Finansman piblik edikasyon an Ayiti, 2010-2018

December 2018 This publication was prepared by SSG Advisors d.b.a. Resonance for the United States Agency for International Development. PUBLIC FINANCING OF EDUCATION IN HAITI 2010-2018 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development by SSG Advisors d.b.a. Resonance through USAID Contract # AID-OAA-M-14-00024. This report was prepared by: Resonance 1 Mill Street, Suite 201 Burlington, VT 05401 Resonance Contact: Carrie Conway Project Director Tel: (802) 735-1169 Email: cconway@resonanceglobal.com Public Financing of Education in Haiti, 2010-2018 INDEPENDENT REPORT December 2018 DISCLAIMER The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. Table of Contents Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................................................................. i Acronyms............................................................................................................................................................................. ii I. Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................................ 1 II. Context and background of the sector ................................................................................................................... 4 III. Strategic Education Sector Documents of the GoH ........................................................................................... 7 IV. GoH Budgetary Allocations & Spending ................................................................................................................ 9 V. Donor/NGO Budgets & Support ............................................................................................................................ 17 VI. Private and family funding of education ................................................................................................................ 24 VII. GoH programming: Universal, Free, and Obligatory Education Program (PSUGO) .............................. 26 VIII. Haitian Government Funds: The National Education Fund .......................................................................... 30 IX. Recommendations .................................................................................................................................................... 33 X. References ................................................................................................................................................................... 35 XI. Annexes ....................................................................................................................................................................... 37 Annex I. MENFP Organization chart ...................................................................................................................... 37 Annex 2. Interview guides ......................................................................................................................................... 38 Annex 3. List of Interviewees ................................................................................................................................ ... 39 Annex 4. Supplemental Statistics ............................................................................................................................. 59 Annex 5. List of Programs & Projects of PIP-Education, 2009-2018 .............................................................. 49 Annex 6. List of the 20 Members of the GSE ...................................................................................................... 54 Annex 7. Exchange Rates (HTG/USD) .................................................................................................................. 55 i Acknowledgments Special thanks to Ms. Christine Veverka (Education Office Chief, USAID/Haiti) who, in proposing this study, permitted a look at the Haitian education sector in a new light, to increase available knowledge, and to contribute to improving the efficiency of public spending. Additional thanks to the former and current State authorities whom were interviewed and who permitted a better understanding of the more complex questions dealt with here. Carl Henry Joseph (UEP/MENFP), Valdéma Eliezer (Dignité, Transport scolaire), Jean Jacques Jean Bouco (MEF), Pierre André Agélus (BRH), and Romuald Piard (Dignité-Transport Scolaire) facilitated the collection of important information and materials for analysis. Jean Bob Aty Noza (StecmaConsulting) helped with the compilation of a variety of materials for the study. The first draft of the study benefited from the comments of Jean Armand Mondélis, Creutzer Mathurin, Daniel Dorsainvil, Joël D. Jean Pierre and Vanneur Pierre. Finally, special thanks to Sergot Jacob, an independent consultant, for contributing to the technical research and content of this report. ii Acronyms BDS Bureau de District Scolaire; School District Office BIZ Bureau d’Inspection de Zone; Office of Zone Inspection BM Banque Mondiale; World Bank BNC Banque Nationale de Crédit; National Credit Bank BRH Banque de la République d’Haïti; Bank of the Haitian Republic CCI Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire ; Interim Cooperation Framework CDMT Cadre des Dépenses à Moyen Terme; Medium Term Spending Framework CONATEL Conseil National des Télécommunications; National Telecommunications Council CSCCA Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif; High Court of Accounts and Administrative Litigation DAA Directions des Affaires Administratives; Administrative Affairs Directorates DAEPP Direction de l’Appui à l’Enseignement privé et au Partenariat; Directorate for Support to Private Education and Partnerships DDE Directions Départementales d’ É ducation; Departmental Directorates for Education DPCE Direction de la Planification et de la Coop é ration Externe; Directorate of Planning and External Cooperation ECVMAS Enquête sur les conditions de vie après le séisme; Investigation of Living Conditions After the Earthquake EPT É ducation pour tous; Education For All FNE Fonds National pour l’ É ducation; National Fund for Education GDP Produit Intérieur Brut; Gross Domestic Product GSE Groupe Sectoriel éducation; Education Sector Group GTEF Groupe de Travail sur l’ É ducation et la Formation; Working Group on Education and Training HTG Gourde Haïtienne; Haitian Gourde IHSI Institut Haïtien de Statistique et Informatique; Haitian Institute for Statistics and Information IMOA Initiative de Mise en Oeuvre Accélérée; Accelerated Implementation Initiative INFP Institut National de la Formation Professionnelle; National Institute for Vocational Training MEF Ministère de l’ É conomie et des Finances; Ministry of Economy and Finance MENFP Ministère de l’ É ducation Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle; Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training MPCE Ministère de le Planification et de la Coopération Externe; Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation NGO Organisation non-gouvernementale; Non-Governmental Organization ONAPE Office National de Partenariat en É ducation; National Office of Education Partnerships PDEF Plan Décennal d’ É ducation et de Formation; Decennial Education and Training Plan PIP Programme d’investissement public; Public Investment Program PNEF Plan National d’ É ducation et de Formation; National Education and iii Training Plan PO Plan Opérationnel; Operational Plan PRONEC Programme de nationalisation des écoles communautaires; Community School Nationalization Program PSDH Plan stratégique de développement d’Haïti; Strategic Haitian Development Plan PSUGO Programme de Scolarisation Universelle Gratuite et Obligatoire; Universal, Free, and Obligatory Schooling Program PTF Partenaire Technique et Financier; Technical and Financial Partner SNA-EPT Stratégie Nationale d’Action- É ducation pour Tous; National Action Strategy- Education For All TCA Taxe sur le Chiffre d’Affaires; Sales Tax UEP Unité d’ É tude et de Programmation (MENFP); Study and Programming Unit (of the MENFP) UNESCO Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'éducation, la science et la culture; UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization UNICEF Fonds des Nations Unies pour l’enfance; United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund UPR Universités publiques en région; Regional Public Universities USAID Agence des États-Unis pour le Développement International; U.S. Agency for International Development USD Dollars américains; American Dollars 1 I. Executive Summary Haiti finds itself at a crossroads; public spending on education is crucial for socioeconomic development as the benefits touch not only private but also social sectors that are fundamental for democracy and social cohesion. In Haiti today, one of the most important needs is qualified human capital/resources in the education sector. However, the current system has considerable room for improvement in order to provide sufficient human capital. The most pressing human resource challenges include: reaching and retaining qualified teaching staff, good governance, and a strong connection between primary and secondary education. These factors combined limit Haiti’s overall development. The Ministry of National Education and Professional Training ( le Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle ; MENFP) is engaged in the preparation of a new plan conceived to identify and improve actions in the sector for the next ten years (2017-2027, see Annex I for an organization chart of the MENFP). This study estimates $435.35 million dollars (USD) has been spent annually in education and training via the MENFP and other government ministries from 2010-2018. 1 As the study will further show, the investment of donors and the government is important; $935 million USD is the cumulative investment of donors in the basic education during the period analyzed. Education is a crucial component of the general government budget (more than 15% of the budget since 2015) and of the social sector (68.8% during the analyzed period). Diverse actors are implicated, including 20 donors (spending on average some 103.8 million USD per year, about 5.19 million USD annually per donor) and about 205 national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), churches, foundations, and associations. 2 The MENFP budget mobilizes 369 million USD annually, of which 73.7% is for the Fundamental I and II levels of education (i.e. basic education). 3 However, without improvement of the general governance of the system, the road these programs could travel could be arduous. Administrative costs dominate domestic spending to the point where investment in this subsector is mainly based (at about 70.7%) on programs and projects funded by technical and financial partners ( partenaire technique et financier ; PTF). Since the 2010 earthquake, the financial investment in basic education amounts to $1.4 billion USD ($157 million annually), of which only 29.33% comes from domestic resources. Administrative costs therefore absorb more than half of the resources dedicated to the sector, leaving few internal avenues for investments in quality (e.g. teacher training or modern teaching materials). These aspects are thus related to cooperation projects; since 2012 a decline in external aid has led to a corollary decline in investment expenditures in the education sector. Although diverse actors have implemented numerous initiatives in the country, their impact is unclear. The areas that are most important for the development of the education sector and rapid economic development (e.g. governance of the education sector, technical and professional training, and higher education) are underfinanced. They received 12%, 4%, and 2%, respectively, of the funding between 2010 and 2015. If higher education/institutions were better equipped to train the teachers of primary education and the education system itself was better governed, then the efforts dedicated to improving 1 The government budget for 2017-18 is available on the website of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). Additional information on the 2017-18 budget for the MENFP can be found in Annex 4 of this study (Figure A.16 and Table A.17). 2 Financial statistics for the types of associations aren’t available as they are not part of the general budget of the republic, but they are nonetheless an important source of financial resources in the education sector. 3 When we consider the sources outside of the MENFP, education and training activities total more than 435 million USD annually. 2 the quality of education would render the system more cost efficient and effective in terms of improving human capital. The education sector appears to be the most precisely planned of all the public sectors as it benefits, at least, from a medium-term plan which gives a strategic action framework (see Chapter III of this report). While the Strategic Plan for the Development of Haiti ( le Plan stratégique de développement d’Haïti ; PSDH) envisions an emergent Haiti in 2030, the education system in a broader sense has not yet demonstrated quality, relevance, or sufficient access, to diversify the structure of the economy, or the gains in productivity and competitiveness that this emergence would entail. The country still relies heavily on imported expertise for these development activities in a country where experts are available locally and could further refine their skills. Recently there have been changes in the education system. This report shows that since the implementation of the universal, free, and obligatory education program (Programme de scolarisation universelle gratuite et obligatoire; PSUGO, referred to as “Children’s schooling program”), the State has put in place multiple funding mechanisms to support this system. Approved in Parliament in June 2017, the law on the National Education Fund (le Fonds National pour l’Éducation; FNE) included 24 fiscal schemes, which were intended to enable the system to be less dependent on external resources to finance the PSUGO 4 . Government resources comprise a majority of basic education spending in Haiti (76.14%). However, the system does not yet produce the human capital necessary to reach the achievements envisioned by the PSDH. Currently, only 15% of teachers hold the necessary qualifications required for their jobs. Higher education does not train, at least at this point, the teachers needed for the 2.6 million children who attend primary school. The faculties of education sciences were prioritized, from this perspective, in the recent implementation of the regional public universities ( universités publiques en région ; UPR), but they are still not called upon by the MENFP and are seen to lack the resources to adequately play this role. The challenges of the education system – infrastructure, governance, human capital, and teaching and learning issues – come from a lack of financing. The fiscal system is limited for two main reasons. First, resulting from a low Government revenue (13% of the Gross Domestic Product, GDP), which cannot increase significantly because too few residents make the minimum taxable income. Secondly, efficient fiscal policy in Haiti is further rendered difficult by tax fraud and avoidance among many who are in a position to pay. The study also shows that in 2011, the State acquired additional means of collecting financial resources for the education system. The vote, in 2017, on the National Education Fund Act ( la loi sur le Fonds National pour l’Éducation ; FNE) makes all 24 fiscal mechanisms operational, which will make the system less dependent on external resources. The study also demonstrates that the implementation of the operational plan ( le Plan opérationnel ; PO) for 2010-15 (see Chapter III) suffered from an absence of leadership. An attempt of of a mid-term review, done in 2013, showed that there were both operational problems (e.g. 10% of the activities had been implemented) and financial difficulties (e.g. 13% of the funds had been mobilized). Despite the efforts that have been made, the number of children outside the education system has not been reduced, suggesting a “replacement effect,” indicating a continuation of young children who do not enter school. Indeed, a recent study (UNICEF 2017) drew attention to the fact that 500,000 youth between 4 Resonance was unable to locate the complete list of 24 finance schemes at the time of submission of this report 3 the ages of 5 and 18 years old, 320,000 of whom are ages 6 to 14, are still out of school. 5 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), with 28.78% of the global allocation of $69 million USD between 2010 and 2015, remains, alongside the World Bank (at 28.09%), the leader in terms of “quality” interventions in the education system in Haiti (e.g. reading interventions in the first few years of school, teacher training, production and distribution of teaching materials, etc.). However, these interventions are at risk because of the challenges in governance of the education system which cannot guarantee their sustainability. As a result, two questions arise: 1) What should be funded? and 2) How should it be financed? The discussions in the following chapters show that without appropriate governance, the partners’ investments are exposed to great risk, and the current model doesn’t permit the reinforcement of the MENFP. This study is the first of its kind in exploring the public financial efforts (including those that are philanthropic, flowing through the auspices of the State) for education, in particular those supported by resident taxpayers and partner countries. The study takes into account all of the financial flows which enter the public system and are identifiable as such, either through the general budget of the State or public transfers from the balance of payments. All levels of the education system are therefore taken into account: from preschool to higher education, including literacy, and technical and vocational education. Nevertheless, the focus is on basic education, as the first six years of school are recognized as mandatory in the 2010-15 PO. This study is based on interviews with key government officials (both current and former authorities; see Annexes 2 and 3 for more details) and the collection, processing, and analysis of budgetary, financial, macroeconomic, and demographic data over the period considered (2010-18). Thus, it relies as much on existing secondary data as on primary quantitative and qualitative data from semi-structured interviews with key informants: former Ministers of Education, and Economy; former ministers’ Chiefs of Cabinet; former General Director of the National Telecommunications Council ( Conseil national des télécommunications ; CONATEL); Executives from the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training (MENFP), the Ministry of Economy and Finance ( le Ministère de l’économie et des Finances ; MEF), the school transportation company Dignité, and civil society leaders and donors. 6 The study illustrates the context in which Haitian public education is financed (Chapter II), explains government strategies in the sector (Chapter III), details government budgets and spending (Chapter IV) and those of other donors and NGOs (Chapter V), and finally private and family education financing. Explanations of the PSUGO and the FNE, which undergird these financing sources, are given in Chapters VII and VIII. Finally, Chapter IX contains recommendations based on the study’s conclusions. 5 See Haïti Libre (June 6, 2017). “ Haïti - Éducation : Près de 500,000 enfants exclus du système scolaire haïtien ». <https: //w ww .haitilibre.com/article-21293-haiti-education- pres-de-500-000-enfants-exclus-du-systeme-scolaire-haitien.html>. (Accessed July 30, 2017). 6 The interviews Guides can be found in Annex 2 and Annex 3. 4 II. Context and background of the Education sector Economically, Haiti has not yet recovered in full from the earthquake of 2010. There is extreme poverty and neither the size of the economy nor the tax system allows the State to provide adequate public services. As the population grows at a rate of over 2% per year, growth in domestic wealth (which measures the gross domestic product; GDP) is neither as fast nor as constant as population growth. This results in an impoverishment of the population from year to year. The low wealth creation is dominated by a very small percentage, ranking Haiti among the countries with the highest socioeconomic inequality in the Latin America and Caribbean region (see Table A.1 in Annex 4). 7 The average Haitian lives today with an annual income barely higher than $800 USD. However, the total fertility rate is still high; in 2012, it was a rate of 3.5 children per woman of childbearing age across the country, 8 while the out-of-school-children indicator remains high, with nearly 400,000 children not accessing the education system (see Table 2.1). Table 2.1. Number of children not in school, by age bracket (2014) Level Age bracket # of children not in school % of total children not in school Population of the age bracket % of age bracket population not in school Fund. 1 6-7 65,405 16 % 499,661 13 % Fund. 2 8-11 80,074 20 % 981,875 8 % Fund. 3 12-14 66,593 17 % 810,478 8 % Second. 15-18 186,872 47 % 1,038,401 18 % TOTAL 6 - 18 398,944 100 % 3,330,415 12 % Source: Calculs PhareView (2014) on the base of the ECVMAS. The population of Haiti, estimated at about 11.4 million in 2017 9 , is extremely young – 50% are under 20 years old; the average age is 25; and the median age is 21. 10 On one hand this illustrates the magnitude of the education and training challenge for the population to be able to get out of poverty, and to be able to participate in the process on the other hand. In addition, unemployment was very high among the labor force, even among graduates of vocational training over the past five years who saw a rate of 66% unemployment, according to a recent study (Jacob, 2017). More generally, while investments in the economic sector outweigh the social (see Dorsainvil, 2015), progress is more visible in the social sector than in the economic sector. Per capita wealth is declining instead of rising, despite investments (see Table 2.2). In the social sector enormous efforts have been made in education. 7 The Gini coefficient was 0.592 in 2001 and 0.61 in 2012 according to World Bank information, showing an increase in wealth concentration. 8 See EMMUS V cited in UNFPA (2013). 9 See the projections from IHSI (IHSI 2009). 10 See IHSI (2009). 5 Table 2.2. Evolution of certain economic and social indicators in Haiti (2002 and 2013) Year Life expectancy at birth Infant mortality per 1,000 births Illiteracy rate (% of adults) GDP (constant HTG from 1987) GDP (constan t USD from 1987) GDP per capita (constant HTG from 1987) GDP per capita (constan t USD from 1987) 2002 49.4 71.1 33.8 12,968 2,323 1,464 293 2013 62.1 56.5 14.9 15,026 3,005 1,420 284 Variation 28% -21% -56% 16% -3% Source: Dorsainvil (2015: 27; Table 16) from the Human Development Report, 2014 and the World Development report, 2014. There has been an interruption of the planning cycle since 2015 when the government neither evaluated nor replaced the PO of 2010-15. The research showed that for the last two years, there has been a lack of consultation with the educational community to prepare a new plan based on the results of the previous one. The resources available to the government are limited. The tax burden being among the lowest in the region deprives the State of the financial means to act effectively and sustainably in economic and social spheres, and in particular in the education sector. For Haiti, the question is crucial and is two-pronged: 1) public funding of education is still a major challenge. The majority of the population is indeed poor (e.g. not making the minimum taxable income, depriving the State of tax revenue essential to invest in education), and 2) education costs are quite high because schools are mostly private (90% of Fundamental I and II, comprising 78% of pupils). Some recent initiatives have created conditions for the mobilization of additional financial flows (particularly public ones) in the education sector whose domestic components (fed through parafiscal mechanisms) have substantially increased. Furthermore, official donations to the government have been part of additional commitments to support reconstruction 11 There seems to be a tacit consensus that the battle for access has come a long way and the focus now shifted to other more crucial issues such as quality of education, cycle completion, and intercycle transition. 12 In the framework of the program undertaken by the MENFP to “extend and consolidate” the second public network of regional universities 13 ( universités publiques en région ; UPR) with the directive to establish faculties in science of education to provide qualified human resources for the educational system. 14 11 This is without considering the fact that in 2016, 205 NGOs (national and international) of which 30% were active, were enlisted by the minister of planning and external cooperation ( le Ministère de la planification et de la coopération externe ; MPCE) to operate in the education sector (see Jacob, 2016). The financial resources managed by these institutions are not known to the authorities because they do not figure in the finance laws. Funding channeled through NGOs may sometimes be captured through the donor funds reported in the finance laws. Some 84% of NGOs interviewed declare to be funded by donors but they also have other modalities for funding (e.g. private foundations, fundraisers, government, etc.) of which certain informational aspects are kept confidential (see Jacob, 2016). 12 This was the official position of Haiti during the conference of ministers of education which took place in Washington in 2013. 13 The first network constituted by the Université d’État d’Haïti (UEH) to which 13 faculties in Port-au-Prince are attached, including the faculties of civil law and nursing schools. There are also other higher education institutions which are not members of the UEH but which depend on the ministry for their budget. 14 In the wake of this consensus, it was agreed to consolidate the vocational training sub-sector, which had benefited from support for 6 While there has been recent progress in children’s school enrollment, 15 completion rates, retention, teacher training, and cycle-to-cycle transition remain low. 16 The result of this is low participation in secondary education: 22% in 2010 and 36% in 2014 17 (see Table A.3 in Annex 4). Higher education paints a similar picture: a total of 100,000 students in 219 higher education institutions (456 students per tertiary education, less than one student per 100 inhabitants). 18 Vocational training included only 21,090 students in 447 centers in total in 2012 (with an average of less than 47 students per training center). 19 Only 15% of primary school teachers are qualified. Of a cohort of 100 students enrolled in the Fundamental I cycle, only 22 will reach high school and 8 will make it to the end of the cycle (without necessarily finishing). 20 No study has so far examined the financial flows feeding into the educational sector. The choice of examining the short period since the earthquake is justified mainly by the need to link on the ground reality with recent financial planning efforts, and by the lack of adequate resources. The absence of an assessment of the 2010-15 PO renders the exercise even more necessary. cooperation since 2006. Wile this renewed interest has resulted in increased financial support for increasing youth employability; these efforts have been slow to materialize: a recent study has just shown the poor performance in the insertion of these graduates into the job market (Jacob, 2017). 15 The rate of schooling in basic education I and II was 76% in 2002-03 and 88% in 2012-13 (see MENFP, 2007; PhareView, 2014). 16 See the Operational Plan (PO) 2010-2015 (MENFP 2011: Chap. 3). 17 See MENFP (2011) and PhareView (2014). 18 See Jacob and Mathurin (in press). 19 See Jacob (2017). 20 See the PO 2010-15. 7 III. Strategic Education Sector Documents of the GoH The Government of Haiti’s (GoH) policies over the past 20 years have created a strategic framework that is designed to avoid improvisation and lack of preparation, and consequently the waste of scarce public resources. Three recent strategic documents from the education sector are mentioned here. The national plan for education and training ( le Plan national d’éducation et de Formation ; PNEF), planned to cover the period from 1997-2007, was not actually implemented nor evaluated. Launched in 2007, the national strategy for action-education for all ( la Stratégie Nationale d’Action-Education Pour Tous ; SNA- EPT) was a grant initiative that was adopted at a national forum to cover the period from 2007-2015 and was endorsed by the donor community. As a result, the country would be admitted to the fast track initiative ( l’Initiative de mise en œuvre accélérée ; IMOA) and benefit from an initial support credit of $22 million USD. However, the earthquake’s destruction of most of the school infrastructure in the West and South East departments in 2010 pushed the creation of the operational plan to cover 2010-2015. The operational plan was created in the wake of the political will to reestablish the educational system after the earthquake. As the first policy document really coming from the national authorities, the operational plan approached the system in a holistic way comprising nine axes 21 – rather than simply four which was the case in the PNEF and the SNA-EPT (access, governance, quality, and external effectiveness) 22 – and even includes its own institutional mechanisms for implementation. There has been an interruption in the government’s planning cycle since 2015 as there has been no assessment or creation of a subsequent document to replace the operational plan in a timely manner. The operational plan, at the request of President Préval who had just received the 33 recommendations of the working group on education and training (le Groupe de travail sur l’éducation et la formation (GTEF), 23 was to take over. However, in spite of its systemic approach in addressing age-old problems intrinsic to the education sector, the plan suffered the same fate as previous policy documents, never having been implemented, funded, or evaluated. Moreover, the institutional mechanisms for its implementation were not instituted, which was exacerbated by a succession of four ministers during the period of the plan. A mid-term review was conducted in 2013 and showed that implementation was poor according to both operational and financial indicators (10% of activities were undertaken and 13% of funds were mobilized). In 2017, the PO is already out of date. While a final evaluation would have made it possible to measure progress, establishing the causes of poor performance and incorporating it in another five-year plan was not performed. The PO operationalized the GTEF report’s 33 recommendations. The plan had foreseen not only the method but the rate of gradual re-entry of children not in school, taking into account their age, the financing of their schooling, and the duration (accelerated or not) of this process in the education system. The purpose of this approach was mainly to avoid pushing the system to a threshold that could cause it to exceed its efficiency limits. To override this approach was also to risk a new balance that neither the tax system as such nor the education system could follow or take charge of. 21 See MENFP (2011). 22 See MENFP (2007), MENJS (1997). 23 GTEF (2011). 8 The recent efforts of the GoH under the PSUGO are part of a broader and older strategy, that of universal education, which had been incorporated into the PNEF and the SNA-EPT. In ten years, these efforts have mobilized significant financial resources from various donors. However, for two years and without any real consultation with education stakeholders, the government has been scrambling to prepare a new plan without knowing the results of the previous activities in the sector. This absence of leadership within the government creates the conditions for sector partners to be left in a position where it is impossible for them to align with government directives. The MENFP has begun its planning of a 10-year education and training plan ( le Plan décennal d’éducation et de formation ; PDEF) which is meant to cover 2017-2027. However, recent planning experience in the sector has shown that long-term planning is not the best approach as environmental uncertainties (natural, institutional, political, economic, and social) are ubiquitous and there are high risks when planned activities have long delays. 9 IV. GoH Budgetary Allocations & Spending Most of Haiti's fiscal resources are generated by indirect taxes such as the sales tax ( taxe sur le chiffre d’affaires; TCA), whose character limits effectiveness and therefore, the actions of the State. 24 The 1987 constitution set up a range of new governmental offices which were not adequately funded due to a lack of necessary domestic tax base. This has led to a state that looked to the international community to meet its development needs. Such a situation requires funding from the international community, which usually finances a large part of its development budget. In these circumstances, when aid becomes scarce, the whole public investment system struggles. 25 Haiti’s public finances have, in recent years, revealed several realities noted in other studies: 26 ● A significant increase in income and expenditure; ● A significant increase in self-financed investment spending (whereas before 2011, this was based on an increase in donations – since 2011 this has been due to the funds from PetroCaribe which is now exhausted and accumulating debt); ● A high dependence on external aid for investment projects; ● Fiscal pressure slightly relieved thanks to an increase in revenue, but which still remains low due to a large part of the population which does not pay taxes (13.7% of GDP in 2014-15; 14.3% in 2015-16); ● A weakness of financial resources due in part to the small size of the economy; and ● The simultaneous rise of external debt to pre-2009 levels (in other words, the date of its cancellation). Under these conditions, to stimulate the economy public spending could be stronger. Some of the research available suggests that the increasing availability of funding for investment projects has not translated into the effective implementation of these projects, but simply to higher levels of transfers of resources from the treasury to the accounts of projects (World Bank, 2014). Such a situation makes it difficult to advocate in favor of certain sectors whose effects are more long-term, such as education. Two instruments create the framework within which public funding and expenditures are made. First, the finance laws ( Les lois de finances ) – the decrees establishing the general government budget (who open the budgetary appropriations at the beginning of each fiscal year, and carry these out); and secondly, the regulation laws ( Les lois des règlements ) – which, at the end of each fiscal year, verify what was spent on the budgetary appropriations opened at the beginning of the year. The finance laws are not evaluated, leaving the budgetary credits largely nominative and not necessarily effective in terms of expenditure. The finance laws present a number of problems: ● First, in the absence of a medium-term expenditure framework ( un cadre de dépenses à moyen terme; CDMT) that would have allowed the prioritization of government actions, the budget of the Republic is similar from year to year, without any correlation with the reality or priorities of the government's policy statement; 27 24 For a discussion of the governmental actions regarding social protection, see (2015). 25 The situation continues to be complicated because the loans from Venezuela were spent and managed in a way such that impacts on the economy could not handle. 26 (Dorsainvil, 2015 ; World Bank, 2014) 27 This helps explain why budget policy has not had a significant positive impact on the process of development and economic growth. 10 ● Next, the finance laws have two parts: the functioning of the State and its administration (including payroll) and investment, more conveniently called the Public Investment Program (PIP). Donor inputs take two forms: direct support to the Treasury and project funding (grants and subsidies). In the latter, management is provided directly by donors or by an implementation unit established in cooperation with the government, with a no-objection mechanism provided by the donor. However, for some of these donors, the fiscal year is the calendar year, and in Haiti the fiscal year starts on October 1 and ends on September 30 of the following year, which creates the conditions for constant overlap from one budget year to the next. In addition, donor programs are often presented in the form of an overall financial pool whose division from one year to another automatically creates distortions in the annual estimates; ● In addition, expenditure on education (in the broadest sense, including higher education and technical and vocational training) is not made under the single budget of the MENFP. For example, the company Dignité Transport Scolaire, operating for more than 22 years and transporting more than 2.1 million children in 2016-17 (see Table A.4 in Annex 4), is neither attached to the MENFP nor funded by the Ministry's budget, 28 but rather is financed by MEF grants under the Ministry's cost-share and subsidies option ( Quote-part et Subventions ). This makes it difficult to establish an education account in the national public accounts and, consequently, in the public part of the domestic education expenditure ( la Dépenses intérieure d’éducation; DIE) because it is about financial transactions that are not directly readable in budget documents and for which the actors themselves are reluctant to provide information; ● Finally, the MENFP budget is also not completely legible for the following reasons: o The budget is not broken down by level of education, making isolation and level-specific analysis difficult (e.g. specifically looking at pre-school, basic, or secondary education). o While the system started reforming primary school in the late 1970s, allowing the change in nomenclature to basic/fundamental education, the budget still uses the old term, “primary school,” making it unclear what this refers to. For example, budgets for 2009-10, 2011-12, and 2014-15 include a line called “pre-primary and primary education” which mobilized significant funding: 25.8 million HTG ($617,613 USD); 243.3 million HTG ($5,952,419 USD) et 2.472 billion HTG ($54,260,860 USD) respectively. However, these same budgets also include lines for early childhood and basic education elsewhere; 29 o In addition, in the 2017-18 budget the INFP has an investment loan of 10 million HTG ($159,594 USD) under the heading “Program for strengthening higher education and vocation and technical training,” which includes the construction of high schools, as well as the construction or rehabilitation of ten technical and vocational training centers for another cumulative amount of an estimated 85.8 million HTG ($1,369,323 USD). This leads to investment credits of 95.8 million HTG ($1,459,060 USD) instead of 10 million. Situations such as this mean that not all sections and services match the sum of all the specific projects and programs included in the investment budget; 30 o The same budget also includes, under the FNE, an amount of 2,426,157,952 HTG ($39,951,050 USD) in investment whereas this credit pays the subsidies and functioning 31 of public schools of the PSUGO. 32 In addition, the project « Increasing 28 It is the same for NGOs whose funding does not come from donors based in Haiti, or for vocational training for which five other different ministries (Health, Agriculture, Transport, Social Affairs, & Tourism) intervene without regulation of the INFP/MENFP without their budget being readable. 29 A discussion with a former minister of education from President Préval’s administration permitted further understanding of what effect has come from the activities of the presidential schooling program which became the PSUGO: “It was, in other terms, the PSUGO without the name,” he said. 30 For the period analyzed, only two budgetary years, 2015-16 and 2016-17, show alignment between the data and investments and the summary of projects and programs of the PIP. 31 The same is true of the credits allocated to the operation of the UPRs, which appear in the PIP. 32 However, for fiscal years 2016-17 and 2017-18, the new non-public schools were not admitted to the program and the old ones were 11 access to quality education » is included in the PIP of vocational training and the construction of vocational training centers is included in the PIP of secondary education, etc. These anomalies and inconsistencies require large corrections to make them readable and technically functional. 33 These findings show that the economic and financial governance of the education sector, and the budget itself, are both problematic and an approximation. This statement applies not only to basic education, but to the entire education system. In other words, with the available government budgetary information, it is only possible to arrive at estimates deduced and constructed from what is easier to obtain from the other sections and services of the budget of the MENFP. Moreover, over the period analyzed by this study (2010-2018) the government has budgets equivalent to some 2.5 billion USD 34 (32.27%, on average of GDP, see Figure 4.1), opening budget appropriations in the order of $236 USD per capita (38% of per capita GDP, which only grows about $34 USD each year). These credits, which amount to about 11,085 HTG, are far from being able to make a significant difference in the life of the average citizen for a year. Figure 4.1. Budget Allocations (% of GDP), 2010-2016 Source: Author’s calculations. discarded. Moreover, since the August 2016 Ministry directive (see above), the PSUGO only applies to public schools. The amount is very close to those of previous years when the program was running at full capacity. 33 Other anomalies exist as well for which there is no possible correction. For example, the budget of 2016-17 notes 45 million HTG for a study on the construction of Perches high school, while 25 million HTG is allocated for the construction of the Saint Michel de L’Attalaye high school. In the budget for 2014-15, only 3.9 million HTG are allocated for the construction of five vocational training centers. 34 The 2017-18 budget is $2.5 billion USD, compared to $17 billion USD in the Dominican Republic which has a similar population (10.67 million; see www.populationmediacenter.org , consulted 14 October 2017). General GoH Budget (% GDP) MENFP Budget (% GDP) Education and Training Budget (% GDP) Higher Education Budget (% GDP) 33.32% [VALUE] 36.88% 36.06% 30.25% 28.95% 25.33% 3.38% 4.20% 6.38% 6.03% 4.73% 5.41% 5.68% 3.05% 3.69% 5.91% 5.30% 4.14% 4.81% 4.38% 0.22% 0.23% 0.23% 0.35% 0.36% 0.35% 0.26% 0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 35.00% 40.00% 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17* Budget general de l'Etat (% PIB) Budget Education et formation (% PIB) Budget du MENFP (% du du PIB) Budget Enseign. Superieur (% du PIB) 12 While open general budget appropriations account for about one-third of domestic production, they have been in relative decline since 2012-13 (see Figure 4.1), reflecting irregular movements in the overall budget. Similar patterns can be seen for appropriations for education and training activities, from the bottom to the top of the system, both inside and outside the MENFP since all education and training do not go through this Ministry. In this respect, Haiti is not lagging behind the rest of the world according to the weight of resources allocated to education activities in GDP. The problem lies rather in the small size of the economy: just over 8 billion USD on average for the period analyzed for a population of more than 11 million inhabitants. The credits that pass through the MENFP (domestic resources; functioning including payroll, investments, donations, and loans) 35 , 36 are lower by almost one percent. This is due to the division of education and training activities in Haiti between the MENFP and various other ministries and the lack of an "Education and Training Account" as such. For example, the school bus company Dignité reports to the MEF both from a budgetary and administrative standpoint. In addition to the MENFP and the National Institute for Vocational Training ( Institut national de la formation professionnelle; INFP), technical and vocational training takes place under the auspices of five other ministries (Public Health, Agriculture, Social Affairs, Tourism, and Public Works), but these expenditures are not clearly delineated in these ministries’ budget. The education sector is a significant piece of the government’s budget. For the 2017-18 financial year, for example, it is the first budget item in the social sector 37 and the first budget item among all ministries (15.90% of the general budget). 38 Under the coordination of a director general, the MENFP is organized into various internal services (see Table 4.2) and ten departmental directorates of education ( directions départementales; DDE) which, themselves, consist of school district offices ( bureau de district scolaire; BDS) and zone inspection offices ( bureau d’inspection de zone; BIZ) on which the schools themselves depend. 39 The regular staff of all these internal services (including teaching staff) is 36,385 people, or almost half of the entire public service staff. The budget (operation, payroll and investment included) of all these structures depends on the "internal services,” reporting to the General Directorate, the MENFP (Table 4.2), which makes the MENFP a very centralized ministry from the point of view of budget implementation. 35 On average, 4.47% of GDP ($436 million USD) to finance preschool, basic, and secondary education as well as technical and vocational education, literacy, and the UPRs. 36 The Universite d’Etat d’Haiti (UEH), as an independent institution, does not depend on the MENFP budget, but its costs and those of the UPR (which do depend on the MENFP), shows weak resources allocated to these two large networks of public higher education : 0.29% of GDP on average during the period analyzed. (Figure 4.1). 37 The social sector is represented by the following ministries: MENFP, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Work, the Ministry of Public Health and Population; the Ministry of the Feminine Condition, and the Ministry of Youth, Sports, and Civic Action. 38 Coming from the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communication (12.2% of the general budget), the MEF (8.1%), and the Ministry of Agriculture (6.9%). See MEF, 2017. 39 See Annex 1. 13 Table 4.2. Budget allocations under the MENFP, per section (2010-2018) DESCRIPTION 2009 - 2010 2010 - 2011 2011 - 1012 2012 - 2013 2013 - 2014 2014 - 2015 2015 - 2016 2016 - 2017 2016 - 2017* 2017 - 2018 Internal MENFP Services - General Direction (% of MENFP budget) 87.18% 92.44% 95.90% 95.15% 93.22% 94.57% 96.47% 96.59% 96.76% 96.91% Functioning 118,055,365 131,593,358 135,470,971 146,964,742 179,941,412 198,580,352 3,612,513 154,211,734 162,859,500 190,591,529 Investment 51,953,833 126,875,973 319,332,804 287,692,148 166,254,678 224,396,809 3,925,369 158,614,663 152,421,277 165,326,095 Total 170,009,197 258,469,331 454,803,774 434,656,890 346,196,090 422,977,162 7,537,882 312,826,397 315,280,778 355,827,624 Literacy Office 1.51% 0.76% 0.03% 0.70% 1.06% 0.44% 0.24% 0.16% 0.05% 0.00% Functioning 1,750 ,091 1,911,7 80 159,794 - - - - - - - Investment (PetroCaribe) - - 2,977,161 3,952,613 1,975,517 - - - - Investment (Public Treasury) 1,196,925 200,298 - 236,283 - - 18,391 534,051 - - Total 2,947,016 2,112,078 159,794 3,213,444 3,952,613 1,975,517 18,391 534,051 152,586 - National Cooperation Committee with UNESCO (% of MENFP