Portrait standard des données DRG du pays sur Haïti

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Laura Maxwell and Valeriya Mechkova, University of Gothenburg, and Brigitte Seim, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, under a subcontract with NORC at the University of Chicago. The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. STANDARD DRG COUNTRY DATA PORTRAIT ON HAITI DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DRG-LER) ACTIVITY II Prepared under Contract No.: GS-10F-0033M / 7200AA18M00016, Tasking N009 DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DRG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009 STANDARD COUNTRY PORTRAIT HAITI (APRIL 2019) Prepared under Contract No.: GS-10F-0033M/ 7200AA18M00016 Submitted to: Brandy Witthoft Prepared by: Laura Maxwell, University of Gothenburg Valeriya Mechkova, University of Gothenburg Brigitte Seim, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Submitted by: NORC at the University of Chicago 4350 East West Highway, 8th Floor Bethesda, MD 20814 Attention: Renée Hendley Tel: 301- 634-9489; E-mail: Hendley-Renee@norc.org DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | I TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... IV EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 3 I. DRG STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK ......................................................... 4 CONSENSUS ............................................................................................................................................ 4 INCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................. 6 COMPETITION AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY . .......................................................... 11 RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS ........................................................................................ 15 GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS .................................................... 20 II. KEY ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS .......................................................................... 25 III. FINANCING SELF-RELIANCE METRICS ................................................................... 38 DOMESTIC REVENUE MOBILIZATION (DRM) .......................................................................... 38 PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (PFM) ............................................................................... 40 DOMESTIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND FISCAL TRANSPARENCY ....................................... 41 ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT .................................................... 43 FULLY FUNCTIONING FINANCIAL MARKETS ......................................................................... 45 IV. POSSIBLE ENTRY POINTS FOR DRG STRATEGY AND PROGRAMMING ... 47 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 50 APPENDIX A, VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY (V-DEM) PROJECT ........................... 51 KEY FEATURES OF V-DEM: .............................................................................................................. 51 THE V-DEM DATABASE ..................................................................................................................... 51 THE V-DEM TEAM ............................................................................................................................... 51 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................ 52 RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS .................................................................................................. 52 V-DEM DEMOCRACY NETWORK ................................................................................................ 52 FUNDING ............................................................................................................................................... 53 APPENDIX B, INDICATORS AND INDICES FEATURED IN THE REPORT ......... 54 APPENDIX C, REFERENCES .............................................................................................. 55 USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | II LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Deliberative component index, Trends 1990 – 2017 ................................................................ 5 Figure 2. Deliberative components, Haiti v. Low income countries - 2017 .......................................... 5 Figure 3. Political power distribution by groups, Trends 1990-2017 .................................................... 7 Figure 4. Political power distribution, Haiti v. Low income countries - 2017 ...................................... 8 Figure 5. Women’s political empowerment, Trends 1990-2017, Part 1 ................................................ 8 Figure 6. Women’s political empowerment, Trends 1990-2017, Part 1I . .............................................. 9 Figure 7. Women’s political empowerment, Haiti v. Low income countries - 2017 ........................ 10 Figure 8. Representation of disadvantaged social groups, Trends 1990-2017 .................................... 11 Figure 9. Electoral democracy index, Trends 1990 – 2017 ..................................................................... 13 Figure 10. Electoral democracy index, Haiti v. Low income countries- 2017 ....................................... 14 Figure 11. Diagonal accountability and its components, Trends 1990-2017 ......................................... 14 Figure 12. Candidate restrictions and political party linkages. 1990-2017 ............................................. 15 Figure 13. Rule of law and Judiciary independence, Trends 1990 - 2017 ............................................... 17 Figure 14. Rule of law, Trends 1990-2017 ..................................................................................................... 18 Figure 15. Rule of law, Haiti vs. Low Income countries - 2017 ................................................................ 19 Figure 16. Civil liberties index, Trends 1990 - 2017 ................................................................................... 20 Figure 17. Civil Liberties, Haiti vs. Low income countries - 2017 ........................................................... 20 Figure 18. Equal distribution of resources, Trends 1990 - 2017 ............................................................. 22 Figure 19. Equal distribution of resources, Haiti vs. Low income countries - 2017 ............................ 23 Figure 20. Horizontal accountability index, Trend 1990 – 2017 .............................................................. 23 Figure 21. Political corruption index, Trends 1990 - 2017 ........................................................................ 24 Figure 22. Political corruption, Haiti vs. Low income countries - 2017 ................................................. 24 Figure 23. Commitment to separation of power, Haiti v. Low income countries, 2017 ................... 27 Figure 24. Branches of government, Haiti v. Low income countries - 2017 ......................................... 27 Figure 25. Branches of government, Haiti v. Low income countries - 2017 ......................................... 28 Figure 26. Local and Regional government elected, Trends 1990-2017 ................................................. 30 Figure 27: Commitment to Party System Competition, Trends 1990-2017 ......................................... 31 Figure 28. Party system institutionalization, Trends 1990-2017 ............................................................... 32 Figure 29. Party system institutionalization, Haiti v. Low income countries - 2017 ............................ 32 Figure 30. Civil Society Capacity and Commitment, Trends 1990-2017 ............................................... 33 Figure 31. Freedom of expression, Trends 1990-2017 ............................................................................... 34 Figure 32. Freedom of expression, Haiti v. Low income countries - 2017 ............................................ 35 Figure 33. State ownership of the economy, Trends 1990-2017 ............................................................. 36 Figure 34. Autonomy of the state, Trends 1990-2017 ............................................................................... 37 Figure 35. Sources of Domestic Revenue, Trend 1990-2017 ................................................................... 39 Figure 36. Value added by Sector, Trend 1990-2017 .................................................................................. 40 Figure 37. Inflation in Haiti, Trends 1990 - 2018 . ......................................................................................... 41 Figure 38. Corruption Perceptions Index, Trends 1998-2016 .................................................................. 43 Figure 39. Economic Freedom Index, Trends 1990-2017 .......................................................................... 45 USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | III LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Commitment and capacity for the key actors and institutions in Haiti ............................... 25 Table 2. Goal Indicator: Government Censorship Effort – Media Relative to Region: World Contingent on Indicators: Civil Society ...................................................................................... 47 Table 3. Goal Indicator: High Court Independence Relative to Region: World Contingent on Indicators: Elections ............................................................................................. 48 USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | IV LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CSO Civil Society Organization DRG Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance DRM Domestic revenue mobilization FH Freedom House FSR Financial Self Reliance GDP Gross Domestic Product IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature JSR Journey to Self-Reliance PFM Public Financial Management PPP Purchasing Power Parity SAF Strategic Assessment Framework SES Socio-Economic Status UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization V- Dem Varieties of Democracy WB World Bank WB WDI World Bank World Development Indicators WHO World Health Organization USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This paper offers an overview of key developments in democracy and governance in Haiti since 1990, with a particular emphasis on current levels. We discuss changes over time in Haiti and identify main features of democracy, human rights and governance that are performing well and need improvement compared to other countries in the same income class as Haiti, drawing on data from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem). This exercise yields several interesting patterns, outlined below based on the components of the DRG assessment framework. Main Findings: • Consensus. While many of Haiti’s indicators of deliberation improved markedly during the 1990s , the recent regression in the respect for counterarguments and the range of consultation when policy changes are being considered has ensured that Haiti significantly underperforms compared t o the average among its peers. • Inclusion. Women, disadvantaged socioeconomic groups, the LGBTQ population, and disadvantaged social groups are heavily excluded from political power distribution. Although Haiti has quite high scores for indicators related to women’s rights and freedoms, women remain very underrepresented in journalism and government. • Competition and Accountability. Haiti performs approximately at or above the average among other low income countries on all components of the electoral democracy index, and the country has seen steady improvement in indicators related to diagonal accountability. • Rule of Law. Haiti has struggled to improve the strength of its rule of law, and consequently, the country is underperforming compared to its peers on all components examined, especially within the area of judicial accountability. • Government responsiveness and effectiveness. Haiti has seen very little progress in reducing corrup tio n, and the country is below the average among low income countries on all indicators of politi cal corruption, and is particularly poor performing in public sector corruption. • The analysis of commitment and capacity of key actors 1 (e.g., executive, legislature, judiciary political parties, civil society, and media) shows that Haiti scores medium-to-high on all measures for commitment. However, the country’s capacity across actors and institutions is mostly at medium and low levels—only the capacity of the media is evaluated to be high. Using the “Low Hanging Fruit” tool, we compare democratic development of Haiti to that of other countries, to identify which are the best points of entry (indicators that should be improved) to reach the highest score on three chosen indices. To reach the maximum score on the indicator for government censorship of the media, Haiti should improve the measure related to CSO consultation. For the measure of high court independence compliance with the judiciary, possible points of entry 1 Country commitment relates to the extent to which a country’s legal framework, policies, and norms enable the country to solve its own development challenges, while country capacity relates to how far a country has come in its journey to work across these sectors. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 2 come from the election survey such as election turnout, free and fair elections, election boycotts, election vote buying, and EMB autonomy. Main Findings: Haiti compared to low income countries - 2017 USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 3 INTRODUCTION The goal of the report is to showcase the progress Haiti has made in democratic governance and on its Journey to Self-Reliance, drawing primarily on data from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem), World Bank and other publicly available metrics in order to support USAID strategy and program development. 2 Present are visual summaries of democratic development and governance outcomes in total from more than 70 different indicators. Where data is available, line graphs start in1990 and end in 2017. 3 The standard data portrait includes four sections: • metrics aligned with elements of USAID’s Strategic Assessment Framework (SAF) for the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) sector; • key actors and institution that drive changes in the above areas; • financing self-reliance (FSR) metrics; • possible entry points for DRG strategy and programming. We hope that this comprehensive list of indicators will be useful to paint a picture of the past and current status of democratic development in Haiti, and will serve as useful tool to identify opportunities and risks for future strategies and plans. 2 The full list of sources, indicators’ questions and responses is (will be ) available in the Appendix. 3 Data for 2018 will be available by May 2019. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 4 I. DRG STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK Following are select indicators that respond to each of the five elements of DRG identified by the Strategic Assessment Framework as foundational to democratic development. CONSENSUS The first element of the framework focuses on the extent to which there is basic consensus on questions of national identity, historical narrative, and fundamental rules of the political game. We use the following measures to capture this: • Deliberative component index, which includes the following components: – Respect counterarguments: when important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments? – Range of consultation: when important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at elite levels? – Engaged society: when important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations? – Media Perspectives: do the major print and broadcast media outlets represent a wide range of political perspectives? • Polarization of society and fractionalization of media (available in May). USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 5 Figure 1. Deliberative component index, Trends 1990 – 2017 Haiti’s Deliberative Component Index and its measures of societal engagement and respect for counterarguments steeply improved in the mid-1990s. After remaining stable at a moderate level for almost two decades, though, these three indicators all significantly regressed after 2012, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 2. Deliberative components, Haiti v. Low income countries 4 - 2017 Figure 2 places Haiti in the context of other low income countries in 2017. The large blue dot represents Haiti, while the grey dots are all other countries and the vertical dashed line is the mean 4 Low income countries are based on the World Bank income class definitions in 2018. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 6 value within this income class. Haiti slightly out-performs the average low income class country in indicators for media perspectives and societal engagement. However, Haiti underperforms the average on the measurement of reasoned justification by the country’s political elites, and it is even further below the average on its respect for counterarguments and its range of consultation at elite levels during policy consideration. INCLUSION This chapter focuses on issues related to exclusion and discrimination of specific groups. Are parts of the population formally or informally excluded and disenfranchised from meaningful political, social, or economic participation, influence, or leadership? We use the following measures from the V-Dem data set: • Equality of political power distribution by group. These four indicators pertain to political equality, that is, the extent to which members of a polity possess equal political power. It does not refer to the inevitable differentiation in power that occurs in all large societies between those who hold positions of power within the state (political elites) and lay citizens. It is, rather, about the distribution of political power among identifiable groups within the population. – Gender – Socioeconomic position – Social groups. Note: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status. – Sexual orientation • Female political empowerment, which consists of the following indicators: – Access to justice for women: do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice? – Freedom from slavery for women: are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor? – Women’s civil society participation: do women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups? – Freedom of discussion for women: are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? – Freedom of movement for women: do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country? – Women’s property rights: do women enjoy the right to private property? – Proportion of the legislature that is female USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 7 – Proportion of journalists that are female – Equality of political power distribution based on gender: (See above) • What is the level of suffrage practiced? • Representation of disadvantaged social groups: considering those social groups that are disadvantaged based on socioeconomic position, how well represented are these groups, as a whole, in the national legislature? Figure 3. Political power distribution by groups, Trends 1990-2017 Exclusion can come in many forms, but Figure 3 highlights the ways in which segments of the population are included or excluded from political power. People from lower socioeconomic backgrounds went through rapid swings in their inclusion, with this indicator more than recovering from a steep decline in the early 1990s. Subsequently in the mid-2000s, Haiti began to exclude this group even more severely than in 1990. Other groups remained consistently excluded during the period, although this is recently worsening for women and disadvantaged social groups. Figure 4 displays that power distributed by social group, socio-economic status and gender are currently below average for Haiti when compared to other low income countries. The indicator for inclusion of social groups is the furthest below average, although the LGBT community has been the most excluded in an absolute sense since 1990. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 8 Figure 4. Political power distribution, Haiti v. Low income countries - 2017 Figure 5. Women’s political empowerment, Trends 1990-2017, Part 1 USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 9 Figure 6. Women’s political empowerment, Trends 1990-2017, Part 1I Figure 5 and Figure 6 depict, on the whole, little progress across measures of women’s political empowerment. The only indicators not to suffer at least a slight decline in the last five years are women’s freedom from slavery and property rights, although even the latter has slightly fallen in the past year. Notably, the percentage of female legislators has been consistently below 10 percent with few exceptions, and women’s access to justice is significantly lower than other indicators of female political freedom. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 10 Figure 7. Women’s political empowerment, Haiti v. Low income countries - 2017 Comparing the levels of the features of women’s political empowerment index in Haiti with all other low income countries in 2017 (Figure 7), we see that Haiti is performing above average on more indicators than not. On property rights, Haiti is the furthest above the average for low income countries, while the country is below average on the percentage of female journalists, women’s participation in civil society organizations, and women’s access to justice. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 11 Figure 8. Representation of disadvantaged social groups, Trends 1990-2017 Figure 8 shows that there has been no change in the low representation of disadvantaged groups throughout the period for which data exists. COMPETITION AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY The third component of the SAF framework focuses on competition in the political system. In particular, this section describes the quality of elections, and other mechanisms that ensure the government delivers on its promises. The section also looks at whether there is competition of ideas, a free media, and a vibrant civil society. In other words, does the state broadly provide for adequate political rights and civil liberties? Is a healthy set of checks and balances present between branches of government or between levels of government? To measure these aspects of the political system we use the following indicators: • V-Dem electoral democracy index, which consists of the following sub-indicators: – Free and fair elections: Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence. – Elected officials index: are the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections? USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 12 – Freedom of association: to what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely? – Freedom of expression: to what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression? – Suffrage: what share of adult citizens as defined by statute has the legal right to vote in national elections? • Diagonal accountability Subindicators: – Core civil society index: to what extent is civil society robust? Understood as a civil society that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived. – Freedom of expression: to what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression? • Candidate restrictions: To what extent are candidates restricted to run for office based on ethnicity, race, religion, or language. • Party Linkages: Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents (particularistic vs. programmatic)? USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 13 Figure 9. Electoral democracy index, Trends 1990 – 2017 Based on Figure 9, there has been slight improvement in the components of electoral democracy during the period despite many bumps in the road. The elected officials index shows that popular elections were not used to appoint the chief executive and legislature in the periods of 1990-1991 and 2004-2005, but outside of these brief windows, the indicator has been consistently at 1. Almost all indicators declined for a few years in the mid-2000s, associated with a coup that ousted the popularly elected president until new elections in 2006. However, all indicators (other than suffrage, which has been fully guaranteed for the entire period) are higher today than they were in 1990. Compared to other low income countries, Haiti performs quite well. The country is above average on all indicators except that for free and fair elections, for which Haiti is just slightly below the mean (Figure 10). USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 14 Figure 10. Electoral democracy index, Haiti v. Low income countries- 2017 Delving deeper into the features of competition and accountability, Figure 11 and Figure 12 demonstrate Haiti’s gradual improvement. Figure 11 shows that all three indicators suffered a steep decline in the early 1990s, and the core civil accountability index similarly collapsed about a decade later. However, each indicator has recovered, rising to about 0.8 or higher. Meanwhile, Figure 12 documents that candidate restrictions have stayed nonexistent for the entire period. It is a concern, though, that parties continue to concentrate on providing clientelis t gifts to attract support rather than by relying on party platforms, and the indicator for party linkages has fallen since 2009. Figure 11. Diagonal accountability and its components, Trends 1990-2017 USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 15 Figure 12. Candidate restrictions and political party linkages. 1990-2017 RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS The fourth section focuses on the broad question whether political, economic, and social life is bound by a rule of law. Does the government apply the law equitably to all citizens, including historically marginalized and oppressed groups and individuals? Does it hold itself accountable for adhering to the rule of law? Does the law incorporate fundamental human rights and civil liberties? Does the government enforce, protect, and promote those rights? The following indicators are used in the analysis: • Rule of law index and the following components 5 : – High court independence: When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, does it make decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record, or does it act independently? – Lower court independence: When judges not on the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, does it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record, or does it act independently? 5 Some components are omitted to reduce repetition of indicators throughout the report USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 16 – Compliance with the judiciary: How often the government complies with important decisions of any court with which it disagrees – Compliance with the high court: How often the government complies with important decisions of the high court with which it disagrees. – Judicial accountability: When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined? – Access to justice for women: Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice? – Access to justice for men: Do men enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice? – Executive respects the constitution: Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution? – Impartial public administration: Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties? – Transparent laws and enforcement of the law: Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner? • Civil liberties index and its sub-indices: – Political civil liberties index: To what extent are political liberties respected? Political liberties are understood as freedom of association and freedom of expression – Physical violence index: To what extent is physical integrity respected? Physical integrity is understood as freedom from political killings and torture by the government. – Private civil liberties index: To what extent are private liberties respected? Private liberties are understood as freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom from forced labor, and property rights. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 17 Figure 13. Rule of law and Judiciary independence, Trends 1990 - 2017 USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 18 Figure 14. Rule of law, Trends 1990-2017 The state of the rule of law has stagnated of late in Haiti, as shown in Figure 13 and Figure 14 . Despite large improvement during the early 1990s, most indicators in both figures have since been on a trend of slight regression. In particular, the high court’s independence improved markedly between 1994 and 2003, this reversed in 2004 as a coup took down the country’s government. Although the indicator recovered partially, this was exceeded by a subsequent decrease. Overall, both figures point to concerning developments for rule of law in Haiti. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 19 Figure 15. Rule of law, Haiti vs. Low Income countries - 2017 Figure 15 indicates that indicators for the strength of Haiti’s rule of law are below average across the board compared to other low income countries. Compliance with the high court is furthest below the average, while the transparency of laws and enforcement and the impartiality of public administration are closest to the average. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 20 Figure 16. Civil liberties index, Trends 1990 - 2017 Figure 16 displays, in general, a slow improvement in civil liberties after a sharp improvement in the mid- 1990s. The physical violence index, civil liberties index, and private civil liberties index all fell during the mid-2000s, corresponding with Haiti’s political turmoil, but interestingly, political civil liberties rose during the same time. In the last year, these indicators have all dipped, a worrying trend. Based on their scores in 2017, Haiti is above average in all three indicators shown in Figure 17, most notably in political civil liberties and the physical violence index. Figure 17. Civil Liberties, Haiti vs. Low income countries - 2017 GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS The last pillar of the SAF framework focuses on the extent to which public institutions respond to public needs and provide socially acceptable services. Do those services reach all citizens equally or do certain groups or populations face barriers to accessing services? Do mechanisms exist for all citizens to USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 21 provide constructive feedback on government performance? Do robust internal mechanisms exist to hold government institutions accountable and guard against poor performance, fraud, and waste, as well as violations of human rights? We provide the following operationalization: • Equal distribution of resources index Components: – Educational equality: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens? – Health equality: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens? – Encompassingness: Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how "particularistic" or "public goods" are most expenditures? – Means-tested vs. universalistic: How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity? • Horizontal accountability Components: – Executive oversight: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report? – Legislature investigates in practice: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive? • Clientelism Index: to what extent are politics based on clientelistic relationships? • Political corruption index Components: – Judicial corruption: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision? – Public sector corruption: To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 22 – Executive corruption: How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? – Legislative corruption: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain? Figure 18. Equal distribution of resources, Trends 1990 - 2017 Figure 18 displays an interesting divergence recently in Haiti’s welfare program distribution. Programs have consistently become more encompassing, especially since 2012. All other indicators have remained mostly flat during the period, followed by a steep decline between 2012 and 2013. Only the equal distribution of resources index has seen a slight recovery, but every indicator save for encompassing remains very low. Compared to its peers, Haiti is significantly below average on most indicators, shown in Figure 19. However, Haiti’s expenditures lean slightly more toward “public goods” than those of other low income countries. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 23 Figure 19. Equal distribution of resources, Haiti vs. Low income countries - 2017 Figure 20. Horizontal accountability index, Trend 1990 – 2017 USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 24 Figure 21. Political corruption index, Trends 1990 - 2017 Figure 20 and Figure 21 show some slight progress in executive corruption, executive oversight, and the ability of the legislature to investigate in practice. Mostly, though, the indicators have remained flat. Interestingly, horizontal accountability collapsed during the political turmoil of the mid-2000s. It has since mostly recovered, but the horizontal accountability index has been on a slow downward trajectory in recent years. Figure 22. Political corruption, Haiti vs. Low income countries - 2017 Figure 22 indicates that across all divisions of government, Haiti is underperforming in corruption compared to other low income countries. The country performs best in judicial corruption, both absolutely and relatively to the average, though it is still below average. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 25 II. KEY ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS The framework identifies the following key actors and institutions that drive the changes in the governance areas used in SAF: executive, legislature, judiciary and legal professionals, national human rights institutions; security services; local governments, political parties and electoral institutions, civil society, media, key population groups, and international and global actors. Where that was possible, we have divided the indicators into country commitment and capacity. More specifically, country commitment relates to the extent to which a country’s legal framework, policies, actions, behaviors, and informal governance mechanisms—such as cultures and norms—enable the country to create and strengthen the institutions in order to solve its own development challenges. Country capacity, on the other hand, relates to how far a country has come in its journey across the dimensions of political, social and economic development, including the ability to work across these sectors. Table 1. Commitment and capacity for the key actors and institutions in Haiti • The Executive; – Commitment:  Is the executive elected?  Executive elections multiparty: the elections for the executive allow for meaningful competition between several parties. – Capacity:  Executive election free and fair: to what extent are elections for the executive free from irregularities?  Executive respects constitution: Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?  Executive bribes: How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements? ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS COMMITMENT CAPACITY Executive High Low Legislative High Medium Judiciary Medium Medium Media Medium High Civil Society High Low Political parties and Electoral Management Body High Low USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 26  Executive embezzlement: How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? • The Legislature; – Commitment:  Is there elected legislature in place?  Legislative elections multiparty: the elections for the executive allow for meaningful competition between several parties  Legislature controls its own resources  Legislature questions officials by law  Propose legislation by law – Capacity:  Legislative election free and fair: to what extent are elections for the executive free from irregularities?  Legislature corruption: do members of the executive abuse their power for financial gains?  Lower chamber legislates in practice: in practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation  Legislature investigates in practice • The Judiciary and Legal Professionals; – Commitment:  Type of courts (see measure from Comparative constitution project, specifying the existence of different types of courts)  Government attacks on judiciary: Frequency of government attack the judiciary’s integrity – Capacity:  Judicial reform: Were the judiciary’s formal powers altered this year in ways that affect its ability to control the arbitrary use of state authority?  Judicial purges: are judges removed from their positions arbitrarily or for political reasons? USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 27 Figure 23. Commitment to separation of power, Haiti v. Low income countries, 2017 Figure 24. Branches of government, Haiti v. Low income countries - 2017 Figure 23 shows that Haiti mostly outperforms other low income countries when it comes to its commitment to separation of powers. Although the indicator of government attacks on the judiciary is below average, Haiti’s legislature questions officials at a far higher rate than the country’s peers. However, the indicators in Figure 24 are almost all below average. Haiti’s legislature investigates the executive at an average rate, but the country underperforms significantly in all other indicators, especially compliance with rulings of the high court. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 28 Figure 25. Branches of government, Haiti v. Low income countries - 2017 On all indicators in Figure 25 except for the legislature’s ability to pass laws in practice, Haiti is below average compared to its peer group. While the country is very close to the mean for judicial reform and the rate of executive bribes, Haiti is far below average on the indicator of judicial purges. In fact, Haiti is in the bottom four of low income countries regarding its performance on this indicator. • National Human Rights Institutions; – Commitment:  Is there freedom of religion? – Capacity:  Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice?  Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice? • Security Services (including the Military, Police, and Intelligence Services); – Commitment:  Is there freedom from torture?  Is there freedom from political killings?  Did the country participate in an international armed conflict? USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 29  Did the country experience an internal armed conflict? – Capacity:  Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do?  Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position? • Local and Regional Government; – Local government index:  Commitment: Are there elected local governments;  Capacity: to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level? – Regional government index:  Commitment: Are there elected regional governments;  Capacity: to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level? USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 30 Figure 26. Local and Regional government elected, Trends 1990-2017 Figure 26 demonstrates improvements to indicators of Haiti’s commitment to election local and regional officials and these governments’ ability to act independently of the central government. There has been little progress since the late 1990s, but both indicators remain quite high. • Political Parties and Electoral Institutions; – Commitment:  Party ban – Capacity:  Party institutionalization index: To what extent are political parties institutionalized? This refers to various attributes of the political parties in a country, e.g., level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature. ○ Party Organization: level and depth of organization ○ Party Linkages: links to civil society (clientelistic or programmatic) ○ Party Branches: local party branches are common ○ Party Platforms: coherence of party platforms and ideologies ○ Legislative Cohesion: party-line voting among representatives within the legislature. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 31  EMB autonomy  EMB capacity Figure 27: Commitment to Party System Competition, Trends 1990-2017 As shown by Figure 27, Haiti’s commitment to robust party competition has stayed strong throughout the period, augmented by a recent reduction in party bans and barriers. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 32 Figure 28. Party system institutionalization, Trends 1990-2017 Indicators of party system institutionalization in Figure 28 have fallen in the last five years after decades of relative stability. While, during the period, local party branches have become more common and party platforms have become more coherent, all other indicators are worse today than they were 27 years ago. Meanwhile, Figure 29 shows that Haiti performs below average on all indicators, with the greatest underperformance taking place on coherence of party platforms (in spite of its historical improvement) and the measure of legislative cohesion. Figure 29. Party system institutionalization, Haiti v. Low income countries - 2017 USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 33 • Civil Society; – Commitment:  CSO participatory environment: to what extent diverse CSOs exist and people participate actively in them.  CSO entry and exit: To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?  CSO repression: does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations? – Capacity:  CSO consultation: to what extent major civil society organizations (CSOs) are routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members Figure 30. Civil Society Capacity and Commitment, Trends 1990-2017 Figure 30 illustrates that Haiti’s indicators for civil society participation have been wide-ranging and inconsistent. The Civil society participation index and the measure of CSO consultation both recovered from sharp drop-offs during the mid-1990s, but only the former is higher in 2017 than it was in 1990. The CSO participatory environment is also worse in 2017 than in 1990, but the trend since the turn of the century is one of gradual improvement. However, candidate selection at the national and local levels has become far less democratic since 2012. USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DLG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: HAITI | 34 • Media: – Commitment:  Harassment of journalists  Government censorship of the media – Capacity:  Freedom of discussion - men  Freedom of discussion - women 