Haiti Citizen Security Assessment (CSA) Final Report

Haiti Citizen Security Assessment (CSA) Final Report Latin America and the Caribbean Learning and Rapid Response (LACLEARN) September 2022 This report was prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development under the terms of Contract No. AID-7200AA19D00006 / 7200AA20F00015. The opinions expressed herein are the sole responsibility of Development Professionals, Inc. – Making Cents International, LLC and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development. As an applied research product, this report is not intended for program design. The report may produce recommendations, which USAID and other actors will determine whether or how to address. Haiti Citizen Security Assessment (CSA) Final Report Authors: Alexandre Monnard, Lead Researcher, Senior Research Scientist, NORC at the University of Chicago Richard Gold, Senior Rule of Law and Citizen Security Advisor, LACLEARN Contact: Gabriela Leva, Chief of Party, LACLEARN Development Professionals, Inc. (DPI) gleva@developmentpi.com TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 KEY FINDINGS 1 RECOMMENDATIONS 4 METHODOLOGY 7 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 THEME 1: UNDERSTANDING INSECURITY AND VIOLENCE 11 MAIN PATTERNS AND MANIFESTATIONS OF INSECURITY AND VIOLENCE 11 GANGS, CRIME, AND SOCIETY,21 THEME 1 RECOMMENDATIONS 34 THEME 2: CRIME AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION, RESPONSE, AND SANCTIONING 35 JUSTICE SYSTEM 35 POLICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 44 THEME 2 RECOMMENDATIONS 56 THEME 3: SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF INSECURITY AND VIOLENCE 58 ECONOMY AND LABOR MARKET 58 EDUCATION SYSTEM 66 COMMUNITY AND FAMILY 68 CIVIL SOCIETY 74 POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE 80 THEME 3 RECOMMENDATIONS 85 CROSS-CUTTING THEME: GENDER AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 89 i | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV FIGURES Figure 1: Reported kidnappings in Haiti, 2018–2021 ..........................................................................................12 Figure 2: Reported intentional homicides in Haiti, 2018–2021.........................................................................12 Figure 3: Reported weapons-related injuries in Haiti, 2019–2021 ...................................................................13 Figure 4: Reported rapes in Haiti, 2018–2021 .....................................................................................................13 Figure 5: CSA survey responses to “How common is each event in your neighborhood?” .......................14 Figure 6: CSA survey responses to “Have you modified any habits or activities due to insecurity in the last 12 months?” ........................................................................................................................................................15 Figure 7: CSA survey responses to “How would you feel if gangs disappeared from your neighborhood tomorrow?”................................................................................................................................................................16 Figure 8: Reported intentional homicides, disaggregated by department (2021)...........................................18 Figure 9: Reported kidnappings, disaggregated by department (2021) ............................................................18 Figure 10: Reported rapes, disaggregated by department (2021).....................................................................19 Figure 11: Reported intentional homicides, disaggregated by sex and month, 2020–2021..........................20 Figure 12: Reported weapons-related injuries, disaggregated by sex and month, 2019–2021....................21 Figure 13: Reported rapes, disaggregated by sex and month, 2020–2021......................................................21 Figure 14: Phone survey respondents’ perception of gangs’ activities.............................................................29 Figure 15: CSA survey responses to “To what extent do you trust courts to deal effectively with the problems you face today?”.......................................................................................................................................43 Figure 16: CSA survey responses to “To what extent do you trust the HNP to deal effectively with the problems you face today?”.......................................................................................................................................55 Figure 17: Frequency of HNP activities in the neighborhood of phone survey participants........................56 Figure 18: Analysis of survey data related to salaried jobs and number of livelihood activities..................59 Figure 19: Haiti’s ranking in the World Bank Doing Business Index................................................................62 Figure 20: Diagram of the self-reinforcing cycle of insecurity and economic strain......................................64 Figure 21: Trust in certain types of actors important to local governance and community support.........71 Figure 22: Reported cases of lynching in Haiti, 2018–2021 ...............................................................................73 Figure 23: CSA survey responses to the question on activities gangs may or may not conduct ................84 Figure 24: CSA survey responses to questions about how safe respondents feel doing specific activities in their neighborhood...............................................................................................................................................91 Figure 25: CSA survey responses to questions about the extent to which respondents’ neighborhood or community is affected by different types of youth conflicts...............................................................................92 Figure 26: CSA survey responses to questions about types of relationships that exist in the respondent’s neighborhood.............................................................................................................................................................92 Figure 27: CSA survey responses to questions about having any type of contact with different justice sector actors in the last 12 months.......................................................................................................................93 ii | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV ACRONYMS ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution BSAP Brigades de Surveillance des Aires Protegées CSA Citizen Security Assessment CSO Civil Society Organization CSPJ Superior Council of the Judiciary DEA U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration EMA School of Magistrates FADH Armed Forces of Haiti FGD Focus Group Discussion GOH Government of Haiti GUC Grant under Contract G9 G9 Family and Allies HNP Haitian National Police HTG Haitian Gourde IG Inspector General INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs JSSP Justice Sector Strengthening Program KII Key Informant Interview LACLEARN Latin America and Caribbean Learning and Rapid Response LAPOP Latin American Public Opinion Project LEVE Local Enterprise and Value Chain Enhancement MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti MOJPS Ministry of Justice and Public Security NORC National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago OPC Office of Citizen Protection Sociodig Sociodigital Research Group TVET Technical and Vocational Education and Training UN United Nations USAID United States Agency for International Development USG United States Government iii | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Latin America and Caribbean Learning and Rapid Response’s (LACLEARN’s) Haiti Citizen Security Assessment (CSA) for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) analyzes the state of citizen security and violence in Haiti, including its social, economic, and political determinants. The assessment employed a mixed-methods approach including an extensive desk review; a national phone survey; focus group discussions (FGDs); and key informant interviews (KIIs) with subject-matter experts, civil society and community actors, justice and security actors, donors, and Haitian citizens, including vulnerable populations. Resulting from the team’s analysis, this report outlines evidence-based, timely strategies to improve citizen security in Haiti. KEY FINDINGS VIOLENT CRIME IS ON THE RISE AND ATTRIBUTED TO GANGS Citizens’ perceptions indicate that actual levels of crime and violence are likely much higher than official data reflect. Official Haitian National Police (HNP) crime data reflect an upward trend in many forms of violence and crime (particularly kidnappings) between 2018 and 2021. However, CSA respondents among Haitian citizens and the international community viewed these data as dramatic underestimates of the current security crisis. Respondents also noted that the increased crime and violence affect all strata of Haitian society. Respondents primarily attributed this spike in violent crime to the increasing influence and spread of gangs. As gangs have taken control of neighborhoods and towns, they use violence to maintain control and protect their territories against rivals. As a result, responses suggest many Haitians (particularly those living in or near gang-controlled areas) feel insecure in their communities, are afraid of engaging in routine activities, and have adjusted lifestyles to minimize risk. GANG OPERATIONS ARE NUANCED AND VARIED The assessment team’s literature review and qualitative data provided insights into the structure and operations of Haitian gangs. Haitian gangs engage in a variety of criminal activities, including extortion; kidnapping; political services (such as ensuring votes for politicians among a community); security services; and trafficking of drugs, weapons, and persons. The activities gangs undertake are a function of their organizational and tactical sophistication, their existing territorial control, and political patronage, among other factors. As a result, certain gangs appear particularly focused on a specific subset of criminal activities (e.g., 400 Mawazo and kidnapping). Formal gang alliances – such as G9 an Fanmi e Alye (G9 Family and Allies) – are another recent development which has reshaped the landscape. As evidenced by survey data and official crime statistics, Port-au-Prince bears the brunt of gang presence and insecurity. Kidnappings and gang expansions have led to increasing parts of the city becoming unsafe, as respondents reiterated. However, other parts of the country, especially border cities, ports, and other large cities, increasingly face similar issues. While gangs (and baz1) are not a new phenomenon in Haiti, their overwhelming role in Haitian society today is undisputed. A Haitian journalist characterized 1 Baz are primarily social groups (some of which are armed) that attract children and youth who are out of school and unemployed. Because the line between baz and gangs is blurred, gangs recruit from baz members and other youth. See additional background in the Gangs, Crime, and Society section. 1 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV their expansion and magnitude as such: “Ten (10) years ago, Haiti had few criminal gangs. By mid-2021, there were at least 169 active gangs in Haiti, operating mostly in the Port-au-Prince area.”2 POLITICS, ECONOMIC ELITES, AND GANG ACTIVITY ARE INTERCONNECTED When political instability and conflict rise, space is created for political and economic elites to strategically collaborate with gangs. For instance, gangs in Haiti remain a useful tool for politicians to secure votes of the local electorate and quell movements that might threaten elite impunity. As a result, the nexus of gangs, economic elites, and politicians dominates the country. The recent expansion of gangs and the matching need for weapons,3,4 along with their increasing control of major infrastructure such as ports, appear to have increased their involvement in transnational crime. In addition, experts view the volume and type of weapons in the hands of gangs today as a telltale sign that they are connected to transnational crime and local elites; gang members are typically from poor neighborhoods and for them the cost of such contraband is far out of reach. Despite such pervasive networks, in recent years Haitian gangs have obtained increased autonomy and impunity. In the past, gangs were given control of select neighborhoods in exchange for delivering political support to elites during elections. Today, expanded gang control has enabled them to rely less on support from elites, while increasing elite reliance on gangs as influential actors. HAITI’S BARELY-FUNCTIONING JUSTICE SYSTEM LEAVES CITIZENS WITH FEW ALTERNATIVES The assessment team found that Haiti’s justice system functions poorly and fails to serve citizens. While donors have invested in the justice system for decades, only incremental improvements in specific institutions or legal frameworks have been obtained, but no sustainable advances in access to justice. Government of Haiti (GOH) resistance to increasing the judiciary’s funding and independence has been a major contributing factor to its poor performance. While revised criminal procedure codes were approved by Presidential decree in 2020, political chaos has hindered their initial June 2022 implementation targets. In line with these systemic issues, the judiciary has substantial shortcomings in its delivery of justice: poor infrastructure, a strained relationship with the HNP, prolonged pretrial detention, widespread corruption and elite impunity, and weak protection of victims. The assessment team found that the judiciary rarely helps citizens gain justice in response to violence, which is of particular relevance to the current security crisis. Both perpetrators and victims of violence often avoid the formal justice system, resolving their problems through informal justice, including mediation, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and vigilantism. In gang-controlled areas, gang leaders frequently mediate complaints by victims and other civil disputes. 2 Le Nouvelliste. 2021. “Les différents gangs auraient plus de 3000 soldats et autant d’armes, selon les autorités haïtiennes.” (July 2). Accessed November 14, 2022. https://lenouvelliste.com/article/230190/les-differents-gangs-auraient-plus-de-3-000-soldats et-autant-darmes-selon-les-autorites-haitiennes. 3 Gang activities depend heavily on access to weapons and ammunition. An increase in the number and strength of gangs has created a greater need for weapons. This is no small feat in Haiti, which has been under a U.S. arms embargo since 1991. Despite this, weapons from the United States and other countries are regularly smuggled into Haiti, as facilitated by gang control, corruption of customs, and a lack of GOH resources to conduct sufficient inspections. 4 There have been reports of guns exported from Haiti to Jamaica in exchange for drugs. See Insight Crime. 2020. “Jamaica and Haiti Swap Drugs and Guns.” (June 23). Accessed November 14, 2022. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/jamaica-haiti drugs-guns/ 2 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV LAW ENFORCEMENT IS UNABLE TO GUARANTEE BASIC SECURITY FOR CITIZENS Similar to the broader judicial system, the assessment team found that the HNP is overwhelmed by the country’s security environment, lacks resources, and suffers from political interventions and corruption that breed mistrust. Police officers are ill-equipped and afraid to confront gangs, particularly as they expand their control. Internal and external accountability measures have proven ineffective, while police may collaborate with gangs for financial reasons or personal safety. In addition, the assessment team found that many Haitians do not trust (or rely on) the police. Survey and interview responses suggest that the HNP is generally unable to respond to community needs. As a result, many Haitians have had to either flee from the gangs or cooperate with them, and growing areas of Port-au-Prince have become lawless. ECONOMIC STRIFE AND INSECURITY POSE A SELF-REINFORCING CYCLE Haitian insecurity is closely related to the country’s broader economic strife. The 2017 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer survey indicated that 81 percent of respondents thought the economy had deteriorated in the 12 months prior to the survey.5 Likewise, nearly all CSA youth FGDs cited poverty and food insecurity as critical factors contributing to insecurity in Haiti. A range of CSA interviews noted mechanisms through which insecurity undermines the already-weak economy. For example, high levels of insecurity disrupt already-limited economic activities. Such restrictions result in higher prices for basic goods and fuel, affecting households and transporters. Higher prices and losses of already-limited economic opportunities increase pressure on economically strained households. The combination of economic strain and insecurity may then push some to join gangs, which reinforces this cycle. Similarly, insecurity negatively affects the environment for business operations and investment. The assessment team found that typically small, informal Haitian businesses and even most formal businesses are subject to extortion by gangs and increased security costs. A WEAK EDUCATION SYSTEM LEADS TO INCREASED YOUTH VULNERABILITY School plays an important role in fostering youth development and access to economic opportunity by keeping youth busy, in a well-established structure, and providing opportunities to find employment or develop income-generating livelihood activity. The assessment team found that none of these roles are adequately fulfilled by current Haitian education (both public and private), and the primary and secondary education system is failing in multiple ways to deliver crucial support that might dampen gang and criminal activity. FAMILIES HAVE MINIMAL ABILITY TO INFLUENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY Haitian families and communities, particularly in gang-controlled and poor communities, face both day to-day and long-term challenges exacerbated by the ongoing security crisis. The assessment team found that vulnerability factors include poverty and food insecurity, a lack of a nurturing family environment, the absence of community support (including basic services), and inadequate education. Interviews also highlighted a challenge to traditional family and community morals, which manifests itself in the normalization of violence and a lack of solidarity within communities. 5 The 2021 AmericasBarometer results should be available in late 2022 and are likely to be even worse than 2017 results, given global and Haiti-specific developments over the past 5 years. 3 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV CIVIL SOCIETY’S ABILITY TO IMPROVE SECURITY IS LIMITED Haitian civil society organizations (CSOs) have worked in gang-controlled slums for several years to administer social services and conflict-reduction initiatives. However, many CSOs, even those working on mediation and with gangs, reported that the operating space has closed in the past year. The assessment team concluded that while CSOs have worked effectively in many gang-affected neighborhoods, they can achieve little in the most violent neighborhoods (where GOH presence is also lacking). Ultimately, the sustainability of these efforts depends on reducing elite control of political institutions and increasing government funding to provide basic services. A CORRUPT AND WEAK GOVERNMENT LEAVES A VACUUM FILLED BY GANGS Haiti’s current governance system appears to be captured by elites, hindering its ability to serve citizens and address insecurity. Evidence suggests that many Haitians believe politics and governance (along with poverty) are the major forces promoting insecurity in the country. The GOH is starved for funds for essential state services, notably those required for security and justice in the current context. Haiti has entered a period of political chaos, characterized by the absence of two of the most important state institutions (including the lack of a functioning legislature over the past two years). In this scenario, some politicians, businesses, and gangs have created partnerships that advance their objectives at the expense of citizen security. The current state of the GOH makes holding legitimate elections an unlikely prospect in the near term. RECOMMENDATIONS GOVERNANCE AND ELECTIONS • Support Haitian efforts to hold credible and transparent presidential and legislative elections: Haiti needs a legitimate president and a functioning legislative branch to address issues of citizen security. This effort must be led by Haitians with monitoring support from the international community. . The electoral process should seek to balance speed with the establishment of the necessary conditions for a successful election. Outside security resources may be necessary to secure the elections, particularly in Port-au-Prince, where gangs and insecurity restrict electoral participation. Further, USAID and other donors could build civil society’s capacity for investigative journalism to hold candidates accountable for connections to corruption. • Continue to promote decentralization in Haiti: Decentralization would reduce the extensive financial and political dependence of local governments on the GOH, and empower citizens through improved service delivery and public participation. USAID and other international actors should build demand for an effective legislative framework for decentralization through support to local governments, civil society, and the GOH. USAID has been funding programs to pursue this goal for more than a decade, but a recent analysis of one project, LOKAL+, suggests that significant work remains to be done.6 • Build momentum related to tax reforms: The current tax system is flawed in that general taxes make up only 13 percent of GNP7 and only 14 percent of taxes owed to the state are collected.8 The 6 OXFAM. 2021. “Empowering Local Governments? The LOKAL+ Project in Haiti.” (July 2021). Available here. 7 International Monetary Fund. 2020. “Haiti: Selected Issues.” (April 2020). Accessed November 14, 2022. https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2020/English/1HTIEA2020002.ashx. 8 OXFAM. 2021. “Empowering Local Governments? The LOKAL+ Project in Haiti.” (July 2021). Available here. 4 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV system also benefits elites with the resources and connections to take advantage of it. USG actors should support awareness-raising and advocacy efforts to promote relevant reforms. • Support greater transparency and regulation of Haitian banks: USG agencies along with other international donors should promote greater transparency and tighter controls on Haitian banks and financial institutions, which are key players in high-level corruption. USG actors should also coordinate with the U.S. Department of Treasury to investigate and prosecute money laundering by gangs and crime syndicates. SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT • Create a comprehensive strategic framework for crime reduction: USAID and other USG actors should develop a comprehensive framework for crime reduction in Haiti and monitor its implementation by local government and security actors. This effort should be led in collaboration with Haitian civil society, bring together government and security stakeholders, and include gang leaders in the process so far as permitted by U.S. law. • Strengthen CSOs’ capacities in violence prevention, mitigation, and resilience: CSOs play an important role in helping residents and communities survive as violence spreads across the country. USAID should provide grants to CSOs to develop approaches on violence prevention, mitigation, and resilience in areas that are not severely affected by violence but have gang presence. These grants could also support CSOs to build relations with gangs in these areas, and extend their violence prevention and resilience activities into other areas. One or more grants could help a coalition of CSOs work together with HNP under a comprehensive strategic framework for crime reduction, with capacity-building assistance from NGOs. Further, USG actors could build CSOs’ capacities to facilitate local crime reporting and assistance to victims, while investing in relevant mechanisms in neighborhoods. • Initiate neighborhood-based gang reduction and transformation: A serious gang reduction and societal reinsertion strategy requires sustainable financing, reliable police, and quality social services. Under these circumstances, USG actors could build the capacity of GOH institutions (including the HNP) to work with communities to address gang presence and violence in specific neighborhoods. This assistance could include (1) prioritizing state presence, such as a vetted HNP unit; (2) using visible prevention and interdiction techniques; (3) using dynamic, geo-referenced crime models to track progress; and (4) developing a community communications strategy. • Support an informal justice approach to help victims of violence: Given the challenges citizens face within the formal justice system, USAID should initiate an activity that supports victims of violence (especially gang violence) with a focus on informal justice. The activity could provide grants and technical assistance to informal Haitian institutions, building their capacity to assist victims of violence and resolve conflict. Such institutions would include lawyers, legal aid offices, CSOs, religious leaders, and community leaders. COMMUNITY SUPPORT AND SOCIAL SERVICES • Increase social support for poor families: USAID should provide support for family-based prevention activities focused in high-crime areas. This activity should provide social and psychological support, training on positive parenting skills, and job insertion opportunities for at-risk youth. 5 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV • Support gang and violence prevention for high-risk youth: USAID should support gang and violence prevention activities for youth with the highest risk of gang recruitment. This activity should provide evidence-based interventions that are most suited for the context, and target out-of-school youth and high-risk in-school youth. • Embed school-based violence prevention into formal and informal education: USAID should strengthen the capacity of public and private school teachers to deliver school-based violence prevention programming, ideally differentiated for low- and high-risk children and youth. 6 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV METHODOLOGY STUDY PURPOSE LACLEARN’s Haiti CSA analyzes the state of citizen security and violence in Haiti, including its social, economic, and political determinants. The assessment provides USAID and other actors with evidence based, timely strategies to improve citizen security in Haiti. Recommendations reflect the assessment team’s analysis of opportunities and barriers for change, while considering past successes and failures in citizen security programming. More specifically, the CSA analyzes: • National and subnational patterns of insecurity and violence, with a particular focus on how gangs operate and interact with other actors and communities • Crime and violence prevention, including key actors (e.g., the police, the judicial system, private security forces) and how they contribute to insecurity • Social, economic, and political determinants of citizen security and violence, including socioeconomic structures such as the labor market, education system, and community THEMES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS The CSA is guided by three major themes (including nine sub-themes) that encompass various underlying research questions. THEME 1: UNDERSTANDING INSECURITY AND VIOLENCE • Main patterns and manifestations of insecurity and violence in Haiti − Do citizens’ perceptions and statistics, to the extent that they exist, diverge? − What is the strength and nature of the relationship between gangs and violence/citizen security? − How are violence and gangs distributed across geographies, ethnic groups, social classes, and economic and industry contexts? • Gangs, crime, and society9,10 − How are gangs structured and operating? What is their geographical reach? − How do gangs recruit and retain their members? What does a gang exit look like? − What roles do transnational crime organizations play in gang emergence and activity? − What is the relationship between gangs and communities? − What are the relationships between gangs and the political system, the police and the security forces, the judicial system, and the private sector? 9 To complement the CSA, LACLEARN issued a Grant under Contract (GUC) for InSight Crime to conduct a detailed analysis and mapping of Haiti’s criminal dynamics (with a focus on gangs). While the CSA report addresses gangs in this section and throughout, the InSight Crime report provides a more in-depth analysis in line with these research questions. The InSight Crime final report is available separately; please contact the designated LACLEARN point of contact for additional information. 10 A summary brief of the InSight Crime analysis is available at: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00ZF3H.pdf. 7 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV THEME 2: CRIME AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION, RESPONSE, AND SANCTIONING • Justice System − How is the justice system structured and operating in Haiti? How are actors hired and trained? How is it funded? − What are key barriers to accessing justice in Haiti? Does it vary widely across geographies, ethnic groups, social classes, and economic contexts? What government and civil society mechanisms for enhancing access to justice exist (e.g., legal aid and alternative dispute resolution)? − How effective is the justice system in dealing with violence and citizen security challenges? − How do citizens perceive the justice system? • Police and Law Enforcement − How is law enforcement structured and operating in Haiti? How are they hired and trained? How is it funded? − What are the priorities of law enforcement actors and what strategies and tactics do they employ? How responsive is law enforcement to local needs? What is the role of politics in shaping these priorities? − How is law enforcement acting to prevent and respond to violence and gang activity? − What are accountability mechanisms for law enforcement actors? Are they effective at preventing excessive force and corruption? − How do citizens perceive law enforcement? THEME 3: SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF INSECURITY AND VIOLENCE • Economy and Labor Market − What role do the economy and labor market play in fueling violence and gangs? − What opportunities exist for Haitian youth to acquire skills and make a living? • Education System − What role does education (primary, secondary, and professional) play in violence and gangs? What relationship, if any, exists between education outcomes (dropout, graduation, etc.) and violence and gangs? − What elements of approaches to education (e.g., curriculum, teaching methods and training, access, and availability of schooling) may exacerbate violence and gang involvement? • Community and Family − What are some of the characteristics that make communities more or less vulnerable or resilient to insecurity, violence, and gang activity? − What community policing and conflict resolution mechanisms exist in communities? − What is the role of religious leaders, if any, in dealing with violence and gangs? 8 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV • Civil Society − What evidence, if any, exists to indicate that civic engagement affects violence and gang involvement? What role do civil society and civic engagement and participation play in violence and gangs? − What options exist for youth to be civically engaged? What consultation and participation mechanisms are available for citizens? Are there significant youth social or political movements? If so, what is their stance on and role in gangs and violence? − Under what circumstances have CSOs been able to contribute significantly to mitigating violence in communities? • Politics and Governance − What roles do political competition and instability play in insecurity and violence? − How do high-level corruption networks contribute to insecurity and gang activity? − To what extent are gangs and criminal organizations filling “governance gaps” of institutional weakness and poor provision of services? TECHNICAL APPROACH The assessment employed a mixed-methods approach, including an extensive desk review; a national phone survey; FGDs; and KIIs with subject-matter experts, civil society and community actors, justice and security actors, international donors, and Haitian citizens, including vulnerable populations. The assessment used an actor-centered political economy analytical approach to understand the causes of insecurity and violence, while analyzing variances based on factors such as region and gender. GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE: The assessment is national in scope, while it examines trends at the subnational level with focus on the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (including Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas, and Martissant) and Les Cayes in the South department. DESK REVIEW: The assessment team first completed a comprehensive desk review aligned with the research questions. While this desk review did not entail a systematic review of all literature related to the themes, the assessment team targeted recent documents from the last 10 years and from diverse sources. The team also compiled recent statistics from reputable sources, such as LAPOP. SURVEY: A national phone survey was conducted through a grant under contract (GUC) with Sociodigital Research Group (Sociodig) in Haiti, with technical oversight provided by the assessment team. The survey instrument was developed based on research questions and the principal gaps identified through the desk review. Due to the security context at the time of implementation, the assessment used a Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing survey, not a face-to-face survey. Sampling was performed using a random phone number generator to identify tens of thousands of Haitian mobile phone numbers. Relative to recent surveys conducted in Haiti, the CSA survey sample suggests good representativeness of the overall Haitian population; the principal divergence is that the CSA survey sample is relatively younger and more educated than the overall population. Survey data collection took place between January and March 2022, and the final number of completed surveys was 701 (meeting the target sample size of 700). KIIS AND FGDS: Qualitative data collection consisted of KIIs and FGDs conducted by both the assessment team and Sociodig. In total, 58 individual or small group interviews were conducted, while 8 9 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV youth focus groups were completed. These primarily covered the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (including Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas, and Martissant) and Les Cayes. Respondents included GoH officials, citizen security experts, implementing partners, judicial actors, private-sector actors, security actors (including former HNP officers), community and religious leaders, civil society, and present and past gang members. The assessment team prepared tailored guides for each target respondent group. LIMITATIONS: There are a few limitations regarding the assessment’s methodology. In terms of survey representativeness, face-to-face surveys (relative to phone-based surveys) tend to better reflect an overall population. Phone-based surveys are also more limited in their length. However, a face-to-face survey was not feasible given the security context at the time of implementation. In addition, due to the survey’s sample size, disaggregation of results by select variables (particularly department and age) was not always feasible. Lastly, given security developments in Haiti throughout the assessment’s implementation, the assessment team faced challenges in terms of respondent recruitment and participation (particularly for select groups, such as gang members). 10 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Key findings and recommendations are structured based on the CSA’s overarching themes, sub-themes, and research questions, as presented in the Methodology section. THEME 1: UNDERSTANDING INSECURITY AND VIOLENCE MAIN PATTERNS AND MANIFESTATIONS OF INSECURITY AND VIOLENCE While violent crime is on the rise according to official data, citizens’ perceptions indicate that actual levels of crime and violence are likely much higher (and primarily attributed to gangs) than the current available data reflect. Official HNP crime data demonstrate an upward trend in many forms of violence and crime (particularly kidnappings) between 2018 and 2021. However, CSA respondents among Haitian citizens and the international community view these data as dramatic underestimates of the current security crisis. Respondents also reinforced the view that the increased crime and violence affect all strata of Haitian society. Further, the assessment team concluded that violence is not evenly distributed throughout the country; rather, it is concentrated in the most urbanized areas of Haiti (such as Port-au-Prince in the Ouest [West] department). Official data show that the Ouest department is disproportionately affected; depending on the crime, the other most severely affected departments in diminishing order are Nord (North), Artibonite, Sud (South), and Nord-Ouest (North-West). Respondents primarily attributed this spike in violent crime to the increasing influence and spread of gangs. As gangs have taken control of neighborhoods and towns, they use violence to maintain control and protect their territories against rivals. As a result, responses suggest many Haitians (particularly those living in or near gang-controlled areas) feel insecure in their communities, are afraid of engaging in routine activities, and have adjusted lifestyles to minimize risk. Assessment Question: Do citizens’ perceptions and statistics on insecurity and violence, to the extent they exist, diverge? Official HNP crime statistics are widely considered unreliable, but they do show an upward trend in many forms of violence between 2018 and 2021. However, citizens’ perceptions of crime indicate that the situation is likely more dire than official statistics suggest, as evidenced by LAPOP and CSA survey responses. The assessment team found that most Haitians believed both the intensity and distribution of violence had increased to unprecedented levels in the last few years. Nearly 40 percent of CSA survey respondents felt their neighborhood was at least somewhat unsafe and many reported adjusting their habits as a result. STATISTICS ON INSECURITY AND VIOLENCE:11,12 LAPOP’s 2020 Haitian National Survey13 found that 11 Despite assistance from the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti to strengthen the HNP crime data system and capacity to assess the data, official statistics on insecurity and violence remain unreliable, especially due to lack of reporting crimes associated with widespread distrust of the police and the justice system. Nevertheless, they do indicate trends and magnitudes of crimes. 12 All crime statistics and tables in this section were prepared by the HNP and presented in an untitled Excel table and a PowerPoint presentation, “Statistiques de criminalité : mois d’octobre 2021,” dated November 4, 2021. 13 LAPOP. 2020. “2020 Haiti National Survey: Topline Report.” Accessed November 14, 2022. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/haiti/LAPOP_Haiti_2020_CATI_OC_Topline_Report_Web_210410.pdf. 11 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV crime victimization, insecurity, and gang activity were common in Haiti. Nearly one-quarter of those surveyed reported having been the victim of a crime in the last year. Among HNP data, kidnappings reflect the biggest change in crime levels over the past few years. The annual average of reported kidnappings has skyrocketed – 48 in 2018, 78 in 2019, 234 in 2020, and 453 in 2021 (see Figure 1). However, these levels are lower than those in 2005 (634) and 2006 (722). Figure 1: Reported kidnappings in Haiti, 2018–2021 Intentional homicides have also increased in recent years, with an upward trend from 2018 to 2021 (see Figure 2). The highest level of intentional homicides was 171 in June 2020, while the lowest was 43 in December 2017. Weapons-related injuries (typically caused by guns) have increased slightly in the last 2 years, including a spike in February 2021 (see Figure 3). In comparison with increased levels of kidnappings, intentional homicides, and weapons-related injuries, in the last 2 years, while fluctuating, reported levels of rape have slightly decreased (see Figure 4). Figure 2: Reported intentional homicides in Haiti, 2018–2021 12 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV Figure 3: Reported weapons-related injuries in Haiti, 2019–2021 Figure 4: Reported rapes in Haiti, 2018–2021 Given ongoing security developments, 2022 could likely eclipse 2021 levels of criminality. For example, journalists have compiled hospital (and related) data for various periods of 2022, which indicate alarming increases in these crimes.14 External crime victimization surveys may provide more accurate data than the HNP, because they do not rely on reporting to authorities. Among CSA survey respondents who experienced crime in the last year, the most frequently experienced crime was theft (14.7 percent), 14 ABC News. 2022. “Gangs strangle Haiti’s capital as deaths, kidnappings soar.” Accessed November 14, 2022. https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/gangs-strangle-haitis-capital-deaths-kidnappings-soar-84892283. 13 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV followed by threat of violence (7.7 percent), home invasion (7 percent), extortion (6.7 percent), physical attack (6.6 percent), and sexual assault (0.7 percent). Official crime statistics also do a poor job of capturing domestic violence and do not reflect the impact of spending more time inside on domestic violence. Further, rape and other forms of sexual violence are rarely reported in Haiti. CITIZEN’S PERCEPTIONS OF INSECURITY AND CRIME: The LAPOP 2020 Haitian National Survey found that 60 percent of respondents felt some degree of insecurity, with 26 percent feeling unsafe and 34 percent feeling very unsafe. With respect to the team’s CSA survey, 39 percent of respondents indicated that their neighborhood was either very unsafe or somewhat unsafe, nearly 31 percent reported feeling very or somewhat unsafe while taking public transportation, and approximately 21 percent reported feeling unsafe while shopping. Virtually all CSA interviewees and FGD participants noted a rise in insecurity and expressed concerns such as fear of leaving their home. The assessment team also found that increased perceptions of insecurity were attributed to greater visibility of gangs and to a lesser extent, increased kidnappings. Interviews suggest that Haitians are increasingly concerned about vandalism, break-ins, thefts, shootings, and extortion. Among CSA survey respondents, between 10 and 20 percent believe that shootings, vandalism, and extortion occur either very often or fairly often in their neighborhoods (see Figure 5). Fear of violence and insecurity has also led Haitians to change their lifestyles. Among CSA survey respondents, 35 percent do not leave their house at night, 27 percent do not leave their home for recreation and walks, 22 percent do not let their children play outside, and 21 percent do not leave home alone (see Figure 6). Figure 5: CSA survey responses to “How common is each event in your neighborhood?” 14 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV Figure 6: CSA survey responses to “Have you modified any habits or activities due to insecurity in the last 12 months?” KIIs and FGDs also provide insight into how perceptions of violence and insecurity have changed in the last two decades, and how Haitians are adapting to current violence and insecurity. The assessment team found that Haitians believed both the intensity and distribution of violence had increased to unprecedented levels – not only in Port-au-Prince, but also in other cities and regions. They attribute much of this increase to the growth and expansion of gangs. One citizen security specialist highlighted such changes over the last two decades at the regional level: “The regions were safe and quiet by and large, except maybe Gonaive. Port-au-Prince, though, was never really showing gains. The regions were safe because they had real community leaders, they worked together and took care of themselves and each other. It wasn’t because of police presence since there was little of that. […] There is no reason to expect the insecurity in rural areas to do anything other than increase.” In sum, official crime statistics do not match on-the-ground perceptions that insecurity and violence have reached unprecedented levels. Haitians recognize that the HNP lacks the capacity to give an accurate picture of the true state of crime, and that much crime goes unreported. Assessment Question: What is the strength and nature of the relationship between gangs and violence/citizen security? Many Haitian survey respondents (as well as Haiti observers interviewed) expressed the view that the growing frequency and severity of violence over the last few years was tied to the uncontrolled increase in gang activity. However, official data do not reflect whether perpetrators are gang affiliated, and Haitians are sometimes uncertain about who is behind certain acts of violence. The assessment team found that many Haitians were particularly concerned about gangs in their neighborhoods. In the LAPOP survey, 92 percent said that gangs did not provide security, 97 percent reported that gangs did not help with access to basic goods, and 89 percent said that gangs did not act as community leaders. Youth gang members were named as perpetrators of violence by 66 percent of youth respondents and 73 percent of older respondents in the LAPOP survey. 15 | LACLEARN HAITI CITIZEN SECURITY ASSESSMENT – FINAL REPORT USAID.GOV In the CSA survey, 11 percent noted that gangs were seen fairly often or very often in their neighborhood, while the vast majority thought gangs were harmful for their neighborhood. However, only 11 and 9 percent agreed or strongly agreed that gangs were responsible for violence and theft, respectively. At the same time, if gangs disappeared from their neighborhoods tomorrow, 49 percent said they would feel somewhat or much safer, while 40 percent said they did not know how they would feel in that scenario (see Figure 7). Figure 7: CSA survey responses to “How would you feel if gangs disappeared from your neighborhood tomorrow?” A range of CSA interviewees (including those from the government official, gang leader, donor, police, and community member categories) recognized that gangs were responsible for a significant amount of violence and crime. Crimes that respondents attributed to gangs included kidnapping, armed robbery, homicide, sexual assault, and forms of organized crime such as drug and arms trafficking. A GOH official acknowledged that “the proliferation of armed gangs has led to an exponential increase in the kidnapping, armed robbery and spectacular assassination levels. Fundamentally, [these increases in crime] are due to the growth of armed gangs, because all parts of the country are governed by armed gangs.” A police officer noted the level of violence committed by gangs, stating, “Now gangs are the main actors in regards to criminal acts … as I said things have changed drastically. They kill, they rape, they kidnap, they racket, they even burn people. There are no limits anymore.” RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GANGS, VIOLENCE, AND SECURITY: Surveys, KIIs, and FGDs highlight a perceived strong relationship between gangs and violence. However, official statistics do not show whether crime perpetrators are gang members. That said, about 40 percent of CSA survey respondents reported that they believed gangs were responsible for violence and theft in their neighborhoods.15 Regardless of official statistics, it appears that a variet