Projet de redressement d'urgence et de gestion des catastrophes

Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR2231 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H1430 IDA-H3530) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 12.7 MILLION (US$ 19.4 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI FOR A EMERGENCY RECOVERY AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT PROJECT June 29, 2012 Sustainable Development Department Haiti Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Region Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective April 20, 2011) Currency Unit = Haitian Gourde HTG 1.00 = US$ 0.02439 US$ 1.00 = HTG 41.00001 FISCAL YEAR October 1 – September 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BMPAD Bureau of Monetization of Development Aid Programs CAS Country Assistance Strategy CCPC Communal Civil Protection Committee CDD Community Driven Approach DPC Directorate of Civil Protection DPO Development Policy Operation DRM Disaster Risk Management DRMRP Disaster Risk Management and Reconstruction Project EA Environmental Assessment EOC Emergency Operation Center ERDMP Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Project EU European Union EWS Early Warning System FGHI Hurricane Fay and Tropical Storms Gustav, Hannah and Ike FY Fiscal Year GDP Gross Domestic Product GNI Gross National Income GoH Government of Haiti ICF Interim Cooperation Framework ICR Implementation Completion and Results IDA International Development Association IDB Inter-American Development Bank ISN Interim Strategy Note ISR Implementation Status Report LCSPT Latin American and the Caribbean Procurement Team LICUS Low Income Countries Under Stress M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MICT Ministry of Interior and Territorial Collectivities MINUSTAH United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti MIS Management Information System MTR Mid-Term Review NGO Non-Governmental Organization OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance OP/BP Operational Policy / Bank Procedures PAD Project Appraisal Document PDNA Post-Disaster Needs Assessment PDO Project Development Objectives PNGRD National Disaster Risk Management Plan QAG Quality Assurance Group RF Result Framework SDR Special Drawing Rights SNGRD National Disaster Risk Management System SPGRD Permanent Secretariat for Disaster Risk Management TA Technical Annex ToR Terms of Reference TS Tropical Storm TSS Transitional Support Strategy UCP Project Coordination Unit UNDP United Nations Development Program Vice President: Hasan A. Tuluy Country Director: Alexander Abrantes Sector Manager: Anna Wellenstein Project Team Leader: Ross Gartley ICR Team Leader: Michel Matera THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Project CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 8 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 16 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 21 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 22 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 25 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 28 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 29 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 30 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 41 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 42 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 44 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................... 45 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 46 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 53 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 54 A. Basic Information Country: Haiti Project Name: Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Project ID: P090159 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA - H1430,IDA - H3530 ICR Date: 06/29/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: HAITI Original Total Commitment: XDR 8.00M Disbursed Amount: XDR 12.56M Revised Amount: XDR 12.70M Environmental Category: C Implementing Agencies: Bureau de Monetisation des Programmes d'Aide au Developpement Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC) - Ministry of Interior and Local Government Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 08/26/2004 Effectiveness: 06/01/2005 06/01/2005 Appraisal: 11/08/2004 Restructuring(s): 05/05/2009 11/02/2010 Approval: 01/06/2005 Mid - term Review: Closing: 12/31/2008 12/31/2011 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Moderately Unsatisfactory Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Satisfactory Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): No Quality of Supervision (QSA): None DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 30 30 Flood protection 10 10 Housing construction 10 10 Other social services 50 50 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Administrative and civil service reform 20 20 Natural disaster management 40 40 Participation and civic engagement 20 20 Water resource management 20 20 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Hasan A. Tuluy David de Ferranti Country Director: Michelle C. Keane Caroline D. Anstey Sector Manager: Anna Wellenstein Jose Luis Irigoyen Project Team Leader: Michel Matera Francis Ghesquiere ICR Team Leader: Michel Matera ICR Primary Author: Vica Rosario Bogaerts F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives ( from Project Appraisal Document ) The original project development objectives (PDO), as stated in the Technical Annex, were to: i) support the rehabilitation of the areas affected by the recent adverse natural disasters; ii) strengthen the country's capacity to manage natural disaster risks and better respond to emergencies resulting from adverse natural events; and, iii) reduce the vulnerability of communities through risk identification and risk mitigation activities. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) n/a (a) PDO Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Indicator 1 : Satisfactory planning and completion of a rehabilitation scheme for affected settlements in the regions of, Fonds Verrettes those affected by tropical storm Dean, and those affected by tropical storm Noel. Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 25 22 Date achieved 03/25/2005 11/02/2010 12/31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Partially achieved. Indicator 2 : Capacity established within the NDRMS to prepare for and respond to adverse natural events, including stronger management systems, improved technical capacity of the NDRMS actors, and an operational National Response Plan Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 (i) All members of the DPC and the CCPC and CCDC have been trained. (ii) The National Response Plan was revised and "tested" during the 2011 Hurricane Season Simulation Exercise. (iii) The National Inventory System is operational and updated. Date achieved 03/25/2005 12/31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Partially achieved. National Response Plan validated and tested. Shortcomings in the training component due to limited availability of DPC staffs. DPC management capacity remains limited. Indicator 3 : 73 CCPC fully operational, validated by the DPC, and incorporated into Haiti's national disaster - response system. Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 70 73 76 Date achieved 03/25/2005 03/25/2005 01/08/2008 12/31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target surpassed. All 76 CCPCs have been fully endorsed by DPC and are part of the NDRMS. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Indicator 1 : Priority areas rehabilitated through small scale public infrastructure works which contribute towards physical and economic protection of populations at risk. Twenty-five sub-projects to be executed. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 25 22 Date achieved 03/25/2005 11/02/2010 12/31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Partially achieved. Not all rehabilitation completed. Indicator 2 : Establishment of three Thematic Committees within the SPGRD. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 3 3 Date achieved 03/25/2005 03/25/2005 12/31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved. Indicator 3 : Procurement of IT equipment/software and vehicles to facilitate disaster management response and coordination activities. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) UCP-DPC offices are equipped and operational Date achieved 12/31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved. Indicator 4 : Institutional analysis of the DPC and SPGRD completed and key recommendations for administrative and technical training implemented as well as the Revision of the National Disaster Response Plan. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 Institutional analysis of the DPC and SPGRD completed. National Disaster Response Plan revised. Date achieved 03/25/2005 12/31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Partially achieved. Analysis completed but not all recommendations implemented. National Response Plan validated and tested through multiple simulation exercises. Indicator 5 : Creation, reactivation, training and equiping of 73 CCPC Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 54 73 76 Date achieved 03/25/2005 03/25/2005 01/08/2008 12/31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target surpassed. 76 CCPCs have been established or reactived, trained and equipped. Indicator 6 : Preparation of local risk maps and emergency contingency plans for 73 communities. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 73 76 Date achieved 03/25/2005 01/08/2008 12/31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target surpassed. Local risk maps and emergency contingency plans prepared in 76 communities. Indicator 7 : Identification and execution of risk - reduction projects in 73 communities. Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 73 76 Date achieved 03/25/2005 01/08/2008 12/31/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Target surpassed. 130 small disaster mitigation works implemented in 76 communities. G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements (USD millions) 1 04/29/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 11/17/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.90 3 04/26/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.60 4 06/19/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.80 5 09/27/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.81 6 03/16/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.55 7 07/17/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.63 8 01/16/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.90 9 06/15/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.61 10 12/12/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 9.25 11 06/09/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.04 12 12/15/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 12.17 13 06/16/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.24 14 03/02/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 15.96 15 12/10/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 18.86 H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP 05/05/2009 MS MS 9.89 11/02/2010 S S 15.12 Post earthquake restructuring I. Disbursement Profile 1 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal Country Context 1. At the time of project approval, in January 2005, Haiti was a fragile state emerging from political conflict. A year earlier, a period of turmoil had culminated with the resignation of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Haiti‘s p olitical landscape then changed dramatically. A provisional government took control of the country with the mandate to create the conditions for democratic elections and to support economic and social recovery. A few months later, the Security Council approved the establishment of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Despite these developments, profound challenges remained – particularly in terms of governance. Many of these challenges persisted during the entire project implementation period. It is important to view the Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Project (ERDMP) within this challenging context. 2. Haiti was one of the most disadvantaged countries in the world. In 2005, The estimated per capita Gross National Income (GNI) was US$ 390, making Haiti the poorest country in the Americas and the Caribbean. Over half of its population lived in extreme poverty — less than US$1 per day, and 76 percent on less than US$2 per day. The 2005 United Nations Human Development Index showed indicators below the regional average: infant mortality rate was 79 per 1,000 live births; life expectancy was 49 years; and the adult literacy rate was 51.9 percent. Overall, the index ranked Haiti 153 rd out of 177 countries. Sector Context 3. Haiti was highly exposed and vulnerable to natural hazards . Due to its geographic location, Haiti was exposed to hydro-meteorological and geophysical hazards. Widespread poverty, extensive deforestation and overall land and watershed degradation further exacerbated the country ‘s vulnerability. In 2004, Haiti was hit by two severe events — flash floods and landslides in Belle-Anse and Fonds Verrettes affected more than 100,000 people (May) and claimed more than 1000 lives. Storm Jeanne caused flash floods affecting 300,000 people in the region between Cap Haitien, Port-de-Paix and Gonaives (September). More than 3,000 people died as a result of the flooding. In this context, the Government of Haiti (GoH) asked the World Bank for emergency support. 4. The 2004 May and September floods illustrated the need to strengthen the country’s capacity to address natural disasters. In 2001, the GoH had established the National Disaster Risk Management System (SNGRD) and the National Disaster Risk Management Plan (PNGRD) as its operational framework. On the operational level, the Ministry of Interior and Territorial Collectivities (MICT)'s Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC) and the Permanent Secretariat for Disaster Risk Management (SPGRD) were given the responsibility of implementing the PNGRD. 2 5. At the time, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was providing technical assistance to the DPC in the following areas: i) capacity building; ii) development of response and preparedness plans; iii) strengthening preparedness; and, iv) establishment of a national training center. Despite external support, the DPC remained primarily engaged in short-term reactive planning. In order to enhance the DPC‘s capacity, the transitional GoH expressed interest in changing the institutional status of the DPC to a General Directorate. Rationale for Bank Intervention 6. The ERDMP was the first International Development Association (IDA) project prepared since 1997. Following a steady decline in IDA disbursements between 1997 and 2000, Haiti began accumulating arrears with IDA. As a result, the country was placed into non-accrual with the Bank. In 2002, the World Bank Task Force on Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) called for a new approach to assist the most marginalized and fragile states in non-accrual status. The LICUS reengagement grant package aimed to contribute to the kick-start of initial reforms and the delivery of quick wins in the absence of access to IDA resources. This included two initiatives to strengthen the capacity for emergency recovery and disaster risk management activities. The total LICUS package amounted to US$6.4 million. 7. Following the clearance of arrears (US$52.3 million) in early 2005, the GoH was ready to receive IDA support again. The Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), the partnership of the GoH, donor agencies and international and regional organizations, aimed to identify priority interventions and needed resources to support Haiti‘s recovery . The ICF called for i) simplification, rationalization and harmonization of donor procedures; ii) making funds available in proportion to the real absorptive capacity; and, iii) strengthening institutions. 8. The ERDMP was fully aligned with the Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) FY2005-06 (Report no. 30541, December 10, 2004). Building on the ICF, the TSS focused on i) delivering hope through quick wins such as improved basic services delivery and job creation; and, ii) restoring credibility in institutions through reforms that promoted longer-term economic governance and institutional development. By supporting the GoH to rehabilitate areas affected by the May and September 2004 floods and to support civil protection committees at the local level, the ERDMP was consistent with these two key objectives. 3 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators ( as approved ) 9. The original project development objectives (PDO), as stated in the Technical Annex 1 , were to i) support the rehabilitation of the areas affected by the recent adverse natural disasters; ii) strengthen the country‘s capacity to manage natural disaster risks and better respond to emergencies resulting from adverse natural events; and, iii) reduce the vulnerability of communities through risk identification and risk mitigation activities. 10. Related key outcome indicators were: (i) satisfactory planning and completion of a rehabilitation scheme for affected settlements in the regions of Belle-Anse, Fonds Verrettes and Gonaives; (ii) capacity established within the DPC to prepare for, and respond to, natural disaster events which include: (a) a validated legal framework; (b) stronger management systems; (c) improved technical capacity; and, (d) an operational National Response Plan; iii) functioning disaster committees in at least 70 communes and the successful implementation of risk-prevention and reduction measures in vulnerable communities. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and key indicators and reasons/justification 11. The PDO remained unchanged during project implementation. However, the key outcome indicators were revised. See details below. PDO Level Outcome/Results Indicators Original Indicators Revised Indicators Indicator 1 . Satisfactory planning and completion of a rehabilitation scheme for affected settlements in the regions of Belle - Anse, Fonds Verrettes, and Gonaives. (Original Technical Annex) Revised . Satisfactory planning and completion of a rehabilitation scheme for affected settlements in the regions of, Fonds Verrettes those affected by tropical storm Dean, and those affected by tropical storm Noel. Change Process: Board Approval - Additional Financing (January 2008) Indicator 2 . Capacity established within the DPC to prepare for, and respond to, natural disaster events which include: (i) a validated legal framework; (ii) stronger management systems; (iii) improved technical capacity; and , (iv) an operational National Response Plan. (Original Technical Annex) Revised. Capacity established within the NDRMS to prepar e for and respond to adverse natural events, including stronger management systems, improved technical capacity of the national disaster risk management system‘s actors, and an operational National Re sponse Plan. Change Process: Country Director Approval – 2010 Second level Restructuring Paper. Important to note that the indicator was not marked as ‘revised’. 1 According the guidelines for Emergency Recovery Assistance (OP/BP 8.50 – August 1995), the project team was required to prepare a Memorandum and Recommendation of the President (MOP) and a Technical Annex (TA) instead of the regular more comprehensive Project Appraisal Document (PAD). 4 Indicator 3 . Functioning disaster committees in at least 70 communes and the successful imp lementation of risk prevention and reduction measures in vulnerable communities. (Original Technical Annex) First Revision. Functioning disaster committees, including 54 Communal Civil Protection Committees ( CCPC ) fully operational, validated by the DPC, and incorporated into Haiti‘s national disaster - response system . Change Process: Operations Manual (one of the three effectiveness conditions) Second Revision. 73 CCPC fully operational, validated by the DPC, and incorporated into Haiti‘s national disaster - response system. Change Process: Board Approval - Additional Financing (January 2008) 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 12. While the Technical Annex did not specify the targeted population, it is clear that the project‗s main beneficiaries would be the people affected by the 2004 floods. The people in the affected regions of Belle-Anse, Fonds Verrettes and Gonaives would benefit from the rehabilitation of affected public infrastructure. The project was also expected to benefit the population of the communities where Communal Civil Protection Committees (CCPC) would be established 2 . Other beneficiaries were government staff working with the project implementing agencies. 1.5 Original Components ( as approved ) 13. The PDO was expected to be met through the three components described below: Component 1: Reconstruction and Risk Reduction in the Areas Recently Affected by Floods (US$2.5 million equivalent) 14. Based on the needs identified in the GoH‘s recovery plan and the LICUS activities, the project would support the rehabilitation of small-scale public infrastructure in Fonds Verrettes, Belle-Anse and Gonaives. The focus would be on the rehabilitation of drainage systems, public buildings and community centers. Component 2: Institutional Strengthening of the DPC and SPGRD (US$3.5 million equivalent). The activities financed under this component focused on four key areas: 15. Institutional and Technical Support. Activities aimed at supporting the DPC and the SPGRD included: i) providing institutional and technical support for the creation of a training and documentation center and risk management units within key ministries as well as the establishment of three thematic committees; ii) revising and validating the National Response Plan and developing related emergency procedures and protocols; 2 The 5 Departments and 76 municipalities covered by the project have an estimated population of 6.68 million. 5 iii) providing support to disaster assessment and disaster intervention teams within DPC and key ministries; and, iv) organizing simulation exercises. 16. Technical Studies. The establishment of three thematic committees under the SPGRD would lead to three essential technical initiatives/studies: a public awareness program, an initiative for building norms, and an environmental assessment study for natural disaster vulnerability. 17. Rehabilitation of the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) of the DPC. The project would assist the retrofitting of the national EOC and the purchase of the necessary equipment to make it operational. The project would also support the retrofitting of regional EOCs in each department as well as the installation of a national communications system to coordinate operations between the national and departmental levels. 18. Strengthening Management Systems within DPC. Activities included: i) strengthening the DPC with a new accounting system and an updated inventory system; ii) reinforcing management, administrative and technical capacity within the DPC and the SPGRD; and, iii) supporting the development of institutional development plans and emergency funding procedures. Component 3: Local Risk Management (US$5.5 million) 19. Under this component, the project sought to support the DPC to create or reactivate CCPCs and provide disaster risk-management training. These committees would prepare local risk and vulnerability maps and identify local risk mitigation micro- projects to be financed by the project. Most activities under this component would be implemented using the Community Driven Development (CDD) approach. 1.6 Revised Components 20. The three components were not revised. 1.7 Other significant changes 21. Additional Financing. In October 2007, Tropical Storm (TS) Noel caused severe flooding resulting in significant loss of life and damage to Haiti‘s public and private infrastructure. In the aftermath of the event, the GoH requested additional financing to scale up investments in Component 1 and Component 3. The additional financing was approved on January 31, 2008, and became effective September 5, 2008. 22. The project‘s original‘s closing date was extended by two years, from December 31, 2008 to December 31, 2010. The additional financing supported (i) small works consisting mainly of rehabilitation of affected drainage and irrigation systems, schools, health clinics and community centers; and, (ii) the expansion of the local risk- management activities to ensure full coverage within the five departments where the project was engaged, including the creation and implementation of additional training 6 modules and the financing of additional local risk-mitigation micro-projects for each operational CCPC. Component Original Allocation 2004 Amount Reallocated 2008 Additional Financing 2008 Total Component 1 2.5 - 3.5 6.0 Component 2 3.5 0.05 * - 4.0 Component 3 5.5 - 3.9 9.4 Operating Costs (category 9) 0.05 0.40 - - Non - allocated (category 10) 0.45 (0.45) - - Total ( US $ millions) 12.0 7.4 19.4 * In order to cover the additional audit cost associated with the 2008 project extension, funds were reallocated from the original proj ect. The reallocation process was conducted separately from the additional financing, but carried out in parall el. 23. Restructuring. Following the January 12, 2010 earthquake, the GoH requested that the project be restructured to account for the following: i) an extension of the closing date of the project by 12 months until December 31, 2011; ii) a reallocation among categories of disbursement to cover existing and projected category expense overruns; iii) the elimination of one minor subcomponent related to the installation of a national communication system to coordinate the operations between the national and regional levels; and, iv) a revised results management framework. 24. Following the GoH‘s request the project team prepared a second -level restructuring for the Country Director's approval. The Country Director approved the second-level restructuring on November 2, 2010. The countersigned Amendment Letter was received by the World Bank on November 23, 2010. 25. Outcome Indicators. The revision of the PDO level outcome indicators is discussed in Section 1.3. Below is an overview of the intermediate outcome indicators. Intermediate Outcome /Results Indicators Original Indicators Revised Indicators Component 1 Rehabilitation work (to be determined based on sub - projects to be approved) in Fonds Verrettes, Belle Anse and Gonaives ― identified and completed. Introduced in the o perations m anual. However, it is used for the first time in the 7th ISR. Until the 13th ISR, it was phrased: ‘Rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of areas affected by n atural d isaster’ First Revision . Rehabilitation works in Fonds Verrettes, post tropical storm ( TS ) Dean and post - TS Noel (to be determined based on sub - projects to be approved) identified and completed. Change Process: Board a pproval ―a dditional f inancing (January 2008) Second Revision . Priority areas rehabilitated t hrough small scale public infrastructure works which contribute towards physical and economic protection of populations at risk. Twenty - five sub - projects to be executed. Change Process: Country d irector a pproval – 2010 r estructuring. Important to note that the indicator was not marked as ‘revised’. 7 Component 2 Establishment of three Thematic Committees within the SPGRD. Introduced in the o peration m anual, but as a sub - indicator. Introduced as a full intermediate indicator in the first ISR (April 2005), and referred to as an ‘original’ indicator in the additional financing paper (January 2008) No change . Vehicles provided to the DPC, at the national and departmental level to assist in disaster management response and coordination. Introduced in the first ISR (April 2005), and referred to as the ‘original’ indicator in the additional financing paper (January 2008) Revised . Procurement of IT equipment/software and vehicles facilitate disaster management response and coordination activities. Change Process: c ountry d irector a pproval ―s econd - level r estructuring 2010 Renovation and equipment of OPDES Building to serve as the DPC‘s national training and archives centre. Introduced in the first ISR (April 2005), and referred to as the ‘original’ indicator in the additional financing paper (January 2008) Revised . Renovation and equipping of OPES Building: to serve as the DPC‘s national training and archives center. Renovation and equipping of 5 departmental emergency operations centers. Change Process: rephrased in the ninth ISR (June 2008). Deleted. Change Process: no longer included the s econd - level r estructuring 2010 Instituti onal analysis of the DPC and SPG RD: Basis for DPC administrative and technical training program. Introduced in the fifth ISR (Sept. 2006) and referred to as the ‘original’ indicator in the additional financing paper (January 2008) Revised . Instituti onal analysis of the DPC and SPG RD completed and key recommendations for administrative and technical training implemented as well as the Revision of the National Disaster Response Plan. Change Process: c ountry d irector a pproval ―s econd - level r es tructuring 2010 Component 3 Creation, Reactivation and Training of 54 Community Civil Protection Committees, development of local risk maps, and identification and execution of at least 54 small mitigation projects. Introduced in the o perations m anual and referred to as the ‘original’ indicator in the additional financing paper (January 2008) Revised. Creation, Reactivation and Training of 73 CCPC, development of local risks maps, identification and execution of at least 73 small mitigation projects. Change Process: Board a pproval - 2008 a dditional f inancing Added. Preparation of local risk maps and emergency contingency plans for 73 communities. Change Process: Country Director Approval – Second level Restructuring 2010. Important to note that the indicator was not 8 marked as ‘revised’. Added. Identification and execution of a risk - reduction project in 73 communities. Change Process: c ountry d irector a pproval ―s econd - level r estructuring 2010. Important to note that the indicator was not marked as ‘revised’. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 26. The following section is based on i) an in-depth review of the Project files; and, (ii) the findings of an ICR field mission carried out March 4-16, 2012. 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 27. Processed on a fast-track basis, consistent with the guidelines for Emergency Recovery Assistance (OP/BP 8.50, dated August 1995), the project was approved by the World Bank‘s Board of Directors on January 6, 2005. The grant agreement between the International Development Association (IDA) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Haiti was signed on January 6, 2005 and the project was declared effective on June 1, 2005. The original project had an implementation period of four years with an expected closing date of December 31, 2008. There was no Quality Assurance Group (QAG) review of the project. 28. Assessment of project design. At the time of design, the PDO was relevant and consistent with the transitional government‘s Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) and fully aligned with the IDA Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) for the period 2005-06 (Report no. 30541, December 10, 2004). The PDO continued to be relevant to the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for 2009-12 (Report No. 48284, May 4, 2009). It also remains relevant to the current Interim Strategy Note (ISN) (Report no. 65112, November 1, 2011), which places importance on re ducing Haiti‘s vulnerability to disasters and increasing its resilience to shocks. 29. To achieve the PDO, the project was divided into three operational components: i) reconstruction and risk reduction in the areas recently affected by floods; ii) institutional strengthening for the DPC and SPGRD; and, iii) local risk management. Two aspects of the project design are particularly noteworthy. First, the design was built on close coordination with other development actors which ensured complementarity among efforts. Second, recognizing the current ad-hoc nature of community engagement in disaster response and preparedness, the design incorporated a more productive systematic approach to community engagement on which future Bank projects and others could build. 30. With regard to the implementation arrangements, the project design provided for the establishment of two Project Coordination Units (UCP): the UCP/DPC and the UCP/BMPAD (formerly known as the UCP/PL-480). The DPC was given the overall responsibility for the project, but the day-to-day implementation was divided up by 9 component. The UCP/DPC would be responsible for the execution of component 2 and the UCP/BMPAD for component 1 and 3. In retrospect, these implementation arrangements should have been supported by clear policies and protocols for inter-UCPs communication and coordination. Section 2.2 will provide more details on how the arrangement of two UCPs played out over the course of implementation. 31. Given the emergency nature of the project, the project results framework and related monitoring and evaluation (M&E) arrangements were understandably weak. The PDOs were relevant but rather broad. Another weakness was that the outcome indicators did not have baselines or targets. Moreover, intermediate outcome indicators were not provided – the common practice for emergency projects at the time of preparation. Finally, there were no formal M&E arrangements in place. A further discussion on M&E will be covered in Section 2.3. 32. Incorporation of lessons learned. It is essential to bear in mind that, as one of the first projects following the World Bank‘s re -engagement in Haiti, the project design could not take into account general lessons learned from previous projects in the country. Moreover, the project could not build on examples of best practices in the area of disaster risk management (DRM) as this was a new field for both the GoH and the World Bank. However, it was anticipated that the project would be able to build on two LICUS initiatives during its implementation. 33. Adequacy of government commitment. At the time of design, the GoH recognized the need to strengthen the capacity of the DPC, the national agency responsible for emergency and disaster management in the country. The government expressed strong interest in elevating the agency to the level of General Directorate. This would provide the DPC with increased autonomy and enhance its ability to develop a more comprehensive disaster risk management system. Even though it was not explicitly stated in the Technical Annex, it is evident that the Bank considered this institutional change to be essential for the success of the project. 34. The Bank anticipated that this transformation would occur during the project‘s first year of implementation. However, this expectation turned out to be overly optimistic. Haiti‘s fragile political environment an d lack of financial resources undermined efforts to change the institutional status quo. In hindsight, the project could have benefitted from a more comprehensive analysis of the country‘s political economy and its operational and institutional weaknesses that could affect project performance. That said, is important to keep in mind the considerable speed with which the project was prepared ― there were approximately four months between the concept note review (August 2004) and the Board approval (January 2005). The demands of the GoH and the desire of Bank management to respond to the emergency in a timely manner provided little time for such an analysis. 35. Assessment of risks and mitigation measures. The project design identified a number of risks: i) capacity building was delayed; ii) government funding and personnel allocation to the DPC was inadequate; and iii) NGOs lacked understanding of the project. Additional risks were identified in the technical assistance, including: i) project funding 10 and human resources were reallocated to reconstruction in the case of major disaster during implementation; and, ii) delays in government approval of the change of DPC to a General Directorate. After taking mitigating actions into consideration, the overall risk rating was substantial. 36. According supervision reports the achievement of the PDO was never at risk. Some risks, however, should have been rated higher, particularly the inadequate g overnment support to the DPC and the delays in the agency‘s institutional change. The proposed mitigation measures were: i) the government would commit to early identification of additional human resource needs of the DPC; and, ii) the government would commit to prepare and present the needed decree. The legal document was being prepared through UNDP consultations. The Minister of Interior would take the necessary steps to follow up the approval process at Cabinet level. The proposed mitigating measures appear to have been of little value as these were not within the control of the Bank. 37. In addition, the risk framework should have given consideration to the risks related to the medium/large scale works financed by the project. Given the country‘s high vulnerability to natural disasters, the framework should have included measures to ensure that best practices would be taken into consideration during the design and construction of these works (i.e. making sure that the works would be resilient to future disasters). It is important to note that this risk was indeed recognized during implementation, and subsequently included in the updated risk framework. 2.2 Implementation 38. There are four major factors that affected implementation progress, both positively and negatively. This includes: i) institutional arrangements and readiness; ii) occurrence of natural disasters; iii) the country‘s fragile political environment; and, iv) collaboration with other development actors. 39. Institutional arrangements and readiness. At the time of project appraisal, the UCP/BMPAD had solid experience in project management and had already been involved in the implementation/preparation of two other Bank-financed grants. The DPC, on the other hand, had no experience with the Bank‘s pro cedures and modus operandi , and demonstrated limited capacity. Recognizing the limitations of the DPC, the project recruited a project coordinator, procurement specialist and financial management specialist. In addition, a technical and administrative training program was developed to enhance the DPC‘s capacity. 40. The decision to split the implementing responsibilities between the UCP/BMPAD and the UCP/DPC resulted in confusion about the roles and responsibilities of the two agencies during the early stages of the project. Over time, adequate working arrangements between the two UCPs were developed. 11 41. During the course of the implementation of the project, the UCP/BMPAD became involved in four other Bank projects. As a result, the UCP/BMPAD became increasingly overstretched. This contributed, inter alia , to inefficient execution of procurement processes (see Section 2.4). In addition, it became evident that BMPAD faced difficulties in performing technical audits of the work financed by the project to ensure it complied with all the technical and fiduciary requirements and safeguards. This often resulted in sub-standard design, tardy execution and numerous cost overruns. With the benefit of hindsight, the project team should have considered contracting out the design and supervision of all medium/large work to an external firm. 42. The fact that the DPC did not become a General Directorate had a negative effect on the agency‘s absorptive capacity. The staff and training program turned out to be a necessary but not sufficient condition to bring the DPC up to speed. A major issue was the fact that the processing of consultant contracts and payment authorizations was done by the Ministry of Interior. This, in turn, resulted in delays in the implementation and low disbursement rates ― component 2 had only disbursed 21 percent of the funds allocated by June 2008, six months before the original closing date. Supervision reports repeatedly flagged this as an issue of concern. A further weakness was that it was difficult to conduct field visits due to the limited resources available. 43. Natural Disasters . While the occurrence of natural disaster hampered project implementation, the project managed to respond to these events in a rapid and flexible manner. In 2007, Tropical Storm Noel caused severe flooding resulting in significant loss of life and damage to infrastructure. This led to an extension of the closing date and an additional financing in the amount of US$7.4 million (see Section 1.7) to scale up activities under components 1 and 3. At the same time, the event strengthened the capacity of the newly-established local civil protection committees who played an important role in the preparedness and response activities. 44. One year later, in 2008, Hurricane Fay and Tropical Storms Gustav, Hanna and Ike (FGHI) affected more than 865,000 people between August and September. These events had severe impacts on the national economy: the Post-disaster Damage and Needs Assessment (PDNA) estimated that the impact of FGHI amounted to 15 percent of gross gross domestic product (GDP). Given the recently-approved additional financing, major adjustments were not deemed necessary. However, these events did affect implementation. The DPC UCP was mobilized in the DPC‘s response and coordination activities as well as in the preparation of the PDNA. These engagements adversely affected the already slow disbursement rates under component 2. However, at the same time, many local committees further enhanced their capacity to respond. 45. The 2008 hurricane season triggered demand for additional World Bank assistance for disaster risk management (DRM). The Emergency Bridge and Vulnerability Reduction Project (P114292) and the Emergency School Reconstruction Project (P115261) were approved in FY2009. These projects were able to build on the ERDMP by providing a more systematic approach to disaster risk mitigation, recovery and reconstruction. 12 46. On January 12, 2010 Haiti was hit by a catastrophic earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale. The event caused the deaths of an estimated 220,000 people and resulted in damages and losses of close to US$8 billion. The macroeconomic impact of the earthquake has been estimated at 120 percent of annual GDP. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the ERDMP was the only mechanism at the disposal of the government to provide immediate technical and financial support to the DPC. As such, the project proved to be an invaluable asset allowing the government of Haiti to play an active role in the coordination of the humanitarian relief efforts and the recovery and reconstruction process. Furthermore, the event resulted in a restructuring of the project. Changes included the extension of the closing date; a reallocation among categories; and a revised results framework (see Section 1.7). 47. Fragile Political Environment. The political context ― from project effectiveness to closure ― was characterized by continuous instability (see table 3) . Despite this, the GoH and the Bank were able to ensure that project funding and human resources were never reallocated. That is not to say instability did not affect the implementation of the project. During moments of political change, implementation slowed down due to delays in the preparation of bidding documents, the signing of contracts and withdrawal requests. In addition, political instability diminished the likelihood that the DPC would become a General Directorate as attention was constantly diverted to other, more pressing issues. Table 3: Date Country Timeline Prime Minister Haiti/Bank timeline February 2004 Provisional President Boniface Alexandre takes office March 2004 Gérard Latortue August 2004 December 2004 TSS FY 20 05 - 06 January 2005 June 2005 May 2006 President René Préval takes office June 2006 Michèle Pierre - Louis December 2006 ISN FY 20 07 - 08 January 2008 April 2008 Ericq Pierre September 2008 Michèle Pierre - Louis November 2009 Jean - Max Bellerive CAS FY 20 09 - 12 November 2010 May 2011 President Michel Martelly takes office October 2011 Garry Conille ISN FY 20 12 48. Collaboration with other Development Partners. The project supported strong collaboration with other development partners supporting the disaster risk management agenda in Haiti, in particular with UNDP, the Inter-american Development Bank (IDB), the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and the European Union (EU). Close collaboration has ensured their efforts have been complementary. UNDP provided technical assistance to the DPC for the implementation of the national plan for risk and 13 disaster management, while the IDB focused on hydro-meteorological monitoring and early warning systems, institutional reinforcement of the DPC and of the hydrometeorological services, and the development of a public awareness program. The OFDA and the EU provided emergency equipment and training. 49. These partnerships were essential to the performance of the project, as it exploited synergies among partners and avoided duplication of efforts. Moreover, t he project‘s convening role and close partnerships provided an important framework which is likely to continue to guide multilateral engagement in this area. 50. Despite the above listed implementation challenges, it is important to note that the project performed well in relation to the World Bank's overall portfolio in the country. First, it disbursed well. Second, it was flexible enough to respond to the various crises faced by the country, even if these resulted in rapidly evolving priorities which became difficult for the project management team to monitor and evaluate more robustly. Overall, the project did not experience major delays. Where several World Bank projects achieved less than expected over this period, this project was restructured and implementation arrangements were adjusted to fit the evolving situation and remained active and engaged in whatever was the most time sensitive issue at any given moment. Several other projects in the portfolio were unable to adapt as flexibly. Lessons learned from this project with regard to flexibility and implementation arrangements were used in the design of new projects after the 2010 earthquake. Project staff were trusted by the GoH and called upon in critical moments including after the earthquak