(2025-01) Last Chance? Breaking Haiti's Political and Criminal Impasse
Summary — GI-TOC policy brief assessing Haiti's politico-criminal crisis at the start of 2025, after a year in which at least 5 601 murders were recorded, gangs consolidated control of 85 percent of Port-au-Prince through the Viv Ansanm coalition, and over one million people were displaced. Drawing on fieldwork and interviews, it argues that gangs have moved from violence to criminal governance built on systematic extortion and that neither the underfunded Multinational Security Support mission nor the paralyzed political transition can turn the tide without a strategy that combines public security with justice and action against politico-criminal collusion.
Key Findings
- In 2024 at least 5 601 murders were recorded, a homicide rate of almost 48 per 100 000, and internal displacement tripled to over one million people.
- The Viv Ansanm coalition almost eliminated inter-gang clashes, allowing gangs to control 85 percent of Port-au-Prince and expand into the provinces, with a 70 percent yearly increase in child recruitment.
- Extortion has become a vast illegal taxation system: gangs control or interfere with virtually all critical infrastructure, from port terminals and main roads to border crossings, so trade can barely function without their consent.
- The MSS mission remains critically under-resourced, with 566 officers deployed of 2 500 planned and US$97.4 million received against an estimated US$600 million needed annually as of January 2025.
- The political transition is paralyzed by infighting, illustrated by Prime Minister Conille's dismissal in November 2024 and corruption accusations against three Transitional Presidential Council members.
Full Description
This brief from the GI-TOC's Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti takes stock of an unprecedented year of violence and maps avenues of action for 2025. In 2024 at least 5 601 murders were recorded, an annual homicide rate of almost 48 per 100 000, internal displacement tripled to over one million people, and the Viv Ansanm coalition, coordinated by Jimmy Chérizier, nearly eliminated inter-gang clashes and extended criminal control over 85 percent of Port-au-Prince and large parts of the provinces. The brief identifies three structural shifts: the consolidation of a gang coalition that acts as a vehicle for parallel sovereignty; the growth of vigilante groups whose boundary with public forces is increasingly blurred; and the entrenchment of criminal governance in which extortion functions as a vast illegal taxation system covering ports, main roads, agricultural production and border crossings, so that the economy can barely function without gang consent. It documents the paralysis of the two-headed transition (Transitional Presidential Council and government), including the dismissal of Prime Minister Garry Conille in November 2024, and the underfunding of the Kenyan-led MSS mission, which had 566 officers and US$97.4 million against an estimated US$600 million annual requirement as of January 2025. The methodology combines fieldwork observation and interviews in Haiti with desk research. Recommendations for 2025 include resourcing analysis of the political economy of violence, urgent support and a strategic overhaul for the police and MSS, mediation to relaunch the transition, a justice strategy targeting impunity pacts and white-collar enablers, coherent implementation of sanctions and the arms embargo, organized-crime threat assessments for any peacekeeping operation, and enhanced disarmament, demobilization and community violence-reduction programmes.