Risk Bulletin: Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti - Issue 3

RISK BULLETIN CLICK HERE TO VIEW THE Global Organized Crime Index OBSERVATORY OF VIOLENCE AND RESILIENCE IN HAITI 3APRIL ISSUE2025 Summary highlights The Multinational Security Support mission and the Haitian police: stuck between a rock and a hard place. The Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti is in an increasingly complicated position, and even with 1 000 personnel deployed, it is still far short of the planned 2 500. Despite some victories, gangs have never lost control. Poor coordination between the MSS and the Haitian police, difficulties in rapid deployment and lack of territorial presence, and inadequate intelligence gathering further complicate the response to gang governance. Additional international support is crucial, requiring immediate security measures and long-term institutional reforms to prevent Haiti’s further descent into chaos. The Transitional Presidential Council struggles for political legitimacy in the face of growing insecurity. Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council faces significant challenges establishing political legitimacy amid worsening security conditions. The recently formed Provisional Electoral Council has been tasked with organizing long-delayed presidential elections in November 2025, but only eight of Haiti’s 10 departments may be able to hold elections, potentially excluding up to 60% of eligible voters due to gang control in the Artibonite and West Departments. With gangs holding sway over Port-au-Prince, the possibility of free and fair elections remains questionable. Gang violence in Haiti: The first anniversary of Viv Ansanm. Haiti’s security crisis has further intensified between December 2024 and February 2025, with gangs growing from perpetrators of violence to strategic power brokers, led by the coalition Viv Ansanm. While reducing indiscriminate violence in some areas to establish economic control through extortion, gangs have intensified territorial expansion elsewhere. Their recent attack on Kenscoff — a strategic mountainous commune near Port-au-Prince — represents a tactical shift. By infiltrating this upper-middle-class area, they have established footholds closer to Pétion-Ville, Port au-Prince’s financial and political hub. Despite efforts by Haitian police and the UN-backed Multinational Security Support mission, gangs continue to strengthen their grip, effectively encircling the capital and worsening the humanitarian crisis. Are Haitian gangs on the road to political recognition? The gang coalition Viv Ansanm now controls 85% of Port-au-Prince — and is seeking more political recognition. In January, its leader announced the group’s transformation into a political party and proposed structural changes to the country’s governance. Haiti’s ABOUT THIS ISSUE The third issue of the Risk Bulletin of Violence and Resilience in Haiti analyzes ongoing gang violence in the country and the first anniversary of the formation of Viv Ansanm (Living Together, in Haitian Creole), the gang coalition that has transformed Haiti’s security landscape. It examines the evolution of gang tactics, their expanding territorial control and their growing political ambitions against the backdrop of Haiti’s broader institutional, humanitarian and security crises. Finally, it delves into the factors and dynamics that have driven the intensification of violence in Haiti and boosted the influence of criminal groups and illicit economies. Criminal governance is still gaining ground, unchallenged by the Haitian authorities or the international community. This is particularly evident in the extortion rackets that are still operating in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, but also in Artibonite. Moreover, Viv Ansanm’s emergence as a unified force over the past year is particularly concerning, as the coalition’s demand for political recognition challenges Haiti’s existing political order — creating new dilemmas for the Haitian government and international actors. The steady continuation of gang violence between December 2024 and February 2025 has resulted in Transitional Presidential Council has shown some division in how to respond; some members have considered acknowledging the coalition, while others strongly oppose any alliance with gang entities. This development presents Haiti with a critical dilemma: political integration could incentivize gangs to step down, but might also formalize violent power structures. Moving forward requires transparent institutional policies for demobilizing criminal groups rather than informal political dealings. severe consequences for Haiti’s population, including mass displacement, economic collapse and widespread insecurity. Law enforcement bodies, such as the Haitian National Police, have proven ineffective at countering gang activities. Meanwhile, international efforts, particularly the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support mission, remain hindered by operational challenges. Stranded in a strategic and operational deadlock, the Haitian and international forces remain caught between a rock and a hard place. Since it was established in April 2024, Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council has faced considerable obstacles in implementing meaningful security and governance reforms. This has placed Haiti into a state of political paralysis, with crucial implications for future governance — including the possibility of organizing elections in November 2025 — international cooperation, and broader efforts to restore stability, justice and public order. The complexities of Haiti’s escalating gang crisis underscore the urgent need for a coordinated, multifaceted response to address the root causes and symptoms of the country’s criminal crisis. RISK BULLETIN #3 – APRIL 2025 2 The Multinational Security Support mission and the Haitian police: stuck between a rock and a hard place. The Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission is in an increasingly complicated position. With only 1 000 personnel deployed, compared to the 2 500 originally planned, its operational scope is limited.1 While the mission has so far had some victories since it deployed to Haiti last June — such as the seizure of a residence belonging to gang leader Chérizier at the end of November 2024 — the gangs have never been in a weak position.2 During the weekend of 22 February, the MSS suffered its first casualty after a gang member fatally shot a Kenyan officer while they were responding to a distress call from residents in the commune of Pont Sondé, a commercial hub of Artibonite.3 Consequently, the mission struggles to challenge gangs’ territorial control, particularly in critical urban areas, undermining its efforts to restore order and secure vital infrastructure. The MSS mission’s challenges are also set against the backdrop of an escalating humanitarian crisis. Gangs continue to disrupt humanitarian efforts by limiting access to vulnerable populations and cutting off main supply routes, resulting in food and medical shortages, and further exacerbating residents’ suffering. Humanitarian workers have been targeted, and critical infrastructure, such as medical facilities and shelters, has been destroyed.4 During the recent attacks in Kenscoff (see story 3), Mayor Jean Massillon reported that the attackers had surrounded the area, leaving local authorities struggling to secure reinforcements to repel the assault. The attack resulted in significant loss of life and disrupted agricultural activities, as many victims were working class individuals tending crops. Additionally, leaked information revealing that the Haitian National Police (HNP) was aware of the pending attack but allegedly chose not to act.5 What transpired in Kenscoff underscored three things. First, the serious flaws in coordination, dialogue and trust between the HNP and the MSS, but also the internal institutional weakening of the HNP, linked — in addition to exhaustion in the face of constant engagement with gangs for months — to internal fractures within the command. Second, and this stems from the first problem, the difficulties of the HNP and the MSS to deploy rapidly in different theatres of operations, particularly when these are geographically distant, and to maintain control of the territory, repel the gangs and gain ground against them. Third, the critical need for more effective intelligence gathering and timely response mechanisms within Haiti’s security apparatus. The government’s failure to act on prior warnings highlights systemic issues in coordination and resource allocation. A sustainable solution to Haiti’s security crisis requires rebuilding the HNP into a capable and credible force. On 10 January 2025, the Haitian National Police Academy made progress when it celebrated the graduation of 739 new officers, including 213 women.6Still, Haitian officers often face threats to their lives, receive low pay and experience poor morale. In light of increasing violence, they have demanded better protection and support. Following the fatal shooting of the Kenyan officer in February, Garry Jean Baptiste, leader of one of Haiti’s two major police unions, called on government officials to provide officers with more equipment and backup, and criticized the delay in payments and lack of financial aid for families of slain officers.7 Without systemic reform, however, it is unlikely that the HNP will be able to stand on its own as a force capable of providing security and stability. There is still time and space for the MSS mission to make an impact if properly supported. The international community must work to balance short-term actions with long-term strategies for rebuilding Haiti’s institutions. It must also act decisively to expand the mission and bolster the HNP’s capability to reclaim territories from gang control. Finally, the MSS and the HNP must be able to receive regular operational and tactical training, combined with the provision of intelligence on the evolution of gangs within their territories. This aspect of the operational development of national and international law RISK BULLETIN #3 – APRIL 2025 3 Police patrol in Port-au-Prince, March 2025. The Haitian police force is currently losing the war against the city’s gangs. Photo: Clarens Siffroy/AFP via Getty Images enforcement agencies is sorely lacking at present. The lack of strategic planning prevents the conduct of long term operations and the consolidation of a clear line. The public forces, in particular the MSS, seem to lack reliable information on the behaviour of the gangs, their weaponry and their tactical innovations, creating an Notes 1 Jacqueline Charles, As gangs prepare to attack Haiti’s capital, U.S. freezes critical aid for security mission, Miami Herald, 5 February 2025. 2 Cyrus Ombati, Kenya, Haitian troops flatten Barbecue’s home, The Star, 25 November 2024. 3 Vanessa Buschschlüter, Kenyan police officer killed confronting gang members in Haiti, BBC, 24 February 2025. 4 Jacqueline Charles, Haitian gang shoots up crowded U.S. embassy van, wounding at least one employee, Miami Herald, 20 January 2025; see also Evens Sanon, Haiti’s shuttered main public upper hand for the criminal groups of which the latter are particularly aware. It is essential that these efforts be supported by sustained financial resources, comprehensive police reforms and long-term development strategies. Without such a multifaceted approach, Haiti’s descent into chaos will only continue. hospital is set on fire in latest attack on the institution, Associated Press, 13 February 2025. 5 Juhakenson Blaise, Haiti’s government know about deadly Kenscoff gang attack but did nothing to stop it, The Haitian Times, 31 January 2025. 6 Guest Author and Juhakenson Blaise, Haiti’s National Police adds 739 officers to a depleted force, The Haitian Times, 13 January 2025. 7 Evens Sanon, A police union in Haiti demands more protection as gang violence surges, AP News, 25 February 2025. RISK BULLETIN #3 – APRIL 2025 4 The Transitional Presidential Council struggles for political legitimacy in the face of growing insecurity. Haiti’s persistent security crisis has prompted political developments under the guidance of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), although it has often struggled to implement its strategies. To address the deteriorating security situation and pave the way for possible elections, the TPC announced in January 2025 the creation of a war council designed to direct substantial resources toward combating criminal groups and improving public safety.1The plan includes allocating substantial funds for the Haitian National Police. Part of the responsibilities of the TPC also include establishing the Provisional Electoral Council (PEC) — tasked with organizing long-delayed presidential elections. A critical step in restoring democratic governance in Haiti is the effective functioning of the nine-member PEC. The constitutionally mandated body’s primary duties include voter registration, candidate approval, enforcing electoral laws and certifying election results. January 3 A contingent of 150 Guatemalan military police and 8 Salvadoran airmen arrive in Port-au-Prince to join the Multinational Security The TPC has emphasized the need to hold elections to restore legitimate governance, but Haiti’s worsening security situation could severely hinder voter turnout and election credibility. TPC President Leslie Voltaire has stated that only eight of Haiti’s 10 departments may be able to hold elections in November 2025; the Artibonite and West Departments may be unable to participate due to insecurity in those areas.2As a result, an estimated up to 60% of the eligible voting population may be unable to vote.3This poses a significant challenge to holding free and fair elections. Meanwhile, concerns remain over how to ensure the safety of candidates, voters and election workers. Haitian elections have historically been marred by allegations of fraud, low voter turnout and external interference, resulting in deep-seated distrust in the political system. Political violence and corruption further undermine legitimacy, with past elections tainted by the suppression of opposition groups, January 1 The Transitional Presidential Council declares a 'war' against armed gangs, allocating substantial resources to the nation's security forces. Support (MSS) mission, aiming to combat escalating gang violence. January 10 The Haitian National Police graduate 739 new officers, including 213 women, to bolster efforts against armed gangs. January 18 Kenya deploys an additional 217 police officers to Haiti, joining over 600 Kenyans already assisting the Haitian police in combating gangs. January 27–28 Armed gangs conduct coordinated attacks in Kenscoff, a commune near Port-au-Prince, resulting in at least 40 February 4 deaths and displacing over 1 660 residents. A Salvadoran military contingent arrives in Haiti to assist in the UN-backed security mission, aiming to support local police against powerful gangs.February 13 The general hospital of Port-au-Prince is set on fire, marking a February 23 A Kenyan police officer, part of the MSS mission, is fatally shot during an operation in the Artibonite region, highlighting the dangers faced by international forces in Haiti. FIGURE 1 Key events in Haiti, January–March 2025. significant attack on a critical institution amid escalating violence. February 24 Haitian police officers demand better protection and treatment following the killing of the Kenyan policeman, emphasizing the need for increased support and equipment to combat gang violence. RISK BULLETIN #3 – APRIL 2025 5 bribery and vote tampering.4 With gangs controlling 85% of Port-au-Prince, the fairness of any election is highly questionable. Moreover, in such a climate of violence, elections can act as a catalyst rather than a moment of appeasement. Until security conditions are restored — at least minimally — and the Haitian institutions responsible for organizing and overseeing the proper conduct of the elections are not consolidated, it seems premature — and even dangerous — to embark on a timetable that could quickly become untenable. Notes 1 Jean Junior Celestin, « À la guerre comme à la guerre », déclare le président du CPT, Le Nouvelliste, 3 January 2025; see also Robenson Geffrard, Quels sont les plans du CPT pour le pays en 2025 ?, Le Nouvelliste, 7 January 2025. 2 Jacqueline Charles, Haiti leader says elections can be held this year even as gangs continue their rampage, Miami Herald, 30 January 2025. Finally, it seems essential, in parallel with the normal electoral procedures, to work on designing a strategy to avoid the direct or indirect participation of armed groups in the elections. Whether through pressure, threats, extortion or direct violence against the population or candidates, it is likely that the gangs will try to influence the democratic calendar. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that, in line with what has been regularly documented in Haiti, criminal groups will form an alliance with competing candidates and parties, thus contributing to the systematization of political-criminal collusion, as well as to the risk of political violence. 3 Ibid. 4 Arnoux Descardes, How to break the cycle of weak elections in Haiti, US Institute of Peace, 20 June 2024; see also Sam Biden, The violent influence of armed groups and gangs in Haiti’s fragile democracy, Human Security Centre, 9 April 2024. RISK BULLETIN #3 – APRIL 2025 6 Gang violence in Haiti: The first anniversary of Viv Ansanm. Between December 2024 and February 2025, Haiti witnessed another surge in gang violence, worsening already dire security and humanitarian crises. Data from late 20241to early 2025 paints a harrowing picture: during that period, 1 732 people were killed, 411 injured and 431 kidnapped – bringing the total number of abductions in 2024 to 1 494. Meanwhile, more than KEY FIGURES 1 million people – including 700 000 children – totalling approximately 9% of Haiti’s population, were displaced. Thousands fled in response to mass killings and attacks. Additionally, in Cité Soleil and Croix-des-Bouquets, groups including the 400 Mawozo, the Taliban Gang and Terre Noire gangs specifically targeted police families by torching their homes. Number of homicides or injuries, October to December 2024: 2 143.2 Number of kidnappings: 431, bringing the total to 1 494 in 2024.3 More than 1 million people were internally displaced, including 700 000 children.4 At least 75 children were killed and 22 injured as a result of gang violence, targeted killings or police action. This represents a 70% increase from Q3.5 An estimated 159 people have been killed since January 2025.6 A deeper shift towards governance Since the formation of the gang coalition of Viv Ansanm in February 2024, violence has remained widespread, but gangs have adapted their tactics to better consolidate power. This shift demonstrates increased organization, as gangs are now focusing more on establishing sustained economic control over communities. This unprecedented merger aimed to consolidate power among Port-au-Prince’s most important gangs, enabling them to coordinate operations more effectively and expand their influence. Over the past year, Viv Ansanm has asserted control in new areas expanding to the Artibonite, the northern border to the Dominican Republic, and areas of the south-west, significantly reshaping the country’s security landscape. The coalition’s ability to maintain internal cohesion, despite historical rivalries, stems from shared objectives and a unified front against external interventions, such as the UN-backed mission led by Kenyan police. Their coordinated efforts have led to a decrease in infighting, allowing them to focus on expanding territorial control and challenging state authority. This unity contrasts sharply with the Haitian government’s struggle to work together to establish order, highlighting the gangs’ adaptability and strategic alliances in the face of political instability. In areas including Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets and Tabarre, gangs have reduced7their indiscriminate attacks, allowing displaced residents to return, and increasing their extortion profits from local merchants or farmers. Comparatively, gangs such as the 103 Zombies, Grand Ravine and Ti Bois in Carrefour and RISK BULLETIN #3 – APRIL 2025 7 Gressier have continued8to aggressively expand their territory through attacks on the south-east regions of Kenscoff and Furcy. Beyond the exertion of physical control, as the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime documented throughout the year 2024,9gangs have turned to extortion as a primary revenue stream.10 This ability to make racketeering the foundation of their business model has transformed the political economy of violence. Extortion is directly linked to the gangs’ current ability to make their territorial and social control the foundation of a broader governance, within which systematic extortion is deployed. Within the territories controlled by the gangs, but also on the country’s main roads, as well as around port or border infrastructures, the criminal groups continue to impose a tax on all those active in their fiefdoms. As we documented in January 2025,11 this dynamic is at the heart of the gangs’ territorial consolidation, but also of their desire to expand – including in the Kenscoff areas – in recent months. Each advance by the gangs leads not only to an explosion of violence, but also to the creation of local cells with one or more leaders, one 1 of whose main tasks is to establish a local extortion regime, particularly against businesses in the area, residents in some cases, and also against people wishing to travel on the highways, through the immediate creation of checkpoints. In addition, and this is an issue that will need to be monitored in 2025, extortion by criminal groups has become widespread in rural areas, sometimes in a less visible or at least less documented way than in the capital. This is particularly the case in Artibonite and the central plateau. In Artibonite, gangs have targeted farmers, traders and markets, enforcing so-called protection fees and seizing goods. The Gran Grif gang, under pressure from joint operations of the Haitian National Police and the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, has begun extorting smaller communities such as Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite and Dessalines.12 In Port-au-Prince, extortion now also affects businesses and public officials, further undermining state authority.13 This shift has prompted gangs facing pressure from the police to rely less on crimes such as kidnappings, allowing them to further insert themselves within local economies and making it more difficult to dismantle them. 3 HAITI Port Lafito 1 Canaan CANAAN CANAAN 3 C R OIX -DES-BOUQUETS C R OIX -DES-BOUQUETS Port-Au-Prince Port-au-P rinc e Ba y Pierre VI 1 Terre Noire Chen Mechan 3 Jacmel CITÉ SOLEIL CITÉ SOLEIL 8 N Brooklyn Carrefour Drouillard 2 600 m 0 6 km Terminal Varreux Waf Jérémie International port (CPS) Nan Boston BelekouSimon Pelé 1 MSS T A B ARRE T A B ARRE 8 1 000 m 500 m International port (APN) Baz Nan Chabon Delmas 6 DELMA S DELMA S 400 Mawozo 200 m 2 GRAND S ALINE GRAND S ALINE Thor terminal Parliament 5 Segond Nazon Bel-Air Solino Baz Krache Dife Sea level POR T - A U-PRINCE CARREF OUR MAR TISS ANT POR T - A U-PRINCE CARREF OUR MAR TISS ANT GRESSIER GRESSIER PÉTION- VILLE 2 Gangs are going from Carrefour area Baz Pilate Gran Ravine 101 G ANTHIER G ANTHIER The area is not under the uniform control of a single gang. It is divided between the influences of Gang Mariani (led by Boutbas) and Gang Gran Ravine (led by Ti Lapli). Recently, the area has also been disputed by towards Kenscoff Nan Ti Bwa Laboule Thomassin PÉTION- VILLE Areas of Laboule and Kenscoff are not fully under gang control. It is a zone of contention 400 Mawozo Kraze Baryé F OND S-P ARISIEN F OND S-P ARISIEN the police, who is seeking to regain control. Kenscoff 101 between the police and gang forces. Port Note: Gangs are sometimes named after the zones they control Gang name Specific location LE MONT CEL LE MONT CEL FUR C Y FUR C Y KENSC OFF KENSC OFF OBLE O N OBLE O N Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission Base Parliament International Airport Nan Ti Bwa Gran Ravine Baz Pilate 5 Segond Baz Krache Dife Bel-Air Baz Nan Chabon Delmas 6 Waf Jérémie Simon Pelé Belekou Nan Boston Brooklyn Carrefour Drouillard Terre Noire Canaan Chen Mechan 400 Mawozo Pierre VI Kraze Baryé Gressier (Area of conflict) Viv Ansanm (Area of conflict) Viv Ansanm (Area of conflict) Laboule Kenscoff FIGURE 1 Expansion of gangs in Haiti as of March 2025. RISK BULLETIN #3 – APRIL 2025 8 Gridlocking Port-au-Prince The gangs have strategically resettled in different areas, allowing them to control economic activities and impose their own local governance structures. These tactics play a critical role in gangs’ ability to manoeuvre towards communes like Kenscoff, a high-value target and a crucial stepping stone to Pétion-Ville – the economic and political hub of Port-au-Prince.14 Kenscoff’s strategic importance cannot be overstated. A semi-rural mountainous commune located about 16 kilometres south-east of Port-au-Prince, on top of the city, Kenscoff has traditionally been a haven for the upper-middle class and a logistical buffer zone between the capital and more secure regions. In February, members of the 5 Segond gang in Village de Dieu, led by Johnson ‘Izo’ André, went door to door, indiscriminately Port-au-P rinc e International port (CPS) Waf Jérémie Simon Pelé Ba y 1 Baz Nan Chabon International port (APN) Delmas 6 DELMA S DELMA S Thor terminal Parliament Solino Nazon Bel-Air HAITI 2 CARREF OUR CARREF OUR 2 Baz Krache Dife 5 Segond POR T - A U-PRINCE POR T - A U-PRINCE Gangs are going MAR TISS ANT MAR TISS ANT from Carrefour area towards Kenscoff Nan Ti Bwa Gran Ravine Baz Pilate Laboule 101 PÉTION- VILLE PÉTION- VILLE 2 600 m 1 000 m 500 m 200 m Sea level Port LE MONT CEL BEL O T LE MONT CEL BEL O T 27–28 January 2025: the commune of Kenscoff in Haiti was attacked by heavily armed gangs from the commune of Carrefour. The gangs targeted several areas within Kenscoff, including Belot, Godet and Le Montcel, causing panic and widespread damage. Over 3 000 people fled their homes and over 50 people were killed due to the attacks. N 0 3 km Only access point in and out of Port-au-Prince not controlled by gangs. Areas of Laboule and Kenscoff are not fully under gang control. It is a zone of contention between the police and gang forces. Thomassin Kenscoff 101 KENSC OFF KENSC OFF GODET GODET OBLE O N OBLE O N FUR C Y FUR C Y 101 Parliament Access route Jacmel Port-Au-Prince A U SILENCE A U SILENCE VIEUX VIEUX L A C OUR L A C OUR S E GUIN GRANDE GRANDE R A VINE R A VINE 101 FIGURE 2 Gangs have expanded into the commune of Kenscoff, nestled in the mountains south-east of Port-au-Prince. RISK BULLETIN #3 – APRIL 2025 9 opening fire and setting homes ablaze.15 The small communes of Belot, Furcy, Obléon, Godet and Le Montcel also fell victim to gangs seeking to control Kenscoff.16 In response to the attacks, which have resulted in dozens of fatalities, Haitian authorities have issued arrest warrants for individuals accused of supporting gangs attacking Kenscoff.17 Among the suspects are former Senator Nenel Cassy and former Kenscoff legislator Alfredo Antoine. Despite these arrests, the dismantling of political criminal relationships remains a distant prospect. And while the progress of judicial investigations remains opaque, they leave little hope for a transparent outcome that would shed light on the mechanisms that support criminal groups. Moreover, by infiltrating areas of Kenscoff, from which almost 2 000 people have fled, criminal groups have established footholds in previously unoccupied Notes 1 UN Integrated Office in Haiti, Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2024. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond, 28 February 2025. 7 Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Gangs’ expansion and the pressure on public security strategies, Risk Bulletin, Issue 2, GI-TOC, November 2024. 8 Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond, 28 February 2025. 9 For more publications on extortion and protection rackets in Haiti, see Haiti Observatory. 10 Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Risk Bulletin, Issue 2, GI-TOC, November 2024. 11 Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Last chance? Breaking Haiti’s political and criminal impasse, GI-TOC, January 2025. territories, creating forward operating bases to push towards Haiti’s last financial and political epicentre, Pétion-Ville.18 The attacks on Kenscoff, in addition to the pressure placed on Pétion-Ville, also illustrate the gangs’ desire to take control of one of the few roads around the capital that remains out of their hands. This is likely to be with the broader goal of being able to set up checkpoints there and extend their extortion capabilities, in addition to their territorial and social control. While public forces and the MSS mission do not seem able to repel or reconquer the mountain areas taken by the gangs, these criminal operations suggest that the capital will end up being completely encircled by the armed groups. In addition to the consolidation of the gangs’ power, this situation poses an even greater risk to the movement of displaced persons and the latent humanitarian catastrophe in Port-au-Prince, a situation that currently seems to be out of control. 12 Onès Joseph, Haiti’s Artibonite announces new sercurity measures after new gang attack in Dessalines left 3 dead, multiple injuries and homes set ablaze, The Haitian Times, 29 November 2024. 13 Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Last chance? Breaking Haiti’s political and criminal impasse, GI-TOC, January 2025. 14 Evens Sanon, Gangs attack a neighborhood in Haiti that’s home to the country’s elite, Associated Press, 4 February 2025. 15 Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond, 28 February 2025. 16 HaitiLibre, Haiti – FLASH: Kenscoff attacked, attackers repelled, 28 January 2025. 17 Juhakenson Blaise, Police target 16 ‘dangerous’ high profile figures with gang ties, including ex-lawmakers accused of destabilizing regions of Haiti, The Haitian Times, 19 February 2025. 18 Evens Sanon, Gangs attack a neighborhood in Haiti that’s home to the country’s elite, Associated Press, 4 February 2025. RISK BULLETIN #3 – APRIL 2025 10 Are Haitian gangs on the road to political recognition? One of the most significant developments so far in 2025 has been the rise of Viv Ansanm as it seeks political recognition. The group, which was formed through the merger of rival factions G9 and G-Pèp, now controls nearly 85% of Port-au-Prince. On 2 January 2025, Viv Ansanm’s leader, Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier, announced the group’s transformation into a political party.1In his address shared on social networks, Chérizier accused the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) — established in 2024 to replace Ariel Henry, who took over as acting prime minister following the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse — of corruption and incompetence.2 Chérizier called for reducing the TPC from nine to three members, arguing that a smaller, more streamlined council would improve governance and echoing sentiments made by the Engagés pour le Développement and Fanmi Lavalas political parties.3 Chérizier also framed Viv Ansanm not as a criminal syndicate, but a movement representing Haiti’s marginalized communities, and pushed for its inclusion in future peace talks and electoral discussions. Although these statements should be taken as part of Chérizier’s public communication for at least a year, several indications provided by the criminal leader suggest a desire to go beyond showy acts and put even more pressure on the political context. For example, Chérizier took care to detail a timetable for the construction of a political structure linked to Viv Ansanm. Some TPC members have reportedly considered recognizing Viv Ansanm as a political entity; as of February 2025, discussions regarding the recognition of the coalition as such have been marked by differing viewpoints.4Leslie Voltaire, then-president of the TPC and an affiliate of the Fanmi Lavalas party, has expressed strong opposition to forming any alliance with Viv Ansanm. Voltaire described a document, which was sent to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and which mentioned the coalition’s position, to be an ‘unacceptable alliance’.5‘The fact that any members of the government are considering allowing Viv Ansanm to operate as a political party is like letting the devil in your bed. We cannot actively denounce gang violence while letting them have a political standing,’ remarked a representative for the TPC in an interview with the GI-TOC.6 The differing viewpoints within the TPC underscore the sensitivities associated with recognizing gangs as legitimate actors in Haiti’s transitional governance. On the one hand, political integration could provide an incentive for criminal groups to disarm and transition into governance. On the other hand, integration could formalize violent existing gang-controlled power structures, preventing the emergence of a legitimate government system and potentially harm efforts to address the grievances of marginalized communities. Ultimately, Haiti faces a critical decision. Beyond the political communication adopted by the gangs — and the fractures within the TPC and the government on the stance to adopt in the face of the potential transformation of armed groups into political factions — gang leaders are able to put decisive pressure on the political transition. This situation demands stakeholders to move away from commentary and scandals, such as the one that led to Viv Ansanm signing the official document sent to CARICOM, and develop real institutional policy on how to demobilize or dismantle criminal groups in the future. This process cannot be carried out without broad political and social consultation, and must be conducted with the utmost transparency to avoid any informal dealings between the political sector and the armed groups. Any proposed solution should involve a clear state policy that enables Haiti to make progress in resolving the insecurity crisis, but also to chart the path to a judicial strategy. RISK BULLETIN #3 – APRIL 2025 11 Notes 1 Haiti Channel Network, Haïti : La coalition des gangs armés « Viv Ansanm » désormais transformée en parti politique, 2 January 2025. 2 Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Risk Bulletin, Issue 1, GI-TOC, July 2024. 3 Jacqueline Charles, Can Haiti’s gangs help solve the political crisis? Some politicians seem to think so, Miami Herald, 14 January 2025. 4 Michelly Teixeira, Haitian politicians debate whether criminal gangs should have a role in the country’s future, The Latin Times, 18 January 2025. 5 Radio Télé Vitamine, Haïti-Politique: Leslie Voltaire juge d « alliance inacceptable » le document envoyé à la Caricom mentionnant la position du gang «Viv ansanm», 13 January 2025. 6 Interview with a representative from the Transitional Presidential Council, February 2025. RISK BULLETIN #3 – APRIL 2025 12 Risk Bulletins are regular outputs of our regional observatories, which draw on civil society networks to provide new data and contextualize trends related to organized-crime networks, illicit trade and state responses to them. If you would like to subscribe to future editions of the Risk Bulletin, please sign up here. ABOUT THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime is a global network with 700 Network Experts around the world. The Global Initiative provides a platform to promote greater debate and innovative approaches as the building blocks to an inclusive global strategy against organized crime. www.globalinitiative.net