Défaire l'alliance mortelle des gangs en Haïti

Headquarters International Crisis Group Avenue Louise 235 • 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 • brussels@crisisgroup.org Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110 | 15 December 2025 Table of Contents Executive Summary................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Gangs United .................................................................................................................... 4 A. The Emergence of Rival Gang Factions ..................................................................... 4 B. The Road to Compromise .......................................................................................... 5 C. A Resilient Alliance? .................................................................................................. 6 III. The Changing Nature of Haiti’s Gangs ............................................................................. 10 A. Elite Connections ....................................................................................................... 10 B. Viv Ansanm’s Criminal Enterprises........................................................................... 11 C. Gang Violence ............................................................................................................ 14 IV. The Politics of Viv Ansanm .............................................................................................. 16 A. Gang Populism ........................................................................................................... 16 B. Dialogue and the Pursuit of Amnesty ........................................................................ 19 V. The Fightback ................................................................................................................... 23 A. New Forms of Combat ............................................................................................... 23 B. A Reinforced Foreign Mission ................................................................................... 25 C. Vigilante Justice ......................................................................................................... 27 D. Tightening Sanctions ................................................................................................. 29 E. Exit Ramps for Minors............................................................................................... 30 VI. Restoring Security ............................................................................................................ 32 A. Retaking Territory ..................................................................................................... 32 B. Strengthening the Security Apparatus ...................................................................... 34 C. Demobilisation and Dialogue .................................................................................... 34 D. Curbing Gang Influence in Public Office ................................................................... 36 VII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 37 APPENDICES A. Map of Haiti ...................................................................................................................... 38 B. About the International Crisis Group .............................................................................. 39 C. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Latin America and the Caribbean since 2022 ... 40 D. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................ 42 Principal Findings What’s new? A united front of Haiti’s most powerful gangs, Viv Ansanm, has extended its territorial reach, expanded its illicit rackets and pushed the country to a fresh peak of violence. As a new international force readies for deployment, gangs increasingly claim they are fighting to defend the poorest from predatory elites. Why does it matter? With Haiti’s transitional government due to wind down in February 2026, gangs are intent on using their clout to place allies in the administration and gain a wide- ranging amnesty. Blessed by the UN, the new Gang Suppression Force could spur a surge in combat, possibly endangering civilian lives. What should be done? Outside partners should provide the new force with the resources needed to regain territorial control and bring citizens respite. Once the balance of power shifts toward the state, officials should engage the gangs in talks about curbing violence, demobilising the illicit groups, and severing links between crime and Haitian elites. International Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110 15 December 2025 Executive Summary Born of Port-au-Prince’s most powerful gangs, Viv Ansanm has raised the criminal threat overhanging Haiti’s state and civilians to alarming heights. The gang coalition announced itself to the world by besieging the Haitian capital in early 2024, triggering former Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s resignation. After consolidating its hold on much of the city, Viv Ansanm has expanded into neighbouring departments, tight- ened its grip on the main roads connecting Port-au-Prince to the rest of the country and mounted attacks on the airport, essentially cutting Haiti off. Gangs’ violent offensives have killed over 16,000 people since 2022. But a rising death toll and diversifying criminal portfolio, now including extortion, piracy and drug trafficking, have not stopped gangs from claiming to represent the country’s downtrodden, espe- cially on social media. UN approval of a new foreign force to combat the gangs could shift the balance of power. But it is vital that plans are in place not just to overpower the gangs but also to persuade them to demobilise. Haitian business and political elites have relied on paramilitary forces to protect their interests since the 1950s dictatorship of Francois Duvalier, or “Papa Doc”. But in the wake of the assassination of Presi- dent Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, gangs have mutated, evolving from tools in the hands of the most powerful to overlords of Haiti. Two main gang groupings – the G-9, whose most public figure was Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue, and the Gpèp, under Gabriel Jean Pierre, known as “Ti Gabriel” – fought for supremacy after Moïse’s murder. Even as the two faced off, gang leaders discussed whether to strike agreements to scale down the death toll among their members and spare resources. Mediators managed to craft several pacts among local groups to divvy up coveted turf. Late in 2023, reports emerged that the country’s two main gang coalitions had merged into one platform; their first joint offensive began months later. Alongside its violent expansion, Viv Ansanm has sought to transform its public profile from that of a predatory criminal force into that of an ideological crusader. Crime bosses say their mission is to protect the poorest Haitians from rapacious elites and colonial powers that histor- ically have oppressed this black Caribbean nation. Chérizier and other gang leaders have even announced the creation of a new political party, albeit without taking the steps needed to register it formally. While continuing to enrich themselves at the expense of Haitians rich and poor, their message has nevertheless become more overtly politi- cal: they appear intent on guaranteeing that their allies are part of the next administration, which should be formed by 7 February 2026 to Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page ii replace the current transitional government. The concrete result they aspire to is a general amnesty for leaders and members. Haiti and its foreign partners are looking to beef up their ability to re- spond to the gangs with force. The UN Security Council has approved a new security operation, dubbed the Gang Suppression Force, to replace the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission, which started up in 2024 but has never had the personnel or resources needed to check the gangs. The new force aims to incorporate 5,500 military personnel and expects to draw on reliable funding. Its man- date appears to give it more operational independence and the leeway to adopt more aggressive tactics. But until the force’s deployment, which is expected to commence around April 2026, Haiti’s authorities will have to turn to other methods. A task force, led by Haiti’s prime minister and powered by U.S. private military companies, has already used drones to hit gang members in their urban strongholds, killing over 200 people. Foreign partners are also providing training to the newly reconstituted army. Meanwhile, citizens exhausted by the threat to their neighbourhoods have established self-defence groups, provok- ing a brutal riposte from the gangs. A well-resourced, properly informed and expertly commanded Gang Suppression Force could help change the balance of force on the ground and push the gangs onto the back foot. Port-au-Prince and its foreign counterparts, however, must take care to mitigate the dangers of civilian casualties and violations of human rights, ensuring that robust accountability systems are in place. Once the force is up and running, the Haitian government should also overcome the coordi- nation failures that have plagued previous security campaigns. In particular, the government should appoint members to the National Security Council and ask them to design a strategy that lays out each institution’s role in fighting the gangs. Even so, it remains unlikely that force alone will entirely extricate gangs from the communities they control or sever the nexus with poli- tics that has bedevilled Haiti for over half a century. Though informal negotiations with gangs take place on a regular basis – to gain access to people in need of humanitarian aid or to keep businesses open – many Haitians oppose the idea of formal dialogue with the perpetra- tors of crimes they consider unforgivable. Government officials have correctly said the Haitian state cannot engage in talks from a position of weakness. But if the new multinational force and revamped Haitian security forces allow the authorities to gain the upper hand and broad- cast their armed superiority, state officials should look to use dialogue as a means of convincing the gangs to cut their losses, reduce violence against civilians and, eventually, demobilise. Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page iii While that happens, the administration, with the support of donors, should expand the program that is now providing exit ramps for mi- nors in the gangs’ ranks. In cooperation with international experts, it should also start to design a transitional justice system that provides benefits and a measure of judicial reprieve to those who disarm and cooperate with the authorities, while also guaranteeing that there will be no general impunity. It is hard to understate the damage gangs have wrought in Haiti, kill- ing and raping thousands, creating the hemisphere’s worst humanitar- ian crisis and destroying the lives of millions. Understandably, many Haitians refuse to contemplate responding to the horrors they have endured with anything less than crushing retaliation. But even if the Gang Suppression Force lives up to its promise, it is hard to compute the possible cost in lives and resources of a campaign to destroy the gangs. At some stage, negotiations from a position of strength aimed at protecting civilians and disarming the gangs would serve Haiti far better as a first step on the long path to stability. Port-au-Prince/New York/London/Brussels, 15 December 2025 International Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110 15 December 2025 Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance I. Introduction Illegal armed groups have formed part of Haiti’s political landscape for decades. Francois Duvalier, the dictator known as “Papa Doc”, relied on a network of hired thugs to win the 1957 presidential election. Once in office, Duvalier turned them into a feared militia known as the Tonton Macoutes. They soon outnumbered the Haitian army, enabling Duvalier to consolidate his grip with ruthless repression of opposi- tion. 1 Since then, most presidents have turned to paramilitary forces to maintain power and suppress dissent. 2 The lineage of the gangs cur- rently terrorising Haiti goes back to the chimères of the late 1990s, small armed groups supported by Fanmi Lavalas, the party of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 3 Some Haitians referred to these as baz (base), a name that several criminal outfits still use, though with time “gangs” became the most common label. 4 Politicians and business elites capitalised on these gangs from the turn of the millennium, using them to intimidate opponents, boost the chances of victory for their candidates in elections, protect businesses and attack economic rivals. 5 UN peacekeepers launched a campaign against gangs in 2007, managing to keep a lid on the violence they perpetrated. Over the course of a thirteen-year mission, however, these same UN forces were implicated in hundreds of cases of sexual abuse. Poor sanitation at a base for Nepalese peacekeepers resulted in a cholera epidemic, killing thousands. The peacekeepers’ departure was welcomed by many Haitians. But it left a vacuum that the under- resourced national police force – widely compromised by gang accom- plices within its ranks – was unable to fill. 6 1 Tonton Macoutes is the common moniker for the National Security Volunteers, created in 1959. The name comes from a Haitian folktale about a bogeyman who kidnaps disobedient children; the reference was appropriate, because the Tonton Macoutes often abducted people at night. Up to 60,000 people were killed under the dictatorship of Duvalier and his son. Laurent Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History (New York, 2012), pp. 311-359. 2 Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Briefing N°44, Haiti: A Path to Stability for a Nation in Shock , 30 September 2021. 3 Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°10, A New Chance for Haiti? , 18 November 2004, p. 2. 4 Chelsea L. Kivland, Street Sovereigns: Young Men and the Makeshift State in Urban Haiti (New York, 2020). 5 Crisis Group Briefing, Haiti: A Path to Stability for a Nation in Shock , op. cit. 6 Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Briefing N°49, Haiti’s Gangs: Can a Foreign Mission Break Their Stranglehold? , 5 January 2024. Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page 2 Matters took a turn for the worse after President Jovenel Moïse was murdered in the early morning of 7 July 2021. 7 Gangs were quick to exploit the power struggle among would-be successors to the slain president, seizing the opportunity to expand their turf, ranks and arsenals. 8 Ariel Henry, anointed interim prime minister shortly after the assassination with the blessing of foreign diplomats, called on the UN Secretary-General to deploy a foreign force to help Haitian police halt the gangs’ advances in late 2022. A year later, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of a Kenya-led multinational secu- rity mission. 9 Underfunded and short-staffed, the mission has achieved little. 10 Violence has raged on. Marauding gangs account for large proportions of the 16,000 people who have been killed since 2022 and the 1.4 mil- lion – 12 per cent of the population – who have been displaced. 11 The national palace, ministries, courts, prisons, police stations, schools and hospitals have been damaged or destroyed, forcing authorities to relocate over 100 public institutions. 12 More than 1,600 schools are currently closed; a quarter are occupied by gangs. A lack of educa- tional opportunities and widespread poverty have in turn fuelled gang recruitment of children, which surged by 70 per cent in 2024. 13 Sexual violence is rampant, and more than half the population suffers from acute food insecurity. 14 In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2025, Laurent Saint-Cyr, head of the Transitional Presi- dential Council (one of the two executive bodies of the current gov- 7 Mariano de Alba, “Handling the Aftermath of Haiti’s Presidential Assassination”, Crisis Group Commentary, 23 July 2021. 8 Ibid. 9 In October 2023, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of a non- UN multinational mission led by Kenya, tasked with supporting the Haitian po- lice’s anti-gang operations, as well as securing critical infrastructure and transport hubs. See Crisis Group Briefing, Haiti’s Gangs: Can a Foreign Mission Break Their Stranglehold? , op. cit., pp. 11-14; Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°107, Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti , 19 February 2025, pp. 19-21. 10 Crisis Group Briefing, Haiti’s Gangs: Can a Foreign Mission Break Their Stran- glehold? , op. cit., pp. 11-14; Crisis Group Report, Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti , op. cit., pp. 19-21. 11 “High Commissioner Türk updates Human Rights Council on Haiti: We can – and must – turn this situation around”, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 2 October 2025; “Haiti – Report on the displacement situation in Haiti – Round 11”, International Organisation for Migration, Septem- ber 2025. 12 “Assault on Martissant – June 1, 2021, The Beginning of the So-Called ‘Lost Ter- ritories’, the Surge in Gang Violence, and the Establishment of their Dominance”, Centre d’analyse et de recherche en droits de l’homme, 1 June 2025. 13 “Haiti: Child recruitment by armed groups surges 70 per cent”, UN News, 24 No- vember 2024. 14 “UN Special Representative Patten urges for immediate action as sexual violence surges amid gang violence in Haiti”, press release, UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), 4 June 2025; “Analyse IPC de l’insécurité alimentaire aiguë, Septembre 2025-Juin 2026”, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 10 October 2025. Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page 3 ernment, alongside the prime minister’s office), declared that Haiti is at war with the criminal groups. 15 Many Haitians agree. 16 This report examines the reconfiguration of Haitian gangs and pro- vides recommendations for how to address the challenges they pose to Haiti’s stability. It is based on over 300 interviews conducted between February 2022 and November 2025 with victims, residents, former gang members, members of self-defence groups and experts, as well as state officials, representatives of the private sector, diplomats and members of the security forces in Port-au-Prince, New York, Nairobi and other cities. Approximately one third of the interviews were with women, mostly representing civil society organisations and local com- munities. Most officials in the Haitian state, as well as members of the private sector, diplomatic corps, security forces and non-state armed groups, are men, reflecting the gendered distribution of power in poli- tics, business, law enforcement and the criminal underworld. 15 “Radio Television Caraïbes: Discours de Laurent Saint Cyr, à la 80ème session ordinaire de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies”, video, YouTube, 25 Septem- ber 2025. 16 Tom Phillips and Etienne Côté-Paluck, “‘This is effectively a civil war’: Despair in Haiti as gangs step up assault on capital”, The Guardian , 30 October 2024. Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page 4 II. Gangs United In late February 2024, Haitian gangs launched a wave of coordinated attacks across Port-au-Prince. 17 While the assault took many by sur- prise, prominent gang figures including Jimmy Chérizier (alias Barbe- cue), Christ-Roi Chéry and Iscard Andrice had long understood that an alliance among the most powerful illegal armed groups in the capi- tal would boost their power and profits. A. The Emergence of Rival Gang Factions The first attempts to create a broad gang coalition date to 2018, when criminal figures in the capital began to discuss uniting their forces. Some government officials encouraged this effort, hoping it would be easier to negotiate demobilisation with a unified gang command than with multiple smaller criminal outfits. 18 In June 2020, nine powerful gangs and several other minor groups joined forces. Over the following months, the coalition – officially, the Revolutionary Forces G9 Family and Allies, Mess with One, Mess with All, commonly known as the G9 – launched attacks on criminal groups that refused to join. 19 Chérizier, a former police officer turned gang leader, became the G9’s spokesper- son and one of its most influential figures, although this prominence has at times given the erroneous impression that he is its military chief. 20 In response to attacks from the G9, gang leader Gabriel Jean Pierre – known as “Ti Gabriel” – along with other crime bosses who had refused to sign up to Chérizier’s group joined a front known as Gpèp, or “the people’s eyes” in Haitian Creole. 21 Functioning more as a 17 Crisis Group Report, Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti , op. cit. 18 A spokesperson for the state National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reinte- gration Commission acknowledged in 2020 that the commission had encouraged gang leaders to form a coalition to pave the way for negotiations with the govern- ment. Danio Darius, “Les gangs se sont fédérés sur proposition de la Commission nationale de désarmement, démantèlement et réinsertion”, Le Nouvelliste , 2 Sep- tember 2020. 19 Gangs such as Village de Dieu and Grand Ravine, which operate on the southern outskirts of the capital, joined the G9 for a time, but left the coalition within months. Kettia JP Taylor, “Les gangs du ‘Village de Dieu’ rejoignent le G9, le Bicen- tenaire se dégage peu à peu”, Haiti Infos Pro , 1 January 2020. Crisis Group tele- phone interview, Haitian gang expert, 16 July 2022. 20 The gang led by Barbecue, along with others headed by aliases Djouma, Ezekiel, Iskar, Krisla, Mathias, Mikanor, Sonson and Ti Junior, formed the G9 coalition. Chérizier, as spokesperson of the new alliance, said the group aimed to combat gangs involved in kidnapping, truck hijackings and sexual violence. Despite proof to the contrary, he denied that the G9 had links to the administration of President Moïse or opposition forces. The original video announcing the G9‘s creation, posted on YouTube in June 2020, is no longer available online. 21 Among the gangs that were part of the Gpèp were those led by aliases Izo, Jeff Gwo Lwa, Kempes, Lanmo San Jou, Ti Gabriel, Ti Lapli, Ti Makkak and Vitel- homme. Crisis Group interview, Port-au-Prince, 28 March 2025. Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page 5 platform for tactical military coordination than an organised alliance like the G9, groups in the Gpèp aimed primarily to thwart rival gang offensives, with each leader retaining full autonomy to engage in which- ever criminal activities he chose. 22 B. The Road to Compromise Between 2020 and 2024, fighting between the G9 and Gpèp spiked as the gangs intensified their arms race, recruitment campaigns and pursuit of new sources of revenue. Even so, a number of rival gangs negotiated ceasefires between the end of 2022 and mid-2023. Local facilitators arranged for a truce at the end of 2022 between the Village de Dieu and Grand Ravine gangs (affiliated with Gpèp) and Ti Bwa (aligned with the G9). Then, in 2023, the Gpèp signed a ceasefire with three of the most powerful gangs affiliated with the G9, which had spent the previous three years laying siege to Ti Gabriel’s stronghold in Cité Soleil. 23 Locals were relieved when the truces tempered inter- gang combat. Nonetheless, kidnapping, extortion and sexual violence remained widespread. 24 Gang efforts to hammer out a broad-based alliance redoubled when Kenya offered in August 2023 to lead a multinational security mis- sion. 25 Following Nairobi’s announcement, Chérizier hinted that all the rival gangs could join forces to fight the African police officers. “If [Kenyan agents] come to the poor neighbourhoods and start shoot- ing and killing, we Haitians will rise up and fight to the last drop of our blood”, he warned. “And it will not be a fight by the G9 or the Gpèp, it will be a fight by the Haitian people to preserve the dignity of our country”. 26 A month later, Chérizier announced the creation of a united front be- tween the G9 and the Gpèp, called Viv Ansanm (“Live Together” in Haitian Creole), to overthrow the government headed by then-Prime 22 Some of the gangs under the Gpèp banner, including Kraze Barye and 400 Mawozo, continued to fight turf wars over adjacent territories. According to ex- perts, Gpèp functioned as a decentralised network that engaged in military cooper- ation based on the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. Crisis Group interviews, Haitian gang experts, 22 May 2022; resident of gang-controlled area, Port-au- Prince, 29 November 2023. 23 The truce was brokered partly by Father Tom Hagan, a priest from the U.S. who said he had built on an existing agreement between Chérizier, Mathias Saintil and Iskar Andrice, on one side, and Ti Gabriel, on the other, to avoid fighting at night. Jacqueline Charles, “With help from American priest, four Haiti gang leaders have called a truce. Can it last?”, Miami Herald , 16 July 2023. 24 Crisis Group telephone interview, Haitian human rights defender, 7 September 2024. Crisis Group interview, bus driver, Port-au-Prince, 28 November 2024. See also Azaine Mauryle, “L’accord de paix conclu entre les gangs ne suffit pas, ils doivent déposer ou remettre leurs armes”, Vant Bèf Info , 13 December 2022. 25 “Kenya ready to lead multinational force to Haiti”, Reuters, 29 July 2023. 26 “Tripotay Lakay: Jimmy Cherizier di lap antre nan gè ak fòs etranje Kenya yo depi yo pa”, video, YouTube, 16 August 2023. Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page 6 Minister Henry. 27 The initial phase of the alliance was short-lived, as the killing of gang leader alias Tyson triggered clashes, both within the G9 and between the G9 and Gpèp, for control of his former territory. 28 But even as fighting between gangs resumed – driving violence to its highest levels in over two years – the leaders remained in communica- tion through a shared messaging group, continuing to debate the mer- its of making a non-aggression pact in order to battle the authorities together. These moves were due in no small part to gang leaders’ con- cerns that the foreign mission approved by the UN Security Council in October 2023 might undermine their position. C. A Resilient Alliance? The large-scale, coordinated attacks launched simultaneously across Port-au-Prince in late February 2024 were the first sign of the gangs’ resolve to cooperate militarily. 29 The attacks started on the day that former Prime Minister Henry arrived in Nairobi to oversee the signing of an agreement to deploy Kenyan police officers to Haiti as part of the new multinational force. 30 Viv Ansanm’s siege of Port-au-Prince overwhelmed Haiti’s security forces and paralysed the capital. An initial wave of attacks targeted critical infrastructure and public buildings across the capital, hitting the airport, presidential palace, prisons, seaports, police stations and the force’s academy. 31 With Henry blocked from returning to Haiti, political groups and foreign diplomats embarked on urgent talks about creating a new transitional government. 32 Chérizier protested that Viv 27 “Press Lakay News: Jwèt la gate, Babekyou, G9, G-PEP, Izo, Vitelom, Lanmò Sanjou Zam ala men pou ranvèse Ariel Henry”, video, YouTube, 19 September 2023. At the time, Henry was in New York rallying support for a foreign mission. Over half a dozen leaders of rival gangs – including Barbecue, Chen Mechan, Izo, Jeff Gwo Lwa, Krisla, Lanmo San Jou and Vitelhomme – confirmed Viv Ansanm’s existence through voice notes that circulated on social media. 28 After Tyson was killed by members of his own coalition, the death of Iscard Andrice – one of the G9’s three main founders – disrupted relations among several gangs that controlled strategic parts of Cité Soleil, one of the main battlegrounds. Iscard was described by several sources as the “real mastermind” behind the G9 coalition. “Au moins 6 présumés bandits tués à Cité Soleil dont le nommé Tyson”, Planet Press, 27 September 2023. Crisis Group interviews, residents, Port-au- Prince, November 2023. 29 The gangs currently part of Viv Ansanm include 400 Mawozo, 5 Segonn (Village- de-Dieu), Bel-Air (Les Argentins), Belekou, Boston, Chen Mechan, Delmas 6, Fort Dimanche, Grand Ravine, Izo 2 (Kenscoff), Kokorat San Ras, Kraze Baryè, Krache Dife, La Saline, Mariani, Pierre VI, Gran Grif (Savien), Simon Pelé, Taliban (Canaan), Terre Noire, Ti Bwa, Tokyo and Wharf Jérémie. 30 For more details on this large-scale offensive, see Diego Da Rin, “Will a New Government Halt Haiti’s Nosedive?”, Crisis Group Commentary, 21 March 2024. 31 See Crisis Watch, Haiti entries, March-May 2024. 32 With Henry unable to return to Haiti, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the U.S. and other foreign partners convened a summit in Jamaica on 11 March. Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page 7 Ansanm has been excluded from the new political arrangements, saying “as long as [the gangs] are not at the table, the country will never be at peace”. 33 Gangs kept Port-au-Prince at a standstill for several months, even as the new presidential council was appointed and the first U.S. military flights arrived in the capital to prepare for the foreign security mis- sion’s deployment. Once it became apparent that their joint operations were keeping the new transitional government on the back foot, gang leaders crafted a more formal collaboration. They coordinated their military operations and struck agreements to delimit turf and distrib- ute revenues from extortion and other rackets. 34 Viv Ansanm contin- ued to be governed as it has been since its inception, with no gang leader formally holding authority over the others. Decisions that affect the entire alliance, particularly on strategy, are made following consul- tations with leaders of all member gangs. 35 Viv Ansanm’s offensives have ebbed and flowed. The first wave of large-scale attacks lasted from February 2024 until the official for- mation of the new government three months later. When the first deployment of Kenyan officers arrived in June, the gangs scaled back their attacks, only for these to tick back up in October 2024, once it became clear the mission was understaffed and underfunded. These attacks have continued, with bouts of intense violence. 36 They brought together representatives of Haiti’s main political and social groups, urging them to form a new transitional authority until elections could be held. The result was a nine-member Transitional Presidential Council that would work alongside a prime minister. See Crisis Group Report, Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti , op. cit. 33 “Haiti gang leader will consider ceasefire but warns foreign forces will be treated as ‘invaders’”, Sky News, 29 March 2024. 34 Crisis Group interviews, gang analysts, Port-au-Prince, 4 July and 23 October 2024. 35 Chérizier says he is president and spokesperson of the coalition, but he does not have authority over other leaders. In late 2024, he was forbidden from speaking on the coalition’s behalf for almost a month, for undisclosed reasons. “Mise sous sanc- tion du Président et Porte-parole du regroupement ‘Vivre Ensemble’”, statement, Christla, Jeff Gwo Lwa and Lanmo 100 Jou, 26 November 2024. 36 The last months of 2025 have seen an uptick in fighting as gangs retaliate against the Haitian police, which has stepped up operations in several gang-controlled areas in the capital in collaboration with the multinational security mission and foreign contractors. On 13 November, marines protecting the U.S. embassy were attacked by gang members. The next day, gangs allegedly shot at a helicopter being flown by members of a private military company, forcing it to make an emergency landing in the Santo area of the capital. A week later, a commercial plane was also shot at while landing at the capital’s airport, although it is not clear if gangs were responsible. Juhakenson Blaise, “US Marines return fire after attack on embassy in Haiti amid escalating gang clashes”, The Haitian Times , 16 November 2025; Jacqueline Charles, “Haiti police seize high-powered ‘weapon of war’, kill several gang members”, Miami Herald , 16 November 2025; Jacqueline Charles, “Haiti’s Sunrise Airways suspends domestic flights after bullet hits aircraft”, Miami Her- ald , 23 November 2025. Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page 8 Many observers were sceptical that Viv Ansanm would last more than a few months, given the gangs’ long history of volatile alliances and failed attempts to join forces. 37 Internal tensions have indeed at times threatened to fracture the united front, while conflicts among gang leaders have not completely abated. 38 But by now the vast majority of gangs have agreed to be part of Viv Ansanm. 39 Tellingly, no gang has left the coalition since its creation, and others that were not initially part of the alliance have enlisted. This discipline has allowed Viv Ansanm to alternate between periods of fierce offensives and phases in which they adopt a more defensive posture, focusing on protecting strongholds and newly acquired terri- tories. By joining forces, Viv Ansanm has achieved a level of military might far beyond anything previously seen among Haiti’s gangs. While exact data is unavailable, experts estimate that Viv Ansanm could col- lectively have between 12,000 and 20,000 members, of whom 3,000 are heavily armed. 40 The alliance has enabled rapid expansion into new areas such as Kenscoff – located in the mountains overlooking the affluent neighbourhood of Pétion-Ville in the capital – and several important towns in the Centre department. Both are regions where gangs had not previously established a permanent foothold. 41 Rivalries 37 Former Prime Minister Henry dismissed the alliance early on, saying “a pump- kin does not produce a calabash, and gangs cannot live together”. Kervens Adam Paul, “‘Les bandits ne seront jamais des artisans de la paix’, a déclaré le Premier ministre Henry”, Le Nouvelliste , 25 September 2023. 38 Disagreements among leaders within Viv Ansanm – mainly over turf boundaries and distribution of illicit revenues – escalated into open fighting on two occasions. In September 2024, alias Mathias clashed with alias Djouma, who had escaped from prison that March and had been attempting to reclaim the area that he previ- ously controlled. In the second case, in June 2025, tensions over turf boundaries and a new illegal road toll established in the border between gang-controlled areas triggered clashes between the Chen Mechan and 400 Mawozo gangs. In both cases, fighting lasted no more than three days before being resolved through mediation by other gang leaders in the coalition. Crisis Group interviews, Port-au-Prince, April 2025; and by telephone, June 2025. See also “Football match sparks gang war in Cité Soleil”, Haiti Libre , 13 September 2024; Jonasson Odigène, “Affron- tements armés: deux chefs de gang tués en moins de 48 heures à Carrefour Ma- rassa”, Le Nouvelliste , 9 June 2025. 39 Early on, prominent gangs – including Brooklyn led by alias Ti Gabriel and Wharf Jérémie headed by Micanor Altès – refused to join the emerging alliance. Ti Gabriel operates in the Brooklyn neighbourhood of Cité Soleil and Micanor Altès controls the area of Wharf Jérémie – both strategic territories located in the vicin- ity of the capital’s two main ports. Chérizier and alias Jeff Gwo Lwa convinced Gabriel and Altès to collaborate with Viv Ansanm, though they are not formally part of the coalition’s collective decision-making. Crisis Group interviews, local leaders and gang analysts, Port-au-Prince, March-April 2025. 40 Crisis Group interviews, Port-au-Prince, 24 November 2025, 41 In July, during the traditional Haitian pilgrimage to Saut d’Eau to honour the Virgin Mary, gang leaders Jeff Gwo Lwa, Lanmo San Jou and Chérizier made a public appearance, accompanied by an elite unit formed in 2024 by the Ti Bwa gang, known as Backup 100 Plak. The January 2025 offensive on Kenscoff involved contingents from five different gangs. “Flash report on the events in Kenscoff”, BINUH and OHCHR, 7 April 2025. Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page 9 once thought irreconcilable have faded: rival gang leaders alias Izo and alias Krisla, for instance, now attend the same parties and have even recorded songs together. 42 42 Krisla and Izo were respectively affiliated with the G9 and the GPèp before com- ing together under the Viv Ansanm umbrella. Controlling adjacent territories, they spent several years engaged in fierce clashes over a stretch of national road at the southern entrance of Port-au-Prince. One of their recent musical collaborations is the song “Adrese w a chef” (“Report to the Boss” in Haitian Creole). “Chrisla ft. Izo Vilaj De dye – Adresew a Chef”, video, YouTube, 22 March 2025. Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page 10 III. The Changing Nature of Haiti’s Gangs Over the last few years, gangs have gone from being armies for hire at the service of powerful elites to becoming independent forces working in fast-changing partnerships with the highest bidder. They have con- solidated their grip on territory, boosted their illicit revenues and, it seems, deepened their involvement in drug trafficking. In the course of building their power, they have extracted a brutal toll on the Haitian people, who have frequently been the victims of uncontrolled violence. A. Elite Connections Relations between Haitian gangs and the country’s elites have changed markedly in recent years. As noted above, political forces, first the left- wing political party Fanmi Lavalas and later others, exploited the armed organisations known as baz that were active in densely popu- lated slums of Port-au-Prince and other major cities. 43 Politicians negotiated access for their candidates to these neighbourhoods during electoral campaigns, seeking the baz’s help to mobilise votes or to sab- otage polling stations – including by destroying ballot boxes – when- ever election results promised to turn out unfavourably. 44 In return, they received material support for their communities. These benefits included generators to power street lighting and the appointment of gang members to low-level posts in public administration; over time, gangs were also handed more funds and weapons. 45 Influential mem- bers of these groups became power brokers. Eventually, the ties between these small armed outfits and the Lavalas party frayed, and gangs increasingly turned to criminal practices to boost their income. Businesspeople started contracting them to pro- tect their own firms or to undermine competitors. 46 For the past two decades, elites have also used gangs to steer or quell public demon- strations, whether for or against incumbent governments. 47 Gangs are no longer subordinate to their patrons, however. As the G9 and the Gpèp fought to impose their control upon the capital, gangs proved willing to ally with any suitor able to provide them with funds and weapons. Longstanding loyalties to specific business or political elites evaporated and alliances became increasingly fluid and trans- 43 Kivland, Street Sovereigns: Young Men and the Makeshift State in Urban Haiti , op. cit. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. Crisis Group interview, social leader, Port-au-Prince, 28 November 2023. 46 Crisis Group interview, Haitian businessperson, Port-au-Prince, 24 June 2025. 47 Some of the best documented cases are the massacres allegedly perpetrated by gangs in La Saline, Bel-Air and Cité Soleil between 2019 and 2020 to break up anti-government demonstrations. See Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Briefing N°48, Haiti’s Last Resort: Gangs and the Prospect of Foreign Interven- tion , 14 December 2022, p. 4. Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page 11 actional. 48 Meanwhile, as gangs became more powerful militarily and controlled larger swathes of the capital and beyond, the crime bosses started shunning their former patrons’ orders, instead demanding larger sums from them or directing their campaigns of violence in accordance with their own objectives. 49 B. Viv Ansanm’s Criminal Enterprises As their ranks and firepower have grown, gangs have diversified their funding sources and consolidated various systems for extracting illicit profits. Alongside getting funds and weapons from influential Haitian politicians and business leaders, the groups obtain revenue from sources including protection rackets, illegal road tolls, kidnapping for ransom and sex trafficking. Reportedly, their involvement in drug and arms trafficking is deepening as well. 50 While extortion is not new, it has grown at breakneck speed. Gangs began by targeting small busi- ness owners who had no way of resisting armed threats. Over time, they systematised the collection of illegal taxes, profiting from all existing commerce in areas they controlled – including street vendors’ paltry earnings from selling food and other essential goods. 51 As they got stronger, gangs were able to extort larger businesses in their basti- ons, including bus companies, car dealerships, power plants and fac- tories, as well as firms at industrial parks and seaports. 52 Extortion has since extended to the collection of illegal tolls. In mid- 2021, gangs seized control of a stretch of the national highway con- necting Port-au-Prince with southern regions; since then, they have taken over several other roads leading out of the capital. 53 This move proved lucrative: gangs are now charging $1,500 per truck per month to operate in the area, in addition to $190 for each trip from the 48 For a deeper analysis of the overlap between politics and violence in Haiti, see Crisis Group Report, Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti , op. cit. 49 Crisis Group interview, Haitian politician, Port-au-Prince, 24 October 2024. 50 There is growing concern that gangs might be involved in transnational criminal networks engaged in human trafficking for migration or sexual purposes, as well as in organ trafficking. “Haiti: UN expert William O’Neill concludes official visit”, OHCHR, 28 June 2023. 51 Crisis Group interview, human rights defender, Port-Au-Prince, 28 March 2025. 52 Gangs are now demanding fees from families who want to bury relatives in at least four of the capital’s largest cemeteries, in effect replacing the state tax collec- tion for this service. Fenel Pélissier, “Gangs are taxing corpses in Port-au-Prince”, Ayibopost , 23 June 2025. 53 Viv Ansanm-affiliated gangs now control all the gateways to Port-au-Prince. They hold National Road 2 to the south, large sections of National Road 1 to the north in both the Ouest and Artibonite departments, and more than half of Na- tional Road 8 to the Malpasse border crossing with the Dominican Republic. Since April, when they seized the cities of Mirebalais and Saut d’Eau, gangs greatly ex- panded their presence in the Centre department, consolidating their grip on parts of National Road 3 and other smaller byways. Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page 12 region’s ports. 54 Haiti’s finance minister estimates that gangs earn a further $60 to $75 million annually from extorting shipments coming from the neighbouring Dominican Republic. 55 Payments are also collected at checkpoints set up throughout Port-au-Prince, where vehi- cles, pedestrians and even children going to school are assessed a fee. 56 The cumulative effects of these tolls has been to drive up the costs of goods transported by land, while communities that try not to pay have been on the receiving end of brutal reprisals. 57 Kidnappings for ransom are another source of income for gangs, par- ticularly for groups in the Gpèp criminal coalition (since the creation of Viv Ansanm, Chérizier has tried to persuade other gang leaders to abandon the practice). 58 While abductions have decreased in number over the past year, kidnappings of wealthy individuals and foreigners continue. 59 Women are often raped during captivity, with gangs using sexual violence to strong-arm families into paying the ransom. 60 The Gran Ravine gang kidnapped six UNICEF staff members in July; the next month, eight people, including an Irish nun, were seized from an orphanage in the Kenscoff area by the gang led by alias Izo 2. They were all released after weeks in captivity. 61 For the past year, gangs have resorted to maritime theft and kidnap- ping as well, targeting small boats and medium-size cargo vessels in Port-au-Prince Bay and kidnapping passengers transiting between 54 Crisis Group interview, businessman, Port-au-Prince, 2 April 2025. 55 Roberson Alphonse, “Pour couper l’accès aux gangs à des millions de dollars par mois”, Le Nouvelliste , 29 April 2025. 56 Jean Gilles Désinord, “Port-au-Prince: Un péage illégal au centre-ville – la popu- lation rançonnée par les gangs”, Vant Bèf Info , 8 May 2025. 57 In October 2024, the Gran Grif gang, which operates in the Artibonite department and is part of Viv Ansanm, massacred at least 70 people in the city of Pont-Sondé, accusing the population of using rural routes to bypass the tolls the gang had im- posed on the main road in that area. Jacqueline Charles, “Gang massacre in Haiti town raises questions about effectiveness of international force”, Miami Herald , 4 October 2024. 58 “I want to take this opportunity to send a message to all the guys in Viv Ansanm: no country can develop with kidnapping. … We need to stop kidnapping: it’s a way to show the whole world that it’s not those of us who have weapons who are the problem”. “Tele Ginen: Pòt pawòl Viv Ansanm lan Babekyou salye desizyon gwoup ame yo nan Site Solèy pran pou fè lapè”, video, YouTube, 25 July 2024. 59 After reaching an all-time high of nearly 2,500 in 2024, the number of kidnap- pings has fallen slightly. Sources told Crisis Group that in 2024 gangs managed to extract ransoms as high as $1 million for the release of a kidnapped person. Crisis Group interviews, Port-au-Prince, April 2025. See also “United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti: Report of the Secretary-General”, UNSC S/2025/418, 27 June 2025, pp. 4, 16. 60 “Haiti: ‘Cataclysmic’ situation demands immediate and bold action”, press re- lease, OHCHR, 28 March 2024. 61 Frances Robles, “UNICEF employees held hostage for 3 weeks in Haiti”, The New York Times, 29 July 2025; Tom Phillips, “Eight people kidnapped from Hai- tian orphanage released after three weeks”, The Guardian , 31 August 2025. Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Report N°110, 15 December 2025 Page 13 Gonâve Island and the Haitian mainland. 62 Some gangs, including Village de Dieu and Canaan, have an array of speedboats; others, like Wharf Jérémie and Ti Bwa, which control coastal areas of the capital, have recently acquired vessels with the aim of carrying out more heists at sea. 63 That said, certain changes in criminal behaviour hint that gangs may now be receiving an increasing share of their revenues from drug traf- ficking. Haitian police and law enforcement agencies in neighbouring countries have seized various large shipments of narcotics in recent months, arresting Haitian nationals in the process. 64 In July, the Hai- tian police conducted the largest drug seizure in the force’s 30-year history, intercepting more than one tonne of cocaine off Île de la Tortue, in the north of the country. 65 Officials from the National Com- mission for the Fight against Drugs nevertheless told Crisis G