Rezilyans Sosyal ak Frajilite Leta an Ayiti

THE WORLD BANK Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti A W O R L D B A N K C O U N T R Y S T U D Y 40927 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized A W O R L D B A N K C O U N T R Y S T U D Y Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. Copyright © 2007 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. 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The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission promptly to reproduce portions of the work. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA, Tel: 978-750-8400, Fax: 978-750-4470, www.copyright.com. All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA, Fax: 202-522-2422, email: pubrights@worldbank.org. ISBN-13: 978-0-8213-7187-9 eISBN: 978-0-8213-7188-6 ISSN: 0253-2123 DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-7187-9 Cover photo by Jacob Holdt Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been requested. Contents Preface Abbreviations and Acronyms Executive Summary By Dorte Verner and Stephanie Kuttner 1. Introduction By Dorte Verner and Willy Egset Historical Background: Origins of the Rural-Urban Divide Analytical Framework 2. The Haitian People: Demographics, Poverty, and Socioeconomic Outcomes and Risks By Dorte Verner Demographic Trends Haitian Poverty and Inequalit Migration Endowment and Distribution of Assets and Resources Social Cohesion and Violence Conclusion: Demographic and Socioeconomic Implications for Violence and Conflict Risk 3. Governance and Institutions By Willy Egset and Stephanie Kuttner Functions of the State Haiti’s Fragile State Infrastructure and Basic Services Security Justice and the Rule of Law Conclusion: Restoring the Capacity of State Institutions 4. Political Forces and Actors By Dan Erikson, Emma Grant, Franka Braun, Gillette Hall, Katherine Bain, Mark Mattner, Stephanie Kuttner, and Willy Egset A History of Political Violence A Difficult Democratic Transition, 1990–2004 Political Mobilization and Entrepreneurs of Violence iii vii ix xiii 1 1 4 7 7 y 11 23 27 37 42 43 43 46 50 56 59 65 67 67 69 71 Checks and Balances in Haiti’s Political Process Conclusion: Strong National Leadership is Crucial to Breaking the Conflict-Poverty Trap 5. Conclusion: Breaking Out of the Conflict-Poverty Trap By Dorte Verner, Stephanie Kuttner, and Willy Egset Appendixes A. Country at a Glance B. Demography C. Data and Methodology D. Incidence of Education Level and Poverty Correlates E. Poverty Profile F. Access to Basic Services in Haiti G. Cohesion and Violence in Haiti References Map L IST OF T ABLES 2.1. Median Annual Income Per Capita, 2001 (gourdes) 2.2. Average Income Per Capita by Decile, 2001 (gourdes) 2.3. Income Source for Households Per Capita 2001 (percent) 2.4. Determinants of Income in Haiti, 2001 Quantiles, Dependent Variable: Log Total income (per capita) 2.5. Poverty Gaps, 2001 2.7. Projected Poverty Reduction Impact of Uniform Growth in Haiti 2.8. Domestic Migration, 2001 (percent) 2.9. Reason for Migration, Youth and Adults, 2001 (percent) 2.10. Likelihood of Migrating to Port-au-Prince, 2001 2.11. Migration from Haiti, 1985–2005 2.12. School Attendance by Age, 2001 (percent) 2.13. School Attendance of 7–14 Year-Olds by Income Quintile (percent), 2001 2.14. Work Sector by Gender 2001 (percent) 2.15. Probability of Youth being Unemployed or Inactive 2001 3.1. Functions of the State B.1. Population Size and Growth and Household Size in Urban and Rural Haiti, 1982–2003 B.2. Degree of Urbanization in Haiti and its Regions, 1982 and 2003 (percent) iv Contents 72 74 75 81 83 87 93 97 101 109 113 115 endpiece 11 12 13 14 19 23 24 24 25 26 28 29 34 37 45 88 89 B.3. Average Household Size by Income Group and Place of Residence, 2001 B.4. Average Number of Household Members Aged Less than 15 Years, 2001 D.1. Incidence of Education Level in Rural Haiti (percent), 2001 D.2. Incidence of Education Level in Urban Haiti (percent), 2001 D.3. Incidence of Education Level in Metropolitan Haiti (percent), 2001 D.4. Analysis of Poverty Correlates in Haiti, 2001 E.1. Highest Education Level Completed (percent), 2001 E.2. Poverty Incidence by Farm Size (percent), 2001 E.3. Probability of being Employed in the Nonagricultural Sector, 2001 F.1. Access to Basic Services F.2. Typology of Non-State Basic Service Providers in Haiti F.3. The Haitian Administrative Governance Structure G.1. Confidence in Selected Institutions by Region G.2. Indicators of Fear of Crime by Region L IST OF F IGURES 1.1. Components of a Conflict-Poverty Trap 2.1. Population Growth Rates in Haiti and its Regions, 1982–2003 2.2. Income Source for Households per Capita, 2001 2.3. GDP Per Capita in Selected Countries and Haiti, 1980–2003 2.4. Extreme Poverty Rate (P0) in Haiti by Location and Region, 2001 2.5. Marginal Impact of Attained Education on Poverty in Haiti 2001 2.6. Avg. Years of Schooling for Household Heads by Decade of Birth, 2001 2.7. Access to Infrastructure Services by Location in Haiti, 2001 (percent) 2.8. Access to Water by Income Quintile in Haiti, 2001 (percent) 2.9. Access to Electricity by Income Quintile in Haiti, 2001 (percent) 2.10. Access to Paved or Dirt Roads by Income Quintile in Haiti, 2001 (percent) 2.11. Violent Deaths by Urban Centers, June 2004 to May 2005 2.12. Violent Deaths in Port-au-Prince, Monthly, June 2004 to May 2005 2.13. High Crime Threat Areas in Port-au-Prince 3.1. Number of Police Officers per 100,000 Citizens 3.2. Number of Judges per 100,000 Citizens E.1. Headcount Poverty and Education Attainment in Haiti, 2001 E.2. Headcount Poverty and Religious Affiliation by Location in Haiti, 2001 E.3. Headcount Poverty and Work Sector by Location in Haiti, 2001 Contents v 90 91 97 98 98 99 103 106 107 109 110 111 113 114 5 9 13 16 17 21 28 30 31 32 33 40 40 41 58 61 102 104 105 Preface D orte Verner and Willy Egset (task team leaders and the main authors of this report) led the report team. The work was based on the findings of various missions that vis- ited Haiti during 2005, and on additional research undertaken during 2004. The task team includes Stephanie Kuttner, Michael Justesen, Gillette Hall, Dan Erikson (consultant, Inter-American Dialogue), Katherine Bain, Emma Grant, and Franka Braun. The report does not reflect developments since February 17, 2006. This report is the result of collaboration among several Bank units. Funding for the study was contributed by the Haiti Country Management Unit, the Social Development Department, the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, the LICUS/Fragile State Unit, and the PREM Civil Society Group in Latin America. The funding is gratefully acknowledged. Background papers, notes, and direct input to the report were prepared by Gillette Hall (social protection), Dan Erikson (political situation), Willy Egset and Mark Mattner (urban violence), Michael Justesen and Dorte Verner (youth), Stephanie Kuttner (governance), Dorte Verner (poverty, growth, and labor markets), Katherine Bain, Emma Grant, and Franka Braun (non-state service provision), and Nathalie Lamaute, Gilles Damai, and Willy Egset (rural governance and local institutions). Andrew Crawley edited the report and Vivian Callaghan provided administrative support. The report was produced under the supervision of Caroline Anstey, Director, and McDonald Benjamin, Sector Manager. The members of the team would like to thank other Bank staff and individuals from outside the Bank for support, guidance, and comments. Special thanks are due to Joelle Dehasse, Senior Country Officer, for her support throughout the process. Several other people helped the team, including Christian Lotz, Per Wam, Antonella Bassani, Estanislao Gacitua-Mario, Garry Charlier, Pierre Werbrouk, Mark Mattner, John Redwood, Mark Schneider (International Crisis Group), Jocelyn McCalla (National Coalition for Haitian Rights), Jim Dobbins (RAND Corporation), and John Horton (Inter-American Develop- ment Bank). In Haiti, Nathalie Brisson Lamaute, Gilles Damais, and Dominique Mathon supervised data collection and analysis for some of the background papers under very chal- lenging and sometimes dangerous conditions. The views expressed in this report are exclusively those of the authors. vii Abbreviations and Acronyms ASEC Assemblée de la Section Assembly of the Section Communale Communale AIDS Syndrome Immuno-deficitaire Acquired Immunodeficiency acquis Syndrome ANAMAH Association des juges haïtiens Association of Haitian Judges APENA Administration Nationale National Penitentiary De Prison Administration CASEC Le Conseil administratif de Administrative Council of the la section communale Section Communal CASER Conseil d’administration de Board of Directors of the la section rurale Rural Section CAMEP Centrale Autonome Metropolitan Autonomous Métropolitaine d’Eau Potable Drinking Water Station CCI/ICF Cadre de Coopération Interimaire Interim Cooperation Framework CID Le Conseil Interdépartemental Interdepartmental Council CIMO Compagnie d’Intervention et Company for Intervention and du Maintien d’Ordre the Maintenance of Order CT Autoritès locales Local authorities DHS Enquêtes démographiques Demographic and Health Surveys et de santé EBCM Enquête budget-consommation Household Budget-Consumption des ménages Survey ECD Developpement de la petite enfance Early Childhood Development ECVH Enquete sur les Conditions de Inquire into the Living conditions Vie en Haiti in Haiti EDH Electricite d’Haiti Electricity of Haiti EMA Ecole de la Magistrature School of the Judiciary EU Union Européenne European Union FAd’H Anciennes forces armées d’Haïti Former Armed Forces of Haiti FAES Fonds d’Assistance Economique Economic and Social Assistance et Sociale Funds FAFO Institut pour les sciences sociales Institute for Applied Social appliquées Sciences G Haitian gourde (currency unit) GDP Produit national brut Gross domestic product GIPNH Groupe d’Intervention de la Police Intervention Group of the National Nationale d’Haiti Police of Haiti GNI Gross national income HIV/AIDS Virus Humain D’Immunodéficit Human Immunodeficiency (HIV) et syndrome Virus (HIV) and Acquired acquis d’immunodéficit Immunodeficiency Syndrome (SIDA). (AIDS) HLCS Enquête sur le mode de vie en Haïti Haiti Living Conditions Survey ix HNP Police Nationale Haïtienne Haitian National Police HRW Surveillance de Droits de l’homme Human Rights Watch IACHR La Commission Inter-Américaine Inter-American Commission on sur des droits de l’homme Human Rights ICF Cadre De Coopération D’Intérim Interim Cooperation Framework ICG Groupe des crises internationals International Crisis Group ICLAC D’Instituto canadiense de láminas Instituto canadiense en Construcción de La de Para. de láminas en acero para la d’acero construcción IDB Banque Interaméricain de Inter-American Development Développement Bank IFS Institut pour des études fiscales Institute for Fiscal Studies IG Inspecteur Général Inspector General IHSI Institut Haïtien de Statistique Haitian Institute of Statistics et d’Informatique and Data Processing ILAC Consortium Aide Légale International Legal Consortium Internationale Assistance IMF Fonds Monétaire International International Monetary Fund IMR Taux de Mortalite infatilé Infant mortality rate LAC Latin America and the Caribbean LCR Latin American and Caribbean Region LICUS Pays á faible Revenu etdifficultés Low Income Countries Under Stress MAST Ministère des affaires sociales Ministry of Social Affairs and et d’emploi Employment MICIVIH La Mission Civile Internationale The OAS/UN International de la L’OEA et la mission Civilian Mission internationale des Nations Unies MINUSTAH Mission de stabilisation des United Nations Stabilization Nations Unies en Haïti Mission in Haiti NCHR Coalition nationale pour les National Coalition for Haitian droites humains en Haiti Rights NGO Organisation nonne Nongovernmental organization gouvernementale (ONG) NSPs Non Secteur D’État Dans La Non-state service providers Disposition De Service OAS Organisation des états américains Organization of American States OPs Organisations Populaires Popular Organizations PAHO Organisation Pan-Américaine Pan American Health de la Santé Organization PCHI The Distribution of Per Capita Household Income PPP Parité du pouvoir d’achat Purchasing Power Parity PREM Poverty Reduction and Economic Management x Abbreviations and Acronyms PRSP Papier De Stratégie De Réduction Poverty Reduction Strategy de Pauvreté Paper P0 Headcount Poverty Ratio P1 Poverty Gap Index P2 Squared Poverty Gap Index RI Réfugiés Internationaux Refugees International RNDDH Le Réseau National De la Défense The National Human Rights de Droits de l’homme Defense Network RSF Reporters sans Frontieres Reporters without Borders RDNP Rassemblement des Democrates Nationaux Progressistes UN Les Nations Unies United Nations UNDP Programme des Nations Unies United Nations Development pour le développement Programme UNICEF Le Fonds des Nations Unies pour The United Nations Children’s l’enfance Fund UNMIH Mission des Nations Unies en Haïti United Nations mission to Haiti UNPOL Force de police de l’ONU UN Police force USD Dollars des Etats-Unis United States dollars USAID Agence des Etats-Unis pour le United States Agency for développement international International Development VAT Taxe à la valeur ajoutée (TVA) Value Added Tax VSN/VNS Volontaires de la Sécurité National Security Volunteers Nationale WBI Institut de la Banque Mondiale World Bank Institute WDI Indicateurs pour le Développement World Development Indicators WFP Programme mondial d’ World Food Program l’Alimentation CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit – Gourde (G) EXCHANGE RATE 2001 G23.35 = US$1 2002 G28.20 = US$1 2003 G35.95 = US$1 2004 G37 = US$1 2005 G40 = US$1 2006 G41.9 = US$1 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR January 1–December 31 Abbreviations and Acronyms xi Executive Summary By Dorte Verner and Stephanie Kuttner H aiti is a resilient society whose rural communities in particular have developed coping mechanisms in response to a long history of underdevelopment and political instability. The country’s religious, cultural, and artistic life is highly diverse and vibrant. Like other fragile states, however, Haiti is also beset by widespread poverty and inequality, economic decline and unemployment, poor governance, and violence. This Country Social Analysis 1 examines Haiti’s conflict-poverty trap from the perspective of the triangle of factors that have been identified as its main components: (a) demographic and socioeco- nomic factors at the individual and household levels; (b) the state’s institutional capacity to provide public goods and manage social risks; and (c) the agendas and strategies of political actors. The report’s three main chapters explore the nature of these components, and a closing chapter considers the linkages among them. The Haitian People: Demographic and Socioeconomic Outcomes and Risks This section addresses the main demographic and socioeconomic factors that contribute to Haiti’s conflict-poverty trap. The population growth rate is highest in the cities, and in the metropolitan area in particular. Port-au-Prince now scores highly on known demographic risk factors for violent conflict, including a very young population profile, high population turnover because of high in- and out-migration, and poverty. New migrants continue to be attracted to the area by higher levels of infrastructure and services, greater access to formal and skilled jobs, and lower poverty levels than all other parts of the country. Demographic Trends Haiti’s rapidly growing population is increasing competition for scarce resources in a poor country where such resources are limited. At Haiti’s current population growth rate of 2.2 percent a year, the number of inhabitants, now about 8 million, could reach about 12.3 million by 2030. The country’s rapid rate of population growth, combined with poor economic performance, is lowering per capita GDP, which has fallen by about 50 percent to $332 in the last two decades. Of all sectors, agriculture has been the hardest hit. In the last two decades there has been a very raid rate of urbanization in Haiti, especially in the metropolitan area. Some 40 percent of Haitians lived in urban areas in 2003, up from 25 percent in 1982. Moreover, Haiti is still far from achieving a demographic transition, since xiii 1. The Country Social Analysis (CSA) is a new analytical instrument launched by the World Bank to provide a country-level understanding of the social, economic, and institutional context of development. The CSA analyzes two principal dimensions of development: (i) social diversity, assets, and livelihoods; and (ii) power, governance and institutions. The specific foci and relative emphasis of these components are determined by the country context and Bank portfolio. children and youth still account for roughly 50 percent of the population. Extremely poor households have about twice as many children as do the nonpoor. Most Haitians lack pen- sions, social security and savings, and thus children are often the only security for old age. Poverty and Inequality In 2001, 49 percent of all Haitian households lived in extreme poverty, with wide differences among localities and regions. On the basis of a US$1 a day extreme poverty line, 20, 56, and 58 percent of households in metropolitan, urban, and rural areas, respectively, were extremely poor. Most of the approximately 3.9 million who are extremely poor live in rural areas. Poverty is especially extensive in the Northeast and Northwest regions. Income inequality partly explains why Haiti’s poverty indicators are worse than those in countries that have similar per capita incomes. Income distribution is extremely unequal in Haiti: in 2001, the Gini coefficient for the country as a whole was 0.66, which is among the highest in the world. Social indicators such as literacy, life expectancy, infant mortality, and child malnutri- tion also reveal that poverty is widespread. About 4 in every 10 people cannot read and write; some 20 percent of children suffer from malnutrition; nearly half the population has no healthcare; and more than four-fifths do not have access to clean drinking water. The good news is that poverty measured by these non-income poverty indicators has declined in the last three decades. Nonetheless, the gap between the rich and poor, and among regions, remains wide. Residence in rural areas does not in itself affect the probability of being poor, and those engaged in agriculture are not more likely to experience poverty than those engaged in services and industry. The likelihood of falling below the poverty line in rural areas depends on educational attainment, skills and so on. Female-headed households in rural areas are more likely to be poor than male-headed households. Poverty, moreover, is more prevalent among those with low levels of education. Social capital protects against poverty in rural areas but not to a statistically significant degree in urban areas. In rural, urban and metro- politan areas, migration and education are the factors that most reduce the likelihood of falling into poverty. Migration and the Endowment and Distribution of Assets and Resources Livelihoods in Haiti are determined by three key factors: assets, which can be sold to smooth out consumption when the household is adversely affected by a natural disaster or economic slump; access to labor markets, infrastructure, and services that can improve the opportunities for income generation; and migration. Poor households have very little or no access to many of these livelihood-improving factors. For a large proportion of Haitians, migration is a coping mechanism in the face of poverty and a lack of opportunities. Many move to the capital, which absorbs more than 75,000 migrants every year despite grim living conditions in the slum areas. Most migrants in Haiti are self-selected economic migrants. On average, migrants have more education than those who stay behind. Moreover, migrants have a higher probability of finding jobs than non-migrants, and are more likely to find work in the higher-paid nonfarm sector. International migration has affected the Haitian economy and the welfare of Haitian households for decades. Haiti is the world’s most remittance-dependent country as measured xiv Executive Summary by remittances’ share of household income and of GDP. Remittances from the diaspora constitute the most important private risk management and social protection system for Haitian households. Some 30 percent of all households and 44 percent of metropolitan households receive remittances from expatriates. These transfers total about US$800 million annually and account for about 30 percent of household income. Although remittances are an important source of income for many families, emigration also gives rise to lack of qualified workers or a brain drain. For youth, the lack of parental role models (particularly fathers) caused by emigration leaves an even bigger gap. Access to assets such as education and infrastructural services is highly unequal and strongly correlated with poverty in Haiti. The rural poor in particular lack access to potable water, electricity, and roads. Although overall educational attainment has increased in recent decades, there is substantial variation in attainment and school attendance across regions; children and youth in the poorest regions lag behind their peers in richer regions. Moreover, the children of poor households have less education than their nonpoor peers. Access to safe water and electricity is another significant challenge. Only 7.9 percent of the rural population has access to safe water, compared to 28 percent of those in the metro- politan area. Electricity supply is the public service most marked by unequal access between rural and metropolitan areas: most (91 percent) of the urban population have access to electricity, but the figure falls to 10 percent among the rural population. Moreover, only about 8 percent of Haitians have access to a paved road, and just 3 percent have a telephone. Finally, the extremely poor have much more restricted access to services than do the nonpoor. Labor is poor people’s most abundant asset and it accounts for most of their total income. Nonetheless, the poor are constrained in their labor use in several ways: lack of jobs, low wages, and wage discrimination, especially for women. Many Haitian workers are poor despite working full time, and thus it is important that the quality of jobs, as well as their quantity, is raised. The challenge of job-creation, therefore, is to increase worker pro- ductivity and increase opportunities in the labor market for competitive wages, so as to lift workers and their households out of poverty. Employment analyses suggest that the three key determinants of access to higher-paid employment in Haiti are education, gender, and migration status. Unemployment and underemployment are serious problems, particularly in urban areas. The unemployment rate is highest in urban areas: 49 and 37 percent in metropolitan and other urban areas, respectively, compared to 36 percent in rural areas. In total, each year more than 100,000 job-seekers enter a metropolitan labor market where there are very few opportunities and a high rate of unemployment. The capital’s labor market has fewer total wage jobs than the number of new entrants every two years, and fewer skilled jobs than one year of new entrants. Migration and remittances have spurred expansion in areas such as home-building and banking, which has created jobs for construction and business workers. However, most new entrants to the labor market join the estimated one million Haitians in the informal sector who are engaged in a multitude of occupations, from self-employed traders and artisans to casual laborers. Very few for- mal sector jobs are available. Haitian youth face a number of challenges, such as unemployment and HIV/AIDs. Youth who leave school are likely to end up being inactive or unemployed. The youth unemployment rate is 47 percent, the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and nearly three times that of the older cohort (the 35–44 age group). The unemployment Executive Summary xv rate is highest among women across the country and among youth in Port-au-Prince. In many households, youth face the challenges arising from the absence of the father or both parents, drug abuse, early childbearing, and domestic violence. Haiti also has the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the LAC region, and health services are weak or inaccessible for much of the population. Social Cohesion and Violence Rural Haiti remains relatively peaceful and has a tradition of strong social cohesion. Especially in fragile states, the ability of communities and households to work and live together is essential to maintaining people’s livelihoods, security, and welfare. Social capital indicators that measure levels of trust and reciprocity suggest that robust cohesion on the community level has been crucial in preventing Haiti’s institutional-political crisis from deteriorating into broad social collapse or civil war. There are, however, sharp urban-rural differences: people in rural areas feel far safer in their daily lives than do urban residents. In conjunction with state fragility, political tensions and widespread poverty, rapid urbanization can compound an explosive social situation. Data show that metropolitan residents live in fear of crime and violence, despite higher material living conditions than in rural areas. Respondents in urban slum areas have pointed to multiple causes of violence but concur on the importance of unemployment as a fundamental driver. A direct indicator of trust and social cohesion is whether people feel safe or afraid in various social situations. As many as 58 percent of residents in the metropolitan area feel unsafe “often or most of the time” in their own home, compared to 15 percent in rural areas. While a significant minority in rural areas also expresses fear of visiting markets and other towns, the data show that fear is not a major and daily concern for three-quarters of the rural population. Violence is undermining development in Haiti. Domestic violence against women and children is the most prevalent form of violence: 35 percent of women over the age of 15 have been victims of physical violence. As regards homicide rates, Haiti is estimated to have 34 homicides per 100,000 citizens, which is somewhat higher than the regional average of 22.9 per 100,000. Unconsolidated democratic institutions and “entrepreneurs of violence” have under- mined political leadership. Within a year of the country’s 1990 elections, democracy was brutally repressed by the army and its supporters, using armed paramilitary groups that have been a feature of Haitian politics since Duvalier’s tonton macoutes . After President Aristide’s return in 1994, democratic consolidation was undermined by deep conflicts among erstwhile democratic allies. The result was a political stalemate that lasted until his departure in 2004 and that stalled progress in poverty reduction, economic growth and state building. Moreover, the stalemate transformed important parts of the democratic movement—elements within the urban popular organizations—into violent government enforcers and criminal gangs that struggled for control of territory and state favors, par- ticularly in urban slums and “popular areas.” The pool of potential recruits for crime and violence thus continues to grow, while the opportunity costs of participating in illegal activities or political violence are low. As the population shifts from rural to urban areas, the robust social cohesion that has characterized rural areas becomes less effective in mitigating social dislocation. This places a heavy burden on state institutions to provide basic services that alleviate demographic xvi Executive Summary and socioeconomic pressures, and to mitigate the negative outcomes of crime and conflict. But the state’s institutional capacity to provide basic services, and to establish security and the rule of law, will require significant strengthening if Haiti is to break out of its conflict- poverty trap. Governance and Institutions Institutions matter for social and economic development, and are crucial for state building. Institutions have the potential to mitigate the risk factors of violence and conflict that emanate from the socioeconomic and demographic context. The Haitian state, however, has only a limited capacity to establish law and order, or to create conditions for economic growth and poverty reduction. Progress in breaking out of the conflict-poverty trap demands attention to the restoration of core state functions in these areas. To understand the Haitian state’s capacity to be a driver of development, its financial constraints must first be noted. Haiti’s GDP is extremely low and has been in decline since 1980. In 2005, central government revenues were only 9 percent of GDP, compared to an average of 18 percent among other low-income countries. Only 1.8 percent of revenues derive from taxes on income, profits, or capital. Central government expenditures have fluctuated sharply—between 9 and 16 percent of GDP in recent years—largely as a result of volatility in external assistance. That volatility stems from difficult partnerships with donors who have periodically withdrawn or redirected development assistance in response to political crises and insecurity. Thus a weak domestic revenue base, unstable external flows, and poor expenditure targeting have left spending on education, health, and infra- structure in Haiti below the average of low-income countries. The state’s territorial outreach is limited. The 1987 constitution provides for an elaborate regional and local governance structure. This has never been implemented, however, except at the lowest levels (section communal, commune), where many local councils have been active despite a lack of financial and material resources. Infrastructure and Basic Services In response to the extremely limited public sector provision of infrastructures and basic services throughout the country, the non-state sector has expanded rapidly to attend to unmet needs, especially for health and education services. This may account for the observed improvement in some social indicators. Yet critical gaps in coverage persist in terms of access for the poorest and the overall quality of services for the majority. The role of the Haitian state in primary education is uniquely low from a global per- spective. Of the world’s 20 poorest countries, Haiti is the only one in which more than 50 percent of children are enrolled in non-state schools. A snapshot of the education sector reveals an elite category of private schools (usually religious and urban-based) that have established themselves at the top of the pile, but are affordable to only a small segment of the population. These are followed by a large group of public schools that occupy the mid- dle of the range, and then by the vast majority of private schools at the bottom. Public schools exist mainly in urban areas and 92 percent of all schools are non-state, the vast majority of which do not receive public subsidies. Among all primary and secondary school students, 82 percent attend private, fee-paying schools. Executive Summary xvii State health service provision is similarly limited. Only about 30 percent of health facilities in Haiti are public, and most of them are in urban areas. Nongovernmental organ- izations (NGOs) provide an estimated 70 percent of health services in rural areas and focus in particular on primary health care, including reproductive health, drug counseling, infant care, and HIV/AIDS screening. There are a number of hospitals run by private foundations but the state retains the main responsibility for secondary and tertiary care, as well as for overall oversight and referral. Recent surveys examining the role of non-state service providers in rural areas and poor neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince have found a strong presence of community organizations in areas such as sanitation, drinking water, healthcare, education, and even electricity provision. Public utilities are the main providers of water and electricity but that circumstance does not ensure equal access. The diverse and unregulated nature of basic service-provision can be exploited by political interests that use access as a means of bestowing patronage, garnering support, and gaining leverage. Access to services is patchy, unstable, and unequal, reflecting political considerations in initial provision, poor main- tenance capacity, a low level of coordination, and the violence and crime that affect service supply and demand. Given the state’s limited resources and capacity to provide services directly, development efforts should focus on improving the policy guidelines, coordination mechanisms, and regulatory frameworks for public-private partnerships. Security and the Rule of Law Security and the rule of law are not only crucial to ensuring justice and safety; they are also essential in creating an enabling environment for investments, economic growth, and development. However, private systems of violence linked to political and criminal activities have become decentralized and widespread; Haiti now has more private security personnel than police officers. The institutions responsible for establishing security and the rule of law—the police, judiciary and prisons—have largely collapsed, and to some degree they have become a source of insecurity themselves. Political interference and corruption have undermined previous reform efforts and brought about the rapid withdrawal of interna- tional assistance, with further destabilizing effects. Haiti has one of the world’s weakest police forces. There are 63 police officers per 100,000 people, less than a quarter of the regional average of 283 per 100,000 and only a third of the average for sub-Saharan African countries. Moreover, a significant number of members of the Haitian National Police (HNP) are alleged to be involved in criminal and violent activities, including direct involvement in the past year’s wave of kidnappings, according to human rights organizations and police officials themselves. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is mandated to support national authorities in the reform of the HNP, but it has not had executive authority over the national police force for the purposes of overseeing and monitoring the latter’s activities. There are increasing calls within Haiti and among the international community for MINUSTAH’s mandate to be strengthened in this regard. Haiti’s judiciary is similarly weakened by corruption and frequent political interfer- ence, which have undermined the institution’s independence and constrained the success of previous reform efforts. The justice system suffers from the obsolescence of many laws, the absence of basic guarantees, poorly trained and paid judicial officers, and the advanced state of deterioration of its physical infrastructure. As a result, access to law and justice is xviii Executive Summary difficult and random. Moreover, there is only limited integration of the police, judiciary, and prisons into a functioning criminal justice system or chaîne pénale . Communication breakdowns between the investigative “judicial police,” the prosecutor’s office, court clerks and the prison administration result in long delays in the administration of justice and a pretrial detention rate of almost 80 percent. The state’s ability to provide basic public goods has thus been undermined by a history of neglect, political capture and corruption, and compounded by difficult donor partnerships As regards the state’s administrative capacity, the territorial reach of state institutions is minimal outside major urban centers, decentralization has not been implemented, and the state has been unable to provide basic services or infrastructures to large portions of the population. A diverse and vibrant non-state sector has filled some of the gaps in health and education, but these efforts have been largely uncoordinated and unregulated. The result has been a substantial variation in the quality of the services provided and significant gaps in services for certain regions and vulnerable groups. The institutions responsible for providing the essential public goods of security and the rule of law (namely, the police and judiciary) are largely ineffective and suffer repeated problems of political interference and corruption. Above all, core state institutions remain weak, and the impacts of past technical assistance programs have been largely lost. Before beginning large-scale capacity building programs, government and donors must establish firm oversight and mutual accountability mechanisms to obviate the recurrence of practices that weaken institutions and perpetuate the conflict-poverty trap. Political Actors and Strategies Twenty years have passed since the 1986 ouster of Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier created a window of opportunity to establish a more stable and democratic form of governance. Yet, Haiti’s highly-polarized politics has complicated efforts to address the country’s complex and deeply rooted development challenges. The 1987 constitution provides for a clear separation of executive, judicial and legislative powers, as well as decentralized governance structures. In practice, however, politics in Haiti lacks a predictable system of rules. Political stability will remain illusive without the establishment of an equilibrium among the competing forces within society—including class forces that historically have pitted a small political and economic elite against the vastly larger urban and rural poor. Haitian politics swings between two key dangers: cap- ture by privileged elites who harness government to protect their dominant position in society; and populism that neglects the country’s long-term institutional and economic development while paying lip service to the poor. The 2006 elections do not themselves ensure national reconciliation, but Haiti’s return to elected rule does create opportunities for the consolidation of democratic institutions and processes. Strong national leadership is crucial to achieving a turnaround in Haiti. Entrepreneurs of violence have taken advantage of political instability and weak state institutions to manipulate popular grievances for political and criminal ends. Breaking free of Haiti’s poverty-conflict trap will require capable national political leadership that is committed to the consolidation of democratic institutions and processes. In a context of very difficult socioeconomic conditions, high social risks, defunct state institutions, extremely limited budget resources, and political polarization, Haiti’s leaders face enormous challenges. The Executive Summary xix 2006 electoral process, however, has created new opportunities for reform, reconciliation and partnerships. Conclusion: Breaking the Conflict-Poverty Trap Haiti’s social resilience and social capital, its vibrant cultural life and improvements in social indicators are keystones to draw upon in breaking the conflict-poverty trap. Haiti’s deep and widespread poverty results from a long history of failure to establish even basic enabling conditions for broad-based social and economic development. The state has struggled to provide basic services to the population and has been dominated by a small elite that has made limited investments in infrastructure and basic services. Development, poverty reduction and conflict prevention will not be possible without a focus on strength- ening the state’s capacity to provide basic public goods, including security and the rule of law. Its financial and managerial resources must be used with an exceptionally strong sense of priority. In the past, however, efforts to restore state functions have been undermined by political interference and corruption, which in turn prompted the withdrawal and redi- rection of donor support. A reduction in violence and an improvement in security conditions are of paramount importance in fostering sustainable development in Haiti. Very poor urban neighborhoods are explosive points of conflict in the country’s development crisis, combining demo- graphic, socioeconomic, institutional, and political risk factors. Violence and insecurity in the Port-au-Prince slums in particular have undermined the political process, fuelled con- flict, and negatively affected development and reconstruction efforts. Joint multisectoral interventions in key urban areas (including Cité Soleil) that combine security and poverty reduction objectives will be essential for creating the conditions necessary for broad-based national development strategies. The most important factor for breaking out of Haiti’s poverty-conflict trap cannot be provided by donors but only by Haitians themselves: good leadership. Donors can support good leadership by establishing incentives that reward good governance and penalize the opposite. Because of the centrality of corruption in undermining good leadership, trans- parency in public finances should be a foundation for the Bank and other donors’ assis- tance to a new Haitian government. Haiti’s development crisis is so multifaceted, and the country’s needs are so many, that prioritizing reconstruction efforts and development assistance has proven difficult. This report argues that the focus should be on the restoration of core state functions—the pro- vision of the public goods of security and the rule of law, infrastructure and basic services. Among the triangle of risk factors in the poverty-conflict trap, institutional capacity build- ing is a key entry point for breaking the cycle; improving demographic and socioeconomic outcomes and supporting political dialogue remain longer-term objectives. Institutional reform itself, however, requires a long-term engagement. National planning and interna- tional assistance should build on the existing International Cooperation Framework by pri- oritizing resources and monitoring progress, such that both donors and government can be held accountable for results. xx Executive Summary H aiti holds a unique place in modern world history as the first independent black republic, established in 1804 following the only successful slave revolution against colonial rule. Undoubtedly, this historic accomplishment has helped build national pride and solidarity across economic and social distinctions in Haiti, and is reflected in the country’s vibrant cultural life. But as a stark reminder of the republic’s troubled history, the bicentennial of independence was overshadowed by violence and political instability that resulted in the fall of President’s Aristide’s government in February 2004. The sources of both Haiti’s strong social resilience and the recurrent political instability can be located in the country’s difficult independence process, which is dis- cussed briefly below as a backdrop to this report’s more contemporary focus. Today, the report argues, poverty, institutional weakness, and urban violence continue to sustain Haiti’s conflict-poverty trap in ever shifting ways. Yet Haitians continue to cope by means of informal social mechanisms and migration abroad. This report analyzes these chal- lenges and opportunities in Haiti’s development trajectory and proposes strategic devel- opment priorities to reinforce strengths and mitigate weaknesses. The analytical approach is described in more detail below, following a brief historical introduction. 2 Historical Background: Origins of the Rural-Urban Divide The Republic of Haiti emerged from a colonial order that established economic and social conditions for its post-independence development. Haiti is more known for its early colonial-era dominance in sugar production, but the rapid growth of coffee production CHAPTER 1 Introduction By Dorte Verner and Willy Egset 1 2. The historical background section is based largely on Trouillot (1990) and Lundahl (1979). 2 A World Bank Country Study in the second part of the eighteenth century transformed Haitian society in several ways (Trouillot 1990). The expansion of coffee production to meet soaring international demand attracted a new class of French migrants with more humble backgrounds than the traditional French sugar aristocracy. Together with freed people of mixed ancestry, they established small coffee estates in the country’s mountainous interior, thereby providing a basis for peasant production outside the sugar plantations of the coastal plains. This devel- opment reinforced another practice, whereby slaves were given garden plots for small-scale farming on land that was unfit for larger-scale production and that was more amply avail- able in the interior. Coffee production made the interior a significant economic locus and helped turn an increasing number of producers against French colonial rule. France’s trade monopoly cut off producers from valuable markets in other European countries and the United States. Haitian nationalism was also growing, forging a sense of identity that—with the independence process—came to be seen as essentially black, even among the lighter skinned economic elite. 3 Despite this growing nationalism, Haiti’s political and economic leaders and most of the population were set on different courses. The revolutionary wars destroyed much of Haiti’s physical and human capital. Plantations were ruined; a third of the slave popula- tion was killed, and many escaped to the mountains or enrolled in revolutionary armies; almost the entire white administrative class disappeared; and foreign trade practically came to a standstill. Slavery was abolished but the wars had a disastrous impact on the country’s economy from a fiscal perspective. Hence Haiti’s new leaders, from L’Ouverture during the wars and continuing under Dessalines from 1804, were determined to re-establish large-scale export-oriented plantations to restore the country’s economic strength. Former plantation land owned by whites was confiscated by the state, which led efforts to restore the plantations. However, the availability of land in the interior, and the former slaves’ aversion to plantation work, made it impossible to secure the necessary voluntary labor. Hence the introduction of the fermage system, whereby every person who was not in the army or in urban trade was attached to a plantation under strict supervision and con