Haiti’s criminal markets: Mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking

Haiti’s criminal markets: MAPPING TRENDS IN FIREARMS AND DRUG TRAFFICKING A CKNOWLEDGEMENTS This brief was prepared by the Research and Trend Analysis Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). G ENERAL COORDINATION AND CONTENT OVERVIEW : Angela Me (Chief, RAB) Chloe Carpentier Sonya Yee A NALYSIS AND DRAFTING : Robert Muggah C OPY EDITING : Andrada - Maria Filip M APPING : Alice Bourdet, Coen Bussink, Kristina Kuttnig UN Geospatial (base maps) , C OVER DESIGN AND PRODUCTION : Suzanne Kunnen For their valuable comments we thank colleagues in the Division for Operations and the Division for Treaty Affairs. Disclaimers: The designations employed and the presentation of material on any map in this work do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Mention of any firm or licensed process does not imply the endorsement of the United Nations. This publication has not been formally edit ed. This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or non - profit purposes without special permission from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is made. UNODC would appreciate a copy of any pub lication that uses this publication as a source. Contact: UNODC, unodc - research@un.org Copyright © 2023, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drugs trafficking CONTENTS Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 1 Criminal context................................................................................................................................................. 3 Trafficking infrastructure ............................................................................................................................... 11 The dynamics of firearms smuggling ......................................................................................................... 16 Drug trafficking dynamics ............................................................................................................................. 24 Implications and responses to firearms and drug trafficking................................................................. 30 Annexes ............................................................................................................................................................. 36 1 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drugs trafficking INTRODUCTION KEY FINDINGS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ♦ Increasingly sophisticated and high-calibre firearms and ammunition are being trafficked into Haiti amid an unprecedented and rapidly deteriorating security situation. ♦ Haiti remains a trans-shipment country for drugs, primarily cocaine and cannabis, which mostly enter the country via boat or plane, arriving through public, private and informal ports as well as clandestine runways. ♦ Haiti’s borders are essentially porous, and the challenges of patrolling 1,771 kilometres of coastline and a 392-kilometre land border with the Dominican Republic are overwhelming the capacities of Haiti’s national police, customs, border patrols and coast guard, who are severely under-staffed and under-resourced, and increasingly targeted by gangs. ♦ Heavily armed criminal gangs are targeting ports, highways, critical infrastructure, customs offices, police stations, court houses, prisons, businesses and neighbourhoods. ♦ Virtually every metric of insecurity, from homicide, sexual violence and kidnapping to the killing of police and migration out of the country – is trending upward. ♦ International, regional and national responses have underscored the importance of increasing support to law enforcement and border management. Comprehensive approaches encompassing investments in community policing, criminal justice reform and anti-corruption measures are crucial to delivering sustainable peace and stability in Haiti. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Haiti is in the grip of multiple, interlocking, and cascading crises. If unattended, there are serious risks of further destabilization from a myriad of increasingly powerful criminal armed groups. The risks of regional spill-over and contagion are widely acknowledged: The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly raised concerns about the country’s “protracted and deteriorating political, economic, security, human rights, humanitarian and food security crises” and “extremely high levels of gang violence and other criminal activities”. 1 A particular preoccupation relates to the contribution of illegal firearms and drug trafficking in fuelling Haiti’s deepening security dilemmas. This assessment provides an overview of the scope, scale and dynamics of firearms and drug trafficking in Haiti, including sources, routes, vectors and destinations. It is based on published and unpublished information and 45 interviews conducted by UNODC with representatives of the Haitian government, bilateral and multilateral agencies, subject matter experts, and Haitian civil society. 2 The situation in the country is deteriorating rapidly, and this assessment has drawn upon 1 See UN Security Council (UNSC) (2022) S/RES/2645, 15 July. See also UNSC (2022) S/RES/2600, 15 October; UNSC (2022) S/RES/2653, 21 October; and UNSC (2023) S/2023/41, 17 January. 2 The report was drafted between 20 November and 31 December 2022. It was not possible to visit Haiti duri ng this period , and all interviews were conducted remotely. The identity of the respondents was anonymized in the interview references. 2 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking a variety of sources with their attendant limitations, including unverified media reports, to take account of recent developments. It opens with a cursory overview of the criminal context in which firearms and drug trafficking are occurring. The second section considers the basic infrastructure that facilitates trafficking, especially seaports, roads and airstrips. Sections three and four examine patterns of trafficking of both firearms and drugs into and out of Haiti. The final section summarizes global, regional and national measures to address related challenges, alongside knowledge gaps warranting deeper investigation. Given the evolving circumstances, any attempt to document firearms and drug trafficking trends in Haiti will be fragmented and partial. Even so, certain tendencies and patterns can be discerned. Very generally, firearms and ammunition typically enter Haiti via land and sea, and drugs usually transit Haiti from seaports, airports and across poorly monitored border points. Most weapons are sourced in the US and make their way to gang members and private residents through intermediaries, often through public and private ports and porous checkpoints. Whether they are interdicted or not, most drugs passing through Haiti are produced in Colombia (cocaine) or Jamaica (cannabis) and shipped directly from source, or pass via Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, and Venezuela. From Haiti they are shipped onward to the Dominican Republic, Western Europe and, primarily, the US. 3 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drugs trafficking CRIMINAL CONTEXT Haiti’s prolonged security crisis took an alarming turn for the worse since 2021. Even before the high-profile assassination of former President Jovenel Moïse by suspected foreign and domestic mercenaries in July 2021, Haiti’s cities and towns registered deteriorating economic conditions, rising social unrest, the targeting of human rights defenders 3 , and the growing menace of heavily armed gangs and organized criminal organizations. 4 Today, violent gangs have effectively seized control of large swathes of the country, contributing to a deepening humanitarian crisis. A recent assessment estimates that close to 100,000 Haitians have been physically displaced by insecurity in Port-au-Prince alone. 5 Chronic instability is contributing to rising food prices, surging hunger, dangerous cholera outbreaks, deepening poverty and the potential for a major migration exodus (see Table 1). 6 TABLE 1 Haiti’s security situation (2019 - 2022) 2019 2020 2021 2022 Homicides 1,141 1,380 1,615 2, 183 Kidnappings 78 234 664 1, 359 Police killed 42 30 49 54 Haitian migrants detained by US 932 418 1,527 7,175 Source: UNODC, UNPOL, and US Coast Guard (2022) Confronted with escalating insecurity, Haiti’s Council of Ministers authorized the Prime Minister in late 2022 to take the unusual step of requesting the deployment of a “specialized armed force” by the international community. 7 For its part, the UN Security Council issued a sanctions regime freezing assets, establishing travel bans and embargoing arms flows targeting actors deemed responsible for, complicit in, or having engaged directly or indirectly in actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti. 8 Some Member States and prominent non-governmental organizations have called for more muscular intervention, including the deployment of a multinational police force. 9 The US, for example, has worked with partner Member States on a draft Security Council resolution to deploy a rapid action force, or a “non-UN international security 3 See International Human Rights Clinic – Harvard Law School, Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic – Yale Law School, Global Justice Clinic – NYU Law School, Joint statement from U.S. human rights clinics in solidarity with human rights defenders in Haiti, 27 June 2022. 4 See US Department of Justice, Third Man Charged in Connection with Plot to Kill Haitian Pres ident, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of Florida, May 9 2022 , available at https://www.justice.gov/usao -sdfl/pr/third-man-charged-connection-plot-kill-haitian- president (accessed on 1 February 202 3 ). 5 See IOM, Information sheet on forced d isplacement (June - August 2022), available at https://displacement.iom.int/reports/haiti- information-sheet-forced-displacement-june-august-2022 (accessed on 2 February 2023 ). 6 See UN News , “‘ Catastrophic’ hunger recorded in Haiti for first time, UN warns, ” 14 October 2022. 7 See UN News , “UN chief calls for enhanced security support for Haiti, as crisis worsens; cholera deaths mount”, 10 October 2022; Hauteville, J. (Le Monde ) , “Haiti requests military help to curb crises, despite public backlash ” , 12 October 2022. 8 See UNSC (2022) S/RES/2653. 9 See Security Council Report , “ Haiti: UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) Mandate Renewal” , 15 July 2022 . See also International Crisis Group , Haiti’s last resort: Gangs and the prospect of foreign intervention, Briefing No. 48, 14 December 2022. 4 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking assistance mission”. 10 And while Haitians have previously bristled at foreign intervention, a recent survey claimed that as much as 70 percent of the population currently supports external security assistance, particularly people residing in gang-controlled areas. 11 Meanwhile, lawlessness is worsening across Haiti (see Table 1 and Annexes). It is also growing increasingly violent. US law enforcement and intelligence authorities detected a sharp uptick in the quantity and calibre of firearms and ammunition destined for Haiti in 2022. 12 Haiti’s National Police (HNP), along with the international and domestic human rights groups, have also documented rising levels of killings, sexual violence, protest and kidnapping between 2020 and 2023. 13 Likewise, the US Coast Guard registered a fourfold increase in intercepted Haitian migrants between 2021 and 2022. 14 And 43,900 Haitians, including as many as 1,800 children, were reportedly deported on the border with the Dominican Republic between July and October 2022 alone. 15 Observers are especially concerned with the evolution, expansion, and intensification of gang activity across Haiti. 16 Many of the country’s estimated 150-200 gangs are deeply enmeshed in complex patronage networks aligned with a constellation of political and economic elites. 17 Open- source research and interviews with specialists in Haiti indicate that a small number of gang federations in and around the capital are expanding their territorial influence over urban neighbourhoods. They are also targeting critical infrastructure, including access to sea ports, fuel terminals, airports and key roads in and out of major cities. 18 Gangs have blocked access to fuel reserves, triggering a “humanitarian catastrophe” according to the World Food Programme (WFP). 19 In the absence of an international security mission or equivalent, the practical focus of international support is on delivering humanitarian aid and bolstering the HNP’s capacities to deter and suppress armed gangs, including the trafficking of firearms. 20 There is also growing attention to border security, albeit not at a scale that can meaningfully deter and reduce the flow of weapons, drugs, and other contraband. 10 See Price, N., “ Department press briefing ” , US Department of State, 28 October 2022 , https://www.state.gov/briefings/department -press- briefing - october - 28 -2022/ (accessed on 2 February 2023 ) and US Mission to the UN , “ Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas- Greenfield at a UN Security Council Briefing on Haiti ” , 17 October 2022. 11 See Reuters, “Around 70% of Haitians back international force to fight gangs, survey says”, 3 February 2023. 12 See US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “ HIS announces crackdown on firearms, ammunition smuggling to Haiti, the Caribbean ” , 19 April 2022. 13 See Human Rights Watch ,”Haiti: Wave of violence deepens ” , July 22, 2022. , UNOHCHR and BINUH (2022), “ Gangs use sexual violence to instill fear ” , 14 October 2022 and Reseau National de Defense des Droits Humains (RNDDH) at https://web.rnddh.org/2022/?lang=en (accessed on 2 February 2023 ). 14 See Coast Guard News , “ Coast Guard repatriates 66 people to Haiti ” , 23 December 2022. 15 See Janetzky, M. (AP News ) “ Dominican Republic cracks down at border amid Haiti chaos ” , 11 October 2022. 16 Interviews with key informant KI10, KI11, KI24, KI38 and KI39 as well as multiple Haitian sources from government and the civil society sectors between November and December 2022. See also UNSC (2022) S/RES/2653 and Cotton, J., Hammel, M. and L. Noofoory (2023) Haiti fragility brief, Carleton University . 17 The RNDDH estimated in 2021 that there were at least 164 gangs in Haiti. Haitian specialists dispute the numbers claiming there could be as many as 200. For example, a report authored by The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (G I - TOC) determined there were an estimated 200 gangs in 2022. See G I - TOC, Gangs of Haiti (Geneva, 2022) . See also RNDHH, Violent clashes between armed gangs (2022 , Report/A22/No6 ). 18 See GI - TOC (2022) 19 See Reuters , “ Haitians hope for fuel supplies after police break up gang blockade at terminal ” , November 5, 2022. See also WFP, “Catastrophic hung er levels recorded for the first time in Haiti”, 14 October 2022. 20 Interview with key informant KI10, KI11 and KI24, 5 December 2022. 5 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drugs trafficking Throughout 2022 and early 2023, emboldened Haitian gangs steadily expanded their control over key access points to cities, including the capital Port-au-Prince. Some have also focused on controlling key supply lines connected to public and private ports and international border crossings with the Dominican Republic. 21 Several gangs and gang coalitions, notably the G9, G-Pep, 400 Mawozo, Baz Galil, Vilaj de Dye, Vitelhomme, and Ti Mkak have targeted public and private institutions. 22 Many are also engaged in predatory behaviour in communities under their control contributing to rising levels of extortion, sexual violence, kidnapping and fatal violence (see Annex 1-9). 23 Some UN Members States are determined to ramp-up pressure on the gangs and their backers, including in the wake of egregious acts of violence involving their citizens. 24 The US and Canada have also delivered “vital security equipment” including tactical and armoured vehicles to the HNP on at least two occasions, in October 2022 and January 2023. 25 The Security Council sanctions, which target individuals and entities e ngaging in or supporting criminal activities and violence involving armed groups and criminal networks, among other actions, have so far designated one person under the regime, namely Jimmy Cherizier, who the text identifies as one of Haiti’s most influential gang leaders and who leads an alliance of gangs known as the “G9 Family and Allies” . 26 The EU has further transposed the UN sanctions into legislation. 27 Unilateral sanctions, meanwhile, implicate at least eight former Haitian presidents, prime ministers, senators and businesspeople suspected of involvement in illegal activities such firearms and drug trafficking, among other crimes. 28 Haiti’s political system has been described by the World Bank as “driven by capture, rent-seeking and clientelism”, leading to widespread abuses of powers and corruption . 29 Elected and appointed officials at all levels of government and across multiple sectors have been implicated in illicit activities ranging from corruption, fraud and money laundering to supporting gangs to bolster their political power and capacity to influence elections. 30 As detailed in the unilateral sanctions announcements, several members of Haiti’s economic elite are suspected of involvement in criminal rackets, including influential Haitian families and members 21 Interviews with key informant KI36 and KI37, 19 December 2022. 22 Fora useful overview of G9, G - Pep and 400 Mawozo, among other groups, see InSight Crime, “G9 and Family”, 18 July 2022; Mistler- Ferguson, S., (InSight Crime), “G9 vs. G-PEP- The two gang alliances tearing apart”, 21 July 2022; and InSight Crime, “400 Mawozo”, 23 March 2022. 23 See , for example, UNOHC HR , Sexual violence in Port -au- Prince: A weapon used by gangs to install fear, 14 October 2022. 24 See Blinke n , Anthony, Secretary of State, “U.S . Department of State announces re ward offers for information leading to the arrests and/or convictions of three Haitian gang leaders”, 7 November 2022. and US Department of Justice, “Criminal charges unsealed against Haitian gang leaders for kidnappings of US citizens”, 7 November 2022. 25 See US Southern Command , “US air force delivers Haitian National Police equipment to Haiti ” , Press Release, 15 October 2022. 26 Also targeted by sanctions are criminal actors and armed groups involved in forcible recruitment of children, kidnapping, trafficking in persons, smuggling of persons and wider forms of violence. See UNSC (2022) sanctions measures at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653 . 27 See EU, Council Regulations 2022/2309, 25 November 2022. 28 See Muggah, R. “Haiti is on the brink of state failure”, Foreign Policy, 17 February 2023 . 29 See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Haiti Pathways to responding to recurrent crises and chronic fragility: Systematic Country Diagnostic Update, June 2022, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/709131656602892706/pdf/Haiti -Systematic-Country- Diagnostic -Update- Pathways-to-Responding-to-Recurrent-Crises-and-Chronic- Fragility.pdf 30 See Olivier, D., (2021) “The political anatomy of Haiti’s armed gangs”, NACLA Report on the Americas, Volume 53(1), pp. 83 - 87. . 6 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking of the diaspora in the US and the Dominican Republic. 31 The announcements highlight the concentration of political and economic power in the country. A handful of Haitian family dynasties account for the vast majority of the country’s overall wealth. 32 Some of them are involved in the agricultural, manufacturing, shipping and logistics sectors, while others oversee import-export operations. 33 Several prominent Haitian businesspeople have also acquired honorific diplomatic titles conferring a level of immunity and reductions in import and export tax. 34 Individuals involved in industrial parks warehousing imports 35 and private ports have typically encountered limited oversight from government authorities. 36 Due to mounting concerns with crime and insecurity, private security companies have expanded across Haiti in recent decades (see Box 1). Many provide close protection services for the country’s political and economic elite as well as protection for public facilities, critical infrastructure and small and medium businesses. Significant numbers of such companies also recruit directly from the HNP, with officers either moonlighting or leaving law enforcement altogether to work in the more lucrative private sector. Some of these entities have been implicated in firearms trafficking. The growth of private security in Haiti coincides with similar patterns of private security expansion across Latin America and the Caribbean 37 , alongside a deepening security crisis following the 2010 earthquake 38 and particularly since the departure of UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2017. 31 See GOC (2022) and US Department of the Treasury, “US sanctions additional corrupt Haitian politicians for drug trafficking” , 2 December 2022., https://home.treasury.gov/news/p ress- releases/jy1137 . See also Segura, R. (Foreign Affairs ) ,” Haiti’s state of paralysis” , 20 April 2022. 32 See Burt, G. et al (2015) Deportation, circulation migration and organized crime – Haiti case study, Research Report, (Canada Public Safety, Ontari o). 33 See Hauge, W. (2018) Haiti: A political economy analysis (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo). 34 Interview with key informant KI02, KI03 and KI08, 5 - 10 December 2022. 35 See AP News , “In Haiti, the difficult relationship of gangs and business ” , 27 October 2022. 36 Several of Haiti’s business elite s own private ports and have entered into coalitions to manage services. Maritime services at the public port complex of Port -au- Prince are provided by Caribbean Port Services (CPS) and regulated by the National Port Authority (APN). Interview with key informant KI02, KI03, KI08, KI36, KI37 and KI45 in December 2022. 37 See UNLIREC and DCAF, Armed private security in Latin America and the Caribbean, DCAF and UNLIREC (DCAF and United Nations 2016) . 38 Burt, G. ( 2012), From pr i vate security to public good: Regulating the private security industry in Haiti, SSR Issue Paper No. 9. 7 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drugs trafficking BOX 1. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN HAITI ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The suspects in the assassination of Haiti’s President Moïse inside his home in the early hours of 7 July, 2021 include a team of mercenaries connected to a small US firms, 39 which reportedly offered close protection support, training in firearms, and access to military-style equipment. 40 This is not the first time US-owned private security companies have been implicated in murky ventures in Haiti. In February 2019, for example, several US contractors were reportedly arrested in Port-au-Prince with a cache of weapons and military equipment. 41 They claimed to be providing security to both the government and private security details for local business elites. According to accounts given to media, they were released by Haiti’s Justice Ministry following US intervention, repatriated and freed without charge. 42 Private security firms officially emerged in Haiti following the end of the Duvalier dictatorship in the late 1980s. 43 Haiti’s 1987 Constitution did not originally include provisions for such enterprises. In fact, Article 263 specified that the armed forces and police were the only armed groups permitted to operate in the country. However, a 1988 decree and 1989 amendment legalized private security companies. In 1994, oversight passed from the disbanded armed forces to the HNP via a Presidential decree. 44 Today, private security companies are permitted to acquire and hold firearms in Haiti. The 1988 and 1989 legislation permit firearm licences for up to half of the registered personnel of a private security firm. 45 Only certain categories of weapons – handguns and shotguns – are permitted. All licence applications must be made to the Minister of the Interior and Territorial Collectives (MICT) and the HNP is responsible for delivery and oversight of firearms through a registry managed by the Central Department for Administrative Police (DCPA). Although analysts believe that local private security companies oversee a far larger arsenal than what is legally permitted, 46 information on the scope and scale of their arsenals is unavailable. In 2012, the most recent year for which public records are available, the MICT reported just 40 separate private security companies licenced to operate in the country. 47 Firms reportedly varied in size from 50 to 2,000 personnel, with a total of 12,000 individuals in total. Roughly half of their clients at the time were foreign embassies and non-governmental organizations and the remainder consisted of banks, businesses and schools. While not possible to independently verify, specialists speculate that there could be 75,000 to 90,000 individuals working with roughly 100 private security companies across the country, at least five times the number of registered police officers. 48 39 See BBC, “ Haiti’s president’s assassination: What we know so far” , 20 January 2022. 40 See Dreisbach, T. (NPR) , “Mystery surrounds Florida company suspected in Assassination of Haiti’s President”, 16 July 2021. 41 See Chappell, B. ( NPR) , “Arrest of heavily armed former US military members in Haiti sparks many questions ” , 20 February 20 22. 42 See Cotto, D. and Weissenstein, M. (AP News) “ US military vet re c ounts arrests in Haiti to AP ” , March 21 March 2019 . 43 See Burt, G., From private security to public good: regulating the private security industry in Haiti, SSR Issues Paper 9 (2012, the Centre for International Governance Innovation ). 44 See Republic of Haiti (1994) HNP Act. 45 This ratio is reportedly similar to that of other countries in the region. Interview with key informant KI38,15 December 2022. For more on private security and weapons ownership see Small Arms Survey (2012) A booming business: Private security and small arms, Small Arms Survey ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ). 46 Interview with key informant KI36, 19 December 2022 and KI38 on 15 December 2022. See also Burt et al (2012). 47 See Burt (2012). 48 Interview with key informant KI01, KI27, KI28 and KI32, 1 December 2022. 8 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking US-based private security companies contracted by foreign governments such as Haiti to provide specialized services are subject to a range of domestic oversight mechanisms. 49 For example, when they are recruited to provide essential defence services, including military or law enforcement training, such companies must obtain arms exports licences from the US Department of State and undergo a review that also involves the US Department of Defense. 50 Although the State Department forbids combat services under International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), some private security companies have reportedly pursued unauthorized services. 51 The formation of the HNP in 1994 coincided with the disbanding of the country’s armed forces. Police reform experts believe that the absence of a coherent framework for policing and the rushed formation, recruitment and training of new officers hobbled the force from the start. 52 Despite successive UN missions in Haiti and repeated efforts to exact security system reform, HNP performance has been hampered by mandate, leadership, capacity and budgetary constraints. 53 One persistent deficiency relates to the management and accountability over existing firearms holdings of law enforcement officers and stores of seized weapons. 54 Another long-standing impediment relates to the weak government coordination across agencies – including entities charged with addressing weapons and drug trafficking, customs, migration and anti-corruption efforts. 55 Arguably the most significant challenge facing the HNP is its limited force strength and modest resourcing. As of late 2022, there were an estimated 14,161 HNP personnel, though BINUH assessed that its operational strength was closer to 13,000 and fewer than 9,000 are on active duty. 56 Specialized police units face chronic staffing shortages. For example, the HNP’s border patrol (POLIFRONT) has just 294 officers 57 , an order of magnitude fewer than the Dominican 49 See Jones, S. (ProPublica ) , “US private security firms head to Haiti ” , 21 January 2010; and Picard, M. ( Transparency International ) , “In Haiti, a glimpse of a mercenary industry enabled by weak regulation, Transparency International”, 23 July 2021. 50 See Federal Register, “ Private security contractors (PSCs) operating in contingency operations, humanitarian or peace operations, or other military operations and exercises ” , 9 September 2022. See also US Department of State (2022) Director of Defense Trade Controls, available at https://ww w.state.gov/bureaus -offices/under-secretary-for-arms-control-and-international- security- affairs/bureau -of-political-military-affairs/directorate-of-defense-trade-controls-pm-ddtc/ (accessed on 2 February 2023 ). 51 See Dreisbach, T. ( NPR) , “Mystery surround s Florida company suspected in assassination of Haiti’s president ” , 16 July 2021. 52 Interview with key informant KI01, KI27, KI28, KI32 and KI38 on 1 December 2022 and with KI38 on 15 December 2022. 53 Interview with key informant KI36 and KI30, 19 December 2022. 54 For example, the HNP’s Service de Port d’Arme a Feux (SPAF) has a limited mandate focused on issuing permits and monitoring statistics. It does not undertake due diligence of firearms holders, conduct traces, or safeguard the storage of firearms . Interview with key informant KI36, 19 December 2022. 55 Between 1994 and 2015 there was no clear framework for border control. That changed in 2015 when the HNP created the first official border police spanning four entry points into the Dominican Republic. Meanwhile, Haiti’s coast guard was also placed under the HNP after 1994, generating difficulties related to command and control, effective budgeting, and overall capacity. Interview, 1 December, with key informant KI01, KI27, KI28 and KI32 and 30 November with key informant KI09 and KI15 . 56 See S/2022/747, Letter dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary -General addressed to the president of the Security Council and BINUH, “Security Council Open briefing on Haiti ” , 22 December 2022. 57 POLIFRONT officers are distributed at headquarters, Morne Cass, Capotile, Ounaminthe, Malpasse and Anse -a- Pitre. Border experts believe Haiti should have at least 7,000 to 8,000 border patrol officers to provide adequate security. Review of POLIFRONT statistics provided by HNP. Interview with key informant KI42 on 10 December 2022. 9 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drugs trafficking Republic. 58 Meanwhile, the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) has just 181 officers and a single operational vessel (since others are either undergoing repairs in the US or simply non-functioning). 59 Likewise, the country’s anti-narcotics brigade (BLTS) has just 317 personnel and is severely under-resourced and over-stretched. 60 These capacity shortfalls are contributing to weak chain of custody over seized contraband, including drugs and firearms. Another factor hampering the effectiveness of the HNP is its uneven operational presence across the country. A sizeable share of officers within the HNP and its specialized units are stationed in the capital, Port-au-Prince, with the remainder sparsely distributed across Haiti’s cities, towns and border areas. 61 One reason for this is that many HNP officers are often placed on duties unrelated to their core responsibilities, including the provision of close protection for senior government officials. The misallocation of police further degrades their effectiveness. 62 With the exception of a handful of staff stationed at Haiti’s two international airports and selected border crossings, there are virtually none policing key air, land and maritime entry and exit points. 63 The HNP also struggles to manage, share and analyse data within the organization, much less across government agencies. 64 Notwithstanding the controversial legacy of Haiti’s armed forces during the dictatorship era, there is a persistent chorus for it to be reconstituted. Pressure to rebuild Haiti’s military has been applied since it was disbanded by former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1994. For example, former President Rene Preval (1996-2001) established a commission to review the necessity of the armed forces, though faced with foreign and domestic opposition, opted to reinforce the HNP instead. 65 A decade later, former President Michel Martelly (2011-2016) advocated for the return of the armed forces, but ultimately also demurred. 66 The late President Moïse (2017-2021) took the decision early in his administration to reconstitute the armed forces, announcing the allocation of $8.5 million of defence spending in 2018 and appointment of a high command under the Ministry of 58 By way of comparison, the Dominican Republic fields 32,000 police officers, including an estimated 15,000 border patrol offic ials. What is more, the Dominican Republic has also started building a 164 -kilometre-long border wall with Haiti, ostensibly to reduce drug trafficking, arms smuggling and illegal migrant crossings. Interview with key informant KI42 on 10 December 2022. See also Interpol, Dominican Republic, available at https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we- are/Member - countries/Americas/DOMINICAN - REPUBLIC ( accessed on 2 February 2023 ) and Janetsky, M. (AP News ) , “ Dominican Republic cracks down at border amidst Haiti chaos” , 11 October 2022 , and Reuters “ Dominican Republic begins building border wall with Haiti ” , 20 February 2022. 59 Interview with key informant KI10, KI11, KI24, 5 December 2022. 60 Interview with key informant KI30, 19 December 2022. See also US State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 1 (March 2022). 61 Interview with key informant KI36, 19 December 2022. 62 Interview with key informant KI39, KI40, KI14, KI29, KI36 and KI38, November - December 2022. 63 Interview with key informant KI42 on 10 December 2022 as well as consultations with key informant KI36 on 19 December 2022. 64 The HNP, along with specialized agencies such a s POLIFRONT and BLTS generate data on a range of crimes including homicide, injuries, police deaths and seized contraband though it is affected by considerable reporting gaps. Interview with key informant KI30 and KI36, 19 December 2022. 65 See Boutellis, A. (2011) What army for Haiti, International Peace Academy, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09486#metadata_info_tab_contents . 66 See Latin News, “ The Haitian armed forces (Fad’H) restored: An historic perspective ” , Security and Strategic Review, December 2018. 10 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking Defence. 67 At the time, there was reportedly a plan to recruit 5,000 soldiers to expand national security and civil protection capacities. 68 Today, there are an estimated 500 members of the armed forces, several of whom have received training in Ecuador and Mexico. 69 67 See Delva, J. ( Reuters) , “Haiti installs new high command for 5,000 -strong army” , 27 March 201 8 h . For background, see Casares, A. and Delva, J. ( Reuters) “ Haitian army set to make controversial return after two decades ” , 18 November 2017, and Jasmin, Y. (Voa News) “ Haiti prepares to introduce its revived military ” , 15 November 2017 . 68 See Delva, J. (2018). 69 The nascent armed forces are expected to play a role in civil protection, border protection and civic engineering projects. E cuador was the first country to pr ovide training for middle - level recruits for approximately nine months, though these activities ended with the change of government. Mexico signed a protocol to provide training support in 2018, though these efforts were disrupted by COVID19. Brazil has been approached to provide support but postponed its decision until early 2023, after the October 2022 election. Interview with key informant K I01, KI27, KI28, KI32, 1 December 2022, as well as key informant KI43, KI44, 10 Decembe r 2022. See also Salmon, S. ( Caribbean National Weekly ) , “ Contingent of Haitian soldiers to be trained in Central America ” , 5 September 2022. 11 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drugs trafficking TRAFFICKING INFRASTRUCTURE There are multiple factors compounding Haiti’s criminal markets for drugs and firearms. Most obviously, Haiti features extensive land and maritime borders that are poorly monitored, guarded and defended. Indeed, Haiti has 1,771 kilometres of coastline and a 392-kilometre terrestrial border with the Dominican Republic. Yet the country’s major seaports, border crossings and airports have a modest police and customs presence and virtually no air, sea or land surveillance capabilities. There are also many public and private ports, irregular roads and clandestine airstrips that are poorly monitored and rarely patrolled (see Map 1). As a result, large portions of Haiti’s frontier are porous and susceptible to transhipment of all manner of contraband, including narcotics and firearms. 70 MAP 1 Mapping airport, seaport , and road infrastructure in Haiti Source: United Nations Geospatial. Interviews with officials from UNODC in Caribbean regional office and Port-au-Prince, INL, UNPOL, HNP and Haitian customs. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 70 Haiti’s borders are described as completely porous by multiple relevant specialists. Interviews conducted with key informant KI10, KI11, KI24, KI36 and KI42 in December 2022. 12 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking Another factor that influences Haiti’s criminal economy are its extensive dependencies on imports. Indeed, every facet of the country’s formal and informal economy is connected to goods imported from abroad. For example, approximately 80 percent of all rice and cooking oil and roughly 50 percent of all food products used by Haitians are imported. 71 As a result, there is extensive exchange of goods and services across Haiti’s borders, particularly ports and border crossings, very little of which is subject to scrutiny by POLIFRONT, customs and the HCG. Notwithstanding changes in customs leadership in 2022 and extensive support from countries such as the US, France and Canada, Haiti’s policing and customs authorities are struggling to staff and resource their agencies, especially in frontier areas of the country. They are not only unable to monitor the inflow of contraband but are themselves a frequent target of gangs. 72 Corruption and patronage networks also incubate thriving black markets. Haiti has frequently been included among the world’s most corrupt countries. 73 In 2020, the World Bank scored Haiti 179 out of 190 economies in the ease of doing business. 74 Despite these challenges, the country’s anti- corruption unit (ULCC) has made tentative inroads, including investigations into embezzlement of public property, the illegal award of contracts, misappropriation of funds and abuse of funds from the national to the local levels. The ULCC has reportedly issued over 70 requests to the judicial authorities of political figures failing to declare assets. 75 However, deeply entrenched corruption in the criminal justice sector means that convictions are exceedingly rare. 76 A majority of the legal and illegal products entering Haiti are offloaded from the country’s public and private seaports. There are several public and private ports spread out across Haiti, with the largest cluster in Port-au-Prince 77 and others in Cap Haïtien, Les Cayes, Miragoâne , Port-de-Paix, Petit Goave and Corai (see Map 1). 78 With some exceptions, these ports are in poor condition, intermittently operational and several are closed down indefinitely. 79 There are a significant number of private ports distributed across Haiti, including Gonaïves , Jacmel, Jérémie and Saint Marc, some of them involved in handling international shortsea shipments. 80 There are also large numbers of unmonitored, unmarked and informal landing areas on western 71 See Haiti Price Bulletin, Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS Net, September 2021). 72 Interview with key informant KI36 and KI37 19 December 2022. 73 See the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, which in 2021 gave Haiti a percentile rank of 5.29 out of 100 for control of corruption, https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports (accessed on 3 February 2023) . 74 The World Bank discontinued the ‘ease of doing business’ rankings in 2021. See World Bank (2022) Doing Business Legacy, https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/business - enabling - environment/doing - business -legacy (accessed on 1 February 2023 ). 75 See Haiti Libre, “ L’ULCC remet des preuves de corruption, representant 500 millions de pertes pour l’Etat”, 26 August 2022. 76 See US State (2022) Major corruption cases in Haiti and Government of Haiti efforts to address corruption, Appendix C, https://www.state.gov/wp -co ntent/uploads/2022/11/Appendix -C- Developments -in-Haiti- 004977.pdf (accessed on 1 February 2023 ). 77 There are several key facilities in Port -au-Prince - APN, Varreux and Latifeau which is 30km north of Port -au-Prince and home to fuel terminals. See https://s3.eu -west-1.amazonaws.com/logcluster-production- files/public/documents/ports_overview_guide . 78 See https://www.seabaycargo.com/seaport/HaitiCountry.html?type=3 and https://www.nepia.com/industry-news/haiti- civil - unrest-affecting-port-operations-update/. 79 Interview with key in formant KI03, 15 December 2022. 80 Other ports include Carriers, Anse -a- Galets, La Saline, Anse - d’Hainault, Corail, and Port -a- Piment. Both Baraderes and Cite Soleil are non-operational. See http://portfocus.com/haiti/ (accessed on 1 February 2023 ). 13 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drugs trafficking and southern Haiti’s coasts, including docks, wharves and beaches that facilitate easy access for firearms and drugs shipments. Owing to both the security situation and the derelict state of many ports, container traffic is primarily from major hubs such as Miami-Dade and Port Everglade 81 in the US and routed to Haiti via neighbouring ports such in Freeport (Bahamas), Kingston (Jamaica), Manzanillo (Panama) and Colon (Panama). 82 In many cases, consignments are shipped to Haiti not by large container ships but rather via smaller feeder vessels. According to Haitian customs officials, different Haitian ports are associated with different types of contraband. For example, firearms and ammunition seizures are common on the western and north-western coasts including Port-au-Prince and Port-de-Paix, whereas drug interdiction is a more common occurrence on the northern and southern coasts of Haiti, notably Les Cayes, Jacmel and Jérémie . 83 Haiti’s primary and secondary road networks are also critical vectors for the movement of legal and illicit goods from the coasts to the Dominican Republic and from Dominican Republic into Haiti. The principal road corridors consist of the RN1 running north-south from Cap Haitien to Port-au-Prince; the RN2 that that connects Port-au-Prince to Les Cayes in the south of the country; and the RN3 that stretches west to east from Port-au-Prince through Mirebalais and Hinche to the frontier with Dominican Republic (see Map 1). Haiti also has many secondary road corridors of variable condition and more seldom, if ever, monitored by authorities. Several gangs presently control key access points to the RN1, RN2, and RN3, particularly junctures connected to Port-au-Prince. From there they can control territory, conduct kidnapping operations and extract illegal rents from passing vehicles. Haitian and international authorities are preoccupied with how gangs have expanded their influence over access points to critical infrastructure and public facilities, presumably to strengthen their negotiating position with government authorities. 84 Gang federations such as the G9, for example, blockaded access to ports and restricted access to gasoline and diesel supplies, while calling for the resignation of high-level public officials. 85 Other groups such as the 5 Seconds gang have periodically controlled sections of the RN1, blocked port Latifo, Cimenterie and Moulins d’Haiti, 81 See Charles, J. and Weaver, C. ( Miami Herald) , “How US gun laws and South Florida ports help fuel Haiti’s escalating gang violence ” , 19 August 2022 . See also WPLG Local 10 (2022) Gangs in Haiti get weapons from South Florida, feds say, WPLG Local 10 , https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hftmxz6vUOE (accessed on 28 February 2023) . 82 See, for example, Atlassaian, Haiti Port Assessment, available at https://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/2.1+Haiti+Port+Assessment (accessed on 1 February 2023 ). 83 Interview with key informant KI36 and KI30 on 19 December 2022. Interviews with key informant KI10, KI11, KI24, KI37 and KI45 in November and December 2022. 84 A widely reported example is the blockade of the Terminal Varreux in Port -au- Prince between 2021 and 2022 by gangs associated with the G9 and its UN-sanctioned leader, Jimmy Cherizier ( aka Barbecue). Following a truce between the gangs and local authorities, the G9 was reportedly paid $100,000 to lift the siege. See Shuldiner, H. and Ford, A., Highways and mills – Haiti gangs battle for control of key infrastructure, InSight Crime , 13 October 2022. 85 See Geffrard, P, ( Le Nouvelliste ) , “Reprise de la livraison de carburant a Varreux apres l’annonce d’une treve des gangs armees ” , 12 November 2021 and Thomas, G. ( Reuters) , “Haiti’s streets s lowly return to life as gangs ease fuel blockade ” , 15 November 2022. 14 Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking occupied Haiti’s main courthouse, and even freed inmates from Titanyen prison. 86 Meanwhile, large gangs such as 400 Mawozo have controlled key sections of the RN3 on route to the Dominican Republic, while also facilitating drugs and firearms shipments, robbing merchandise, selling black market fuel and choking local economies. 87 Airports and clandestine runways are another means of shifting legal and illegal products in and out of Haiti. Haiti has long served as a transit hub for the movement of cocaine, cannabis and to a lesser extent, heroin and amphetamines to the US and Dominican Republic. Haiti’s official airport hubs are Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien , with intermittent airline services available for Hinche, Jacmel, Jérémie , Les Cayes and Port-au-Paix (see Map 1). There are several other runways located from Anse- à -Galets and L'île de la Gonâve to Port-Salut, though few of these are currently operational. 88 Following Haiti’s devastating 2010 earthquake, makeshift airstrips were hastily constructed to facilitate humanitarian assistance. 89 While not officially monitored by the Haitian government, clandestine runways were reportedly widespread across Haiti, though several strips were destroyed over the years by UN peace support operations in partnership with foreign and domestic authorities. 90 There are also indications that roads themselves have sometimes served as illegal runways for unregistered flights. 91 Although data on clandestine airstrips is limited, the case of Savane Diane in Arbonite is instructive (see Box 2). 86 See Geffrard, P ( Le Nouvelliste), “ Le palais de justice envahi et controle par gang de Village -de- Dieu, Le Nouvelliste”, 6 June 2021. See also HaitiLibre “ The women’s prison attacked,