Rapport de fin d'exécution et de résultats - Projet de transport et de développement territorial

Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00003073 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H213-0 and IDA-H526-0 IDA) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 11.2 MILLION (US$ 16.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) AND AN ADDITIONAL FINANCING GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 7.6 MILLION (US$ 12.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI FOR A TRANSPORT AND TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT January, 2014 Sustainable Development Department Caribbean Country Management Unit Latin America and Caribbean Region Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective January 10, 2014) Currency Unit = Haitian Gourdes HT Gourdes 1.00 = US$ 0.0238 US$ 1.00 = HT Gourdes 42 FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AF AVSF BMPAD Additional Financing Agronômes et Vétérinaires Sans Frontières Agronomists and Veterinarians Without Borders Bureau de Monétisation pour l’Aide au Développement Office for the Monetization of Development Aid CARDP Center Artibonite Regional Development Project CCI/ICF Cadre Intérimaire de Coopération Interim Cooperation Framework CBO Community-based Organization CDD Community-Driven Development CECI Canadian Center for International Cooperation CIDA Canadian International Development Agency EA Environmental Assessment EMP Environmental Management Plan EU European Union FER Fonds d’Entretien Routier Road Maintenance Fund GOH Government of Haiti IDA International Development Association IADB Inter-American Development Bank IFAD International Fund for Agriculture Development M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDOD Maître D´Ouvrage Délégué Non-Government Organization in charge of project implementation MIS Management Information System MPCE Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation MTPTEC Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports , Energie et Communications Ministry of Public Works, Transport, Energie and Communications O&M Operation and Maintenance PRODEP Proje t de Développement Communautaire Participatif Community Participation Development Project PRODEPUR Community Participation Development Project in Urban Areas PRGRD Disaster Risk Management and Reconstruction Project PROREV Emergency bridge and vulnerability reduction project PRUII Infrastructure and Institutions emergency recovery project TGOH Transitional Government of Haiti TSS Transitional Support Strategy UCE Unité Technique d’Exécution Technical ExécutionUnit UNDP United Nations Development Program USAID United States Agency for International Development Vice President: Hasan A. Tuluy Country Special Envoy : Mary Barton - Dock Sector Manager: Aurelio Menendez Project Team Leader: Pierre Bonneau ICR Team Leader: Pierre Bonneau HAITI Transport and Territorial Development Proj ect CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph Table of Contents 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................ ............................. 12 1.1. Context at Appraisal ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 2 1.2. O riginal Project Development Objective (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) ....... 4 1.3. Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 4 1.4. Main Beneficiaries ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 5 1.5. Original Components (as approved) ................................ ................................ ................. 6 1.6. Revised Components ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 8 1.7. Other significant changes ................................ ................................ ................................ . 8 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation ................................ ................................ .................... 8 2.1. Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry ................................ ................................ . 8 2.2. Implementation ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 12 2.3. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization .................... 13 2.4. Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance ................................ ................................ ................. 14 2.5. Post - completion Operation/Next Phase ................................ ................................ .............. 15 3. Assessment of Outcomes ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 15 3.1. Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation ................................ ....................... 15 3.2. Achievement of Project Development Objectives ................................ .............................. 17 3.3. Efficiency ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................ 18 3.4. Justification of Overall Outcome Rating ................................ ................................ ............. 20 3.5. Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts ................................ .......................... 20 3.6. Summary Findings of Beneficiary Surveys and/or Stakeholder Workshops ...................... 21 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ................................ ................................ ...... 23 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ................................ ................................ ... 23 5.1. Bank Performance ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 23 5.2. Borrower Performance ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 25 6. Lessons Learned ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 27 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ........................ 29 A. Basic Information Country: Haiti Project Name: Haiti Transport and Territorial Development Project / P TDT Project ID: P09 5523 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA - H2130 ICR Date: 01/31/2014 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: REPUBLIC OF HAITI Original Total Commitment: SDR 11.2 M Disbursed Amount: SDR 10.7 M Revised Amount: SDR 18.8 M Disbursed Amount: SDR 18.2 M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Public Works, Transportation, Energy and Communications (MTPTEC) Co - financiers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 09/02/2005 Effectiveness: 12/13/2006 Appraisal: 02/03/2006 Restructuring(s): 12/22/2008 Approval: 04/11/2006 Mid-term Review: 07/01/2009 Closing: 06/30/2013 07/30/2013 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): No Quality of Supervision (QSA): None DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Roads and Highways 76 80 Agriculture Marketing and Trade 10 20 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Rural services and infrastructure 29 80 Trade facilitation and market access 14 20 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Hasan A. Tuluy Pamela Cox Country Director: Mary A. Barton-Dock Caroline D. Anstey Sector Manager: Aurelio Mendez Makhtar Diop Project Team Leader: Pierre Bonneau Jayme Porto-Carreiro / Nicolas Peltier-Thiberge ICR Team Leader: Pierre Bonneau ICR Primary Author: Jean-Claude Balcet F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objective ( from Project Appraisal Document ) The PDO was to lower the marketing costs for small producers in two selected ‘micro-regions’ comprising 4 to 5 communes in the Northern and South-Eastern departments of Haiti (N.B.: marketing costs are those costs incurred in the aggregate of functions involved in moving goods from producer to consumer). Specific Objectives: (i) reduce transport costs in bringing locally- produced goods to markets and productive inputs from market, (ii) reduce other marketing costs (e.g., transit losses), and (iii) ensure the sustainability of investments (transport and other basic infrastructure). Key project indicators were: (i) outputs: km of roads improved up to acceptable standards, number of spot interventions and emergency maintenance activities, km of roads receiving adequate levels of routine maintenance, amount of basic infrastructure investments financed by the project, and amount of productive investments identified through the territorial development window; (ii) outcomes: decreased transport costs, decreased travel time, decreased transit losses and employment generated; and (iii) impact: increased traffic. Revise d Project Development Objective (as approved by original approving authority) Project was restructured in 2008 and benefited from an additional financing (AF) grant in 2009. The PDO statement was not revised. Key Performance Indicators were unchanged except for one (km of roads improved up to acceptable standards from 80 km to 52 km), following coordination with EU that had accepted to finance the remainder of RN3 rehabilitation. One performance indicator was added for the new Component 4 (post natural disaster’s reconstruction of selected infrastructure). PDO and Result Indicator s Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from PAD ) Formally Revised Target Values (PAD AF) Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Project Development Objective PDO Indicator 1 : Decrease in transport costs Value 0 -25% -25% -38.5% Date achieved 02/08/2008 03/06/2006 11/04/2009 07/30/2013 Comments Achieved . The percentage is the arithmetic average between the North and the SE corridors for the decrease in the transports for goods. PDO Indicator 2 : Decrease in travel time Value 0 -30% -30% -58% Date achieved 02/08/2008 03/06/2006 11/04/2009 07/30/2013 Comments Achieved. The percentage is the arithmetic average between the North and the SE corridors for the transport of goods and passengers. The target was substantially exceeded. PDO Indicator 3 : Days per year during which roads are impractical Value >20 <5 <5 0 Date achieved 02/08/2008 03/06/2006 11/04/2009 07/30/2013 Comments Achieved . The two stretches of roads are passable year round. PDO Indicator 4 : Lower transit costs Value 0 -30% -30% >-30% Date achieved 02/08/2008 03/06/2006 11/04/2009 07/30/2013 Comments Substantially a chieved. The transit costs are highly correlated to the decrease in travel time and the improvement in the quality of transport. For perishable goods these costs are estimated to have decreased by over 30% (beneficiary survey). Component 1 : Improvement of key transport corridors (road improvement and maintenance) Component 1: Km of roads improved to acceptable standards Result indicator 1 Value 0 80 52 48.5 Date achieved 02/08/2008 03/06/2006 11/04/2009 07/30/2013 Comments 93% achieved. Fewer km were rehabilitated in the North as a positive result of coordination with EU and AFD about RN3 rehabilitation. It was agreed that the Bank would finance the rehabilitation of the road Carrefour Lamort to Barrière Battant Component 1: Result indicator 2 Km of roads receiving adequate level of maintenance Value 0 80 80 0 Date achieved 02/08/2008 03/06/2006 11/04/2009 07/30/2013 Comments Not achieved . Activit ies not completed by the project . The northern stretch received maintenance directly from MTPC . However both stretch e s are included in FER priority list of eligible road according to the FA legal covenant concerning funding for maintenance activities. Component 1: Result indicator 3 No. of spot interventions and emergency maintenance activities Value 0 5 1 1 Date achieved 02/08/2008 03/06/2006 11/04/2009 07/30/2013 Comments 100% achieved . The spot intervention completed was the ‘Pont Limite’ over the Bouhay a river between the St. Raphaël and Dondon communes. At project restructuration (end - 2008) all other spot interventions were transferred over to Component 4. Component 1: Result indicator 4 Workdays generated by road maintenance activities Value 0 832 832 0 Date achieved 02/08/2008 03/06/2006 11/04/2009 07/30/2013 Comments Not achieved . No maintenance activities were funded under TTDP . Hence, no employment was generated directly by TTDP on that front. Howeve r MTPTC road maintenance activities on northern stretch did generate employment Component 1: Result indicator 5 Increased traffic on rehabilitated roads Value 0 +20% +20% > 20% Date achieved 02/08/2008 03/06/2006 11/04/2009 07/30/2013 Comments Substantially achieved. Traffic data were collected at project closure as part of the impact study; however t he composition of the fleet using the rehabilitated stretches had chang ed dramatically which make difficult the comparison with the baseline survey (2007) Component 2 : Territorial development window Component 2: Result indicator 1 Cumulated amount of acceptable investment proposals assessed, prioritized and presented to financiers Value (US$ million) 0 5.0 5.0 4. 2 Date achieved 02/08/2008 03/06/2006 11/04/2009 07/30/2013 Comments 84 % achieved . Arithmetic average between the North and SE micro - regions. Component 2: Result indicator 2 Cumulated amount of basic infrastructure proposals financed Value (US$ million) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2. 15 Date achieved 02/08/2008 03/06/2006 11/04/2009 07/30/2013 Comments 86 % achieved . Investment proposals for only about US$2 .15 million were financed. The reason is that the cost of technical assistance (MDOD s ) exceeded th e estimated cost by about US$350,000. Since no additional funding was earmarked for Compon ent 2, it was decided to transfer the corresponding funding from Subcomponent 1.2 (subprojects) to Subcomponent 1.1 (territorial planning) to finance the MDODs’ contracts. Component 4 : Post - natural disasters’ reconstruction of selected infrastructure Component 4: Result indicator No. of spot interventions on transport infrastructure affected by natural disasters Value 0 - 15 2 6 Date achieved 11/04/2009 - 11/04/2009 07/30/2013 Comments 1 73 % achieved . Additionally, t he result was ach ieved by contracting SMEs, hence supporting local SMEs and creating employment . G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements (USD millions) 1 06/12/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.0 0 2 11/14 /2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.0 0 3 05/08/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.2 0 4 06/ 26/ 2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 5 10/08 /2007 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.89 6 03/11/2007 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00 7 06/25/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.30 8 11/25/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.72 9 04/20/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.72 10 07/29/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.42 11 09/11/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.19 12 04/29/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.9 8 13 02/25 /20 11 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.03 14 10/11/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.88 15 05/13/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.84 16 01/09/2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.86 17 09/ 04/ 2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.60 H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP 12/22/2008 Y S MS 3.44 The Additional Financing represented the Bank's response Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP to the need for hurricane - related disas ter relief. Changes : FA incorporated lessons learned at the time, added US$12.0 million funding overall , and created Component 4 with own performance indicator . If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving body) enter ratings below: Outcome Ratings Against Original PDO/Targets Moderately Satisfactory Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets Moderately Satisfactory Overall (weighted) rating Moderately Satisfactory I. Disbursement Profile 12 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1. Context at Appraisal (a) Country and Sector Background 1. General Country Background . For several decades, Haiti struggled to emerge from cycles of political instability and natural disasters that devastated its economy, weakened state institutions, exacerbated poor governance and deepened poverty. By 2003, the situation had become so pre carious that external aid dried up, the World Bank closed its office in Haiti and many other donor agencies withdrew their support. Armed opposition forces entered from the Dominican Republic to remove President Aristide from power and he left the country on February 29, 2004. Subsequently, a transitional government was formed, a United Nations peace - keeping force (MINUSTAH) was deployed to maintain stability, and the Bank reengaged in Haiti. In addition to political shocks, Haiti is consistently struck by natural disasters, with devastating effects. In Haiti, 96 percent of the population lives in areas at high risk to multiple natural hazards (landslide, flood, earthquake). In 2007 and 2008, 5 hurricanes and tropical storms struck Haiti (Noël, Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike). The magn itude 7.0 earthquake of 2010, caused over 200,000 deaths and displaced 1.5 m illion people, caused US$7.9 billion (120% of GDP) in damages and losses and US$11.3 billion in reconstruction needs. 2. Agricultural Sector Background. In 2005, before project inception, agriculture played a dominant role in the Haitian economy, contributing almost 30 percent of GDP (2002 figure) and accounting for around 50 percent of overall employment, two thirds of employment in rural areas, and three fourths of employment for the poor. Smallholder agriculture dominated the rural economy. As the major engine of growth, it had the potential to generate, in the short-to-medium term, multiplier effects for the rest of the rural economy. The major obstacle to mobilizing this potential was low rural productivity combined with a high cost of doing business. The Bank’s 2005 Agriculture and Rural Development Review stated that the competitiveness of smallholder agriculture had declined in previous decades resulting in a cycle of persistent poverty, out- migration and environmental degradation. It identified the lack of access to markets due to poor transport conditions, as well as the lack of post-harvest and market infrastructure, as major reasons for the agricultural decline. 3. Road Sector Background. At project appraisal, Haiti’s road network was in abysmal condition, causing very high transport costs and unreliable transport services. This situation was the result of years of neglect. The collapse of the road maintenance, the reduced level of investment and the adverse climatic conditions had resulted in a dramatic deterioration of road assets. According to the 2004 road inventory, only 20 percent of the 3400 km of Haitian roads was in acceptable (good and average) condition, whilst 80 percent of the network was in bad or very bad condition. The proportion of roads in acceptable condition had fallen dramatically in the decade of the 90s since it was estimated at 34 percent in 1991. About 1,100 km of roads had been taken out from the national road inventory due to their extreme levels of degradation, making them impassable part of the year. 4. Disaster Relief and Reconstruction . At the time of appraisal, the Bank had already embarked on several operations meant to address damages and disruptions caused by hurricanes and tropical storms, such asa project focused on disaster relief following the Fonds Verrette flash flood that wiped out half of the city and the Mapou flooding that claimed several thousand lives in the South East (FY2004). But the Bank had not yet systematically included this kind of support as part of project design, and no major reallocation of funds from existing operations had 13 been performed to that effect, as was done subsequently following the devastating 2010 earthquake and 2012 Sandy hurricane. (b) Rationale for Bank involvement (original project) 5. Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) . In early 2004, the Transitional Government (TGOH) led the donor community in preparing an Interim Cooperation Framework. The ICF sought renewed political and social stability, and economic growth. Its broad strategic themes were to: (i) strengthen political governance and promote national dialogue; (ii) strengthen economic governance and contribute to institutional development; (iii) promote economic recovery; and (iv) improve access to basic services. The Transport and Territorial Development Project (TTDP) reviewed by this report, was intended to contribute directly pillars (iii) and (iv) of the ICF. It was expected to create local economic opportunities by facilitating access to markets and improved livelihoods through better access to basic services such as education and health. The Project was also intended to contribute indirectly to ICF pillars (i) and (ii) regarding political and economic governance through sound and transparent management of public resources for transport infrastructure. 6. Bank’s IDA Transitional Support Strategy (TSS). In January 2005, the Bank’s Board of Directors endorsed a Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) for Haiti, which included up to US$150 million in grant commitments over a two-year period. A key aspect of the TSS was poverty alleviation through improved access of communities to basic services and infrastructure. The two- year strategy sought to restore hope by supporting: (i) basic services provision; (ii) job creation; (iii) rehabilitation of areas devastated by floods in 2004; and (iv) community initiatives in local development. The TSS was also intended to strengthen governance and institutions, improving transparency, and promoting inclusion and consensus building on development priorities. TTDP was closely linked to the TSS as regards: (i) improvement of transport corridors needed to link rural producers to markets with a focus on two ‘micro-regions’ (Sub-Component 1.1); (ii) spot interventions and maintenance to ensure all-weather accessibility on selected connecting roads (Sub-Component 1.2); and (iii) promotion of territorial development and community initiatives through a participatory planning process to determine development priorities and select local investments (Component 2: Territorial development window). 7. TTDP was approved by the Executive Directors on April 11, 2006, and became effective on December 13, 2006. The project was initially financed through a US$16 million equivalent IDA grant. It was restructured on December 8, 2008. The restructuring consisted in a reallocation of grant resources in the amount of US$7.3 million to finance reconstruction works following hurricanes and tropical storms that struck Haiti in 2007 (Noël) and 2008 (Fay, Gustav, Hannah and Ike - FGHI). A new component was added, entitled ‘Post natural disasters’ reconstruction of selected infrastructure’. (c) Rationale for Bank Involvement (additional financing) 8. The additional financing (AF) grant was approved by the Executive Directors on December 8, 2009 and became effective on January 11, 2010. The additional grant was meant to help finance the costs associated with a financing gap due to: (i) additional activities included as part of a the project restructuring processed in 2008, in response to reconstruction needs generated by the 2007 and 2008 hurricanes and tropical storms; and (ii) the cost escalation of the road rehabilitation works included in the initial project. It is worth noting that the devastating 2007/2008 storms and hurricanes, which were followed by the terrible 2010 earthquake and the 2012 Sandy hurricane, were major external events which stopped regular administrative activities and diverted the focus of most government services and agencies to short-term disaster relief and reconstruction efforts. The reason for the cost escalation was due to the realization that the 14 anticipated traffic on the National Road No. 3 (RN3) in the North justified an upgrade of standards, and, hence, more costly rehabilitation work to be undertaken by the Project. 9. At the same time, the financing strategy for RN3 was modified based on the result of close coordination between the three donors involved (IDA, AFD and EU). The AFD agreed to finance the technical studies of the Hinche - Saint Raphaël section (45 km), whereas IDA agreed to finance those of the Saint Raphaël - Carrefour la Mort section (38.7 km). Works and supervision contracts were to be financed by AFD and EU on the Hinche - Barrière Battant section (75.2 km), whereas IDA would finance the Barrière Battant - Carrefour la Mort Section (8.5 km). 1.2. Original Project Development Objective (PDO) and Key Indicators ( as approved) 10. The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to lower the marketing costs for small producers in the two selected areas (called ‘micro-regions’). The marketing costs were defined as are those costs incurred in the aggregate of functions involved in moving goods from producer to consumer. The Specific Objectives were to (i) lower transport costs in bringing locally-produced goods to market and productive inputs from market; (ii) reduce other marketing costs (e.g., transit losses); and (iii) ensure the sustainability of investments (transport and other basic infrastructure). 11. The key original project performance indicators retained, as per the PAD Results Framework, were: (i) outcome indicators: decrease in transport costs and travel time, reduction in transit losses and increase in employment; and (ii) output indicators: km of roads improved up to acceptable standards, number of spot interventions and emergency maintenance activities, km of roads receiving adequate levels of routine maintenance, amount of basic infrastructure investments financed by the project, and amount of productive investments identified through the territorial development window. 12. The original project was intended to pilot a territorial development approach in two ‘micro- regions’. The micro-regions correspond to an economically integrated territory encompassing four to five communes sharing (i) similar agro-ecological conditions and production potential; (ii) common economic interests; and (iii) common roads, marketplaces and other basic infrastructure. The two micro-regions selected according to their rural growth potential and their needs in basic infrastructure were Dondon-St Raphaël (five communes in the North department) and Thiotte- Anse à Pitre (four communes in the South-East department). In each micro-region, the project was to finance (i) key transport improvement investments expected to have a major impact on rural accessibility and become anchors to promote rural growth (Component 1); and (ii) basic infrastructure and productive investments prioritized by local stakeholders to generate rural growth, with a view to capitalize on improved transport conditions (Component 2). If successful this model was to be replicated in other micro-regions in Haiti. 1.3. Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 13. The additional financing did not involve any modification to the Project Development Objective. The result framework was updated to reflect the incorporation of Component 4 into the project design. The corresponding result indicator for Component 4 (no. of spot interventions on transport infrastructure affected by natural disasters) was added to the project results framework. Two targets were revised: (i) the target for km of roads improved up to acceptable standards, was revised downward from 82km to 52km to reflect the agreement that the UE would take responsibility for the stretch of road from Barrière Battant to St. Raphaël (30km) previously assigned to the Bank; and (ii) the target for spot interventions under Component 1 was revised downward from 5 to 1, as all spot interventions were passed on to Component 4 as part of the 15 restructuring, except one (the ‘Pont Limite’ bridge over the Bouhaya river between Dondon and St. Raphaël). 14. Table 1 below sums up the initial targets for the project PDO indicators and Component results, and the revised target that were to guide project implementation following Board approval of the additional financing. Table 1 – Initial and revised targets for PDO indicators Initial Target Revised Target PDO Indicators Decreased transport costs - 25% - 25% Decreased travel time - 30% - 30% Days per year in which the rehabilitated road is impractical <5 <5 Lower transit costs - 30% - 30% Component 1 Results Indicators Km of roads improved up to acceptable standards 80 52 Km of improved roads receiving adequate level of maintenance 80 80 No. of spot interventions and emergency maintenance activities 5 1 Workdays generated by maintenance activities (thousands) 832 832 Increased traffic +20% +20% Component 2 Results Indicators Cumulated amount of acceptable investment proposals assessed, prioritized and presented to financiers ($ million) 5.0 5.0 Cumulated amount of basic infrastructure financed ($ million) 2.5 2.5 Component 4 Results Indicators No. of spot interventions on transport infrastructure affected by natural disasters - 15 1.4. Main Beneficiaries 15. The initial TTDP project was expected to bring important benefits to the Haitian population, particularly small producers from the two selected micro-regions, which are highly dependent of the quality and reliability of the transport system to access local and regional markets: (i) the micro-region of Dondon-St. Raphaël, which covers five communes in the Northern department, connected to Cap Haïtien the second biggest city in the country (production of coffee, vegetables, beans, corn and citrus peels); and (ii) the micro-region of Thiotte-Anse à Pitre covering four communes in the South-Eastern department, and located along the border with the Dominican Republic (production of coffee, vegetable, beans, roots, cattle and charcoal); the Bank-funded CDD project (PRODEP) had a presence in this second micro-region. The most prominent criteria in reaching the decision concerning the selection of the two micro-regions were their high agriculture potential and the lack of roads and market infrastructure. Thus, improved roads and market infrastructure could make a large impact on the local economy of 16 these areas. Since these micro-regions are characterized by smallholder agriculture, it was expected that any increased growth would directly benefit many poor households. 16. The additional financing approved by the Executive Directors in response to the 2007 and 2008 hurricane seasons was meant to channel project resources to repair and reinforce selected infrastructure that were key to ensuring the continuity of the Haitian transport system. The intended beneficiaries were the populations living close to the spot interventions being financed under Component 4. These interventions were meant to enable them to preserve their livelihood base, and access markets and basic social services. 1.5. Original Components ( as approved) 17. Over a six-year period, the project was expected to finance the following activities: 18. Component 1: Improvement of key transport corridors (US$11.25 million). The component’s objective was to improve the transport conditions in a sustainable manner in the two micro-regions, through selected interventions on roads and critical points that are essential to the rural economy. The project was to finance the cost of the works, related technical and economic studies and implementation supervision. 19. Sub-Component 1.1: Road improvement and spot interventions (US$10.75 million). The project was to finance the improvement of key transport infrastructure in each of the selected micro-regions. Two transport corridors of about 50km each, constituting the ‘backbone’ of the transport system in each micro region, were identified in consultation with local stakeholders during project preparation. For each of these transport corridors, the project was to first finance detailed feasibility and engineering studies to determine the most appropriate technology for the road rehabilitation works. The scope of these studies was to also include selected spot interventions to restore or preserve access (e.g., bridges, low water crossings, consolidation of slopes). These studies were to be contracted by the Project Coordination and Implementation Unit (UCE) at the Ministry of Public Works (MTPTEC). Once the studies had helped determine the appropriate technical solutions for road improvement and spot interventions, the Project would finance the cost of the related works and supervision. It was expected that large road improvement works would be executed by mid-to-large size firms while spot interventions would be contracted out to SMEs, or even to micro-enterprises such as those expected to be used for routine maintenance (see Sub-Component 1.2). Component 1 was to be implemented in close coordination with the other donors. 20. The two transport corridors selected were: a) Corridor no. 1: Carrefour Lamort - St. Raphaël (38.8 km): This corridor comprised a segment of National Road no. 3 (RN3) connecting a number of important local markets (e.g., Grand-Rivière, Dondon, Saint Raphaël) to Cap-Haïtien; a number of spot interventions had been identified on this corridor; and b) Corridor No. 2: Forêt des Pins – Anse à Pitre (60 km): This corridor comprised a segment of the Departmental Road no. 102 (RD102) connecting the Thiotte-Anse à Pitre micro-region to Port-au-Prince and to an important market located on the Dominican border (Pedernales); on the RD102 segment from Thiotte to Forêt des Pins (20 km), the preliminary technical assessment performed during project preparation had recommended only periodic maintenance works. 21. Sub-Component 1.2: Emergency and routine road maintenance (US$0.5 million). The total collapse of the road maintenance system in the early 1990s constituted one of the most 17 critical issues facing road investments in Haiti. Reforms engaged by the Government as well as the support of donor community had allowed some limited progress in this area, the most notable being making functional and operational the Road Maintenance Fund (FER) financed by earmarked taxes (essentially a gasoline tax) in 2003, which was not active . The project intended to support the reform of the Haitian road management system initiated with FER’s creation. Specifically, it was intended to ensure that the list of priority roads whose maintenance was FER’s responsibility was duly established and published on a monthly basis, and that FER would have corresponding access to all proceeds earmarked for maintenance of these roads. Sub- Component 1.2’s funding was earmarked only to support road maintenance activities of the road investments to be financed by the Project. Rather FER was to be strengthened through the provision of logistical support and training under Component 3 (see below). 22. Component 2: Territorial development window (US$3.0 million). The improvement of the key transport corridors identified in the micro-regions was meant to become an anchor around which rural growth initiatives would be developed. In order to facilitate the emergence of such growth initiatives, a ‘territorial development approach’ was to be pioneered in each micro-region. This approach aimed at putting in place a process to prioritize and assess growth initiatives (Sub- component 2.1) that could be financed either by the project (Sub- component 2.2) or by other donors, or by the Government. 23. Sub-component 2.1: Territorial planning process (US$0.5 million). This sub- component aimed to support the territorial planning process leading to the identification of priority investments at the micro-region’s level, including two stages: (i) a broad participatory consultation in which all local and regional stakeholders were to present investment proposals consistent with the project development objective; and (ii) a prioritization exercise managed at the level of each micro-region and performed by an ad hoc territorial planning committee (the ‘Consultation Table-CT’) in which stakeholders would decide and endorse the territorial development strategy proposed for the region and the list of related investments. The CT is a forum regrouping all stakeholders involved in planning at regional level, i.e., representatives of the central government, the local governments (Communes and Communal Sections - CASECs and ASECs), the civil society and the private sector. The municipal services convene and chair the CT, and act as its secretariat jointly. This CT process was to be managed by a facilitator hired and financed under the sub-component. The role of the facilitator was to organize the broad participatory consultation process, provide technical assistance to the communes and ensure the implementation of the prioritized sub-projects. This last responsibility included assessing the technical, economic and financial feasibility of subprojects, contracting the operators that would implement the related works, and supervising and monitoring implementation and sustainability of sub-projects financed under this component. 24. Sub-component 2.2: Complementary sub-projects ($2.5 million). The priority investments (‘sub-projects’) that would emerge from the above territorial planning process were to be financed up to a total of $2.5 million for the two micro-regions. The facilitator recruited under the previous sub-component, was to provide the required assistance to complete the sub- project feasibility studies. The cost of eligible investments were to be between $20,000 and $100,000, that is, larger than the cost of investments eligible for funding under CDD projects such as the Bank-funded PRODEP (typically under $20,000). It was envisaged that a few projects costing over $100,000 would be made eligible for project funding on an exceptional basis, subject to prior approval by the Bank. In implementing the priority investments, the Project was expected to work closely with the other donors so as to secure additional funding, including IADB, the European Union, UNDP (Capacity 21 and/or UNCDF) and the Canadian, German and Spanish cooperations, as they had acquired experience in territorial planning in Haiti and/or were active in the two micro-regions. 18 25. Component 3: Project administration and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) (US$1.75 million). This component was to finance expenditures for project administration, including environmental management and M&E activities. Eligible expenditures included: (i) staff costs of implementing units; (ii) studies and consultancies; (iii) training activities; and (iv) acquisition of goods and equipment needed for project implementation (e.g., vehicles, office equipment, computers). Administrative costs incurred by the main PCU (UCE of MTPTC), and by BMPAD and FER were to be eligible under this component. 1.6. Revised Components 26. Component 4, introduced after the 2008 restructuring, was intended to finance a list of priority reconstruction works, identified by the Haitian Ministry of Public Works, Transport, Energy and Communication (MTPTEC), with the technical assistance of IDA (see List of Component 4 reconstruction works in Annex 2). 1.7. Other significant changes 27. The initial IDA grant resources (US$16 million) were reallocated and increased as indicated in Table 2 below, based on the 2008 restructuring and subsequent approval of the Additional Financing by the Board (US$12 million): Table 2 – Initial, restructured and revised IDA grant allocations (US$ million) Component/ Sub - Component Initial allocation (2006) Restructured allocation (2008) Revised allocation (2009) Component 1 : Improvement of key transport corridors 11.20 3.75 18.66  Sub - Component 1.1: Road improvement and spot interventions 10.70 3.25 18.16  Sub - Component 1.2: Road maintenance 0.50 0.50 0.50 Component 2 : Territorial development window 3.00 3.00 3.00  Sub - Component 2.1: Territorial planning process 0.50 0.50 0.50  Sub - Component 2.2: Complementary sub - projects 2.50 2.50 2.50 Component 3 : Project administration and M&E 1.70 1.85 1.93 Component 4 : Post natural disaster’s recon s truction - 7.30 4.25 Unallocated 0.10 0.10 0.16 Total amount 16.00 16.00 28.00 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation 2.1. Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 28. Background analysis . The Bank prepared the project in a period of about eight months from September 2005 to April 2006. The preparation team focused on the institutional arrangements and the operational project implementation mechanisms included in the project manual. The social analysis was based on similar project experience and beneficiary assessments. 19 The Government carried out an environmental assessment with public consultation. The preparation team relied on the conclusions of the 2005 Bank-financed Agriculture Sector Review (ESW) and on the experience gained outside Haiti with similar projects, notably the Peru 2 nd Rural Roads Project (FY2001) for overall project design. For Component 1 the team benefited from the long-standing Bank experience regarding road rehabilitation and maintenance. For Component 2 the team capitalized on territorial planning activities that had been undertaken by other donors notably UNDP, and the French and Canadian cooperation agencies, as regards planning at communal and regional level. 29. Building on prior experience with similar projects, the project design strategy included the following features that were deemed crucial in the Haitian context: (i) multi-sector approach: to be effective the project needed to have a broad multi-sector development perspective and a corresponding proper mix of investments; (ii) territorial development strategies: given the diverse agro-ecological conditions of the micro-regions, a spatially differentiated approach was required; (iii) stakeholder’s involvement: in the absence of a decentralization framework and attendant institutions designed to reach out to beneficiaries at the grassroots, participatory planning was deemed required as a means to promote project ownership, particularly for the road works that would require regular maintenance; and (iv) initial investment as anchor to jumpstart economic growth: in the context of Haiti where transport conditions were abysmal, such an investment had to focus road rehabilitation; the intent was not to spread resources too thinly but to squarely focus on the key roads identified as the major impediment to rural growth. 30. Project objectives and indicators. The PDO to lower marketing costs for small producers was relevant to further the ICF and TSS goals. It was responsive to the country’s circumstances and development priorities at that time. PDO indicators concerning the decrease in transport cost and travel time, as well as the ‘transitability’ (days per year during which the roads are impractical), were realistic and reachable. They focused on the outcome for which the project could reasonably be held accountable given its duration, resources, and approach. The indicator related to lower transit costs (i.e., losses incurred during transport) was well-taken to estimate project impact, but, as defined, it proved too broad to be accurately measured. It should have been specified for the given types of goods and products being transported, the composition of which changed dramatically during the project duration (with more perishables being transported in particular). Since this indicator overall is highly correlated with travel time and conditions, it was possible to get a sense of the improvements brought about by the project. But it was difficult to accurately compare the pre-project and post-project situations. Similarly, the indicator concerning the increase in overall traffic, as formulated, proved difficult to assess. It should have been specified for different types of vehicles. Indeed, the indicator did not take into account the likely change in the composition of the fleet of vehicles using the rehabilitated roads. It so happened that the fleet using the rehabilitated roads, because of improved road conditions, changed so dramatically (e.g., preeminence of motorcycles that were quasi-inexistent at project inception, and replacement of trucks by smaller pick-up trucks and mini buses that were similarly quasi-inexistent at project inception) that it proved difficult to compare the baseline (2007) and end-project (2013) situations. Despite the challenges of comparing pre- and post-measurements, the qualitative data gathered in the context of the beneficiary assessment and the existing high levels of transit as well as considerably reduced travel times indicate the positive impact of the project on both cost and overall traffic. 31. Institutional arrangements. The project relied on two implementation units: (i) the Coordination and Execution Unit (UCE): this unit, located with the MTPTEC, was the primary implementation unit in charge of overall project coordination as well as the execution of Component 1; UCE had been created prior to TTDP implementation but had only operated on a limited scale at project start-up; TTDP contributed to strengthen its capacity; and (ii) PL480 20 agency (later renamed the Office for the Monetization of Development Aid-BMPAD) in charge of Component 2: this agency had been created to distribute and monetize in-kind foreign aid (US aid mostly, and thereafter the Venezuelan Petro-Caribe aid); at the time of project start-up it had taken responsibility for the Bank-financed CDD PRODEP project and had created a project management section to that effect; this section relied on other sections for financial, safeguard and M&E purposes; being newly created the project management section had limited capability at project start-up. 32. One of the main problems beyond the limited initial capacity of the implementing units, is that, as TTDP implementation unfolded, they became over-burdened by the management of several other large projects: (i) UCE came to assume responsibility for several other Bank projects, dealing with transport infrastructure reconstruction, notably following 2007/2008 hurricanes and the 2010 earthquake; and (ii) BMPAD also experienced a large increase in its workload, with the development of the Petro-Caribe program and the addition of several projects (including the Bank-financed PRODEPUR, the equivalent of PRODEP for urban areas). Like TTDP, some of these large projects, if their focus was not on emergency and disaster-relief in the first place, were given access to additional resources through the Additional Financing mechanism to assume this type of activities during their implementation. As a result, UCE’s and BMPAD’s implementation capacity became stretched as years went by, especially with regard to financial management and M&E, and their focus became diverted to a significant degree to disaster-relief and reconstruction activities with negative impact on TTDP implementation