Rapò sou jan pwojè a te aplike: Pwojè Kreyasyon Djòb ann Ayiti

Document of The WorldBank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 17238 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT HAITI EMPLOYMENT GENERATIONPROJECT (CreditNo. 2765 - HA) December 18, 1997 Environmentallyand Socially Sustainable Development Sector Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Gourdes (G) Average Exchange Rate: (As of June 20, 1997) US$1.00 = G16.70 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR OF THE BORROWER October 1 - September 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AGETIP - Agence pour la Gestion de Travaux d'Infrastructure Publics CASEC - Conseil d'Administration de la Section Communale CDS - Centres pour le Developpement et la Sante CECI - Centre Canadien d'lEtude et de Cooperation Intemationale CBF - Cooperative Housing Foundation EGP - Employment Generation Project GOH - Governrnent of Haiti 10 - Implementing Organization MARNDR - Ministry of Agriculture MDE - Ministry of Environment MDOD - Maitre-D'Ouvrage Del6gu6 MTPTC - Ministry of Public Works PMO - Prime Minister's Office PADF - Pan-American Development Foundation SDR - Special Drawing Rights UCG - Unite Centrale de Gestion UNDP - United Nations Development Program USAID - United States Agency for International Development Vice- President : S.J. Burki Country Director : 0. Kalantzopoulos Sector Director M. Koch-Weser Staff Member P. Werbrouck FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT HAITI EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PROJECT CREDIT2765-HA TABLEOF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE EVALUATION SUMMARY i PART I: PROJECTIMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT I Background 1 A. Project Objectives 1 B. Achievementof Project Objectives 3 C. ImplementationRecord and Major Factors Affectingthe Project 5 D. Project Sustainability 6 E. Bank Performance 7 F. Borrower Performance 8 G. Assessmentof Outcome 9 H. Future Operation 9 I. Key LessonsLearned 10 PART H: STATISTICAL ANNEXES 11 1. Summaryof Assessments 12 2. RelatedBank Loans/Credits 13 3. Project Timetable 13 4. Loan/CreditDisbursement:CumulativeEstimatedand Actual 14 5. Key Indicatorsfor Project Implementation 15 6. Studies Includedin Project 17 7A. Project Cost 18 7B. Project Financing 18 8. Status of Legal Covenants 19 9. Bank Resources: Staff Inputs 23 10. Bank Resources: Missions 23 APPENDIXES: A. Mission'sAide-Memoire B. Borrower Contributionto the ICR C. Executive Summary Final report This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT HArrl EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PROJECT CREDIT 2765-HA Preface 1. This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR)for the Employment Generation Project in Haiti, for whichCredit2765 - HA in the amountof SDR31.8million(US$50million equivalent)was approvedon July 11, 1995 and made effectiveon July 13, 1995. 2. The credit was closed on April30, 1997;the originalclosingdatewas March31, 1997. Finaldisbursement took place on November20, 1997. The balanceof SDR565,732.58 was canceledon December18, 1997. The project's finalaudithas not yet been received. 3. The ICR was preparedby Pierre Werbrouck,Sr. Agricultural Economist,and Garry L. Charlier(Rural Infrastructure Specialist), Environmentally and SociallySustainable DevelopmentSectorUnit, Latin Americaandthe Caribbean Region. The ICR was reviewedby Messrs.Mark Cackler,(LCSES),0. Kalantzopoulos, M. Donoso Clarkand J. Panzer (LCC3C). The Borrowerprovidedcommentsthat are includedas appendix B to the ICR. 4. Preparationof this ICR startedduringthe Bank'sfinalsupervision/completion missionin May 1997. It is based on materialin the project file. The borrowercontributedto the preparation of the ICR by providingopinionsreflectedin the mission's aide-memoire andthe projectfinal report, the executivesummaryof whichis attachedas AppendixC. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PROJECT CREDIT 2765-HA HAITI EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction 1. The Employment Generation Project (EGP) originated during the Consultative Group follow-up meeting held in Haiti in May 1995. It was prepared on the basis of employment generation studies carried out for the Emergency Economic Recovery Credit (Cr. 2670-HA). The Project was conceived to bridge the transition from short-to medium-term economic assistance. It was to reach short-term poverty alleviation objectives during a politicallyvolatile period and while democratic institutions were still fragile. It was estimated that nearly 1.6 million famnily members of unskilled workers in mostly economicallydepressed areas would benefit from income generated by the creation of about 487,000 person-months of employment. A. Project Objectives 2. The objectives of the Project were to: (a) create short-term employment for people in extreme poverty in support of the Borrower's program for poverty alleviation; (b) rehabilitate seriously deteriorated economic and productive infrastructure in the Borrower's country; and (c) strengthen the capacity of non-government and community organizations operating in the territory of the Borrower and the Borrower's central and local authorities to manage labor intensive small-scaledevelopment projects, including the establishment of a national non-government contract management entity and the development of a longer term strategy for poverty alleviation, employment and small infrastructure maintenance. 3. Comments on Project Objectives. Considering the political situation, the short-term objectives were ambitious. The longer-term objectives mentioned under (c) would have stood a better chance of being reached in an institutional development program than in a short-term action-oriented project. B. Implementation Experience and Results 4. The Project outcome is rated highly satisfactory. The employment creation component (92 percent) of the Project is rated highly satisfactory because: (i) the component reached the ambitious job creation objectives; (ii) project funds benefited the poorest layers of the population and provided the highly-needed cash to stimulate recovery from the economic hardships during the international embargo; and (iii) rehabilitation of crucial productive, economic and basic infrastructure along with protection/conservation of environmentallydegraded or threatened areas meet or exceed appraisal expectations in most cases. - ii - 5. The institutional development componentis rated satisfactory.The Project enhancedthe managerial, administrative and operationalcapacitiesof UCG, participating municipalities and CASECs,NGOs, various community organizations and smallrural private enterprises. The Project, however,fell short of developing a strategyfor povertyalleviation through small-scale laborintensiveinvestments on a more sustainable basis. The Projectwas closed one month after the originaldate in the Credit Agreement. 6. Amongthe key factors that affectedthe performance of the Projectwere: (i) strong Governmentsupport and excellentcooperationbetweenthe Bank and Governmentduringproject preparationand processing;(ii) UCG's pragmaticandeffectivemanagement; (iii) excellent performance by NGOs and implementing organizations; (iv) a good project methodology; and (v) the Bank's flexibleprocurementand disbursement proceduresand continuous follow-up. C. Summary of Findings Sustainability. 7. The sustainability of the Projectis uncertain. Soilconservation and particularly irrigation workswhichdirectlyconcernthe beneficiaries are likelyto be maintained.Sustainability of sub-projectssuchas solidwaste management and rural road rehabilitation is unlikely. They belongto the publicsector domainand need specificfunding. The Project strengthened national and local institutions with stafftrainedand experienced in labor-intensive infrastructure rehabilitation works at local levels. It did not establisha nationalnon-government contract management entityto implement a longerterm strategyfor povertyalleviation, employment and smallinfrastructuremaintenance. Bank and Borrower Performance 8. Bank performance is rated highlysatisfactory.In addressing GOH'surgent need and request for assistance,the Bank showedswiftresponsiveness and extremecreativityand flexibility that led to a record-breaking short periodfor preparation,appraisal,Board presentation, effectiveness and first disbursement.To ensuresuccessduringimplementation, the Bank dedicateda significant amount of resourcesto assistthe Borrower. 9. The Borrower'sperformance is rated satisfactory.Whilethe Borrowerwas very actively involvedin project preparation,subsequent administrations have reducedtheir support for the Projectand eroded its sustainability.Nevertheless, the Projecthas achievedsignificant job creationresults. D. Future Operations 10. At present,an IDA-financed basicinfrastructure projectis beingprepared. It is recommended that this projectuses the privatesector,whichhas been strengthenedby the EGP, to act as a major playerin project implementation. The possibility of bilateraldonors usingthis approachalso remainslikely. - 111 - E. Key LessonsLearned 11. The lessonsto be drawn from the implementation of this Project comprisethe highly successfulcooperationbetweenprivateand publicsector,eligibility criteriaof sub-projects, participation by the beneficiaries andinstitutional development. (i) a well coordinatedpartnership betweenpublicand private/non-governmental sectors can liveup to tremendouschallenges.NGOs have showna substantial implementation capacityand drive,whichthe publicsector cannotmatch. Future small infrastructure projectsshouldtake this experienceinto accountand make use of this privateimplementation capacity; (ii) not all infrastructure rehabilitation sub-projectsare suitedfor labor-intensive methods. Road constructionand some other sub-projectsrequiringheavy-dutyequipment need more capitalinputsfor satisfactory completion than were agreedupon under the 60- 40 percent rule for allocationof labor and capitalexpenditures.The type of sub-projects undertakenshouldbe consistentwith the type of resourcesavailable; (iii) substantial and time-consuming participation with beneficiaries and local authoritiesare necessaryfrom the inceptionof sub-projectsto ensure sustainable post- implementation maintenance and operation. This often conflicts with the pressureto disburseand achievequickresults. Althoughtradeoffsare unavoidable, higherbeneficiary contributions and participation in the sub-projectdesignwould have increasedthe likelihood of sub-projectsustainability; (iv) the Bank and the Government are ableto move veryfast when supportedby senior officials. Fast projectpreparationneed not to diminishquality. Moreover,flexibility in procurement,disbursement andintensesupervision have ensuredsuccessful implementation; and (v) more realismis neededaboutwhat can be achievedin terms of institutional development in such a short time periodand in an environment such as the one prevailing in Haiti in 1995-96. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PROJECT CREDIT2765-HA HAM PART I - PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT Background 1. The Employment GenerationProject(EGP) originatedduringthe Consultative Group follow-upmeetingsheld in Haiti in May 1995. The reinstatedconstitutional Government requestedIDA's supportto continuefinancing the USAIDJobs CreationProject whichwas soon to be completed. The 1991-1994 international embargoand economicdeclinecausedgreat hardshipfor the rural and urban poor who were left with few prospectsfor short-term improvement.In the context of an aggravatedeconomicdeterioration, the Governmentattached high priorityto the extensionof this Jobs CreationProjectto alleviate poverty. EGP's swift identification and preparationbenefitedextensively fromthe Jobs CreationProject's successful experienceand from initialwork done on employment generationas part of the preparationof the EmergencyEconomicRecoveryCredit(Cr. 2670-HA). Withunemployment hoveringnear 70 percent,the Projectwas seen as a criticalcomponentin the maintenance of politicaland economicstability duringthis periodof transitionand emergingdemocratic institutions. A. ProjectObjectives 2. EGP's objectives were to: (a) create short-termemployment for peoplein extreme povertyin supportof the Borrower'sprogramfor povertyalleviation; (b) rehabilitateseriously deterioratedeconomicand productiveinfrastructure in the Borrower'scountry;and (c) strengthen the capacityof non-government and community organizations operatingin the territory of the Borrower,and the Borrower'scentraland localauthoritiesto managelaborintensivesmall-scale development projects, including the establishment of a nationalnon-governmental contract management entityalongwith the development of a longerterm strategyfor povertyalleviation, employment, and smallinfrastructure maintenance. 3. EGP was composedof two parts: employment generationand institutional development. Part A: Employment Generation 4. This component was to carryout highprioritysmall-scale development activities (includinglabor costs and associatedequipment,management and supervision thereof), especially in the areasof (a) productiveand economicinfrastructure, including the rehabilitation of roads, culverts,bridges,and irrigationanddrainagecanals;(b) environmental protection,including watershedmanagement, erosioncontroland soilreclamation; (c) pollutioncontrol,including urban solidwaste disposaland clearingof urban waste water drains;and (d) other activities. It -2 - was to create an estimated 487,000 person-months of short-term employment. This would generate an average income of US$70 (equivalent to about 6 months cash income) for approximately 325,000 extremely poor laborers supporting about 1.6 million family members. Part B: Institutional Development 5. This component was to provide technical assistance (including training, studies and auditing services, vehicles, furniture, staff and other incremental operational support) for the implementation of Part A and develop the Borrower's long-term employment and poverty alleviation strategy. 6. The Project would: (a) strengthen non-governmental and community organizations involved in the implementation of part A, as well as the Borrower's local authorities, by improving their capacity to identify, prepare, implement and maintain small-scale labor intensive economic development projects; (b) assess the experience of previous employment generation programs, and increase the maintenance of investments in rural roads, irrigation and soil conservation by developing maintenance strategies; and (c) support development and initial implementation of a longer term strategy to generate employment in economicallydepressed areas, including the creation of a national autonomous non-governmental entity able to provide delegated contract management services (e.g. as in the AGETIP model) ' especially for small-scale labor-intensive works. 7. The Government of Haiti was the Borrower and UCG (Unit6 Centrale de Gestion attached to the Prime Minister's Office) was the implementingagency. To carry out Part A, UCG made agreements with four MDODs (Non-Governmental Organizations) which in turn made sub- contracts with other implementingorganizations (NGOs, local authorities or other private sector organizations) to implement sub-projects. 8. Comments on the Project Objectives. EGP's objectives were ambitious and challenging in terms of outcome and disbursement flow. Implementation has shown that the goals were reachable. With respect to the institutional development component, it is doubtful whether the longer-term strategy objectives could have effectivelybeen reached within such short project period. More time is needed to fully accomplish such goals. B. Achievementof Project Objectives 9. EGP was an intense labor generation effort, with critical short-term benefits. It was also to form a bridge towards a more sustainable long-term approach. Accordingly, the primary goal AGETIPrefershere to management agenciesfor smallpublic infrasructure works. These agencieshave been successful for the implementationof municipalinfrastructure workson the Africancontinentand have been sponsoredby the WorldBank. -3- of EGP was to addressimmediate povertyalleviation needs throughjob creationand income generationand to improveseverelydilapidated economicand productiveinfrastructure.EGP made substantial contributions to immediate povertyreliefmainlythroughthe creationof a large numberof short-termjobs, a substantial injectionof moneyin the local economies, the improvement of infrastructure affectingthe livelihood of the poor, and the protection/ rehabilitation of various environmentally degradedlocations. EGP also strengthenedcommunities and implementing agenciesand financedseveralinteresting but scatteredinstitutionaldevelopment activities. As was feared for in the StaffAppraisalReport,it fell short of ensuringlong-term sustainability. EmploymentGeneration Component 10. The mainphysicaloutcomesof the employment generationcomponentare summarized below (Table1). 11. EGP created475,700person-months of short-termemployment in 18 months. The job distribution over the project periodis irregular: about 25,000jobs per monthwere created during the first projectyear (September1995 - August 1996) and60,000jobs per month in the last quarter of 1996. This can be explained by the late recruitment of three MDODswhose contracts were only signedin the secondquarter of 1996. Table 1: Summary of Project Outputs Outcome Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage estimate estimate (b/a) (a) (b) (b/a) A- Job Creation Jobs created(person-months) 487,000 475,691 98% Of which for women(person-months) 97,400 100,685 103% Total wages paid (US$ million) 27 22 81 % B- Infrastructure Rehabilitation Roads Rehabilitated(km) 1,100 763 69% Area under improved irrigation (ha) 62,000 Canalsrehabilitated(km) 1,500 1,599 107% Garbage/debrisremoved('000 m 3 ) 200 177 89% Erosion-protected area (ha) 8,000 13,000 163% Water supply (km) 14.5 TOTAL COST (US$ million) 51.4 47.4 92% 12. The arithmetic average of 26,500 jobs per month created by EGP over that period is to be compared with the 40,000 monthly jobs provided by the national assembly industry before the military coup in 1990-91. Twenty-one percent of the jobs have been carried out by women. The total wages paid to workers and directly injected into largely depressed local economies amounted to US$22.0 million (53 percent ofthe component's total disbursement). About 317,100 individuals supporting some 1.6 millionhousehold members (22 percent of the Haitian population of 7.2 million) were employed in the Project all over the country. An average laborer received over a six week working period an income of about US$70 (31 percent of per capita GDP). Some additional US$4 to 6 million of Project funds have been channeled to the local economies as wages for employees of the private sector providing the building materials. 13. Independent studies on a sample of workers indicate that 60 percent of the earned income went to consumption (food, closing, housing), and 40 percent to investment (education, livestock, small-scale trade, and farming). The Employment Generation Component (US$47.4 million, 90 percent of total costs) of the Project was disbursed in its entirety by March 1997. 14. EGP carried out 158 community sub-projects in 96 (out of 133) municipalitiesin the nine geographic departments. Average sub-project size was US$276,000. Most of the SAR quantitative physical goals have been exceeded. The quality of the works is generally satisfactory (in over 75 percent of the sub-project samples independently evaluated). Durability (especially for rural roads) appears uncertain due mainly to the lack of adequate post-project maintenance mechanisms. In addition to the three initial eligible categories of works (productive and economic infrastructure including the rehabilitation of roads, culverts, bridges, and irrigation and drainage canals; environmental protection; and pollution control), EGP financed also rehabilitation expansion of potable water supply. 15. EGP had also some secondary benefits. The following are two examples of the kind of indirect/secondary benefits brought by the Project. At Goyavier/St-Marc, savings generated through the implementation of a soil conservation project enabled the communityto initiate the construction of a local school and to attract other funding and assistance for completion. Self-confidence and positive momentum built within the community of Desdunes/Artibonite from the successful implementation of a drainage/irrigation sub-project allowed the community to raise more than US$32,000 to rehabilitate the badly deteriorated access road to that locality. Moreover the employment generation component contributed towards: (i) the training of specialized laborers; (ii) the development of local enterprises; (iii) the strengthening of local training centers; (iv) the elaboration of a technical reference manual for labor-intensive projects; and (v) the improvement of the environmental impact assessment system. Institutional Development Component 16. Multiple diverse institutional strengthening actions were undertaken and their outcomes are generally satisfactory. EGP provided working experience in labor-intensive infrastructure projects to 135 implementingorganizations (mostly local NGOs, community groups or associations,selectedmunicipalities and smallrural privatefirms). It provided sta trainingfor municipalities, CASECsand selectedcentraladministration entities. It also financed: (i) basic office equipmentand furniturefor municipalities and CASECs;(ii)variousurban studies(urban -5 - development masterplan outlines,strengthening of municipal fiscalmanagement, and socio-economic studies);and (iii) equipment for the ministriesof agricultureand publicworks. Someactions,however,were somewhat dispersedandlackedcohesionwhichreducedtheir impact. 17. UCG was slow to start with the development of a long-termstrategyand the creationof a nationalautonomousentityto provideinfrastructure contractmanagement services. WhenUCG finallybegan activelypromotingthe proposalin mid-1996, GOI's interestand support for the creationof such autonomousentityhad diminished.GOH had becomemore favorableto a public sectormanagementapproachof employment creationand infrastructure development. As a result, EGP fell short of developing a longterm nationalstrategyto support and promote employment generationin povertystrickenareas. It didnot establishan AGETIP-type national institution with the capacityto carryout sucha strategyon a sustainable basis. C. Implementation Recordand Major FactorsAffectingthe Project 18. Overall,the employment generationcomponent (Part A) of the Projectwas implemented with some delay. The initialobjective was to disbursemost fundsin the first projectyear to addressimmediate povertysituationsafterthe economicembargoandto revivethe rural economy. Late contractingof three MDODsand intensesub-project(particularly environmental) screening by UCG has caused somebunchingat the end of the projectperiod. 19. The institutional development component (Part B) was more difficultto implementas it lackeda basic design. This resultedin a very late start (April1996)and severalmonthsof negotiations betweenUCG andthe Bank on the component'sobjectives,strategiesand content. Timefor implementation and qualitycontrolwas consequently reduced. To accommodate completionof some elementsof the component, the Projectclosedone monthlater than planned. About US$2.2millionfor Part B was not used. The majordeterminants of project implementation are discussedbelow. 20. GovernmentSupport. EGP's quickstart-upbenefitedlargelyfrom GOH's strong support and commitment, and from an alreadyexisting,fullyoperationalUSAIDJobs Creation Projectimplementation structurekept in place thanksto bridgefinancingfromthe "Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale"fundedby the Interamerican Development Bank. Continuoussupportfor the Project at the locallevel(municipalities, CASECs,NGOs) has been a key factor in EGP's overallsuccess. At times, changesin the CentralGovernment 2 , however, generateddistractionsand delays(specifically with respectto the institutional development component). 21. UCG Management. UCG'sflexible and efficientadministrative and operational management has been a decisivepositivefactor in achievingthejob creationand physicaltargets. Nevertheless,late contractingof three MDODsand delaysin approvingMDODwork-plans resultedin a 4-monthlag in reachinginterimjob creationtargets. Thisreducedthe time allocated 2 The Projectwas implemented under three differentAdministrations. -6- for maintenance of sub-projectsandbuncheda considerable part of the works in the second semesterof 1996. UCG's financial management performance declinedafterthe closureof the project. It is expectedthat the finalprojectaudit willbe qualified. 22. EGP's managementarrangement with three layersof entities(UCG,MDODs,IOs), each with differentand well specified mandatesand responsibilities clearlystated in enforceable performance-type contractswas also a key elementin ensuringefficient,withinbudget and timely deliveryof projectoutcomes. 23. MDODPerformance. The management capacityand experienceof the MDODs, particularly the Pan AmericanDevelopment Foundationresponsiblefor two-thirdsof the works, has been the centerpiece of EGP's successful implementation. The three other MDODs(Centre Canadiend'ttude de CooperationInternationale, CooperativeHousingFoundationand Centres pour le Developpement et la Sante)have also provento be highlycapableof fulfilling their contractand deliveringoutcomesin excessof expectation, in a timelyfashion,withinbudget and up to agreedqualitystandards. The sameconsiderations are also applicable to most of the 135 implementing organizations involvedin EGP'simplementation. This collaboration between public and privatesector is exemplary in the regionand shouldbe continued. 24. Methodology. EGP's methodology was builton the main successfactors of the previous USAIDJobs-CreationProject. In particular,the use of sub-projectprototypeswas key in speeding-upthe whole sub-projectcycle(from formulation to implementation). Nevertheless,the designand formulationof sub-projects in some cases sufferedfrom technicalshortcomingsdue to oversimplification or lack of in-depthstudies. 25. Bank Procurement, Disbursement and Supervision. The Bank's flexibleprocurement and disbursement systemwhichalloweda sole-sourcecontractorfor US$32 million,accepted relatively high thresholdsfor direct contracting, providedadvances to MDODsexceedingUS$20 millionwithoutrequiringa bank guaranteeand reliedexclusively on ex-post controlhas significantly facilitatedfieldimplementation. Moreover,fundswere transferredto MDODs withoutan intermediary accountin the CentralBank,hence speedingup moneytransfers. 26. As shownin Table 10 of the Statistical Annexes,the Bank conducted 11 project supervision missionsbetweenAugust 1995 and February1997,seven of them emphasized the status of MDOD'shiring,the institutional development component'sstart-upand initiativesto establishan AGETIP-typecontractmanagement agency. This intensepattern of assistanceto the project has contributedsignificantly to its successful implementation. 27. DirectPaymentsto MDODsand Ols. Direct paymentsto well-screened, reliable,but overallwell-trustedMDODsand implementation organizations has been key to timelypayment for works and wages;a criticalconcernin a politically and sociallysensitiveenvironment characterized by the publicadministration's past inability to pay on time. 28. ForeignExchangeFluctuations. Nine monthsafter start-up,fluctuationsin the SDR exchangerate resultedin a reductionof about 7 percent(US$3.5million)of the US$ amount of the Credit available for the Project. Concurrently, a reductionin the Gourde/US$exchangerate contributedto offset partiallythat loss. D. ProjectSustainability 29. EGP's sustainability containstwo aspects: (i) the sustainability of the infrastructure works and post-projectmaintenance by responsible sector line agencies,local authoritiesand communities; and (ii) the sustainability of the employment generationprogramitself as to whether and how suchactivitiesin the longerrun would fit into a comprehensive povertyalleviation and economicdevelopment strategy. Thesetwo questionswere to be addressedby studiesand technicalassistance in the Project'sinstitutional development component. 30. Sustainability (or durability) of physicalrehabilitation works variesa great deal depending on locationbut also on the categoryof works. An independentevaluationof sub-projectsamples, indicatesthat soilconservation and particularly irrigationworks are most likelyto be sustainable. Initiatives alreadyundertakenby beneficiaries to maintainand/or operate the rehabilitated irrigationsystems(in morethan 50 percentof the cases)or to protect soilconservationworks in manysites are positiveindicatorsfor sustainability.Sub-projects suchas garbagecollection, street and drain cleaningalongwith rural road rehabilitation is likelyto be less sustainable.People considersuchworks part of the publicsectordomainand willnot maintainthem on a voluntary basiswithoutbeingpaid. Suchmaintenance requirespublicfundingandmanagement, still a scarce commodity in Haiti. 31. Concerning the sustainability of the employment programitself,EGP did neitherdefinea strategyfor povertyalleviation throughsmall-scale laborintensivetype investments at local levels, nor establishan AGETIPor similarprivatemanagement unit to promote employment on a more sustainable basisthrough creationandtrainingof smalllocalprivate contractors.Recent GOH initiativesin basicinfrastructure investment opt for programmanagement through sector line Ministries. 32. The Project, however,left behindstrengthened nationaland localinstitutions(UCG, selectedcentraladministration agencies, municipalities, MDODs,and 1Os)with stafftrained and experienced in labor-intensive infrastructure rehabilitation works at local levels. Someof these MDODscould undertakelarge programsof small-scale infrastructureinvestments.EGP also left behindlargequantitiesof tools andvarioustype of officeequipmentand furniture. Thoseare very valuableandready-to-useassets on whichGOH has the option to keep buildingon. E. BankPerformance 33. OverallBank performance is rated as highlysatisfactory.The involvement of the Bank was justifiedat a time whenit was criticalthat donor-financed projectsgeneratedincomefor the poor duringthe transitionto politicaland economicstability, whileprivateled employment and economicgrowthwould pick up the slackin the economy.In addressing GOlfs urgent need and request for assistance,the Bank showedswiftresponsiveness and extremecreativityand flexibility.This led to a record-breaking time 10-weekperiodfor preparation,appraisal,Board presentation,effectiveness and first disbursement.Thisrapidturnoverwas the result of -8- tremendouscooperationand coordination withinthe Bank and betweenthe Bank and GOH. EGP's designwas based on the Borrower'sextremepovertysituation,the judgmentof in-country implementation capacity,risk assessmentof successand sustainability that proved to be accurate. The Bank'sperformance duringappraisalis thus rated highlysatisfactorydespiteshortcomingsin the preparationof sectionsof the institutional development component. 34. To ensuresuccessduringimplementation, the Bank dedicateda significant amount of resourcesto assistthe implementing agency. Elevensupervision missionstook place over the 21-monthimplementation period. The Bank'sresponsiveness in addressing unforeseen implementation problemsor issueswas swift,and communication with UCG was steady. Close coordinationbetweenthe Bank andUCG contributedto keepingthe Project on track, and the requiredtechnicalassistancewas made available to UCG accordingto the implementation plan. Giventhe fast pace of projectimplementation, the changeof task managerless than ten months before projectcompletioncausedsome delay,but relatednegativeimpactswere eventually limited. The Bank has shownsome inflexibility in the applicationof the rule of 60 percent (of sub-projectexpenditures for wages). It has maintained that UCG was to identifyand financesub- projectswith a high laborcontent. It alsofeared that a reductionin the percentageof labor costs would make too manysolidwaste urban sub-projectseligible for financing under EGP. F. BorrowerPerformance 35. OverallBorrower'sperformance is rated satisfactory.Whilethe Borrowerwas actively involvedin projectpreparation,subsequentadministrations have reducedtheir support for the Project and its sustainability. 36. The Borrower'sperformance duringprojectpreparationis rated highlysatisfactory. Upon its re-establishment in October 1994,the Constitutional Government mappeda coherent economicand socialrehabilitation programto facethe problemsand challenges ahead. The Prime Minister'sOfficetook a leadingrole in coordinating major donor emergency programs. To underscorethe importanceof emergency actions,it created the CentralImplementation Unit (UCG)in December1994 to ensureand supervisethe implementation of the Economic EmergencyProgramand the EGP. The GOHexpressedits request for assistanceunder EGP with a clearfocus andhigh levelof priority,fully supportedandwas activelyinvolvedin allphases of projectpreparation. 37. The Borrower'sperformance in implementing Part A of the Project is rated satisfactory. UCG showedadequateleadershipin buildingon the previousJOBS CreationProjectexperience, in improvingand adaptingEGP's rules, proceduresand standardsto the new environment of the nationalpost-embargoperiod and kept the employment generationcomponenton track. Participationand involvement of centraland local government authoritiesat all steps of sub- project cyclewere routinelysought. UCG found it difficult to manageEGP under the 60/40 ratio ( labor content over materialsand other costs) mandatedper sub-project.Nonetheless, MDODs and most IOs demonstrateda highlevel of flexibility, creativityandprofessionalism in carrying out their respectivecontractualcommitments and in meeting(whennot exceeding)outcome deliverytargets. Despitewidenedpositiveresponseat local levels,activesupport of key central administrations and sector line ministries nevermaterialized. -9 - 38. The Borrower'sperformance in implementing Part B of the Projectis rated satisfactory. After initialenthusiasm, the Borrowerdemonstrated hesitationand at timesnoticeablelack of interest and support for the main long-termoptionsof the institutional development componentas agreedduringproject preparation. As a result,the institutional development objectiveswere only partiallymet andthe Project'ssustainability remainsuncertain. G. Assessmentof Outcome 39. The ICR rates the overalloutcomeof this Projectas highlysatisfactory.UCG's evaluation of the outcomeof the Project is includedas Appendix B. In general,UCG also considersthat the successfuloutcomeof the employment generationcomponentshouldbe the definingfactor of the overallevaluation. 40. The employment generationcomponent(Part A), amounting to 92 percent of the Project is rated highlysatisfactoryfor the followingreasons: (i) the Project reachedthe ambitious job creationobjectives;(ii) projectfundsbenefitedthe poorestlayersof the populationand provided the highly-needed cashto stimulate recoveryfromthe economichardshipsduringthe international embargo;and (iii) rehabilitation of crucialproductive, economicandbasicinfrastructurealong with protection/conservation of environmentally degradedor threatenedareasmeet or exceed appraisalexpectations in most cases. 41. An independentevaluationof EGP's economicimpactindicatesthat the rehabilitation of irrigationschemeshas providedmost economicbenefitsto the country. The rehabilitation of roads and water supplyshowedalso substantial return on investment.The returns on the constructionof new roads were not evaluatedas beingimportant. Data lackedto carry out an economicevaluationof the soilconservation projects. 42. The outcomeof the EGP'sinstitutional development component(Part B) accountingfor about fivepercent of the Project cost is rated satisfactory for the followingreasons. (i) the managerial, administrative andoperationalcapacitiesof UCG, selectedcentral Government bodies,participating municipalities and CASECs,NGOs, variouscommunity organizations and smallrural privateenterprises were significantly enhanced; (ii) the Project has supportedpunctualoperations,whichmay not alwayshave been internally coherent,but whichhave mostlysupportedongoinglong-termstrategicprograms(such as UNDP's urban development program)whichmay prove to be vitalto the country's development; and (iii) communities have receivedlargenumbersof tools andequipmentredistributed to beneficiaries afterEGP's completionwhichthey willbe ableto use for the maintenance of the works and completionof other works. - 10- H. Future Operation 43. Despitevariousrecommendations on waysto connectEGP's immediate poverty alleviationobjectives with long-termdevelopment assistance,GOHdecidednot to create an AGETIP. It is howeverstronglyrecommended that future Bank-financed operationsbe carried out using the privatesector capacitycreatedunder EGP. 44. Duringa project closingseminarfuture actionsto buildon EGP's positiveachievements have been reviewedand discussed. UCG and the UNDP-funded technicalassistanceproject HAI/94/003"PriorityAssistance to Municipalities" carnied out by the UnitedNations Conference for Human Settlement (UNCHS-HABITAT) have expressedtheirintentionto follow-upon a wide diffusionand "marketing" of the mainstudiescarriedout under EGP, specifically the seven urban development masterplan outlinesand the socio-economic studies. I. Key LessonsLearned 45. The lessonsto be drawn fromthe implementation of this Project comprisethe highly successfulcooperationbetweenprivateand publicsector, eligibility criteriaof sub-projects, participation by beneficiaries, projectownership,institutional development, and realismin establishing projectobjectives. The lessonsinclude: (i) a partnership between public and private/non-governmental sectors can live up to tremendouschallenges.NGOs have showna substantial implementation capacityand drive, which the public sector cannot match. Future small infrastructure projects should take this experience into account and make use of this private implementation capacity; (ii) not all infrastructure rehabilitation sub-projects are suited for labor-intensive methods. Road construction and some other sub-projects requiring heavy-duty equipment need more capitalinputsfor satisfactory completion than were agreedupon under the 60- 40 percent rule for allocation of labor and capital expenditures. The type of sub-projects undertakenshouldbe consistentwith the type of resourcesavailable; (iii) extensive participation with beneficiaries and local authorities are necessary from the inception of sub-projects to ensure sustainable maintenance and operation. This often conflicts with the pressure to disburse and achieve quick results. Although tradeoffs are unavoidable, higher beneficiary contributions and participation in the sub-project design would have increased the likelihoodof sub-project sustainability; (iv) the Bank and the Government are able to move very fast when supported by senior officials. Fast project preparation need not to diminish quality. Moreover, flexibility in procurement, disbursement and intense supervision have ensured successful implementation; and (v) more realism is needed about what can be achieved in terms of institutional development in a short time period and in an environment such as the one prevailing in Haiti in 1995-96. - 11 - PART H - STATISTICAL TABLES Table 1: Sumrary of Assessments Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits Table 3: Project Timetable Table 4: Loan/Credit Disbursement: CumulativeEstimated and Actual Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Table 6: Studies Included in Project Table 7A: Project Cost Table 7B: Project Financing Table 8: Status of Legal Covenants Table 9: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Table 10: Bank Resources: Missions - 12 - Table 1: Summaryof Assessments A. Achievementof objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Applicable Macro policies X Sectorpolicies X Financial objectives X Institutional development X__ Physical objectives _ Povertyreduction X Gender issues X Other social objectives X Environmentalobjectives X Public sectormanagement X Private sectordevelopment X NGO involvement X B. Projectsustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain x C. Bank performance Highly Satisfactory Deficient _______ _______ _______ ______ Satisfactory_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Identification X PreparationAssistance X Appraisal X Supervision X D. Borrowerperformance Highly Satisfactory Deficient Satisfactory Preparation X Implementation X Covenantcompliance X Operation(if applicable) E. Assessmentof outcome Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfactory x - 13 - Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits Loan/credit title Purpose Year of Status approval Preceding operations 1. Road Maintenance and Road maintenance and small 1995 Active Rehabilitation infrastructure 2. Economic and Social Fund Construction of Schools and 1991 Active Health facilities 3. Emergency Economic Structural Adjustment 1995 Active Recovery Following operations 1. Basic Rural Infrastructure Small Municipal 1996 Under Infrastructure preparation 2. Rural Development Project Research and small rural 1998 investments Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in project cycle Date planned Date actual/ latest estimates Identification (executive Project 5/95 5/95 Summary) __ -Preparation 5/95 5/95 Appraisal 5/95 5/95 Negotiation 6/95 6/95 Board presentation 7/95 7/95 Signing 7/95 7/95 Effectiveness 7/95 7/95 -Project completion 9/96 4/97 Loan closing 3/97 4/97 - 14 - Table 4: Loan/CreditDisbursement: Cumulative Estimatedand Actual (US$ thousands) I FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 Appraisal estimate 36,000 14,000 -- Actual 31,354 15,068 Actual as % of estimate 87% 108% Date of final disbursement November 20, 1997 - 15 - Table 5.A: Key Indicators for Project Implementation I. Key implementation indicators Estimated Actual in SAR/President's Report [ A. Employment Generation Component A-1. Job Creation - Jobs created (person-month) 487,000 475,691 - Of which women (person-months) 97,400 100,685 - Total wages paid (US$ millions) 27.0 22.0 - Daily wages paid (Gourdes) 36.0 36.0 A.2. Improvement of Infrastructure and Public Services - Road Rehabilitated (km) 1,100 763 - Irrigation Canals rehabilitated (km) 1,500 1,599 Sediment removed ('000 m 3 ) 1,800 1,816 - Urban Pollution Debris removed ('000 m 3 ) 200 177 Canals cleared (km) 66 59 Sediment removed ('000 M 3 ) 190 178 Streets cleaned (km) 300 442 - Soil and Water Conservation Land protected (ha) 8,000 13,000 Contour canals built (km) 700 2.010 Terrace and hedge rows (km) 300 2,268 Drywalls (km) 90 788 Gully plugs (km) 60 242 Trees planted ('000 trees) 1,000 2,946 Gabions (m 3 ) 2,600 13,043 - 16 - Table 5.B: Key Indicators for Project Implementation (Continued) I. Key implementation indicators Estimated Actual in SAR/President's Report B. Institutional Development Component - Training number trained UCG 3 2 MDODs 4 3 lOs 90 135 People 11,000 15,700 - Technical Assistance number receiving TA UCG 22 13 lOs 450 135 Participating Communes 9 129 Participating Communal Sections 36 458 - Maintenance Plans developed (number) 45 22 Work undertaken by Communes/NGOs 54 30 II. Other indicators A. Employment Generation Component - Irrigation Areas with improved irrigation (ha) 62,000 - Urban pollution Street pavement (km) 15 - Soil and Water Conservation Ravines corrected (km) 600 - Water Supply Ditch excavation (km) 106 Pipe laying (km) 14 Standpost (unit) 192 B. Institutional Development Component TA for Ministries/ other administrations 8 Dump site plans developed 3 Urban development master plan outlines 7 - 17- Table 6: Studies Included in Project Study Purposeas definedat | Status Impact of study appraisal/redefined 1. Economnic Evaluationof Calculatethe economic benefits Studywas Studywill help ProjectInvestments from labor intensivesmall scale completedat the GOHin planning projectsto identifythose end of the Project. for future projectsthat contributemost to employment the local economy; serve as projects,in input to GOH'sstrategyfor particularwith employment generation. respectto economic eligibility criteria 2. Strategyfor Work Development of a maintenance Studynot carried Maintenance strategyfor rural roadsthat out wouldbenefitfrom relevant nationaland international experienceand be consistent with sectorguidelines 3. Development of Long Term AssistGOHto developand Studynot carried AGETIP-type InstitutionalStrategies implementlong term strategies out,but seminar approach forbuildinglocal institutions took place awareness with capacitiesto manage and implementlabor intensive investments(in the AGETIP model). 4. Reviewof Haiti's Public Identifymain issues,bottlenecks Studynot carried l ProcurementAct and optionsin viewHaiti's out development needsand that GOHcouldinclude in revised Act proposalto be submitted to Parliament. 5. Urban Development Studies Providethe selected Completed Studieswill help for 7 secondarycities (Jacmel, municipalities with the municipalitiesin J&r6mie, Fort-Libert6, Hinche, appropriateplaning and planingurban Gonaives,Miragodne, management tools in development Saint-Marc anticipationof future local worksand development investments needs investments 6. Dump site certifications Identifypotentialand suitable Completed certifieddump site studiesfor 4 municipalities dump sites and provideselected shouldhelp (Cap-Haitian,Gonaives,St.- municipalities with technical municipalities Marc, and Jacmel) assessmentsneededto get MDE achieve better solid certification wastemanagement and environmental urban pollution control - 18 - Table 7A: Project Cost Appraisal estimate Actualllatest estimate (US$ million) (US$ million) Item l Local Foreign Local Foreign costs costs Total costs costs Total A. Employment Generation Component 1. Soil Conservation 14.5 0.8 15.2 11.1 11.1 2. Road Rehabilitation 14.5 0.8 15.2 10.9 10.9 3. Irrigation Works 9.6 0.5 10.1 10.9 10.9 4. Waste Management 9.& 0.5 10.1 9.9 9.9 4.bis. Potable Water Supply - - 2.2 2.2 5. MDOD's Management 0.07 0.6 .7 -- 2.4 2.4 Subtotal Employment Gen. Comp. 48.2 3.1 51.4 45.0 2.4 47.4 B. Institutional Development 1.7 3.3 5.0 2.7 -- 2.7 Project Administration 1.5 -- 1.5 TOTAL PROJECT COSTS 49.9 6.4 56.4 49.2 2.4 51.6 Table 7B: Project Financing Appraisal estimate Actual/latest estimate (US$ million) (US$ million) Source ll Local | Foreign | Local Foreign J _________ costs costs Total costs costs lTotal |IBRD/IDA 43.6 6.4 50.0 44.0 2.4 46.4 Beneficiaries 6.4 -- 6.4 5.2 -- 5.2 TOTAL 50.0 6.4 56.4 49.2 2.4 51.6 - 19- Table 8: Status of Legal Covenants HAITI Employment Generation Project, Cr. 2765-HA Agree- Section Covenant Present Original Revised Description of Covenant Comments ment Type Status fulfillment fulfillment l _ date date _ Credit 3.01a 5 C "Duediligencecovenant." None 3.Olb 5 C Borrowershall ensurethat the UCG carries None out the Projectin accordancewith the OperationalManual and the QuarterlyWork __________ Programs. 3.01c 5 C The Borrowershall complywith its None obligations under the UCG Agreement. 3.01d 5 C The Borrowershall ensurethat the UCG None complieswith its obligationsunder any MDOD Agreement. 3.02 10 C Procurement shall be governedby the None l_________ ___________ provisions of Schedule 3. 3.03 10 NYD The Borrowershallfurnish to the None Association, no later than six months after the Closing Date, a plan for future operation of the Project,and carry out the plan with due diligencetaking into accountthe Association's comments. 3.04a 5 C The Borrowershall ensurethat the UCG None will conductthe overall planning and monitoringof the Project;reviewand approvethe proposalsfor Sub-projects; prepareprogram reports;overseethe carryingout of Sub-projects; undertake procurement; administerthe withdrawalsof the proceedsof the Credit relatedrecords, accountsand audits; and complywith the _ _ _ _ _ __ _ obligations relating to insurance. - 20 - 3.04a 5 C use of goodsand services,plans and None (continue schedules,recordand re