Éviter l’effondrement : évaluation du secteur de la sécurité en Haïti et perspectives pour de futurs programmes de gouvernance et de réforme du secteur de la sécurité 2025

Backing from the brink: assessing Haiti’s security sector and opportunities for future security sector governance and reform programming 2025 SUMMARY REPORT Backing from the brink: assessing Haiti’s security sector and opportunities for futu- re security sector governance and reform programming This document provides an overview of the contents of the assessment of the security sector in Haiti carried out by DCAF, at the request of Switzerland, France and Germany. The original assessment offers a security threat profile, an analysis of the security ecosystem and its challenges, a brief examination of the Multinatio - nal Security Support Mission transition into the Gang Suppression Force, a mapping of the security assis - tance provided by international partners and recommendations with potential entry-points towards improved governance and effectiveness of the security sector. The assessment took place from November 2024 to November 2025. ABOUT DCAF DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance is dedicated to improving the security of states and their people within a framework of democratic governan - ce, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and gender equality. Since its founding in 2000, DCAF has contributed to making peace and development more sustaina - ble by assisting partner states, and international actors supporting these states, to improve the governance of their security sector through inclusive and participatory reforms. It creates innovative knowledge products, promotes norms and good prac - tices, provides legal and policy advice and supports capacity-building of both state and non-state security sector stakeholders. DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance Maison de la Paix Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 730 94 00 info@dcaf.ch www.dcaf.ch ISBN: 978-92-9222-807-1 Authors: Anícia Lalá Zoryana Verbych Shestin Thomson Witny Dorsainvil Review: Hervé Auffret Jean-Michel Rousseau Enric Gonyalons Copyright: DCAF encourages the use, translation, and dissemination of this pu- blication. Do not alter the content of the report and provide the below citation when referencing it. Cite as: DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, “SUMMARY OF THE REPORT. Backing from the Brink: Assessing Haiti’s Security Sector and Opportunities for Future Security Sector Governance and Reform Programming” (Geneva: DCAF, 2025). Design: Camilo Medina Publishing: Published in 2025 by DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Go - vernance DCAF Geneva All photos: ©Zoryana Verbych All rights reserved. Table of Contents A bbrevi A tions ................................................................................................. 6 1. i ntroduction ................................................................................................ 7 1.1 Objectives .............................................................................................................................. 9 1.2 General Research Questions ............................................................................................. 9 1.3 Methodological Considerations ...................................................................................... 10 2. F indings .................................................................................................... 11 A Dynamic National Security Ecosystem ............................................................................... 11 Exploring Alternative Investments: From short-term to medium-term ........................... 14 Strategic Planning as a Pathway from Reactiveness to Prevention ............................... 15 Complementary Investments in Peacebuilding ..................................................................... 17 Transitioning the MSS into a Gang Suppression Force .................................................... 17 Mapping of International Partners’ Assistance ................................................................... 18 3. r ecommend A tions ........................................................................................21 SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE ............................................................................................21 1. International Coordination for Impact ............................................................................. 21 2. Reconfiguration of the MSS into a Gang Suppression Force ....................................... 23 3. Strategic planning and operational effectiveness ........................................................ 23 4. Internal control and external oversight of the Security Sector .............................. 25 Internal Control ...................................................................................................................... 25 External Oversight .................................................................................................................. 25 5. DDR and CVR .......................................................................................................................... 26 6. Psychosocial Support and Trauma Healing ...................................................................... 27 7. Gender and Security Assistance ........................................................................................ 27 8. Maritime Security .................................................................................................................. 28 SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE ............................................................................................28 9. Coordination of Haitian national security: strategic vision for informed decision-ma - king .............................................................................................................................................. 28 10. Leadership and Change Management ............................................................................... 29 NATIONAL SECURITY ECO-SYSTEM ENABLERS ................................................................... 30 11. Curbing illegal weapons trafficking and transnational organised crime ............... 30 12. Regulation and Monitoring of Private Security Companies ....................................... 30 13. Enhancing Coordination and Public Communication .................................................... 31 14. Fighting Impunity and Corruption .................................................................................... 31 15. Coordination Across the Criminal Justice System ....................................................... 32 16. Sanctions Regime ................................................................................................................ 32 NATIONAL SECURITY ECO-SYSTEM ENABLERS ................................................................... 32 17. Peace Dialogue, Dealing with the Past and Non-Recurrence ..................................... 32 Abbreviations ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data BINUH United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti BSAP Protected Areas Surveillance Brigade CARICOM Caribbean Community CSOs Civil Society Organizations CVR Community Violence Reduction DCAF Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone EU European Union EUR Euro FAd’H Haitian Armed Forces FY Fiscal Year GSF Gang Suppression Force HQ Headquarters IATI International Aid Transparency Initiative IDP Internally Displaced Persons IGPNH Inspector General of the National Police of Haiti ISACG International Security Assistance Coordination Group MD Haiti’s Ministry of Defense MSS Multinational Security Support Mission OAS Organization of American States OCAG Government Action Control Body OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development DAC Development Assistance Committee OHCHR UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights OPC Office of Citizen Protection PMSCs Private military and security companies PNH Haitian National Police RNDDH National Human Rights Network SEA Sexual Exploitation and Abuse SGBV Sexual and Gender Based Violence SSG/R Security Sector Governance/Reform TFP Technical and Financial Partners TPC Transitional Presidential Council UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSOH UN Support Office in Haiti UK United Kingdom US United States of America USD United States Dollar 6 Haiti is currently living through another dark period of its history, ravaged by armed violen - ce perpetrated by organised criminal gangs 1 responsible for egregious violations of human rights of its population, in the face of a depleted state capacity to provide protection and redress. A fragmented polity eroded by power quests by political actors, weak security ins - titutions, general lack of public service delivery, and institutionalised corruption, in tandem with the absence of elections since 2016, plunged the country into a deep governance and security crisis. The resulting erosion of state legitimacy created the ripe opportunity for gangs to capitalise on and to consolidate power, denoting that lasting solutions go beyond immediate security to encompass the creation of jobs, the end of impunity, and the delivery of justice. The country is therefore facing another litmus test of refoundation of its social contract or risking collapse. A critical event in the recent history of Haiti was the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse on 7 July 2021, which left the interim management of the country in the hands of Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who in turn resigned in the wake of pressure from the intensifi - cation of gang violence and growing unrest in early 2024. This prompted negotiations be - tween political actors, culminating in the Kingston Agreement of 11 March 2024, brokered by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The agreement enabled a governance set-up for a transitional period until elections, including the creation of a nine-member Transitional Presidential Council (TPC). This body subsequently appointed a Prime Minister to lead an interim government predicated on restoration of security, initiation of constitutional reform, and conduct of elections. Thus far, Mr Gary Conille and subsequently Mr Alix Didier Fils-Ai - me served as Prime Ministers, during this political transition. The Government Action Control Body (OCAG) was also part of the interim governance set-up, but was not established, opening a key oversight and accountability gap in the ab - sence of an elected parliament. 2 The TPC has seen its legitimacy and authority questioned through calls for leadership change or disbandment, and street demonstrations against perceived inactivity in light of the surge of gang violence (Blaise, 2025a), but also of sus - pected engagement of some of its members in corruption practices. 3 At the time of writing, the elections that originally were due to take place in November 2025 to enable a transfer of power to elect leadership by February 2026, have now been rescheduled for August 2026 and December 2026 (second round), with a new President due in post by January 1 Estimates point to about 200 gangs operating in Haiti. A robust characterisation of Haitian gangs, including their composition and their action can be found in ‘Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, power and an escalating crisis’ Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, October 2022. 2 Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH). (2025, April 28). Poor governance, insecurity, corruption, and impunity: in one year, the CPT has worsened the already concerning situation in the country. RNDDH. https://web.rnddh.org/poor-governance-insecurity-corruption-and-impunity-in-one-year-the-cpt-has-worsened-the-alre- ady-concerning-situation-in-the-country/?lang=en 3 This has been uncovered by an investigation carried out by the Anti-Corruption Unit and the case is allegedly on hold on judicial competence and procedural grounds as well as on account of entitlement to immunity as members of this Council (Mérancourt, 2024). Rapport d’enquête conduit par l’ULCC sur les allégations de sollicitation de cent millions de gourdes par trois membres du Conseil Présidentiel de Transition (CPT) : Smith AUGUSTIN, Emmanuel VER - TILAIRE et Louis Gerald GILLES pour la reconduction de Monsieur Raoul Pascal PIERRE LOUIS à la présidence du Conseil d’Administration de la Banque Nationale de Crédit (BNC). https://www.haitilibre.com/docs/ULCC-Resume-Exe - cutif_241002_130345.pdf, Mérancourt, W. (2024, October 4). The hidden ‘corruption pact’ between presidential council members and bank chief. AyiboPost. https://ayibopost.com/the-hidden-corruption-pact-between-presidential-coun - cil-members-and-bank-chief/ 1. Introduction 7 2027. When considering the history of previous foreign interventions in Haiti in the wake of se - curity crises, it is evident that despite the temporary stabilisation achieved, their legacy of institutional reforms has not met sufficient follow-up and leadership to use the newfound opportunity to consolidate the state security institutions. Haiti’s police, being the key se - curity institution, have been unable to address the gang menace and face allegations of human rights violations and extrajudicial killings, whilst the still embryonic armed forces lack the numbers and capacities. This exposes the strategic and operational weaknesses as well as the legitimacy gaps deriving from the scarcity of state investment in these insti- tutions. The scale of violence, both systemic and direct, and the terror being inflicted upon Haitians by way of kidnappings, raids, killings, sexual violence and cyclical displacement, has led to the establishment and deployment of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved and Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) in Haiti, in October 2023. Entrusted with the mission to support the Haitian National Police (PNH) to restore security and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections, the problematic mandate and insufficient resources allocated to the MSS denoted a mismatch considering the gang threat, thereby putting results to the test in the face of limited gains. Alongside the MSS deployment in early 2024, the gangs coalesced into a functional and rather stable alliance, known as Viv Ansanm. Criminal gangs with different levels of power, strength and territorial reach 4 halted mutual in-fighting, shifting into a common goal of exer - ting violence over state institutions and their representatives. 5 The estimates pointed to gang control of over 85% of Port-au-Prince (Blaise, 2024), through the ability to carry out coordinated attacks, including on previously safe areas of Port-au-Prince. Whilst the existence of the Haitian gangs lies in the exploitation of state weakness, their resilience is strongly anchored in the regional and transnational criminal economy. Hence, their level of organisation, engagement in systematic destruction of public infrastructure, coordinated take-over of strategic territory, and military-grade weaponry warranted the question of whether the current security threat had been properly assessed and classified, and an adequate national and international response devised. An intended recalibration of the international response was provided on 30 September 2025 through the UNSC appro - val of a resolution establishing the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) as the successor to the MSS (S/RES/2793). The resolution sponsored by the United States (US) was enacted six months after an urgent proposal for reconfiguration had been presented by the United Na - tions Secretary-General to the UNSC. The GSF will benefit from enhanced logistic support through the creation of a UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) and from financing through assessed contributions of the regular peacekeeping budget, and will count on an executive 4 Estimates point to about 200 gangs operating in Haiti. A robust characterisation of Haitian gangs, including their composition and their action can be found in ‘Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, power and an escalating crisis’ Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, October 2022. 5 According to International Crisis Group analysis, the Viv Ansanm cooperation agreement first emerged in Sep - tember 2023, when gang leaders in Port-au-Prince declared they would stop fighting one another. This move was widely seen as a response to UN Security Council negotiations over a resolution authorising the multinational mission, and gang leaders continued to communicate in the following months about the possibility of joining forces against a foreign security mission. Crisis Group Briefing, Haiti’s Gangs: Can a Foreign Mission Break Their Stranglehold? Crisis Group Latin Ameri - ca and Caribbean Briefing N°49, 5 January 2024. 8 mandate to carry out operations on its own and in support of the PNH and Haitian armed forces. In the meantime, responses by non-state and hybrid security actors have proliferated, dee- pening the predicament of (in)security governance. Haitian communities have organised themselves through the constitution of self-defence groups applying in return violent mea- sures in dealing indiscriminately with gang members and criminal suspects alike. Non-sta - tutory security forces such as the Protected Areas Surveillance Brigade (BSAP) were officially called to arms, a Security Task Force was formed and activated, and international Private Military and Security Companies began operations. Against this background, DCAF—the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance was asked by Switzerland to carry out a preliminary assessment of the security sector in Haiti to identify entry points for potential additional support to that already existing but focusing on bridging the short- to medium-term requirements. France and Germany joined this initiative, which includes a mapping of the support by the international community to the security sector in the last five years, with the intent to strengthen coordination. Due to time and resource limitations, the justice sector remained outside the scope of this study, despi- te mention of key linkages to the security sector, as pertinent. The following objectives and key research questions were set-up for the assessment: 1.1 Objectives 1. To improve International Partners’ knowledge and awareness about challenges and opportunities of Security Sector Governance/Reform (SSG/R) in Haiti, through the identification of specific entry points for provision of strategic and operational support to the country. 2. To reinforce the strategic advisory capacity of international partners for improved de- cision-making on future SSG/R opportunities in Haiti, as a result of increased aware - ness and discussion of the assessment findings. 3. To foster international partners’ agreement on improved coordination mechanisms and joint programming initiatives for supporting better performance and governance of the security sector in Haiti. 1.2 General research questions 1. Beyond the urgent intervention of the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) and parallel humanitarian assistance efforts, how can international partners provide support to strengthen the effectiveness and governance of Haiti’s legitimately establi - shed security and defence institutions? 2. Given past interventions and current support to Haitian security and defence institu- tions, what additional support is needed for the national security and defence strategy and institutional strategic planning? What other potential gaps remain or have recent- ly emerged that need to be addressed? 3. How could increased coordination among Technical and Financial Partners (TFPs) enhance the effectiveness of current and future international assistance? How can collaboration between national authorities and international partners be strengthened regarding support for the security sector? 9 4. How can assistance to the security and defence sector be better aligned with strate- gies to support a democratic political transition and be consistent with the creation, in the medium and long term, of a more inclusive and socially cohesive society? 5. Given the experience of previous external security stabilisation interventions in Haiti, what measures are needed to improve the performance of the MSS and its coordina - tion with the Haitian authorities? 1.3 Methodological considerations Produced through the adoption of combined methods, this assessment relied on a literatu - re review based on open-source data and analysis, and over 50 online interviews with key informants, in-country exchanges, and focus groups. The latter were carried out in late July 2025, after fieldwork postponements given the dire security situation. As a strategy to cope with the different engagement and logistical challenges, but also as general good practice, the DCAF team included a national consultant working in Haiti. Collaboration between the DCAF team and the mandators was essential to the data collection process, and for that we express gratitude. We are also thankful to all national and international actors who ge - nerously contributed their time and information to this study. Detailed information about the terms of reference and the methodology can be accessed upon request. 10 2. Findings A dynamic national security ecosystem Haiti’s dynamic national security ecosystem is currently characterised by the interplay of a panoply of actors operating de facto in the security domain, with two key constitutionally mandated security forces taking centre stage, namely the national police of Haiti (PNH), and Haiti’s armed forces (FAd’H). Both, however, remain the epitome of the state’s contes - ted monopoly of force, given their lack of capacity to effectively tackle national criminality and transnational organised crime in the shape of drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illicit financial flows, and human and organ trafficking. The PNH was developed anew as the key security force in 1995, upon the demise of the armed forces, and although expected to become the cornerstone of public security provi - sion and professional law enforcement, never reached the expected numbers, technical capacity, and degree of professionalism to proficiently fulfil its mission of ensuring the safe - ty and security of Haitians. A key structural factor concerns the force strength, which most interviewees put at 12,000 at most, with a much lower figure than that representing readily available operational staff, given the considerable number posted in bureaucratic functions, but also a significant rate of attrition, including defections, dismissals, fatalities in the line of duty, resignations and retirements. With Haiti’s population estimated at around 12 million, the country displays a ratio of 1 police officer per 1000 inhabitants , which is much lower than the internationally recognised standard of 2.2 and the ratio of nearby countries as shown in Figure 1. Moreo - ver, the bulk of this force is concentrated in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, leaving the remainder of the country even more exposed to threats. Figure 1 – Police officers per 1’000 people, 2015 Source: OurWorldinData 11 Therefore, the Government of Haiti sees an immediate requirement to address this weak - ness by increasing the number to at least 20,000 personnel. Whilst growing the force is an indisputable need, the pace and the method should not be overlooked. Important concerns arise about the envisaged reduction of the duration of core training—from 6 to 3 months— when juxtaposed to low salary levels, and against the background of no compulsory vet - ting system being incorporated in the recruitment process (Interview 21, 2025). On the one hand, poorly trained recruits can become more of a liability than strength when it comes to real-life operations. On the other hand, the combination of low salaries and no vetting may lead to producing corrupt officers resorting to extortion of populations, or engaging in unlawful activity, if faced with an enticing structure of incentives to integrate criminal infor- mation networks, or even joining the ranks of gangs. This bears potential to aggravate a current vulnerability of the PNH concerning the infiltration of its ranks by criminal actors, and the collusion of certain personnel with select gang leadership, which results in under- mining the effectiveness of intelligence-led operations. The need to introduce a solid vet - ting system is therefore underscored by these developments. Haiti’s embryonic armed forces (Fad’H) navigate the fine balance of building a newly foun - ded corporation, established in 2017, on values of non-interference, professionalism and ethos, and the weight of the legacy of recidivism in political interventionism through coups d’état and systematic human rights abuses, which led to the armed forces previously being disbanded in 1995. It is composed of 1,000 personnel, of which women could potentially amount to 10% of the total (Interviews 24, 45 & 47, 2025). In the short term and with trai - ning support from international partners, the numbers should soon amount to 1,300, with the aim of reaching 5,000–10,000 in the medium term (5 years), across the army, air force, and navy. Therefore, currently, and considering also their limited equipment, their capacity to contribute to the restoration of safety and security through reinforcement of the Police remains extremely low. The Government of Haiti has been taking steps to increase the budget allocated to the operations of the PNH and the FAd’H; however, concerns have been emerging related to absorption capacity whilst being able to comply with the precepts of state financial ma - nagement. It remains unclear if those pertain to a lack of management and governance capabilities on the part of the PNH, if it is a case of poor communication with the Ministry of Finance, or both. More generally this is a symptom of the need to devote attention to financial management of the security sector, since both state and international partners’ resources will keep inflowing. Efforts carried out throughout time by international partners to assist in building the capa - city of the PNH, whilst relegating all other security sector institutions, contributed to signifi - cant imbalances in the security architecture. The latter has been deprived from institutional complementarities, mutual intra-sectoral checks and balances, and resilience. Further - more, an unintended consequence has been that in the absence of robust government investments in the statutory security forces, and with weak institutional control and external oversight mechanisms in place, these imbalances generated breeding grounds for certain unrestrained state and non-state armed actors. Such is the case of the Protected Areas Surveillance Brigade (BSAP) and of the self-defence groups, locally titled ‘Bwa Kalé’, which will require considerable attention and attuned strategies of disengagement once rampant insecurity has been quelled. 12 Not least protruding are the dynamics of train-and-equip type assistance as well as exe - cutive action by non-statutory security actors engaged by national authorities in view of its ‘security-first’ approach to combat gangs more effectively. This includes the establishment of a Security Task Force and the contracting of Global Vectus, an international private military and security company (PMSC), by the Government. Coexisting alongside it are the associated risks linked to inadequate coordination across the security sector, and, importantly, the relegation of human rights considerations, loss of life as collateral damage, amplification of violence, and outsourcing of core state responsibilities. The Security Task Force congregates elements from different elite security forces, alle - gedly drawn from units mandated to protect state assets in the past. However, not much information exists in the public space about this actor, or about its modus operandi. From what has been relayed to the assessment team by interviewees, risks present themselves on at least three accounts. The first is that apparently this new Security Task Force did not include members from the statutory security providers—out of fears of gang infiltration in these forces—nor did it provide for any coordination between them, raising effectiveness questions. The second is that this Security Task Force started using armed drones as a new instrument in the fight against the gangs, whilst ambiguity around gang membership prevails, considering forced recruitment and the high percentage of minors within these gangs (Vyas, 2025). The third is that oversight and accountability over the management and activity of this body are unclear, concerning both its institutional set-up, conditions of payment and reporting lines to state authorities, currently represented only by the executi - ve branch—the Prime Minister’s office. With the current level of threat, it is not to be expected that the Government will release operational details about this Security Task Force; however public communication about its constitution, set-up, management and oversight would go some way to bridge the trans- parency and legitimacy gaps, particularly for a society with heightened expectations about safety and security results that long to arrive in the immediacy. From a programming but also pragmatic perspective, there is a necessity to support grea- ter efficiency of national state authorities’ control over PMSCs—both national and inter - national—given that these are likely to remain an important actor of security provision in Haiti, at least in the short-term, whilst state capacity to curb insecurity remains feeble. This should include the implementation of transparency and disclosure of contracts entered with foreign PMSCs; adoption of limited time-bound contracts and licence renewal based on monitoring of incidents and after action reviews and regular assessment of results-based performance; as well as robust measures for oversight of compliance concerning legal provisions for the use of force—including employment of surveillance and lethal technolo - gies and equipment, ensuring accountability for potential human rights abuses, and finan - cial transparency. The current security ecosystem—See Figure 2 below—is therefore typical of hybrid securi - ty settings, where myriad connections between the security actors with varying degrees of legitimacy amongst different political, economic, and societal constituencies, maintain and reproduce themselves through fluidity of informal and transactional relations. The latter ul - timately reign over institutional development and consolidation of state security institutions (DCAF, 2024a). 13 Even if refashioned with the introduction of ‘newer’ elements like the PMSCs, Haiti’s lon - ger historical development of the security sector shows a resurface of practices of popular resistance, violent conquest of power, including the use of militias and paramilitary groups, and securitisation of political and economic power struggles as adaptation of control strate- gies. Fully accounting for them is key to measuring and accepting that a degree of risk ac - companies the provision of security sector assistance to Haiti. Skewed institutional develo - pment efforts of state security institutions will recurrently fail in the absence of oversight, of broader nationally driven peacebuilding strategies, and if change towards a more inclusive polity and redistribution of the country’s opportunities and resources does not materialise alongside. Figure 2. National Security Ecosystem Diagram Source: Author Illustration Exploring alternative investments: from short-term to medium-term The opportunity to do things differently this time around presents itself, should there be openness to bridge short-term security assistance, based on the essential but insufficient tactic-operational security-first approach, with at least medium-term institutional support. This would materialise through investing security assistance on building management and leadership capacities, as well as on governance and accountability of the security sector. Investments in operational and strategic capabilities do not need to be mutually exclusive, since both stand to benefit from transversal elements imparted such as institutional inte - grity and sustainability. Both enable improved delivery on mandates, as well as responsi - veness in the provision of public security as a service delivery to communities. This is of utmost importance given the context of Haiti, whereby the search for reliable leadership has been tarnished by the pursuit of self-centred personal gain and corruption, discrediting a significant number of past and present leaders, including from the security sector. The deep mistrust among leaders, between them and the rank-and-file, and between them and the communities, hinders the legitimacy of the security institutions and the rebuilding of social cohesion. There are two levels at which international partners may intervene in the short-term. The first concerns the partnership between the GSF and the Haitian security and defence 14 forces to fight the gangs, and which should contemplate an on-the-job training approach in joint operations, in addition to deliberate imparting of knowledge through peer learning and mentoring. This would build up the operational capacity of the PNH and of the FAd’H to take over security responsibilities in a sustained manner, once the foreign intervention force exits the country. The second comprises essential complementary efforts by bilateral and multilateral part - ners on increasing security sector governance assistance through programs dedicated to instilling an institutional culture, know-how and regularity of processes on security po - licymaking. This includes enhancing capabilities in strategic planning, development and update of regulatory frameworks, institutional reviews, and mainstreaming of anti-corrup - tion strategies, mechanisms and methods. Such endeavours must incorporate support to Inspectorate-General entities of security and defence institutions, but also to strengthen external oversight to be carried out by the Parliament, the ombuds institution (OPC), the judicial institutions, CSOs and media. Within the PNH and the FAd’H, Inspectorate-General entities have been open to support, and the BINUH, through OHCHR, has recently started assisting. Support to the PNH has focused on improving regulatory controls, internal policies, and investigations to ensu- re compliance with international human rights standards, which are relevant concerning proportionality and fulfilment of legality in the use of force. Assistance to the FAd’H has been in the form of training sessions on human rights, ethics, and deontology. This type of support deserves to be further investigated for consolidation and expansion, but on its own is also insufficient. Additional investments in external oversight are crucial, promoting positive practices, transparency and accountability, and should be planned considering a networked approach between the OPC, CSOs and media, as well as in view of a newly elected Parliament in sight for 2026. Strategic planning as a pathway from reactiveness to prevention A culture of strategic planning is insufficiently established in Haitian security and defence institutions—despite example of previous strategic plans of the PNH (2017–2021)—with the adoption of this practice happening in an ad hoc fashion and often determined by the leadership of the day rather than by regular instituted processes. Consequently, the lack of consistency affects operational performance due to non-existent or poor prioritisation of human resources management, financial allocations, and logistic resources. Ultimately, this hinders the quality of decision-making and impacts negatively on operational effecti - veness, in detriment of engagement in prevention efforts and in preparedness for potential security crises. It is illustrative that only three in ten geographical departments that com- pose Haiti have been severely affected by the scourge of gangs’ threats, as shown in the Figure 3 below, yet all responses have been focused on the immediacy of the security cri - sis in them. Preserving the territorial integrity of the ‘gang-free’ areas through preventative measures and actively addressing vulnerabilities deriving from structural and conjunctural social, economic and rule of law shortcomings is not being actively carried out by Haitian security sector institutions and their international partners. An overdue assessment inten- ded to lead to a Strategic Plan of the PNH for the upcoming five years could have encom - passed the missing prevention approach and engagement, without relegating the urgency of action. 15 Figure 3. Fatalities in violent events - 1.01.20-10.05.25, by Departments Source: DCAF, based on ACLED data Contributing to the lack of policy, strategy and planning is the absence of a collegial entity bringing together the leaders of the relevant security and defence institutions, and which should function as a decision-making/coordination and/or consultative body for security guidance, and which could be addressed by instituting/reactivating the National Security Council. Beyond crisis management, this entity encompasses the potential to work from a foresight and planning stance, providing, for example, guidance and anchor to the required process of Review of Haiti’s National Security and Defence System, not least because a decade has elapsed since the country’s last White Paper was produced, geopolitics are fast changing, and the country faces a major internal security crisis, amidst a troublesome context of regional transnational organised crime. A Review of Haiti’s National Security and Defence System should not be understood as a performative exercise, but as a process with real consequences for the reorganisation and operational effectiveness of the security sector. Besides updating a SWOT analysis ( strength, weakness, opportunity, threat ) this process allows us to question the configu - ration of the security sector and to interrogate the role and contribution of each actor to the attainment of security, stability and peace. Outdated missions and roles, overlapping mandates, grey areas, complementarities and gaps, and territorial distribution of forces are scrutinised, allowing for streamlining and dispelling ambiguities, for example concerning public security provision and law enforcement. For example, not only potential overlaps between the FAd’H and the PNH would be analysed, particularly in view of the expansion of both forces, but also the fragmentation of the intelligence function and services would be addressed. In addition, there is real value in terms of efficiency, with current, emerging, and projected needs defined to understand how they match available financial resources and growth potential, given the expected fiscal space of the state to invest in the security and defence sector. An opportunity to address the strategic gaps related to the National Security Council and 16 the Review of National Security and Defence, is to sequentially align the latter with a wider and potentially upcoming process of Constitutional Review . This would allow the up- date of the Constitution, addressing the current mismatch with the reality of a hybrid and fragmented security ecosystem, whilst also anchoring new security-related provisions on deeper substantive analysis, legal review and inclusive discussion processes involving state actors such as security institutions, civil service, judiciary, academia, think tanks, civil society, religious groups, women and youth associations, and the private sector. In this way assistance to the security and defence sector would be further aligned with strategies of support for democratic political transition and consolidation. Complementary investments in peacebuilding The latter requires peacebuilding commitments in the interface with security-related pro- cesses, as is the case of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) and Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programmes, targeting different groups, but prioritising that of children and youth defecting or rescued from gang subjugation. Offering professional training opportunities and gainful employment as part of reintegration pro- grammes into society will be key, and there are options to explore, comprising projects led by national civil society organisations (CSO), as well as opportunities to develop such pro - grammes fostering coalitions between the state, CSOs and eventually the private sector, to implement constitutionally established processes such as the Service Civique Mixte and the Military Service. Another entry point concerns societal dialogue for reconciliation . The Haitian socie- ty has lived through cyclical periods of extreme violence, encompassing serious abuses and violations of human rights perpetrated by the military, paramilitary, and militia groups, which have gone collectively unacknowledged, and which still linger under a veil of impuni - ty. The reproduction of those cycles, fuelled by a militarised mindset fed by not only direct violence and structural conditions of inequality, but also the cult of violence that prevails in the media needs to be interrupted by the agency of Haitians, many of whom remain unde- cided on a pathway towards dialogue with gangs. In the meantime, work towards demilita- rising minds and improving civil-military relations could start through support for dedi- cated projects, or for lines of activity within broader international assistance programmes, aiming towards a more peaceful and resilient society and social cohesion. Transitioning the MSS into a gang suppression force The transition of the MSS into the GSF provides a renewed opportunity for the internatio - nal community to support Haiti in the restoration of security and safety of its inhabitants and pave the way to elections. The quintessential question of whether a 2,500 personnel mission was enough to quell a gang force estimated at about 12,000 has been partially answered through the GSF now envisaging a personnel ceiling of 5,550, including police, military and (50) civilians (S/RES/2793, 2025, para. 4). Mandate-wise the GSF has been authorized to play a stronger operational and offensive role, meaning that it can now conduct targeted anti-gang operations independently or in cooperation with the PNH and with the FAd’H, to neutralize, isolate and deter gangs that threaten civilian populations, abuse human rights, destroy key infrastructure and undermi - ne institutional stability. Ensuring that the Rules of Engagement and its application follow 17 UN standards and legal obligations concerning respect for human rights, international law, and international humanitarian law, as well as the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), where applicable, will be key for successful results and the legitimacy of the GSF. From a logistic and operational vantage point the creation of UNSOH encompassing coverage of costs of food, medical care and evacuation, transportation and vehicle main- tenance, strategic communications and troop rotation, is a plus, especially considering that not only the GSF will benefit, but also the PNH and FAd’H, when engaged along, boosting conditions of service and morale. An outstanding feature is that UNSOH is tasked with providing technical support to the Organisation of American States (OAS), to assume the full logistical support responsibility of the GSF within six months of adoption (S/RES/2793, 2025, para. 10). Seemingly an ambitious timeframe yet providing greater clarity on the expected growing role by the OAS in terms of taking over key responsibilities from the UN, which is consentaneous with the logic of regional organizations playing a more prominent role on peace and security, beyond political good offices and programmatic support to rule of law. This is an encouraging prospect if matched by suitable allocation of financial re - sources. The litmus test of what is a comprehensive UNSC resolution will reside in how it will be implemented, translating into performance and legitimacy vis-à-vis the Haitian society. Four outstanding strategic questions will be determinant. The first is more immediate and concerns the need to operationalize the GSF through force generation and commitment of additional financial resources to the GSF Trust Fund. The second concerns the imple - mentation of all components of coordination envisaged by the S/RES/2793 namely: be - tween different UN entities, between the GSF and different UN entities and OAS, between the GSF and the national security and defence forces, and between all the previous and bilateral partners. The third refers to how the GSF will operate juxtaposed to the activities of Global Vectus and potentially other private military and security contractors. And finally, the ultimate question refers to the real investment required not only in present delivery, but also in consciously strengthening the capacities and governance of Haiti’s security and de - fence forces to play effectively their constitutionally mandated roles. This will require effort by the GSF leadership in ensuring that learning-by-doing and mentoring approaches are mainstreamed across all levels of joint operations’ work. Complementary efforts by bilate - ral and multilateral partners on increasing both the efficiency and governance of the secu - rity sector will be essential, contributing both to a responsible phase-out and exit strategy of the GSF once the situation is stabilised, and to finally seizing the opportunity to invest in sustainable peace. Mapping of international partners’ assistance Transversal to the different entry points and pathways presented for security sector as - sistance, a key finding for international partners concerns the fine-tuning of their own aid processes , not necessarily to do more, but to do better with the resources at hand. At the level of existing practices, the mapping of the international assistance provided to Haiti between 2020-2025 revealed four key trends, namely: 1. The reporting of technical and financial partners’ (TFP) programming on the Inter - national Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), analysed according to the Organisation 18 of Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) codes, shows that security system management and reform occu - pies the third position amongst the most supported categories of aid, demonstrating that significant resources are being devoted to this domain. In contrast, assistance to areas that strengthen governance and accountability such as national audit, om- budsman and media remains at the low end, as does support for national authorities’ coordination of incoming aid. This confirms the space for balancing effort towards supporting governance and accountability of the security sector in Haiti. 2. Coordination among international partners comes predominantly in the form of joint funding for multilateral programmes supporting security-related activities, as is the case with UNDP’s Programme of Support to the Haitian National Police; trust funds such as that created to support the MSS, and technical coordination groups, such as the International Security Assistance Coordination Group (ISACG) led by Canada. Whilst the assistance provided varies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the latter two prevail, mostly focused on provision of equipment and training to the security forces. This is attested by the activity of ISACG that provides an effective platform for positive communication and sharing of information, as well as to find so - lutions to emerging logistic obstacles, with the resulting awareness helping to prevent duplication of TFP assistance, particularly around provision of equipment. However, this has been revealed as insufficient in terms of pursuing full alignment and com - plementarity of TFP priorities, as new projects emerge (Interview 5, 2025). While tactical and operational activities provide critical immediate security support, gaps in assistance at the strategic level point to challenges to attain the institutionalisation of efforts within existing security systems to ensure sustainability, and shift from reac - tive to proactive programming. Hence, besides greater investment in enhancement of Haiti’s security sector leadership and strategic management; for improvement of alignment between TFP security assistance, it would be advisable to scale