Urban Community-Driven Development Project

Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR 0000 4163 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA - H3940; IDA - H6210; IDA - H9730) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF X DR 34.4 MILLION (US$53.2 1 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI FOR A URBAN COMMUNITY - DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PRODEPUR October 31 , 2017 Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice Latin America and Caribbean Region 1 US$47.7 million at June 29, 2017 exchange rate Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Exchange Rate Effective June 3 0 , 2017 Currency Unit = Haitian Gourdes ( HTG ) HTG1.00 = US$0.016 US$ 1.00 = HTG62.8 FISCAL YEAR October 1 – September 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AF Additional Financing ASEC Assemblée Section Communale ( Communal Section Assembly) BCOIZP Bureau de Coordination Opérationnelle des Interventions dans les Zones Prioritaire ( Office for the Operational Coordination of Interventions in Priority Zones) BMPAD Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d’Aide au Développement (Office of Monetization of Development Aid Programs ; formerly the PL - 480 Management Office) BTC Bureau Technique de Coordination ( Technical Coordination Bureau ) CADEC Conseil d'Appui au Développement C ommunautaire ( Council for Community Development Support ) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CASEC Conseil d’Administration de la Section Communale ( Administrative Council of the Communal Section ) CBO Community Based Organization CBD Caribb ean D evelopment Bank CDD Community Driven Development CECI Centre d’Etudes et de Coopération Internationale (Center for Studies and International Cooperation) CIAT Comité Interministériel d’ Aménagement du Territoire (Interministerial Committee for Territorial Planning) COPRODEP Community - Driven Project Development Councils CPF Country Partnership Framework CRC Community Reconstruction Centers DINEPA Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assannissement ( National Directorate of Potable Water and Sanitation ) EPPLS Entreprise Publique Pour les Logements Sociaux ( Social Housing Public Enterprise) EMF Environmental Management Framework ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework GoH Government of Haiti GDP Gross Domestic Product GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery HSI Haiti Stabilization Initiative HTG Haitian Gourde IDA International Development Association IDP Internally Displaced People IFC International Finance Corporation IHRC Interim Haiti Recovery Commission IRR Internal Rates of Return ISN Interim Strategy Note J/P HRO Jenkins/Penn Haitian Relief Organization M&E Monitoring & Evaluation MDOD Maître d’Ouvrage Délégué ( Service Providers) MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance MICT Minist è re de l’Int é rieur et des Collectivit é s Territoriales (Ministry of Interior and Local Authorities) MINUSTAH Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) NGO Non - Governmental Organization NPV Net Present Values OM Operations Manual O&M Operation and Maintenance PADF Pan - American D evelopment Foundation PAPs Project Affected P eople PDNA Post - Disaster Needs Assessment PDO Project Development Objective PREKAD P rojet de R econstruction des Quartiers D éfavorisés de Port - au - Prince ( Port - au - Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project ) PRODEP Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif ( Community - Driven Development Project) PRODEPAP Projet Pilote de Développ e ment Communa u taire Participatif dans l’a ire Métropolitaine de Port - au - Prince (Pilot Community - Driven Development Project in the Port - au - Prince Area) PRODEPUR Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Urbain ( Urban Community - Driven Development Project ) PUGRD Projet d'Urgence de Gestion des Risques et des D ésastres ( Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Project ) RAP Resettlement Action Plan RF Results Framework RPF Resettlement Policy Framework SDR Special Drawing Right UCLBP Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics (Unit for Construction of Housing and Public Buildings) US$ United States Dollar Senior Global Practice Director : Ede Ijjasz - Vasquez Practice Manager: Ming Zhang Task Team Leader: Jonas Ingemann Parby ICR Team Leader: Roland Bradshaw HAITI Urban Commu nity - Driven Development Project PRODEPUR CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... i B. Key Dates ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ i C. Ratings Summary ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... i D. Sector and Theme Codes ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ ii E. Bank Staff ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................... ii F. Results Framework Analysis ................................ ................................ ................................ . iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ................................ ................................ ................ xi H. Restructuring (if any) ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ xi I. Disbursement Profile ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... xiv 1 . Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................ ........................... 1 3. Assessment of Outcomes ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 19 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ................................ ................................ ..... 27 5. Assessment of Bank and Recipient Performance ................................ ................................ .. 28 6. Lessons Learned ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 31 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Recipient/Implementing Agencies/Partners ....................... 33 Annex 1 - Project Costs and Financing ................................ ................................ ..................... 34 Annex 2 - Outputs by Component ................................ ................................ ............................ 35 Annex 3 - Economic and Financial Analysis ................................ ................................ ............ 39 Annex 4 - Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ........................ 42 Annex 5 - Beneficiary Survey Results ................................ ................................ ...................... 44 Annex 6 - Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................ .............................. 48 Annex 7 - Summary of Re cipient's ICR and/or Comments to the Draft ICR ........................... 49 Annex 8 - Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ................................ .. 56 Annex 9 - List of Supporting Documents ................................ ................................ ................. 57 Annex 10 - Detailed Context at Appraisal ................................ ................................ ................ 58 MAP OF HAITI ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................ 62 i HAITI Urban Community - Driven Development Project: PRODEPUR DATASHEET A. Basic Information Country: Haiti Project Name: Haiti - Urban Community - Driven Development Project : PRODEPUR Project ID: P106699 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA - H3940 IDA - H6210 IDA - H9730 ICR Date: 03/21/2017 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: Republic of Haiti Original Total Commitment: XDR 9.60M Disbursed Amount: XDR 34.2 3 M Revised Amount: XDR 34.40M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Office of Monetization of Development Aid Programs - Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d’Aide au Développement ( BMPAD ) Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: N/A B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 10/29/2007 Effectiveness: 10/27/2008 10/27/2008 Appraisal: 03/11/2008 Additional Financing (AF) or Restructurings (R ): 10/06/2010 (AF) 10/21/2011 (R) 03/ 2 4/2014 (R) 06/20/2014 (AF) 05/20/2016 (R) Approval: 06/03/2008 Mid - term Review: 09/10/2012 09/24/2012 Closing: 03/31/2014 12/31/2016 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory ii C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA): None DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Moderately Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Other Public Administration 1 5 15 Other Education 10 10 Social Protection 25 25 Urban Transport 10 10 Other Water Supply, Sanitation and Waste Management 40 40 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Social Inclusion 40 40 Participation and Civic Engage ment 40 40 Urban Development 40 40 Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 20 20 Services and Housing for the Poor 40 40 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Jorge Familiar Pamela Cox Country Director: Anabela Abreu Yvonne M. Tsikata Practice Manager/Manager: Ming Zhang Ethel Sennhauser iii Project Team Leader: Jonas Ingemann Parby Garry Charlier Bernice V an Bronkhorst ICR Team Leader: Roland Alexander Bradshaw ICR Primary Author: Claudia Soto Orozco F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to improve access to and satisfaction with: (a) basic and social infrastructures and services, and (b) income - generating opportunities for residents of targeted disadvantaged urban area . Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The revi sed Project Development Objective (PDO ) is to improve access to and satisfaction with: (i) basic and social infrastructure and services, including housing repair, reconstruction and community infrastructure improvement needed as a result of the Emergency; and (ii) income - generating opportunities for residents of selected disadvantaged urban areas . (a) PDO Indicator(s) Note: In all cases where the original indicator (PAD) was revised either as part of Additional Financing or Restructuring, an explanation is provided in the Comments section. Text in italics are clarifications based on official ly recorded data. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value 2 Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Indicator 1 : Increased access to water in disadvantaged urban areas that selected such subprojects (i.e., water kiosks, standpipes, community cisterns, rainwater capture, etc.). Value quantitative or Qualitative) Original: 85.51 % 3 Revised : 74.33% + 15% + 7.5 % Based on original baseline 95% Based on original baseline 76.7 % Based on revised baseline 84.5 % Based on revised baseline 2 Baseline and target values are based on the baseline studies conducted in 2011 and 2014 by specialized firms/consultants. 3 This baseline was officially added to the RF through the March 2014 restructuring. iv Date achieved Original: 3/24/2014 Revised: 5/20/2016 6/3/2008 3/24/2014 6/20/2014 5/20/2016 12/31 /2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded . A baseline survey was carried out during implementation . The target value was first reduced in light of (i) the low demand for this type of subproject from community beneficiary groups ( CB O s), and (ii) constraints on implementation of water subprojects due to restrictions set by the principal water provider. The t arget value was re vised a second time as part of the second AF to reflect the addition of four new municipalities to the Project. Indicator 2: Increased access to sanitation in disadvantaged urban areas that selected such subprojects (i.e., garbage collection, solid waste disposal, recycling, composting, sanitary blocks, etc.). Value quantitative or Qualitative) Original : 13.47 % Revised: 27.91% + 20 % 23.47% Based on original baseline 29% Based on original baseline 33.44% Based on revised baseline 33.22% based on revised baseline Date achieved Original: 3/24/2014 4 Revised: 5/20/2016 6/3/2008 3/24/2014 6/20/2014 5/20/2016 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Substantially A chieved . A baseline survey was carried out during implementation. The 2016 restructuring revised the baseline and the target to reflect the addition of four new municipalities to the Project as part of the second Additional Financing. Indicator 3: Increased access to rehabilitated street and drainage infrastructure in disadvantaged urban areas that selected such subprojects (i.e., cleared and rehabilitated drainage canals, ditches, etc.) Value quantitative or Qualitative) Original: 27.85% 5 Revised: 26.40% +10% 53% Based on original baseline 35.40 % Based on revised baseline 49.45 % B ased on revised baseline Date achieved Original: 3/24/2014 Revised: 5/20/2016 6/3/2008 6/20/ 2014 5/20/2016 12/31/2016 4 Idem. 5 Idem. v Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded . A baseline survey was carried out during implementation. The 2016 restructuring revised the baseline and the target to reflect the addition of four new municipalities to the Project as part of the second Additional Financing. Indicator 4: Increased access to social infrastructure and services in disadvantaged urban areas that selected such subprojects (daycare centers, primary schools, secondary schools, health clinics, job training ) Value quantitative or Qualitative) Original : 24.51% Revised: 56.53% +10% 51% B ased on original baseline 66.4 3% B ased on revised baseline 74.99% Based on revised baseline Date achieved Original: 3/24/2014 6 Revised: 5/20/2016 6/3/2008 6/20/2014 5/20/2016 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded. A baseline survey was carried out during implementation. The 2016 restructuring revised the baseline and the target to reflect the addition of four new municipalities to the Project as part of the second Additional Financing. Indi cator 5: Percentage of productive/income generating subprojects that are self - sustaining six months after being fully operational 7 . Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0% 80% N/A 12.06 Date achieved 6/20/2014 6/20/2014 N/A 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Not achieved. Only 12.06% of productive/income generating subprojects are self - sustaining six months after being fully operational. This is due to the fact that many such projects did not generate enough profits and were not economi cally sustainable. Indicator 6: Number of productive/income generating subprojects fully operational 8 . Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 650 N/A 501 Date achieved 6 /20/201 4 6/20/2014 N/A 12/31 /2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Not achieved. The project did not monitor this indicator correctly and only recorded “the number of CDD subprojects completed”. Even th is figure is in correct as the final number of CDD sub projects completed is 652, not 501. Th e total number productive subp rojects completed was 1 31 out of 652 . Indicator 7: Percent of beneficiaries for whom the majority of expected subproject results, as defined by beneficiaries at the start of the project, were achieved (as per results from community evaluation forms) Value 0 % 85% N/A 70% 6 Idem. 7 Idem. 8 PDO indicators 5 and 6 were originally combined as one indicator since the beginning of the Project until 8/24/2014 (ISR number 15) “number of productive/income - generating subprojects that are self - sustaining six months after being fully operational”, wit h baseline value 0 and target value 25% set as part of the March 2014 restructuring. The division into two indicators was made official through the second AF in June 2014. vi quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 6/20/2014 6/3/2008 N/A 12/31 /2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Partially achieved. Th is indicator was met , but th e RF of the last ISR and Aide - Memoire do not capture the results of the beneficiary survey. The beneficiary survey revealed that more than 90% of beneficiaries are satisfied with the results of the Projects and confirm that implementation of subprojects ha s brought considerable positive economic, social and cultural changes in their community. Indicator 8: Residents that have returned to neighborhoods upon completion of housing reconstruction and repair works or receiving a rental grant 9 Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 5,480 N/A 8,844 Date achieved 10/6 /201 0 6/20/2014 N/A 12/31 /2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded. This indicator exceeded the target by 61% . (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Indicator 1: Volume of construction debris cleared in Project neighborhoods Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 13,347 10 41,747 N/A 42,800 Date achieved 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 N/A 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded. Indicator 2: Number of corridors repaired . Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 31 11 108 N/A 108 Date achieved 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 N/A 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % Achieved . 9 This indicator was first introduced as part of the first AF in October 2010 unde r the title “Displaced residents that have returned to original neighborhoods upon completion of housing repair and reconstruction works . The second AF (June 2014) formally revised this indicator to introduce the rental cash grant dimension “ Residents that have returned to neighborhoods upon completion of housing reconstruction and repair works or receiving a rental grant”. 10 When this indicator was introduced as part of the March 2014 restructuring, the Project had already cleared 13,347m 3 of debris 11 Whe n this indicator was introduced, the Project had already repaired 31 corridors. vii achievement) Indicator 3: Number of eligible CBOs joining COPRODEPs 12 Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 1,000 1,173 1,218 Date achieved 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 6/20/2014 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded. Indicator 4: Percent of subprojects successfully implemented, operated, and maintained (as per technical audits) Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 % 95% 70% 83% Date achieved 6/3/2008 6/3/2008 3/24/2014 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded. This revised target was exceeded by 13 percent . Indicator 5: Percent of municipal governments successfully proposing and implementing subprojects in coordination with CBOs Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0% 65% 100% 100% Date achieved 6/3/2008 6/3/2008 3/24/2014 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved. A ll municipalities targeted by the Project coordinated effectively with CBOs in proposi ng and implement ing subprojects. Indicator 6: Percent of subprojects completed in a timely manner Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 % 85% N/A 70.09% Date achieved 6/3/2008 6/3/2008 N/A 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Partially achieved. Delays were caused by the lack of experience and capacity of CBOs and COPRODEP s in project preparation and supervision . Indicator 7: Roads rehabilitated, Non - rural (core indicator) 13 Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 km 8 km 16 km 22.28 km Date achieved 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 6/20/2014 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % The revised target was e xceeded by 39%. 12 This indicator was first introduced in the original PAD under the title “Percent of eligible CBOs joining COPRODEPs”, with a baseline of 0% and a target of 80%. The indicato r title was revised as part of the March 2014 restructuring. 13 This indicator was formally only added to the RF through the March 2014 restructuring. viii achievement) Indicator 8: Number of people in urban areas provided with access to Improved Water Sources under the project 14 Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 50,000 63,650 61,501 Date achieved 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 6/20/2014 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) The revised target was almost achieved (96.7%) . Indicator 9: Cumulative number of housing repair and reconstruction works financed through grants and completed Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 5,000 1,204 1,384 1,906 Date achieved 10/6/2010 10/6/2010 3/24/2014 6/20/2014 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) The revised targets were e xceeded. Indicator 10: Health facilities constructed, renovated, and/or equipped (number) 15 Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 0 3 5 5 Date achieved 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 6/20/2014 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Achieved. Indicator 11: Percent of women holding membership in COPRODEP s executive committee Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 24% 30% N/A 33.97% Date achieved 6/20/2014 6/20/2014 N/A 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % achievement) Exceeded. Indicator 12: Percent of prioritized projects submitted by women CBOs Value (quantitative or Qualitative) 13% 15% N/A 15% Date achieved 6/20/2014 6/20/2014 N/A 12/31/2016 Comments Achieved. 14 Idem 15 Idem ix (incl. % achievement) Indicator 13: Number of subproject proposals proposed Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 1,520 DROPPED 895 Date achieved 6/3/2008 6/3/2008 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement) Dropped during restructuring to streamline the M & E. Indicator 14: Number of subproject proposals prioritized/approved Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 380 DROPPED 459 Date achieved 6/3/2008 6/3/2008 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement) Dropped during restructuring to streamline the M&E. Indicator 15: Percentage of neighborhood area cleared from construction debris Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 100 DROPPED Not available Date achieved 10/6/2010 6/20/2014 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement) Dropped during restructuring to streamline the M&E. A similar indicator was introduced (intermediate indicator 1) at the same time this indicator was dropped. Indicator 16: Urban development plans completed and approved by communities Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 1 DROPPED 2 Date achieved 10/6/2010 10/6/2010 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement) Dropped during restructuring to streamline the M&E. Indicator 1 7 : MDOD contracts signed and operating Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 1 DROPPED 3 Date achieved 10/6/2010 10/6/2010 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement) Dropped during restructuring to streamline the M&E. Indicator 18: CRCs are established, fully staffed and effectively operating Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 1 DROPPED 2 Date achieved 10/6/2010 10/6/2010 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 Comments Dropped during restructuring to streamline the M&E. x (incl. % achievement) Indicator 19: Percent of subprojects specifically targeting women, youth, and the elderly (proposed, managed by, and/or benefiting these groups) Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 35 DROPPED N/A Date achieved 6/3/2008 6/3/2008 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement) Dropped during restructuring to streamline the M&E. Indicator 20: Percent of women, youth, and elderly participating in CBOs and COPRODEPs (as measured by the % of CBOs participating; CBO attendance at COPRODEP Prioritization meetings) Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 55 DROPPED N/A Date achieved 6/3/2008 6/3/2008 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement) Dropped during restructuring to streamline the M&E. Indicator 21: Percent of member CBOs participating in COPRODEP meetings. Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 90 DROPPED 90 Date achieved 6/3/2008 6/3/2008 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement) Dropped during restructuring to streamline the M&E. Indicator 22 : Timely completion of baseline survey and M&E reports Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 100% DROPPED 100% Date achieved 6/3/2008 6/3/2008 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement) Dropped during restructuring to streamline the M&E. Indicator 23: Percent of CBOs obtaining additional financing from non - project sources Value quantitative or Qualitative) 0 10 DROPPED N/A Date achieved 6/3/2008 6/3/2008 3/24/2014 3/24/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement) Dropped during restructuring to streamline the M&E. xi G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements ( US$ millions) 1 06/23/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 11/26/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 05/28/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00 4 07/29/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.42 5 01/25/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.92 6 01/26/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.92 7 05/28/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.92 8 02/21/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.15 9 03/07/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.15 10 12/10/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 12.45 11 07/07/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 15.98 12 02/07/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 20.16 13 12/16/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 30.32 14 02/16/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 31.89 15 08/24/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 35.86 16 03/05/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 38.16 17 07/30/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 40.84 18 03/23/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 45.15 19 10/21/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 49.08 20 05/14/2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 47.2 H. Restructuring (if any) H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in US$ millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP 10/06/2010 Y S S 4.13 First Additional Financing: An Additional Financing Grant in the amount of SDR19.9 million (US$30 million equivalent) was approved in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake to finance housing repair s , reconstruction and community infrastructure improvements in two of the neighborhoods covered by the project . To incorporate these additional activities in the scope of the Project, the PDO was also revised as follows: “to improve access to, and satisfaction xii H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in US$ millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP with: (i) b asic and social infrastructure and services, including housing repair, reconstruction and community infrastructure improvement needed as a result of the Emergency; and (ii) income - generating opportunities for residents of selected disadvantaged urban areas ." 10/21/2011 N S S 9.37 (9.04 for H3940 + 0.33 for H6210) First restructuring: Th is Level 2 first restructuring include d a rental grant and a relocation grant under the definition of Cash Grants under Component 4 : Housing Repair and Reconstruction to support eligible internally - displaced households to move out of camps into a home. 03/ 2 4/2014 N MS MS 31.88 (14.81 for H3940 +17.07 for H6210) Second restructuring: Th is Level 2 second restructuring shift ed resources away from private housing reconstruction to public infrastructure and public multifamily housing, under Component 4 : Housing Repair and Reconstruction , to better support neighborhood upgrading and increase housing stock. T he restructuring also modified key performance indicators to better capture Project results . In addition, the Grant closing date was extended by 1 5 months from March 31, 2014 to June 30, 2015 to allow sufficient time for implementation. 06/20/2014 Y MS MS 34.42 (14.81 for H3940 + 19.61 for H6210) Second Additional Financing: A second Additional Financing Grant of SDR4.9 million (US$7.50 million equivalent) was approved to finance the scaling up of urban community subprojects. As part of this AF, the PDO was re vised to correct a past minor xiii H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in US$ millions Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made DO IP discrepancy between the PAD and the legal agreement 16 . The Grant closing date was also extended by one year to June 30, 2016 to allow sufficient time for the completion of additional activities. 05/20/2016 N MS MS 45.92 (14.87 for H3940 + 25.89 for H6210 + 5.16 for H9730) Third restructuring: The third restructuring ( L evel 2) aimed to modify four key performance indicators to better capture Project results based on the outcome of the baseline study. This Level 2 restruc turing also extended the Grant closing date by six months to December 31, 2016 to accommodate delays caused by the political situation ( related to the postponed presidential run - off of December 2015 ) and allow for the completion of housing repairs and community subprojects. 16 The PDO in the PAD is “ to improve access to and satisfaction with: (i) basic and social infrastructure and services, including housing repair, reconstruction and community infrastructure improvement needed as a result of the Emergency; and (ii) income - generating opportunities for residents of targeted disadvantaged urban areas,” while the PDO in the legal agreement is : “to improve access to and satisfaction with: (i) basic and social infrastructure and services, including housing repair, reconstruction and community infrastructure improvement needed as a result of the Emergency; and (ii) incom e - generating opportunities for residents of selected disadvantaged urban areas.” xiv I. Disbursement Profile 1 1 . Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. At the time of appraisal in 2008, Haiti was emerging from a long period of political, economic, and social strife. D evastated by decades of violence , political instability 17 , and little or negative gross domestic product (GDP) growth, Haiti was swept b y a wave of riots an d conflict in early 2004, after armed opposition forces remove d President Aristide from power, resulting in thousands of deaths and the destruction of public and private property. In this context of fragility and economic downturn 18 , the country experienced high levels of crime and gang - related violence . Poverty levels were also significant , as 78 percent of the population was considered poor (living on less than US$2 a day) . However, a fter 200 6 , the country made important progress in stabilizing the security situation and the economy . Presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections were held successfully in 2006, and power was transferred smoothly from a transitional government to an elected one. The economy improved i n fiscal year 2006, with a GDP growth of 2.1 percent. 2. During the two years preceding the election of president Pr é val in 2006 , the country experienced high levels of violence, particularly in the vulnerable urban neighborhoods of Port - au - Prince where neither the national police nor the UN Stabilization mission forces (MINUSTAH) present in Haiti since 2004 dared operate. Politically motivated execution s , vandalism , and physical and sexual assaults were prevalent. Armed gangs had created linkages and collusion with international drug smugglers 19 and had expanded the territory under their control by moving to and operating in new neighborhoods. They had also acquired more sophisticated weaponry smuggled into the country and paid for by the proceeds of illegal activities. In parallel, many citizens in the middle and upper classes had constituted quasi - militia protection groups. It was estimated that in this period about 200,000 small arms were in circulation, the majority of them ille gal. Crime rates remained high and kidnappings increased. It is estimated that between February 2004 and December 2005, about 8,000 people ha d been murdered in Port - au - Prince 20 . Kidnapping rates grew steadily, reaching 1,900 kidnapped people between March and December 2005. 3. At the time of appraisal in 2007, the country had made progress in stabilizing the security situation but the crime and violence situation in disadvantaged urban areas continued to be dire. Politicized armed gangs continued to use vulne rable urban neighborhoods such as Cité - Soleil and Bel - Air in Port - au - Prince 21 as a base to engage in kidnapping and other criminal activities across the city. As the population shifted from rural to urban areas, the robust social cohesion that characterized rural areas bec a me less effective in mitigating social dislocation. Additionally, criminal activity was prevalent near the industrial areas of Port - au - Prince, forcing businesses to absorb high security costs and periodically shut down or move their operat ions 22 . These neighborhoods highlighted the key socio - economic challenges faced by disadvantaged urban areas: high demographic pressure from domestic migration without accompanied access to 17 Haiti has seen a succession of 13 heads of state in 20 years since the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986. 18 The country had defaulted on much of its foreign debt and from 2003 to 2004 the economy contracted by 3.5 percent 19 T he U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration estimated that about eight percent of the cocaine entering the United States in 2006 transited eit her Haiti or the Dominican Republic. 20 Kolbe and Hutson, 2007 “Human rights abuse and other criminal violations in Port - au - Prince, Haiti: a random survey of households”. 21 The sources of violence were highly concentrated in Port - au - Prince’s major disadvant aged urban areas of Cité - Soleil, Bel - Air, La Saline, and others (although gangs operate out of these areas and across the city). 22 “Guns, Books, or Doctors? Conflict and Public Spending in Haiti” World Bank, 2016 2 employment, basic infrastructure and services. Most notably, these neighborhoods witnessed: (i) high unemployment, acute poverty, and malnutrition ; (ii) insufficient access to safe water and sanitation, including solid waste collection ; and (iii) a lack of law enforcement. Cite - Soleil, in particular , constituted a sort of lawless state within a state and by 2007 served as a critical focal point of instability, violence, and civil unrest threatening the stability of the national government. 4. C ementing a lasting peace therefore not only implied direct efforts to strengthen law enforcement and combat crime, but also to address the socioeconomic drivers of gang membership and violence : lack of economic opportunities and access to basic services. The reform and strengthening of the Haitian National Police was one of the government’s top priorities at the time of appraisal 23 . Complementing the efforts of the national government and MINUSTAH, t he Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI), an interagency effort of the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Departm ent of State , also aimed to decrease violence and improve stability, focusing on Cite - Soleil, through community building, the provision of public infrastructure , and police support programs. At that point it had become clear to t he Government that the restoration of security would require job creation and improve ment of services and living conditions. These measures would help establish a positive presence of the State as a provider of public goods and promote a s tronger and more durable peace. 5. T h e State’s capacity to apply the rule of law and deliver basic public services to the population however remained significantly weak . The institutions responsible for establishing security and the rule of law - the police, judiciary and prisons - were weak and to some degree had become a source of insecurity themselves. Political interference and corruption had undermined previous reform efforts . Haiti’s insufficient budget and unstable donor assistance flows resulted in inadequate spending on basic social s ervices and infrastructure. In 2006, Government revenues were only 10 percent of GDP, among the lowest in the world , and s pending for priority sectors (agriculture, education, health, infrastructure, and justice and security) accounted for about 4 percent of GDP 24 . D ay - to - day operation of the decentralized local administrations w as severely hampered by the lack o f human and financial resources . M unicipal budget allocations were highly insufficient to respond to citizen’s needs due to the inadequate levels of taxes collected by communes and the limited operational capacity of the decentralization fund established in 1996 25 . 6. Considering its limited public spending capacity for the social sector and the lack of trust of the population in government institutions , the central government decided to empower communities to enable basic service - delivery . At appraisal, the population had experienced long - term neglect and resented the effects of the government’s inability to provide basic services due to political capture and corruption. Non - state actors had filled some of the gaps in health and education, but these efforts w ere largely uncoordinated and unregulated. This had created a sense of disconnect and mistrust of government institutions by the vulnerable population. To respond to these challenges, the Government directly empowered communities with decision - making autho rity and control of financial resources for job creation initiatives and for investments in basic services. C ommunity - Driven Development ( CDD ) projects and approaches would 23 The HNP Strategic Plan was presented and approved in March 2005, Haitian National Police Reform Plan, 2006. 24 Spending for priority sectors (agriculture, education, health, infrastructure, and justice and security) accounted for 4.2 percent of FY2005/06 GDP. Particularly, budget allocation for t he education sector was about 2.5 percent of GDP in FY2006/07, the lowest in the LAC region (average of 5 percent of GDP). For the same year, allocations to the health sector were than 2.7 percent, below the regional average of 3.3 percent of GDP. Haiti Pu blic Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review, World Bank 2008. 25 The Fonds de Gestion et de Développement des Collectivités Territoriales (FGDCT) was created by decree for the operation and development of municipalities. 3 contribute to : (i) delivering basic services and responding to infrastructure needs when public provision of services was lacking; (ii) promot ing social cohesion by fostering collective action, joint communal responsibility, and transparent access to information and decision - making; and (ii) serving as an entry point for the strengthenin g of local government s to work more closely with their constituencies. 7. Haiti remained a fragile state , trying to emerge from a stop - and - go economic dynamic interspersed by political turmoil, social unrest, natural disasters and weather shocks . Indeed, in 2009 Haiti was one of the most disadvantaged countries in the Western Hemisphere w ith: (i) a GDP per capita of US$ 668; (ii high levels of absolute poverty and extreme poverty (60 and 31 percent respectively in 2009) ; (iii) a low human development index of 0.4; and (iv) a high vulnerability to natural hazards, e.g., flash floods and landslides claim ed more than 5,000 lives and affect ed more than 1.5 million people between 2004 and 2009. 8. On January 12, 2010, Haiti was struck by a magnitude 7.3 earthquake (with the epicenter 16 kilometers away from Port - au - Prince). The disaster killed more than 220,000 people, injured 300,000 and directly affected the lives of over 2 million. This event wa s recorded as the worst natural disaster in the Western Hemisphere in 50 years. In addition to the staggering loss of life, the March 2010 Post - Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) recorded severe damage in and around the capital Port - au - Prince where 65% of th e country’s GDP was estimated to be generated: over 400,000 buildings were damaged, of which 115,000 entire ly destroyed and 145,000 severely damaged. The total damages and losses were estimated at US$ 7.8 billion, equivalent to 120 percent of Haiti GDP in 2 009. This catastrophic situation forced up to 1.5 million people to seek shelter in temporary and densely populated tent camps that increased the risk of epidemiological diseases. In October 2010, a cholera epidemic broke out in Port - au - Prince, killing at least 3,6 00 people and sickening over 170 ,000 by the end of 2010 . Nineteen out of twenty Ministries had collapsed and the lives of 16,000 staff of various Ministries were lost. The situation was dire when Bank post - earthquake missions arrived in Haiti. C ounterparts were quasi non - existent, and homeless people were roaming the rubble in very unsafe and u nhygienic environments . 9. Faced with this situation, the Haitian Government, development partners and international NGOs struggled to devise an effective course of action and to sequence priorities to tackle massive response and reconstruction challenges. Some previous disasters were similarly large in scale, such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami, which ravaged Banda Aceh, Indonesia in particular in December 200 4, which caused 227,000 deaths in 9 countries, and the large earthquake, which ravaged the region of Kashmir in Pakistan and northern India in 2005, which caused 87,000 deaths and massive destruction in the mountain city of Muzaffarabad Pakistan. However, reconstruction solutions used in these cases were of limited application. The greenfield solutions proposed in Aceh where the land had been wiped clean of structures could not be applied in Haiti due to the interspersion of collapsed and standing housing in dense urban areas. Similarly, the reconstruction mechanisms used in the city of Muzaffarabad Pakistan, relied on strong Government capacity, clear cadaster registries, and a financial architecture, which were not present in Haiti. Though many lessons pe rtaining to the link between response and reconstruction, aid architecture and coordination could be drawn from international experience, applicable models for reconstruction in Haiti’s environment simply did not exist and had to be developed during the re sponse and reconstruction effort. 4 10. Rationale for Bank ’s engagement . The rationale for Bank involvement was based on the following Project related aspects: (a) The Urban Community - Driven Development Project ( Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Urbain PRODEPUR) built on the Bank’s previous and ongoing Community - Driven Development enga gement in Haiti, and on international experience . Initially, t he Project sought t o build on successful Bank - funded CDD interventions in Haiti , particularly two r ural CDD p roject s , and an Urban CDD Pilot Project 26 . These experiences allowed to integrate into project design recommendations regarding : (i) t he application of participatory mechanisms ; (ii) the definition of capacity building assistance for subproject implementation ; and ( iii) the role of local government structures in project implementation . The Project also drew on lessons f r om the Bank’s successive generations of Rural Poverty Reduction projects in Brazil, Honduras, and Jamaica, and on the experiences of CDD projects in post - conflict/fragile states , e.g., Afghanistan, Liberia, and the West Bank/Gaza. (b) The Project also complemented initiatives of other donors in support of security restoration and poverty alleviation in disadvantaged urban areas. O perations financed by the international community, including United Nation s Agencies, the US government, IDB and NGOs generally focused on peace stabilization and the rapid provision of physical infrastructure. The value added o f the Bank - financed project consisted in : (i) placing great emphasis on the capacity building of communities and municipal governments to complement the provision of physical infrastructure ; and (ii) contributing to donor coordination both at the central g overnment level (via the Bureau de Coordination Opérationnelle des Interventions dans les Zones Prioritaires [BCOIZP]), and at the municipal level via the participation of municipal government re presentatives in the Project Development Councils COPRODEPs , the structures created by the project to identify and develop community and municipal subprojects . (c) The World Bank Group’s post - earthquake response was comprehensive. In total US$479 million were mobilized by the World Bank Group to support response and reconstruction from existing and new sources of funding during FY10. In the short term, the Bank placed the entire Haiti portfolio under the emergency procedures of BP/OP 8.00 to provide maxi mum flexibility to respond to the urgent, medium, and long - term needs resulting from the disaster . While many development partners focused on securing temporary and transitional shelters and providing essential relief services (e.g., water, food, medicine) , the Bank’s comparative advantage laid in supporting the reconstruction with a long - term view to “build back better”, integrating risk data and diagnostics, capacity building for safer construction, as well as a pragmatic approach to repairing and recons tructing neighborhoods, including public spaces and permanent housing. (d) With Funds from IDA and from various Trust Funds, working through Haitian institutions and in collaboration with partners and NGOs, the Bank financed the Structural Assessment of 400, 000 buildings, developed detailed and state of the art multi - hazard mapping of the city of Port - au - 26 These include : ( i ) the Rural CDD Pilot Project, implemented in 2004 with the support of a US$1 million Post - Conflict Fund (PCF) grant; ( ii ) the Labor - Intensive and Basic Infrastructure Rehabilitation Pilot Project, financed by a US$1 million Low - income Country Under St ress (LICUS) grant in 2005; ( iii ) the US$61 million International Development Association (IDA) - funded Rural CDD Project (PRODEP), under implementation at the time of appraisal; and ( iv ) an Urban CDD Pilot Project (PRODEPAP), financed by a US$1.25 million PCF grant, also under implementation in two disadvantaged urban areas of Port - au - Prince (Cité - Soleil and Bel - Air). 5 Prince, carried out a full LiDAR assessment of the affected area, supported the Government in developing building codes for schools and health centers and a building guide for private housing construction, trained a core group of 80 engineers at the Ministry of Public Works who in turn trained masons, building professionals and community workers in earthquake resilient retrofitting and construction, and supp orted community - based neighb orhood reconstruction for US$95 million to benefit over 200,000 people in neighborhoods most affected by the earthquake. (e) The Bank’s urban reconstruction stance was anchored in the urban - focused IDA Urban Community Driven Deve lopment Project (PRODEPUR), which was under implementation and invested in community level infrastructure. After the earthquake, PRODEPUR received an immediate US$ 30 million Additional Financing (AF), known as PRODEPUR Habitat. PRODEPUR Habitat aimed to fi nance housing repair and to reconstruct and improve community infrastructure in areas affected by the disaster. A number of initiatives to help the reconstruction drive were supported in parallel: (i) a Japan Social Development Fund financed cash - for - work under PRODEPUR; (ii) GFDRR funded the SBA and the mapping of national and local disaster - prone areas; (iii) an Institutional Development Grant built IHRC capacity to make the NRHRF operational and to