Lutter contre la corruption en Haïti

Addressing Corruption in Haiti Robert Klitgaard February 2010 Abstract: In the aftermath of the disastrous earthquake of January 12, 2010, Haiti will receive unprecedented aid for reconstruction and for its promising economic strategy. But given the country’s legacy of corruption, massive aid could simply result in another massive Haitian failure. Success hinges on facing corruption squarely and developing a hard‐headed, politically sensitive anti‐corruption strategy. How this could be done, given Haiti’s realities and lessons from fighting corruption around the world, is the subject of this paper. Robert Klitgaard is a University Professor at Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA 91711 USA. He has been an advisor and researcher in more than 30 countries in the Americas, Africa, and Asia, including Haiti under the first term of President Aristide. His eight books include Controlling Corruption , Adjusting to Reality: Beyond “State vs. Market” in Economic Development , and High Performance Government: Structure, Leadership, Incentives (with Paul C. Light). This paper was prepared as an offering to Haitians and the many foreign friends who wish to help the country rebuild and reform. Email: robert.klitgaard@gmail.com. 1 Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................................................... 1 1. SUCCESS IN HAITI: AN IMAGINARY NEWS STORY FROM 2015............................................. 2 2. ADDRESSING CORRUPTION IN HAITI: AN OVERVIEW .............................................................. 3 3. GREAT BEGINNINGS AND ELEPHANT ELITES................................................................................. 4 “W E F ALL INTO THE S AME T RAP O VER AND O VER A GAIN ”......................................................................... 4 Y ESTERDAY AND T ODAY ..................................................................................................................................... 6 T HE EARTH MOVES ............................................................................................................................................ 7 4. HAITI’S ECONOMIC STRATEGY.............................................................................................................. 9 5. INTERNATIONAL LESSONS ON COMBATING CORRUPTION ................................................. 14 C ORRUPTION C RIPPLES D EVELOPMENT ....................................................................................................... 14 H OW TO C HANGE THE I NSTITUTIONAL C ULTURE ....................................................................................... 15 H OW TO MOBILIZE A LLIES ............................................................................................................................. 17 P REVENTIVE MEASURES THROUGH B ETTER S YSTEMS ............................................................................... 19 H OW TO S UBVERT S YSTEMIC C ORRUPTION ................................................................................................. 21 6. TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR HAITI .................................................................................................... 27 H OW TO D EVELOP A S TRATEGY ..................................................................................................................... 28 H OW TO B UILD MOMENTUM AND P OPULAR S UPPORT .............................................................................. 30 H OW TO A VOID D ISTORTIONS FROM I NTERNATIONAL A ID ....................................................................... 32 H OW TO B UILD S KILLS AND L EADERSHIP .................................................................................................... 33 ANNEX 1. A PROCESS FOR DEVELOPING AN ANTI‐CORRUPTION STRATEGY................... 35 ANNEX 2. IDEAS FOR A HAITI LEADERSHIP ACADEMY ............................................................... 38 O BJECTIVES ....................................................................................................................................................... 38 P ROGRAMS ......................................................................................................................................................... 38 T HOUGHTS ON L OGISTICS ................................................................................................................................ 40 REFERENCES..................................................................................................................................................... 42 2 1. Success in Haiti: An Imaginary News Story from 2015 Five Years after the Quake, Haiti’s “Model Recovery” Port-au-Prince, February 13, 2015 (Reuters)— Only a few years ago, Haiti was considered by some a hopeless cause. “After the earthquake of 2010, more than our buildings had collapsed,” says Bonaventure Ouvert, a Haitian journalist. “Our economy was in ruins. There was almost no civil service. Our morale was devastated. Everyone assumed that Haiti would just drop deeper into our historic pattern of corruption and instability.” On the contrary, notes Masahito Okazaki of Transparency International. “Today the level of confidence in Haiti is high, and this reflects a remarkable effort by its leaders to create a state that serves its people’s interests.” The percentage of people living in poverty has fallen from more than twice the mean of Caribbean countries to just above that mean. Growth has averaged over 7 percent per year, driven by clothing and textiles, agriculture, and foreign aid and investment. Haiti created a new system for managing reconstruction funds in a transparent way. Free zones have been developed, with good infrastructure and independent administration. “Haiti’s recovery is a model for other countries,” observes Jules Fisher of The Economist. “Haiti has avoided most of the problems that arise after disasters and during the subsequent reconstruction.” Government in Partnership Most people believe that behind Haiti’s success lies effective governance, vital for the country’s large new flows of aid and investment. “Our government has learned how to work through partnerships,” notes Alphonse Michel, Minister of Public Works, Transport, and Communications. “In reconstruction, and in activities ranging from social services to free zones to agriculture, we use a variety of public-private-nonprofit partnerships, all of them ethically led and carefully evaluated.” “They used foreign experts ruthlessly,” notes the UNDP’s Jürgen Frommer. “They took advantage of strategic help in areas like public works and social audits. They re-conceptualized the whole idea of foreign advisers, thinking of them primarily not as doers but as teachers and capacity builders.” The private sector has participated in “integrity pacts” in most sectors of public works. Here business leaders and government officials jointly pledge not to engage in bribery or other forms of illicit behavior— and to audit jointly any alleged violations. Citizen surveys have been used to create “scorecards” for every government agency. Also, lawyers, accountants, and business people are interviewed to “diagnose” corrupt systems—and help design and monitor improvements. These changes—coupled with strong, honest leadership—have led to surprising improvements. Performance indicators have been created for most sectors of government, and they are on the rise. For example, the cost per kilometer of roads built is about 30% less than the historical figure. The cost of constructing a rural school has also declined about 30%. Customs revenues per dollar spent in customs administration have risen to $240 this year (the world standard is between $200-$300). On Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Haiti has moved in five years from near the bottom of world rankings to just a place just behind Costa Rica and ahead of many other countries in the Americas. Changing Image and Reality “A major challenge for us was to defeat a mentality that Haiti could never succeed,” says Minister Michel. “We still have much to do, but we believe that everyone realizes that Haiti is a place that is on the move, where excellence can thrive.” Important steps in this direction were to improve law and order and to create an effective system of property rights. “Development in so many other countries has foundered on property rights and the problem of creating a transparent and efficient legal system,” Frommer observes. “Haiti gave these issues priority from the beginning, and it’s working.” Haiti has been able to recapture talent that had gone abroad. Thousands of highly trained Haitians returned to work in public, private, and non-profit sectors. The government has also emphasized the development of talent within the country. Leadership training has been another area of remarkable innovation. Haiti employed international [The rest of story is not yet available] 3 2. Addressing Corruption in Haiti: An Overview The imaginary news story above makes welcome reading. Five years from now, we learn, Haiti’s post‐earthquake reconstruction will be a great success. How this success will happen is only hinted at. But note this big idea: Haiti will surmount systemic corruption. Impossible, many say. “The biggest obstacle to reconstruction and development in Haiti is corruption,” they shrug. “But what can be done about that, especially here?” The feeling of futility is part of the challenge in Haiti. To overcome it, we must begin with Haitian reality. (“We” of course means Haitians first and foremost.) We must appreciate the legacy of systemic corruption, understand Haiti’s proposed economic strategy, and anticipate the scale and challenges of reconstruction. Then we must look hard at the various phenomena that go under the rubric of corruption. We must understand corruption’s costs, so that we do not simply sweep it under the rug in the name of reacting quickly and strongly to urgent human needs. We must understand corruption as a phenomenon of systems, rather than (just) of immoral individuals. And we must appreciate that systemic improvements have been made, even in very difficult settings. Experience in other countries shows how corruption can be prevented and subverted—if never, alas, eliminated. Then we can turn to the implications for Haiti. How can Haiti’s reconstruction and development efforts address the old realities and the new possibilities of systemic corruption? 4 3. Great Beginnings and Elephant Elites In the aftermath of the earthquake of January 12, 2010, many people inside and outside Haiti have called for a new beginning. The crisis is an opportunity to remake the country, they say, not just the collapsed buildings but also the legacy of bad governance and systemic corruption. “I want this to be a new country,” President René Préval said at the end of January, waving his hands for emphasis. “I want it to be totally different.” This yearning for a new Haiti is by no means something new. In April 2009, Prime Minister Michèle Duvivier Pierre‐Louis gave an impassioned speech to Haiti’s aid donors (Pierre‐Louis 2009a). “I believe that together we will seize this opportunity to make a real difference and change forever the course of history,” she said. “We strongly believe that Haiti is at a turning point, perhaps even a tipping point.” But she also acknowledged that in Haiti calling for a new beginning can evoke derisive laughter. “In Haiti, popular comedians have for the past 50 years parodied the almost theatrical repeated announcement of a ‘Great Beginning’ in which they did not really believe themselves. The time has come to break away from such cynicism.” “We Fall into the Same Trap Over and Over Again” Michèle Pierre‐Louis was present at another of Haiti’s “great beginnings.” In 1991, she was part of the new government of Jean‐Bertrand Aristide, the first democratically elected president since Haiti became independent in 1804. Aristide came to office promising to wash away the old Haiti of Papa Doc and Baby Doc Duvalier, the tonton macoutes , the predatory corruption. “It was very exhilarating, at the beginning,” Pierre‐Louis told an interviewer in July 2009. “Everybody in the world was saying finally Haiti is going to come out, finally democracy is going to be built” (Pierre‐Louis 2009b). In 1991 Haiti was at a low point. One of Haiti’s ablest economists, Leslie Delatour, concluded: “Recent events in the economic and financial areas present clear evidence that the Haitian economic system is on the verge of a collapse.” In a book entitled Paper Laws, Steel Bayonets: Breakdown of the Rule of Law in Haiti , the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights concluded bluntly: “There is no system of justice in Haiti (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1990). Even to speak of a ‘Haitian justice system’ dignifies the brutal use of force by officers and soldiers, the chaos of Haitian courtrooms and prisons, and the corruption of judges and prosecutors.” Two experts in public administration, Derick Brinkerhoff and Carmen Halpern, said that Haiti’s “history and culture do not offer firm footing for transition to either democracy or ‘service government’… The road to change is filled with potholes and blind curves. Reformers beware.” (Brinkerhoff and Halpern 1989). A French anthropologist argued that rural people had given up on the Haitian state. 5 Their every action and inaction was designed to protect themselves against what Brinkerhoff and Halpern called “the sanctioned plunder that was and remains the core of Haitian politics.” President Aristide promised a fresh start. He seemed to have what for years Haitian governments had lacked: integrity, political will, and popular support. Six weeks after his inauguration, it was my good fortune to spend a week with President Aristide and some of his cabinet. “There has been a change of mentality,” he told me, “a political will not to have corruption, terrorism, drugs. We have begun a strategy that reflects the importance of transparency and participation.” I talk to people and they say we cannot do anything with Haiti because it has always been corrupt. “They rob and they rob,” they say, and history demonstrates it. I’m shocked by hearing this; but it is true, it is a fact. But since we have come in, we are respecting the law and the rights of citizens. . . So we will change this impression and create confidence, in America and France and Germany. Our example will demonstrate this change , which is real. The President directed his new ministers to root out corruption. They seemed to be listening. The Planning Minister told me, switching from French to English for emphasis, “The President is dedicated to this cause. I swear to you that each Minister is committed to fighting corruption.” In April 1991, I wrote a short policy paper called “A New Start for Haiti?” I expressed the hope that Aristide’s mandate would enable something dramatically different, something that would change the psychology of defeatism. “Haiti may invite some people to despair,” I wrote. “But as President Aristide's courageous example shows, Haiti is also a land of surprises” (Klitgaard 1991). The next surprise came less than six months later, on September 29, 1991, when a military coup removed President Aristide from office. Violence and repression followed; corruption resumed in force. Three years later, in 1994, Aristide was brought back to office with international help. But the hope he had represented had largely vanished. To many people, Aristide had become what he once had opposed, a dictator astride a machine of corruption. As Pierre‐Louis (2009b) recalled: Those were very long years, and something happened to the country and to the president. When he came back, I think things got really rough, we really started going down the drain. Somehow, something very deep happened in the mind of this country, and we have not really put our finger specifically on it. Interviewer: What did you feel was different after the return of Aristide in 1994? 6 Pierre Louis: The man himself had changed. He was married, he was into money, he was into corruption. He invented the Petits Projets de la Présidence [a corruption‐riddled system of presidential largesse]. I don’t think he had escaped from the Haitian president’s syndrome, which is stay in power by all means. There are many Haitian presidents who have fallen into that trap. Once that is your perspective and that is your project, all means are used... I don’t think we know our history very well, and we fall into the same trap over and over again. It’s unfortunate that we keep making the same mistakes. Yesterday and Today Now skip forward to 2008. Food riots and four hurricanes hammered Haiti, leading to a sudden loss of 15 to 20 percent in gross domestic product. The global recession undercut the ability to respond of Haiti and of the international community. But Haiti and its friends did take positive steps. A new economic strategy, crafted by Oxford University economist Paul Collier (2009) and developed with Haiti’s many stakeholders, promised realistic and yet potentially transformative changes (more on this plan below). The April 2009 donors’ meeting addressed by Prime Minister Pierre‐Louis promised important partnerships. President Préval received international praise for leading the country forward. The problem, however, is not just Haitian presidents. In her July 2009 interview, Prime Minister Pierre‐Louis talked about Haiti’s systemic corruption. All the elites—the mulatto elites, the university elites, the union elites, the peasant elites—are like a huge elephant sitting on this country and you cannot move it, because there is no political class, because there are no political parties, and everyone becomes corrupted and perverted. If you can’t go into that system, the system rejects you. And so far we have not found the wrench that will move this thing. These words of the Prime Minister were received by many influential Haitians as a slap in the face. A Haitian political analyst blogged (my translation): Her remarks, however justified against an obsolete political class and a largely corrupt economic elite, sapped her political support. The majority of the political parties have poorly received and digested her truths. Against her, a bloc has formed through the processes of illicit enrichment of the Bourdon Group close to the president and his wife. The numerous potential candidates for the presidency are made very nervous by her presence in the prime minister’s office. Together these political sectors did not wait for the constitutionally mandated delay of one year in office to attack her (Lucas 2009). 7 One of the justifications for their attacks on Pierre‐Louis turned out to be: corruption. Widespread rumors said that part of $197 million in aid following the 2008 hurricanes had disappeared. Since it was her government, her critics said, she was to blame. Under fire, Prime Minister Pierre‐Louis addressed the nation on October 27, 2009. She defended herself against the critiques. Three audits of the emergency fund would show that accusations of corruption were unwarranted. She reviewed the achievements during her year as head of government. She emphasized the creation of a new image of Haiti, a new discourse about public administration and the role of the state. She underlined the efforts her government had made to improve the situation of the people and “change the negative image given to Haiti at the international level.” In terms of international cooperation, she spoke of “a change of paradigm.” Two days later, on October 29, the Haitian Senate voted to dismiss Michèle Pierre‐ Louis and her government. Her own great beginning was over. The Earth Moves And now, of course, the world has turned its attention to Haiti once more. The horrific earthquake of January 12, 2010, has been called the world’s greatest peacetime disaster apart from the 2004 Asian tsunami. President Barack Obama quickly galvanized an unprecedented U.S. relief effort. Other international actors also reacted strongly. As I write several weeks after the earthquake, one sees progress in relief work and the first steps toward an international strategy for reconstruction and development. One hears calls for a Marshall Plan for Haiti. One hears rhetoric about a new beginning, such as President Préval’s words cited above, or those of John Miller Beauvoir, a young Haitian NGO leader: “I think we should bury the status quo under the rubble.” And predictably, one also hears what Pierre‐Louis called that old cynicism about Haiti. “Despite the best intentions of the international community,” declares the lead paragraph of a Reuters news story fourteen days after the earthquake, “Haitians have little faith they will see the billions of dollars in aid pledged to rebuild their earthquake‐shattered country, which international monitors rate as one of the world's most corrupt” (Zengerle 2010). One learns of crime mounting from an already high level, thanks to a combination of thousands of escaped prisoners, greater economic privations, and new criminal opportunities following the earthquake. Some have speculated that the drug economy, already huge in Haiti, will flourish further in the chaos of 2010 and beyond. “Haiti has always been a weak link against drug trafficking,” said Ivelaw Griffith of the City University of New York. “It’s a grave situation, and it’s going to get graver, because people are now going to be even more susceptible to whatever corrupting forces are out there” (Hawley 2010). 8 These are realities that Haiti’s reconstruction and development strategies must face. It is no use saying, as one leading development economist did, that talk about corruption is just an excuse for not doing anything. It is no use writing, as two international experts on Haiti recently did, “Of course Haiti has failed, failed and failed again. Yet episodes of traumatic failure are ingrained in the histories of even the most advanced economies” and then simply moving on to the need for aid (Collier and Warnholz 2010). It is also of no use, at least not until we do the analysis, to jump to the conclusion that Haiti’s legacy of failure makes Haiti a hopeless case. We should instead ask how the design and implementation of Haiti’s reconstruction and development strategy might address “the sanctioned plunder that was and remains the core of Haitian politics.” This is the goal of this paper. 9 4. Haiti’s Economic Strategy A legacy of systemic corruption is one part of Haiti’s reality. Another is Haiti’s impressive new economic strategy (Collier 2009 and Government of Haiti 2009). How do the corruption and the strategy interact? The economic strategy, written before the earthquake, focuses on jobs, basic services, food security, and the environment. The strategy is under no illusion about the competence or probity of Haitian state institutions. It calls for many public‐ private partnerships, which though they involve government leadership and monitoring also include NGOs and the private sector, as well as international partners. It also calls for new institutions, such as property rights courts for free zones. In Table 1, I try to provide the key elements of the economic strategy and some of the critical roles the strategy asks the Haitian government to perform. Several points are worth underscoring. First, both reconstruction and the new economic strategy will rely heavily on public private nonprofit partnerships . Government officials will have to learn how to design and manage partnerships for rebuilding cities and infrastructure, for maintenance, for free zones, for the garment industry, to name a few. These tasks require going beyond the standard repertoire of public administration. Second, some new government entities are foreseen, such as a dedicated court to hear land claims in free zone areas and one or more independent service authorities for social services. In Haiti, unusually for developing countries, most social services are now provided by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private sector. In part, this reflects the weakness of Haiti’s government, particularly in rural areas, and the desire of donors to evade possible mismanagement and corruption. But the current system is said to suffer from geographic imbalances, some current services of very low quality, and nonoptimal subsidies for particular services in particular areas. Therefore, the country’s economic strategy recommends the creation of a government‐led Independent Service Authority (ISA)—or perhaps more than one— to coordinate and co‐fund NGO and private‐sector provision of social services. This quasi‐independent public organization would implement policies set by government ministries (health, education, and so forth). An ISA would have three functions: take in money from donors and government; channel the money via contracts to providers; and monitor the performance, creating competition, with best providers being scaled up. An ISA would have a board with a government majority but with participation from donors and other pertinent actors. How to create and run such 10 an agency, how to lead and manage such a board, would be new challenges for Haiti’s government—and for its partners. Table 1 Schematic Summary of Governance Challenges in Haiti’s Economic Strategy Objective Priority Role of State Key Innovations New Skills Jobs Expand garment industry Improve and expand free zones Create better partnerships with garment industries Property rights fast track New maintenance funding and mgt for roads New private roles in electricity and ports New management of Customs in free zones New partnerships with garment industries Property rights reforms and fast‐track mgt. Regulating enhanced free zones Creating and managing maintenance partnerships Designing and regulating private roles in electricity and ports Contract with and supervise outside mgt of Customs Creating and managing partnerships with garment industries Labor‐intensive works with maintenance (roads, reconstruction, etc.) Encourage use of labor‐ intensive methods Revamp maintenance systems New ways to fund and perhaps to deliver the maintenance of roads (and other infrastructure) New ways to involve citizens in design and implementation of reconstruction New ways to monitor quality and conditions Create and manage new relationships with donors, businesses involved in infrastructure, and citizens’ groups—in design and in maintenance Design and manage new processes for citizen involvement in reconstruction. Create and use flows of objective information about activities and results Expand mango exports (and more generally agricultural development) Create new free zones in agriculture Facilitate farm‐ to‐market transactions Setting up rural free zones Property rights, including fast track in free zone Lead in the design, maintenance, and mgt. of rural roads Creation and regulation of free zones Property rights reforms and fast‐track mgt Creating and managing maintenance partnerships 11 Basic services Extend and unify basic public services to all of Haiti Lead and regulate efforts by NGOs and private providers Create independent service authority for public services (more than one?) Creation, mgt., and evaluation of independent service authority(‐ies), combining government, NGOs, and private sector Create and use flows of objective information about activities and results—including systems for client feedback Food security With donors, create a virtual insurance policy against large jumps in world food prices Enhance domestic food production Food‐for‐work scheme plus tapered subsidies Earmark aid budget for “insurance” Facilitate farm‐ to‐market transactions New schemes of many kinds New ways to fund and perhaps to deliver the maintenance of rural roads Creation and mgt of domestic and international partnerships to provide food for work, subsidies, and virtual insurance Improve partnerships for design and maintenance of rural roads, with donors, businesses, and rural people Environ‐ ment Reforest Haiti Create clear and marketable property rights Improve maintenance Change prices of charcoal (+) and “gas bombs” (‐) Reduce population pressure in rural areas Redo property rights from laws to registries New public‐private partnerships for maintenance of forests and of land agreements Property rights reforms and fast‐track mgt. Creating and managing maintenance partnerships Third, the partnerships depend on the evaluation of activities and results . Evaluation is notoriously difficult in settings like Haiti’s, for reasons of cost, data quality, data analysis, and possibilities for distortion. Nonetheless, around the world exciting examples exist of the use of feedback from citizens and partners to gauge what is working and what isn’t. The demand for such information is another 12 challenge, and the developing world is replete with examples of performance data that policymakers (and citizens) ignore. The best way to make sure that people care about performance is to have their own incentives linked to evaluation. This opens a large area of both concern and promise, where international experience should help guide Haitian officials and their partners. Finally, all the priority areas in the economic strategy, plus of course the huge reconstruction effort, are susceptible to corruption . More on this below. For the economic strategy to succeed, therefore, the Haitian government and its partners will need strong skills, some of them novel. Some of the skills are cross‐ cutting, others are area‐specific.  Cross cutting skills. Designing and managing public‐private partnerships. Public works and reconstruction: planning, management, and maintenance. Evaluation. Preventing corruption.  Area specific skills. Property rights reforms and administration. Free zones (clothing; agriculture). Enabling and regulating the private provision of electricity. Enabling and regulating private ports. Customs reform (managing private customs organizations in free zones; computerizing customs data elsewhere) Haiti’s massive reconstruction effort, still undefined at this writing, will no doubt also demand better governance. Large‐scale public works programs are notorious in Haiti and elsewhere for inefficiency and corruption. Moving people from disaster‐susceptible areas to other parts of Haiti will require sophisticated planning, political mobilization, security, and property rights. Haitian public officials will have to do new things, and do old things in different ways. The challenge goes beyond the mustering and development of new skills. In a demoralized public sector, an important task will be to rebuild pride in Haiti and in public service. The greatest lack is said to be ethical leadership and effective management. How to address these needs is a first‐order challenge for Haiti and its international friends. Finally, the subject of this paper, corruption. Haiti’s economic strategy raises old and new challenges of good government. Public‐private partnerships have the promise of shared information and comparative advantage. They have the potential disadvantages of creating of a quasi‐monopoly, increasing cronyism, and inadvertently promoting a kind of “regulatory capture” on steroids. Privatizing port activities or electricity provision promises lower costs but in many countries is also the occasion for grand corruption. Independent service authorities need to guard against a government takeover of NGO and private activities, with the threat of cooptation and corruption, and the loss of diversity and competition inherent in a decentralized system of service providers. And reconstruction after emergencies is 13 fraught with corruption even in advanced countries, but especially where accounting is weak and people are not widely involved in monitoring public works. In Haiti, therefore, improved governance and anti‐corruption should be central components of reconstruction and development. Given the legacy of poor governance and systemic corruption, how can this be accomplished? 14 5. International Lessons on Combating Corruption Even an economic strategy as sensitive to governmental weakness as Haiti’s is will require new governmental roles and skills. Even a plan that envisions so many public‐private partnerships will face daunting risks of incompetence and corruption. Can Haiti and its international partners possibly overcome these risks? The question has an all‐too‐ready answer: “Not here.” The psychology of pessimism in Haiti is not delusional, although it sometimes draws on some delusional rhetoric (racism, imperialism, and so forth). History in Haiti does not lead to optimism. Haiti’s current problems do include frightening levels of violence (Eberstadt 2006), widespread childhood slavery (Cadet 1998), and appalling governance (and sometimes in rural areas no governance). And yet when we confront people who cite these facts as evidence that Haiti is beyond hope—be they Haitians or outsiders—it is tempting to shout them down (“racists”) or simply to cheer the Haitian equivalent of “yes, we can.” It is difficult to face up to systemic corruption. We fear that admitting the problem will derail reconstruction and development efforts, because we assume, wrongly, that nothing can be done about systemic corruption. This phenomenon is not at all confined to Haiti. Around the world, railing against corruption is popular in local newspapers and in international agencies. But if corruption is admitted to be a central problem, what can be done about it? This question quickly changes the complainers’ tune from impassioned outcry to embittered cynicism. “Nothing can be done about corruption,” many of the same citizens and journalists and officials will mutter sadly, if privately. This mismatch between diagnosis and response, between heart and head, means that we do too little about corruption. Corruption Cripples Development So what? “What is the problem about corruption?” was the title of an article by political scientist Colin Leys more than four decades ago (Leys 1965). His answer: corruption is not much of a problem. Leys argued that corruption has its functions, sometimes even its benefits. Under awful conditions, bribery may be socially and not just privately beneficial. The political scientist Samuel Huntington (2006 [1968]) noted: “In terms of economic growth the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, honest bureaucracy.” These scholars of the 1960s had a point. But today, informed by both careful case studies and econometric estimates, we have abundant evidence of corruption’s many costs. Systemic corruption distorts incentives, undermines institutions, and redistributes wealth and power to the undeserving. Corruption slows economic progress. Axel Dreher and his colleagues (2007) estimate that corruption is 15 responsible for a reduction of 58 percent in per capita income in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 63 percent in sub‐Saharan Africa and south Asia. My research with Johannes Fedderke shows that other things equal countries with more corruption have less investment, and each dollar of investment has less impact on growth (Klitgaard et al. 2005; Fedderke and Klitgaard 2006). Daniel Kaufmann and colleagues (2009) have shown that measures of poor governance, such as high corruption, lack of rule of law, and lack of citizen voice, have direct and negative effects on long‐term outcomes such as infant mortality and educational attainment. Corruption undercuts democracy and decentralization. As John T. Noonan (1984) put it, dictatorship and corruption are the two great sins of government. We should not think of opposing corruption in Haiti or elsewhere because we are goody‐goodies and corruption is sinful. We fight corruption because it hurts what we most want to achieve in society. Can anything be done about corruption? The short answer is yes. Around the world, one finds inspiring examples of cities and towns, ministries and agencies, and countries making progress in the fight against corruption. Not everywhere, to be sure, and even with the success stories progress is not overnight. Success is always incomplete, and “recorruption” is always a threat (Dininio 2005). Despite success stories in reducing corruption, it is surprising how cynical people can become about this subject, to the point of fallacy. “Corruption has existed throughout history. Every country has corruption, even the most advanced. So, what can be done about corruption? Nothing.” To see the fallacy clearly, substitute “disease” for “corruption.” No one would conclude that nothing can be done about disease, that there is no use for public health programs, doctors, hospitals, or medicine. Like disease, corruption comes in many forms, some cancerous, some mild. Like disease, corruption can be widespread like a pandemic or occasional like the mumps. Like disease, prevention is important, and so is treatment of diseased members of the body politic. Fortunately, we can learn from other countries about preventive measures and cures for the various diseases grouped under corruption. Of course, the problems and the settings differ, so we cannot simply copy. But common themes emerge. a. Successful reformers change institutional cultures. b. They mobilize and coordinate a variety of resources inside and outside the government. c. They think in terms of corrupt systems instead of corrupt individuals. How to Change the Institutional Culture When corruption is widespread, the institutional culture grows sick. The norm is corruption; expectations are that corruption will continue. Cynicism and despair 16 become widespread. Change seems impossible. Even so, there are cases where leaders have made substantial progress in changing a sick institutional culture. The leaders begin by sending a strong signal of change. Not just words: in corrupt societies, people have heard plenty of rhetoric about corruption and now don’t believe it. Fry Big Fish To break through this culture of corruption, experience indicates that “frying big fish” is essential. Big, corrupt actors must be named and punished so that a cynical citizenry believes that an anti‐corruption drive is more than words. This includes those giving as well as those receiving bribes. It is also important that a campaign against corruption is not confused with a campaign against the opposition. Importantly, therefore, one of the first big fish should preferably come from the political party in power. In Hong Kong, for example, credibility for the new Independent Commission against Corruption came when an ex‐police commissioner of Hong Kong was extradited from retirement in England and punished in Hong Kong. The ICAC also nailed scores of other high‐ranking police officials. To a skeptical public and a hardened civil service, these prosecutions sent a credible signal of change. As a former ICAC commissioner wrote: An important point we had to bear in mind (and still have to) is the status of people we prosecute. The public tends to measure effectiveness by status! Will they all be small, unimportant people, or will there be amongst them a proportionate number of high‐status people? Nothing will kill public confidence quicker than the belief that the anti‐corruption effort is directed only at those below a certain level in society (Williams 1983). Just after he assumed power in Colombia, President Andrés Pastrana’s anti‐ corruption team flew to several regions and held hearings about supposedly corrupt mayors and governors. The team had the power to suspend people from these offices—something that leaders in other countries may not have—and the team used this power to send a signal to the local leaders and to the whole country. The President’s anti‐corruption team also went after a specific case of corruption in the Congress—choosing as the big fish people from the President’s own party. Under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission has won global praise for its performance. It has successfully prosecuted scores of public servants, some of them extremely senior, as well as business people giving bribes. In 2001‐2002, President Enrique Bolaños of Nicaragua went one step further. He locked up the former President Arturo Alemán, under whom Bolaños had served as Vice President, on charges of corruption. 17 Even though “frying big fish” is an indispensable step in breaking the culture of impunity, the emphasis on past offenders can be overdone. An analogy with health policy is germane. Individual cases of grave illness must be dealt with. But in the long run, prevention deserves priority. Therefore, after frying a few big fish, the strategy should emphasize prevention and the reform of institutions. Pick Visible, Low hanging Fruit A second principle used by successful reformers is to show progress in some highly visible areas within six to twelve months. These leaders do not tackle the most important problem first, if that problem is very difficult. To build momentum, it is good to begin an anti‐corruption campaign where citizens perceive it to be most evident and most annoying, or where the political leadership has given a field particular salience, or where it is believed that corruption is undercutting economic reform. In doing so, these leaders create short‐term successes that can change public expectations: “Maybe things can change…maybe they will change.” Short‐term success builds momentum for deeper, long‐term reforms. Bring in “New Blood” Even when they work with people within existing institutions, effective reformers invite in people from outside. This “new blood” might be young people to be “eyes and ears” (as Mayor Ronald MacLean‐Abaroa did with interns in La Paz, Bolivia), business people to take important public positions (for example, the Anti‐ Corruption Czar under President Pastrana and several leaders of President Vicente Fox’s reform efforts in Mexico), and young accountants to partner with “senior heroes” in in‐depth investigations (as in the case of Efren Plana, who famously cleaned up the Philippines’ Bureau of Internal Revenue more than two decades ago). How to Mobilize Allies Coordinate Government Institutions A successful fight against systemic corruption must involve more than one agency of government. Long‐term success requires the contributions of the supreme audit authority, the police, the prosecutors, the courts, the finance functions of government, and others. The fight against corruption also requires a strong leader—someone strategic and brave and politically astute. But the leadership trait that is most important is the ability to mobilize other actors and to coordinate their efforts productively. The task is not command and control, but mobilization and coordination. For example, in Colombia the Anti‐Corruption Czars of Presidents Pastrana and Alvaro Uribe have created mechanisms for coordination across major ministries and agencies of government (auditing, investigation, prosecution, and so forth). Hong Kong’s Independent Commission against Corruption works in three areas— 18 prosecution, prevention, and public relations. In each area, the ICAC works closely with and through other government agencies. Involve Public Servants Surprisingly perhaps, it turns out that even public servants involved in corrupt systems are willing and able to analyze where those systems are vulnerable to corruption—as long as the focus is on corrupt systems and not on condemning isolated individuals. Successful reforms also do something good for their public sector employees. For example, new systems of performance measurement are linked with better pay, promotion policies, and “prizes” such as overseas trips and courses. Mobilize Citizens The government must invite those outside of government to become part of the solution. After all, corruption is not confined to the public sector. Business people and lawyers pay the bribes while condemning the phenomenon of bribery. They find themselves in a situation described in the novel Catch 22 : “But suppose everybody on our side felt that way?” “Then I’d certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way. Wouldn’t I?” Only collective action and credible, systematic reform can break out of this corrupt equilibrium. Citizens should be part of the solution. How? Mayor MacLean invited citizens’ groups to become involved in local public works, which enabled new kinds of accountability. So did Mayor Jesse Robredo in Naga City, Philippines, and Mayor Elba Soto in Campo Elias, Venezuela. Mayor Soto created an Office for Development and Citizen Participation, using citizens as eyes and ears to insure successful implementation of public works. Benin’s National Front of Organizations against Corruption discovered adulteration of glucose sacks distributed by the government, leading to wide publicity and a conviction. Citizens know where corruption is and how corrupt systems work . Lawyers understand the workings of corruption in legal systems. Accountants know the illicit games played with audits. Business people understand how corrupt systems of procurement and contracting work. Citizens know where bribery shapes the services they receive (or don’t receive). This knowledge can be culled in many ways. In surveys, people can be asked where they perceive corruption to be occurring. In confidential interviews, insiders can be asked how a corrupt system works. For example, a study of a procurement system may lay out the various steps: prequalification of bidders, technical criteria and their weights, the judging of the various bids, the process for post‐award changes, and the payment of the contract. Each of these may be subject to corruption. Interviewees are asked, in effect, “Here is how things are supposed to work in 19 prequalification. In your experience, what problems tend to emerge? How prevalent do you guess these problems are? What distortions are created?” The results of many such interviews (perhaps fifteen or more) can then be the basis for a diagnostic of a procurement system. The diagnostic can be shared with the interviewees for comments and corrections. The final version can be shared with many parties, including the government, and used to plan remedial actions. A year later, the interviews and surveys can be repeated. Progress can be assessed. New remedial actions can be recommended. Mobilize International Partners Successful leaders also mobilize international assistance in the fight against corruption. Foreign aid can be used to fund the diagnosis of corrupt systems. Aid can enable experiments, such as “report cards” where citizens give marks to different public services (Paul 2002), and incentive reforms. Preventive Measures through Better Systems In the longer term, reducing corruption requires better systems. Successful leaders understood that better systems go beyond better laws and codes of conduct. Corruption can be understood through a stylized formula: Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability. Corruption flourishes when someone has monopoly power over a good or service, has the discretion to decide how much you get or whether you get any at all, and where accountability is weak. It also is affected by positive and negative incentives. So, corruption‐fighters must reduce monopoly, limit and clarify discretion, and increase transparency in many ways. And they must alter incentives. i. Reduce Monopoly Reducing monopoly means enabling competition, as in government contracts in La Paz and in Colombia. Mayor MacLean‐Abaroa got the city of La Paz out of the construction business, meaning that public works could be carried out by any of a number of private companies. Mexico put online all government contracts and procurement plans, so plans, prices, and winners are public knowledge. Argentina reduced corruption in hospitals by publishing prices of all purchases throughout the hospital system. Corrupt deals that had resulted in higher prices were quickly made evident. ii. Limit Discretion Limiting discretion means clarifying the rules of the game and making them available to the common man and woman. Mayor MacLean‐Abaroa created a “Manual for the Paceño,” which described simply and in three languages what was required to get a permit, build a house, start a business, and so forth. President Pastrana used the Internet to limit discretion: it became harder for a government 20 official to trick a citizen because the rules of the game were available online. Judge Plana simplified the tax code, making it simpler to