Rapò Trimèstryèl Konsèy Sekirite UNODC a (2025-07)

United Nations S /2024/554 Security Council Distr.: General 16 July 2024 Original: English 24 - 13054 (E) 0508 24 *2413054* Letter dated 15 July 2024 from the Secretary - General addressed to the President of the Security Council Pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2692 (2023) , I have the honour to transmit to the Security Council the fourth quarterly report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The report includes the requested updated information on the sources and routes of arms trafficking and illicit financial f lows and on relevant United Nations activities and recommendations. I should be grateful if you would have the present document brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council. ( Signed ) António Guterres S/2024/554 24 - 13054 2 / 25 Report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023) I. Introduction 1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023) , in which the Security Council tasked the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) with reporting to the Council every three months, concurrently with the reporting cycle of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), through the Secret ary - General, on sources and routes of illicit arms and financial flows and on relevant United Nations activities and recommendations. The report covers the period from 19 April to 12 July 2024, which was a time of instability in Haiti, including the consol idation of powerful gangs and the formation of a transitional presidential council. It was prepared in advance of the deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission. 2. The first report of UNODC ( S/2023/780 ) provided an overview of trafficking in firearms and ammunition in Haiti, detailing key sources, methods and routes from the north and east of the country, and drawing insights from the UNODC briefing note entitled “Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trend s in firearms and drug trafficking”, issued in March 2023. The report documented a surge in trafficking of sophisticated weapons from 2021 to 2023, mostly linked to criminal gangs, with firearms primarily shipped from the United States of America, sometime s arriving through the Dominican Republic. The second report ( S/2024/79 ) explored the regional dynamics of firearms trafficking, highlighting source and transit countries, such as the United States, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, and the domestic dynamics, particularly the role of gangs in Port - au - Prince in procuring and distributing weapons. It was noted in the report that a few of the gangs were particularly adept at stockpiling and redistributing firearms and outlined efforts by anti - corruption agencies to disrupt arms purchases. The third report ( S/2024/320 ) described escalating gang violence in Haiti ’ s capital between January and March 2024, emphasizing the deteriorating security situation, the vulnerability of southern Haiti to trafficking and the link between destabilization and increased migration flows in the Caribbean. The need to strengthen borde r controls to prevent access to firearms was stressed and details were provided concerning how gangs were consolidating control over strategic areas in Port - au - Prince and in coastal regions. 3. The present report contains further explanations of the regional, national and subnational dimensions of trafficking in firearms and ammunition and illicit financial flows. The transnational implications of persistent instability in Haiti are described, including in relation to regional trafficking in drugs, human trafficking and migrant smuggling. In addition, the report covers the evolution of Haiti’s criminal networks, including non - State actors, and their involvement in both political developments an d organized crime. The preparation of the report during a period of intense volatility in Haiti underlines the importance of routine monitoring and surveillance of patterns of organized criminality in the country and wider region. Background 4. During the reporting period, several Haitian gangs expanded their influence and capabilities in advance of the deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission. Armed with automatic and semi - automatic rifles and handguns, the gangs S/2024/554 3 / 25 24 - 13054 are increasingly autonomous from their political and economic backers. 1 E mpowered by proceeds from transnational crime and emboldened by political instability, some have become more public, amplifying their voice in the media. In the process, several gangs are positioning themselves as strategic political players. Figure I Gang controlled areas of Port - au - Prince as of June 2024 2 __________________ 1 According to the United Nations human rights expert in Haiti, gangs continue to profit from extortion, kidnapping and payouts from politicians and elites, but over the past few years they have become much more autonomous and no longer need the financial su pport of the old guard (see Maria Abi - Habib, “Haiti’s gangs grow stronger as Kenyan - led force prepares to deploy”, The New York Times , 21 May 2024). 2 See S/2023/674 and S/2024/320 . See also Global Initiative on Transnational Organized Crime, “A critical moment: Haiti ’ s gang crisis and international responses”, February 2024. S/2024/554 24 - 13054 4 / 25 Figure II Gang controlled areas of downtown Port - au - Prince as of June 2024 5. Although rival gangs continue to compete violently among themselves, there also continues to be evidence of increased collusion and cooperation. In September 2023, Haitian gangs entered into informal truces and worked closely together. 3 A n example is the so - called “Viv Ansanm” (“Live Together”) alliance. While the temporary alliance stumbled due to infighting in late 2023, it was restored in February 2024 (see S/2024/320 ) after gangs publicly pledged to overthrow the former Prime Minister and amid calls to forcefully resist the Multinational Security Support Mission. 6. The Viv Ansanm alliance has helped gangs to consolidate their influence in Port - au - Prince. According to key informants of UNODC, some gangs periodically share profits from the extortion of domestic private sector actors in a shared fund. Proceeds are al so used to illegally acquire firearms and ammunition. 4 S everal gangs launched a coordinated attack against the international airport, government facilities, police __________________ 3 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and BINUH, “Human rights situation: main trends, quarterly report: July - September 2023”, in which it was noted that between July and September 2023, several gang members announced truces. 4 Information provided by the Department of Safety and Security, 5 June 2024. S/2024/554 5 / 25 24 - 13054 stations and the national prison. Among the 4,600 inmates who escaped were individuals with connections to transnational organized criminal networks. 7. The escape of high - level gang members generated destabilizing effects in Haiti. An example of this is the leader of the Baz Pilate gang, who had been convicted of murder, illegal possession of firearms, rape and armed robbery in June 2022. Aligned with the G9 gang, Baz Pilate is described as one of Haiti ’ s most feared gangs with expertise in drug trafficking, racketeering and assassinations. 8. Other experienced criminal escapees could prove to be a destabilizing force. One of them, the former head of security for the late President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, was allegedly driven to Village de Dieu and reportedly collaborated with the 5 Segond g ang in importing illicit firearms, ammunition and, potentially, drugs. 5 H e was also a principal suspect in a significant case pursued by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration in 2015 and the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the Directorate of Judicial Police on charges of illegal drug trafficking and kidnappin g. 6 I n the same way as for the aforementioned head of Baz Pilate, this escapee worked alongside the 5 Segond gang and has reportedly been involved in illicit activities. 7 9. Some Haitian gangs appear to be evolving into militia - like structures. For example, the 5 Segond gang 8 i s shifting its image from a traditional gangster profile to a paramilitary organization. 9 I ndeed, its leader recently announced the creation of a special unit called “Unité Vilaj de Dieu”. In addition to adopting more formal military attire and insignia, there is also online evidence that some gang members are brandishing FN FAL rifles, 10 w eapons that have seldom been seen or seized in Haiti. 11 10. Multiple political and gang leaders have lobbied privately and publicly for gang members to be granted amnesty by the incoming government. Specifically, the former leader of the 2004 Haitian coup, who was convicted in the United States for conspiracy t o launder drug money, claimed that he would seek amnesty for gang leaders should he eventually assume power. 12 I n recent months, several politicians have floated a proposal that former government officials and gang members should be offered immunity for past crimes, including corruption. II. Dynamics of criminal activities Regional dynamics of the flows of illicit arms and ammunition 11. As noted in the previous reports, there are at least three major firearm trafficking routes into Haiti (see figures III and IV). The northern route involves the flow of firearms from the United States to Port - au - Prince, Port - de - Paix and Cap - Haïtien. The so uthern route features firearms trafficked across Haiti’s southern coast via the __________________ 5 Key informant K2, 11 June 2024. 6 Both the former head of security for the late President and the leader of the Baz Pilate gang spent two months in Village de Dieu and later may have escaped from Haiti by boat. Their whereabouts are unknown. Key informant K8 on 18 June 2024. 7 Key informant K8, on 5 June 2024. 8 Supported by other G - Pèp members, such as Grand Ravine, 400 Mawozo and Projet la Saline. 9 Christian Triebert, Maria Abi - Habib and John Ismay, “How a Haitian gang is trying to turn itself into a militia”, The New York Times , 21 May 2024. 10 The FN FAL is a light automatic weapon previously manufactured in Belgium that is no longer produced. 11 See Robert Muggah, “Securing Haiti’s transition: reviewing human insecurity and the prospects for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration”, Occasional Paper No. 14, Small Arms Survey, 2005. 12 See Maria Abi - Habib, Natalie Kitroeff and Frances Robles, “Why everything changed in Haiti: the gangs united”, The New York Times , 14 March 2024. S/2024/554 24 - 13054 6 / 25 Caribbean and South America, including Colombia and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). The eastern route involves arms and munitions transiting across the land borders between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Figure III Dynamics related to trafficking in firearms and ammunition from Florida, United States S/2024/554 7 / 25 24 - 13054 Figure IV Regional dynamics related to the flow of trafficking in firearms and ammunition 12. Historically, most firearms used by Haitian criminal groups were either sourced from the United States or stolen and diverted from the Haitian National Police, the Haitian Armed Forces or from private security companies and civilians. 13 W hile the legal United States market remains the leading source of firearms and ammunition entering Haiti, there are also some indications of new weaponry surfacing, potentially sourced from other countries, including Brazil and Colombia. __________________ 13 According to key informant K6 on 11 June 2024, private security firms must authorize arms acquisition with the Haitian National Police. They are permitted 12 - gauge shotguns and handguns only. Owing to the United States firearms embargo, some companies are resorting to other markets to source firearms and ammunition. In the case of legally sourced weapons from the United States, purchasers are required to sign end - user certificates. There are indications that some high - level political and economic figures ar e sourcing higher calibre weapons separately on black markets. See also UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets”. S/2024/554 24 - 13054 8 / 25 13. Recently reports have emerged of a shipment from Port Everglades in Fort Lauderdale, United States, to Cap - Haïtien. In April 2024, the Haitian National Police intercepted boxes containing at least 26 illegal handguns and assault rifles and hundreds of rounds of ammunition concealed in a 45 - foo t cargo container (see figure V). 14 T he shipment was coordinated by Alliance International Shipping 15 a nd transported on a King Ocean Services cargo vessel. 16 T he transaction was purportedly destined for gangs in Artibonite Valley. The suspected individuals involved in the shipment (a trafficker in the United States, the designated recipient in Haiti and a customs broker) are all still at large. 17 Figure V Firearms, ammunition and other illicit products seized on 5 April 2024 in Cap - Haïtien Source : Official Facebook page of the Haitian National Police. 14. Despite intensified measures by the authorities in the United States to prevent trafficking in firearms and ammunition, 18 t here are significant operational challenges. A key obstacle is the limited oversight over shipping logistics. Containers are leased __________________ 14 The weapons shipment intercepted on 5 April 2024 included 12 automatic rifles, 14 pistols and 999 cartridges, including products made in the United States by Palmetto, Taurus and Smith and Wesson (see annex I). Other seizures reported in Cap - Haïtien involv ed 279 9 mm bullets (25 October 2023), 75 12 gauge shells and 100 9 mm bullets (23 November 2023), 92 9 mm, 78 5.5 mm, and 9 0.45 calibre bullets (22 December 2023), 2 pistols and 13 9 mm magazines (29 April 2024) and 10 9 mm magazines, 100 9 mm rounds, 50 0.38 calibre bullets and 7 12 gauge shells (11 June 2024). 15 Alliance International Shipping has been implicated in previous weapons seizures, including in July 2022. 16 According to the customs authorities and the Brigade de Lutte contre le Trafic de Stupéfiants, the incident occurred in Cap Terminal I, the boat name was Rainer D and the container number was KSOU - 451487 - 6. 17 Key informant K1 on 28 May 2024. 18 According to the United States Customs and Border Protection agency, it has stepped up its enforcement posture on exports and has devised operations aimed at intercepting weapons and arms headed to the island of Hispaniola. These operations include additio nal targeting and examination of exports, thus curbing smuggling efforts. Their presence is more obvious at the Port of Miami, at freight forwarders and at Miami International Airport. In addition, during 2024 outbound inspections conducted by the agency o n passengers going to the island of Hispaniola have yielded numerous interceptions of large quantities of undeclared currency and arrests and investigations are in process. Key informants K3, 3 June 2024, and K1, 10 April 2024. S/2024/554 9 / 25 24 - 13054 and the company’s role is limited to arranging shipments and does not extend to tracking content. 15. There is growing awareness of the dynamics of trafficking in firearms from the United States to Haiti. Ongoing criminal proceedings involving the former head of the 400 Mawazo gang in the United States are instructive. The proceedings alleged that kidn apping proceeds were used to purchase 24 firearms, including AR - 15, M4 and military - grade 0.50 calibre sniper rifles in Miami, Orlando and Pompano Beach in the United States. The orders were made by the former leader from inside a prison in Haiti ’ s capital (see S/2024/320 ). An official of the United States Homeland Security Investigations agency described a “marked uptick” in the volume and calibre of firearms trafficked to Haiti since 2023. 16. Traffickers have used the so - called break - bulk port in the Miami River. 19 R ather than sending products in containers, consignments are divided into smaller parcels to send staples such as rice, beans and other supplies to family and friends. 20 A loophole allows cargo with handwritten manifests valued at less than $2,500 to avoid inspection, making them ideal for concealing contraband. Firearms, ammunition and parts and components are hidden in consumer products and the hulls of freighters. Cargo sent from these ports is exceedingly difficult to search even if there is intelligence on suspected illicit consignments. 17. Another trafficking route is to the south of Haiti from places such as Colombia and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). Reports have circulated on social media of 5 Segond gang members using FN FAL and AK - 47 rifles. Key informants report that some gang members are involved in drug trafficking activities with Spanish - speaking “foreigners”. Indeed, at least one Colombian drug cartel has used Haiti as a trans - shipment point to the United States and Europe and could potentially be supplying firearms and amm unition to Haitian gang members. These transactions are likely conducted with support from prominent Haitian politicians and business operators under sanctions by the United States, Canada and the Dominican Republic. 18. In April 2024, the President of Colombia disclosed that a significant cache of firearms, grenades, mortar rounds and over a million rounds of various types of ammunition had disappeared from military warehouses in Tolemaida and La Guajira in Colombia. 21 H e suggested that some of these were being sold to organized criminal groups, including cartels, and could be redirected to Haitian gangs. While plausible, there is no publicly available evidence to back up these claims. 19. Even so, there are longstanding drug trafficking linkages between Haiti and Colombia, 22 i ncluding the alleged involvement of the previously mentioned former head of security for the late President, Mr. Moïse. 23 A s previously mentioned, he was a prime suspect in one of the largest drug cases ever pursued by the United States __________________ 19 According to key informant K1 on 7 April 2024, there are two categories of shipments from the Miami River. The first includes container vessels using the National Port Authority, Port Lafito and Miragoâne as ports of call. The second involves bulk carriers , or so - called “vrac” (vraquier) vessels, that are smaller and transport goods to Gonaives, Saint - Marc and other smaller ports of call. 20 The delivery of non - bulk cargo is often used as an economical way to send goods to Haiti. Cargo is dropped off by box trucks, pick - ups and private cars and is more difficult for customs officials to inspect. 21 See “Arms traffickers in Colombia could supply Haitian gangs”, Haiti Libre , 3 May 2024. 22 See UNODC, “ Haiti’s criminal markets” for more on the historical relationship between Colombian and Haitian drug cartels that extends back to the 1980s and 1990s. 23 In an interview on 7 June 2024, key informant K4 alleged that the former head of security for the late President, Mr. Moises, introduced the Clan del Golfo criminal group from Colombia to Haiti. He is known to have travelled to Colombia in 2021. In an inte rview on 8 February 2024, key informant K7 shared suspicions that Clan del Golfo was the likeliest group to maintain drug - related connections with Haiti and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). S/2024/554 24 - 13054 10 / 25 Drug Enforcement Administration in Haiti. The incident occurred in 2015 when the MV Manzanares cargo ship docked in Port - au - Prince with over 1,000 kg of cocaine and heroin concealed in a consignment. 20. The eastern firearms trafficking route continues to pose a risk for trafficking in firearms and ammunition. Several consignments of ammunition were intercepted in the Dominican Republic in recent months, with 1,480 0.38 calibre and 3,000 9 mm capsules seized in La Haina Port in the Dominican Republic. 24 A separate shipment from Florida was intercepted in Puerto Plata, 25 w hich included 5,000 9 mm rounds for filling 9 mm capsules, 1,000 bullets for filling 9 mm expandable capsules, 5 magazines for PMAG 30 5.56 rifles, and 1 barrel for a 300 Blackout rifle. 21. The Dominican Republic has taken several steps to disrupt trafficking in firearms and ammunition across the border with Haiti, as well as through its ports and airports. 26 T he increase in reported seizures of weapons and ammunition in recent months highlights the commitment of the customs authorities. 27 O fficial data made available by national customs authorities indicate that there have been no registered seizures at the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti since July 2023. 22. Given the existing stock of firearms already trafficked to Haitian gangs, it is conceivable that demand may be shifting towards ensuring a more predictable and steady supply of ammunition. Official statistics of illegal firearms intercepted by Haitian authorities could suggest a gradually declining trend. According to official reports generated by the Haitian National Police, 401 firearms of various calibres were reportedly seized in 2021, 342 were seized in 2022, 265 were seized in 2023 and 96 have bee n seized thus far in 2024. The most seized firearms include pistols, making up 55 per cent of all seizures in 2021, 56 per cent in 2022, 52 per cent in 2023 and 50 per cent in the first half of 2024 (see annex II). It is not yet possible to determine if th ese downward trends are a consequence of changes in the scale of firearms trafficking or a matter of declining capacities of authorities to intercept them. 23. Haitian police and customs authorities have struggled to stem the flow of firearms and ammunition into the country, particularly at seaports, airports and border crossings. The United Nations and others have reported multiple instances of some Haitian public and private seaports being actively used for the transfer of firearms and munitions. 28 T hese challenges are compounded by an understaffed and underequipped maritime law enforcement capacity. There are also concerns about the integrity and capabilities of certain Haitian public security leaders. In this regard, the Director of the Haitian Nati onal Police was removed from office on 15 June 2024. 24. Meanwhile, there is growing pressure on United States legislators to take more action to stem the flow of firearms and ammunition to Haiti and reduce the forced deportation of Haitian migrants. Several members of the United States Congress have met wit h human rights organizations to extend the temporary protection status for Haitians, end deportations and advocate for stronger controls at ports in Florida. These interactions may have generated results. For example, in March 2024 United __________________ 24 Interview on 10 June 2024. 25 Interview on 12 June 2024. 26 From June 2023 to 14 June 2024, the General Directorate of Customs has seized: 2,887,093 pieces of ammunition, 173 firearms, 386 sporting firearms, and currency amounting to DOP 1,698,237.77. 27 Since May 2021, the customs “risk engine” tool has improved control efficiency and accuracy. Coordinated efforts with the United States Homeland Security Investigations agency since 2021 led to 41 controlled deliveries of firearms, resulting in 67 arrests. Expansions of the UNODC Container Control Programme in Puerto Plata and Dajabón in the Domin ican Republic and new X - ray machines have enhanced operations and interdictions, with significant advancements made in 2022, 2023 and 2024 (information received from the General Customs Administration on 17 June 2024. 28 See UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets”. S/2024/554 11 / 25 24 - 13054 States lawmakers introduced the Caribbean Arms Trafficking Causes Harm (CATCH) Act, which seeks to curb the flow of illegal firearms, including to Haiti. 29 25. The United States authorities have also taken concrete steps to disrupt trafficking in arms and ammunition. In 2022, the United States Congress increased penalties for straw purchases and firearms trafficking linked to the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act. In July 2023, the United States Department of Justice appointed a coordinator for Caribbean firearm prosecutions and in February 2024, the Haiti Transnational Investigative Unit was established to assist the exchange of information between law enforce ment partners in the two countries. 30 Armed groups and their links to regional criminal economies 26. The connections between Haiti’s more prominent gangs and transnational organized criminal groups are diverse and overlapping (see figure VI). 31 T he trafficking in drugs, firearms, migrants and even eels is facilitated by Haiti ’ s strategic proximity to North American and European markets. It is also exacerbated by weak border and criminal justice capacities, protracted political instability, systemic corruption and severe economic challenges, making it an attractive hub for trans - shipment and various illicit activities. Figure VI Diverse transnational organized criminal activities involving Haiti Source : UNODC. __________________ 29 See https://cherfilus - mccormick.house.gov/sites/evo - subsites/cherfilus - mccormick.house.gov/ files/evo - media - document/CATCH%20Act%20Text.pdf . 30 See United States Immigration and Customs, “Homeland Security Investigations and Haiti Ministry of Justice establish a transnational criminal investigative unit”, 14 February 2024, available at https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/homeland - security - investigations - and - haiti - ministry - justice - establish - transnational . 31 See UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets”. Colombian drug cartels have used Haiti as a trans-shipment point for cocaine exports to the United States and Europe. Illegal firearms and ammunition are trafficked into Haiti from the north, south and east. Contraband ranging from out- of-date drugs to food products are frequently smuggled into Haiti. Over the past decade Haiti has registered a rising risk index score for money-laundering and terrorist financing. The combination of political instability, border restrictions and other factors are contributing to increased smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons. The eel trade is highly unregulated, with products sold illegally into international markets. Haiti is affected by a range of organized crime. Sustained demand for firearms and ammunition and continued trans-shipment of cocaine are facets of the criminal economy. But other criminal enterprises, including the trade in counterfeit goods, money- laundering and even the illegal trade eels, are common. Haiti’s c riminal l andscape S/2024/554 24 - 13054 12 / 25 27. Aside from a modest artisanal industry producing simple weapons, Haiti has no domestic firearms manufacturing capacity. 32 A s a result, Haitian criminal groups, as well as private security firms and private individuals, require hard currency to source weapons and munitions. Multi - jurisdictional smuggling networks have evolved to meet the demand for weapons by organized criminal groups. 28. The price of firearms and ammunition depends on the calibre and quality, and whether they are legal or illegal. Firearms that are licensed are typically more expensive than illegal firearms, owing to the paperwork and associated transaction costs (see table 1). The current average street price of licensed handguns in Haiti can reach as high as $3,000, while an unlicensed handgun costs closer to $1,500. A legalized shotgun can be valued at around $800 to $1,000, compared with $400 to $500 for illegal fir earms. The price for semi - automatic and automatic rifles, which are virtually all illegal, varies from $5,000 to $10,000. The price of ammunition also varies: 0.45 calibre ammunition runs $2.50 per round, 9 mm ammunition runs $3 per round, and 5.56 mm ammu nition runs roughly $7.5 per cartridge and 7.62 ammunition runs around $10 per bullet. 33 Table 1 Estimated values of legal and illegal firearms for civilians in Haiti Approximate legal value (United States dollars) Approximate illegal value (United States dollars) Handgun 1 500 3 000 Shotgun 800 – 1 000 400 – 500 Semi - automatic and automatic rifles n/a 5 000 – 10 000 0.45 and 9 mm n/a 2.5 – 3 5.56 and 7.62 mm n/a 7.5 – 10 Note : Prices may vary according to the calibre , quality, location and other factors. Approximate prices based on interview with key informant K6 on 11 June 2024 and in partnership with the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. 29. Members of Haiti’s diaspora have links to both local and international organized criminal groups. The ability of Haitian gangs and criminal networks to leverage Haitian nationals residing abroad plays a pivotal role in sourcing illegal products and sus taining the functioning of the cross - border trafficking system. The significant volume of these small - scale remittance flows and financial transactions means that illicit financial flows are likewise easily concealed among otherwise legitimate transactions . 30. Haitian gangs such as G9, 5 Segond, Grand Ravine, Baz Galil and 400 Mawozo oversee partnerships with international criminal networks, which in turn facilitate trafficking in firearms and drugs and people smuggling. There are suspicions that Haitian cri minal groups have links to groups in Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). 34 National diversion of arms 31. Other State and non - State armed groups could potentially be sources of diverted firearms and ammunition. The Protected Areas Security Brigade of the Haitian __________________ 32 See UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets”. 33 Information collected in cooperation with the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. 34 Interview with key informant K7, 8 February 2024. S/2024/554 13 / 25 24 - 13054 National Protected Areas Agency is responsible for environmental monitoring of protected areas in Haiti. 35 T he Brigade reportedly includes 6,000 – 15,000 armed personnel, though local experts suggest the number may be closer to 1,500. 36 H owever, the Brigade may be expanding: during the last quarter of 2023, 484 new recruits reportedly graduated in Jacmel. 32. Since late November 2023, the leaders of the Protected Areas Security Brigade have declared alliance with political figures and pledged support for the revolution against the administration of the former Prime Minister, Ariel Henry. The former Prime Minister ordered the removal of all Brigade officers in a bid to crack down on their operations. In late 2023 and early 2024, elements of the Brigade violently clashed with the Haitian National Police. Local media reports also documented s uspected Brigade in volvement in criminal activities. Even so, the Brigade has latent support from the local Haitian population in the vicinity. 33. The Haitian Armed Forces, disbanded in 1995 and restored in 2017, had been reconstituted into an infantry battalion of roughly 700 active personnel by 2023. Engineering support was received from Ecuador and Mexico, military equipment from Taiwan, Provi nce of China, and training from Argentina. Brazil, France and several African nations have reportedly offered support. While serving as a “gendarmerie” and operating in selected areas, the Haitian Armed Forces are not authorized to conduct stand - alone oper ations and information concerning the extent of their holdings of weapons and ammunition is not publicly available. 34. There are hundreds of private security companies in Haiti, some of which facilitate firearm permits for civilians or provide weapons clandestinely. 37 T he deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission will likely be accompanied by a wide range of private security vendors, trainers and personnel that will provide services to the Mission. While there is limited publicly available information on t he precise number and ownership structure of private security companies in Haiti, there have been sightings of higher calibre firearms being held by private guards on the street. Under Haitian law, private security firms can equip only half of their listed personnel with shotguns and handguns. 38 35. Owing to the uneven provision of public security, Haitian communities have a long tradition of establishing neighbourhood protection groups. Over the past year, such groups have been set up in Canapé Vert, Morne Brun and Montagne Noire and in several parts of the Delmas district. These groups are constituted of residents, including former and current police officers. While s uch groups have yet to graduate to full - fledged militia, they can assume similar characteristics. Many request a so - called tax to p rovide protection and have gradually militarized in response to gangs. Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants 36. The average numbers of arrivals to and departures from Haiti have declined overall since the start of 2024. In January 2024, there were reportedly over 46,000 travellers of varying nationalities departing Haiti. 39 T he prison break and attack on the international airport in March 2024 contributed to a decline of more than 80 per cent in air travel to just over 7,600 travellers in March 2024. While the number of documented travellers to Haiti increased again in April and May 2024, it is still well below the __________________ 35 The Protected Areas Security Brigade’s mission is also to provide support to border control authorities. 36 Interview with key informant K8, 10 January 2024. 37 See UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets”. 38 Ibid. 39 Information received from the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) of the Caribbean Community, 2024. S/2024/554 24 - 13054 14 / 25 previous average. The imposition of border restrictions by several countries and chronic political and social instability in Haiti could trigger increased illegal border crossings. 37. The current security situation has affected migration and trafficking dynamics. Specifically, the temporary disruption to the international airport and seaports in March 2024 stymied the movement of both licit and illicit goods. Border control measures imp osed by the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and the United States have contributed to reduced cross - border flows . 40 T his has likely also incentivized smuggling services, including in transportation, accommodation, food and escort support, for irregular border crossings, including corruption at border points. The services of smugglers are procured online or through person al connections. 38. There are multiple reports of Haitians seeking to enter countries in Latin American and Caribbean since May 2024. Information collected by UNODC indicated that nine Latin American and Caribbean countries have initiated criminal investigations involving Hai tians as smuggled migrants or as smugglers . 41 I n their attempt to reach Canada and the United States irregularly, Haitian nationals often enter Nicaragua without a visa 42 o r travel through Brazil, Colombia and Panama (through the Darien Gap). From January to May 2024, some 9,872 Haitians were detected crossing the Panama - Colombia border irregularly. Haitians may pay smugglers, on average, $250 to cross into the Dominican Rep ublic, or even as much as $10,000 for such services, despite an average annual salary of roughly $1,200 – $1,500. 39. Haitians have continued to travel directly to the United States via the Dominican Republic and neighbouring Caribbean countries. United States authorities have detected an increase in the smuggling of Haitian migrants by sea via the Mona Passage and th e Bahamas in recent months. 43 H aitians are also reportedly departing from northern Haiti directly to the Bahamas and neighbouring Turks and Caicos islands. Meanwhile, the United States Customs and Border Protection agency reported 144,994 encounters with Haitians in the first seven mont hs of 2024 (compared with approximately 163,781 in 2023 and 56,596 in 2022). 44 40. A disturbing trend is the escalated risk of child exploitation in Haiti, particularly due to chronic instability, widespread school closures, diminished economic opportunities and rising food prices. The United Nations has identified a heightened risk of c hildren being exploited for the purpose of domestic servitude, a practice known as restavek (Creole for “stay with”). The well - documented practice involves traffickers taking advantage of lower - income households by arranging for placement of their children with wealthier families, who exploit them in domestic servitude. Although restavek was widely reported prior to 2024, with an estimated 1 in 15 children believed to be affected, 45 t he dire conditions have generated heightened vulnerabilities. __________________ 40 See “Bahamas takes steps to protect borders as Haitian crisis deepens”, Loop News , 18 March 2024; “Jamaica wants to avoid ‘an avalanche’ of Haitians and will only take in a few refugees”, Dominican Today , 9 March 2024; and United States, Department of Homeland Security, “Presidential proclamation to suspend and limit entry and joint DHS - DOJ interim final rule to restrict asylum during high encounters at the southern border”, June 2024. 41 UNODC conducted a survey among prosecutors in Latin America and the Caribbean in May 2024 on open investigations related to trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. Six ongoing cases of smuggling of migrants involving Haitians were reported. 42 Haitians may be sent an “invitation letter” and “travel authorization” to fly to Nicaragua and then onward to the Guatemala - Mexico border and eventually to the Mexico - United States border. 43 According to IMPACS (2024), 22 Haitian nationals were intercepted in Jamaica having illegally entered by sea. 44 See United States Customs and Border Protection Encounters platform ( https://www.cbp.gov/news room/stats/nationwide - encounters ). 45 See https://restavekfreedom.org/issue/ . S/2024/554 15 / 25 24 - 13054 41. Relatedly, there are widely reported concerns of vulnerable children being recruited by gangs and criminal groups 46 f or illegal activities, including with regard to violence and sexual exploitation. There are an estimated 180,000 internally displaced children in Haiti, and OHCHR estimates that between 30 and 50 per cent of gang members are minors, who are often coerced into joining gangs because they fear reprisals for their family or themselves (see A/HRC/54/79 ). With an estimated 200 gangs and some 15,000 gang members operating nationally, there could be as many as 7,500 children involved in these armed gangs. III. Reviewing illicit financial flows 42. The high level of volatility and breakdown of Haitian institutions hinders a detailed assessment of the scale and dynamics of illicit financial flows. This is not a novel challenge: Haiti has registered a rising risk index score for money - laundering an d terrorist financing over the past decade. In 2023, the country reported a score of 8.25, the highest in the world. 47 H aiti has likewise failed to meet several targets set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to address strategic deficiencies. 43. Notwithstanding the absence of fully functioning institutions, it is still possible to track illicit financial flows by focusing on payment streams via proxy indicators, including remittances and transfers. The World Bank, for example, estimates that t here was a 57 per cent increase in personal transfers received in Haiti between 2017 and 2022, from $2.4 to $3.8 billion (see table 2). There was also a 144 per cent increase in remittances paid, from $309 million in 2017 to $725 million in 2022 (ibid). Wh ile most of these flows were likely directed towards purchasing basic goods and services in the formal and informal economies, they are also likely to include increased illicit financial transactions involving criminal groups. Table 2 Reported remittances to Haiti from the United States, 2017 – 2022 (United States dollars) Personal remittances received Personal remittances paid 2017 2 419 165 423.81 297 710 340.43 2018 2 735 177 966.71 309 403 439.14 2019 2 695 149 513.66 284 975 298.61 2020 3 257 277 839.54 549 483 207.17 2021 3 994 393 882.97 678 498 745.92 2022 3 797 752 749.15 725 386 292.38 Source : World Bank world development indicators, 2024, available at https://databank.worldbank.org/ source/world - development - indicators . __________________ 46 Gangs and criminal groups, while often referred to interchangeably, have distinct characteristics. Gangs typically have a strong social identity, with members sharing common cultural or neighbourhood backgrounds and adhering to a defined hierarchy and codes of conduct. They are often territorial, engaging in activities ranging from petty crime to serious offences in order to assert dominance or protect their turf. In contrast, criminal groups primaril y focus on illegal activities for profit, with varying structures from loosely organized networks to sophisticated organizations. They are less concerned with territorial control, operating more secretly and often internationally, engaging in high - level cr imes such as drug trafficking, money - laundering and cybercrime. Both pose significant challenges to law enforcement but understanding their differences helps in developing targeted intervention strategies. 47 See https://www.fatf - gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Haiti.html . S/2024/554 24 - 13054 16 / 25 44. Haiti’s political and economic instability are aggravated by systemic corruption and money - laundering. 48 L aws intended to deter, disrupt and penalize corruption and money - laundering are only partially implemented and are poorly enforced. Prior to and during the current security crisis, investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption and economic and financial crimes have been hindered by loopholes in existing legal frameworks. 49 K ey laws are still missing, including on asset recovery, the protection of witnesses, victims, informants and whistle - blowers and ensuring public access to information. Haitian authorities reportedly lose up to $650 million a year due to underreporting reve nue, fraudulent reporting, under qualified staff and manipulated performance metrics at the General Customs Administration. 50 45. Nevertheless, the anti - corruption unit has led multiple national consultation processes on draft laws regarding free access to information and whistleblower protection. The unit has initiated the development of a legislative framework dedicated to asset re covery. 51 P rosecutions for corruption are extremely rare, however. Criminal justice and oversight institutions involved in anti - corruption efforts have themselves been systematically degraded. Haiti’s routinely scores low when it comes to perceptions of corruption an d anti - money - laundering indices. 52 M easures undertaken by the unit suggest that improvements are feasible, even in highly turbulent settings. 53 T he scaling up and consolidation of support for more comprehensive anti - corruption and anti - money - laundering measures will be warranted e specially once institutions are fully functioning and high - level political commitment to financial integrity can be re - established, including in partnership with international partners such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 46. Despite incremental progress in advancing the anti - money - laundering agendas in 2024, 54 H aiti continues to be carefully monitored by FATF and remains on its grey list of States with strategic deficiencies with regard to anti - money - laundering and countering the financing of terrorism. 55 I n June 2021, Haiti made a high - level political commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of its regime for anti - money - laundering and countering terrorist financing in collaboration with FATF and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) leading to improvements, including preventive strategies, information - sharing with relevant foreign counterparts and measures to address technical deficiencies in addressing money - laundering and terrorist financing offenses. Despite Haiti ’ s ongoing efforts, deadlines established in its action plan have expired. 56 __________________ 48 See UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets”. 49 See executive summaries of the United Nations Convention against Corruption Implementation Review Group, 19 – 23 June 2017 (available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/ UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/ExecutiveSummaries/V1701394e.pdf ) and 12−16 June 2023 (available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ ImplementationReviewGroup/12 - 16June2023/CAC - COSP - IRG - II - 2 - 1 - Add.32/2305765E.pdf ). 50 Information from an unpublished report by IMPACS, May 2024. 51 See https://x.com/ULCCHaiti/status/1801656989162029567/photo/1 . 52 In 2023, for example, Haiti was ranked 172 out of 180 countries in Transparency International ’ s Corruption Perceptions Index (see https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/haiti ). 53 Information from an unpublished report by the anti - corruption unit concerning investigations between March and November 2023. 54 Between 2 and 7 June 2024, senior officials from the Central Financial Intelligence Unit of Haiti participated in the CFATF plenary in Trinidad and Tobago to explain its latest monitoring report. The delegations reportedly praised the country ’ s progress despite an extremely degraded security situation (interview with Central Financial Intelligence Unit official, 13 June 2024). 55 See https://www.fatf - gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Haiti.html . 56 See FATF, “Jurisdictions under increased monitoring, 23 February 2024, available at https://www.fatf - gafi.org/en/publications/High - risk - and - other - monitored - jurisdictions/Increased - monitoring - february - 2024.html . S/2024/554 17 / 25 24 - 13054 47. In 2023, investigators at the anti - corruption unit completed 11 investigative reports into corruption and money - laundering. Of the total of 42 investigative reports submitted to the Haitian judiciary over the past three years, three indictments were is sued by magistrates for adjudication in the criminal court. 57 I n the first six months of 2024, the Haitian Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau o versaw more than 30 cases, including five related to corruption. 58 A n Anti - Corruption Circuit was established in February 2022. On 4 June 2024, a team of investigators from the anti - corruption unit and Haitian National Police officers conducted a search of the National Education Fund offices. The operation followed recent allegations of corruption and embezzlement committed between 2017 and 2024. 48. Several longer - term anti - corruption investigations are generating results. In May 2022, the anti - corruption unit conducted a search of the General Customs Administration. By December 2022, the anti - corruption unit had ordered the freezing of the bank a ccounts of the Director of the Administration and other financial assets due to a failure to substantiate sources of asset growth. The investigation was concluded in March 2023 and recommended the prosecution of the former head of the General Customs Admin istration and his accomplices for illicit enrichment, money - laundering and false asset declarations. 59 T he evidence unveiled a sophisticated scheme for concealing assets, involving cash deposits in bank accounts, undeclared real estate acquisitions and dubious commercial activities through shell companies. 60 49. On 8 May 2024, the examining magistrate issued an order referring the former head of the General Customs Administration, his wife and a Catholic priest who was the former director of the international non - governmental organization Food for the Poor in Cap - Haïtien, to the criminal court on charges of money - laundering, illicit enrichment and false asset declarations. The judge ruled that the evidence presented by the anti - corruption unit was sufficient for indictment. In an order made public on 14 May 202 4, the examining magistrate referred the defendants to the criminal court for trial without a jury. However, the whereabouts of the accused are unknown. 50. Many Haitians, including politically exposed persons and their family members and associates, 61 o ften establish companies in southern Florida during or shortly after they, or their business partners, assume public office or positions in important agencies. 62 51. This behaviour, if supported by additional investigations and data, could raise concerns about potential conflicts of interest, abuse of power and the undermining of public trust in government instit