Rapport sur l'achèvement et les résultats de la mise en œuvre : Projet de reconstruction des quartiers de Port-au-Prince (PREKAD)

i Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00004162 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (TF-99644) ON A GRANT FROM THE HAITI RECONSTRUCTION FUND IN THE AMOUNT OF US$65 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI FOR A PORT-AU-PRINCE NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (PREKAD) October 31, 2017 Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice Latin America and the Caribbean Region Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized ii CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Effective Exchange Rate: www.oanda.com) Currency Unit=Haitian Gourdes (HTG) US$ 1.00 = HTG 39.47 (December 31, 2011) US$ 1.00 = HTG 65.72 (December 31, 2016) HTG 1.00 = US$ 0.015 (December 31, 2016) FISCAL YEAR October 1 – September 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AF Additional Financing AGETIP Agence d’Exécution de Travaux d’Int érêt Public BMPAD Bureau of Monetization of Development Aid Programs (Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d’Aide au Développement) BSA Structural Building Assessment CASEC Communal Section Boards (Conseils d’Administration de la Section Communale) CDD Community-driven development CECI Centre d’Etude et de Coopération Internationale - MDOD CHF Cooperative Housing Foundation currently GC - MDOD CIAT Inter-Ministerial Committee for Territorial Planning CIH Housing Commission COI Cost of Illness COPRODEP Project Development Council (Conseil de Projet de Développement Participatif) CRC Community Reconstruction Center (Centre d’Appui à la Reconstruction – CAR) DAE Directorate of Analysis and Evaluation of the BMPAD DRM Disaster Risk Management EPPLS Public Enterprise for Social Housing – Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (Entreprise Publique pour le Logement Social) ERL Emergency Recovery Loan ERR Economic Rate of Return ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework GC Global Communities previously CHF - MDOD GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery GOH Government of Haiti HAPNRD Haiti Action Plan for National Recovery and Development HH Habitat for Humanity - MDOD HNIS Housing and Neighborhoods Information Systems HRF Haiti Reconstruction Fund IHRC Interim Haiti Recovery Commission IIERP Institution and Infrastructure Emergency Reconstruction Project IOM International Organization for Migration - MDOD J/P HRO Jenkins/Penn Haiti Relief Organization- MDOD JSDF Japan Social Development Fund MAST Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail) MDE Ministry of Environment (Ministère de l’Environnement) MDOD Service Providers or Project Management Contractor (Maître d’Ouvrage Délégué) MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances) iii MICT Ministry of Interior and Local Authorities (Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales) MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission for Haiti MIS Management Information System MPCE Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération Externe) MTPTC Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications (Ministère des Travaux Publics Transports et Communication) NDC Neighborhood Development Council NPV Net Present Value NRHRF Neighborhood Return and Housing Reconstruction Framework OFDA Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance OM Operational manual OPM Office of the Prime Minister ORAF Operation risk assessment framework PADF Pan American Development Foundation - MDOD PCU Project Coordination Unit of the BMPAD PDNA Post-Disaster Needs Assessment PMC Project Management Contractor or MDOD in French PREKAD Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project (Projet de reconstruction des quartiers défavorisés de l’aire métropolitaine de Port -au-Prince) PRODEP Rural Community Driven Development Project PRODEPUR Urban Community Driven Development Project with three declinations: Initial; Habitat; and AF RAP Resettlement Action Plans RPF Resettlement Policy Framework RSCG Rental Support Cash Grant programs SA Special Account SBA Structural Building Assessment SS Single Source UCLBP Building Unit for Public Housing and Buildings - Office of the Prime Minister (Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics) UN-HABITAT United Nations Human Settlements Program US United States USAID United States Agency for International Development VSL Value of Statistical Life WAVES Wealth Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services YLD Year-Lived with Disability (part of the global burden of disease metric) Rating MS Moderately Satisfactory MU Moderately Unsatisfactory NR Not Reported S Satisfactory U Unsatisfactory Senior Global Practice Director: Ede Ijjasz - Vasquez Practice Manager: Ming Zhang Task Team Leader at ICR: Jonas Ingemann Parby ICR Team Leader: Roland Alexander Bradshaw iv HAITI Port - au - Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project CONTENTS Content Data Sheet A. Basi c Information ………………………………………………………………… ……….. vi B. Key Dates ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ i C. Ratings Summary ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... i D. Sector and Theme Codes ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ ii E. Bank Staff ................................ ................................ ................................ .............................. iii F. Results Framework Analysis ................................ ................................ ................................ . iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ................................ ................................ ................ vi H. Restructuring (if any) ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ vi I. Disbursement Profile ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ vii 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................ ........................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ................................ ........................... 6 3. Assessment of Outcomes ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 10 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ................................ ................................ ..... 14 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ................................ ................................ .. 16 6. Lessons Learned ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 18 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors ........................... 20 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ................................ ................................ ...................... 21 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................ ................................ .............................. 22 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................ ................................ ............. 28 Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ................... 31 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ................................ ................................ ....................... 33 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................ ............................... 34 Annex 7. Summary of Recipient's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ................................ . 35 Annex 8. List of Supporting Documents ................................ ................................ ................... 41 Annex 9: Exogenous and Endogenous Factors that Affected PREKAD Implementation ........ 42 Annex 10 Implementation Arrangements ................................ ................................ ................. 45 MAP ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 49 i A. Basic Information Country: Haiti Project Name: Port au Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project ID: P125805 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-99644 ICR Date: 03/21/2017 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: ERL Grantee: Government of Haiti Original Total Commitment: US$ 65.00M Disbursed Amount: US$ 64.87M Revised Amount: US$ 65.00M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: BMPAD Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: Effectiveness: 07/28/2011 Appraisal: 04/04/2011 Restructuring(s): 10/11/2012 02/12/2015 05/20/2016 Approval: 04/04/2011 Mid-term Review: 07/15/2013 06/30/2014 Closing: 06/30/2015 12/31/2016 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Grantee Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory ii C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA): None DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Major Sector/Sector Public Administration Other Public Administration 11 11 Social Protection Social Protection 24 24 Transportation Roads and highways 10 10 Water, Sanitation and Waste Management Other Water Supply, Sanitation and Waste Management 10 10 Industry, Trade and Services Housing Construction 45 45 Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme Finance Finance for Development 4 4 Disaster Risk Finance 4 4 Urban and Rural Development Disaster Risk Management 4 4 Disaster Preparedness 4 4 Disaster Response and Recovery 4 4 Disaster Risk Reduction 4 4 Rural Development 2 2 Land Administration and Management 2 2 Urban Development 60 60 iii Services and Housing for the Poor 60 60 Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 23 23 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Jorge Familiar Calderon Pamela Cox Country Director: Anabela Abreu Alexandre Abrantes Practice Manager: Ming Zhang Guang Zhe Chen Task Team Leader: Jonas Ingemann Parby Sylvie Debomy Co-Task Team Leader: Ali Alwahti ICR Team Leader: Roland Alexander Bradshaw ICR Primary Author: Fadi M. Doumani F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives ( from Project Appraisal Document ) To help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and improving basic community service infrastructure. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) To help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and/or return to improved housing conditions and improving basic community service infrastructure. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values 1 st Restructuring Formally Revised Target Values 2 nd Restructuring Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Indicator 1: Number of displaced households who have returned to neighborhoods upon completion of housing repair and reconstruction works and/or receiving return suppor t Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 12,000 16,000 16,000 16,099 Date achieved 31 - Jul - 2011 30 - Jun - 2015 11 - Oct - 2012 12 - Feb - 2015 31 - Dec - 2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded target by 1 % The result of this indicator is the sum of intermediate indicators 1, 2 and 8 (see below) Indicator 2: Number of households benefitting from community - wide upgrading Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 42,000 42,000 42,000 75,035 Date achieved 31 - Jul - 2011 30 - Jun - 2015 11 - Oct - 2012 12 - Feb - 2015 31 - Dec - 2016 Comments (incl. % Exceeded target by 79% iv Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values 1 st Restructuring Formally Revised Target Values 2 nd Restructuring Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years achievement) Indicator 3: Direct project beneficiaries Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 210,000 210,000 210,000 348,163 Date achieved 31 - Jul - 2011 30 - Jun - 2015 11 - Oct - 2012 12 - Feb - 2015 31 - Dec - 2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Core Supplemental Indicator . E xceeded target by 66 % Indicator 4: Direct project Female beneficiaries Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 105,000 105,000 105,000 182,089 Date achieved 31 - Jul - 2011 30 - Jun - 2015 11 - Oct - 2012 12 - Feb - 2015 31 - Dec - 2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Core Supplemental Indicator . E xceeded target by 73 % Note: Indicator targets were not changed during the 3 rd Restructuring. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values 1 st Restructuring Formally Revised Target Values 2 nd Restructuring Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Indicator 1: Percentage volume (m 3 ) of debris cleared in neighborhoods Value (quantitative/ qualitative) 0 TBD TBD 1,154 2,405 Date achieved 31 - Jul - 2011 30 - Jun - 2015 11 - Oct - 2012 12 - Feb - 2015 31 - Dec - 2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) T arget exceeded by 1 08% T arget to be determined as a % of contracted agreement of volume removed from total volume . However, o nly the volume removed by contractors is reported . Indicator 2 : Number of housing units re paired compliant with standards Value (quantitative/ qualitative) 0 8,300 3,000 1,162 1,134 Date achieved 31 - Jul - 2011 30 - Jun - 2015 11 - Oct - 2012 12 - Feb - 2015 31 - Dec - 2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved 98 % of target. Indicator 3 : Number of houses re built compliant with standards Value (quantitative/ qualitative) 0 3,700 1,000 938 944 Date achieved 31 - Jul - 2011 30 - Jun - 2015 11 - Oct - 2012 12 - Feb - 2015 31 - Dec - 2016 Comments Exceeded target . v Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values 1 st Restructuring Formally Revised Target Values 2 nd Restructuring Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years (incl. % achievement) Indicator 4 : CRCs are established, fully staffed and effective Value (quantitative/ qualitative) 0 4 4 4 4 Date achieved 31 - Jul - 2011 30 - Jun - 2015 11 - Oct - 2012 12 - Feb - 2015 31 - Dec - 2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved target. Indicator 5 : Number of community infrastructure repair and rehabilitation contracts completed Value (quantitative/ qualitative) 0 TBD TBD 277 288 Date achieved 31 - Jul - 2011 30 - Jun - 2015 11 - Oct - 2012 12 - Feb - 2015 31 - Dec - 2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded target by 4% Indicator 6: Community urban development plan completed and approved by the Communities Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 TBD TBD 4 4 Date achieved 31 - Jul - 2011 30 - Jun - 2015 11 - Oct - 2012 12 - Feb - 2015 31 - Dec - 2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) T arget achieved. Indicator 7 : Baseline established no later than 6 months after project launch and M&E reports available annually Value (quantitative/ qualitative) 0 1 1 1 1 Date achieved 31 - Jul - 2011 30 - Jun - 2015 11 - Oct - 2012 12 - Feb - 2015 31 - Dec - 2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) T arget achieved . Indicator 8 : Number of households provided Re turn Cash Grants Value (quantitative/ qualitative) Not Applicable Not Applicable 12,000 13,900 14,021 Date achieved 31 - Jul - 2011 30 - Jun - 2015 11 - Oct - 2012 12 - Feb - 2015 31 - Dec - 2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target e xceeded . Note: Indicator targets were not changed during 3 rd Restructuring. vi G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements ( US$ millions) 1 08/13/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 03/19/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00 3 04/18/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 2.00 4 11/04/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.00 5 05/17/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 9.15 6 12/22/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 25.99 7 07/21/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 41.20 8 11/07/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 47.42 9 03/16/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 50.65 10 07/30/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 53.68 11 03/11/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 62.13 12 10/21/2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 64.46 13 05/17/2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 64.79 H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in US$ millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP 10/11/2012 Yes MS M U 4 . 98 T he project was restructured to : (i) accelerate the return of camp dwellers to safer housing conditions in neighborhoods after hurricane I saac , in particular through the introduction of Return Cash Grants for one year ; and (ii) increase the volume of financing for infrastructure versus in situ house reconstruction. US$ 2. 6 million from Component s 3 (Institutional Support and Studies) and 4 (Project M anagement) and the US$ 2 million contingencies were transferred to Component 2 (Repair and Improvement of Community Infrastructure). The PDO was amended , some key PDO level and intermediate indicator targets were updated ; a new Return Cash Grants Intermediate Indicator was introduced. 2/1 2 /2015 No MS MS 49.04 The restructuring include d : (i) a vii Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in US$ millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP reallocation of grant proceeds between categories to support the priori ti zation of investments towards more infrastructure and less housing reconstruction sub - projects ; and (ii) a 12 - month extension of the closing date from June 30, 2015 to June 30 , 2016. Intermediary indicator target values w ere updated to reflect the prioritization of investments in the housing subcomponent. 5/20 / 2016 N o MS MS 62.86 The restructuring ex tend ed the project closing date by six months to accommodate delays caused by the political situation related to the postponed presidential run - off of December 27, 2015. I. Disbursement Profile 1 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. At the end of 2009, Haiti was a fragile state trying to emerge from a stop-and-go economic dynamic interspersed by political turmoil, social unrest, high poverty levels, natural disasters and weather shocks . Haiti was one of the most disadvantaged countries in the Western Hemisphere with: (i) a GDP per capita of US$668; (ii) high levels of absolute poverty and extreme poverty (60 and 31 percent respectively in 2009); (iii) a low human development index of 0.4 ; (iv) large income inequalities, with an almost constant GINI coefficient of 0.6 between 2001 and early 2010; (v) a poor stewardship of environmental assets, illustrated by a low Environmental Performance Indicator of 40 in 2009 1 ; and (vi) a very high vulnerability to catastrophic events, e.g., flash floods and landslides, which claimed more than 5,000 lives and affected more than 1.5 million people between 2004 and 2009 (see Annex 9 for more details). 2. On January 12, 2010, Haiti was struck by a magnitude 7.3 earthquake (with the epicenter 16 kilometers away from Port-au-Prince). The disaster killed more than 220,000 people, injured 300,000 and directly affected the lives of over 2 million . This event was recorded as the worst natural disaster in the Western Hemisphere in 50 years. In addition to the staggering loss of life, the March 2010 Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) recorded severe damage in and around the capital Port-au-Prince where 65% of the country’s GDP was estimated to be generated: over 400,000 buildings were damaged, of which 115,000 entirely destroyed and 145,000 severely damaged. The total damages and losses were estimated at US$7.8 billion, equivalent to 120 percent of Haiti GDP in 2009. This catastrophic situation forced up to 1.5 million people to seek shelter in temporary and densely populated tent camps that increased the risk of epidemiological diseases. In October 2010, a cholera epidemic broke out in Port-au- Prince, killing at least 3,600 people and sickening over 170,000 by the end of 2010. Nineteen out of twenty Ministries had collapsed and the lives of 16,000 staff of various Ministries were lost. The situation was dire when Bank post-earthquake missions arrived in Haiti. Counterparts were quasi non-existent, and homeless people were roaming the rubble in very unsafe and unhygienic environments. 3. Faced with this situation, the Haitian Government, development partners and international NGOs struggled to devise an effective course of action and to sequence priorities to tackle massive response and reconstruction challenges. Some previous disasters were similarly large in scale, such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami, which ravaged Banda Aceh, Indonesia in particular in December 2004, which caused 227,000 deaths in 9 countries, and the large earthquake, which ravaged the region of Kashmir in Pakistan and northern India in 2005, which caused 87,000 deaths and massive destruction in the mountain city of Muzaffarabad Pakistan. However, reconstruction solutions used in these cases were of limited application. The greenfield solutions proposed in Aceh where the land had been wiped clean of structures could not be applied in Haiti due to the interspersion of collapsed and standing housing in dense urban areas. Similarly, the reconstruction mechanisms used in the city of Muzaffarabad Pakistan, relied on strong Government capacity, clear cadaster registries, and a financial architecture, which were not present in Haiti. Though many lessons pertaining to the link between response and reconstruction, aid architecture and coordination could be drawn from international experience, applicable 1 Yale university website: <http://epi.yale.edu/country/haiti>. 2 models for reconstruction in Haiti’s environment simply did not exist and had to be developed during the response and reconstruction effort. 1.2 Sector Context 4. The recurrent catastrophic events pre-2010 had already revealed the weaknesses of the housing sector in Haiti, especially in Port-au-Prince; these weaknesses were brought to the fore by the 2010 earthquake. Uncontrolled development driven by rural migration, as well as the lack of appropriate urban planning tools, housing policy and building codes, and suitable mechanisms for enforcement, were the main reasons for the pervasive structural vulnerability of constructions that led to the devastating effects of the earthquake. Moreover, the institutional framework governing the housing sector in Haiti was extremely fragmented and included numerous public agencies that had some sort of jurisdiction over housing and urban development: Ministry of Interior and Local Authorities (MICT); Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE); Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication (MTPTC); and Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MAST). 5. The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) - which was created at the “Towards a New Future for Haiti” international donor conference on March 31, 2010 in Santo Domingo - became the development partners’ sole official interlocutor after the earthquake. MAST was designated as the coordination agency on housing reconstruction, although it lacked the capacity and technical expertise to assume the necessary management and coordination role. MTPTC carried out the Structural Building Assessment (SBA) program, funded by the World Bank’s Global Facility for Disast er Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Office of the United States ( US) Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The objective of the SBA was to: (i) inform the population about dangerous buildings; (ii) promote the reoccupation of safe buildings and in doing so contribute to the decongestion of temporary shelter camps; and (iii) develop a platform for economic recovery. By March 16, 2011, the program had assessed structural conditions of and color-coded about 400,000 single and multi-unit residential buildings: 54 percent were assessed as green-tagged or safe to inhabit; 26 percent yellow-tagged, as repairs were needed; and 20 percent red-tagged, as the houses needed to be destroyed and rebuilt. 1.3 Recovery Strategy 6. Following the earthquake, the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) was set up as a partnership between the GOH and the international community with a view to finance post- earthquake reconstruction projects approved by the GOH/IHRC. The GOH/IHRC oversaw the implementation of GOH strategies to inform the reconstruction process. It was also tasked with making sure that international assistance was aligned with the priorities of the Haitian people and the GOH, while ensuring accountability and transparency. It was a new challenge for GOH to absorb the large aid flows and to broker political consensus to endorse these new critical policies and strategies. In October 2010, the GOH agreed to in principle but never officially endorsed the GOH/IHRC Neighborhood Return and Housing Reconstruction Framework (NRHRF). The framework explicitly identified the preferred option for the displaced people: to return to their original neighborhoods and restore, to the extent feasible, their previous livelihoods. Still, development partners and other stakeholders found in difficult to align their housing reconstruction programs with the provisions of the framework, which led partners to use their own reconstruction standards (see below). 3 1.4 Rationale for World Bank Involvement 7. The World Bank Group’s post-earthquake response was comprehensive. In total US$479 million were mobilized by the World Bank Group to support response and reconstruction from existing and new sources of funding during FY10. In the short term, the Bank placed the entire Haiti portfolio under the emergency procedures of BP/OP 8.00 to provide maximum flexibility to respond to the urgent, medium, and long-term needs resulting from the disaster . While many development partners focused on securing temporary and transitional shelters and providing essential relief services (e.g., water, food, medicine), the Bank ’s comparative advantage laid in supporting the reconstruction with a long- term view to “build back better”, integrating risk data and diagnostics, capacity building for safer construction, as well as a pragmatic approach to repairing and reconstructing neighborhoods, including public spaces and permanent housing. 8. With Funds from IDA and from various Trust Funds, working through Haitian institutions and in collaboration with partners and NGOs, the Bank financed the Structural Assessment of 400,000 buildings, developed detailed and state of the art multi-hazard mapping of the city of Port- au- Prince, carried out a full LiDAR assessment of the affected area, supported the Government in developing building codes for schools and health centers and a building guide for private housing construction, trained a core group of 80 engineers at the Ministry of Public Works who in turn trained masons, building professionals and community workers in earthquake resilient retrofitting and construction, and supported community-based neighborhood reconstruction for US$95 million to benefit over 200,000 people in neighborhoods most affected by the earthquake. 9. The Bank ’s urban reconstruction stance was anchored in the urban-focused IDA Urban Community Driven Development Project (PRODEPUR), which was under implementation and invested in community level infrastructure. After the earthquake, PRODEPUR received an immediate US$30 million Additional Financing (AF), known as PRODEPUR Habitat. PRODEPUR Habitat aimed to finance housing repair and to reconstruct and improve community infrastructure in areas affected by the disaster. A number of initiatives to help the reconstruction drive were supported in parallel: (i) a Japan Social Development Fund financed cash-for-work under PRODEPUR; (ii) GFDRR funded the SBA and the mapping of national and local disaster-prone areas; (iii) an Institutional Development Grant built IHRC capacity to make the NRHRF operational and to coordinate corresponding interactions with public and private stakeholders; (iv) a Spanish grant supported the IHRC in the preparation of a housing policy and housing subsidy framework; (v) IDA approved the US$65 million Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency Recovery Project in March 2010, which would collect and treat debris and provide temporary housing to the Ministry of Finance and relaunch basic financial functions; and (vi) IFC provided support to define a housing finance framework. 10. In 2010 the US Government provided support for urban upgrading and housing reconstruction programs to Haiti through the HRF. The World Bank agreed to serve as a partner entity for the implementation of these funds which would fund reconstruction of Port-au-Prince neighborhoods severely affected by the earthquake . The HRF funded PREKAD following a US$65 million grant (TF-99644) from OFDA and was considered PRODEPUR Habitat ’s “twin.” PREKAD was prepared during February - April 2011, was approved on schedule on May 4, 2011 and became effective on July 28, 2011. PRODEPUR Habitat and PREKAD aimed to : (i) facilitate and speed up the return of the displaced residents of the targeted districts to their communities by helping them repair and/or rebuild their homes in compliance with earthquake/hurricane-proof standards; (ii) facilitate the return of displaced 4 people to safe rental housing; and (iii) improve the basic infrastructure and services of neighborhoods by financing the construction of roads, corridors, bridges, drainage systems, street lighting, commercial spaces, and amphitheater. The twin projects operated in the Port-au-Prince neighborhoods of Delmas, Cité-Soleil, and Carrefour-Feuilles, as well as Nazon and Martissant. The twin projects were prepared and managed by the same Bank core team, used the same in- country implementation arrangements (detailed in Annex 10) and were managed by the same project coordination, the Bureau of Monetization of Development Aid Programs (BMPAD) and operated under the aegis of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). 11. At the time of PREKAD’s first years of implementation , capacity remained critically low in the country and it was paramount to utilize existing implementation arrangements and mechanisms to deliver activities and channel funds. Also, as the extreme emergency and complete chaos of the aftermath of the earthquake began to fade, it became urgent to find rapid solutions to the massive challenge of providing and caring for the 1.5 million people living in camps. Providing temporary shelter, food, water and sanitation, health and education services, new livelihoods, and protection from violence to these internally displaced persons, many of whom were traumatized, was an essential but monumental task. International solidarity was high and emergency funding was substantial, but the authorities and the international community rapidly began to understand that such a situation could not be sustained for long without unacceptable human consequences and a potential instability. A sense of strong urgency emerged to help people leave the camps to safer housing and better livelihoods. 1.5 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Original Key Indicators 12. The PREKAD Project Development Objectives (PDO) were: to help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and improving basic community service infrastructure. PREKAD had three key indicators, including a core indicator: (i) number of displaced households who have returned to neighborhoods upon completion of housing repair and reconstruction works and/or receiving return support; (ii) number of households benefitting from community-wide upgrading; and (iii) number of households benefitting from community-wide upgrading with a breakdown by gender (core indicator). 13. The main beneficiaries of PREKAD were the people affected by the earthquake in some neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, Delmas, Cité-Soleil, and Carrefour and were initially estimated at 210,000 people. 14. The project consisted of the four inter-related components as follows:  Component 1: Debris Removal and Housing Repair and Reconstruction (US$38 million). Carrying out of: (i) the removal of debris; and (ii) the safe demolition of Red-tagged Houses and Buildings, and houses considered unfit for repair. Supporting residents to: (i) the repair and/or retrofit of Yellow-tagged houses and buildings, through the hiring of local contractors under the supervision of the Project Management Contractor (MDOD); or (ii) the on-site reconstruction of Red-tagged Houses and Buildings, and houses unfit for efficient repair, through the provision of Cash Grants to Beneficiaries. Providing technical assistance to support neighborhood communities, including Neighborhood Development Councils (NDCs), in the preparation and implementation of Project activities and other associated activities.  Component 2: Community Service Infrastructure Repair, Improvement and Extension (US$20 million). Carrying out of: (i) repairs, improvement and extension 5 of basic community infrastructure, including, inter alia , roads, walkways, drainage ditches and channels, solid waste management facilities, water supply systems and sanitation facilities; and (ii) construction of Community Reconstruction Centers (CRCs) that will be established as a permanent one-stop shop for consultations and training to serve the targeted Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods.  Component 3: Institutional Capacity Support and Studies (US$5 million). Provision of technical assistance to support the GOH and the Municipalities of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.  Component 4: Project Management (US$2 million). Supporting BMPAD in the coordination of the administrative, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, financial management and procurement aspects of the Project, through the financing of incremental operating costs, goods, and consultants ’ services. 1.6 Strategic Fit 15. The PREKAD fitted the Bank and the GOH strategies as it:  Was in line with the Bank Group FY09-12 Haiti Country Assistance Strategy (CAS --48284-HT, discussed by the Board on June 2, 2009) for which promoting growth and local development through CDD was a central theme.  Was processed under the Bank OP/BP 8.0 Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies and was aligned with the guiding principles for emergency operations.  Provided support for key objectives under the GOH HAPNRD , adopted in March 2010, which identified housing as a major priority under social rebuilding. This priority included repairs as well as reconstruction of permanent homes to encourage internally displaced persons to return home. 1.7 Implementation Arrangements 16. Implementation arrangements involved several stakeholders : (i) the BMPAD was the executing agency, and was responsible for the Program administration and management, and directly managed Components 3 and 4; (ii) seven MDODs (PADF, IOM, GC, HFH, CECI, J/P HRO and DAMA Construction) implemented Components 1 and 2; (iii) the Building Unit for Public Housing and Buildings (UCLBP) under the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), which replaced the GOH/IHRC, coordinated and guided reconstruction policy, and created norms and guidelines for implementing agencies; (iv) the MTPTC provided the mandate for the components, i.e., repair and reconstruction of houses and infrastructure, approved planning and town planning plans and coordinated with the BMPAD communication officer on all aspects of the Habitat communication strategy; (v) the Port-au-Prince and Delmas Municipalities approved planning and town planning plans; (vi) the CIAT drafted terms of reference and the follow-up of studies on the Operational Planning Plans and other procedures involving urban planning and urban development issues in the Port-au-Prince urban area; and (vii) the Public Enterprise for Social Housing (EPPLS) under the MAST was involved in the management of rental stock/home ownership of social housing. In addition, a series of coordination efforts in the sectors were made, including the Round Table of the Housing group, chaired by UCLBP, and composed by several government agencies and various international organizations and donors, with the objective of coordinating and harmonizing intervention in the urban and housing sector. 1.8 Revised Project Development Objectives 6 17. The PREKAD PDO was revised during the 1 st Restructuring (level 1) in October 2012 as follows: to help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and/or return to improved housing conditions and improving basic community service infrastructure. As stated above, by end 2012, the urgency of returning people from camps to neighborhoods had sharpened, considering diminishing resources, political volatility, and increasingly difficult conditions in the camps. This urgency was compounded by the impacts of Hurricane Isaac (August 25, 2012) which further deteriorated conditions for IDPs. The sub- objective added to the original PDO aimed to speed up the return of internally displaced people to to temporarily safe houses at the request of the GOH. The PREKAD key indicators were unchanged; one intermediary indicator was replaced by another to monitor the new one-year rent grant. 1.9 Restructuring and Revised Components 18. The project was restructured three times as discussed in Section H of the Data Sheet. The targeted beneficiaries increased, while the component scope remained unchanged; however, more weight was put on the Return Cash Grants to accelerate the return of displaced people to secure homes. 1.10 Other significant changes (Not Applicable) 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 19. Soundness of background analysis. The project built on the achievements and lessons learnt at the global level from earlier Bank post-earthquake operations, as well as Urban Development and Emergency Recovery Projects and in Haiti, notably PRODEP, ERDMOP and PRODEPUR. PREKAD was developed by drawing extensively on the PRODEPUR Habitat AF. The Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL) instrument was the most appropriate, as it allowed the needed flexibility to fine tune the design based on rapid developments and changes in the aftermath of the earthquake. However, despite the reconstruction coordination efforts and technical support led by UN Habitat and actively supported by World Bank Staff and experts during project preparation and beyond, the GOH at the technical and political levels did not succeed in adopting national reconstruction policy containing standards with regard to eligibility for reconstruction support, the standard size of reconstructed houses, or a unified mechanism for the delivery of subsidies to home owners for reconstruction. In this context, each development partner (e.g., USAID) and international NGOs (e.g., Habitat for Humanity) used its own reconstruction standards. 20. The PDOs responded to the country ’s emergency and development priorities and focused on attainable outcomes, while the indicators were SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, results-based and time-bound). They were scaled up during the 1 st Restructuring. Due to a shift in strategy (see project design below) the project evolved to place more emphasis on community infrastructure and rental grants, reducing the volume of housing repairs and reconstructions. Thus, two intermediate indicators associated with house reconstruction and repair were scaled down twice and a new indicator was introduced for cash grants to monitor the movement of displaced people from camps to safer houses. 7 21. The institutional and implementation arrangements were similar to PRODEPUR. The PRODEPUR institutional set up proved its efficiency given it previous experience in managing World-Bank financed projects. 22. Assessment of project design. The project design took into account key lessons from earlier projects including international experience in Indonesia and Pakistan among others, though many of the solutions applicable in other settings were not appropriate or implementable in Haiti, due to both the terrain and physical conditions, as well as the lack of institutions as these were already challenged and had themselves been victims of the Earthquake on a large scale. Synergies between PRODEPUR Habitat and PREKAD proved instrumental in defining the PREKAD modus operandi, oversight, monitoring, safeguards, financial management, procurement, and management information systems (MIS). the original project design was appropriately ambitious in terms of housing reconstruction and repair based on what was known at the time. 23. Restructuring . However, housing reconstruction and repair was scaled down during the restructurings, first in 2012. This change reflected an evolving situation on the ground: (i) a much sharper focus on and greater urgency of moving displaced persons out of camps into safer neighborhoods starting in mid-2012 by government and partners; and (ii) the realization that a key assumption of the original government approach and project design – namely that displaced persons mostly owned property in neighborhoods to which they wished to return – was incorrect. It had become clear by 2012 that 80 percent of people who had lived in collapsed neighborhoods were renters meaning that reconstruction and rehabilitation support (a form of support that would go to the owners of the properties they rented) would not necessarily benefit them. Polling also demonstrated that their attachment to the neighborhoods where they lived at the time of the Earthquake was limited, and that their willingness/desire to move elsewhere if given the opportunity was much greater than expected. Also, experience had shown that private investment in reconstruction could be incentivized and leveraged very effectively by investing in public neighborhood infrastructure first and that the existing rental market could generate economic activity existed in pockets of the city that had not been destroyed. In response to this learning and to the objective accelerating return out of camps, the restructurings scaled down housing reconstruction targets (Intermediate indicator) and reoriented resources toward rental cash grants and enhancing community infrastructure. 24. Support by the Project to the return of camp dwellers to neighborhoods consisted of a (i) one year rental cash equivalent to US$500, and (ii) US$150 for transport and family support (transport at time of leaving the camp and support after 8 weeks of checking that the family still lived in the same house as agreed with the recipient), and support to beneficiary families provided by the NGOs/MDODs, including psychological assistance, vocational training and livelihood programs. Where possible, returnees were also connected to services financed under other Bank projects, such as the Education for All Project (P124134), which financed tuitions waivers for primary school and school feeding. 25. Government commitment . The GOH ’s commitment was clearly re-emphasized with the creation of the OPM/UCLBP in November 2011, which showed strong leadership and became the driver of the reconstruction process. GOH chose BMPAD as the primary agency to implement PREKAD as an emergency and fast disbursement project, as it was already managing other Bank projects with similar delivery mechanisms, e.g., PRODEP and PRODEPUR. 26. Assessment of risks. Project risk was correctly rated as high due to the exogenous and endogenous factors (see below and Annex 9). 8 2.2 Implementation 27. Positive factors helped implement PREKAD such as the dedication of the OPM/UCLPB and BMPAD staff, the experience of MDODs in working in very harsh conditions, and the resilience of NGOs working in insecure areas of Port-au-Prince, coupled with the various public stakeholders that saw value-addition in collaborating towards the realization of the project outputs and outcomes. The preliminary beneficiary engagement in the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan area under PRODEPUR prior to the earthquake paid off, as community structures were quickly set up (CRCs and NDCs) 28. Exogenous and endogenous factors affected PREKAD implementation during 2011- 2016 (see details in Annex 9) although corrective measures were devised for the endogenous factors. The exogenous and endogenous factors include: (i) the chaotic aftermath of the earthquake prevented the emergence of any reconstruction leadership and the formulation of a consensus reconstruction strategy, and affected the progress of reconstruction; (ii) the political turmoil and social unrest that occurred on and off during PREKAD implementation; (iii) the catastrophic hurricane punctuated the implementation period; (iv) inflationary pressures that started in 2013 increased equipment prices and delayed MDOD operations until their contracts were adjusted for inflation by BMPAD; (v) unclear urban planning policy, housing policy and land tenure that hindered reconstruction, and provided mixed signals to entities dealing with reconstruction; (vi) changing factors on the ground that underpinned the first two restructurings, notably the urgency brought by deteriorating conditions and the unsustainability of camps and a better understanding of the composition of the displaced and their status as renters and homeowners; (vii) improved BMPAD implementation capacity after the 1 st Restructuring ; (viii) significantly improved the institutional set up after the creation of OPM/UCLBP in November 2011 and the adoption of the first national housing policy; (ix) work in unsafe areas, e.g., Cité- Soleil and Carrefour-Feuilles; (x) lack of technical and financial capacity of municipalities hampered the drainage construction; and (xi) unsecured and un-hygienic camps, compounded by NGOs having to leave the country after their funding dried up. 29. The Mid-term review (MTR) of April 2014 was timely and identified actions to address issues affecting the implementation of PREKAD. BMPAD addressed the findings of the MTR and improved operational management with guidance from the Bank. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 30. M&E design. As discussed in Section 2.1 above, indicators in the Results Framework were SMART and were revised during the restructurings to reflect changes in project objectives and scope. The monitoring arrangements as described in the PAD (establishment and operation of a Management Information System (MIS), semi-annual technical audits, a mid-term review, and regular monitoring and evaluation reports) were in accordance with generally accepted practices. The M&E design could have included indicators to capture achievements in: (i) the quality and sustainability of infrastructure works; (ii) capacity building of municipalities and line ministries in implementation/supervision of works, and institutional strengthening at the national level. 31. M&E Implementation . BMPAD submitted biannual and annual reports to the Bank in a timely manner. These reports included progress achieved on all indicators and identified key 9 areas for action. Information on key project outputs and indicators was regularly collected and reported in ISRs as part of the Bank’s supervi