Rapport sur l'achèvement de la mise en œuvre et les résultats: Projet de reconstruction d'urgence des écoles

Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR2426 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H4600) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR3.4 MILLION (US$5 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI FOR AN EMERGENCY SCHOOL RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT November 30, 2012 Human Development Department-Education Sector Caribbean Country Management Unit-Haiti Latin America and the Caribbean Region C losure Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized ii CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective August 30, 2012) Currency Unit = Haitian Gourdes (HTG) HTG1.00 = US$ 0.0238 US$ 1.00 = 42.05 FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS APG Adaptable Program Grant BND Bureau de Nutrition et de Developpement (Office for Nutrition and Development) CAE Country Assistance Evaluation CAS Country Assistance Strategy CCT Conditional Cash Transfer CDB Caribbean Development Bank CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CP Conseillers Pédagogiques (Teaching Advisors) DAA Department of Administrative Affairs DAEPP MENFP’s Department for Private Education and Partnership DDEs Direction Departemental d’Education ( Regional Education Departments ) DGS Direction du Genie Scolaire (Civil Works Unit) DHS Demographic and Health Survey 2005 DPCE Planning Department DPC Direction de la Protection Civile (Directorate of Civil Protection) DPS Direction de Projects Sociaux (Directorate of I Social Projects) EFA ERDMP Education for All Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Program ESRP Emergency School Reconstruction Program FAES Fonds d’Assistance Economique et Sociale (Fund for Social and Economic Assistance) FGHI Tropical Storm Fay and Hurricanes Gustav, Hanna and Ike IDB Inter - American Development Bank ISN Interim Strategy Note LAC Latin America and the Caribbean Region MENFP Ministere de L’Education Nationale et de la Formation Professionelle ( Ministry of Education ) MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance NAPSS National Action Plan for Safe Schools NDRMS National Disaster Risk Management System MPCE Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation PCU Project Coordination Unit PDNA Post - Disaster Needs Assessment PRSP Croissance et pour la Reduction de la Pauvrete - (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) RAP Resettlement Action Plan RPF Resettlement Policy Framework iii Vice President: Hasan Tuluy Country Director (Special Envoy): Alexandre V. Abrantes Sector Manager: Reema Nayar Project Team Leader: Patrick Philippe Ramanantoanina ICR Team Leader: Patrick Philippe Ramanantoanina ICR Primary Author: Richard J. Carroll iv HAITI EMERGENCY SCHOOL RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT CONTENTS Data Sheet B. K EY D ATES ........................................................................................................................................... V C. R ATINGS S UMMARY ............................................................................................................................. V D. S ECTOR AND T HEME C ODES ............................................................................................................... VI E. B ANK S TAFF ........................................................................................................................................ VI F. R ESULTS F RAMEWORK A NALYSIS ..................................................................................................... VII G. R ATINGS OF P ROJECT P ERFORMANCE IN ISR S ................................................................................... IX H. R ESTRUCTURING ( IF ANY ) ................................................................................................................... IX I. D ISBURSEMENT P ROFILE ...................................................................................................................... X I. P ROJECT C ONTEXT , D EVELOPMENT O BJECTIVES AND D ESIGN ....................................................... 1 1.1. Context at Appraisal ............................................................................................................... 1 1.2. Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators ................................... 1 1.3. Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification ............................................................................................................................. 2 1.4. Main Beneficiaries .................................................................................................................. 2 1.5. Original Components .............................................................................................................. 2 1.6. Revised Components ............................................................................................................... 3 1.7. Other significant changes........................................................................................................ 3 II. K EY F ACTORS A FFECTING I MPLEMENTATION AND O UTCOMES ...................................................... 3 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry...................................................................... 3 2.2 Implementation ............................................................................................................................ 5 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization............................. 6 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance ......................................................................................... 7 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase ...................................................................................... 7 III. A SSESSMENT OF O UTCOMES ............................................................................................................ 8 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation ................................................................ 8 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives ........................................................................ 9 3.3 Efficiency ................................................................................................................................... 10 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating ................................................................................... 11 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts ................................................................. 11 3.6 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops ..................... 11 IV. A SSESSMENT OF R ISK TO D EVELOPMENT O UTCOME .................................................................... 11 V. A SSESSMENT OF B ANK AND B ORROWER P ERFORMANCE .............................................................. 12 5.1 Bank Performance ..................................................................................................................... 12 5.2 Borrower Performance .............................................................................................................. 13 VI. L ESSONS L EARNED ........................................................................................................................ 14 VII. C OMMENTS ON I SSUES R AISED BY B ORROWER /I MPLEMENTING A GENCIES /P ARTNERS ........... 14 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ........................................................................................... 15 Annex 2. Outputs by Component................................................................................................... 16 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis .................................................................................. 19 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes .............................. 20 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ............................................................................................ 21 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results .................................................................... 22 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...................................... 23 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ........................................ 40 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ....................................................................................... 41 Annex 10: Excerpt from Independent Architect’s Report on ESRP Schools ............................... 42 v A. Basic Information Country: Haiti Project Name: HT: Emergency School Reconstruction Project Project ID: P115261 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H4600 ICR Date: 11/30/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE Original Total Commitment: XDR 3.40M Disbursed Amount: XDR 3.4M Revised Amount: XDR 3.40M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Education, Fonds d’Assistance Economique et Sociale Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: None B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 11/13/2008 Effectiveness: 06/25/2009 06/25/2009 Appraisal: 02/11/2009 Restructuring(s): 05/04/2011 12/14/2011 Approval: 03/05/2009 Mid-term Review: Closing: 12/30/2011 05/31/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: MS Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: MS Borrower Performance: MS C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: MS Government: S Quality of Supervision: MS Implementing MU vi Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Performance: MS Overall Borrower Performance: MS C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA): None DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Moderately Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Other social services 5 5 Primary education 90 90 Public administration- Education 5 5 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Education for all 65 65 Natural disaster management 35 35 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: HasanTuluy Pamela Cox Country Director: Alexandre V. Abrantes (Special Envoy) Yvonne Tsikata Sector Manager: Reema Nayar Chingboon Lee Project Team Leader: Patrick Philippe Ramanantoanina Michael Drabble/Peter Holland ICR Team Leader: Patrick Philippe Ramanantoanina ICR Primary Author: Richard J. Carroll vii F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the Project is to assist the Republic of Haiti in restoring and improving access to basic education in selected destroyed and/or heavily damaged public primary schools of its territory. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) No revision (a) PDO Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Indicator 1 : Occupation rate of rebuilt schools will be maintained at 75% or above following completion of civil works as measured within 6 months of Project closing. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A 75% 75% 85% Date achieved 02/17/2009 12/30/2011 05/31/2012 11/26/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target met At the 5/4/2011 restructuring, wording was changed only in terms of the time for indicator measurement, from “during the next school year following completion of civil works.” (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Indicator 1 : Number of schools rebuilt or rehabilitated with satisfactory technical standards in 2011 Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A 15 11 11 Date achieved 02/17/2009 12/30/2010 05/31/2012 05/31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target met. Target was revised downward at the 5/4/2011 restructuring because of cost increases and delays relating to January 2010 earthquake. Schools were built to MENFP and Ministry of Public Works standards including anti-cyclonic and anti- seismic norms. Indicator 2 : Number of schools retrofitted as emergency temporary shelters—4 schools in 2011 Value (quantitative N/A 5 4 4 viii or Qualitative) Date achieved 02/17/2009 12/30/2011 05/31/2012 05/31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target met. Target revised at 5/4/2011 restructuring because of factors relating to 2010 earthquake. Indicator 3 : Methods for safe school construction are adopted in 2011. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A 50% application of methods in new, donor-funded construction Methods for safe school construction are adopted Methods drafted and discussed at MENFP in 2011 and 2012 Date achieved 02/17/2009 12/30/2011 05/31/2012 05/31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target partially met. Indicator 4 : Development of training modules on measures to increase safety in all schools. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A 1 set of training materials disseminated in 2010 and 2011 7 modules 7 modules Date achieved 02/17/2009 12/30/2011 05/31/2012 05/31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target met. The 7 modules are: 1- Evaluating Vulnerability and Risk; 2- Anti- hurricane and anti-seismic norms; 3- Team work; 4- Project Management; 5- Social Accountability; 6-Role of School Facilities; and 7- Parent-Teacher Relationships Indicator 5 : Increased awareness of vulnerabilities to disaster management and the mitigation measures for the education sector amongst the stakeholders. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A Consultations and workshops 9-consultations 2-workshops 20 consultations 5 workshops Date achieved 02/17/2009 12/30/2011 05/31/2012 05/31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target exceeded. Specific target numbers were added at the 5/4/2011 restructuring. Indicator 6: A NAPSS which will sustain the activities beyond the Project life, as it will function as a business plan of the GOH over the medium- to long-term Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A Plan endorsed by most stakeholders and major donors Plan prepared, adopted and presented to donors in 2011 Plan drafted in 2011 Date achieved 02/17/2009 12/30/2009 05/31/2011 05/31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target partially met as revised at 5/4/2011 restructuring. Draft NAPSS was prepared in 2011 and is being revised. Indicator 7: Percentage of schools rebuilt for which prequalification visits were conducted. Value N/A 100% 100% 100% ix (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 02/17/2009 12/30/2011 05/31/2010 05/31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target met. Indicator 8: Number of general quality assurance supervision missions carried out by DGS for each school built Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A 3 per school built (equivalent to 45 school visits). 2 per school built (equivalent to 22 school visits). 1 per school built (equivalent to 11 school visits) Date achieved 02/17/2009 12/30/2011 05/31/2011 05/31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target partially met. Architect retained at ICR stage to further assess quality of school construction. Indicator 9: Number of DGS staff trained to become Master Trainers on NAPSS issues. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) N/A 20 10 24 Date achieved 02/17/2009 12/30/2011 05/31/2011 05/31/2012 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target exceeded. 24 DGS staff have received training in evaluating vulnerability and risk, anti-hurricane and anti-seismic construction and teamwork. G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements (USD millions) 1 04/30/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 07/31/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 12/13/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.80 4 05/01/2010 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 0.80 5 02/23/2011 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 1.16 6 09/11/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 3.54 7 05/16/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.76 H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP 5/4/2011 No M U MU 1.35 Revising most of the targets and x Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP dates in the results matrix because of the increase in unit costs caused by the increased demand for construction post - the January 2010 earthquake. The main change is the reduction of total number of schools rebuilt from 15 to 11. 12/14/2011 No MS MU 4.03 Extension of the closing date to May 31, 2012 because of disruptive rainy season of 2011, to resolve complications at construction sites, and to allow for completion of school construction. I. Disbursement Profile I. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1. Context at Appraisal 1. At the time of appraisal, prolonged political instability, weak economic growth, and intractable poverty resulted in Haiti’s classification as a “fragile state”. More than three quarters of Haitians were poor (living on less than US$2 a day), and in the United Nations 2007/2008 Human Development Index, Haiti ranked 146th of 177 countries worldwide. 2. In August and September 2008, Haiti was struck by four successive storms and hurricanes: Tropical Storm Fay and Hurricanes Gustav, Hanna and Ike (FGHI), which severely damaged major public and social infrastructure and injured and killed hundreds of people. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) conducted a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) that estimated the overall impact of the FGHI on the socio-economic development of the country and developed a preliminary strategy for early-, medium- and long-term recovery and reconstruction. With respect to education, the PDNA estimated total damages and losses at nearly US$30 million, with another US$70 million in identified needs for the sector. According to official statistics, 964 schools were greatly damaged, affecting more than 200,000 children. These assessments underestimated the total damage, because the assessment focused on public sector infrastructure, which accounts for less than 20 percent of schools. Moreover, the education sector was already in poor shape from previous storms and neglect. 3. Rationale for Bank involvement. The Emergency School Reconstruction Project (ESRP) was prepared while there were two other ongoing, Bank-supported projects in the education sector: Education for All-EFA -Adaptable Program Grant-APG 1, and the Meeting Teacher Needs for EFA Project ( Formation Initiale Accelere -FIA). The context at appraisal was that the APG-1 was providing demand-side support in the form of tuition subsidies and school nutrition, while the FIA Project provided the supply-side intervention of newly trained teachers. However, the education sector also had a dire need for schools. The timing of ESRP was to benefit from the increase in trained teachers from the FIA Project. The ESRP was also part of a package of new operations including the Emergency Bridge Reconstruction and Vulnerability Reduction Project (US$20 million) to address emergency and short-term reconstruction needs. The ESRP responded to a direct request received from the Government of Haiti (GOH), specifically the Ministry of Education and Professional Development (MENFP) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) to help with school reconstruction. 4. The Project’s goal of restoring and improving access to schooling, was aligned with the Bank’s Interim Strategy Note’s focus on “quick wins”, and fell within the core priority of strengthening human capital outlined in the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ( Document de Strategie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Reduction de la Pauvrete - DSNCRP). The operation also was intended to strengthen the Bank’s position as one of the Ministry of Education’s main partners in the education sector. 1.2. Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 5. The PDO is “to assist the Government of Haiti in restoring and improving access to basic education in selected destroyed and/or heavily damaged public primary schools of its territory.” The original and revised PDO indicators are found in Table 1. 2 Table 1: Key Indicators and Revisions Original PAD Indicators Restructured/Revised Indicators Occupation rate of rebuilt schools will be maintained at 75% or above during the next school year following completion of civil works. Occupation rate of rebuilt schools will be maintained at 75% or above following completion of civil works, as measured within six months of Project closing. 1.3. Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 6. There was no revision of the PDO. The PDO indicator was revised as shown in Table 1. The modification was not to the target, but only when it would be measured. 1.4. Main Beneficiaries 7. The main beneficiaries are primary school students who will attend a greatly improved school facility that provides more space per student and safer construction standards. With the reduction in the number of schools to be built (from 15 to 11) following the May 2011 restructuring, the number of beneficiaries was reduced from 4,500 to 3,300 students. This figure was based on an average school capacity of 300 students. 8. The Direction du Genie Scolaire (DGS), a unit of the MENFP, benefited from training for 24 staff to become master trainers, as well as the rehabilitation of its offices following the 2010 earthquake and the provision by the Project of equipment to facilitate its supervisory and regulatory role in the Project. Through raised awareness of school safety through consultations and workshops, and the National Action Plan for Safer Schools (NAPSS), teachers and students at the schools benefited from increased school safety. The construction of temporary shelters in rebuilt schools also benefited students and the surrounding community in four schools. 1.5. Original Components Component 1: “Building back better” selected destroyed and/or heavily damaged public primary schools 9. The vast majority of the Project’s resources were to finance the reconstruction and rehabilitation of public primary schools under this component. The ESRP could respond to only a few of the worst situations identified through the PDNA. The schools were to be built using higher building standards than traditionally followed with the goal of building structures that could withstand natural disasters. 10. This component also aimed to add new facilities in some of the rebuilt public schools to be used as temporary emergency shelters for victims and evacuees during a natural disaster. In most cases, transforming a school to become an emergency shelter involved financing a combination of: (i) building an extra-large room attached to the existing school structure; (ii) upgrading and expanding the school latrines; and (iii) ensuring that schools have a secure access to drinkable water and/or energy source if possible. Component 2: Reducing and mitigating the vulnerability of educational infrastructure 11. The main objective of this component was to put in place a nation-wide program that helps reduce major risks to and vulnerability of schools caused by natural disasters. To this end, the component aimed to support increased preparedness of key stakeholders in case of natural 3 disasters. Specifically, a NAPSS was to be developed, combined with reinforcement of the capacity of the DGS to properly enforce new norms and regulations relating to the construction and maintenance of educational infrastructure. The elaboration of the NAPSS was to include: (i) a vulnerability assessment and risk analysis of existing educational infrastructure; (ii) a study on “The impact of disasters on the education sector in Haiti”; (iii) the organization of a national workshop on building and maintaining safe schools; and (iv) the elaboration of the NAPSS implementation plan. The ESRP was also to support the development of a communications strategy and communication activities/tools aimed at disseminating the main lessons learned through the implementation of the Project. The goal was to ensure that the ESRP would have a strong demonstration effect on education stakeholders. 1.6. Revised Components 12. The components were not revised. 1.7. Other significant changes 13. The Project was restructured twice: • May 4, 2011 , which scaled down the number of schools from 15 to 11, because of a surge in demand for construction materials and services that increased construction costs. The increase in demand for construction materials was a result of the January 2010 earthquake, which subsequently led to rebuilding on a massive scale. Seismic norms were added to the construction standards for the schools. Some of the training targets were also scaled down. The schedule for approving the NAPSS was also pushed back. This restructuring, which did not change the PDO, was approved by the Special Envoy to Haiti. • December 14, 2011 , which was only to extend the closing date from December 30, 2011 to May 31 2012 to allow for completion of school construction. The need for the extension was based on delays due to the 2010 earthquake, a disruptive rainy season and complications at construction sites. This restructuring, which did not change the PDO, was approved by the Special Envoy to Haiti. II. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 14. The urgent need for school reconstruction arose from the damage from FGHI. However, there had previously been a long period of neglect of school buildings. The ESRP school design strategy was to demonstrate the possibility of building good quality, safe schools that could withstand the natural disasters that are common in Haiti. 15. The ESRP was processed under emergency procedures to help the Government of Haiti (GOH) respond quickly and effectively to damage caused to the education sector infrastructure, and enhance preparedness for future natural emergencies. It aimed to restore access to schooling through the reconstruction of damaged schools. It also included activities to improve the capacity and methods for safe school construction (“building back better”), and to strengthen the institutional capacity of the MENFP to fulfill its supervisory and regulatory mandate. The Project also included activities to mitigate the vulnerability of school infrastructure through the development of the NAPSS, which would improve preparedness for natural disasters in the education sector. The ESRP was hoped to have a demonstration effect on the entire education 4 sector in Haiti and, in particular, on influencing practices and approaches in the construction sector. 16. The ESRP was designed also to reinforce DGS capacity, focusing on the DGS’ role in terms of: (i) identification and selection of schools or schools sites; (ii) general quality assurance of construction and rehabilitation of educational infrastructure; (iii) completion of vulnerability assessments for existing schools; and (iv) involvement in reducing and mitigating the vulnerability of educational infrastructure. To that end, the DGS was to be supported with equipment (vehicles, motorcycles and office equipment/furniture) for the central level and the Education Departmental Delegations where the DGS has deployed staff. Training was also part of the capacity building activities to ensure that all the staff involved in these activities have the required skills and knowledge to carry out their duties effectively. The DGS was also supported with a budget to undertake requisite field missions focusing on prequalification and supervision activities. Selected DGS staff were to be trained as Master Trainers to disseminate the new methods for safe school construction, and therefore, participate in a training of trainers program. The Project aimed at a core group of trainers at the community level. 17. Lessons learned and reflected in the Project design: The Project design took into account lessons learned from previous operations in Haiti and from Bank-wide experience with emergency response and mitigation operations at the global level that helped minimize certain Project risks. The Project design incorporated lessons from Colombia in ensuring that the local Government, the MENFP and the community took leading roles in design and implementation, including school maintenance. The communities were not required to provide in-kind and/or cash support for the rebuilding of the heavily damaged or destroyed schools, but they were consulted and regularly informed during the reconstruction process for safer schools. The Project also benefited from building norms in schools in Madagascar, given that traditionally built facilities were found to collapse after cyclones. Good practices for building codes from El Salvador were incorporated. 18. To implement these lessons the Project design called for a five-step process: (i) pre- qualification of the schools; (ii) preparation of bidding documents (feasibility study) and contracting of construction firms; (iii) community mobilization; (iv) general supervision of civil works; and (v) final delivery of rebuilt schools. Building safer and more resilient schools implied higher costs than for standard schools of lesser quality. However, the choice for ESRP was to promote a safer and more resilient model of schools, including access to latrines and potable water. 19. The cost of construction in Haiti is high by regional standards. At appraisal the complete reconstruction of a six-classroom primary school with latrines, water well, surrounding wall and equipment was estimated to cost between US$200,000 and US$250,000, including the 10 percent fee paid to the contract management agency (the Fonds d’Assistance Economique et Sociale —Fund for Social and Economic Assistance—FAES). The additional civil works equipping schools as emergency shelters was expected to add between 15 and 25 percent to the US$200,000 low-end Project unit cost or equivalent to between US$30,000-US$50,000 per school. The roles and responsibilities for the implementation of this sub-component were shared between the FAES (in charge of civil works) and the DGS, which was responsible for general quality control assurance through supervision and certification of civil works. The Bank also emphasized the importance of funding maintenance for the new schools (PAD Annex 9), and suggested the use of debt relief resources as a source of funding. 5 2.2 Implementation 20. The devastating earthquake that occurred on January 10, 2010, less than seven months after the ESRP became effective, left more than 200,000 people, 5 percent of the population, dead. There was widespread destruction of infrastructure, schools and government buildings, including the MENFP. Implementation of the APG-1 was halted for several months. The costs of construction of the schools were driven up substantially because of the soaring demand for construction materials and labor. The DGS offices were badly damaged by the earthquake and therefore had to be temporarily relocated to a borrowed space for several months. The unit cost of school construction increased to a range of US$300,000-350,000, an increase of 40 to 50 percent. It was in this context that the Project was implemented. 21. The DGS worked with the MENFP’s Department for Private Education and Partnership (DAEEP), and selected the schools, using specific eligibility criteria and geographic targeting following consultations with the beneficiary communities. As part of the prequalification process for the selection of schools, the DGS was responsible for: (i) collecting information related to the number of children regularly attending the schools that would be rebuilt; and (ii) assessing the potential unmet demand for education. The DGS worked with colleagues from the Planning Education Division and staff in DDE. Through pre-qualification of schools, the schools were dimensioned, taking into account the existing and expected needs of the community. The DGS met with the school director and staff, the school-parent community and the local authorities. DGS staff worked with MENFP staff at the local level including inspectors and the district education office staff. 22. Actual school construction was carried out by local firms recruited by the FAES, who also recruited supervision firms to oversee the construction works. These firms completed construction of all 11 schools by April 2012, well in time for the 2012/13 school year, which began in October 2012. Confirmation of school construction was done at three levels: (i) one supervision visit by DGS; (ii) site visits to several schools during the ICR fieldwork; and (iii) an assessment by an independent architect. These site visits confirmed that the schools were mostly completed and were of a much higher standard than other school construction in nearby communities. Given the post-earthquake devastation, it was an impressive feat for FAES to be able to deliver 11 new schools with only a modest delay. A large reason why FAES could meet the school construction target is because FAES was simply fortunate that its construction capacity was not destroyed in the earthquake. The Project was fortunate that FAES was the entity managing the construction firms and activities and not the MENFP itself, which had suffered major damage. 23. Because of construction cost increases and limited resources, FAES also had to cancel some nonessential design elements, such as fences in some schools and flush toilets in others. According to the post-completion architect’s report, FAES was able to reinstate the canceled elements as additional works in a number of cases. These reinstated elements were financed by the Project itself (with the gains as a result of the fluctuation of the exchange rates) and by the FAES's own funds. 24. The independent architect’s review of construction quality and durability was requested by the ICR team in order to have a comprehensive evaluation of the school construction. This architectural review found that while the schools were, for the most part, built to satisfactory 6 technical standards, there were a number of minor and major flaws in the design and the construction of the schools. For example the cable that secures school roofs was not properly positioned. Moreover, the cable was iron rather than steel with a higher susceptibility to corrosion. Water runoff channels could also have been better designed in some cases. Part of the reason for these flaws is the weak quality review from DGS. The ICR field mission also discovered that there was not any specific provision for maintaining the schools. FAES and school administrators referred rather vaguely to ad hoc efforts by the community to monitor the condition of the school buildings. However, there was no budget for either cosmetic (painting, grounds keeping) or structural upkeep of the new schools. The Bank is discussing with FAES how to address these issues, including a review of the architect’s report. It has been confirmed that all 11 schools are in operation for the 2012/2013 school year. 25. To ensure stakeholder participation in the development of the NAPSS, a multi- stakeholder Task Force was created to steer NAPSS elaboration. The Task Force included officials from the MENFP, the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Interior, NGOs and education private sector representatives, among others. It contributed to rich discussions and a holistic approach to NAPSS elaboration, as reflected in the preliminary version of the NAPSS, which was validated by this Task Force. Using training and assessment tools created by the Project, the DGS conducted vulnerability assessments of 158 schools in the two departments targeted by the Project ( Sud-Est and Nippes ). These activities provided data contributing to the elaboration of the NAPSS. A national workshop, along with many other smaller workshops and consultations, was also conducted to collect feedback on the vulnerability assessment and on the preliminary draft of a study titled, “The impact of disasters on the education sector in Haiti,” as well as part of the elaboration of the NAPSS. This workshop was useful in filling information gaps in the study and contributed to the validation of its findings. 26. The NAPSS has been presented to donors, but is still under revision. The NAPSS process has lagged in part because of weak ownership by the MENFP. This weak ownership may also undermine the potential demonstration effect of the newly built schools in terms of demonstrating construction norms for other schools to be built in the coming years, which will feed into the NAPSS process. The NAPSS’s main elements are: (i) prioritization of the needs for new school buildings, based on basic norms of construction which reflect international standards and respond to the findings of the vulnerability assessment and study; (ii) addressing the issue of retro-fitting of existing school buildings; (iii) protection and safety of the nonstructural components of the schools such as equipment and pedagogical materials; (iv) national guidelines for emergency planning at the school level; (v) guidelines for capacity building of education professionals to promote a culture of safety in schools; and (vi) clear and succinct guidelines to ensure effective implementation of each of these. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 27. Design . An M&E framework with specific targets was developed and the indicators were relevant to the PDO of restoring access to selected primary schools. The M&E function was used to determine the number of school-children expected to enroll, which determined the size of the school to be rebuilt. A potential occupancy was established for each school. If a given school is built to accommodate 300 children at six grade levels, and the 300 school- children were enrolled in the beginning of the school year, its occupation rate was 100 percent. Measuring the occupation rate is critical for assessing the achievement of the Project’s 7 development objective. One shortcoming with the PDO indicator is that it is measured with one overall target for all the schools, which does not allow it fully capture individual school occupation rates. The intermediate indicators tracked that schools and emergency shelters were built to satisfactory technical standards. Additional evidence of improved access was produced at the ICR stage. The PAD stated that these standards and norms were to be developed through a consultative process, which they were for both the MENFP (with respect to schools) and the Ministry of Public Works (with respect to construction standards for all government buildings). 28. Implementation. The schools were completely built only near the end of the 2011/12 school year, and so occupation rates could not be measured during Project implementation. With respect to school construction-related intermediate indicators, progress was monitored through regular reports transmitted from FAES field offices to the central office, and with respect to NAPSS-related indicators, through NAPSS Task Force meeting minutes and reports from the FAES central office. It was important to compare the schools built against technical standards. After the earthquake, anti-seismic norms were added to the anti-hurricane norms in the architectural plans at the request of MENFP as part of the May 2011 Project restructuring, which the Project monitored. Other indicators captured the quality of the school site selection, which was adequate and the quality of supervision, which was weak. 29. Utilization. M&E data on school construction costs were used to determine the revised number of total schools to be built. Also, based on M&E tracking, intermediate Project indicators were revised downward during restructuring. Intermediate indicators were also used to track the progress of the NAPSS process and the adoption of school safety standards. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 30. ESRP was rated as an environmental category B project. The pre-screening of projects for this emergency operation indicated that OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and OP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement) would be triggered and an Environmental Assessment and Management Framework (EMF) was developed and disclosed and used during construction. Environmental impacts under the proposed Project were relatively minor and were localized because most construction was on existing sites to replace damaged buildings. There were no involuntary resettlements. 31. The Project disbursed slowly, initially, because of earthquake-related delays with school construction, which accounted for 90 percent of the Grant proceeds. Still, there was no issue in terms of compliance of FAES with the Bank financial management procedures, nor was there an outstanding audit during the Project. The procurement plan was approved by the Bank. While the earthquake caused construction delays and necessitated a project extension, there were no delays and/or issues related to procurement matters. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 32. School construction is continuing with assistance from other donors including the IDB. Support to the NAPSS process and other institutional strengthening is continuing under the Bank-funded Project on Risk and Disaster Management (P126346). Other donors are also contributing to the NAPSS. For example, the Direction du Development et de la Cooperation (DDC—Swiss Aid) is working with the GOH on school designs incorporating anti-seismic and anti-cyclonic safety features. 8 III. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Rating: High 33. Objectives. The objective of restoring and improving access to basic education remains highly relevant as Haiti continues to rebuild schools that were damaged in hurricanes and the 2010 earthquake. There is still a massive deficit of functioning schools. With its limited resources, the ESRP was able to rebuild only 11 of the 964 schools that needed repair to be usable or needed to be rebuilt entirely. Similarly, other donors have funded only a small fraction of the needed schools, so projects that include new schools continue to be highly relevant. The rebuilding of schools is also part of the national education strategy’s priority to achieve universal primary education (Government of Haiti - The Operational Plan for Education 2010-2015 and the Declaration of General Policy of the Prime Minister—May 2012 ( Enoncé de Politique Générale du Premier Ministre ). The President personally inaugurated the school rebuilt with Project funding at Anse-a-Veau. The NAPSS is also highly relevant going forward and supports the most recent (through calendar 2012) World Bank Interim Strategy Note (ISN) FY2012-2013 emphasis on improved governance in the public sector. The Project was doing more than simply replacing schools that had been destroyed; it was “building back better.” 34. Design. The Project design was adapted to reach its stated objective in a low capacity context, and included reliance on existing agencies to provide supervision and quality control, which contributed to relevance. Reinforcement of DGS capacity also remains relevant, as it continues to struggle with issues such as adequate supervision of existing schools and those under construction. However, the DGS’s role in ensuring quality of construction needs to be better defined. The approach to developing the NAPSS is relevant from the standpoint of stakeholder participation and buy-in through consultations and workshops, as a national-level safer school strategy has never been established in Haiti. The design to improve safety standards and construction norms still needs work but is substantially relevant. The NAPSS will need continued support from donors to maximize its value as a national strategy for school construction. 35. One possible critique of the relevance of the approach to school construction is that the choice of expensive, high durability construction means that fewer schools could be built with available funds. However, the Project carefully reviewed lessons of experience with other projects in the region (Section 2.1), and concluded that it was more effective to build to a standard that would not have to be rebuilt given the vulnerability of Haiti to natural disasters. The higher standards favored by the more costly approach were relevant to improved safety because the schools could better withstand harsh weather and earthquakes, which continues to be relevant as Haiti works to update its construction norms and upgrade its portfolio of schools. This relevance is enhanced by the likelihood that, because of climate change, weather will continue to become more severe. 36. Implementation. Overall, the relevance of implementation was substantial as evidenced by the fact that FAES was able to construct the schools in an emergency environment (FGHI) that was compounded by the January 2010 earthquake. Given the level of devastation, it is conceivable that construction capacity in the country would have been diverted to other priorities. However, that did not happen. The May 2011 restructuring kept the Project’s scope relevant by scaling down the number of schools from 15 to 11. In addition, the Project adapted 9 to changing needs by including an explicit focus on anti-seismic considerations post-earthquake, and by directing resources to the rehabilitation of the DGS offices in order to restore and improve their physical operational capacity. 37. Implementation would have been enhanced by stronger technical support, perhaps working in tandem with DGS personnel. For example, school quality would have benefited by a more reliable provision of quality control at the school design and construction stages as many flaws, both significant and minor, were discovered after completion of construction. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Ratings: Substantial PDO: To assist the Government of Haiti in restoring and improving access to basic education in selected destroyed and/or heavily damaged public primary schools of its territory 38. This PDO has two parts, restoring access and improving access, which are assessed to be fully and partially achieved, respectively. The PDO aimed to achieve these improvements in schools most heavily affected by FGHI. The pre-qualification visits to selected new school sites by DGS ensured that the pre-existing schools at the sites had been severely damaged (at least 50 percent of the classrooms) or destroyed. The benefits of the ESRP are the restored access and improved access (safety and resilience of construction) from 11 new primary schools, which serve approximately 3,300 primary students who live in areas where the schools had been destroyed or heavily damaged. 39. The PDO indicator is that rebuilt schools are maintained at 75 percent student occupancy within six months of Project closing. With a 75 percent occupancy ratio, the restoration of access to basic education is achieved because students are able to attend school when they otherwise would not be able to because their school had been destroyed. The overall occupancy rate reported by the PCU in November 2012 was 85 percent, thus exceeding the target rate overall, which is evidence that the objective of restoration of access to basic education was achieved. The main intermediate indicator, as revised, of 11 new primary schools built to satisfactory technical standards was partially achieved. This indicator captures both restoring access and improving access. 40. Evidence of improved access is that the schools were built to satisfactory technical standards of both the MENFP/FAES and the Ministry of Public Works, and that these technical standards ensure safer schools by applying anti-seismic and anti-hurricane norms. Thus, the longevity of schools is extended and the likelihood of interruption of school attendance from weather and seismic damage to schools is reduced co