Dènye chans? Soti nan blokaj politik ak kriminèl Ayiti a

I ww JANUARY 2025 LAST CHANCE? BREAKING HAITI’S POLITICAL AND CRIMINAL IMPASSE Maur © 2025 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Global Initiative. Cover: © Guerinault Louis/Anadolu via Getty Images Please direct inquiries to: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Avenue de France 23 Geneva, CH-1202 Switzerland www.globalinitiative.net ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This brief is an output of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s Obser vator y of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, which serves as a forum for research and analysis, civil societ y empowerment, capacit y building and suppor t for multilateral actors. We would like to thank the people in Haiti who made this study possible. Although for security reasons their names cannot appear in the report, their support is crucial to this work. The authors would also like to thank Mark Shaw, Tuesday Reitano and Walter Kemp for their comments, and the GI-TOC’s Publications team for their support in reviewing and developing the brief. CONTENTS Summary�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1 The Viv Ansanm gang coalition: an alliance for parallel sovereignty �����������������������������������������4 Growing threat of vigilante groups �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7 From gang violence to criminal governance ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9 Embedded actors, mafia-like rule���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10 Haitian politics: between paralysis and permanent conflict���������������������������������������������������������12 The Multinational Security Support mission: between a rock and a hard place��������������������������������������� 13 Mandate needed to tackle organized crime���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������14 Conclusion and policy recommendations for 2025 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������16 Notes��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19 1 SUMMARY I n 2024, Haiti suffered a year of unprecedented violence as gangs tightened their grip on the country. Criminal groups now control 85% of the capital, Port-au-Prince, and large swathes of the provinces. Over a million people are now internally displaced, a three-fold increase in one year. 1 At least 5 601 murders were recorded during the year, an increase of more than 1 000 victims compared to 2023, equivalent to an annual homicide rate of almost 48 per 100 000 inhabitants, a national record. 2 The deployment in June 2024 of a Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support mission (henceforth MSS) has so far failed to help Haiti’s National Police (HNP) to tackle the gangs. The Haitian and Kenyan forces remain tactically and operationally overwhelmed by adversaries who have vastly increased their arsenals and territorial control. Beyond the security dimension of the crisis, 2024 was marked by shifts in the gangs’ strategy. Three key developments stand out. Firstly, the gangs forged a criminal coalition known as Living Together (Viv Ansanm, in Haiti creole). 3 Through this collaboration, the gangs consolidated their capacity for criminal governance, which they have enforced through extortion and the enactment of ever stricter rules over the daily life of Haitians. Finally, through their capacity for violence and by increasing their voice in public debate, criminal leaders are able to influence the course of the country’s political transition, to put pressure on Haitian authorities and the international community, and to become more embedded than ever in Haiti’s political and economic system. The challenges posed by Haiti’s criminal groups are therefore greater than just their security threat. The country is now marked by not only militia-type practices and vigilantism, but also the gangs’ ability to shape the political sphere. The situation in Haiti in 2025 therefore presents a politico-criminal crisis in which gang leaders will seek to occupy a strategic space within the system, not replace it. Faced with this grim outlook, national and international responses are proving feeble. On the security front, lack of international funding and political support for the MSS, and consequently for Haiti’s police, is preventing any progress. On the domestic political stage, the two-headed governance structure set up in April 2024, with the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) on one side and the government on the other, has become paralyzed by political infighting. In 2024, institutional weaknesses and internal political wars opened up opportunities for the gangs to exploit. Criminal groups acted quickly and strategically, adapting to the context and putting pressure on the authorities. Institutional fragility thus feeds gang power, which, in turn, continues to weaken transition efforts, in a vicious circle from which no one seems to escape. 2 Against this backdrop, the United States and Haiti have asked the United Nations Security Council to transform the MSS into a peacekeeping operation. 4 As we await the response, the situation is deteriorating. But whether an operation materializes or not, without a holistic response that draws on a better understanding of Haiti’s political economy of violence, and explicitly tackles the problem of impunity, corruption and collusion between gangs and their white-collar allies, any sort of mission will not turn the tide. It is illusory to think that security will improve without institutional and political solidity, and vice versa. While Haitian people are subjected to unprecedented human rights violations, the pathway to resolv- ing the crisis has reached an operational and conceptual impasse. This brief offers avenues of action for 2025. It begins by outlining how the gangs’ governance has developed alongside the inadequacy of the current public security strategy, before looking at the political challenges ahead for Haiti’s transition and the international community. To have a significant impact, the brief makes the case for a paradigm shift in the national and international response, which must take full account of the Haitian organized crime ecosystem. The challenge is immense, but the tools are at our disposal to forge joint action in the face of a criminal crisis that is unique on a global scale. The methodology for this brief combines fieldwork observation and interviews conducted in Haiti, and desk research. The study also draws on previous research conducted by the GI-TOC in Haiti. All fieldwork activities were conducted by GI-TOC teams. To protect their security, the names of the participants are not given. The gang crisis that has engulfed most of Haiti, particularly its capital, Port-au-Prince, needs a comprehensive approach encompassing security, justice, development and humanitarian efforts. © Clarens Siffroy/AFP via Getty Images 3 7 February Guy Philippe organizes rallies against Prime Minister Ariel Henry. The mobilizations fail. 29 February Henry signs agreement to deploy 1 000 Kenyan police officers as part of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission. 11 March Henry announces his intention to resign once a transitional body is appointed. 4 March The airport shuts down after gang attacks, preventing Henry’s return to Haiti. It remains closed until 20 May. 3 April After weeks of negotiations, the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) is created. 24 April Henry resigns from office. 3 May After blockades by gangs, Haitian police regain access to the fuel terminal in Varreux. 25 June The first contingent of Kenyan forces is deployed in Port-au-Prince; 200 officers arrive in Haiti, out of the 2 500 planned. A few weeks later, a further 200 officers are deployed. 24 July Rival gangs controlling Cité Soleil sign a truce, allowing the population to move between neighbourhoods for the first time in months. 20 August The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctions Haiti’s former president Michel Martelly for facilitating drug trafficking and supporting gangs. 12 September Jamaica and Belize send small contingents of officers to support the MSS. 10–11 September Clashes between the Belekou and Simon Pelé gangs in Cité Soleil leave dozens dead, marking an outbreak of violence within the truce. 30 September The UN Security Council renews the mandate of the MSS for a further 12 months. 3 October The Gran Grif gang perpetrates a massacre in the Artibonite department, leaving at least 115 people dead. The massacre marks a resumption of attacks in the country. 17 October Gangs launch days of assaults on the Solino, Nazon, Delmas and Tabarre neighbourhoods in the capital. 18 October The UN Security Council authorizes the renewal of the sanctions regime against Haiti for 12 months, extending the scope of the arms embargo. 11 November Prime Minister Conille is dismissed by the TPC. 11–12 November Further gangs attacks in the capital provoke a wave of population displacement; the airport closes again after shots are fired at commercial aircraft. The US aviation regulator suspends civil flights to Port-au-Prince. 1 December Gangs attacks have displaced 40 000 people in the capital since 11 November – the largest since UN Migration began tracking data in Haiti. 12 December US civilian flights to Port-au-Prince are banned until March. Political events Gang-related events UN, MSS, international cooperation A YEAR OF CRISIS IN HAITI 2024 29 February Gangs launch coordinated assaults across Port-au-Prince. Gang leader Jimmy Chérizier claims responsibility and announces the creation of a gang coalition, Viv Ansanm. 3 March Armed gangs take control of Haiti’s largest prison; 4 000 inmates escape. 8–27 March Over 50 000 Haitians flee Port-au-Prince because of gang violence. 25 April The TPC is sworn in at the National Palace. 12 April The UN Security Council extends the mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti until 15 July 2025. 30 April Edgard Leblanc Fils is elected president of the TPC. 28 May TPC appoints Garry Conille as the new interim prime minister. 8 July Gangs take control of Gressier, a key point on the road between the capital and the south-west. 25 July The 400 Mawozo gang takes control of Ganthier, south-east of the capital, towards the Dominican Republic. Violence spreads outside Port-au-Prince. 10–12 September Maritime transport comes under threat following gangs attacks on vessels. Several companies suspend their operations to Haiti. 27 September The UN Security Council adds two people to the list of sanctioned Haitians: Luckson Elan, leader of the Gran Grif gang, and Prophane Victor, a former MP accused of weapons trafficking and supporting criminal groups. 7 October Leslie Voltaire succeeds Fils as president of the TPC. The appointment comes amid political disputes and corruption accusations against TPC members. 18 October Six soldiers from the Royal Bahamas Defence Force arrive in Port-au-Prince to reinforce the MSS. 12 November The TPC appoints Alix Didier Fils-Aimé as prime minister. 20 November The UN Security Council discusses the proposal of transforming the MSS mission into a UN peacekeeping operation. China and Russia reject the proposal. 6–11 December The Wharf Jeremie gang carries out massacres against the neighbourhood’s population, murdering more than 200. 3–4 January Two contingents of soldiers and police officers from Guatemala and El Salvador arrive in Port-au-Prince to join the MSS. 2025 THE VIV ANSANM GANG COALITION: AN ALLIANCE FOR PARALLEL SOVEREIGNTY F or Haiti, 2024 was marked by unprecedented violence, interrupted only between May and September 2024 by a period when gangs reduced their attacks on the population and police. 5 The calm was shattered by a massacre carried out on 3 October by the Gran Grif gang in the Artibonite region. 6 This and subsequent massacres demonstrated that cycles of violence and appeasement are dictated by criminal groups, not by any strategy on the part of the state or the international community. FIGURE 1 Gang-controlled zones of Port-au-Prince as of January 2024.DELMAS TABARRE CIT