(2024-02) CRS - Haïti : Développements récents et politique américaine

Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Updated February 1, 2024 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R47394 SUMMARY R47394 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy February 1, 2024 Haiti, located on the island of Hispaniola bordering the Dominican Republic, remains mired in interrelated political, security, and humanitarian crises. Haiti lacks an elected president and Karla I. Rios legislature following the July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. Moïse had named Analyst in Latin American Ariel Henry to be prime minister prior to his death, but Henry had not been sworn in as required Affairs under Haitian law. Since the assassination, a political stalemate has persisted over whether Henry or a transitional government should govern until elections are convened. A December 2022 Clare Ribando Seelke Henry-backed accord aimed to create a path to elect a president by February 7, 2024. As that date Specialist in Latin has approached, protests against the de facto Henry government have escalated. American Affairs The political impasse has hindered Haiti’s ability to respond to worsening security and humanitarian crises. In October 2022, Henry asked for a foreign security force to help reestablish control amid rampant gang violence. Although many Haitian civil society groups initially opposed this request due to concerns regarding abuses committed during past interventions and Henry’s unelected status, some have since expressed support for a foreign security force presence. After Kenya offered to lead a “multinational security support (MSS) mission,” the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution in October 2023 to authorize a non-U.N. mission funded by voluntary contributions. The status of the MSS is uncertain, however, as Kenya’s High Court has ruled the deployment unconstitutional. The crises in Haiti continue to fuel instability and U.S.-bound migration. U.S. Policy U.S. policy in Haiti has aimed to support Haitian efforts to restore security, the rule of law, democratic institutions leading to free and fair elections, and economic and social stability. The Biden Administration allocated $237.4 million in bilateral assistance for Haiti in FY2022 and $204.5 million in FY2023, including increased support for the Haitian National Police. The Administration requested $291.5 million for Haiti in FY2024. Separately, the Administration provided more than $126.5 million in humanitarian assistance to Haiti in FY2023. In March 2023, the Administration released a 10-year plan for promoting peace and stability in Haiti, a priority country under the Global Fragility Act (P.L. 116-94), supported by additional funds. The Administration pledged $100 million in foreign assistance and $100 million in Defense Department operational support to the proposed MSS. The U.S. Treasury and State Departments have publicly sanctioned eight current or former Haitian officials, including two former prime ministers, and several gang leaders. The United States co-drafted a U.N. Security Council resolution to sanction gang leaders in Haiti and their financial backers (adopted in October 2022). Congressional Action Congress set objectives for U.S. policy toward Haiti through 2025 in the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act (P.L. 117-103, Division V). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), did not designate a total funding level for Haiti but placed democracy-related conditions on some assistance. Neither the House- passed (H.R. 4665/H.Rept. 118-146) nor the Senate Appropriations Committee-reported (S. 2438/S.Rept. 118-71) versions of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024, would designate a specific aid amount for Haiti. However, both measures would place restrictions on assistance to the central government. In addition to foreign assistance, the House passed, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported, bills (H.R. 1684/S. 396) that would require an annual State Department report on ties between gangs and politicians in Haiti and would direct the President to impose sanctions on individuals identified in the report. Bills to renew trade preferences for Haiti (H.R. 5035/S. 552) also have been introduced in both houses. Congressional oversight efforts in the 118th Congress have focused on the Administration’s plans to improve security and democracy in Haiti, its relationship with the Henry government, and its pledged support for a multinational force deployment to Haiti. Congressional Research Service Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Political Situation ............................................................................................................................ 2 Background ............................................................................................................................... 2 Post-Assassination Political Impasse ........................................................................................ 4 Security Crisis ................................................................................................................................. 5 Humanitarian Situation .................................................................................................................... 7 U.N. Presence in Haiti and Recent Action ...................................................................................... 8 Sanctions Resolution ................................................................................................................. 9 Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission ...................................................................... 10 U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress ............................................................................................... 11 Foreign Assistance .................................................................................................................. 12 Bilateral Assistance ........................................................................................................... 12 Humanitarian Assistance ................................................................................................... 14 Funds to Support the Multinational Security Support Mission ......................................... 14 Global Fragility Act Implementation ................................................................................ 15 Donor Coordination .......................................................................................................... 15 Trade Preferences .................................................................................................................... 16 Sanctions: U.S. and Multilateral ............................................................................................. 16 U.S. Department of Justice Cooperation ................................................................................. 17 Weapons and Drug Trafficking ............................................................................................... 18 Migration Issues ...................................................................................................................... 18 Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 20 Figures Figure 1. Map of Haiti ..................................................................................................................... 2 Tables Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Haiti by Account: FY2018-FY2024 ..................................... 13 Contacts Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 20 Congressional Research Service Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Introduction Haiti, a Caribbean country that shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic (see Figure 1), has been of ongoing interest to Congress and successive U.S. presidential administrations because of its proximity to the United States, chronic instability, and vulnerability to natural disasters.1 Although Haiti has endured corrupt, authoritarian leaders for much of its history, governance arguably had improved in the years prior to a 2010 earthquake.2 That disaster killed more than 200,000 people and set development back significantly. Despite extensive international support for Haiti’s recovery, democratic institutions remain weak and the country continues to contend with extreme poverty; wide economic disparities; and both human-made and natural disasters. An August 2021 earthquake killed 2,000 people. The situation in Haiti further deteriorated after Haiti at a Glance the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in Capital: Port-au-Prince July 2021 led to uncertainty over who would Population: 12.3 million (2023, IMF est.) succeed him. Two days before the Languages: French (official), Creole (official) assassination, Moïse named Ariel Henry to be Area: 10,710 sq. miles, slightly larger than prime minister, but Henry was not sworn in. Massachusetts Henry has served as de facto prime minister GDP: $25.9 billion (2023, current prices, IMF est.) since mid-July 2021, although protests calling Real GDP Growth: -1.8% (2021); -1.7% (2022); - for his resignation have resurged in 2024. 1.5% (2023) (% change, constant prices, IMF) Per Capita GDP: $2,130 (2023, current prices, IMF) Haiti lacks an elected president, legislature, and Life Expectancy at Birth: 60.8/66.7 years local government; the terms of the last 10 (male/female) (PAHO, 2022) elected senators ended in January 2023. A Maternal Mortality Ratio: 480/100,000 live births political standoff between Henry’s de facto (UNDP, 2022) government and opposition political and civil Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF); Pan society leaders regarding how to form a American Health Organization (PAHO); United transitional government to stabilize the country Nations Development Programme (UNDP). and convene elections persists amid a worsening security and humanitarian crisis. In October 2022, Henry requested international support to help the Haitian National Police restore order. In October 2023, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution to authorize the deployment of a non-U.N. multinational security support (MSS) mission to Haiti led by Kenya and supported by voluntary contributions. Kenya had aimed to deploy its police to lead the MSS early this year, but a January 2024 ruling by Kenya’s high court ruled the deployment unconstitutional.3 The 118th Congress may consider options for responding to the interrelated political, security, and humanitarian crises in Haiti, including what, if any, U.S. support should be provided to a potential MSS. This report provides an overview of the situation in Haiti and U.S. policy responses to date. 1 For background, see Laurent DuBois, Haiti: the Aftershocks of History (New York, NY: Picador, 2013); Philippe Girard, Haiti: The Tumultuous History: From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken Nation (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, 2010). 2 International Crisis Group, Consolidating Stability in Haiti, Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 21, July 18, 2007. 3 Tom Odula, “Kenya’s High Court Rules That Deploying the Nation’s Police Officers to Haiti Is Unconstitutional,” Associated Press (AP), January 26, 2024. Congressional Research Service 1 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Figure 1. Map of Haiti Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS). Political Situation Background Haiti won independence from France in 1804, making it the second independent republic in the Western Hemisphere (after the United States). Since then, the country has experienced long periods of authoritarianism and political fragility, punctuated by foreign interventions and natural disasters.4 Since the fall of the brutal Duvalier dictatorship (1957-1986), attempts to consolidate democratic rule have had limited success.5 In 1991, a military coup interrupted the term of Haiti’s first president elected in free and fair elections, Jean-Bertrand Aristide of the center-left Fanmi Lavalas party (1991; 1994-1996; 2000-2004). The threat of a U.S. military intervention allowed Aristide to return three years later to complete his term. In 2000, Aristide began a second term after the opposition boycotted the presidential election due to flawed parliamentary elections 4 Rocio Cara Labrador and Diana Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022 (hereinafter Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path”). Haiti reportedly paid an indemnity to France of some $560 million, which caused a significant drain on Haiti’s finances well into the 20th century. Concerns about the indebted country’s ability to pay its creditors prompted a U.S. intervention from 1915 to 1934. Lazaro Gamio et al., “Haiti’s Lost Billions,” New York Times, May 20, 2022; Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti: 1915- 1934 (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971). 5 Fearing communist rule and/or instability on the island, successive U.S. presidential administrations recognized the regimes of François Duvalier (1957-1971) and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-1987), despite concerns about the leaders’ authoritarian tendencies. See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “U.S. Relations with Haiti” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, American Republics, vol. V, document 309, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d309; and U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Telegram from the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State” in Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, vol. XXIII, document 253, August 14, 1978, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1977-80v23/d253. Congressional Research Service 2 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy favoring Fanmi Lavalas. In 2004, Aristide—facing an armed uprising against his rule led by Guy Philiipe, a drug trafficker subsequently imprisoned on money laundering charges in the United States, as well as U.S. and international pressure—resigned and went into exile.6 From 2004 to 2017, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a peacekeeping force that grew to 13,000 at its peak, sought to restore order in the country; build the Haitian National Police (HNP); and, later, help with recovery after a 2010 earthquake. The legacy of MINUSTAH is complicated, as troops helped restore some stability to Haiti but reintroduced cholera into the country and committed human rights and sexual abuses. This experience initially led many Haitians to oppose the type of foreign military involvement requested by the Henry government.7 President Michel Martelly (2011-2016) and his chosen successor, Jovenel Moïse (2017-July 2021), who represented the center-right Tèt Kale Party (PHTK), both took office after disputed elections and administered governments allegedly rife with corruption.8 Under Moïse, Haiti experienced political and social unrest, high inflation, antigovernment protests, and gang violence. Like other Haitian politicians, Moïse allegedly provided money and arms to gangs in exchange for favors, including suppressing antigovernment protests such as those that erupted in 2018 after the government announced fuel price hikes.9 A 2021 report by Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic documented state (primarily police) involvement in attacks on neighborhoods in which some 240 civilians died from 2018 to 2020.10 Instability increased in 2019 after Haitian auditors issued two reports to the country’s chief prosecutor alleging Moïse and other officials had misappropriated and embezzled millions of dollars in public funds.11 Political gridlock between the executive and legislative branches led to the government not organizing scheduled October 2019 parliamentary elections. The terms of the entire lower Chamber of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired in January 2020, as did the terms of all local government posts, without newly elected officials to take these positions.12 Thereafter, Moïse ruled by decree, with some controversy over whether his term was to end in February 2021 or February 2022 (the U.S. State Department did not take a position on that dispute).13 6 AP, “Supporters of Former Haitian Rebel Leader Guy Philippe Launch Widespread Protests,” January 16, 2024. Daniel P. Erikson, “Haiti After Aristide: Still on the Brink,” Current History, vol. 104, no. 679 (February 2005). 7 Carla King et al., “‘MINUSTAH Is Doing Positive Things Just as They Do Negative Things’: Nuanced Perceptions of a UN Peacekeeping Operation Amidst Peacekeeper-Perpetrated Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Haiti,” Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 21, no. 6 (November 17, 2021), pp. 749-779. For how past interventions have influenced recent popular opinion in Haiti, see Rafael Bernal, “Human Rights Coalition to Biden: No Military Intervention in Haiti,” The Hill, November 1, 2022. 8 On Martelly and Moïse’s elections, see Georges Fauriol, “Haiti’s Problematic Electoral Dynamics,” Global Americans, December 21, 2021. On Martelly and drug trafficking, see Jacqueline Charles and Michael Wilner, “Canada Sanctions Former Haiti President Michel Martelly, Two Former Prime Ministers,” Miami Herald, November 21, 2022. On corruption in the Moïse government, see Maria Abi-Habib, “Haiti’s Leader Kept a List of Drug Traffickers. His Assassins Came for It,” New York Times, December 12, 2021. 9 Chris Dalby, “International Sanctions Seek to Weaken Haiti’s Patronage System Between Politicians, Gangs,” InSight Crime, November 24, 2022. For Moïse officials’ involvement in attacks on neighborhoods where protests occurred, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020. 10 Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, Killing with Impunity: State-Sanctioned Massacres in Haiti, April 2021. 11 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix C: Major Corruption Cases in Haiti and Government of Haiti Efforts to Address Corruption,” November 10, 2022. 12 The 10 remaining senators’ terms expired on January 9, 2023. 13 U.S. Department of State, “Appendix F: Alleged February 2021 Coup Against President Jovenel Moïse and U.S. and (continued...) Congressional Research Service 3 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy On July 7, 2021, armed assailants assassinated President Moïse in his private home in Port-au- Prince. Details of the attack remain under investigation; however, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has arrested 11 individuals for their role in a plot to kill Moïse, three of whom have been sentenced to life in prison.14 The FBI also has supported Haitian authorities’ investigation of the crime, although threats to the safety of those authorities and turnover among the judges leading the investigation have hindered Haitian efforts. Post-Assassination Political Impasse Moïse’s assassination gave rise to uncertainty about who would succeed him as president and who would serve as prime minister. Under the Haitian Constitution (Article 149), if a president dies in the last two years of his term, the legislature should elect a provisional president to serve out the term.15 As Haiti lacked a functioning legislature at the time of the assassination, the choice of who would succeed Moïse could not follow the prescribed constitutional order. Three individuals laid claims to serve as prime minister: interim Prime Minister Claude Joseph; Ariel Henry, a neurosurgeon nominated to be prime minister two days before Moïse’s death but not sworn in; and Joseph Lambert, then-president of the Haitian Senate. On July 11, an inter- agency U.S. delegation traveled to Haiti in response to a request for security and investigative assistance from the Haitian government. U.S. officials met with all three claimants to prime minister. After days of jockeying among the claimants over who would become prime minister, Joseph agreed that Henry would be prime minister and he foreign minister.16 Lambert separately gave up his quest to be prime minister; the U.S. government later sanctioned him for drug trafficking. On July 17, the United States, United Nations, and other donors issued a statement calling for the formation of an “inclusive government” and encouraging Prime Minister-designate Ariel Henry to form a government.17 Henry’s irregular path to his position, struggles to address Haitian challenges while in office, and allegations of his possible involvement in Moïse’s assassination, have eroded his credibility.18 Since the assassination, a political stalemate has persisted over how to convene elections and who should govern until an elected government is in place. In September 2021, de facto Prime Minister Henry and his supporters proposed that Henry name a provisional electoral council to convene elections, and that Henry remain the single head of government until a new elected government takes office. Rival political and civil society leaders, some of whom backed the Montana Accord, a 2021 proposal to form an interim government led by a president and prime minister, argued for a transitional government not led by Henry.19 International Partner Efforts to Support Free and Fair Elections in Haiti,” November 2022, at https://www.state.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Appendix-F-Developments-in-Haiti-004977.pdf. 14 Sarah Morland and Kylie Madry, “Ex-Colombian Soldier Pleads Guilty in Haiti President’s Assassination,” Reuters, December 22, 2023. 15 Haiti’s Constitution of 1987 with Amendments Through 2012 is available in English at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012.pdf?lang=en. 16 CRS interview with State Department officials, January 9, 2023. 17 U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), “Core Group Press Release,” July 17, 2021. 18 Monique Beals, “Judge, Investigators say Haitian Prime Minister Involved in President’s Assassination,” The Hill, February 8, 2022. 19 The Montana Accord proposed a two-year interim government led by a president and prime minister, with oversight committees, to restore order, administer elections, and create a truth and justice commission to address past human rights violations. Georges Fauriol, “Haiti: Betting on the Montana Accord,” Global Americans, February 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service 4 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy On December 21, 2022, Henry put forth a new transition proposal—the National Consensus for an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections (or the December 21st agreement)—that was signed by a range of stakeholders, including some former signatories of the Montana Accord.20 His government established a three-member High Transition Council (HTC) to implement that transition plan in January 2023 and appointed eight judges to the country’s highest court in March 2023. Since May 2023, a group of eminent persons from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has facilitated several rounds of talks among Henry and other stakeholders focused on increasing the size of the HTC and possibly expanding its powers, as well as selecting an electoral council. Those talks have yielded limited progress. Some Haitians are calling for Henry to step down by February 7, 2024, the date by which the December 21st agreement aimed to have an elected government assume office.21 In recent months, protests calling for Henry’s resignation have increased. Some of those protests have been led by former rebel leader Guy Philippe (repatriated from the United States in December) and members of an armed government environmental protection brigade that have clashed with police.22 Security Crisis Relations between Haitian gangs and the country’s political and economic elite are well established. Haiti’s past presidents and prominent politicians have used and received support from gangs. Generally, gangs provide political elites with services such as campaign support, voter intimidation, bribery, fundraising, vandalism, and protest disruption. Former President Aristide reportedly relied on support from gangs that engaged in political repression, and the Canadian government sanctioned former President Martelly for his role in financing gangs.23 Business elites have formed relationships with gangs in order to protect their businesses and enable them to move merchandise throughout the country and abroad. In December 2022, the Canadian government imposed sanctions on three prominent businessmen for reportedly providing “illicit financial and operational support to gangs.”24 Since Moïse’s assassination, state authority has collapsed in parts of Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas. As of late 2023, armed gangs reportedly controlled 80% of the capital and other urban areas, as well as major highways and the agricultural region of Artibonite (see Figure 1).25 These gangs are often better armed than the national police.26 A wave of protests and gang- led violence erupted in September 2022 after de facto Prime Minister Henry announced the end of fuel subsidies. Gangs took over a major port and the country’s main fuel terminal, temporarily grinding the economy to a halt and blocking humanitarian agencies’ access to some areas. As 20 U.N. Security Council, U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), Report of the Secretary General, S/2023/274, April 14, 2023. 21 BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, S/2024/62, January 15, 2024. Hereinafter: S/2024/62. 22 AP, “Haiti Cracks Down on Heavily Armed Environmental Agents After Clashes with Police,” January 29, 2024. 23 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Haiti: The Chimères, Their Activities and Their Geographic Presence; the Treatment of the Chimères by the Authorities and the Presence of Group Members Within the Government and the Police (2006-May 2008), June 3, 2008; Harold Isaac and Brian Ellsworth, “Canada Sanctions Haiti Ex-President Martelly for Financing Gangs,” Reuters, November 20, 2022. 24 Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada, “Canada Imposes Sanctions Against Haitian Economic Elites,” December 5, 2022. 25 AP, “UN Human Rights Official is Alarmed by Sprawling Gang Violence in Haiti,” October 31, 2023. BINUH, Criminal Violence Extends Beyond Port-au-Prince: the Situation in Lower Artibonite from January 2022 to October 2023, November 2023. Hereinafter: BINUH, November 2023. 26 Jon Lee Anderson, “A Land Held Hostage,” The New Yorker, July 24, 2023. Congressional Research Service 5 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy noted previously, Henry requested an international force to help quell the security situation in October 2022; however, such a force has yet to be established (see “Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission” below).27 The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates that there are at least 300 criminal groups operating in Haiti.28 However, some local sources suggest the number of criminal groups is closer to 750, including self-defense groups.29 Many of these groups have developed alliances to amplify their operational capabilities. According to the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the number of reported homicides increased by 119% last year, rising from 2,183 in 2022 to 4,789 in 2023.30 Kidnappings escalated from 1,359 in 2022 to 2,490 in 2023, an 83% increase.31 Gangs have sought to find new revenue through kidnapping for ransom and other crimes amid diminished support from elites fearful of being designated for U.S. and Canadian sanctions.32 Gang attacks on government personnel and critical infrastructure have increased as they have grown more autonomous. According to U.N. reports, gangs have used “collective rape” and other gender-based violence (GBV) against women, children as young as 10, and the elderly to intimidate people. 33 Gender- based and sexual violence, though gravely underreported, is more prevalent in zones contested by gangs in which many inhabitants lack access to basic health, education, and social services. Doctors Without Borders estimates that its staff treated 42% more survivors of GBV in 2023 than in 2022 (some 3,700 victims), a majority of those were victims of armed actors rather than intimate partner violence.34 The U.N. Secretary-General described the Haitian National Police (HNP) in 2022 as “spread thin” and lacking weapons, equipment, and capacity.35 Some 1,663 officers resigned over the course of 2023, leaving the HNP with 13,196 officers as of December.36 Low pay and poor working conditions have increased attrition among HNP officers available to perform police duties.37 At any given time, only 4,000 officers are available for policing.38 In 2023, 45 out of 412 police buildings were non-operational, were under the direct control of armed gangs, or had been subjected to repeated attacks.39 27 Catherine Osborn, “Haiti’s Crisis Escalates,” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2022. 28 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Haiti: Humanitarian Response Plan 2023 at a Glance,” Relief Web, April 13, 2023. 29 BINUH, November 2023. 30 S/2024/62. 31 Ibid. 32 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, S/2023/41, January 17, 2023; BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, S/2023/492, July 3, 2023; Reuters, “Haiti Rights Group Records Three-Fold Rise in Kidnappings for Early 2023,” April 4, 2023. 33 This draws from BINUH and Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Sexual Violence in Port-au-Prince: A Weapon Used by Gangs to Instill Fear, October 14, 2022; OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights Situation, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Gang Control and Security Vacuums: Assessing Gender-Based Violence in Cité Soleil, May 2023. 34 Widlore Mérancourt and Amanda Coletta, “’Collective Rapes’ Surge as Weapon in Haiti’s Gang War,” Washington Post, January 29, 2024. 35 BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, S/2022/747, October 10, 2022. Hereinafter: S/2022/747. 36 Security Council, S/2024/62. 37 U.N. Security Council, BINUH, Report of the Secretary General, S/2023/492, July 3, 2023. 38 Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH), Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments June Through November 2023, December 2023. 39 U.N. Security Council, S/2024/62 and S/2023/769. Congressional Research Service 6 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy A July 2022 International Crisis Group study estimated that 40% of HNP officers had ties to gangs.40 Corruption, combined with the HNP and Haitian Coast Guard’s lack of control over the country’s ports and borders, have made Haiti a hub for drug and arms trafficking and worsened gang violence (see “Weapons and Drug Trafficking”). When police have sought to confront gangs, confrontations have often proven deadly. In November 2022, criminals assassinated the director of the HNP’s training center at the center. Impunity prevails in Haiti’s weak justice system. In addition to failing to resolve Moïse’s assassination, Haitian authorities have yet to arrest Jimmy Chérizier, a former HNP officer turned gang leader who was linked to Moïse, or other Haitian officials implicated in the 2018 La Saline massacre of 71 people.41 Gangs overtook several of Haiti’s main courthouses in summer 2022, and many of the courthouses remain inoperable. Without functioning courts, Haitian prisons continue to hold inmates, 85% of whom were in pretrial detention in June 2023; prisons have a 331% cell occupancy rate.42 Many inmates lack access to food, water, and medical care. Haitian authorities have increased the prison budget by 87% for 2023/2024, including a 41% increase for food.43 The rampant violence in Haiti has left many Haitians hopeless and frustrated. Since April 2023, Haiti has experienced a rise in antigang vigilantism—the Bwa Kale movement.44 On April 24, Port-au-Prince residents lynched and burned 10 alleged gang members. The movement is now in all 10 administrative departments (states) of Haiti; hundreds have been killed.45 Humanitarian Situation Haiti is a fragile country that is highly vulnerable to natural disasters due to its location and topography (exacerbated by deforestation and climate change), and the Haitian government’s limited capacity to respond to such disasters. A decade after the devastating 2010 earthquake, inadequate recovery efforts, combined with subsequent natural disasters (e.g., Hurricane Matthew, a 2021 earthquake) and disease outbreaks (e.g., cholera, Coronavirus Disease 2019 [COVID-19]), have further weakened the state’s ability to protect and provide for its citizens.46 Flooding in June 2023 resulted in more than 40 deaths and left some 13,000 Haitians homeless.47 The Fund for Peace’s 2023 Fragile States Index ranked Haiti as the 10th most fragile state in the world due to various factors, including the state’s lack of legitimacy and inability to deliver services, uneven economic development, and relatively low levels of social cohesion.48 40 International Crisis Group, New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists, July 27, 2022. 41 Chérizier, then-Minister of the Interior Fednel Monchery, and President Moïse’s Departmental Delegate Joseph Pierre Richard Duplan allegedly planned an attack carried out by gangs on protesters who had criticized the government. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2020. 42 BINUH, Human Rights Situation Main Trends, Quarterly Report: July-September 2023, October 27, 2023. 43 S/2024/62. 44 Reuters, “Haitian Residents Lynch and Set Fire to Suspected Gang Members,” April 26, 2023. 45 BINUH, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2023/768, October 16, 2023. Hereinafter: S/2023/768. 46 On recovery and reconstruction, see Jonathan Katz, The Big Truck That Went by: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2014); Government Accountability Office (GAO), Haiti: USAID and State Should Improve Management and Assessment of Reconstruction Activities, GAO-23-105211, March 2023. Hereinafter: GAO, March 2023. On subsequent disasters, see Labrador and Roy, “Haiti’s Troubled Path.” 47 Jacqueline Charles, “At Least 42 Dead, Thousands Homeless in Haiti After a Weekend of Heavy Rains, Flooding,” Miami Herald, June 5, 2023. 48 The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, at https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/. Congressional Research Service 7 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy In contrast to some previous humanitarian crises Haiti has endured, the political and security situation is the primary driver of the current humanitarian emergency.49 According to U.N. officials, as of October 2023, gang violence had displaced at least 195,000 people.50 Gang blockades of highways have limited humanitarian access, particularly to the southern peninsula but also to communities to the east and north of the capital. The G9 gang’s blockade of the Varreux fuel terminal from September to November 2022, combined with broad unrest, caused businesses and hospitals to close. During that period, Haitians, fearful of encountering gang violence, sheltered in place amid a lack of water and sanitation services, fuel, electricity, and food. UNOCHA estimates that 5.5 million Haitians are in need of humanitarian aid.51 Since mid- September 2023, the Dominican Republic has closed its shared land border with Haiti in response to a water dispute. The continued closure could exacerbate humanitarian conditions in Haiti’s border departments.52 In 2023, UNOCHA requested $719.9 million for the Humanitarian Response Plan in Haiti. As of December 2023, donors had provided 33% of the funds requested, or $242.2 million.53 Ongoing humanitarian concerns include food insecurity and inadequate access to health care, protection, and education. In September 2023, the World Food Program and its partners estimated that 4.4 million Haitians, roughly 44% of the population, faced acute levels of hunger.54 In October 2022, cholera resurfaced in Haiti; as of December 2023, it had claimed 1,156 lives.55 While cholera is preventable through vaccination and treatable with rehydration, gangs have reportedly prevented patient access to health facilities and denied medical staff entry to affected communities. In March 2023, BINUH reported that 21 health facilities had temporarily shut down or reduced their activities due to violence.56 Children in Haiti are extremely vulnerable to protection concerns, particularly gender-based violence. They have also lost years of schooling due to COVID-19, insecurity and cholera-related school closures, and armed attacks on schools.57 U.N. Presence in Haiti and Recent Action The U.N. has had a continuous presence in Haiti for almost 20 years, with diplomatic and financial support provided by successive U.S. presidential administrations. Following the collapse of the Aristide government in 2004, the U.N. Security Council established MINUSTAH to help restore order and train the HNP.58 After the 2010 earthquake, the Security Council expanded MINUSTAH’s size and mission. 49 UNOCHA, “Seven Things to Know About the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti,” October 26, 2022. 50 International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Haiti Emergency Response: Situation Report,” October 2023. 51 UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2024, December 2023. 52 World Food Program (WFP), “Haiti: Overview of DR Border Closure Impacts,” November 3, 2023. 53 United Nations, “Support to Haiti’s Police, Deployment of Multinational Mission Fundamental Towards Restoring Stability in Country, Senior Official Tells Security Council,” January 25, 2024. 54 WFP, “Severe Hunger Persists in Haiti as Violence Intensifies in the Capital,” September 19, 2023. 55 Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), “Cholera Epidemic in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” December 27, 2023. 56 OHCHR and BINUH, Human Rights Situation, Main Trends, Quarterly Report: January-March 2023, March 8, 2023; Reuters, “Medecins Sans Frontieres Shuts Haiti Hospital amid Gang Violence,” March 8, 2023. 57 U.N. Children’s Fund, “Haiti: Armed Violence Against Schools Increases Nine-Fold in One Year,” February 9, 2023. 58 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 1542 (2004)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 4961st Meeting, on 30 April 2004,” S/RES/1542 (2004), June 1, 2004. MINUSTAH’s original mission aimed to restore security and stability, (continued...) Congressional Research Service 8 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy A Security Council resolution ended MINUSTAH in 2017, citing Haiti’s peaceful completion of a long-delayed electoral process in February 2017 as a milestone.59 The Security Council also praised MINUSTAH for supporting the political process, professionalizing the police, and improving security and stability in Haiti, achievements that proved short-lived. Haitian and international human rights and health experts criticized MINUSTAH for its role in introducing cholera to Haiti (a disease that had not been present in the country for more than a century) and for allegations of sexual abuse by some of its forces.60 In 2016, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki- Moon apologized for the U.N.’s role in a cholera outbreak that ultimately caused nearly 10,000 deaths; the U.N. also launched a $400 million fund to confront the epidemic.61 In 2017, the U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) succeeded MINUSTAH, focusing on strengthening judicial institutions, protecting human rights, increasing the professionalism of the HNP, and reinforcing the rule of law. The mission also supported violence- reduction projects and income-generating activities for youth. During MINJUSTH’s mandate, the number of HNP officers increased by 10% to 15,400 and courts reported a 300% increase in files processed on the day of their reception.62 In October 2019, the U.N. transitioned to a political office, the U.N. Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), for an initial one-year period that the U.N. Security Council twice extended. BINUH’s mandate, which currently runs through July 2024,63 is to advise the Haitian government on how to establish an inclusive national dialogue on reestablishing stability, security, and the rule of law so elections can be held, among other aims. The mission also emphasizes protecting and promoting human rights, including by documenting recent gender-based violence by gangs and producing reports from Haiti for the U.N. Secretary-General and Security Council.64 BINUH coordinates with other U.N. agencies, funds, and programs, ranging from humanitarian agencies such as the World Food Program to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. Sanctions Resolution On October 17, 2022, the Security Council discussed a resolution sponsored by the United States and Mexico to establish a U.N. sanctions regime against gang leaders in Haiti and those who finance them. The Security Council unanimously approved the sanctions resolution (Resolution promote political processes (including elections), strengthen institutions and rule-of-law-structures, and promote and protect human rights. 59 U.N. Security Council, “Resolution 2350 (2017)/Adopted by the Security Council at Its 7924th Meeting, on 13 April 2017,” S/RES/2350 (2017), April 13, 2017. Critics argue, however, that a transitional government, not the U.N.-backed PHTK government, accomplished that goal. Even with MINUSTAH present, Haiti experienced a constitutional crisis after Michel Martelly failed to convene elections to choose his successor. Georges Fauriol, ‘A Cycle of Instability’: Haiti’s Constitutional Crisis,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 8, 2021. 60 For background, see CRS In Focus IF10502, Haiti: Cholera, the United Nations, and Hurricane Matthew, by Maureen Taft-Morales and Tiaji Salaam-Blyther. 61 U.N. News, “U.N.’s Ban Apologizes to People of Haiti, Outlines New Plan to Fight Cholera Epidemic and Help Communities,” December 1, 2016. By the end of 2021, donors had contributed only $21.8 million to support the pledged $400 million fund. See U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund, 2021 Annual Report. 62 U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, “MINUJUSTH Completes Its Mandate, Putting an End to 15 Consecutive Years of Peacekeeping in Haiti,” October 16, 2019. 63 For background, see BINUH, “Mandate,” at https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/mandate. 64 BINUH and OHCHR, Sexual Violence. Congressional Research Service 9 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy 2653) on October 21, 2022; an expert committee has recommended, and the Security Council has added, four gang leaders to its sanctions list (See “Sanctions: U.S. and Multilateral”).65 Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission On October 6, 2022, de facto Prime Minister Henry and his ministers requested the deployment of an international force to help Haitian forces quell the security situation and allow humanitarian aid to flow. On October 8, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres sent a letter to the Security Council recommending various approaches to respond to that request.66 On October 17, 2022, the Security Council discussed a proposed resolution by the United States and Mexico, which reportedly would have authorized the deployment of a non-U.N. multinational force to Haiti.67 From October 2022 through mid-2023, few countries publicly offered to send their forces to Haiti and many countries, including Canada, declined U.S. requests to lead such a force. In July 2023, Kenya announced its willingness to “positively consider” leading a multinational force in Haiti and sending 1,000 police to support the HNP if authorized by the Security Council.68 The State Department and CARICOM praised Kenya’s disposition even as some questioned the human rights record of the Kenyan police.69 In August 2023, Kenya deployed an assessment mission accompanied by U.S. officials to Haiti. In an August 15 letter to the Security Council, the Secretary-General said the mission should focus on disarming gangs, securing key installations and highways, and reasserting state presence to enable basic services to reach the population.70 He also asserted that “the robust use of force by a specialized multinational police force,” likely supported by military assets, is needed to help the HNP reestablish law and order. He outlined how the U.N. could provide logistical support to the multinational force, while also expanding BINUH to facilitate a political accord and train the police, among other tasks. On October 2, 2023, the Security Council approved Resolution 2699 to support a Kenyan-led multinational force financed by voluntary contributions to provide security for critical infrastructure, training, and operational support to the HNP.71 Russia and China abstained from the vote. The resolution called on member states to contribute personnel, equipment, financial, and logistical support for the MSS. In late January 2024, Kenya’s High Court blocked the Kenyan government from deploying police officers to Haiti, ruling that police officers cannot be deployed on foreign operations missions.72 65 Security Council, “Resolution 2692 (2023),” July 14, 2023. U.N. Security Council, “Security Council 2653 Sanctions Committee Adds 4 Entries to its Sanctions List,” SC/15520, December 8, 2023. 66 Such approaches included deploying a non-U.N. rapid action force (probably composed of some military forces) to support the HNP, forming a multinational police task force, creating a multinational antigang force, expanding BINUH’s budget and mandate, bolstering the HNP and the justice sector, and combating arms trafficking. Security Council, S/2022/747. 67 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a U.N. Security Council Briefing on Haiti,” October 17, 2022. 68 Reuters, “Kenya Ready to Lead Multinational Force to Haiti,” July 29, 2023. 69 U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Kenya Considering Leading a Multinational Force in Haiti,” August 1, 2023; CARICOM, “Statement on Multi-national Force to Support Haiti,” August 4, 2023; Luke Taylor, “Kenya’s Offer to Send Police to Haiti Sparks Human Rights Concerns,” The Guardian, August 5, 2023.. 70 Security Council, “Letter Dated 14 August 2023 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2023/596, August 15, 2023. 71 Security Council, “Resolution 2699 (2023),” October 2, 2023. 72 Jacqueline Charles, “No Cops for Haiti: Kenya Court Blocks Sending Police to Help Fight Kidnapping Gangs,” Miami Herald, January 26, 2024. Congressional Research Service 10 Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy The Kenyan government reportedly plans to challenge the ruling. While the U.S. State Department has reaffirmed its support for an MSS mission to Haiti, the composition, budget, and timing of a potential deployment remain unclear.73 Any units or participants in a mission to Haiti (whether police or military troops) would be subject to U.N. vetting, while those receiving U.S. support would be subject to U.S. human rights vetting (22 U.S.C. §2378d and 10 USC §362). Human rights experts have suggested additional training that should be provided to MSS members as well as mechanisms to prevent, investigate, and punish any potential human rights violations.74 U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress Biden Administration policy goals in Haiti include supporting Haitian-led efforts to confront gangs and insecurity, resolve the political and constitutional crisis, revive the economy, and address the root causes of emigration from the country.75 Since Moïse’s assassination, U.S., Canadian, and U.N. officials—among others criticized for past interventions in the country—have emphasized their support for “Haitian-led solutions” to the country’s challenges. In March 2023, the Biden Administration issued a 10-year plan for Haiti, as mandated by the Global Fragility Act (GFA; P.L. 116-94), with a long-term, interagency goal of helping the government and citizenry of Haiti work together to develop a shared vision and plan to achieve long-term stability.76 (See “Global Fragility Act Implementation.”) U.S. officials have pursued several courses of action to advance those goals. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other top U.S. officials have stressed the urgency of reaching a political consensus on how to reestablish constitutional order to