(2003-09) CRS - Haïti : Questions pour le Congrès

Order Code IB96019 CRS Issue Brief for Congress Received through the CRS Web Haiti: Issues for Congress Updated September 17, 2003 Maureen Taft-Morales Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress CONTENTS SUMMARY MOSTRECENTDEVELOPMENTS BACKGROUNDANDANALYSIS From AristidetoPreval andBackAgain Congressional Concerns HoldingofDemocraticElections Cost andEffectiveness ofU.S.Assistance OtherForeignAssistance Haiti’s EconomicPolicyandRoleforU.S.Business SecurityandHumanRights Concerns Narcotics Trafficking HaitianMigration Legislationinthe107th Congress LEGISLATION CHRONOLOGY IB96019 09-17-03 Haiti: Issues for Congress SUMMARY Congress continues to express concern national elections, and international donors, about a number of developments in Haiti, includingtheUnitedStates,withheldelection especially its stalled democratic process and aid. Aristidewontheelectionsandwasinau- increased violence and human rights viola- guratedonFebruary7,2001. PresidentAris- tions. tide has pledged to enact political, judicial, andeconomicreforms. Negotiationsbetween Since the virtual withdrawal of U.S. Lavalas and the opposition alliance Conver- troops in February 1996, Congress has been gence,mediatedbytheOrganizationofAmer- concerned that U.S. assistance to Haiti be icanStates (OAS),havestalledrepeatedly. effective and that Haitian leaders pursue democratic reforms, including holding free International organizations have been and fair elections, adopt sound economic increasinglyconcernedaboutHaiti’sinability policies, improve security conditions, and toresolveitsimpasse. TheU.N.withdrewits fullyinvestigatereportedhumanrightsabuses. mission in Haiti in February2001 and issued reports expressing concerns about the Hai- Concernoverpoliticalstabilityincreased tians’ failure to find a compromise and the as Haiti operated without a fully functioning current lawlessness and fear of political vio- government. An April 1997 election dispute lence. InDecember2002,Caribbeanheadsof remained unresolved, the prime minister state expressed concern over “continuing resigned in June1997, and a successor could instabilityandtheprospectofabreakdownin not be agreed upon. President Preval thesocial order”inHaiti. dissolved the Haitian Parliament in January 1999 and ruled by decree after that. This In2002,theOASpassedtworesolutions political paralysis also contributed to eco- to establish an OAS Mission in Haiti, call on nomic stagnation, preventing major reforms the Haitian government to “restore a climate from being finalized and impeding access to of security” necessary for resuming negotia- over$500millionininternational assistance. tions, and to strengthen the mission and sup- port normalization of Haiti’s relations with In July 1999, President Rene Preval international financial institutions. A June signed a new electoral law that effectively 2003 resolution urged implementation of the annulled the disputed April 1997 elections. earlierresolutions. After three postponements and international expressionsofconcernaboutHaiti’sfailureto U.S.assistancetoHaitifor FY2000was setadate,newelectionswereheldonMay21, $78million;forFY2001,$72million;forFY- 2000. Both domestic and international ob- 2002, $54 million. The request for FY2003 serversnotedirregularitiesinthetabulationof is$47million,buttheFY2003ForeignOpera- election results. Nonetheless, the electoral tionsAppropriationsbill(P.L.108-7)provides councilaffirmedthoseresults,whichfavored “not less than$52.5 million” from food aid formerPresident Aristide’s Lavalas party. funds for Haiti. The bill contains no other conditions on aid to Haiti. It allows Haiti to Becauseofthis controversy,theopposi- purchase defensearticles andservices forthe tion boycotted the November 26, 2000 HaitianCoast Guard. Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress IB96019 09-17-03 MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS On September 15, the White House reported to Congress that Haiti had “failed demonstrably” to comply with international agreements to combat illicit drug trafficking duringthepastyear. PresidentBushdetermined,however,thatitwasinthenationalinterest tocontinueprovidingaidtoHaiti despiteits counternarcotics performance. In August 2003, the Haitian government announced plans to hold elections in November. The U.S. Embassy in Haiti said that elections that did not comply with conditionsofanOAS-negotiatedagreement,includingcreatingasafeenvironment,would be“unacceptable.” Two-thirdsofHaitianlegislators’termsexpireinJanuary2004;without electionstheParliamentwillnotbeabletofunctionlegally. UndertheOASresolutions,the Haitian government committed to professionalizingthe Haitian National Police force, but observers have criticized efforts to date. U.S. Secretaryof State Colin Powell stated, at an OASmeetinginJune,thatiftheHaitiangovernmenthadnotcreatedtheclimateofsecurity necessary for forming a credible and neutral electoral council by September, “we should reevaluatetheroleoftheOAS inHaiti.” OnJuly22,theBushAdministrationlaunchedaninitiativetopreventthetransmission oftheHIV/AIDSvirusfrommotherstochildren;Haitiwasoneof14countriesincludedin theprogram. AccordingtoUS-AID,betweenfourandsixthousandHaitianchildrenareborn withthevirus eachyear. Haiti and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) took steps to normalize relations. Haitipaid$32millioninarrearsinearlyJuly,leavingonly$3millioninitsforeign reserves.OnJuly23,theIDBannouncedit would start releasing$196millioninloans. A $50millionloantosupportthegovernment’sbudgethadbeenapprovedbytheIDBin1996, and was ratified by the Haitian parliament in June 2003. Four other loans totaling $146 million will support specific health, education, rural roads, and water and sanitation programs. Haiti must still meet certainconditions toreceivesegments oftheloans. BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Congress hasfollowedeventsinHaiticloselyduringthis decade,but especiallysince September 19, 1994, when about 20,000 U.S. militaryforces, under code name Operation Uphold Democracy, entered Haiti as the lead force in a multi-national force to restore Jean-BertrandAristidetopower. AristidewasfirstelectedPresidentinDecember1990in elections that were considered democratic, and he took office in February 1991. He was overthrownbyamilitarycouponSeptember30,1991,andlivedinexilefor3yearsuntilthe United States negotiated his return in October 1994. During the last year of President Aristide’s first 5-year term, elections were held. Rene Preval was inaugurated as the new President of Haiti on February 7, 1996, in Haiti’s first democratic transfer of power. In January1999, Preval dissolved the legislature and ruled bydecree for the rest of his term. Having won elections that were boycotted by most of the opposition in November 2000, AristidewasinauguratedforhissecondtermasPresidentonFebruary7,2001. Aselection disputes from 2000 remain unresolved, political turmoil has increased, human rights conditions worsened,andmost foreignaidremains blocked. CRS-1 IB96019 09-17-03 From Aristide to Preval and Back Again The Haitian military regime agreed to relinquish power after 3 years of diplomatic pressureandeconomicsanctionsbytheUnitedStates,andmembersoftheOrganizationof AmericanStates(OAS)andtheUnitedNations(U.N.). Facedwiththeimminent threatof aU.S.invasion,theysignedanagreementcallingfortheimmediate,unopposedentryofU.S. troops, a legislatively approved amnesty for the military, the resignation of the military leadership, and the return of President Aristide. Shortly after the initial entry of the multinational forces, President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994, and within afewmonths,onMarch31,1995,theU.S.-ledoperationgavewaytotheU.N.peacekeeping operation,calledtheU.N.MissioninHaiti orUNMIH. Following President Aristide’s return, Haiti took steps to hold democratic elections, with substantial assistance from the United States and the international community. Most first-round parliamentaryand municipal elections were held on June 25, 1995. Although deadly violence, which marred past Haitian elections, did not occur, election observers alleged that there were numerous irregularities, including ballot burning in some places. Several rerun or runoff elections were held subsequently, from July to October, 1995. Pro-Aristidecandidateswonalargeshareoftheparliamentaryandlocalgovernmentseats. Presidential elections were held December 17, 1995. The Haitian constitution prevented Aristide from running for a second consecutive term. Rene Preval, an Aristide supporter, won, with 89% of votes cast, but with a low voter turnout of only 28%, and with many parties boycottingtheelection. Rene Preval was inaugurated as President of Haiti on February 7, 1996. Preval was trainedasanagronomistinBelgiuminthelate1960s,andhelivedandworkedintheUnited States in the early 1970s. He returned to Haiti in the mid-1970s and worked for several businesses, after which he opened a bakery in 1983. With the fall of the Duvalier dictatorshipin1986,Prevalwasactiveinseveralcivicgroups,particularlyRespect forthe Constitution,andhealsoworkedwithFatherAristide’sFamilyIsLifeorphanage. In1991, heservedas PrimeMinisterandDefenseMinisterofAristide’sgovernment,untilAristide was overthrown. In March 1993, he joined Aristide in Washington, D.C. Preval returned toHaitiinOctober1994,andservedasthedirectoroftheinternationally-fundedEconomic andSocialAssistanceFundfromMarch1995untilhewaselectedPresidentofthecountry. As President, Preval launched his “Democratization by Capitalization” program to privatizegovernmententerprisethroughjointventureswithprivatecapital. Despitepublic protests against the economic reforms, the Haitian Senate passed privatization and administrative reform laws on September 25 and 26, 1996 allowing the release of $226 million in foreign aid through the International Monetary Fund. Protests against the associated austerity measures continued, however. One of the most vocal critics of the proposedeconomicausterityprogramwasAristide. InJanuary1997heformedanewparty, LavalasFamily,asavehicleforhispresidentialbidintheyear2000.PrimeMinisterRosny Smarthbarelywonaparliamentaryno-confidencevoteonMarch26,butbowedtopressure from opponents of the government’s unpopular economic reform and resigned on June 9. He cited the Electoral Council’s mishandling of the April elections as a reason for his resignation,sayinghedidnot want tobeassociatedwithfraud. CRS-2 IB96019 09-17-03 By the end of 1997, Haiti’s failure to form a new government had already cost the nation$162millioninassistancefromtheInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank,andtens of millions from other sources. On July 15, 1998, then President Preval nominated a prime minister. The nomination process was stalled for months, however, by bureaucratic procedures. On January 11, 1999, Preval declared that most of Parliament’s term had expired,eventhoughelectionshadnotbeenheldtoreplacethem. Hetheninstalledmembers ofhisCabinetandanelectoralcouncilbydecree,andbeganrulingbydecree. Hecontinued todosothroughtheendofhis term inFebruary2001. Inelectionsboycottedbymostoftheopposition,Aristidewaselectedpresidentagain in November 2000. He signed an agreement with outgoing President William J. Clinton, promisingtomakeseveralpolitical,judicial,andeconomicreforms. AccordingtotheWhite House,nonewpromisesweremadebytheUnitedStates.TheBushAdministrationaccepted the reforms set forth in the letter as necessarysteps for the Aristide government to make. AristidetookofficeagainonFebruary7,2001. ThedisputestemmingfromirregularitiesintheMay2000electionsremainsunresolved. AtthethirdSummitoftheAmericasinApril2001,hemisphericleaderssingledoutHaitias a country whose democratic practices were in trouble and asked the Organization of AmericanStates(OAS)totryagaintohelpnegotiateasolutiontothecrisis.TheOAS has beenmediatingon-againoff-againtalksbetweentheAristidegovernmentandtheopposition allianceConvergence,but negotiations remainstymied. Tensions and violence in Haiti have increased dramatically since Aristide resumed office. Supporters of both President Aristide’s Lavalas Family party and the opposition coalition Convergence have reportedly engaged in the cycle of violent revenge. Human Rights Watch said that while Aristide called for a peaceful response to a December 2001 attack on the National Palace, his supporters were allowed to commit “serious acts of violencewithapparentimpunity.” OnJanuary15,2002,theOASPermanentCouncilpassed Resolution806establishinganOASMissioninHaitiandcallingfortheHaitiangovernment todoallitcouldtoensureaclimateofsecurityandconfidencenecessarytoholdfreeandfair elections,includingprosecutinganyonefoundtobeinvolvedintheDecemberviolence. On July2, the OAS released a report statingthat the attack on the National Palace was not an attempted coup, as the Aristide Administration had claimed, and that “[T]he political oppositiondidnotparticipateintheplanningorintheexecutionoftheattack.” Italsosaid thatthegovernmentandLavalaspartyofficialsarmedmilitantswhoplunderedandburned thehomes andoffices ofoppositions members afterthepalaceattack. On September 4, invoking the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the OAS passed Resolution822. ThisfurtherstrengthenedtheOASmissionto“support,monitor,andreport onimplementation”ofOASresolutionspertainingtoHaiti,andoncommitmentspreviously madebytheHaitiangovernment,includingstrengtheningdemocraticinstitutions,forming a new Provisional Electoral Council, and developing and implementing a comprehensive disarmament program.It alsocalledforHaiti toproceedwithelections in2003. A high-level OAS- Caribbean Community(CARICOM) delegation visited Haiti in March2003. ThedelegationurgedtheHaitiangovernmenttotake“immediateandconcrete measures to improve the security situation” and the Haitian opposition parties and other sectorsofcivilsocietyto“participateactively”informingaProvisionalElectoralCouncil. CRS-3 IB96019 09-17-03 As the political impasse remains unresolved, analysts say prospects for elections in 2003 grow dimmer. On June 10, at its session in Chile, the OAS passed Resolution 1959, regretting that neither the government nor the opposition had fully implemented their obligations under the previous two resolutions, and urging both to do so. (For OAS resolutions andreports,see[http://www.oas.org/].) Congressional Concerns Inthelastfewyears,Congresshasbeenconcernedaboutanumberofdevelopmentsin Haiti,withattentionshiftingfromoneareatoanotherasthesituationchanged. From1991 to1994,CongressexpressedconcernovertheflowofHaitianrefugeesandwaystorestore the democratic process toHaiti duringtheperiodofthemilitaryregime. Later, following themilitaryactioninSeptember1994,Congresswasconcernedwiththecostandsafetyof U.S.troopsinHaiti,andtheholdingofdemocraticelectionstoselectanewparliamentand a replacement for Aristide. Following the inauguration of President Preval in 1996, CongresswasconcernedthatU.S.assistancetoHaitibeeffective. Congressalsoexpressed concernthatHaiti’spoliticalstalematestymiedreformandeconomicdevelopment,andthat various election disputes be resolved in a transparent manner. Since Aristide’s return to officeinFebruary2001,otherongoingconcernsinclude theimprovementof securityand human rights conditions in Haiti, and the reduction of illegal trafficking of narcotics throughHaiti. Holding of Democratic Elections After Aristide was restored to power in 1994, Congress was concerned that Haiti continuetostrengthenits transitiontodemocracy,andinparticularthat it holddemocratic elections in 1995 in accordance with Haiti’s 1987 Constitution. In keeping with the arrangements for President Aristide’s return to power, Haiti pledged to hold democratic elections,eventhoughsomeofAristide’ssupportersarguedthathewasentitledtoanother 3years becausehewas deniedofficefor3years bythemilitarycoup. The Clinton Administration spent $1.3 million in technical aid for the presidential election,whichwasheldonDecember17,1995. Althoughdeemedtobegenerallyfreeand fair by international observers, the turnout was only about 28% and many of the parties boycottedtheelections. RenePreval,PresidentAristide’sPrimeMinisterin1991,received 89% of the vote, with Leon Jeune comingin a verydistant second with 2.5%. Preval was inauguratedas thenewPresident ofHaiti onFebruary7,1996. The low turnout and the lack of competition has raised questions about the adequacy oftheelections. TheofficialU.S.PresidentialDelegationtotheHaitianelectionsfoundthe election to be “another important achievement in establishing a fully functioning democracy.” The report on the election by the International Republican Institute (IRI) observationgroup,however,whilepraisingthefactthatitwasanelectionwithoutviolence, expressed reservations about the election because it lacked adequate participation or competition,keyelements ofafullysatisfactorydemocraticelection. CRS-4 IB96019 09-17-03 Elections forone-thirdoftheSenateandforterritorial assemblies were held on April 6, 1997. An assemblywas elected in 565 communal sections, roughly equivalent to U.S. towns or districts. These are the smallest administrative unit in Haiti’s governmental structure. Communal sections are part of 133 communes, similar to U.S. counties, which belong to nine departments, similar to U.S. states. Each communal section assemblywill chooseonemembertorepresentthematthecommunallevelonamunicipalassembly,which will in turn select a representative to serve on a departmental assembly. Although these assemblies, collectively referred to as territorial assemblies, are mandated in the 1987 constitution,thiswasthefirsttimeHaitianswereabletovoteforofficialsatthislocallevel. Manyobserversexpressedthesameconcernstheyhadduringthepresidentialelections: lowturnout—estimatedtobe5%—andnumerousirregularities.TheUnitedStatesdecreed thefirstroundelectionsfreeandfair,buttheOrganizationofAmericanStatesdisagreed. IRI calledtheelections“anotherlostopportunityinHaiti’sdemocraticdevelopment,”citingthe extremelylowturnoutandthecontinued“breakdownintheballotandresultcollectionand consolidationprocess.” PartialSenateresultswereannouncedinearlyMay: twoofthenine Senate seats open werewonbycandidates ofFamilleLavalas,former President Aristide’s new party. The top two candidates in the other seven races were to face each other in a runoffelection. These runoff elections were indefinitelypostponed by the Electoral Council in June, amidwidespreadcharges that it hadmanipulatedthe elections in favor of Aristide’s party. Mostpoliticalpartieshadplannedtoboycotttherunoffelections. Thepostponementcame afterU.S.AmbassadorWilliamSwingtoldPresidentPrevalthattheUnitedStateswouldnot recognize the runoff elections unless the Electoral Council reheldelections in areas where theboycottingparties claimedfraudhadbeencommittedintheApril elections. PrimeMinisterSmarthsaidhisresignationwasdueinparttothefraudhebelieveswas committedbytheelectoral council,towhichhedid not want to be party. “Icannot justify that abuse of power,” Smarth reportedly said. “In our country, power is a sickness.” The countrywaswithoutaprimeministerforayearandahalf,withfourfailedattemptstoname a new one, and no resolution to the 1997 elections controversy. Preval named a new electoralcouncilbydecreeinearly1999. Aftercriticizingthecouncil’snewelectorallaw, Preval signed it on July16, effectivelyannulling the April 1997 elections and seeming to pavethewayforaresolutiontothecountry’s 2-yearoldcrisis. The United States allotted $16 million over two fiscal years for elections assistance. Theprovisionalelectoralcouncil’stasksincludedtheregistrationofalmost4millioneligible voters, issuing voter identification cards for the first time, and organizing legislative and municipalelectionsforsome10,000postsonMay21,2000. Everyelectedpositioninthe countryexcept forpresident andeightSenateseats,wereontheballot. Contestedinthose elections were the entire 83-seat lower house, 19 of the 27 seats in the upper house — includingthetwoseatswon,butneveroccupied,byFamilleLavalas—133mayoralposts, andhundreds oflocal consultativeassemblies. Manyobservershopedtheseelectionswouldmeanthat,aftertwoyearsofadeadlocked government and more than a year of President Preval ruling by decree, a new Parliament could be installed and international aid released. Instead, the elections brought Haiti into anothercrisis. Bothoppositionpartiesandinternationalobservershavesaidtheprocessused CRS-5 IB96019 09-17-03 to tabulate winning percentages was erroneous and gave Lavalas ten more first-round victories than they should have had. Increased political violence surrounded the vote, including the arrests or murders of manyopposition activists. Elections council president LeonManusfledHaitiinfearofhislife,reportedlysayingherefusedtogiveintopressure fromPresidentPrevaltoapproveincorrectresultsgivingLavalascandidates18Senateseats; Manus said Lavalas candidates won onlyeight seats and that the others should have faced second-round runoffs. Two other council members resigned. The remaining council members announced the disputed results as final. Despite domestic and international objections, theremainingrun-offelections wereheldJuly30. InSeptember,thousandsofprotestersshoutinganti-Aristideandanti-Lavalasslogans calledfortheresignationoftheLavalas-controlledlegislature. TheOAStried tobrokeran agreementbetweenLavalasandtheopposition,tonoavail. Presidentialelectionswereheld on November 26, 2000. Because the Haitian government refused to address the contested electionresults,theUnitedStatesandotherinternationaldonorswithheldelectionassistance and refused to send observers, and opposition parties boycotted them. Aristide won the electionandtookofficeonFebruary7,2001. Hisinaugurationwasattendedbyfew,ifany, heads ofstate. TheUnitedStates was representedonlybyits ambassador. President Aristide pledged to make several political, judicial, and economic reforms, includingcorrectingtheproblemsoftheMay2000elections. Effortstoresolvethedispute frustrated the international community. In OAS-mediated talks in July2001, the Aristide governmentandtheoppositionallianceConvergenceagreedtoholdnewelectionsforlocal andmostparliamentaryseatsbutcouldnotagreeonaschedule. InJuly2002 theopposition proposedthatpresidentialelectionsbere-heldaswell,althoughalltheOASmemberstates recognize Aristide as Haiti’s legitimate head of state, and the OAS SecretaryGeneral said thattheNovember2000elections“haveneverbeenthesubjectofanOASorSummitofthe Americas mandate.” Negotiations have also been interrupted repeatedly by episodes of violence. TheOASpassedResolution822onSeptember4thattriedtobreakthepoliticalimpasse byrecognizingthegovernment’s“constitutionalelectoralprerogatives.” Inotherwords,it removedtheobstacleofhavingtocompletenegotiationswiththeoppositionbeforeelections canbeheld. Theresolution,aconsensusresolutionnegotiatedbymemberstatesandvoted forbyHaiti,says legislativeandlocal elections will beheldin2003,onadatetobeset by a new Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). An “autonomous, independent, credible and neutralCEP”wastobeestablished byNovember4,2002. Haitifailedtomeetthatdeadline, in part because the opposition alliance, the Democratic Convergence, refuses to name a representativeforthecounciluntilthegovernmentmakesallreparationstooppositionforces it agreed to for damage done bygovernment supporters in December 2001 and deals with security issues. Aristide named a partial CEP in February. The OAS has called on the governmenttocreateasafeenvironmentforelectionsandontheoppositiontoactivelyhelp form a CEP. If those steps are not taken, the possibility of holding elections in 2003 becomes less andless likely. CRS-6 IB96019 09-17-03 Cost and Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance Congress has been concerned about the cost and effectiveness of U.S. assistance to Haiti,despiterecognitionofthegreatneedsofthepoorestcountryinthehemisphere. The ClintonAdministrationprovidedapproximately$100millioninforeignassistancetoHaiti each year from FY1996 - FY1999. Aid decreased after that, with $78 million in FY2000, $72millioninFY2001,$54millioninFY2002. TheoriginalrequestforFY2003was$47 million;SecretaryofStatePowellannouncedinJunethataidwasincreasedto$70million. Therequest forFY2004is $53million. CongresshasmonitoredaidtoHaiticlosely,andhasestablishedanumberofconditions onthisassistanceovertheyears. Inthepast,ithasconditionedaidupontheholdingoffree and fair democratic elections, the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for humanrightsabuses,andfullcooperationinnarcoticsinterdictionefforts. Congresshasalso requiredthatallassistancebeapprovedunderspecialnotificationrequirements,prohibiting anyfunding to Haiti except through regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. Actingunderthisprovision,theHouseInternationalRelationsCommittee andtheSenateForeignRelations Committeehaveat times placedholds onaidtoHaiti. CongressplacedconditionsonaidtoHaitiundervariationsoftheDoleamendmentin the Foreign Operations Appropriationsbills from 1996-1999. Thebills limitedall foreign aid to Haiti, except humanitarian and electoral assistance, unless there were progress in investigations of extrajudicial and political killings, and other conditions. The FY2000 foreignaidbilloutlinedcongressionalprioritiesforassistancetoHaiti,including“aggressive action to support the Haitian National Police;” ensuring that elections are free and fair; developingindigenoushumanrightsmonitoringcapacity;facilitatingmoreprivatizationof state-ownedenterprises;asustainableagriculturaldevelopmentprogram; and establishing aneconomicdevelopmentfundtoencourageU.S.investmentinHaiti. Thebillalsorequired thepresidenttoregularlyreporttoCongressontheHaitiangovernment’sprogressinareas ofconcerntoCongress. Table 1. U.S. Aid to Haiti, FY2000-2004 (dollarsinmillions) FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 Program (actual) (actual) (actual) (req.) (req) DevelopmentAssistance 0.00 0.00 0.25 11.00 7.15 ChildSurvivalandHealth(CSH) — — 0.64 14.00 21.83 Econ.SupportFunds(ESF) 52.50 46.90 30.00 0.00 0.00 P.L.480FoodAssistance,TitleII (grantsfor emergency/ 25.08 25.11 23.13 22.37 23.85 humanitarianpurposes) International.NarcoticsControl — — — — — PeaceCorps 1.38 1.32 1.50 1.69 1.93 For.MilitaryFinancingGrants — — 0.30 0.40 0.33 Interntl.MilitaryEd.Train.(IMET) 0.30 0.01 0.05 0.20 PeacekeepingOperations — — 0.09 — — TOTAL 79.26 73.33 55.92 49.51 55.28 Source:U.S.DepartmentofState. Note:FY2000USAIDoperatingexpensestotaling$174.60millioninHurricaneSupplemental. CRS-7 IB96019 09-17-03 TheForeignOperationsAppropriationsbillforFY2001shiftedconditions,prohibiting aidtotheHaitiangovernmentuntilHaitiheldfreeandfairelectionstoseatanewparliament andwasfullycooperatingwithU.S.effortstointerdictillicitdrugtrafficthroughHaiti.The onlyconditioninFY2002foreignaidappropriationslaw(P.L.107-115)requirednotification to Congress prior to provision of any aid to Haiti. The FY2003 foreign assistance appropriations bill (P.L. 108-7, Division E) contains no conditions on aid to Haiti. The FY2003foreignaidbillcontinuestoallowHaititopurchasedefensearticlesandservicesfor the Haitian Coast Guard, and provides for “not less than $52.5 million” in food assistance program funds tobeallocatedtoHaiti (Sec.551). TheBushAdministrationsaysaidtothegovernmentwillnotbereneweduntilPresident Aristidefulfillshispromisesofpolitical,economicandjudicialreforms. U.S.assistanceis beingprovided through non-government organizations (NGOs). Supporters of this policy arguethatprovidingaidtothegovernmentwouldpermitthegovernmenttoavoidresolving itspoliticaldisputeandmakingotherpromisedreforms,suchasprivatizationofinefficient government enterprises, which are necessary to revive the economy. They argue that not muchprogresswasmadeinHaitiwhenmassiveassistancewasprovidedearlier.Theyalso notethataidisstillprovidedtoHaitiforbasicprogramsinhealth,education,foodsecurity, and environmental projects through NGOs, and for police and other reforms through the OASSpecialMissioninHaiti.SecretaryofStatePowellannouncedonJune9anadditional $1 million U.S. contribution to the OAS mission, and an additional $23 million in humanitarian aid to Haiti for FY2003. He also stated, however, that if the Haitian government has not created the climate of security necessary for forming a credible and neutralelectoralcouncilbySeptember,“weshouldreevaluatetheroleoftheOASinHaiti.” Critics arguethataidtothegovernment is necessarytosupport thefragiledemocracy in a time of severe need, and to prevent instabilityand massive migration from the island. They stress that Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere with annual per capitaincomeofonly$225,andarguethatwithholdingaidtothegovernmentiscontributing to the continuing deterioration in Haitians’ quality of life. In a November 2001 letter to President Bush, the Congressional Black Caucus said that “it is wrong to impose an inflexible policywhich conditions US relations and aid, be it loans orgrants, entirelyon a country’spoliticalprocess.” TheCaucuscalledforareviewofU.S.policytowardHaitiand theremoval ofits “blockade”ofaidtoHaiti. Other Foreign Assistance. InadditiontotheformerClintonAdministrationand theBushAdministration,representativesoftheInternationalMonetaryFundandtheWorld BankhavecriticizedHaiti’scontinuedfailuretoresolvethepoliticalimpasseunderPresident Aristide, despite extensive efforts on the part of the OAS and other international players. Since2000otherconditionshavecontinuedtogrowworseaswell.Humanrightsconditions havedeterioratedfollowingPresidentAristide’sannouncementofa“zerotolerance”policy for“criminals.” AccordingtoAID,theexecutivebranchhasmovedsteadilytoconsolidate power at the expense of the judicial and legislative branches of government. The internationalcommunityhasrespondedbygreatlyreducingoreliminatingassistancetoHaiti. Becauseofthequestionedlegitimacyofthespringandfall2000elections,theinternational communityinitiallywithheldabout$600millioninaid.Overatwo-yearperiod,donorgrants to Haiti declined by over 50%, from $357 million in FY1999 to about $160 million in FY2001. During the same period, gross loan disbursements declined by over 66%. The World Bank closed its office in Haiti, primarily because of the government’s failure to CRS-8 IB96019 09-17-03 adhere to IMF targets. Much of this international aid has expired or been redirected elsewhere. Most funding will have to be renegotiated even if the Haitian government resolves theelectiondisputeandcarries out otherpromisedreforms. The Inter-American Development Bank has six loans to Haiti, totaling about $199 million,whichwentundisbursedforseveralyears. Althoughtheloanswereapprovedbythe IDB between 1996 and 1998, the Haitian parliament did not approve four of them until December 2000; another was ratified in June 2003. Several issues stalled release of the loans,includingthequestionofthelegitimacyoftheparliament;Haitifallingintoarrearson the payment of otherIDBloans,precludingfurtherdisbursement of loans; and the Haitian governmentnotmeetingconditionsrequiredbytheloanspriortodisbursement. TheOAS andtheUnitedStateshadalsoopposedreleaseofinternationalfundsbeforeHaiti’spolitical impassewas resolved. OASResolution822,passedinSeptember2002,supports“normalizationofeconomic cooperation” between the Haitian government and the international financial institutions, urging the parties “to resolve the technical and financial obstacles that preclude such normalization.” On May 14, 2003, Haiti reached an agreement on a one-year economic program withtheIMF,removingoneobstacle. Theprogram still needs tobeapprovedby IMFmanagement,andwouldnotstartuntiltheHaitianparliamentapprovesarevisedbudget for 2003. In early July, Haiti paid $32 million in arrears to the IDB. On July 23 the IDB announceditwouldstartreleasing$196millioninloans. A$50millionloantosupportthe government’sbudgethadbeenapprovedbytheIDBin1996andwasratifiedbytheHaitian parliamentinJune2003. Fourotherloanstotaling$146millionwillsupportspecifichealth, education,ruralroads,andwaterandsanitationprograms. TheHaitiangovernmentstillhas not clearedits arrears withtheWorldBank. Haiti’s Economic Policy and Role for U.S. Business CongresshasbeenconcernedthatHaitifollowsoundeconomicpracticesandthatU.S. business play a role in Haiti’s economic recovery and development. Haiti is the poorest nationinthehemisphere;Haitianunemploymentisashighas80%.Haiti’spercapitaincome is$250—muchlessthanone-tenthoftheLatinAmericanaverage,accordingtoanAugust 1998WorldBankreport,Haiti:TheChallengesofPovertyReduction. “Theoverwhelming majorityoftheHaitianpopulationarelivingindeplorableconditionsofextremepoverty,” saysthereport,pointingtoalonghistoryofpoliticalinstability,corruption,misuseofpublic funds,andlackofgovernanceas akeyfactorinthat poverty. U.S.andinternationallendinginstitutionshaveurgedHaititoenactreformstoreduce theroleofgovernmentandtoencouragedomesticandforeigninvestment. Privatizationof nine government-operated para-statal enterprises (electricity,telephone, seaports, airports, twofinancialinstitutions,andcement,flourandvegetableoil factories)has beenseenasa keyreform to reduce government expenditures and stimulate investment. Other proposed reforms funded by AID or other institutions were measures to strengthen budget and monetary policy, to modernize the investment and commercial codes, and to improve bankingpractices. Economic reform, and the flow of international assistance triggered by it, have been uneven. During Aristide’s first term, the Haitian parliament passed legislation guiding CRS-9 IB96019 09-17-03 economicpolicyreform,includingprivatizationofthemanyinefficientstate-runenterprises. TheAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(AID)andtheinternationalfinancialinstitutions were then able to release most of the non-project assistance that had been on hold. Funds movedmoreslowlythanoriginallyintended,however,becausethelackofexpertiseinthe Haitian government made the negotiating and carrying out of programs more difficult. Furthermore, although President Aristide had agreed to privatize some of the government enterprises, he backed off when political opposition arose. This decision prompted the resignation in October 1995 of his Prime Minister, Smarck Michel, and the suspension of assistancebytheinternational financial institutions. FormerPresidentPreval’sprivatizationofgovernmententerprisesdrewpublicprotests against that and other aspects of economic reform. Preval’s “Democratization by Capitalization”programcalledforincreasingagriculturalproductionthroughthepartialsale of four state-run businesses: Electricityof Haiti (EDH), the Telecommunications Service (TELECO),theMinoteri(aflourmill),andtheHaitianCementCo. TheHaitianParliament passed President Preval’s privatization andadministrativereform proposals on September 25and26,1996,pavingthewayforthereleaseofsome$226millioninforeignaidthrough theInternationalMonetaryFund. PrimeMinisterRosnySmarth’sresignationinJune1997, the failure to replace him for a year and a half, and Preval’s dissolution of parliament left Haiti without a fullyfunctioninggovernment. This caused further delays in the execution ofeconomicreforms,stymiedthepassageofimportantlegislation,includingannualbudgets (Haiti has had only one approved budget from 1996 to 2002), and again interrupted the deliveryofinternational aid. ThelackofinfrastructureinHaiti,itspoliticalproblems,risinginsecurity,andextreme poverty make for a poor investment climate. Haiti’s political stalemate and deteriorating economyhaveinhibitedbothpublicandprivateinvestment. Security and Human Rights Concerns Congresshasbeenconcernedwiththesecurityandhumanrightsconditionswithinthe country. In1995,duringhisfirstterm,PresidentAristidetookstepstobreakwiththepattern inwhichamilitary-dominatedpoliceforcewasassociatedwithhumanrightsabuses.Haiti, with U.S. assistance, demobilized the old military, established an interim police force of selected ex-militarypersonnel, and began to train a professional, civilian Haitian National Police (HNP) force. The level of reported violence, flight of refugees, and alleged assassinationsdroppedmarkedlyfromveryhighlevelsduringthedefactomilitaryregime. Sincethereturntocivilianrulein1994,Haitihasmadeprogressintheprotectionofhuman rights,butthegainsmadearefragileandthreatenedbypoliticaltensionsandproblemswith impunity. Accordingto the Human Rights Watch 2002 World Report, “worseninghuman rightsconditions”markedPresidentAristide’sfirstyearbackinoffice. Twomajorhuman rights reports were released in April 2003. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights “expressed deep concern at the deteriorating human rights situation” in Haiti. The OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported that “human rights defenders and journalistsareincreasinglyatriskinHaiti.” InitsJune11"TraffickinginPersons”report, theBushAdministrationsaidthat theHaitiangovernment “does not fullycomplywiththe minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking [in persons] and is not making significant efforts to do so.” The report said Haiti is “a source country for trafficking of children for forced labor and sexual exploitation,” mostly within Haiti, but also into the CRS-10 IB96019 09-17-03 DominicanRepublic. Between90,000to300,000poorruralchildrenages4to14serveas unpaiddomesticlabor,or“restaveks,”inslave-likeconditions withurbanfamilies. Congress passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations bills for 1996-1999 with conditions onaidtoHaiti under variationsoftheDoleamendment. Thesebills limitedall foreignaidtoHaiti,excepthumanitarianandelectoralassistance,unlesstherewereprogress in investigations of extrajudicial and political killings and other conditions. The FY2000 foreignaidbilloutlinedcongressionalprioritiesforassistancetoHaiti,includingdeveloping indigenoushumanrightsmonitoringcapacity. TheForeignOperationsAppropriationsbill for FY2001 reflected a shift in congressional concern, prohibiting aid to the Haitian government until Haiti held free and fair elections to seat a new parliament and was fully cooperating with U.S. efforts to interdict illicit drug traffic through Haiti. For FY2002, CongressprohibitedaidtoHaitiexceptthroughregularnotificationprocedures,butplaced nootherconditionsonaid. Currentlaw(P.L.108-7)containsnoconditionsonaidtoHaiti, allows Haiti to purchase defense articles and services for the Haitian Coast Guard, and provides “not less than$52.5 million” from food aid funds for Haiti. The final Foreign Relations AuthorizationAct forFY2003(P.L107-228)has noprovisiononHaiti. Shortly after taking office in 1996, President Preval asked U.N. troops and police monitors to remain in Haiti tomaintainsecurity. TheU.N.maintaineda presence in Haiti foranother5years,shiftingfrompeacekeepingforcestocivilianforceschargedwithpolice monitoringandsomehumanrightsmonitoringduties. UnderpressurefromChina,however, thesizeofthemission,andlengthsoftheextensionswerediminished. (China challenged the U.N. mission there because of Haiti’s ties withTaiwan,whichChinaconsiders to be a renegadeprovince.) TheU.N.endeditsmissioninFebruary2001. U.N.SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annansaidthemissioncouldnot functionina“climateofpolitical turmoil.” Annan’sreportalsosaidthatHaiti’spoliceforceisunder-equipped,“demoralizedand unmotivated”andthatLavalashad“disregardedallcallsforarectification”oftheMay2000 elections. On May 18, 2001, Annan released another report expressing “concern about lawlessnessandanever-presentfearofanoutbreakofmajorpoliticalviolence...” inHaiti. He noted that Aristide had asked for a renewed U.N. mission but did not indicate whether onewouldbeprovided. Mostobserversagreethatextensivereformofthejudicialsystemisnecessarytofurther strengthenthestate’sabilitytomaintainlawandorderandtocontinueimprovingrespectfor humanrights. InMay1998,ajudicialreformbillthathadlanguishedinparliamentsincelate 1996wasfinallypassed. Haititook majorstepsforwardinitsjudicialreformprocessand fightingpoliceimpunityin2000. Intwomajorhumanrightscases,formerHaitiansoldiers were found guilty of extrajudicial killings and given prison sentences ranging from three years tolifeterms. Over the last several years, increases in political violence renewed concerns over security and police effectiveness. In June 2001, President Aristide announced a “zero tolerance” policytoward suspected criminals. Accordingto various human rights reports, thisannouncementwasfollowedbynumerousextrajudicialkillingsbytheHaitianNational Policeandlynchingsbymobs. Thegovernment’srespectforfreedomofthepresscontinued to deteriorate. Most mediaoutlets practiceself-censorshipout offear of retaliation. Over 20 journalists went into exile after receiving death threats. Another, Brignol Lindor, who CRS-11 IB96019 09-17-03 hostedoppositionspeakersonhisradiotalkshow,washackedtodeathbymembersofapro- governmentgroupafteralocalLavalasFamilyofficialannouncedovertheradiothatLindor should be met with “zero tolerance.” According to the State Department’s March 2003 Human Rights Practices Report, the Haitian government ‘s human right record remained poor,withpolitical andcivil officials implicatedinserious abuses.” AlthoughtheinvestigationintotheApril2000killingofprominentradiojournalistJean Dominiquecontinued,theprocesswasslowedbyalackofcooperationfrompoliceandother officials,accordingtohumanrightsreports. Aninvestigatingjudgefledthecountrybecause of death threats. Two key suspects have died under suspicious circumstances. Lavalas FamilySenatorandpresidentoftheSenateCommissiononPublicSecurityDanyToussaint is a suspect in the Dominique murder. In January2002, on the dayhis Senate colleagues were to vote whether to lift Toussaint’s immunity from prosecution as a member of the legislature, Toussaint appeared on the Senate floor accompanied by“at least a half-dozen gun-totingmen” (Washington Post, March 4, 2002, p.A14). The Senate returned the case to the judge prosecuting the case, rejecting his request to lift Toussaint’s immunity and askingformoreevidencelinkingToussaint tothemurder. AnotherspateofviolenceoccurredinDecember2001,involvinganattackagainstthe national palace and subsequent violence targeting members of the opposition. On July2, 2002,theOASreleasedareportstatingthattheDecemberattackwasnotanattemptedcoup, astheAristideAdministrationhadclaimed. AlthoughtheOASdidnotconfirmopposition claimsthatthegovernmentstagedtheattackasapretextforclampingdownondissent,itdid saythat“[T]hepoliticaloppositiondidnotparticipateintheplanningorintheexecutionof the attack.” The report also said that the government and Lavalas party officials armed militantswhoplunderedandburnedthehomesandofficesofoppositionmembersfollowing thepalaceattack. Theoppositionhascomplainedthatthegovernmentisnotpayingallthe reparations it agreed to pay. Since late 2002, violent protests have erupted around the country,withreports ofincreased calls forAristide’s removal amongHaiti’s poor,usually consideredAristide’s coresupporters. TheHaitianNationalPolice(HNP)iswidelyreportedtobecorrupt,anditsleadership troubled. In May 2003, a force of international police officers arrived to support the government and the OAS Special Mission in efforts to professionalize the police force, establishsecurity,andconductdisarmament.Aftertheheadofthecounternarcoticstaskforce wasarrestedforallegedlyblockingamainhighwaytoallowacocaine-carryingplanetoland, theOASurgedAristidetoappointnewleadershipoftheHNPinconsultationwithitsSpecial Mission. AccordingtotheOASMission’sApril2,2003 report,theAristideAdministration appointedthreetopleadersinMarch,withcursoryornoconsultationwiththeMission. Two oftheappointmentsdrewsharpcriticismfromoppositionpartiesandhumanrightsgroups, who said that the new interim Director General, Jean-Claude Jean-Baptiste, had been involved in the murder of political partyleader Pastor Sylvio Claude in 1991, and that the newChiefInspectorGeneral,PierreEvansSainturne,hadthreatenedthejudgeinvestigating the murder of journalist Jean Dominique in 2001. Jean-Baptiste resigned on June 3. His successorwentintoexileafteronly16days,allegingthathewasbeinggivenordershecould not followwithout becoming“corrupt andsubservient”(WashingtonPost,6/23/03). CRS-12 IB96019 09-17-03 Narcotics Trafficking Haiti is a major transshipment point for illegal narcotics, mostly cocaine, being transported from South America to theUnitedStates,accordingto the State Department’s March 2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Several factors make Haiti attractivetonarcoticstraffickers.LocatedbetweenSouthAmericaandtheUnitedStates,its coasts and border with the Dominican Republic are largely uncontrolled. Haiti’s nascent democratic institutions and ineffectual infrastructure have been further weakened by the politicalimpassethathascharacterizedthecountrysince1997. Haiti’scurrentlegalsystem isantiquated. Haitianauthoritieschargedwithcontrollingdrugtraffickingareinexperienced, lack sufficient resources, and, because of Haiti’s extreme poverty, are considered highly susceptible to corruption. According to the State Department’s 2002 report, “There are allegations that high-ranking[Government ofHaiti] officials inthegovernment,judiciary, andpoliceareinvolvedinortolerate[drug] trafficking.” In2001,theBushAdministrationsaidHaitiwasnotcertifiedashavingfullycooperated withU.S.drug-controlefforts.In2002,andagainonJanuary31,2003,theAdministration determinedthatHaitihad“faileddemonstrably”tocounterinternationalnarcoticstrafficking. All three years it granted a waiver so that aid to Haiti could continue. According to the Administration,theHaitiangovernment’scommitmenttocounternarcoticsin2002was“very weak,”althoughit did take two important actions. The Haitian government put into force abilateralmaritimenarcoticsinterdictionagreementwiththeUnitedStates,andestablished an “as yet untested” financial intelligence unit. The Administration has said that “Haitian povertyandhopelessness”werechiefcatalystsinHaitianinvolvementinthedrugtradeand inillegalmigrationtotheUnitedStates. CuttingoffaidtoHaiti,includingprogramsaimed at attackingthosecatalysts,“wouldaggravateanalreadybadsituation.” Haitian Migration The main elements of current immigration policy regarding Haitians are migrant interdiction on the high seas and mandatory detentions of undocumented, interdicted Haitians. The Bush Administration lists “limiting the number of illegal immigrants from Haiti” as its first national interest in Haiti (USAID Budget Justification to the Congress FY2003). Since1981,U.S.policyhasbeenforthe U.S.CoastGuardtostopandsearchHaitian vessels on the high sea that are suspected of transporting undocumented Haitians. This policydevelopedasaresponsetoamassivemigrationofCubanandHaitianboatpeoplein 1980, when about 25,000 Haitians arrived in Florida. There was another surge of Haitian migrantsduringthedefactomilitaryregime,peakingat38,000justafterPresidentAristide was overthrownin1991,and droppingto barely1,000 after Aristide’s return in1994. The numberofHaitianmigrants interdictedat sea bytheU.S.Coast Guardhas remainedfairly steadysince 1998, with slightlyover a thousand interdictions peryearforthepast 5 years. Fourteen hundred eighty-six Haitians were interdicted in FY2002. Renewed attentionhas been focused on Haitian migrants, however, since October 29, 2002, when some 220 Haitians arrived on Florida’s shores. The Bahamas has reported increased illegal Haitian migration. In 2002, over 4,000 Haitian migrants were interdicted there, almost a 50% increaseovertheprevious year,andthehighest numberinadecade. CRS-13 IB96019 09-17-03 Some of the Congressional debate over the years has focused on whether interdicted Haitiansareeconomicmigrants,andshouldthereforebereturnedtoHaiti,orwhetherthey are refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution who should be allowed to stayin the United States while applying for political asylum. Some Members and human rights advocatesexpressconcernthatHaitiansarenotgiventhesametreatmentasotherimmigrants seekingasylumintheUnitedStates. AttorneyGeneralJohnAshcroftissuedarulinginApril 2003thatillegalHaitianimmigrantswithnoknownlinkstoterroristgroupscanbedetained indefinitelyto address national securityconcerns. Ashcroft said the ruling was needed to discouragemassmigrationfromHaiti,anduseofHaitibypeoplefromtheMiddleEastfor illegal migration to the United States. The latter charge was disputed by immigrant advocates and some U.S. consular officials. (For more information see CRS Report RS21349, U.S.ImmigrationPolicyonHaitianMigrants,byRuthEllenWasem.) Legislation in the 107th Congress P.L. 107-115 (H.R. 2506). The Foreign Operations appropriations bill for FY2002. Section 520 prohibits providing assistance to Haiti except through regular notification procedures totheCommitteesonAppropriations.Thelawcontains nootherconditions on aid to Haiti. Section 554 allows the Haitian government to purchase defense articles and services for the Haitian Coast Guard, subject to regular notification procedures of the Committees on