(2026-05) Haïti : Troisième examen au titre du programme de surveillance par les services du FMI et demande de prolongation — Communiqué de presse ; et Rapport des services du FMI

© 20 26 International Monetary Fund IMF Country Report No. 26 / 107 HAITI THIRD REVIEW UNDER THE STAFF - MONITORED PROGRAM AND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION — PRESS RELEASE ; AND STAFF REPORT In the context of the Third Review u nder the Staff - Monitored Program and Request for Extension , the following documents have been released and are included in this package: • A Press Release . • The Staff Report prepared by a staff team of the IMF for the Executive Board’s information following discussions that ended on April 1, 2026 , with the officials of Haiti on economic developments and policies underpinning the Third Review Under the Staff - Monitored Program . Based on information available at the time of these discussions, the staff report was completed on May 7, 2026 . The IMF’s t ransparency policy allows for the deletion of market - sensitive information and premature disclosure of the authorities’ policy intentions in published staff reports and other documents . Copies of this report are available to the public from International Monetary Fund • Publication Services PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090 Telephone: (202) 623 - 7430 • Fax : (202) 623 - 7201 E - mail: publications@imf.org Web : http://www.imf.org International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C. May 2026 PR 2 6 / 164 IMF Management Approves the Third Review and Extends the Staff - Monitored Program with Haiti FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE A S taff - Monitored Program (SMP) is an informal agreement between an IMF member countr y and IMF staff to monitor the member country’s economic program. As such, SMPs do not entail endorsement by the IMF Executive Board. SMP s taff reports are issued to the Board for information. • Management of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has approved the third r eview of the Staff - Monitored Program (SMP) with Haiti , together with the authorities’ request for a n extension of the program through June 19, 202 7 . A ll program targets were met as of end - December 2025 . Reform progress continues, albeit at a slower pace than anticipated in some areas due to security conditions, capacity constraints, and political uncertainty. • The SMP extension will help anchor macroeconomic stability and sustain reforms during the political transition. The authorities continue to demonstrate ownership of the program and continue engaging with IMF staff through the high - level SMP Monitoring Comm ittee. • Persistent insecurity, political fragility, and the recent increase in international oil prices are compounding the dire humanitarian and economic situation. T he authorities are encouraged to use available buffers to mitigate shocks, protect the most vulnerable , and adapt policy implementation as conditions evolve. Washington, DC – May 21, 2026 : Management of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved on May 5 , 2026, the third review of Haiti’s Staff - Monitored Program (SMP), including the authorities’ request for a n extension of the SMP through June 19, 202 7 . SMPs are informal agreements between country authorities and the IMF to monitor the implementation of the authorities’ economic program and build a track record of policy implementation that could pave the way for financial assistance from the IMF’s uppe r credit tranche (UCT). Haiti’s SMP is tailored to its context of acute security challenges, institutional fragility, and capacity constraints. It supports the authorities’ priorities of economic stabilization, improved governance, anticorruption, and stre ngthening the social safety net. Haiti continues to face a severe humanitarian and security crisis, compounded by recurrent shocks an d a fragile political transition. Gangs continue to undermine state authority, leaving approximately 5.7 million people facing food insecurity and 1.45 million people internally displaced. The oil price shock stemming from the war in the Middle East has emerged as a major headwind, significantly raising the fuel import bill and implicit subsidy cost, and aggravating an already weak fiscal position. These pressures add to the i mpact of Hurricane Melissa in October 2025, which disrupted economic activity and exacerbated humanitarian needs . Haiti is also navigating a fragile political transition that is expected to culminate in 2 general elections later this year — the first in a decade. T he UN - supported Gang Su p pre s sion Force began arriving in April 2026 and is expected to be fully deployed by October 2026, which could help restore security and support recovery . Economic conditions remain dire . Real GDP contracted for a seventh consecutive year in FY2025 and a further contraction is expected in FY2026 . Inflation has eased recently but remain s elevated. Against the backdrop of weak economic activity and heightened uncertainty, financial intermediation has continued to contract. Retrenchment in bank lending and financial disintermediation have contributed to improvements in non - performing loan r atios, while capital adequacy ratios remain well above regulatory minimums. Despite a deteriorating external environment, international reserve buffers remain adequate. Higher international oil prices are weighing on the external position, but strong remittance partly offset these pressures . T he current account is expected to weaken in FY2026 but will remain broadly balanced . Gross international reserves are projected at US$3.4 billion at end FY2026 — over seven months of prospective imports of goods and services. The nominal exchange rate has remained stable . Fiscal policy remains constrained by persistent security challenges, institutional weaknesses, and limited policy space. Revenue performance in FY2026 has been weak, due to disruptions to economic activity, administrative fragilities, and institutional paralysis triggered by the termination of the Transitional Presidential Council’s mandate . Higher international oil prices are expected to add further pressure through higher implicit subsidy costs , despite the authorities ’ decision to increase domestic fuel prices in April . Budget execution has remained uneven , underscor ing the importance of prioritizing spending while safeguarding support for the most vulnerable. Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside . A further deterioration in security conditions, together with persistently higher global oil prices, could further strain economic activity, aggravate humanitarian conditions through higher food prices, and intensify fiscal pressures. Potential shifts in foreign immigration policies could slow remittance inflows, with adverse implications for the external position. All program targets were met at end - December 2025 . Reserve accumulation has been strong with net international reserves reaching USD 1.76 billion in December 2025. The revenue, primary balance, and social spending targets all remained on track. The monetary financing target was also met despite an increa singly constrained fiscal space. The reform agenda — covering governance, public financial management, safeguards, and data provision — continues to advance, albeit with delays in some areas. While security remains the top priority, t he SMP will continue emphasiz ing : Strengthening governance and reducing corruption are critical to rebuild ing trust in public institutions and overcoming fragility . Reforms anchored in the Governance Diagnostic Report aim to improve the integrity and effectiveness of public institutions, including more transparent management of public finances, stronger safeguards in revenue administration, and more effective mechanisms to deter and address corruption, organized crime, and illicit financial activities. Efforts to further strengthen the anti ‑ money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism framework — including through the publication of the recently concluded national risk assessment and closing remaining gaps — ar e also critical to reinforcing financial integrity and supporting Haiti’s exit from the Financial Action Task Force grey list. 3 Stepping up revenue mobilization efforts given Haiti’s low revenue base and large security and development needs. Higher international oil prices are straining fiscal space, reinforcing the importance of accelerating tax and customs administration reforms, including operationalizing the new tax code, strengthening the digital infrastructure, and improving compliance — particularly among large taxpayers. The fu el price adjustment will reduce foregone revenues resulting from the oil price shock. However, it is critical to complement these decisions with measures to protect the most vulnerable, including by leveraging the remaining resources from the IMF 2023 Food Shock Window . Improving budget execution to ensure that limited public resources are effectively directed toward priority social, humanitarian, and security spending amid rising needs . This requires stronger cash management, tighter commitment controls, and better preparation and prioritization of public investment projects. It is also critical to ensure the timely and effective delivery of public assistance, strengthen social spending execution, and safeguard support to vulnerable households. Together, th ese steps will help improve spending efficiency, strengthen the management of fiscal risks, and enable public spending to better support development and reconstruction efforts. Consolidating the central bank’s policy framework and credibility. Exchange rate stability has provided an important nominal anchor for the economy. In the face of the oil shock, preserving reserve adequacy while using available buffers in a temporary and carefully calibrated manne r will be critical to managing external pressures . Fully operationalizing the new reserve management framework, including updated investment policies and guidelines will help strengthen governance at the central bank. Enhancing the regulatory and supervisory frameworks in the financial system. The authorities are making progress in strengthening risk ‑ based banking supervision, including through the continued rollout of on ‑ site inspections and enhancements to off ‑ site monitoring of banks ’ risk profiles. Efforts are underway to operationalize the new supervisory framework, integrate risk ‑ assessment tools into the BRH ’ s supervisory architecture, and finalize a new chart of accounts for financial institutions. These reforms will safeguard financial stability and reinforce the resilience of the banking system. Improving data quality and timeliness . T he Bank of the Republic of Haiti completed the FY2023 audit and financial statements and has initiated the FY2024 audit . Continued implementation of the safeguards assessment recommendations will strengthen central bank governance and risk management. Efforts continue to strengthen data reporting frameworks, including the International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity template , external sector and government finance statistics , and the reporting of financial soundness indicators . Collaborating with development partners to manage elevated fiscal risks and preserve macroeconomic stability, and the reform agenda. Amid heightened oil price pressures, there is an increasing risk that financing gaps could translate into domestic debt accumulation, undermining the public sector’s balance sheet. External support should be provided primarily in the form of grants rather than non ‑ concessional borrowing. Together with rigorous appraisal and transparency requirements for donor ‑ financed operations, this support would help safeguard the public sector balance sheet, consolidate progress achieved under the program, and support a durable recovery that improves living conditions for the Haitian people. In line with the Fund Strategy for Fragile and Conflict - Affected States , IMF staff will continue to collaborate closely with Haiti’s main development partners, particularly on governance and strengthening institutional capacity. HAITI THIRD REVIEW UNDER THE STAFF - MONITORED PROGRAM AND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The security and humanitarian crises in Haiti continue to deteriorate, compounded by recurrent adverse shocks and an ongoing political transition . The oil price shock stemming from the war in the Middle East has emerged as a major headwind, raising the fuel import bill and implicit fuel subsidy costs , further weakening an already fragile fiscal position. These pressures add to the impact of Hurricane Melissa in October 2025, which disrupted economic activity and exacerbated humanitarian needs, and are takin g place amid an ongoing fragile political transition, aimed at restoring governance, improving security, and paving the way for the first general elections in a decade. At the same time, the international community is prioritizing security and stability. T he arrival of the Gang Suppression Force in April could help improve security conditions and renew momentum for international support. Economic conditions remain dire. Real GDP is expected to contract for an eight h consecutive year in FY2026. Real GDP fell by 2.7 percent in FY2025, and staff now project a deeper contraction in FY2026 reflecting higher international oil prices, the impact of Hurricane Melissa in October, and political uncertainty. Annual inflation ro se to 31.9 percent by end - FY2025 but has decelerated in recent months. Higher international oil prices are weighing on the external position, but strong remittances continue to provide an important offset. As a result, the current account balance is expected to remain broadly balanced in FY2026, and gross international reserves are projected to remain adequate at over seven months of prospective imports of goods and services. Fiscal conditions remain extremely weak. Domestic revenues have declined and are projected at 4.3 percent of GDP in FY2026, reflecting continued security - related disruptions, administrative fragilities, and institutional paralysis triggered by the termination of the Transitional Presidential Coun cil’s mandate. Moreover, higher oil prices are expected to add pressure through implicit fuel subsidy costs , while budget execution remains uneven amid capacity constraints and heightened uncertainty. These developm ents have sharpened policy trade - offs and underscore the importance of prioritizing spending while safeguarding support for the most vulnerable May 7 , 2026 HAITI 2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside. A further deterioration in security conditions, together with persistently higher global oil prices, could further strain economic activity, worsen humanitarian conditions, and intensify fiscal pressures. P otential shifts in foreign immigration policies could slow remittance inflows, with adverse implications for the external position. On the upside, the deployment of the Gang Suppression Force — supported by the newly established United Nations Support Office for Haiti — could help restore confidence and support economic activity. The authorities remain committed to the Staff - Monitored Program (SMP). All end - September 2025 indicative targets have been met except for the fiscal revenues target, which has been missed by a narrow margin , reflecting continued security - related disruptions to tax collection . All end - December 2025 quantitative and indicative targets were met. Reserve accumulation has been strong. The revenue, primary balance, social spending , and monetary financing targets all remained on track , despite an increasingly cons trained fiscal space. The reform agenda — covering governance, public financial management, safeguards, and data provision — continues to advance, albeit with delays in some areas. Three of the eight s tructural benchmarks assessed in this review were met , with delays concentrated in public financial management and resource mobilization . The authorities remain engaged in program implementation through the high - level Program Monitoring Committee. Policy discussions focused on maintain ing policy implementation and reform momentum during the election year. Priorities included: (i) boosting revenue mobilization; (ii) strengthening budget execution; (iii) advancing core governance reforms, (iv) safeguarding monetary and financial stability; and (v) improving data adequacy. Despite the progress made so far, p ersistent insecurity, political fragility , an uncertain electoral process, and geopolitical developments pose increasing challenges to the SMP’s objectives going forward . The authorities have requested a nine - month SMP extension through June 19, 2027. This request reflects Haiti’s multidimensional crisis, heightened fragility — including a fragile political environment and exposure to large exogenous shocks — and aims to anchor the SMP objectives of macroeconomic stabilization and reform momentum during the transition. The extension would also provide a bridge to maintain close engagement with the aut horities until a new government is elected, thus ensuring the country continues to build a track record of policy implementation. Staff supports the request and proposes adjustments to the structural benchmarks accordingly to reinforce public financial management and safeguards . HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 3 Approved By Dora Iakova (WHD) and Jay Peiris (SPR) Policy discussions were conducted remotely during March 23rd to April 1st, 2026. The team comprised Camilo E. Tovar (Head), Nathalie Pouokam, Gonzalo Huertas, and Maylin H. Sun (all WHD); Tatsuya Hasegawa (SPR); Abdoul Karim Sidibe (STA); Jinkyu Sung (FAD), and Gabriel Duvalsaint and Ralph Wata (Port - au - Prince office). Ben Aldersey (LEG) and Laurence Coste (LEG) provided support on governance and AML/CFT issues. Ms. Toyosi Ojo provided research analysis, and Madina Toshmuhamedova (all WHD) assisted with mission scheduling and the preparation of the report. Mr. André Roncaglia and Ms. Ludmilla Buteau Allien (both OEDBR) joined key discussions . CONTENTS GLOSSARY ________________________________ ________________________________ _______________________ 5 CONTEXT ________________________________ ________________________________ _________________________ 7 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ________________________________ ________________________________ _______ 8 PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION UNDER THE SMP ________________________________ ____________ 13 OUTLOOK AND RISKS ________________________________ ________________________________ _________ 14 POLICY DISCUSSIONS ________________________________ ________________________________ _________ 15 A. Fiscal Policy ________________________________ ________________________________ ___________________ 16 B. Enhancing Governance and Transparency ________________________________ _____________________ 22 C. Strengthening the Monetary and Exchange Rate Frameworks ________________________________ 23 D. Safeguarding Financial Sector Stability ________________________________ ________________________ 24 E. Data Adequacy and Other Issues ________________________________ ______________________________ 25 PROGRAM ISSUES ________________________________ ________________________________ _____________ 26 STAFF APPRAISAL ________________________________ ________________________________ _____________ 27 BOX 1. Fuel Pump Price Adjustment Mechanism and Recent Development ___________________________ 12 FIGURES 1. Real Sector Developments, 2019 – 26 ________________________________ __________________________ 31 2. Fiscal Sector Developments, 2019 – 25 ________________________________ _________________________ 32 3. Monetary and Financial Sectors Developments, 2019 – 26 ________________________________ ______ 33 4. External Sector Developments, 2019 – 26 ________________________________ _______________________ 34 HAITI 4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND TABLES 1a. Quantitative and Indicative Targets, December 2024 – September 2025 ______________________ 35 1b. Quantitative and Indicative Targets, December 2025 – March 2027 ___________________________ 36 2a. Structural Benchmarks under the 2024 SMP ________________________________ _________________ 37 2b. Structural Benchmarks under the 2024 SMP — Proposed for the Extension ___________________ 38 2c. Schedule of Reviews ________________________________ ________________________________ __________ 38 3. Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2022 – 31 ________________________________ _________ 39 4a. Non - Financial Public Sector Operations, 2022 – 31 (In Millions of Gourdes) ___________________ 40 4b. Non - Financial Public Sector Operations, 2022 – 31 (In Percent of GDP) _______________________ 41 5a. Balance of Payments, 2022 – 31 (In Millions of U.S. Dollars) ________________________________ ___ 42 5b. Balance of Payments, 2022 – 31 (In Percent of GDP) ________________________________ __________ 43 6. Summary Accounts of the Banking System, 2022 – 31 ________________________________ __________ 44 7. External Financing Requirements and Sources ________________________________ ________________ 45 8. Financial Soundness Indicators, September 2023 – December 2025 ____________________________ 46 ANNEXES I. Estimate of the Economic Impact of Hurricane Melissa ________________________________ ________ 47 II. Remittance Outflows ________________________________ ________________________________ __________ 50 III. Strengthening Public Investment Management ________________________________ _______________ 52 IV. Risk Assessment Matrix ________________________________ ________________________________ _______ 54 V. Adverse Scenario and Sensitivity Analysis of Global Developments ___________________________ 57 APPENDIX I. Letter of Intent ________________________________ ________________________________ _________________ 59 Attachment I. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies ____________________________ _ 63 Attachment II. Technical Memorandum of Understanding ________________________________ ___ 78 HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5 G lossary Acronym Definition AGD General Administration of Customs AML/CFT Anti - Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism ASYCUDA Automatic Systems for Customs Data BMPAD Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d'Aide au Développement BOP Balance of Payments BPM6 Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, Sixth Edition BRH Bank of the Republic of Haiti CA Current Account CD Capacity Development CCRIF Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility CERC Contingency Emergency Response Component CNLBA Commission Nationale de Lutte contre le Blanchiment d'Actifs CNMP National Commission for Public Procurement CPI Consumer Price Index CSCCA Council of the Superior Court of Accounts and Administrative Disputes DGB General Directorate of the Budget DGI Directorate of General Taxes DNFBP Designated Non - Financial Businesses and Professions DSA Debt Sustainability Analysis EDH Électricité d'Haïti EU European Union FAES Economic and Social Assistance Fund FER Fonds d’entretien routier FDI Foreign Direct Investment FSIs Financial Soundness Indicators FSW Food Shock Window FX Foreign Exchange GDP Gross Domestic Product GIR Gross International Reserves GSF Gang Suppression Force GOES Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite HELP Haiti Economic Lift Program Act HOPE Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership and Encouragement Act HURDAT2 North Atlantic Hurricane Database (HURDAT2) IMF International Monetary Fund IT Indicative Target LOI Letter of Intent MARNDR Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development MAST Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance HAITI 6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND MENFP Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training MJSP Ministry of Justice and Public Security MSPP Ministry of Public Health and Population ML/FT Money Laundering / Financing of Terrorism MPEC Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation MT/LT Medium Term / Long Term NEER Nominal Effective Exchange Rate NFA Net Foreign Assets NIR Net International Reserves NRA National Risk Assessment NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration OAS Organization of American States OEDBR Office of the Executive Director for Brazil OPEC+ Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and Partners PDNA Post - Disaster Needs Assessment PIMA Public Investment Management Assessment PIP Public Investment Program PIT Personal Income Tax PSUGO Universal, Free, and Compulsory Schooling Program PTIP Public Three - Year Investment Plan QT Quantitative Target RCF Rapid Credit Facility REER Real Effective Exchange Rate RMS Revenue Management System SB Structural Benchmark SDR Special Drawing Rights SIMAST Information System of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor SMP Staff - Monitored Program ST/MT Short Term / Medium Term ST/LT Short Term / Long Term SYDONIA Customs Automation System TA Technical Assistance TMU Technical Memorandum of Understanding TPC Transitional Presidential Council TPS Temporary Protected Status TSA Treasury Single Account UCT Upper Credit Tranche UCREF Central Financial Intelligence Unit UN United Nations US United States HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 7 CONTEXT 1. Haiti’s severe humanitarian and security crisis persists amid recurrent adverse shocks . Gangs continue to exert influence in several areas across the country , including Port - au - Prince, undermining state authority, and constraining access to basic services. Humanitarian needs continue to escalate: about 6.4 million people are expected to require emergency assistance in 2026, 5.7 million people (roughly half the population) face acute food insecurity, and 1.45 million people are internally displaced. The crisis has been compounded by recurrent domestic and external shocks, notably the oil price shock stemming from the war in the Middle East and Hurricane Melissa in October 2025 (Annex I). 2. Political uncertainty remains high amid a fragile transition process aimed at restoring institutional legitimacy, security, and delivering the first general elections in a decade. Following the expiration of the Transitional Presidential Council’s (TPC) mandate on February 7, executive power was transferred to Prime Minister Mr. Alix Didier Fils - Aimé, who appointed a new cabinet, including a new Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Serge Collin. The new executive has reaffirmed its commitment to the Staff - Monitored Program (SMP) and signed a National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections with political parties and economic and civil actors. While the pact is intended to provide a framework for restoring order and preparing for elections, it has also raised concerns about adherence to the previously established electoral calendar. 3. The international community is prioritizing security and stability. The Gang Suppression Force (GSF) began arriving in April and is expected to be fully deployed by October 2026, while the UN Integrated Office in Haiti ’s mandate has been extended through January 2027. Together with the Haitian - led Roadmap for Stability and Peace , supported by the Organization of American States, these efforts signal renewed international momentum to support Haiti’s recovery. In this context, the US administration in February 2026 approved a retroactive but temporary extension of the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) and Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension (HELP) Acts, which had expired in September 2025, restoring preferential access 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 2017 2021 2025 Monthly security index 12-month moving average Security Conditions Index 1/ ( Index normalized to 100 over 1997 – 2025) Sources: Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics ( IHSI), Factiv a, and IMF staff calculations. 1/ Based on the share of news articles referencing security - related events. Note: Higher values indicate w orsening security conditions. President Artiside ousted Assassination of President Moïse 2010 Earthquake 0 200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,000,000 1,200,000 1,400,000 1,600,000 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 Jan- Mar 2024 Apr-Jun 2024 Oct-Dec 2024 Apr-Jun 2025 Jul-Sep 2025 Killed Injured Kidnapped Internally displaced (rhs) Violence Related Casualties and Displacement (Number of people) Sources: UNHCR, IOM, and BINUH. HAITI 8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND to the US market for Haiti’s apparel industry through end - December 2026. However, the subsequent February 20, 2026 decision by the US administration to apply a 10 percent import surcharge effectively eliminated the preferential treatment under HOPE/HELP. 4. Economic conditions remain dire. Real GDP contracted for a seventh consecutive year in FY2025, and the economic outlook for FY2026 has weakened further. Annual inflation rose to 31.9 percent by end - FY2025 but has decelerated in recent months. Remittances remain strong despite the adverse external conditions. However, the oil price shock has emerged as a major headwind, raising the fuel import bill and implicit fuel subsidy costs, 1 further weakening an already fragile fiscal position and sharpening policy trade - offs. Domestic fuel price adjustments — including a 29 percent increase in the price of gasoline — and the adoption of a decree to establish a more predictable framework for dome stic fuel price setting have heightened social tensions. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 5. Economic activity contracted for a seventh consecutive year in FY2025. Real gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 2.7 percent in FY2025 — slightly less than the 3.1 percent contraction projected at the time of the second review. This decline was broad - based. Agriculture, Haiti’s largest economic sector, declined by 4.8 percent, including a 19 percent rice shortfall vis - à - vis its five - year average. Manufacturing shrank by 4.3 percent, driven by an 8 percent decline in textiles as insecurity weighed on export - or iented assembly. Commerce and transport contracted by 7.7 percent and 15.4 percent, respectively. Annual inflation reached 31.9 percent by the end of the fiscal year (September 2025) and, after peaking in October, eased to 2 0 . 6 percent by March 2026. C ore inflation reached 22.8 percent by end - FY2025 after a steady and broad - based rise throughout the year. Inflation trends reflect insecurity - related supply disruptions, including gang tolls and road blockades, which have raised distribution costs for goods and services . 1 Implicit fuel subsidies are defined as the quantity of fuel sold for consumption multiplied by the difference between cost - recovery prices and domestic pump prices. In Haiti, these subsidies are initially reflected in foregone fuel tax revenues, with any r emaining gap covered through direct budgetary transfers. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Mar-20 Nov-20 Jul-21 Mar-22 Nov-22 Jul-23 Mar-24 Nov-24 Jul-25 Mar-26 Food Headline Core Inflation (In percent, year - on - year) Sources: Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics (IHSI), and Bank of the Republic of Haiti. 0 100 200 300 400 500 Oct-22 Mar-23 Aug-23 Jan-24 Jun-24 Nov-24 Apr-25 Sep-25 Feb-26 Net Remittances (In millions of US dollars) Source: Bank of the Republic of Haiti. HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 9 6. On the external front, strong remittances more than offset the widening trade deficit. The current account delivered a surplus of 1.9 percent GDP in FY2025, reversing a deficit of 0.6 percent of GDP in FY2024. The surplus reflected a sharp increase in net remittances. Net remittances remain robust in FY2026: from October 2025 to February 202 6, they increased by 15.8 percent relative to a year earlier, despite already being at historically high levels. The seasonal rise in December inflows was particularly strong, possibly reflecting precautionary behavior amid uncertainty surrounding the expi ration of Temporary Protected Status ( TPS ) for Haitian migrants in the US . 2 At the same time, higher oil prices are raising the import bill — estimated at about USD 180 million or about 0.45 percent of GDP — while exports remain subdued. Satellite - based port activity data indicates export weakness persisted through February following the non - renewal of HOPE/HELP in September, while imports continued to rise. 7. External financing has declined sharply over the past decade, although recent donor support has provided some near - term support. Compared to the historical peak in FY2010 (USD 1,840 million), the amount of budget support and grants received by the Haitian government had 2 The expiration of TPS for Haitian migrants was extended , through court order, to July 1, 2026 . Text Figure 1. Haiti: Monitoring Economic Activity Through Satellite - Based Port Data Average daily cargo ship arrivals have declined sharply since mid - 2025, and total trade activity remains well below pre - pandemic levels. Although import volumes have picked up, export volumes remain weak. • • Overall tanker and cargo ship arrivals remain subdued. Sources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mar-24 May-24 Jul-24 Sep-24 Nov-24 Jan-25 Mar-25 Cargo Tanker 7-day Moving Average Prior Year: 7-day Moving Average Arrival of Ships, March 2024 - March 2025 (Number of ships) 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 0 2 4 6 8 10 Dec-20 Sep-21 Jun-22 Mar-23 Dec-23 Sep-24 Jun-25 Mar-26 Imports Exports (rhs) Daily Import and Export Volumes (In metric tons) 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 Dec-20 Sep-21 Jun-22 Mar-23 Dec-23 Sep-24 Jun-25 Mar-26 Cargo ships Tanker ships (rhs) Daily Ship Arrivals (Average monthly number) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mar-25 May-25 Jul-25 Sep-25 Nov-25 Jan-26 Mar-26 Cargo Tanker 7-day Moving Average Prior Year: 7-day Moving Average Arrival of Ships, March 2025 - March 2026 (Number of ships) HAITI 10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND declined over 80 percent by end FY2025 (USD 364 million). Against this backdrop, external donors — including foreign governments and international organizations — committed about USD 20 million to support Haiti’s recovery from Hurricane Melissa. Countries have also pledged about USD 35 million in new funding to the GSF trust fund to help restore security. 8. International reserves accumulation remains strong. The Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BRH) continued to purchase foreign exchange (FX), with cumulative net purchases since end - September 2024 exceeding USD 725 million, as of end February 2026. Gross international reserves exceeded USD 3.4 billion as of end - January — over seven months of prospective imports , bolstered by strong remittances . Despite these purchases, the nominal exchange rate has remained stable at around 130 gourdes per US dollar. The real exch ange rate appreciated 31 percent during FY2025, and since then an additional 9 percent through February 2026. 9. Fiscal out turns in FY2025 were broadly balanced, but budget execution remained weak . In FY2025, the overall balance recorded a small deficit of 0. 1 percent of GDP, while the primary balance (Indicative Target, IT ) posted a surplus of 0.1 percent of GDP. Nominal domestic Text Table 1 . Haiti: Net International Reserves - 2024 SMP Definition (In Millions of US Dollars, Unless Otherwise Indicated) • Sep 2024 Sep 2024 Sep 2024 Jul 2025 Aug 2025 Sep 2025 Oct 2025 Nov 2025 Dec 2025 5/ Revised 1st Review Revised 2nd Review Revised 3rd Review A. Gross International Reserves 2,525.2 2,522.2 2,522.3 3,120.4 3,198.7 3,236.7 3,186.7 3,274.6 3,392.2 Monetary gold 153.1 153.1 153.1 192.0 199.6 222.7 233.5 244.0 254.3 Holdings of foreign currency 36.7 37.4 37.5 80.4 62.1 42.4 21.6 55.2 27.7 Demand deposits abroad 444.1 443.7 443.8 766.0 828.4 845.1 803.9 837.4 974.3 Investments abroad 1/ 1,769.3 1,765.9 1,765.9 1,975.6 2,003.8 2,021.7 2,034.0 2,050.2 2,048.2 SDR holdings 2/ 94.2 94.2 94.2 78.5 76.8 76.8 65.7 59.9 59.9 Reserve Position in the Fund 2/ 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 B. Reserve Related Liabilities 306.6 306.9 306.9 235.2 235.2 236.8 225.6 221.5 221.1 Liabilities to the IMF 2/ 3/ 245.1 245.1 245.1 234.7 234.7 234.7 223.6 219.4 219.4 Short-term loans from private non-residents 4/ 60.2 60.2 60.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Liabilities to IFIs 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.3 0.3 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.4 Certified checks in FX 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 C. FX Denominated Liabilities to Residents 1,263.4 1,263.7 1,262.2 1,362.4 1,361.6 1,360.9 1,349.6 1,347.5 1,367.0 Financial sector FX deposits in the central bank 1,231.0 1,231.0 1,231.0 1,331.3 1,330.5 1,327.7 1,316.4 1,314.4 1,346.3 Government FX deposit in transitory account (Venezuela debt) 32.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Swaps with financial institutions 32.7 31.2 31.2 31.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 20.7 D. Other FX Liabilities 35.2 35.2 35.2 38.4 37.1 36.3 35.4 34.4 34.9 Off-balance sheet FX liabilities 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 Project accounts 20.2 20.2 20.2 23.3 22.0 21.2 20.3 19.3 19.8 Special accounts 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 E. Net International Reserves, 2024 SMP definition (A - B - C - D) 919.9 916.3 918.0 1,484.4 1,564.8 1,602.7 1,576.1 1,671.2 1,769.3 Memorandum Items (not included in program NIR calculation) Miscellaneous central bank FX liabilities (including values for adjustment) 23.4 23.4 34.5 5.1 11.7 6.3 5.8 9.3 4.0 Central government FX deposits in the central bank 228.9 228.9 232.7 239.3 259.2 245.0 243.5 243.2 249.7 Short-term central government FX liabilities (next 12 months) 26.7 31.1 31.1 29.9 33.1 31.4 31.4 29.9 33.1 Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti, International Financial Statistics, and Fund staff calculations. 1/ Following IMF technical assistance in July 2025, some assets were reclassified in line with international best practices. 4/ This refers to a credit line used to facilitate the payment of the Venezuela debt operation in January 2024. 5/ Monetary data for January, as submitted by the authorities, are undergoing validation, as they include retrospective revisions to historical data. 3/ For program purposes, all outstanding Haiti liabilities to the IMF are considered, including the January 2023 Rapid Credit Facility (Food Shock Window), disbursed at a government account in the BRH, for an amount of SDR 81.9 million. 2/ Based on IMF books. For the purposes of the 2024 SMP, between September 2024 and September 2026, the amounts in SDR will be converted to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate as of September 30, 2024 (1 USD = 0.737261 SDR). HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 11 revenues ( IT ) increased by 13. 3 percent year - on - year, but the revenue - to - GDP ratio declined to 4. 8 percent — its lowest level since FY2002 . Grants of 1.2 percent of GDP helped counter balance the weak domestic revenue performance. Total expenditure increased, concentrated towards the end of the fiscal year, but reached only 75.5 percent of the supplementary budget, with capital spending particularly low at 42.2 percent. 3 Social spending ( IT ) also increased, but delivery remains constrained by administrative and security bottlenecks. As of January 202 6 , about 90 .2 percent of Food Shock Window (FSW) resources had been executed, leaving about 1.5 billion gourdes unspent. 10. In FY2026, fiscal conditions have weakened further . This reflects continued security - related disruptions to economic activity, administrative fragilities, and institutional paralysis triggered by the termination of the TPC’s mandate. FY2026 data as of February 202 6 shows that domestic revenues ( IT ) have remained subdued — 1.7 percent of projected GDP compared to an average of 2.6 percent over the past 10 years. B udget execution has also remained uneven , with total and capital spending reaching 25.2 percent and 12.2 percent of the budget, respectively (against 10 - year averages of 25.5 and 7.1 percent ) . S pending peak ed in December before easing in January and February 2026 . 4 Grants received as of February 2026 were lower than in the same period of FY2025. Social spending reached 21.2 billion gourdes (0.4 percent of GDP) during October 2025 – February 2026, but execution remained constrained (¶21). 11. Higher international oil prices are expected to add pressure through foregone revenues associated with higher implicit subsidy costs. In response the authorities increased pump prices for gasoline by 29 percent and for gasoil and kerosene by about 37 percent, equivalent to about a 40 percent pass - through of higher international prices ( B ox 1 ). The authorities have also adopted austerity measures in public administration, including a freeze on new vehicle acquisitions, reduction in fuel expenditure 3 Expenditures had a peak in September 2025, due to a temporary spike in cash payments and commitments . 4 The December expenditure increase reflected higher spending on wages and salaries, goods and services, and transfers and subsidies, partly due to year - end seasonality. 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 Oct-24 Dec-24 Feb-25 Apr-25 Jun-25 Aug-25 Oct-25 Dec-25 Feb-26 Revenue Expenditure Fiscal Revenues and Expenditures (In millions of gourdes) Sources: Ministry of Economy and Finance FY2025 Outturn Budget 1/ 2nd Review 2/ 3rd Review 2/ Total Revenue and Grants 6.0 6.1 5.4 5.1 Domestic revenue 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.3 Grants 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.8 Total Expenditure 6.2 6.4 5.7 5.8 Current expenditure 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.3 Wages and Salaries 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 Goods and Services 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 Interest payments 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 Transfers and Subsidies 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 Capital expenditure 1.9 2.2 1.5 1.5 Primary balance 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 Overall balance -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 Sources: Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and IMF staff estimates. 1/ The budget was adopted on October 10, 2025. 2/ Figures for the 2nd and 3rd Reviews are full-year projections. FY2026 Text Table 2. Haiti: Fiscal Developments (In percent of GDP) HAITI 12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND allocations for public institutions, restrictions on official travel, and limits on security escorts for public officials. These measures should help contain part of the fiscal pressure from the oil shock, although fiscal space remains extremely limited. In FY2026, t he oil price shock is projected to generate an excess fuel import bill of about USD 180 million and f oregone fuel tax revenues of about HTG 14.2 billion . 5 12. Banking sector indicators have improved , reflecting financial disintermediation. Non - performing loan ratios, while elevated, declined from 14.2 percent to just under 9 percent between June and December 2025, and capital adequacy ratios (at 26 percent in December) have consistently 5 Implicit fuel subsidies — and related foregone revenues — arise from the gap between the domestic cost recovery price s and pump prices. The domestic cost recovery price s are estimated to have an elasticity of 1.89 with respect to increases in WTI prices, implying that higher fuel import costs do not translate one for one into revenue losses. Box 1. Fuel Pump Price Adjustment Mechanism and Recent Developments On March 27, 2026, amid surging global oil prices, the Haitian authorities issued a decree introducing an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism. Under the decree, calculated prices for gasoline, gasoil, and kerosene — defined as the cost - insurance - freigh t import price plus applicable direct and indirect charges and margins — are reviewed monthly and adjusted according to predefined thresholds. Specifically: • No adjustment when the calculated price varies by 3 percent or less relative to the last published pump price. • Automatic adjustments when the variation exceeds 3 percent, provided that the adjustment does not exceed 10 percent of the last published pump price. • For adjustments in excess of 10 percent, the pump price is set by the Government, following consultation with a Petroleum Market Consultative Council — a nine - member body composed of representatives from the public and private sector. Under the decree, pump prices are calculated and set monthly by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and the Ministry of Trade and Industry at the end of each month, and published on the first day of the following month through a joint ministerial notice. On April 1st, 2026, the authorities implemented the first price adjustment under the new adjustment mechanism. Effective April 2, 2026, pump prices increased from HTG 560 to HTG 725 per gallon for gasoline (a 29.5 percent increase), from HTG 620 to HTG 850 per gallon for diesel (a 37.1 percent increase), and from HTG 615 to HTG 845 per gallon for kerosene (a 37.4 percent increase). These adjustments are expected to reduce fiscal pressures from fuel subsidies and limit incentives for cross - border fuel smuggl ing. 0 2 4 6 8 GUY COD SLV FCS TTO HND JAM SUR DOM GIN HTI CMR SEN BRB Gasoline Prices (US dollar per gallon) Sources: www.globalpetrolprices.com Note: The red patterned segment denotes post – fuel price adjustment for Haiti. Country labels follow ISO 3 - letter codes. FCS: Fragile and Conflict - Affected States. 1.2 Adjustment Date Product Old Pump Price New Pump Price Percent Change Sep-22 Gasoline 250 570 128.0 Diesel 353 670 89.8 Kerosene 352 666 89.2 Jul-23 Gasoline 570 560 -1.8 Diesel 670 620 -7.5 Kerosene 666 615 -7.7 Apr-26 Gasoline 560 725 29.5 Diesel 620 850 37.1 Kerosene 615 845 37.4 Sources: Haitian Authorities and IMF staff calculations. Fuel Pump Price Adjustments, 2022–26 (HTG per gallon) HAITI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 13 remained well above the 12 percent regulatory minimum. These movements reflect a sharp retrenchment in lending and the reallocation of bank balance sheets towards central bank and sovereign claims , rather than strengthening capital . System - wide gross loans fell by 68 percent between March 2022 and December 2025, with a contraction of 22 percent in 2025. This broad - based decline across all commercial banks’ portfolios will continue to weigh on economic activity. Preliminary data for Ja nuary - February 2026 suggests gross loans contracted an additional 4 percent in real terms. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION UNDER THE SMP 13. Program implementation remains on track, but reform momentum has slowed amid deteriorating conditions. The authorities remain committed to the SMP despite the challenging domestic and global environment. • Quantitative and Indicative Targets. End - September 2025 ITs were met except for the fiscal revenue target, which was missed by a narrow margin — 0. 04 percent of the target — reflecting continued security - related disruptions to economic activity and tax collection (¶1 0 ). All quantitative and indicative end - December 2025 targets have been met. Reserve accumulation has remained strong with net international reserves reaching USD 1.76 billion in December 2025. The revenue, primary balance, and social spending targets remai ned on track. The monetary financing target was also met despite an increasingly constrained fiscal space. The authorities confirmed no accumulation of domestic or external arrears and no plans to contract non - concessional loans. • Structural Benchmarks. Reforms continue to advance, albeit with delays in some areas, particularly in public financial management and revenue mobilization. Of the eight structural benchmarks (SBs) due for assessment at the time of the third review, three were met. (Table 2). The status of reforms assessed in this review is as follows: o Although procurement contracts have been published on the websites of the National Commission for Public Procurement (CNMP) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), publication has lagged since October 2025. ( SB2 — continuous , not met). o FSW monthly execution reports ( SB3 — continuous , met) continue to be published on the websites of the MEF and the General Directorate of the Budget (DGB). The quarterly internal expenditure audit for the use of FSW resources due in December 2025 was provided on time. ( SB4 — continuous SB, met). o The Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes (CSCCA) has conducted and published the financial and operational compliance audit of FSW spending for FY2022 - 23 0 10 20 30 40 50 Mar-22 Aug-22 Jan-23 Jun-23 Nov-23 Apr-24 Sep-24 Feb-25 Jul-25 Dec-25 BNC BUH CAPITALBK SOGEBK UNIBNK SOGEBL Gross Bank Loans (In billions of real gourdes) Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti. Note: Figures are expressed in constant March 2022 gourdes. HAITI 14 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND and FY2023 - 2024 with delay. The audit for FY2024 - 2025 remains ongoing ( SB5 — end - March 2026 target, not met). o The latest quarterly report on the operations and financial status of the Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES) is delayed but expected to be published soon ( SB6 — continuous , not met). o The digitalization of tax declarations and payments for large taxpayers is facing implementation constraints.