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Cette note des Perspectives macroéconomiques et pauvreté de la Banque mondiale (printemps 2020, date de clôture le 6 avril 2020) indique que la croissance du PIB haïtien est anémique depuis cinq ans, dépassant à peine la croissance démographique de 1,5%, et que le PIB s'est contracté d'environ 0,9% durant l'exercice budgétaire 2019 dans un contexte de crise politique prolongée qui a affecté l'agriculture et les services. Le déficit budgétaire a été contenu à 4,0% du PIB grâce à des coupes dans l'investissement en capital et les dépenses sociales, tandis que le ratio dette/PIB a presque doublé, passant de 23,7% en 2014 à 43,3% en 2019.
La gourde s'est dépréciée de plus de 22% sur l'exercice et l'inflation a clôturé au-dessus de 20%, érodant le pouvoir d'achat des ménages, environ la moitié d'entre eux étant en insécurité alimentaire fin septembre 2019. Au premier trimestre de l'exercice 2020, l'activité est restée atone, avec un PIB estimé en recul de 4,0% en glissement annuel et une estimation d'inflation de la Banque de 22,5% fin janvier. Les perspectives prévoient une contraction du PIB de 3,5% en 2020 sous l'effet de la COVID-19 sur les services, les envois de fonds et les exportations, avant une reprise modeste de 1,0% en 2021 et 1,3% en 2022, le déficit du compte courant se creusant à 6,1% du PIB en 2020.
La reprise ne devant pas dépasser la croissance démographique, aucune amélioration du bien-être n'est attendue et l'incidence de la pauvreté augmenterait probablement, avec des risques baissiers liés à la crise politique non résolue, au vide institutionnel après la caducité du Parlement le 13 janvier 2020 et à la pandémie de COVID-19.
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118 MPO / Apr 20 Cut off date for information in this MPO: March 21st, 2020. The cut-off date for information in this MPO was April 06, 2020.
Recent developments
Haiti’s GDP growth has been anemic over
the past five years, barely keeping up with
population growth of 1.5%. In HFY2019
the country remained engulfed in a pro-
tracted political crisis, with GDP estimat-
ed to have contracted by 0.9%, hampered
by agriculture and the service sectors. The
agricultural sector is host of poor workers
(53% in 2012). Its contraction is likely to
have a detrimental effect on them. The
good performance of the textile sector –
which employs 25% of formal labor–
avoided a more acute decline of GDP. The
fiscal deficit was contained at 4.0% of GDP
at the expense of physical capital invest-
ment and social spending. Recurrent ex-
penditures, however, rose by 14%. The
debt/GDP ratio almost doubled over the
past five years, from 23.7% in 2014 to
43.3% in 2019, reflecting the deterioration
of the fiscal accounts. Debt service in 2019
was 2.0% of GDP, higher than spending in
education (1.7%), health (0.6%) and social
protection (0.1%). From a 2012 base of
around 25%, extreme poverty has barely
moved. Employment estimates point to
enduring unemployment rates of around
13%, and around 30% among the youth.
As of 2017, only 23% of the population
was estimated to live within 5 kms of a
health center with adequate services.
The central bank (BRH) has tightened its
policy stance and kept monetary financing
of the government deficit within the legal
limit in HFY2019. BRH monetized the
equivalent of 1.4% of GDP of the deficit,
which it partially offset by raising its poli-
cy rate and depletion of net foreign re-
serves. The remaining deficit was covered
either by accumulating arrears (1.9%) or
by T-bills issuance (0.8%), which may
have contributed to further crowding out
of the private sector. Despite the tight
monetary stance, the currency (gourde)
depreciated by more than 22% over the
fiscal year. Given the high exchange rate
pass-through, the lag of the 2018 moneti-
zation and domestic food supply shortag-
es during 2019, inflation remained in dou-
ble digits, closing the fiscal year at over
20%. This has likely negatively affected
households’ purchasing power, leading to
decline in consumption and/or a deterio-
ration in the quality of the basket con-
sumed. In fact, about half of households
were considered food insecure at end Sep-
tember 2019.
The current account deficit (CAD) nar-
rowed from 3.7% of GDP in 2018 to 0.4%
of GDP in 2019 on weak import demand
and increased remittances (now at 35% of
GDP), principally coming from the US
and the Dominican Republic, Haiti’s top
trading partners.
In Q1 HFY2020, political tensions height-
ened, and economic activity remained
subdued, with GDP estimated to have
contracted by 4.0% y/y. The continued
decline in imports helped stabilize the
gourde that depreciated by 15.1% y/y in
January 2020 compared to a 25.5% y/y
depreciation in September 2019. The
Bank’s inflation estimate for end-January
stands at 22.5% (no official data has been
published since August 2019). Overall
uncertainty and the presence of violent
HAITI
FIGURE 1 Haiti / Real GDP growth and sectoral contribution
to real GDP growth
FIGURE 2 Haiti / Actual and projected poverty rates and real
private consumption per capita
Sources: Haiti Statistical Office (IHSI). Sources: World Bank. Notes: see Table 2.
GDP is estimated to have contracted by
0.9% during Haitian fiscal year (HFY)
2019, amid political turmoil, social dis-
content and protests against corruption.
The economic slump coupled with a weak
capability of revenue administration
brought revenue down. Nonetheless, the
fiscal deficit was contained due to severe
cuts in capital investment and social pro-
grams, with attendant negative conse-
quences on growth prospects and poverty
reduction. The outlook is fraught with
downside risks amid an unresolved politi-
cal crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.
The global outlook is very uncertain. This outlook reflects information available at the time of its preparation. As more information becomes available,
these projections will be revised. They are presented now to assist policymakers to design alternative policy responses.
119 MPO / Apr 20 Cut off date for information in this MPO: March 21st, 2020. The cut-off date for information in this MPO was April 06, 2020.
gangs in certain areas may have affected
small entrepreneurial activities and agri-
cultural households, which together ac-
count for about 70% of the workforce.
Outlook
A lull in political tensions is the silver
lining of the COVID-19 pandemic, which
will however wreak havoc on the econo-
my. GDP is expected to contract by 3.5%
in HFY2020, hindered by the services sec-
tor. On the demand side, private con-
sumption is expected to dip due to decline
in remittances as Haiti’s top remittances-
sending countries (US, Canada and
France) enter into recession from the im-
pact of COVID-19. This will affect more
than a quarter of rural households who
are remittances recipients. Attendant to
the announced policy response to ease the
stress the pandemic will inflict on the
economy, government spending will pick
up. Reduced tourist receipts and disrupt-
ed Haiti textile sector supply chains from
China and the DR will prompt a decline in
overall exports. Over the medium term,
economic activity is expected to pick up,
growing at 1.0% in 2021 and 1.3% in 2022,
assuming the disruptions caused by
COVID-19 do no linger and the fiscal
stimulus has the expected impact on ag-
gregate demand. Inflation will likely
remain around 20% in the short term and
should stabilize around 18% over the me-
dium term, with attendant impact on pur-
chasing power of the poor. Despite the
positive shock of declining oil prices, the
CAD is expected to widen to 6.1 % in
HFY2020, on declining remittances and
exports; but it is expected to narrow to
2.0% of GDP over the medium term as
imports pick up and remittances and ex-
ports return to pre COVID-19 levels. The
economic rebound is not expected to out-
pace population growth, however. Hence,
no welfare improvement is expected and
poverty incidence would likely increase.
Risks and challenges
Parliamentary elections scheduled to take
place in October 2019 were scrapped,
prompting president Jovenel Moïse to
declare on January 13th, 2020 that Parlia-
ment had lapsed, ushering in another epi-
sode of institutional vacuum. This institu-
tional void has led to a paralysis of need-
ed reforms. Furthermore, the lack of re-
cent economic and demographic data rais-
es caution about the ultimate impacts of
the ongoing crisis on the population, with
greater welfare losses still possible. Hai-
tian authorities announced the first cases
of COVID-19 on March 19th. Even if this
shock is short-lived, it will certainly strain
the country’s already weak health sector
capabilities, with further adverse impact
on the poor. Haiti is continuously battered
by various shocks, particularly natural
hazards and political instability, that have
constrained its capacity to sustain growth
over the long term and COVID-19 will
represent a blow to the economy with
greater impact on the most vulnerable.
The textile industry, accounting for 25% of
formal jobs, is at risk. A lack of protective
measures for the informal sector workers
may lead to further negative impacts.
With the vast majority (over 90%) of
workers uninsured, health shocks can lead
to large income losses. The absence of a
broad safety net can hinder efforts to roll
out transfers to support the most vulnera-
ble (such as the 65+ years cohort, of which
50% are considered poor).
TABLE 2 Haiti / Macro poverty outlook baseline scenario (annual percent change unless indicated otherwise)