(2008-01) CRS - Ayiti: Devlopman ak Politik Ameriken Depi 1991

(cid:0) (cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:9)(cid:15)(cid:5)(cid:16)(cid:7)(cid:3)(cid:15)(cid:17)(cid:7)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:7)(cid:21)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:7)(cid:20)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:22)(cid:9)(cid:7) (cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:7)(cid:3)(cid:15)(cid:17)(cid:7)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:28)(cid:9)(cid:15)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:26)(cid:12)(cid:15)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:9)(cid:16)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:12)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:7)(cid:26)(cid:12)(cid:15)(cid:22)(cid:9)(cid:28)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:7) (cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:2)(cid:13)(cid:5)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:6)(cid:15)(cid:8) (cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:16)(cid:9)(cid:11) (cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:8)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:7)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:21)(cid:6)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:8) (cid:14)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:18)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:16)(cid:9)(cid:11) (cid:19)(cid:7)(cid:12)(cid:20)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:18)(cid:11)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:11)(cid:21)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:11) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:9)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:11)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:13)(cid:6)(cid:11) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:0)(cid:4)(cid:4)(cid:5) (cid:6)(cid:6)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:5) (cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:5) (cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:3)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:5)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:5)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:9)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:14) Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:6) (cid:6) (cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8) Following the first free and fair elections in Haiti’s history, Jean-Bertrand Aristide first became Haitian President in February 1991. He was overthrown by a military coup in September 1991. For over three years, the military regime resisted international demands that Aristide be restored to office. In September 1994, after a U.S. military intervention had been launched, the military regime agreed to Aristide’s return, the immediate, unopposed entry of U.S. troops, and the resignation of its leadership. President Aristide returned to Haiti in October 1994 under the protection of some 20,000 U.S. troops, and disbanded the Haitian army. U.S. aid helped train a civilian police force. Subsequently, critics charged Aristide with politicizing that force and engaging in corrupt practices. Elections held under Aristide and his successor, René Préval (1996-2000), including the one in which Aristide was reelected in 2000, were marred by alleged irregularities, low voter turnout, and opposition boycotts. Efforts to negotiate a resolution to the electoral dispute frustrated the international community for years. Tension and violence continued throughout Aristide’s second term, culminating in his departure from office in February 2004, after the opposition repeatedly refused to negotiate a political solution and armed groups took control of half the country. An interim government, backed by the Bush Administration, was established with Gérard LaTortue as Prime Minister. The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has tried to improve security conditions, but Haiti remains unstable. Natural disasters have contributed to instability. After several postponements, presidential elections were held on February 7, 2006, and runoff legislative elections were held on April 21. The electoral council declared René Préval winner after a controversial calculation process. He was inaugurated to a five-year presidential term on May 14, 2006. President Préval has sought to restore stability, build democratic institutions, and establish conditions for private investment in order to create jobs. He enjoys broad support from the international donor community, the Bush Administration, and Congress. On December 9, 2006, the 109th Congress passed a special trade preferences bill for Haiti (the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement/HOPE Act of 2006, Title V, P.L. 109-432). Congressional concerns regarding Haiti include fostering democratic development, stability, and security; the cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and human trafficking; addressing Haitian migration; and alleviating poverty. The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161) includes a number of provisions on U.S. aid to Haiti that are described in this report. During its second session, the 110th Congress may consider a variety of legislation that has provisions on Haiti: H.Res. 234, H.Res. 241, H.Res. 909, H.R. 351, H.R. 454, H.R. 522, H.R. 750, H.R. 1001, H.R. 1645, H.R. 2830, H.R. 4986, S. 222, S. 821, and S. 1348. An expansion or extension of current trade benefits provided through the HOPE Act may also be considered. This report will be not be updated. (cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:29)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:6) (cid:6) (cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:14)(cid:8) Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991.....................................................................................1 Most Recent Developments......................................................................................................1 Aristide’s First Term in Office (February-September 1991).....................................................2 Restoration of Aristide to Office (October 1994)......................................................................3 Completion of Aristide’s First Term (1994-1996), and the First Préval Administration (1996-2001)............................................................................................................................4 The 2000 Haitian Elections.................................................................................................4 Aristide’s Second Term in Office (2001-2004).........................................................................5 OAS/CARICOM Efforts to Resolve Haitian Conflict........................................................6 Aristide’s Departure............................................................................................................7 The Interim Government (2004-2006)......................................................................................8 The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti’s Activities in 2004-2006...................................11 The 2006 Elections..................................................................................................................12 Background to the Elections.............................................................................................12 Results of February 2006 Elections..................................................................................14 The Préval Presidency.............................................................................................................15 Relations with the United States.......................................................................................16 U.S. Policy and Congressional Concerns......................................................................................17 Support of Democracy............................................................................................................17 U.S. Assistance to Haiti...........................................................................................................18 Trends in U.S. Aid.............................................................................................................18 Congressional Action and Conditions on Aid...................................................................19 Trade Preferences Legislation...........................................................................................21 Protection of Human Rights and Security Conditions............................................................23 U.S. Arms Transfers and Sales to Haiti...................................................................................26 Narcotics Trafficking...............................................................................................................27 Haitian Migration....................................................................................................................28 Humanitarian Factors..............................................................................................................29 Environmental Degradation and Rehabilitation......................................................................30 Legislation in the 110th Congress............................................................................................30 Legislation in the 109th Congress............................................................................................32 Legislation in the 108th Congress............................................................................................34 Chronology....................................................................................................................................35 (cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:19)(cid:14)(cid:6)(cid:15)(cid:8) Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Haiti, FY1990-FY2008......................................................................22 Table 2. DOD Incremental Costs of U.S. International Peace and Security Commitments, FY1992-FY1996........................................................................................................................23 (cid:16)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:11)(cid:15)(cid:8) Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................38 (cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:29)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:6) (cid:6) (cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:29)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:6) (cid:6) (cid:0) (cid:15)(cid:13)(cid:16)(cid:13)(cid:17)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:14)(cid:8)(cid:5)(cid:11)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:2)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:17)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:23)(cid:11)(cid:24)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:26)(cid:25) (cid:8) (cid:2)(cid:13)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:24)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:13)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:15)(cid:8) U.S. officials have continued to express strong support for the Préval government, particularly improvements it has made, with U.N. support, in the security realm. In December 2007, Paul Tuebner, the USAID Mission Director in Haiti praised President Préval for “taking the actions necessary to bring Haiti out of conflict and into development.”2 His comments were similar to those expressed by President Bush during President Préval’s first official visit to the United States in May 2007. President Bush praised Préval for his efforts to improve economic conditions and establish the rule of law in Haiti, and Préval responded by saying that his government seeks increased U.S. investment in Haiti. There is also bipartisan support in Congress for the Préval government. On December 9, 2006, the 109th Congress passed a special trade preferences bill for Haiti. The Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act of 2006 (H.R. 6142) was incorporated into the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 as Title V (P.L. 109-432). Supporters said the bill could generate 20,000 jobs in Haiti within a few months of its implementation. State Department officials estimate that some 4,500 jobs have thus far been created.3 Some Haitian officials and business leaders hope that the 110th Congress will consider expanding the benefits provided by the HOPE Act and extending the duration of those benefits in order to help the country attract new investors and create more jobs.4 The Bush Administration and Congress are likely to maintain an interest in ensuring that Haiti is able to hold free and fair elections this spring for the 10 seats in the Haitian senate whose terms will expire in May 2008. The U.S. government is providing close to $4 million to support the Senate elections in Haiti. The elections, originally scheduled for the late fall, were postponed after members of the country’s electoral commission accused the commission’s leadership of embezzling funds. President Préval named a new commission in December 2007, but expressed serious concerns about his country’s ability to afford the multiple elections that the current Haitian constitution requires. His December statements followed an October 2007 speech in which he called for constitutional reform. Since that time, Haitian leaders and civil society has been debating the pros and cons of reforming the country’s 1987 constitution.5 In November 2007, the Préval Administration published its Poverty Reduction Strategy, a key requirement to meet the International Monetary Fund’s conditions for debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). Haiti still has to meet certain other conditions (a so-called “completion point”) before its roughly $1.54 billion in foreign public debt, which is 1 Sources for historical background include CRS Report 95-602, Haiti: Efforts to Restore President Aristide, 1991- 1994; and CRS Report 93-931, Haiti: Background to the 1991 Overthrow of President Aristide, both by (name redacte d). 2 “Haiti’s Improved Economic Situation Tied to Better Security,” State Department Press Releases and Documents, December 5, 2007. 3 U.S. Department of State, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Hill Briefing, January 24, 2008. 4 Jacqueline Charles, “HOPE Act Would Help Haiti’s Garment Industry,” Miami Herald, November 26, 2007. 5 Robert Perito and Jasenka Jocic, “Paper Versus Steel: Haiti’s Challenge of Constitutional Reform,” United States Institute of Peace Briefing, January 2008. (cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:29)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6) (cid:23)(cid:6) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:6) (cid:6) mostly owed to the IMF and the World Bank, is cancelled.6 Upon reaching that completion point, Haiti will also be eligible for cancellation of its debt to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Until that point is reached, the IDB is providing $50 million in grant funding annually for Haiti. On October 15, 2007, the United Nations Security Council voted to extend the mandate of the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for another year and directed the Mission to undertake more operations to secure Haiti’s borders and maritime boundaries. The number of troops was reduced slightly, while the number of police was increased in order to help the Haitian National Policy maintain control over urban areas. This latest extension occurred after Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon’s August 2007 visit to Haiti. During his visit, he praised President Préval’s efforts to fight corruption and to reform Haiti’s police, judiciary, and prison systems. On May 21, 2007, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) announced the seizure of 1,056 pounds of cocaine and the arrest of three drug smugglers in international waters near the island of Hispaniola.7 That and other seizures occurred as a result of a series of joint interdiction operations carried out in the spring and summer of 2007 by DEA, Dominican, and Haitian officials. There is increasing concern among some Members of Congress that Haiti and the Dominican Republic are becoming major transhipment points for drugs coming from South America. They would like to see more joint interdiction efforts carried out and counternarcotics assistance provided to Haiti. H.R. 4986, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, would require an Administration report to Congress on counternarcotics assistance to Haiti. (cid:28)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:29)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:5)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:18)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:31)(cid:10)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:8) (cid:30)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)!(cid:12)(cid:21)(cid:6)(cid:26)(cid:11)(cid:6)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:8)"##"$(cid:8) Jean-Bertrand Aristide was first elected President in December 1990, in elections that were widely heralded as the first free and fair elections in Haiti’s then-186-year history. A Roman Catholic priest of the radical left, Aristide’s fiery sermons contributed to the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship. The most controversial of 11 presidential candidates, Aristide won a landslide victory with 67.5% of the vote. His inauguration took place in February 1991, on the fifth anniversary of Jean-Claude Duvalier’s flight into exile. President Aristide was faced with some of the most serious and persistent social, economic, and political problems in the Western Hemisphere. After eight months in office, Aristide had received mixed reviews. He was credited with curbing crime in the capital, reducing the number of employees in bloated state enterprises, and taking actions to bring the military under civilian control. But some observers questioned his government’s commitment to democracy. Opposition leaders and others criticized him for not establishing a cooperative relationship among the democratic elements, failing to consult the legislature in appointments as required by the Constitution, and for manipulating the judicial system in the prosecution of Duvalierists. His record in the area of respect for human rights was also mixed. He was criticized for appearing to condone mob violence, but was also credited with significantly reducing human rights violations while he was in office. 6 This debt figures was taken from: Mark Weisbrot and Luis Sandoval, “Debt Cancellation for Haiti: No Reason for Further Delays,” Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2007. 7 “DEA Seizes 1,056 Pounds of Cocaine, Arrests Three Drug Smugglers in International Waters Near Hispaniola,” U.S. Fed News, May 21, 2007. (cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:29)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6) (cid:31)(cid:6) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:6) (cid:6) Some observers believe that during his eight-month tenure, Aristide contributed to political polarization within Haiti by refusing to condemn violent acts of retribution, and holding out the threat of mob violence against those who disagreed with him. On September 30, 1991, days after a speech in which some contend Aristide threatened the bourgeoisie for not having helped his government enough, Aristide was overthrown by the military. Some maintained that the elite business class financially supported the coup leaders. Most human rights monitors credit Aristide’s first administration with being the first Haitian government to address the need to improve respect for human rights, and the needs of the poor majority. They also asserted that progress made during his term was undone by the military regime that followed. Most sources credit Aristide with creating a much greater sense of security in Haiti during his first term than there had been in years. According to the State Department human rights reports for 1991 and 1992, there were no reports of disappearances during Aristide’s eight-month term and dozens in the months following the coup. The State Department estimated coup-related deaths at 300-500 at the time, while Amnesty International estimated them to number over 1,500. (cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:13)(cid:5)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:18)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:28)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:8)(cid:11)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:31)(cid:10)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:8) (cid:31)(cid:23)(cid:11)(cid:13)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:8)"##%$(cid:8) The leaders of the military coup faced stronger international sanctions than did previous coup leaders in Haiti, mainly because a democratic government had been overthrown. For over three years, the military regime resisted international demands that Aristide be restored to office. U.S. policy consisted of pressuring the de facto Haitian government to restore constitutional democracy to Haiti. Under the Administration of President George H. W. Bush, measures included cutting off assistance to the Haitian government; imposing trade embargoes, as called for by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations; and supporting OAS and U.N. diplomatic efforts. While some observers believed that the Administration of President William J. Clinton intensified pressure on the Haitian regime and helped advance negotiations to restore democracy to Haiti, others felt it did not apply enough pressure. After the collapse of the Governors Island Accord, which called for the military regime’s resignation and Aristide’s return to power by October 30, 1993,8 critics increased pressure on the Clinton Administration to change its policy. The Administration then took a tougher stance toward the military regime, imposing ever-stiffer sanctions, and ultimately ordering a military intervention to remove it. On September 18, 1994, when it learned that a U.S. military intervention had been launched, the military regime signed an agreement with the United States providing for Aristide’s return. It also called for the immediate, unopposed entry of U.S. troops, a legislative amnesty for the military, and the resignation of the military leadership. President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994, under the protection of some 20,000 U.S. troops. On March 31, 1995, having declared that a “secure and stable environment” had been established, the United States transferred responsibility for the mission to the United Nations.9 8 “The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, Report of the Secretary-General,” U.N. General Assembly Security Council, A/47/975, S/26063, July 12, 1993. 9 “Remarks by President William Clinton ... at U.N. Transition Ceremony,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Port-au-Prince, Haiti), March 31, 1995. (cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:29)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6) (cid:6) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:6) (cid:6) (cid:16)(cid:13)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:14)(cid:6)(cid:11)(cid:18)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:28)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:29)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:5)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:27)(cid:8) "##%(cid:12)"##&$’(cid:8)(cid:3)(cid:7)(cid:20)(cid:8)(cid:11)((cid:6)(cid:8)(cid:30)(cid:18)(cid:5)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:8))(cid:5)*(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:8) (cid:28)(cid:20)(cid:27)(cid:18)(cid:7)(cid:18)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:5)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:18)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:8) "##&(cid:12)+,,"$(cid:8) Following his return, President Aristide took steps to break with the pattern in which a military- dominated police force was associated with human rights abuses. Haiti, with U.S. assistance, demobilized the old military, established an interim police force of selected ex-military personnel, and began to train a professional, civilian Haitian National Police (HNP) force. According to various human rights reports, the level of violence, flight of refugees, and alleged assassinations dropped markedly from very high levels during the de facto military regime. Also in 1995, President Aristide took steps to hold democratic elections, with substantial assistance from the United States and the international community. Most first-round parliamentary and municipal elections were held in June 1995. Although the deadly violence which had marred past Haitian elections did not occur, election observers alleged that there were numerous irregularities. Several re-run or runoff elections were held from July to October. Pro- Aristide candidates won a large share of the seats. Presidential elections were held December 17, 1995. The Haitian constitution prevented Aristide from running for a second consecutive term. René Préval, an Aristide supporter, won, with 89% of votes cast, but with a low voter turnout of only 28%, and with many parties boycotting the election. Préval assumed office in February 1996. He launched a program to privatize government enterprise through joint ventures with private capital. Despite public protests against the economic reforms, the Haitian Senate passed privatization and administrative reform laws, allowing the release of millions of dollars in foreign aid through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Protests against the associated austerity measures continued, however. One of the most vocal critics of the proposed economic austerity program was former President Aristide. In January 1997 he formed a new party, Lavalas Family, as a vehicle for his presidential bid in the year 2000. (cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:7)(cid:7)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:17)(cid:5) The Haitian parliamentary elections in 2000 were an attempt to resolve disputed elections from 1997, which had triggered an electoral crisis at the time. Saying that the 1997 elections were marred by fraud, Préval’s Prime Minister resigned. Haiti was then without a prime minister for a year and a half, with four failed attempts to name a new one, and no resolution to the 1997 elections controversy. In January 1999, President Préval declared that most of Parliament’s term had expired, although elections had not been held to replace them. He then installed members of his cabinet and an electoral council by decree. He continued to rule by decree through the end of his term in February 2001. In July 1999, President René Préval signed a new electoral law that effectively annulled the disputed April 1997 elections and provided for new elections. The United States allotted $16 million over two fiscal years for elections assistance for the 2000 Haitian vote. The aid supported the provisional electoral council, whose tasks included the registration of almost 4 million eligible voters, issuing voter identification cards for the first time, and organizing legislative and municipal elections for some 10,000 posts in May 2000. Every elected position in the country was on the ballot except for president and eight Senate seats. Many observers hoped these elections would mean that, after two years of a deadlocked government and more than a year of President Préval ruling by decree, a new parliament could be (cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:29)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6) !(cid:6) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:6) (cid:6) installed and international aid released. Instead, the elections brought Haiti into another crisis. Both domestic and international observers noted irregularities in the tabulation of election results for some Senate seats. Nonetheless, the electoral council affirmed those results, which favored former President Aristide’s Lavalas party. In September 2000, thousands of protesters shouting anti-Aristide and anti-Lavalas slogans called for the resignation of the Lavalas-controlled legislature. The OAS tried to broker an agreement between Lavalas and the opposition, to no avail. Presidential elections were held on November 26, 2000. Because the Haitian government refused to address the earlier contested election results, the United States and other international donors withheld election assistance and refused to send observers, and opposition parties boycotted them. Although Aristide won the election with a reported 91.5% of the vote, turnout was very low, with estimates ranging from 5% to 20% of eligible voters participating. (cid:28)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:29)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:21)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:20)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:18)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:31)(cid:10)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:8) +,,"(cid:12)+,,%$(cid:8) As President-elect, Aristide wrote a letter to outgoing U.S. President Clinton, promising to make several political, judicial, and economic reforms, including correcting the problems of the May 2000 elections. According to the White House at the time, no new promises were made by the United States.10 The Administration of George W. Bush, which took office on January 20, 2001, accepted the reforms set forth in the letter as necessary steps for the Aristide government to make. Aristide took office again on February 7, 2001. At his inauguration, the United States was represented by its ambassador. During President Aristide’s second term, increases in political violence renewed concerns over security and police effectiveness. In 2001, President Aristide announced a “zero tolerance” policy toward suspected criminals. According to various human rights reports, this announcement was followed by numerous extrajudicial killings by the Haitian National Police and lynchings by mobs. The government’s respect for freedom of the press continued to deteriorate. According to the State Department’s February 2004 Human Rights Practices Report, “The [Haitian] government’s human rights record remained poor, with political and civil officials implicated in serious abuses.” Observers also made increasing charges of corruption during Aristide’s second term. The interim government (2004-2006) claimed that its investigation into the ousted Aristide Administration uncovered embezzlement of millions of dollars of public funds. The Central Unit for Financial Information reported that millions of dollars in public funds were illegally transferred to private institutions created by Aristide and that an estimated $20 million were transferred to personal foreign accounts belonging to Aristide. The interim government filed a suit in U.S. federal court November 2, 2005, alleging that Aristide and eight co-defendants broke U.S. law by transferring public funds to personal foreign accounts. Aristide’s lawyer dismissed the lawsuit as “baseless” and said that it was part of a government misinformation campaign against Aristide. Observers made allegations of corruption and misuse of public funds throughout much of Aristide’s second term. Transparency International reported Haiti as one of the most corrupt countries in the world for several years.11 10 Statement by the Press Secretary, The White House, December 28, 2000. 11 In Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, the higher the number, the higher the (continued...) (cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:29)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6) (cid:31)(cid:6) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:6) (cid:6) (cid:0)(cid:2) (cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:18)(cid:25) (cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:26)(cid:26)(cid:16)(cid:27)(cid:11)(cid:17)(cid:5)(cid:11)(cid:16)(cid:5)(cid:23)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:5)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:26)(cid:14)(cid:10)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:5) Efforts to resolve the electoral disputes of 1997 and 2000 frustrated the international community for years. At the third Summit of the Americas in April 2001, hemispheric leaders singled out Haiti as a country whose democratic practices were in trouble and asked the OAS to try again to help negotiate a solution to the crisis. The OAS had been mediating on-again off-again talks between the Aristide government and the opposition alliance Democratic Convergence. In OAS- mediated talks in July 2001, the Aristide government and the opposition agreed to hold new elections for local and most parliamentary seats, but could not agree on a schedule. Tensions and violence in Haiti increased dramatically after Aristide assumed his second term in office. Supporters of both President Aristide’s Lavalas Family party and the opposition coalition Convergence reportedly engaged in a cycle of violent revenge. In January 2002, the OAS Permanent Council passed Resolution 806 establishing an OAS Mission in Haiti and calling for the Haitian government to do all it could to ensure a climate of security and confidence necessary to hold free and fair elections. In July 2002, the OAS released a report stating that a December 2001 attack on the National Palace was not an attempted coup, as the Aristide Administration had claimed, and that “[T]he political opposition did not participate in the planning or in the execution of the attack.” It also said that the government and Lavalas party officials gave arms to militants who plundered and burned the homes and offices of opposition members after the palace attack.13 Also in July 2002, the opposition proposed that presidential elections be re-held as well. All the OAS member states recognized Aristide as Haiti’s legitimate head of state, however, and the OAS Secretary General said that the November 2000 elections “have never been the subject of an OAS or Summit of the Americas mandate,” meaning that only the disputed May 2000 parliamentary elections were within the OAS mandate to negotiate a solution.14 In September 2002, the OAS passed Resolution 822 that tried to break the political impasse by recognizing the government’s “constitutional electoral prerogatives.” In other words, it removed the obstacle of having to complete negotiations with the opposition before elections could be held. A consensus resolution, negotiated by member states and voted for by Haiti, stated that legislative and local elections were to be held in 2003, on a date to be set by a new Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). An “autonomous, independent, credible and neutral CEP” was to be established by November 4, 2002. Haiti failed to meet that deadline, in part because the Democratic Convergence refused to name a representative for the council until the government dealt with security issues and made all reparations to opposition forces for damage done by government supporters in December 2001. Aristide named a partial CEP in February 2003. In June 2003, the OAS passed Resolution 1959, regretting that neither the government nor the (...continued) perception of corruption. In 2002, Haiti was ranked 89th out of 102 countries; in 2003, Haiti was ranked 131st out of 133, and corruption there was described as “pervasive”; in 2004, Haiti was ranked 145th out of 145. Available online from Transparency International’s website at http://www.transparency.org. 12 CARICOM, the Caribbean Community and Common Market, was originally an economic organization of English- speaking Caribbean countries. Dutch-speaking Suriname joined in 1995, French- and HaitianCreole-speaking Haiti in 2002. 13 “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events of December 17, 2001, in Haiti,” OEA/Ser.G CP/INF.4702/02, July 1, 2002, part III. 14 “Report of the Secretary General in Response to CP/INF.4724/02,” OEA/Ser.G CP/doc.3643/02 corr.1, August 27, 2002, part I. (cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:29)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6) (cid:6) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:6) (cid:6) opposition had fully implemented their obligations under the previous two resolutions, and urging the government to create a safe environment for elections and the opposition to help actively form a CEP. Those steps were not taken, and elections did not take place in 2003. In November 2003, the new U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, James Foley, described the current state of Haiti as “very worrisome from all points of view: poverty, insecurity, economic development, infrastructure, environment, health, etc.,” and said that it was essential that Haiti resolve its political impasse so that Haiti and its international donors “can work together to resolve all of these fundamental problems.” A U.N.-appointed human rights expert said in November that the human rights situation there had “again deteriorated,” criticizing the ongoing impunity of human rights violators; the “persistent dysfunctions in the administration of justice,” and the frequently violent suppression of freedom of expression and especially of peaceful demonstrations. Saying he was “very disturbed” at the rising political violence there, then-U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell backed a proposal by the Roman Catholic Bishops Conference of Haiti to set up a council of advisors to help Aristide govern until new parliamentary elections were held. Aristide supported the initiative, but the opposition, which accused Aristide of corruption and mismanagement, rejected it. In January 2004, the CARICOM secured Aristide’s agreement to disarm political gangs, appoint a new prime minister, and form an advisory council. Opposition groups refused to negotiate a settlement or participate in elections unless Aristide resigned. Two- thirds of Haitian legislators’ terms expired in January 2004 without elections having been held to replace them. President Aristide began ruling by decree. The conflict escalated when armed rebels seized Haiti’s fourth largest city, Gonaives, on February 5, and the armed rebellion spread to other cities. Street battles ensued when police forces tried to regain control, leaving dozens dead. CARICOM continued trying to negotiate a solution to the crisis. Civil opposition groups operating mainly in the capital denied any links to the armed rebellions. After being criticized by some for statements appearing to indicate it might support the elected President’s removal, Administration officials said the remarks were not intended to signal support for Aristide’s resignation, and that the Bush Administration sought a peaceful solution to the crisis. Colin Powell and other foreign diplomats suggested the possibility of bringing in outside police forces, but only to support the enforcement of a political agreement reached by the Haitian government and the opposition, such as the one proposed by CARICOM. The opposition rejected the agreement. (cid:19)(cid:27)(cid:10)(cid:17)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:29)(cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:17)(cid:5)(cid:31)(cid:4) (cid:9)(cid:27)(cid:11)!(cid:27)(cid:4)(cid:5) With rebel forces moving toward the capital of Port-au-Prince on February 28, 2004, the Bush Administration increased pressure on Aristide to resign, stating that “His failure to adhere to democratic principles has contributed to the deep polarization and violent unrest that we are witnessing in Haiti today.” Aristide resigned the next day and flew into exile. He later said he was kidnapped, a charge the White House strongly denies. Following succession protocol outlined in the Haitian constitution, Supreme Court Chief Justice Boniface Alexandre was sworn in as President on February 29. The United Nations unanimously passed a resolution authorizing an international force, initially comprising U.S. Marines and French and Canadian police and military forces, to help restore order.15 That force was replaced by U.N. peacekeepers three months later, in June 2004. A tripartite commission, based on an element of the CARICOM proposal, was formed to help run an interim government. CARICOM said it was not prepared to 15 S/RES/1529 (2003), February 29, 2004. (cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:29)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6) (cid:31)(cid:6) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:21)(cid:8)(cid:27)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:6) (cid:6) hold discussions with Haiti’s new leaders, however, and called for an investigation into Aristide’s “relinquishing of the Presidency” by an independent international body such as the United Nations. During a demonstration on March 7, 2004, in which protesters called for the exiled Aristide to stand trial for alleged corruption and human rights violations, six people were reportedly killed by suspected Aristide loyalists. U.S. Marines killed at least six Haitians who they said were trying to attack them. Speaking from exile in the capital of the Central African Republic on March 8, Aristide asserted, “I am the elected president,” and appealed for “peaceful resistance” by his supporters to what he called the “occupation” of Haiti.16 After Jamaica allowed Aristide to