023. 6 Interview conducted in Port-au-Prince, July 2024. 7 Roberson Alphonse, Cité Soleil: Controversial penalty triggers another gang war, Le Nouvelliste, 12 September 2024. 8 Doctors Without Borders, People fleeing violence in Port-au- 2024. gender-based violence in Cité Soleil, Haiti, GI-TOC, May 2023. 15 Doctors Without Borders, People fleeing violence in Port-auPrince urgently need water and sanitation, 15 August 2024. 16 Summer Walker, Gang control and security vacuums: Assessing gender-based violence in Cité Soleil, Haiti, GI-TOC, May 2023. Prince urgently need water and sanitation, 15 August 2024. 9 Doctors Without Borders, Closed ports, empty shelves: Haiti urgently needs medical supplies, 21 May 2024. RI S K BU LLETI N #2 – NOV EM BER 2024 13 Risk Bulletins are regular outputs of our regional observatories, which draw on civil society networks to provide new data and contextualize trends related to organized-crime networks, illicit trade and state responses to them. If you would like to subscribe to future editions of the Risk Bulletin, please sign up here. ABOUT THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime is a global network with 700 Network Experts around the world. The Global Initiative provides a platform to promote greater debate and innovative approaches as the building blocks to an inclusive global strategy against organized crime. www.globalinitiative.net