Implementation Completion and Results Report - Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency Recovery Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00004504 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA H5510; H8120; D1360) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 67.2 MILLION (US$ 102.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE Republic of Haïti FOR A Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency Recovery Project 12/2 7 /2018 Transport Global Practice Latin America And Caribbean Region Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS FISCAL YEAR J ul y 1 - June 3 0 (Exchange Rate Effective January 31, 2010) Currency Unit = Special Drawing Rights 40.021670 = US$1 0.643421 US$ = SDR1 FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 (Exchange Rate Effective as of July 31, 2012) Currency Unit = Haitian Gourde (HTG) 42.55 HTG = US$1 US$0.6629 = SDR 1 FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 (Exchange Rate Effective: October 17, 2016) Currency Unit = Haitian Gourds 64.7 HTG = 1 USD 0.73000 SDR = 1 USD FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 Regional Vice President: Jorge Familiar Calderon Country Director: Anabela Abreu Senior Global Practice Director: Guangzhe Chen Practice Manager s : Juan Gaviria Task Team Leader(s): Malaika Becoulet, Eric Brintet ICR Main Contributor : Benjamin Fouchard ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AF Additional Financing BRH Haïti Central Bank ( Banque de la République d’Haïti ) BTEB Building Technical Evaluation Unit CIAT Inter - ministerial Committee for Territorial Planning ( Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire ) CNMP Procurement Regulatory Agency ( Commission Nationale des Marchés Publics ) CPF Country Partnership Framework CS - CCA Supreme Audit Institution ( Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif ) DPC Civil Protection Directorate ( Direction de la Protection Civile ) DRM Disaster Risk Management EU European Union ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework FCV Fragility, Conflict and Violence FGHI Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike (four hurricanes that stroke Haiti in 2008) Cap - Haïtien GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery GIS Geographic Information System GoH Government of Haiti HOPE Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 (HOPE I) ICB International Competitive Bidding IDA International Development Association IDB Inter - American Development Bank IDP Internally Displaced Persons IEG Internal Evaluation Group IGF Financial Inspectorate ( Inspection Générale des Finances ) IHSI Haitian Statistics Institute IIERP Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency Recovery Project IMF International Monetary Fund MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance ( Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances ) MPCE Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation ( Ministère de Planification et Coopération Externe ) MTPTC Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communication ( Ministère de Travaux Publics, Transport et Communications) NCB National Competitive Bidding NDRMS National Disaster Risk Management System NGO Non - Governmental Organization OM Operations Manual OCPAH Association of Chartered Public Accountants of Haiti ( Ordre des Comptables Professionnels A gr éés d’Haïti) PAP Project - Affected People PCU Project Coordination Unit (Unité de Coordination de Projet) PDNA Post - Disaster Needs Assessment PDO Project Development Objective PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability PIMAP Public Investment Management Action Plan PIU Project Implementation Unit PFM Public Financial Management PFMRAP Public Financial Management Reform Action Plan PPA Project Preparation Advance QCBS Quality Cost Based Selection RF Results Framework SBD Standard Bidding Document SEEUR Urban and Rural Equipment Maintenance Unit (Service d'Entretien des Equipements Urbains et Ruraux) UN United Nations TABLE OF CONTENTS DATA SHEET ....................................................................... ................................................... 1 I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIV ES ................................ ....................... 6 A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 6 B. SIG NIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION ................................ .............................. 10 II. OUTCOME ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 12 A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 12 B. ACHIEVEMENTS OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ................................ ................................ ..................... 13 C. EFFICIENCY ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 1 7 D. JUSTIFICATI ON OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING ................................ ................................ .... 19 E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS ................................ ................................ ......................... 20 III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFF ECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 21 A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................ ................................ ................... 21 B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ................................ ................................ ............. 22 IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, CO MPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 23 A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ................................ ............................ 23 B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ................................ ..................... 25 C. BANK PERFORMANCE ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 26 D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ................................ ................................ ....................... 27 ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRA MEWORK AND KEY OUTPU TS ................................ ........................... 31 ANNEX 2. BANK LENDIN G AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 44 ANNEX 3. PROJECT COS T BY COMPONENT ................................ ................................ ........... 46 ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ................................ ................................ ........................... 47 ANNEX 5. BORROWER, C O - FINANCIER AND OTHE R PARTNER/STAKEHOLDE R COMMENTS ... 54 ANNEX 6. SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO THE PROJE CT ................................ ............................ 56 ANNEX 7. MAP OF HAIT I AND THE EPICENTER OF THE EARTHQUAKE ................................ .... 62 ANNEX 8. NUMBERED L IST OF INDICATORS AN D CHANGES IN THE RES ULTS FRAMEWORK .. 63 The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 1 of 66 DATA SHEET BASIC INFORMATION Product Information Project ID Project Name P120895 Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery Country Financing Instrument Haiti Investment Project Financing Original EA Category Revised EA Category Full Assessment (A) Full Assessment (A) Related Projects Relationship Project Approval Product Line Additional Financing P130749 - AF Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery 27 - Sep - 2012 IBRD/IDA Additional Financing P156049 - Second Additional Financing Infra & Instit Emergency Recovery 10 - Nov - 2016 IBRD/IDA Organizations Borrower Implementing Agency Republic of Haiti Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications, Unité Centrale d'Exécution The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 2 of 66 Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO The Project Development Objective is to support the Recipient in its early sustainable recovery efforts from the effects oftheEmergency, through selected interventions aiming at contributing to rebuilding key institutions and infrastructure Revised PDO The Revised PDO is to support the Recipient in its sustainable recovery efforts from the effects of the Emergency, throughselectedinterventions aiming to rebuilding key institutions and infrastructure. FINANCING Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing IDA - H5510 65,000,000 65,000,000 64,450,045 IDA - H8120 35,000,000 35,000,000 33,397,682 IDA - D1360 2,800,000 2,800,000 2,679,118 Total 102,800,000 102,800,000 100,526,845 Non - World Bank Financing Borrower/Recipient 0 0 0 Total 0 0 0 Total Project Cost 102,800,000 102,800,000 100,526,845 KEY DATES Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing 18 - Mar - 2010 23 - Apr - 2010 17 - Apr - 2012 30 - Jun - 2013 29 - Jun - 2018 The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 3 of 66 RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions 10 - Sep - 2012 46.38 Additional Financing Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Results Framework Change in Loan Closing Date(s) 23 - Jun - 2016 83.10 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) 28 - Oct - 2016 84.84 Additional Financing Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Reallocation between Disbursement Categories 21 - Dec - 2017 94.31 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Reallocation between Disbursement Categories KEY RATINGS Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Modest RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual Disbursements (US$M) 01 18 - May - 2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.75 02 21 - Feb - 2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.58 03 02 - Aug - 2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 22.21 04 22 - Apr - 2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 37.02 05 15 - Nov - 2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 49.03 06 04 - Jul - 2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 59.83 07 17 - Mar - 2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 73.00 08 25 - Nov - 2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 77.19 09 29 - Jun - 2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 78.93 The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 4 of 66 10 28 - Jan - 2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 79.87 11 08 - Oct - 2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 84.84 12 13 - Apr - 2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 88.00 13 04 - Dec - 2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 93.51 14 29 - Jun - 2018 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 99.15 SECTORS AND THEMES Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%) Public Administration 13 Central Government (Central Agencies) 10 Other Public Administration 3 Financial Sector 20 Public Administration - Financial Sector 20 Transportation 38 Urban Transport 35 Other Transportation 3 Water, Sanitation and Waste Management 29 Sanitation 15 Other Water Supply, Sanitation and Waste Management 14 Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Finance 25 Finance for Development 25 Disaster Risk Finance 25 The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 5 of 66 Urban and Rural Development 75 Disaster Risk Management 75 Disaster Response and Recovery 25 Disaster Risk Reduction 25 Disaster Preparedness 25 ADM STAFF Role At Approval At ICR Regional Vice President: Pamela Cox Jorge Familiar Calderon Country Director: Yvonne M. Tsikata Anabela Abreu Senior Global Practice Director: Laura Tuck Guangzhe Chen Practice Manager: Aurelio Menendez Juan Gaviria Task Team Leader(s): Nicolas Peltier - Thiberge, Luc Razafimandimby Malaika Becoulet, Eric Brintet ICR Contributing Author: Benjamin Loic Fouchard The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 6 of 66 I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL Context 1. At the time of appraisal of the Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency Recovery Project (IIERP) in March 2010, Haiti had struggled for decades to emerge from a poverty strife due to political instability, internal conflicts and natural disasters. Despite these exogenous shocks and natural disasters, the Haitian economy had demonstrated progr ess by means of technical and financial support from donors . Economic growth had averaged 2.5 percent per annum over the preceding three years and economic performance through Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 (ending in September 2009) was positive despite the glo bal crisis’ impact and a post - FGHI rebound ( f our h urricanes – Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike (FGHI) – hit Haiti during the 2008 hurricane season ) . This trend continued through October - December of 2009. Growth reached 2.9 percent in FY2009, driven by a strong a gricultural and manufacturing output. Macroeconomic indicators improved, as evidenced by annual inflation bottoming out at minus 4.7 percent in September and a reduced fiscal deficit (excluding grants and externally - financed projects) that was contained at 4.4 percent of G ross D omestic P roduct (GDP) because of efficient fiscal consolidation. At the same time, low import prices decreased, and textile exports had increased because of the HOPE Act 1 . Exports and resilient remittances helped reduce the external account deficit from 4.5 percent in FY2008 to 3.2 percent of GDP in FY2009. 2. Progress was dramatically interrupted on January 12, 2010, when Haiti was struck by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake very close to Port - au - Prince . The capital is the country’s political, economic and administrative nerve center, where an estimated 65 percent of GDP and 85 percent of government revenues are generated. The epicenter Léogâne, in the Western Province of Haiti, is a highly - populated are a and is located only 17 kilometers away from Port - au - Prince ( s ee map in Annex 7). The earthquake caused unprecedented damage in the country and was recorded as the worst natural disaster impact in recent history. The disaster killed an estimated 230,000 p eople, injured 300,000, and displaced 1.5 million people as a result of the collapsed buildings and infrastructure. The damages and losses were evaluated at US$7.8 billion (120 percent of GDP or almost six times larger than the accumulated impact of the di sasters suffered by Haiti since 2004 ) and reconstruction needs at US$11.3 billion. Figure 1 . Relative impact and sector structure of the impact Source: PDNA 2010 1 In December 2006, the 109th Congress passed the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 (HOPE I), which included special trade rules that give preferential access to U.S. imports of Haitian apparel. The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 7 of 66 3. Haiti’s inadequate infrastructure and lack of building codes was evidenced in the collapsed and damaged infrastructure in the disaster area. In Port - au - Prince, the Natio nal Palace, the main ministries , the United Nations (UN) headquarters, national peniten tiary, and the parliament building were heavily damaged. The capacity of the Government of Haiti (GoH) was severely hindered by the earthquake by both the lo ss of life of critical staff and by partial or total collapse of its primary buildings, including t he following key public governance entities: the tax and customs administrations, the National Statistical Institute, the procurement regulatory agency, the Court of Accounts, and the Road Maintenance Fund (FER). 4. The primary road network linking the capital to the four departments of the southern peninsula (South East, Nippes, Sud and Grand’ Anse) which represents one third of the country’s population was severely damaged by the earthquake. The national road Route Nationale # 2 (RN2) was interrupted in Léogâne (the earthquake’s epicenter) and at least one bridge on RN2 (Pont Fauché) had been damaged. On the national road RN4, linking Port - au - Prince to the heavily devasted city of Jacmel, large volumes of landslide r ubble disrupted traffic. 5. The January 2010 earthquake deepened the existing governance challenges in Disaster Risk Management (DRM) . Lack of technical capacity, sustainable institutional structures to properly address crisis management and a clear crisis management framework, contributed to overlapping and duplicating responsibilities of several Haitian institutions. The Inter - Ministerial Committee for Territorial Planning (CIAT) was created in March 2009 but important shortfalls were still identified with reference to territorial planning and risk management, such as: (i) a lack of an integrated approach to disaster prevention (i.e., poor urban planning, inefficient water management and significant erosion caused by environmental deterioration); (ii) inade quate technical standards for infrastructure construction, and (iii) a lack of infrastructure maintenance of roads and bridges and resilient designs (roads and bridges that had been properly maintained were less affected). 6. Given the country’s numerous n ecessit ies , the multiple donors and Non - Governmental Organizations (NGOs) arriving in Port - au - Prince immediately after the earthquake sought to thoroughly coordinate and partner their interventions. In the month immediately following the earthquake, an ef ficient mechanism for donor coordination had not yet been established. A World Bank technical assistance team was deployed in the first four weeks following the earthquake to reestablish contact with the GoH, evaluate early needs and identify critical reco very interventions. The team used all prior and existing coordination mechanisms such as the Sector Coordination Group ( Groupe Sectoriel Transport ), joint missions and bilateral discussions, to ensure that the World Bank’s intervention strategy was consistent among donors . Rationale for World Bank Involvement 7. The World Bank possessed vast experience in emergency response operations and could contribute with lessons learned from past interventions. An Internal Evaluation Group (IEG) report 2 assessing the lessons learned of more than 528 World Bank - financed disaster - related projects during the period of 1984 to 2005 was released in 2006. These results, in addition to the World Bank staff’s experience through successful World Bank - funded post - disaster reconstruction , provided a strong contribution towards the P roject’s preparation. 2 Hazards of Natur e, Risks to Development - An IEG Evaluation of World Bank Assistance for Natural Disasters, IEG, 2006 The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 8 of 66 8. With a longstanding experience supporting the transport and the Disaster Risk Management sectors in Haiti since 2004, the World Bank had worked alongside the GoH to improve the Direction de la Protection Civile’s capacity (Civil Protection Directorate) to coordinate the preparation and response to natural disasters. Several Transport and Disaster Risk Management (DRM) projects were still under implementation during t he P roject’s appraisal including: The Transport and Territorial Development Project (PTDT) (P095523), the Emergency Response Disaster Management Project (ERDMP) (P090150) and the Emergency Bridge Reconstruction and Vulnerability Reduction Project (PROReV) (P114292). 9. Faced by a need for early intervention in response to a humanitarian crisis, the technical expertise of the World Bank combined with the trusted relationship with the GoH was key to coordinate the Post - Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA). In the initial phase following the earthquake, the World Bank - hosted Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) became a leading contributor to the PDNA implemented in February/March 2010. The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the In ter - American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank unified their technical and financial resources to establish a collaborative, coordinated effort to: (i) estimate the overall impact of the earthquake on specific communities, affected areas and the ov erall country’s economic development; (ii) develop a preliminary strategy for early, medium and long - term recovery and reconstruction, and (iii) assist the GoH with technical and policy advice to strengthen their National Disaster Risk Management System an d facilitate the coherent and effective implementation of identified activities. A Project Preparation Advance (PPA) was also processed for urgent equipment purchase and response to urgent demands for recovery. Theory of Change (Results Chain) Figure 2. Theory of C hange ( R esults C hain) The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 9 of 66 Project Development Objectives ( PDOs) 10. The original PDO , as stated in the Financial A greement approved on March 22, 2010 and consistent with the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) , is to support the Recipient in its early sustainable recovery efforts from the effects of the Emergency, through selected interventions aiming at contributing to rebuilding key institutions and infrastructure. Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators 11. The key project o utcome i ndicators, as per the PAD Results Framework (RF), were: • Estimated number of people benefiting from repaired infrastructure ; • Project influenced the reconstruction planning process for Port - au - Prince and surrounding affected areas so that public consultation mechanisms are strengthened ; • MEF restored internal control and audit, and able to process payroll ; and • Crisis governance institutions strengthened and operating . Components 12. The achievement of the PDO was to be supported by the P roject’s following three components: 13. Component 1 – Restoring Key Economic and Financial Functions of the Recipient , provided support to: (a) enable the reinstatement of MEF’s basic functions, such as, inter alia, budget formulation, execution and reporting, and (b) carry out activities to assist in fully re - establishing the government’s function , including through relocation or physical structure rehabilitation, and thereafter operationalizing, though, inter alia, provis ion of goods and equipment and technical assistance, key financial management, control and expenditure institutions of the Recipient. 14. Component 2 – Emergency Rehabilitation of Selected Public Infrastructure , supported: (a) rehabilitation or reconstruction activities of key institutional and transport infrastructure through the piloting of sound social and environmental practices; and all related studies and supervision activities, and (b) strategic studies related, inter alia, t o infrastructure reconstruct ion based on specific infrastructure designs intended to increase the resilience of rebuilt infrastructure. 15. Component 3 – Institutional Support, Reconstruction Planning and Project Management , provided support to: (a) restore the functioning capacity of k ey institutions of the Recipient’s crisis governance framework; (b) carry out planning activities for the short, medium and long - term reconstruction phases; (c) carry out institutional strengthening activities; (d) finance Project management activities; (e ) establish and operate an engineering clearinghouse in the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, Energy and Communications ( MTPTEC ) to manage the technical knowledge deriving from assessments carried out by national and international institutions and there after to disseminate good engineering practices and innovative solutions, and (f) assist the Recipient with preliminary basic recovery activities . 16. The Grant’s estimated costs , by component , at appraisal , and after the approval of two subsequent Additional Financing Grants (paragraph 19) and at closing, are presented below : The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 10 of 66 Table 1 . Project Components and cost at approval and at closing Project Components Parent Grant 2010 First Additional Financing 2012 Second Additional Financing 2016 Total Estimated cost in PAD and AF Final costs (% Estimated costs in SDR) Component 1: Restoring key economic and financial functions of the Recipient 10.0 12.0 2.8 24.8 100% Component 2: Emergency Rehabilitation of Selected Public Infrastructure 35.0 20.3 - 55.3 100% Component 3: Institutional Support, Reconstruction Planning and Project Management 5.0 2.7 - 7.7 100% Project Preparation Advance 15.0 - - 15.0 100% Total 65.0 35.0 2.8 102.8 100% B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets 17. The P roject’s PDO was revised under the 2012 First Additional Financing (AF) to remove the word “early” before “sustainable recovery efforts . ” With this change, the Project sought to move beyond the humanitarian and emergency response to address not only reconstruction needs, but also broader infrastructure and institutional development needs. Revised PDO Indicators 18. The PDO indicator “Crisis government institution strengthened and operating” was dropped, as the GoH decided instead to finance the consolidation and reinforcement of the Direction de la P rotection Civile (DPC) and the existing crisis management units ( Com ité Communaux de Protection Civile CPC; Cellule de crise ) under the Emergency Bridge Reconstruction and Vulnerability Reduction Project (PROReV – P114292) and the Disaster Risk Management & Reconstruction Project (DRMRP – P126346) . The “project beneficiaries, including women beneficiaries” indicator was introduced in the first AF and was added in response to World Bank corporate requirements. Revised Components 19. The Additional Financings and Restructurings over the life of the P roject include 3 : i. The Additional Financing and F irst R estructuring , dated September 2012 (H812 - 0 - HT ) : The first Additional Financing (AF) to the IIERP in the amount of SDR 23.3 million (US$35 million equivalent) was approved by the World Bank’s Executive Board of Directors on September 10 , 2012. It became effective on February 5, 2013 and its closing date was June 30, 2016. The first AF was requested by the GoH for scaling up original activities to enhance its development impact. It financed mo dified project activities in support of public sector reform (Component 1) and provided continued financing for investments in the transport and infrastructure sectors (Component 2) , such as the operation of the Truitier D ebris Processing F acility , for the b uilding structural assessment, and for the construction of the Labadie - Cap Haitian road. 3 See A nnex 6 for table of changes summary and detailed description of changes in the P roject’s a dditional f inancings . The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 11 of 66 ii. Second Restructuring , dated June 2016: The Project ’s second restructuring (Level 2 ) in June 2016 extend ed the Grant’s closing date by six months, from June 30, 2016 to December 31, 201 6. The extension was requested to allow for th e completion of remaining activities under Component s 1 and 2 (small custom building and Labadie - Cap Haitian road) which ha d suffered some delays due to both a challenging political and gove rnance environment and technical issues . iii. Second Additional Financing and Third Restructuring , dated October 2016 (D136 - 0 - HT) : The World Bank approved a second Additional Financing in the amount of SDR 2.0 million (US$2.8 million equivalent) on October 28 , 2016 to fill a financing gap under Component 1 and a Restructuring to reallocate funds between Component 1 and Component 2 and to extend the Grant’s closing date by an additional year, from December 31, 2016 to December 31, 2017. The Additional Financing and Restructuring became effective on March 17, 2017 . iv. Fourth Restructuring , dated December 2017 : The project was restructured in December 2017 to allow for the completion of activities critical to the implementation of the MEF’s Public Financial Manageme nt Reform Action Plan. The R estructuring consisted of : (i) a six - month extension of the closing date from December 31, 2017 to June 30, 2018; and (ii) a reallocation of SDR 855,000 (US$1.2 million equivalent) from Component 1 to Component 3 of the first Additional Grant (H812 - 0 - HT) to cover both operational costs and a financing gap under Component 3, caused by a significant depreciation of the SDR allocation. Other Changes 20. The project’s closing date was extended four times for a cumulative total of 60 months . 21. The result framework for the intermediate outcomes w as revised through the first and the third Restructuring s to reflect the increased scope and improved impact of the project activities. Some new interme diate outcome indicators were added, and/or some original indicators were dropped to more accurate ly reflect project activities. D etails are provided in Annex 8. Rationale for Changes and T heir Implication on the Original Theory of Change 22. The project was designed to be flexible , and therefore , it allowed for the scaling up original activities or adapting them to continued emergencies without affecting the Theory of Change . 4 The Project was designed under a framework approach around three components with a positive list of pre - identified activities to allow for maximum flexibility and accommodate changes on the ground immediately following the emergency and throughout the Project’s lifetime. The minor change to the PDO under the first AF reflects the stabi lization of the emergency context two years after the earthquake. 23. From early recovery activities, the P roject moved progressively toward more sustainable development , as anticipated in its initial design. The initial activities financed by the Project Preparation Advance (PPA) 5 focused on 5 The Project Preparation Advance (PPA) was approved early February 2010 in the amount of US$15 million and supported the The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 12 of 66 equipment and supply for first necessity recovery . A s a result, the initial Grant financed implementation of early activities for PDO achievement in a n uncertain context . The A dditio nal F inancing could then take stock of the progress achieved and implement innovative programs focused on a deeper reform and longer - term investment for economic development. 24. Although the scope was expanded to address the country’s immediate needs and broader infrastructure and institutional development, the successive natural disasters challenged the achievement of this shift in objective. Reconstruction was prioritized over long - term development for several years in the aftermath of the earthquake, an d consequently other challenges arose . Tropical Storm Isaac (August 2012), Hurricane Sandy (October 2012) and Hurricanes Matthew (October 2016), Irma and Maria (September 2017) all affected Project activities, requiring redesigns in some instances and the temporary suspension of activities in others, resulting in implementation delays and several extensions. In addition, key activities implemented under Component 1 faced substantial disruption particularly during the last three years of the P roject’s life due to lack of good governance in a persistently challenging political environment. II. OUTCOME A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating Relevance Rating: High 25. T he PDO, including both early and longer term sustainable efforts, remained highly relevant and contributed to the Project’s relevance in the World Bank Group’s Haiti Country Partnership Framework (CPF – Report No.98132) for FY2016 - 2019 6 . At completion , the P roject demonstrated key responses to bottlenecks for inclusive and sustainable growth highlighted in the 2015 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD – Report No. 99566). The P roject’s design and PDO addressed the shift from reconstruction to longer term develo pment and the GoH’s fundamental institutional and technical weaknesses. The CPF through its three strategic pillars – (i) Transparency and Accountability; (ii) Reducing Haiti’s Vulnerability to Disasters; and (iii) Increasing Haiti’s Resilience – and the S CD both target the need for sustainability and effectiveness of public programs, the improvement of governance through accountable and effective Haitian institutions , and an increase in resilience and reduction in vulnerability. 26. Outcomes and Outputs financed by Component 1 were aligned with the CPF’s cross - cutting theme “Governance, Accountability and Sustainability”, particularly to Objective 10 “Improve Transparency and Accountability in Public Financial Management”. The infrastructure - related activities under Component 2 contributed to Area of Focus 1 of the CPF ’s Objective 1 “Contribute to Enhancing Income Opportunity,” through the creation of jobs and the improvement of infrastructure reliability in facilitating mobility of goods and people, private sector growth and access to opportunities. The long - term planning activities under Component 3 contribute d to the Area of Focus 3 “resilience” and the cross - cutting Objective 11 “Improve Capacity for Sustainable Basic Service Delivery”. Obj ectives to improve resilience are addressed in the corresponding Objective 8: “Strengthen Natural Disasters preparedness” and Objective 9: Government in providing immediate technical and financial assistance to some of the most vulnerable populations (see paragrap h 28 for mo re details). 6 The Haiti Country Partnership Strategy (Report no. 98132 - HT) was discussed by the Board of Executive Directors on September 29, 2015 . The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 13 of 66 “Improve Disaster Prevention and Strengthen Climate Resilience” through development of data, analytical tools, policy options, financial models, and institutional capacity building . This was also identified in the CPF as a key cross - cutting objective to underpin sector policies based on sustainable models for service delivery. B . ACHIEV E MENTS OF PDOs (EFFICACY) Assessment of Achievements of Each Objective/Outcome 27. The PDO is assessed against the targets confirm ed in the latest restructuring from December 2017 (See Annex 1 and 8). No split rating was applied to the efficacy assessment due to the removal of the word “early” f rom the PDO since this change and, overall, the addit ional financing s and restructurings expanded the scope of the P roject ( see paragraph s 1 9 and 2 1 ). Figure 2 . Project timeline, milestones and main activities Efficacy Rating: Substantial Support the Recipient in its sustainable recovery efforts from the effects of the Emergency 28. The P roject almost fully achieved the objectives of supporting the Recipient to (i) quickly (early) and sustainably recover from the effects of the Emergency through (ii) rehabilitating the capacities of its key institutions (Components 1 and 3) and infrastructure (Component 2 and 3) following the January 2010 earthquake. 29. The Project P reparation A dvan ce (PPA) approved in early February 2010 (Figure 3) supported the Government in providing immediate technical and financial assistance to some of the most vulnerable populations. The PPA financed 50,000 solar power lanterns dispensed in the four main citie s affected by the earthquake (Port - au - Prince, Delmas, Jacmel The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 14 of 66 and Léogâne). Nutrition portions were provided to 50,000 children under 5 years of age ( In termediate Outcome Indicator #1) and to 15,000 pregnant women. The P roject’s implementation arrangements through PIUs guaranteed by a World B ank - executed PPA on behalf of the R ecipient and supported by a fiduciary agent allowed for responsiveness, flexibility, and the achievement of concrete results, despite the humanitari an crises ( PDO indicator #4 and Intermediate Outcome Indicator #20 ) . PDO (i) support the Recipient in its sustainable recovery efforts from the effects of the Emergency, through selected interventions aiming at contributing to rebuilding key institution s 30. The P roject largely achieved the objective of supporting the GoH in rebuilding key institutions following the Emergency , based on the evidence below. 31. PDO indicator #1: “MEF restored internal control and audit, and the a bility to process payroll” targeting the restoration of the main economic management functions of the MEF was achieved. 32. Prefabricated units (temporary offices) were provided to the General Directorate of Taxes (DGI), Budget Administration (DGB) and the Treasu ry and Economic Study Department (DEE) and 262 fully equipped work stations with computers, communication equipment, power generators (in absence of Electricity of Haiti (EDH)) were put in place, resulting in capacity restoration of key entities of the Min ist ry of F inance (budget preparation, taxes collection; payroll and salary payments; external and internal controls) (Intermediate Outcome Indicator #6). In February 2010, three weeks after the earthquake, the General Directorate of Taxes was progressively recovering its capacity to collect revenue and in consequence between January and March 2010 revenue collection increased from 25 percent to almost 50 percent of the pre - earthquake targets and increased steadily in the following years (Figure 4). Figure 3 . Tax and Customs receipts 2010 - 2017 (HTG millions – source: TOFE) 33. The Project has also contributed to sustain the capacity for the S tate to collect taxes and customs revenues, with the reconstruction and operationalization of a new anti - seismic customs office (Intermediate Outcome Indicator Number 8). Slight design modifications delayed its opening to the public (see efficiency section ). - 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 Tax & Customs receipts 2010 - 2017 (HTG millions - source: TOFE) The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 15 of 66 34. The capacity to process public servant’s salaries was fully restored and the registry of civil servants was updated less than six months after the event (Intermediate Outcome Indicator #5). The ability to process salary payments to civil servants was critical to ensure consistent recovery efforts. The Treasury’s archives were salvaged from the buildings that collapsed in the earthquake and the P roject financed the reorganization and filing of the archives by an archivist. A total of 15 accounting posts ( postes comptables ) (against the four as initially targeted) were established and operationalized to control budget expenditures in line ministries (Intermediate Outcome Indicator #2) . 35. With the scaled - up Component 1 ( First and Second AFs ), the Project effectively supported the GoH to establish and operationalize the institutional framework to properly manage envisioned Public Financial Management (PFM) reform activities and enhance capacities of the MEF’s entities . With the PFM Reforms Committee in plac e and operational since the last quarter of 2014, the GoH is now better equipped to steer and coordinate ongoing reform activities. However, despite the capacity building delivered to the Court of Accounts, the Court remained jammed by its constitutional m andate of "ex - ante" audit of public contracts (Intermediate Outcome Indicator # 4) . Although some of the targets were not reached, progress was made with the decrease in number of months elapsed between the end of a fiscal year and actual submission of th e consolidated government general accounts for external audit to CSCCA (Intermediate Outcome Indicator #3) . Whereas the P roject has successfully contributed to support the Government, especially MEF, to recover from the emergency, the achievements regardin g the reforms and expected changes to the legal framework and to the coordination and monitoring mechanisms with the U nite d’ E tude et de P rogrammation (UEP) are less tangible (In termediate Outcome Indicators # 3 ; 4 and 7 ) . The Government has not yet completed the implementation of ambitious but necessary reforms to the legal framework that would eventually allow the Court to better perform its control functions. 36. Finally, the P roject fully achieved its PDO I ndicator #3 as it has influenced the reconstruction planning process t h rough enhanced capacities key entities such as Inter - Ministerial Committee for Territorial Planning ( CIAT) and MTPTC and its technical directorates ( Building Technical Evaluation Unit ( BTEB ) and U rban and Rural Equipment Maintenance Unit ( SEEUR ) ). 37. The P roject supported the MTPTC in the establishment of a Building Technical Evaluation Unit (BTEB) that managed the rapid assessment process of affected buildings and houses . With more than 1.5 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in camps the identification of safe houses and buildings became an immediate priority. The Project financed the training of engineers and building evaluators under the first phase of the BTEB. By May 2010, the BTEB operating under the MTPTC had rapidly increased its capacity to 150 engineers divided into 10 field units, performing 1500 to 2000 daily assessments, resulting in a total 92,000 buildings assessed by the BTEB. The training developed and delivered under the Project by experts from UNOPS, paired with the ownership of MTPTC and leadership of BTEB was effective and allowed throughout to conduct over 430,000 building assessments (Intermediate Outcome Indicators #14 and #15). Under the firs t AF, the activities of the BTEB were scaled - up, bolstering the MTPTC’s capacity to handle the recovery and reconstruction process, and to promote the diffusion of construction best practices, including para - seismic standards at the national level. A regio nal BTEB office was opened in the Nord Department (highly exposed to seismic risk) and the Project also financed the construct bus (a mobile training center), activities comprised of itinerant experts’ team that delivered training for more than 16 , 000 maso ns all over the country (Intermediate Outcome Indicator #16) . Technical guidelines such as a Repair Guide for Small Buildings, a Retrofit Guide for Small Buildings, and a Manual for Seismic Resistant Construction of Small Buildings, were successfully devel oped by MTPTC. Key strategic documents regarding seismic resistant technical guidelines for construction were developed along with training and have informed the neighborhoods reconstruction activities of the Government and its technical and financial part ners (Intermediate Outcome Indicator #17) . The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 16 of 66 38. With the support of the P roject, CIAT, created only nine months before the earthquake, became one of the major actor of the reconstruction process. CIAT undertook various analytical studies that influenced the re construction process and informed the key decisions for prioritizing the investments under this Project as well as other World Bank - and donor - financed projects. Transversal development strategies and instruments were successfully developed by CIAT, includ ing key strategic documents and new territorial development planning tools (Intermediate Outcome Indicator # 18) . CIAT was financed under the PPA and produced amongst other strategic pieces “Haiti Tomorrow – Centre - Artibonite Loop Territorial Strategy for Reconstruction” in 2010. The document established a vision for the G o H, its population and the technical and financial partners, articulated around the concept of a more even distribution of economic activities and financial r esources throughout the countr y . CIAT’s work leveraged funds (IDB, EU, WB, private sector, etc.) and projects to develop the Southwest, the North, as well as the Center of the country taking into account socio - economic and environmental factors, such as: (i) social and territorial ineq ualities including access to basic services; (ii) economic comparative advantage of the different parts of the region (tourism, agricultural), and (ii) risk exposure and extreme vulnerability to natural events . The US$58 million Haiti Center and Artibonite Regional Development Project (P133352) was approved by the World Bank’s Board of Directors in 2013 , including a grant from the Climate Investment Funds. With the support of the P roject which provided qualified staffing, experts and TA, a multi - sectoral ap proach was developed with relevant actors looking at needs and opportunities in key cross - sectors (institutional framework, transport infrastructure, provision of basic services, public services, environmental management, economic potential, urban manageme nt/planning) (Intermediate Outcome Indicator #19). PDO (ii) support the Recipient in its sustainable recovery efforts from the effects of the Emergency, through selected interventions aiming at contributing to rebuilding key infrastructure 39. The P roject also largely achieved the objective of suppor ting the GoH in rebuilding key infrastructures following the e mergency , based on the evidence below. 40. PDO indicator #2: M ore than 1,100, 000 people benefited directly from repaired infrastructure exceeding the target . 41. The Project contributed to early restoration of the main road network connecting Port - au - Prince to the four Departments of the South P eninsula . Following the earthquake, National Road #2 (RN2) was impassable which led to people living near the e picenter of the earthquake without communication and accessibility to Port - au - Prince and complicating access to the National Road #4 (RN4), the main road linking Port - au - Prince with the city Jacmel which was almost destroyed by the earthquake (see Annex 7) and remained blocked several days after the earthquake. The Project had a phased approach on this: it financed the removal of 25,000m3 of debris within the first four months and focused on stabilizing slopes after rain showers. It also immediately finance d the full technical studies so that after that first phase the GoH was able to prioritize more than 118 interventions w ith due attention paid to sustainability as well as social and environmental aspects to ensure the stabilization of 100 km of road segments and use the credit to finance a “critical spot intervention program” under the Project (Intermediate Outcome Indicator s #9 , #10 and #13) . 42. The Project also financed the establishment and operation of the Truitier Debris Processing Facility, a first and unique site for debris reduction and storage with international management standards. The World Bank was a key member of the Debris Management Task Force formed by the GoH and composed of its line minis tries, its technical and financial partners, and NGOs. The facility processed over 1.3 millionm3 of rubble during the 2010 - 2014 period. It provided formal jobs and improved the dire conditions of a previously mismanaged and uncontrolled open dumpsite becau se the The World Bank Infrastructure & Institutions Emergency Recovery (P120895) Page 17 of 66 facility was built within the footprint of the dumpsite (Truitier landfill). The operator of the facility hired some of the population living in the area to work on the facility perimeter, provided health, hygiene and safety equipment and trainings, and technical assistance to the Services Métropolitains de Collecte des Résidus Solides (SMCRS, attached to MTPTC and Ministry of Interior) in char ge of the operation of the landfill. The operator, beyond the perimeter of the debris facility, helped SMCRS organize the landfill, maintain a road circuit within the landfill (using the debris), instruct the different stakeholders using the landfill (for compost, hospital wastes, sludge, etc.), and stop the fires (Intermediate Outcome Indicator #12). This activity was critical because clearing the debris off the streets and off the sites was the first step to any reconstruction activity. It was also instru mental to the entire reconstruction process because without this facility, no donor could have continued financing other debris clearing, demolition or transport activity. 43. The P roject helped clean t he drainage system before the rainy season. As the 2010 r ainy season (April - May) and hurricane season (July - November) loomed , the cleaning of canals was a priority to prevent major flooding downtown where 22,000 people were at risk. The Project financed the extraction of over 110,000m3 of waste and debris materi al in total, from five of the primary canals identified by the GoH (the other canals were covered by other donors). The contracts were signed less than four months after the earthquake and the works completed in time before the heavy rains. T housands of pe ople were at risk in p art because many displaced househ