Systèmes semenciers dans les États fragiles: Étude de cas d'Haïti

Seed Systems in Fragile States HAITI CASE STUDY 2 Activity Title : Feed the Future Global Supporting Seed Systems for Development activity Activity start date and end date : Aug 24, 2018 – Aug 23, 2023 Cooperative agreement number : 7200AA18LE00004 Document title : Seed Systems in Fragile States - Haiti Case Study Publication date : September 30, 2021 Author’s names : Marcia Croft Citation: Croft, M. Seed Systems in Fragile States - Haiti Case Study . 2021. A Feed the Future Global Supporting Seed Systems for Development activity report. Sponsoring USAID office : LOC Unit, Federal Center Plaza (SA-44)/M/CFO/CMP Technical office: USAID/RFS/CA AOR name: Daniel Bailey Activity Goal : Improved functioning of the high-impact integrated seed systems Language of document : English Submitted on behalf of: Catholic Relief Services Submitted by: Nikaj van Wees, Chief of Party S34D activity Catholic Relief Services 228 West Lexington Street, Baltimore, MD 21201 Nikaj.vanwees@crs.org 3 Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the key informants who supported this study with their time, insights, and experiences. During the study period, Haiti experienced a presidential assassination, a major earthquake, and a hurricane. The invaluable time of the key informants is greatly appreciated. Cover page photo credit: Oscar Leiva for CRS DISCLAIMER This report was made possible by the generous support from the American people through the U.S. Government's Feed the Future initiative and the United States Agency for International Development through Cooperative Agreement 7200AA18LE00004. The contents are the responsibility of Catholic Relief Services and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. Feed the Future Consortium Partners in the Feed the Future Global Supporting Seed Systems for Development activity: 4 Table of Contents Acronyms 5 Abstract 6 Introduction 7 Haiti: State Fragility and Historical Context ................................................................................................................................ ...7 Historical overview in relation to agriculture ................................................................................................................................ .......8 Agriculture and Food Security ................................................................................................................................ .............................8 Cropping systems ................................................................................................................................ ... 8 Agroecologies and Livelihood Zones ................................................................................................ ..... 9 Food security challenges ................................................................................................ ......................... 9 External support .................................................................................................................................. 11 Historical and Current Seed Sector Development ........................................................................................................................... 11 Farmers’ Seed Sources .......................................................................................................................... 11 Farmers’ use of improved varieties .................................................................................................................................................... 14 Emergency Seed Provisioning ............................................................................................................................................................ 15 Community-Based Seed Production .................................................................................................................................................. 16 Formal Seed Sector ............................................................................................................................................................................ 17 Summary ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 17 Stakeholder Perspectives ................................................................................................................ 19 The Role of Farmer Groups .............................................................................................................................................................. 19 Seed Companies, Agrodealers, Formal and Informal Traders ...................................................................................................... 19 National research organizations involved in seed system development ........................................................................................... 21 International research organizations involved in seed system development ..................................................................................... 21 Public Sector and Government Seed Actors .................................................................................................................................... 21 Local and international NGOs involved in seed-related activities ................................................................................................. 23 Local NGOs ........................................................................................................................................ 23 International NGOs ............................................................................................................................. 24 International development & UN agencies ..................................................................................................................................... 25 Donors involved in seed sector development ...................................................................................................................................... 25 Summary and Vision ........................................................................................................................................................................ 26 Conclusion and Points for Consideration ....................................................................................... 29 Points for Consideration Specific to the Haitian Context ............................................................................ 29 Works Cited 30 Annex 1. Key Informant Interviews and Tool .................................................................................. 32 5 Acronyms CECOSAM Centre de Conditionnement et de Stockage des Semences de Maïs CIPDSA Commission Intersectorielle de Production et Distribution de Semences Améliorées CIAT International Center for Tropical Agriculture CIMMYT International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center CRS Catholic Relief Services EGS Early Generation Seed EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FEWSNET Famine Early Warning Systems Network GAP Global Agriculture Practices GDP Gross Domestic Product HDI Human Development Index IDB International Development Bank MARNDR Ministère de l’Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural MYAP Multi-Year Assistance Program NGO Non-Government Organization ORE Organization for the Rehabilitation of the Environment QDS Quality Declared Seed SERA Service d’Etudes et de Recherches Agricoles SNS Service National Semencier SSSA Seed System Security Assessment UN United Nations UNDP United Nation Development Programme 6 Abstract This overview of seed systems in fragile states focuses on Haiti, with insights drawn from the literature and key informant interviews. While the Haitian context is constantly evolving, the lessons drawn from this case study can help inform seed system development in fragile states. Specifically, there is a need for definitive seed law and regulatory frameworks for private sector investment, which was echoed across many stakeholders. Despite limitations in government capacity, this regulatory framework would go a long way towards providing the assurance the private sector needs to develop in the seed sector. In addition, informal traders play a very important role in seed systems in fragile states and need to be incorporated into seed sector development; informal sector traders are as important if not more important than formal sectors seed traders in developing resilient seed systems in these contexts. There is also a need to better understand the gender dynamics of the seed sector, especially the role of female informal traders. The informal market plays a crucial role in seed systems in fragile states but ignoring the gendered dynamics of women’s work in the formal and informal seed sectors would jeopardize the future inclusive development of these systems. 7 Introduction Background: Seed system development in fragile states Definitions and indicators vary, but – according to USAID - the term ‘fragile state’ is used to refer to countries where the legitimacy of the government is in question, and the state itself is either unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portion of its population (ILO, 2016). USAID’s definition of fragile states includes a broad range of failing, failed, and recovering states. The Fragile States Index (The Fund for Peace, 2021) usefully provides an annual ranking of 178 countries across 12 indicators of the risks and vulnerabilities faced by individual nations. The formal seed sector is either weak or non-existent in fragile states. Farmers rely on the informal seed sector, and many also receive seed and related support through emergency interventions. Current approaches to emergency seed provisioning aim to support farmers with access to seed in the short term, but these approaches often do little to support the emergence of sustainable seed systems in the long term. Existing formal sector models are not viable in the context of fragile states due to severe lack of capacity, insecurity, and on-going political and economic instability. The context of fragility – which is often combined with natural disasters such as drought and floods, pests such as locusts and fall army worm, and now COVID-19 – necessitates that seed systems are resilient. There are various different approaches and many unanswered questions as to how seed systems should be developed and made resilient in fragile states. Governance arrangements between government, private sector, NGOs, international organizations and donors are considered to be key, and the division of power and decision-making between actors is central (Cordaid & Wageningen University, 2014). In general, the emergence (or re-emergence) of private seed enterprises in fragile states is almost completely dependent on serving the needs of donor-driven emergency seed provisioning. The private sector’s reliance on emergency seed provisioning for seed sales makes it difficult to transition to more sustainable business models, especially when farmers are accustomed to receiving seed for free through humanitarian interventions. Given the many challenges outlined above, humanitarian and development agencies working in fragile states need guidance in designing support to seed systems that are consistent with USAID’s resilience agenda and appropriate to the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. The broader study for which this case study was undertaken will contribute to resilience-building among farmers by proposing ways in which seed systems can provide farmers in fragile states with access to quality seed of appropriate varieties. It will contribute to resilient seed systems by proposing models for the (re-)establishment of new, more robust seed systems that are able to adapt and transform to withstand the various shocks and stresses that characterize fragile states. The interventions that will be proposed must necessarily bridge the divide between humanitarian and development assistance to ensure that short-term, emergency seed interventions do not undermine longer-term development objectives within seed systems. Haiti: State Fragility and Historical Context Currently, Haiti is ranked 149 out of 182 countries on the Human Development Index, indicating that life expectancy, education, and per capita income are extremely low in comparison to other countries. On the other hand, Haiti is ranked 13 out of 179 countries on the fragility index indicating 8 high risk and vulnerability to shocks. Haiti also experiences the most inequality of any country in the Western Hemisphere as measured by the Gini Index and has high levels of food insecurity due to unstable domestic food supply, market power disparities, population pressure, and limited economic opportunities. Haitians pay 30%-77% more for food as compared to other countries in the region when income and purchasing power are accounted for (FEWS NET, 2018). Haiti has also suffered from political instability over the past decades, with frequent president and cabinet changes and poor governance and accountability (FEWS NET, 2018). Agriculture makes up just 28% of GDP despite 60% of the population identifying farming as their primary source of income (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010 1 ). Historical overview in relation to agriculture Haiti became one of the first nations to free themselves from colonial rule in 1804 when a slave revolt expelled the French colonialists and established Haiti as an independent country. Located on the western portion of the Hispaniola island in the Caribbean, agriculture has been a critical part of Haiti’s past, present, and future economy. Agriculture still forms the backbone of the nation of over 10 million, with 80% of the population engaged in agriculture as part of their livelihood (FEWS NET, 2018). Though Haiti has suffered from political instability for many decades, it was self-sufficient in key staples until the early 1980s. Since then, it has been increasingly dependent on imported food, especially rice, wheat, and edible oils (FEWS NET, 2018). While this has had negative implications for the stability of food prices, Haiti has a thriving agro-export sector for a number of key commodities including vetiver oil, coffee, cocoa, bananas, mangoes and other fruits. Food riots in 2008 led to a change in government, and the large primary and secondary impacts of the 2010 earthquake increased the vulnerability of the poorest. Average household sizes increased from 6.44 to 8.68 people, while meals fell from 2.48 per day to 1.59 from pre-earthquake levels to immediately after the 2010 earthquake (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). This disaster was followed by unprecedented levels of aid to Haiti, with implications for the seed sector, as discussed below. Agriculture and Food Security Cropping systems Haiti has year-round crop production, thanks to its climate and varied agroecological zones (FEWS NET, 2018). Rice, maize, beans, peas, roots and tubers, and plantains are some of the most common staple crops grown in Haiti. Rice is the most important staple crop in Haiti (average consumption of 50 kg/year/person) followed by maize and sorghum. Bananas/plantains, tubers, beans, and peas are also important staples produced locally while wheat flour is an imported staple. Red beans, black beans, and pigeon pea are the most commonly grown peas and beans while tubers include sweet potatoes, cassava, and yams. Some of the most high-value crops are fruits such as mangoes, papaya, pineapple, mangosteen, guava, and citrus as well as cocoa, tobacco, coffee, and sugarcane (FEWS NET, 2018). Other vegetables and fruits that are increasingly common include cabbage, tomato, eggplant, leaf amaranth, watermelon, and tree fruits such as acerola. While there are not specific ‘women’s crops’ identified in the literature, many women do cultivate high-value vegetables and are 1 https://seedsystem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/SSSA-Haiti-Main-Report.pdf 9 responsible for selecting healthy foods to feed their families (Kellum et al., 2020; Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). One third of the land area is arable in Haiti. There are five basic production systems across the 1.2 million ha cultivated each year: rainfed lowland agriculture, dryland lowland agriculture, rainfed hill and mountain agriculture, dryland hill and mountain agriculture, and irrigated areas most commonly associated with rice production (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). Haiti also includes a somewhat unusual combination of fruit trees and root crops in arboriculture (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010) Agroecologies and Livelihood Zones Agroecologies in Haiti include both drought-prone areas and slightly wealthier irrigated zones (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). The majority of agricultural land is rainfed, with only 13% of productive units with access to irrigation. Two rainy seasons take place between April and June and then August to November. Roughly 60% of Haiti has steep slopes of over 20%, contributing to soil erosion and degradation (FEWS NET, 2018). Due to the diversity of agroecologies, bean seeds are available year-round through an exchange from the highlands to the lowlands that ensures beans are always present in informal markets. Though agriculture makes up a part of the majority of the population’s livelihood, production is not high enough to meet current demand. Haiti produces an average of 380,000-455,000 tons of agricultural produce per year and yet is a net importer of food (12% of net imports) including many staples (Ng & Aksoy, 2008; Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). While Haiti is self- sufficient in tubers, plantains, maize, and sorghum, it still experiences a deficit in two if its most important staples: rice and beans (FEWS NET, 2018). The majority of production comes from smallholder farmers; 75% of productive land is made up of parcels of less than 1ha. Approximately 25% of smallholder farmers are women and 11% are youth up to 29 years, though these figures may be underestimates as family members make up the labor force for 95% of farms (FEWS NET, 2018; UNCTAD, 2006). Eighty-five percent of the Haitian economy is informal and dominated by women’s commercial activities (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). Haiti has one of the highest rates of economically active women in the developing world with 62% of women active in the labor force (approximately equal to men) (Correia, 2002). Agricultural trade provides the most common occupation for women which means that women are often responsible for purchasing and preparing the food for their household as well as generating the income needed to purchase it (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). Female traders in the agricultural sector are commonly known as Madam Saras. Food security challenges Haiti faces multiple challenges to food security in terms of availability, access, utilization, and stability. These challenges include environmental degradation, political and economic instability, and agricultural productivity. Haiti has one of the highest rates of food insecurity in the world, with nearly half of the population (4.4 million) in need of food assistance and 1 million classified in emergency status (World Food Programme, 2018). Almost one quarter of children in Haiti are chronically malnourished and 10% are underweight due to many factors, including poor diet. 10 Haiti is one of the most vulnerable countries to natural disasters. Between 2000 and 2016, there were 74 natural disasters in which 12 million people were impacted and 237,176 people lost their lives, principally the 2010 earthquake (FEWS NET, 2018). Natural disasters include earthquakes, floods, storms, droughts, and epidemics (See Figure 1). In events per square kilometer, Haiti surpasses all other Latin American and Caribbean countries. These disasters destroy crops and market infrastructure and displace thousands of people. Figure 1. Major natural events affecting Haiti. Source: (FEWS NET, 2018). Environmental challenges have worsened food insecurity, especially in rural areas. Forest cover is currently only 1% of Haitian land area, contributing to landslides, erosion, and reduced resilience to extreme weather events (FEWS NET, 2018). Due to the highly mountainous nature of Haiti’s geography, steep slopes exacerbate the effects of deforestation. Cutting trees for charcoal for both cooking and income has been a critical driver of deforestation, but also a stopgap measure for the most vulnerable families seeking to close consumption gaps. Approximately 37 million tons of soil from 12,000 ha are eroded each year (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). This means that 30-50% of the population of Haiti are working on extremely fragile lands with arid land, steep slopes, or fragile soils. Market dependence is high in Haiti, especially for the most vulnerable households. These households purchase 45%-85% of their food, leaving them vulnerable to price spikes and market volatility, even in areas of agricultural production (FEWS NET, 2018). While food processing contributes to improved food stability, processing capacity is limited and concentrated in Port-au- Prince but includes milling imported wheat, fermenting sorghum into alcoholic and other beverages, and mixing and bottling imported vegetable oil. Smaller mills with limited production capacity exist across the countryside (FEWS NET, 2018). In addition, the major food processors have 11 demonstrated non-competitive behavior in the past; each of the largest food companies offer products with virtually no overlap with others, supporting the establishment of monopolies. This may be due to government inaction or a lack of willingness to confront large and powerful food corporations. Road availability and accessibility determine commodity flows far more than distance between locations, which can be impacted by security and extreme weather events (FEWS NET, 2018). Women face additional food security challenges in general. Women have fewer job opportunities than men and are 20% more likely to be unemployed. They also receive 32% less in wages when they are able to secure employment. Women receive less education, face more health challenges, and are more likely to face domestic violence (FEWS NET, 2018). Agricultural productivity in Haiti remains low, limiting food availability. A variety of factors contribute to low productivity, including low use of high-quality inputs, low access to finance, pests and diseases, extreme weather events, soil degradation, land fragmentation, and poor agricultural practices (FEWS NET, 2018). The Haitian seed system for sorghum was devastated by the Sugarcane Aphid that wiped out sorghum production in 2015, demonstrating the fragility in the seed system. Government programs regularly provide access to agricultural inputs, but these are often delivered late, limiting their impact. External support Haiti receives external support from a variety of sources, making up 60% of the national budget (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). Haiti receives extensive food aid, totaling 95,000 MT in just three years between 2004-2006 (FAO, 2009). This often comes under the name of emergency aid, but is not always appropriately targeted (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). External agricultural support comes from a variety of NGO and UN agencies, while the Haitian government also distributes large amounts of seed on an annual basis. The 2010 earthquake marked an unprecedented level of seed aid in Haiti, with dramatic impacts on the private sector, displacing the work of female traders and entrepreneurs, Madam Saras. Rural small-scale commerce declined in 91% of cases, but seed availability was cited as a reason in only 4% of cases. Humanitarian actors were advised to move away from an emergency focus on agricultural interventions in favor of medium-term farmer-driven agricultural marketing systems (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). The Haitian government has subsidized and distributed fertilizer for over ten years to promote agricultural productivity. The distributions have often come late or been impacted by stockouts, and the fertilizer programs have increased dependence on foreign aid that already covers the majority of the national budget. These market distortions have provided fertilizer to farmers at below-market prices but have not succeeded in boosting food production (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). Historical and Current Seed Sector Development Farmers’ Seed Sources Farmers use multiple channels to access seed, including both formal and informal seed systems (Table 1). In Haiti, the vast majority (98%) of sources are informal (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). The lack of formal sector outlets limits their penetration in rural areas, 12 however the formal sector seed is common in rice and vegetable crops and reaches farmers through Madam Saras. Excluding eggplant and amaranth, 100% of all other less common vegetable crops are sourced from improved, imported formal seed (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). Table 1. Quantities of seed (kg and percentages) farmers sow or plan to sow second season post 2010 earthquake by seed source and crop. N = 2,975, includes 3 priority crops per household; 983 households ( Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti , n.d.). Approximately 15-20% of seed comes from farmers’ own stocks, primarily maize and sorghum and in limited areas, peanuts. Legume and cereal seeds are occasionally sourced from other farmers for an additional 2% of seed, with the exception of rice where approximately 9% of seed comes from family and friends. Vegetatively propagated crops like banana, sweet potato, yam, and manioc often come from other farmers (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). The low amounts of seed from farmers’ stocks may be in part due to the difficulty of storing large-seeded crops like beans, cowpeas, and other legumes. On-farm storage for cereals like maize and sorghum is more common, but cash needed for school fees or debts may induce farmers to sell their produce at harvest and save less of their own production. Especially for beans, the purchase of most or all seed is common even in times of crisis. Many farmers prefer not to carry the risk of storing seed when they know they can purchase appropriate seed from the market at sowing time (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). Figure 2 disaggregates seed source by gender of household head, demonstrating minimal differences between male- and female-headed household seed purchasing patterns. Figure 2. Seed sources by household head gender (Source: Seed System Security Assessment, 2010). 13 Haitian farmers occasionally access seed through decentralized seed production initiatives that generally produce relatively small (800-900 MT) amounts of seed, often led by NGOs or the FAO (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). These groups primarily produce key crops like rice and beans, but specialized farmer seed producers are only used for 1% of seed. While this seed may meet higher quality standards than most informal sources, there is no legal framework for Quality Declared Seed (QDS) in Haiti. QDS still remains uncommon for most farmers (Seed System Security Assessment – Haiti, 2010). The dominant source for seed is informal markets, providing 70% of all seed but especially critical for beans, peanuts, and cowpeas. Unlike other low-income countries, local market use remains high and was consistent both before and after the 2010 earthquake (Seed System Security Assessment – Haiti, 2010). Seed trade at the community level is often a role played by women. Women are generally responsible for selling harvest and purchasing seed for the coming season. Roughly half of women in rural areas also store grain at the household level for resale when prices rise. Smallholder farmers spend an average of $60-$70 per season on seed purchases (Seed System Security Assessment – Haiti, 2010). For the most vulnerable farmers, this represents a large expense and can be a poor investment if seed quality is low. The local seed or grain markets can be weekly in rural locations or permanent in larger towns. Farmers are known to travel to specific (and sometimes distant) locations to procure seed. For women, who spend an average of 1.8 hours cooking and 2.0 hours fetching food and water the time burden of traveling to purchase seeds may cut into critical childcare activities (Kellum et al., 2020). For example, in the South Department farmers travel 80 minutes each way by foot to reach markets an average of 45 times per year (Shields, 2001). These informal markets in Haiti, as in other countries, are often stocked by vendors who sell seed and grain separately, with seed at prices 50%- 100% higher than grain and with distinction between the qualities of each (Seed System Security Assessment – Haiti, 2010). Seed and grain travel to and from these markets through a network of 14 producers, importers, wholesalers, retailers, Madam Saras (as defined on p. 6) and other intermediaries who provide a robust trade network across the country (Seed System Security Assessment – Haiti, 2010). There are also women’s community groups that collectively buy large quantities of grain for sale before prices increase during planting time, including one example in Bassin Bleu, a collective which purchases roughly 450 kg per month (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). Different methods are used to differentiate seed from grain within the informal market. While some sources state that farmers are careful to question vendors about the quality and origin of the seeds when making their selections (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010), others note that farmers do not distinguish between grain and seed (Walters, & Brick, 2010). Sellers that differentiate between grain and seed use size and uniformity to separate seed while others expect buyers to do their own sorting. Farmers often select larger grains for seed and remove broken or damaged seeds (Walters, & Brick, 2010). It is not clear the extent to which source is used to differentiate seed from grain. Farmers do generally prefer seeds that are local over imported for key staple crops like maize, sorghum, pigeon pea, and peanut, though they may differentiate depending on the crop. While 41.3% of farmers report buying bean seed they did not consider local, this is closer to 12%-14% for sorghum, maize, pigeon pea, and peanut (Walters, & Brick, 2010). Farmers’ use of improved varieties 2 Improved varieties face many challenges entering the market and reaching widespread adoption in Haiti, as described below. Very few sources supply new varieties to the seed system, with the exception of rice and horticultural crops. Both rice and vegetables are important for income generation, which helps to account for the introduction of far more improved varieties than other crops (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). Roughly one quarter of farmers use fertilizer, which is often a prerequisite for some improved varieties. This may suggest that the wealthiest farmers are able to take advantage of high-quality inputs while the majority of smallholder farmers are excluded from the most productive and profitable production systems. Most farmers indicated that their seed sources for major crops had not changed in the 5-10 years (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). While some stated that they have access to improved varieties, other farmer groups mentioned that this was only possible when provided by donors, with the exception of vegetable seeds, which are primarily imported (Walters, & Brick, 2010). The Seed System Security Assessment (SSSA) of 2010 found that 14% of farmers had tried a new seed variety in the last 5 years, primarily as a result of seed aid (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). A 2013 survey found that 13.9% of households reported received extension services, a relatively high number, though this primarily came from donor-funded projects, 2 Improved varieties are the product of formal breeding programs that have undergone testing and are released through a formal process. Improved varieties are distinct from landraces which are local varieties of a domesticated plant species that have developed over time through a combination of farmer selection and adaptation to the natural and cultural environment in which they are found. Some improved varieties are developed through pure line selections of local varieties so that they conform to a particular standard of characteristics. This definition has been adapted from Context Network (2016). See also https://agrilinks.org/post/seed-system- definitions#:~:text=Formal%20seed%20system%3A%20The%20formal,formal%20release%20and%20maintenance%2 0system . 15 private sector, and NGOs. Over 50% of the extension services mentioned focused on seed (Goertz, 2016). Seed distributions for ‘emergency’ responses have played a much larger role in diffusing new varieties than extension programs, especially for maize and beans as well as sorghum and rice to some extent (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). While the intention of emergency seed distributions might be to provide appropriate planting material, introducing new varieties may be ineffective or even cause harm. Emergency seed distributions are not accompanied by the technical assistance and multi-season follow-up necessary to responsibly introduce new varieties into the market and may leave farmers without a sustainable linkage to markets to purchase the same improved varieties. Emergency Seed Provisioning Emergency seed aid has taken place for decades in Haiti, in most cases in the form of direct distribution. CRS began using seed fairs as one alternative modality in 2009, which combines vouchers with NGO-facilitated fair events that gather many types of seed vendors. No examples of cash-based seed responses were found in Haiti. Seed aid in Haiti reached unprecedented levels following the 2010 earthquake. Following the January earthquake, seed aid took place in south, central, and northern provinces in Haiti for the following two planting seasons (Spring and Summer/Fall), even though direct earthquake damage took place close to the capital of Port-au-Prince. The FAO alone aimed to reach 68,000 families and seed aid requests from the Government of Haiti and UN exceeded $750M (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). Following the earthquake, however, there was significant migration out of the capital, roughly 85,000 people. Many planned to stay in the more rural regions that they moved to (Walters, & Brick, 2010). While the impacts of the earthquake were multi-faceted, the seed aid response may not have strengthened the already fragile seed market in Haiti ( Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti , 2010). Though farmers stated that they were likely to shift to short-season crops and shift from high-cost seeds like bean to cheaper seed like maize, seed availability does not appear to have been restricted (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010; Walters, & Brick, 2010). Roughly 18% of farmers stated that they would decrease land area planted, but in the case of female-headed households their initial (before-earthquake) land areas were significantly smaller than male-headed households (Table 2). While formal and informal vendors sometimes faced challenges accessing seed on credit following emergencies (Walters, & Brick, 2010), vendors noted that they would be able to source more local seed if needed. This suggests that markets had sufficient supplies of seed but that purchasing power is the barrier. Though seed was distributed, seed aid – both emergency and development aid – accounted for only 4% of seed sown post-earthquake (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). In fact, no vendor interviewed for the SSSA could ever recall a time when they were not able to find seed in the past 40 years (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). 16 Table 2. Farmer perceptions of effects of earthquake on land, by sex of household, all sites (Source: Seed System Security Assessment – Haiti, 2010). * Difference in mean land area before earthquake is significantly different by sex of household head with t-test at <10% assuming equal variances and <5% assuming unequal variances, but no significant differences after earthquake. Direct distribution appears to have been the most common response to the 2010 earthquake. It is likely that as much as 40% of the emergency seed distributions in Haiti come from imported seed (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). However, some aid came in the form of vouchers and fairs, which can use existing market channels to connect voucher recipients with seed, fertilizer, tools, and other inputs. This approach has smaller negative impacts on the market and can benefit farmers as consumers and suppliers, depending on how the approach is implemented (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010; Walters, & Brick, 2010). Community-Based Seed Production The vast majority (70%) of seed is purchased by farmers through the informal market, with relatively little coming from community-based seed production. While often project supported, these farmer seed production enterprises still only provide modest amounts of seed to farmers. These enterprises may have the potential to build on strengths in the formal and informal sector but have yet to reach scale (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). The most commonly cited collection of community-based farmer groups is the NGO Organization for the Rehabilitation of the Environment (ORE), which works through farmer groups to produce high-quality seed. Working with 200-300 contract farmers, ORE multiplies roughly 800-900 MT of maize and bean seed (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010; Walters, & Brick, 2010). While these decentralized multiplication systems have been effective in the Sud, they are not yet being replicated elsewhere. 17 Formal Seed Sector The formal seed sector captures only a small (2%) percentage of the market, imported formal sector seeds are available and common in rice and horticultural crops (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). Formal seed companies capture this market, however formal plant breeding in Haiti has not been extensive since the 1990s. The formal seed sector and plant breeding is regulated to some extent by the National Seed Service, which is severely understaffed and underbudgeted. The NGO ORE has been one of the only organizations regularly breeding and screening crops, such as maize, beans, and sorghum (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). In terms of seed regulations, Haiti has experimented with several forms of regulation and bodies to carry it out. In 1970, the Service d’Etudes et de Recherches Agricoles (SERA), was created as a research arm of the then Department of Agriculture. This lasted 13 years until SERA was closed in 1983 and its authority and activities were transferred to the Faculty of Agronomy. In 1978, the Centre de Conditionnement et de Stockage des Semences de Maïs (CECOSAM) was created specifically to regulate and improve seed quality in maize, though this was later extended to other crops. It had impressive facilities, with the capacity to store 500 MT and process 1 MT of maize per hour. Unfortunately, poor management of a large quantity of maize seed caused financial issues for CECOSAM and it has not resumed operations since it was looted in 1994. In the previous year, 1993, the Commission Intersectorielle de Production et Distribution de Semences Améliorées (CIPDSA) was formed. CIPDSA contributed to distribution of seed to Haitian farmers, funded by UNDPN and the EU. A number of private seed companies and institutions (see Seed Companies, Agrodealers, and Formal and Informal Traders section below) were created to supply seed to CIPDSA and FAO around the same time. CIPDSA’s mandate was not renewed in 2002 when it was dissolved due to lack of funds (Seed System Security Assessment - Haiti, 2010). Currently, the Service National Semencier (SNS) is in charge of the seed sector but has limited capacity and resources to fulfill its mandate. Summary In Haiti, the informal seed sector remains the strongest and most dominant, while also demonstrating substantial resilience in the face of crises like the earthquake of 2010. The formal seed sector has an important role to play in introducing new varieties, but these channels are not well established and have not made inroads into the most important Haitian crops other than rice and vegetables. Community-based seed multiplication may have some promise but is yet to be scaled up. One of the most important lessons learned from Haiti is the importance of coordination and thorough seed assessments in response to crises. The earthquake of 2010 deeply impacted Haiti in multiple ways, but markets for informal seed were still functioning post-earthquake. Rather than distributing imported seed, the response to this emergency had an opportunity to strengthen seed market systems rather than circumventing them. While many actors carried out seed fairs and used vouchers, future responses have the opportunity to be more coordinated. Even when farmers do not have seed stocks on hand post-crisis, this is often commonplace for certain crops (especially beans) and does not necessarily imply that direct distributions are needed. Introduction of improved seed is an important challenge to address in the future. While emergency distributions have been responsible for a large portion (53%) of new varieties, these are often not the best situations to introduce new varieties or new crops. Sustained technical support for new 18 varieties and extension services are critical to variety introductions, as well as consistent market linkages to improved seed suppliers. 19 Stakeholder Perspectives To complement the literature review, key stakeholder interviews were carried out between July and September 2021. Key informant interviews were carried out remotely based on a semi-structured interview guide (Annex 1). Key informants came from private sector, university, NGO, and UN backgrounds and helped to provide depth to the information gathered through the literature as well as a more up-to-date view of seed systems in Haiti, following the dynamic events of 2021 including the presidential assassination, earthquake, and hurricane. Stakeholders were selected to represent diverse sectors and perspectives and contacted through a snowball sampling technique. The Role of Farmer Groups Stakeholder interviews confirmed the important role farmer groups could play in the Haitian seed system, though their potential is largely untapped. In addition, women farmers have been shown to have limited leadership roles in farmers’ associations (Kellum et al., 2020). Though there are many active farmer organizations, they are not often consulted or considered in government decision making. Women’s associations are starting to increase in number, but these receive less support than others (Kellum et al., 2020). Many stakeholders confirmed the important role ORE is playing in working with farmer groups on seed production and reaching out to this stakeholder group. In total, there are at least 1,050 farmer groups that have been trained in Quality Declared Seed (QDS) production since 1993. While the seed may be quality declared, there is no formal legal framework for QDS in Haiti, meaning that no government body certifies the quality of the seed. The Ministry of Agriculture facilitated the creation of seed producer groups before the 2010 earthquake but not many of these groups had the capacity to produce quality seeds at that time. Following the earthquake and the humanitarian response by many different agencies, most seed included in the responses was imported. The Haitian Government sought to change this and worked with the FAO to train many producer groups on QDS seed production, so that future emergency responses could incorporate local seed. Though these farmer groups are free to sell their seed to anyone, only 10-20 of these groups have the capacity to sell directly to NGOs or the FAO due to the heavy administrative burden on farmer groups of institutional buyers like NGOs. The majority of the groups sell QDS seed to intermediaries or wholesalers who might then sell the seed to institutional buyers or retailers. In general, the farmer organizations do not have the internal capacity to market seeds themselves and so rely on seed intermediaries of all sizes. Seed Companies, Agrodealers, Formal and Informal Traders The seed sector is primarily informal and lacking in regulation. Following the end of CIPDSA, there has not been a strong government presence regulating seeds either in the capital or in the rural areas. The formal seed companies that exist in Haiti import seeds rather than producing locally and specialize in rice and vegetables. There are very few formal seed companies with outlets outside of the capital, even fewer that provide extension advice in limited areas. This has contributed to the lack of technical assistance supporting improved variety adoption. Formal Haitian seed companies include COMAG S.A., Agroservice S.A., and Darbouco S.A. Of these, Darbouco is the oldest (founded in 1948), with 85% of their sales in vegetables, especially cabbage, carrots, onions, cucumbers, and beets. Cereals make up the remainder. Seeds are imported 20 into Haiti from locations like Japan, the US, and the Dominican Republic, but Haitian companies conduct some variety trials to identify the best candidates. The primary direct customers for seed are agrodealers, mostly male, as well as some Madam Saras. Formal seed companies rely on these networks to reach the last mile rather than establishing their own proprietary distribution systems. For Darbouco, roughly 20% of seed sold goes to institutional buyers like NGOs, and 80% primarily address individual farmers’ needs through networks of intermediaries. Many ad-hoc seed businesses exist to respond to NGO and institutional buyer needs but do not serve farmers as part of their business model. These businesses start up when there is a large request for seed but don’t operate between donor funding cycles. Working with both Haitian government and other institutional buyers, these local seed entrepreneurs tend to purchase seed from informal markets but often sell the seed as certified. Private companies stated that they have had few successful NGO collaborations, as they tend to be short lived. There have been successful examples of public-private partnerships with public universities in Haiti. Haitian companies like Acceso, Etoile du Nord, and BRANA/Heineken work with contracted outgrowers to produce seed, while Quisqueya University helps select the best varieties. This makes improved varieties accessible, and the private companies are able to pay a premium. Social enterprise Acceso works with farmers to link them with input and output markets, especially for beans and peanuts, and works to create local processing centers that employ women. Etoile du Nord is a grain elevator and processor of sorghum that works closely with BRANA/Heineken to source sorghum for their beverage products and both have collaborated to connect farmers with high quality sorghum seeds. No youth-specific collaborations with private sector actors were found. One of the main challenges facing formal seed companies is the low storage quality at rural agrodealers. The large seed companies can invest in quality storage infrastructure but they cannot guarantee the quality to the final customer because of the various ways the seed is stored along the supply chain. Security conditions in Haiti are also a challenge for seed companies, as roads are often controlled by different gangs making transport across the country dangerous. While these security risks are often borne by the intermediaries including Madam Saras, they impact the ability of seed companies to reach rural consumers. These insecure conditions often translate into higher prices for customers when goods reach the market. The COVID-19 pandemic has also disrupted the seed markets in unexpected ways as US seed suppliers have had shipping delays and challenges meeting orders. Californian seed producers in particular faced water shortages, whic