Evalyasyon rapid enpak kriz la nan Ayiti

OCTOBER / 2024 / RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI 1 HAITI RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT /OCTOBER 2024 / A report prepared by the government of the Republic of Haiti with the support of the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the World Bank. RÉPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI 2 This Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment (RCIA) report for Haiti is a collaborative product authored jointly by the government of Haiti and the staff of the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the World Bank. Acknowledging the institutions’ different mandates and areas of expertise, the findings, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in the RCIA do not necessarily constitute the views or formal recommendations of the European Union, United Nations, Inter-Americaan Development Bank, or World Bank on all issues, nor do they reflect the views of the governing bodies of these institutions or their member states. It is also recognized that because of different mandates, not all of the collaborating institutions will share or engage in all activities set forth or proposed in the report, and it is further understood that each institution will carry out or be engaged with any such activities in accordance with its mandate and operational policies and procedures. OCTOBER / 2024 / RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI 3 HAITI RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT /OCTOBER 2024 / 4 Communes Included in the Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment within the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Area Arrondissement boundary Commune boundary Commune in focus of RCIA N W E S 7.5 15 km OCTOBER / 2024 / RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI i Acknowledgments The Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment was carried out jointly by the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the World Bank, under the leadership and participation of the Government of Haiti. The contributions provided by senior government officials were essential, among them from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooper ation, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, the Ministry of Interior and Territorial Communi ties, the Ministry of Public Health and Population, and the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications, as well as various other government agencies. The authors appreciate the strong support and contribu tions of the various national stakeholders that made this effort possible, as well as the leadership and technical con tributions of each of the partner institutions. ii Table of Contents iii Acknowledgments Acronyms and Abbreviations 1 Executive Summary 1 Methodology 1 Summary of the Impact Assessment 3 Investment Needs (2024–2026) 3 Crisis Recovery Framework 4 Institutional framework 5 I: Introduction 6 Background and Rationale 6 Objectives 6 Assessment Methodology 8 Structure of the Report 9 II: Context of the Crisis in Haiti 10 Macroeconomic Context 13 Crisis and Violence Context 14 Scenarios and Risks 17 III: Crisis Impact and Priority Needs 18 Priority Axis 1: Economic Recovery, Support for Economic Diversification, and Strengthening of Economic Governance 19 Context 20 Agriculture 20 Industry 21 Services 24 Governance 27 Transparency and Accountability 27 Overview of Recovery Needs 29 Priority Axis 2: Rehabilitation of Economic and Social Infrastructure and Reduction of Vulnerabilities to Natural and Climate Shocks 29 Transportation Infrastructure 29 Electric Infrastructure 30 Water and Sanitation 30 Telecommunications and Digital Infrastructure 31 Housing 31 Public Buildings 32 Overview of Recovery and Reconstruction Needs OCTOBER / 2024 / RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI iii Priority Axis 3: 34 Promotion of Access to Health Care, Education and Other Basic Social Services; Social Inclusion and Food Security Internal Displacement 34 Social Protection 35 Infrastructure for Elementary and Secondary Education 36 Higher Education Infrastructure 36 Food Security and Nutrition 37 Health Infrastructure 38 Overview of Recovery Needs 39 Priority Axis 4: 41 Strengthening Rule of Law and Public Security Justice System 41 Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 41 Police 42 Penitentiary System 42 Community Violence Reduction 43 Overview of Recovery and Reconstruction Needs 43 IV: Crisis Recovery Framework 46 Crisis Recovery Vision, Strategic Objectives, and Core Principles 47 Programmatic Framework for Recovery 48 Prioritization and Sequencing 48 Transversal Issues 50 Assumptions, Prerequisites, and Risks 50 V: Institutional Arrangements 52 Institutional Framework 53 Monitoring Arrangements 54 VI: Investment Plan 55 Investment Plan 56 Financing Platform 58 References 59 Appendix A: Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment Programmatic Framework (2024–26) 62 Appendix B: Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment Investment Plan 75 3 Acronyms and Abbreviations ACLED BINUH CPI CRF DAP DGI DINEPA GBV GDP HNP IADB IDP IHSI IPC MEB MEF MSSM OMU PPP RCG RCIA SGBV SIMAST ZMPP Armed Conflict Location and Event Data United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti Consumer Price Index Crisis recovery framework Directorate of Penitentiary Administration General Directorate of Taxes National Directorate for Drinking Water and Sanitation Gender-based violence Gross domestic product Haitian National Police Inter-American Development Bank Internally displaced person Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Minimum expenditure basket Ministry of Economy and Finance Multinational Security Support Mission Operational monitoring unit Purchasing power parity Recovery coordination group Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment Sexual and gender-based violence Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor database Port-au-Prince metropolitan area OCTOBER / 2024 / RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI 1 Executive Summary After having several multidimensional crises affect Haiti for years, the country is at a critical juncture. The Kingston Declaration of March 11, 2024, concluded negotiations among various Haitian actors and led to the April 3 Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition. The agreement involved a wide range of Haitian stakeholders and established a transitional institutional architecture consisting of the Presidential Transition Council (TPC) and a transitional government to oversee the transition process. This agreement was formalized in the May 27 decree establishing the organization and functioning of the TPC, identifying the five strategic objectives for the transition period (see Section II). After years of crises, this transition process presents a window of opportunity to end the cycle of violence and forge a path out of fragility. Recognizing that tangible economic, social, and institutional recovery must accompany progress in the political transition, the government of Haiti launched the Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment (RCIA) in May 2024. The RCIA has been undertaken under the leadership of the Ministry of Economy and Finance and with the support of the World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). The RCIA was conducted between July and October 2024 and had the following three objectives: • Assess the impact of the crisis (2021–24) in areas most affected by the security crisis, particularly the Port au-Prince metropolitan area (ZMPP, see map above), on the population, the economy and poverty, physical infrastructure, and basic services and institutions. Where possible, the assessment included other affected areas, notably the Artibonite Department. • Define a recovery framework and investment plan for fiscal years 2025 and 2026, and identify – where possible – initial provisions for the medium-term (2026–30) to consolidate recovery and development gains. • Strengthen coordination of actions and interventions between the government and technical and financial partners with the support of the European Union, IADB, United Nations, and the World Bank. This report summarizes the findings and recommenda tions of the RCIA. It evaluates the impact of the 2021–24 crisis and defines urgent stabilization and recovery prior ities, complementing broader security, political, and hu manitarian efforts. As the RCIA assessment took place at a time in which the security crisis remains unresolved, future assessments will complement the present evaluation. To facilitate such future assessments, the RCIA establishes a recovery framework to allow for progressive expansion to other parts of the country as security conditions improve. Methodology The RCIA follows a rapid assessment methodology draw ing from post-conflict and post-disaster approaches. Giv en time and access constraints, the RCIA drew on exist ing data and analyses and consultations with an extensive network of stakeholders. Given the urgency to define im mediate recovery needs, the RCIA identifies and quantifies damages and short-term priority needs based on rapid as sessment methodologies. It goes on to develop an invest ment plan to address the identified priorities leveraging existing programs where possible and based on previous experiences and absorption capacities. As such, the RCIA does not apply the standard methodology of Recovery and Peace Building Assessments and Post Disaster Needs As sessments but develops standardized prioritization criteria to ensure a targeted, selective approach to identifying criti cal interventions, results, and investment requirements. Al though recognizing that the security crisis extends beyond the metropolitan area, the RCIA has prioritized ZMPP as the most affected area by the crisis. The RCIA is structured around four priority axes of intervention covering economic recovery, infrastructure rehabilitation, social security and services, and rule of law. These priority axes, and corresponding sectors and subsectors, were identified in joint workshops under the leadership of the Government of Haiti and are aligned with the strategic objectives outlined in the May 27 decree establishing the organization and functioning of the TPC. They also reflect the guidance received during the May 31 meeting of the TPC, with the four institutions outlining the parameters of the RCIA. Summary of the Impact Assessment The 2021–24 crisis has had a devastating impact on Port-au-Prince and the country as a whole. The impact of this crisis has been far reaching, affecting most of the population in the metropolitan area and resulting in disruptions, damages, and losses across all sectors, spanning economic productivity, critical infrastructure, 2 basic social services, and the ability of the state to provide essential institutional functions, including public security and law and order. Although the RCIA focuses on the most affected areas and populations of the ZMPP, the crisis had cascading effects throughout the country, given regional commercial, financial, transport, and other dependencies. The core findings of the impact assessment in the four axes are summarized below: AXIS 1 ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION, AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE • Private Sector: The security crisis has led to a significant decline in economic activity and employment, notably through looting, pillaging, and disruption of transportation routes. The secondary (manufacturing and industry) and tertiary (services) sectors have suffered the greatest losses. In the secondary sector, manufacturing, construction, and public utilities (electricity and water) with economic activity declined by 16 percent, 23 percent, and 43 percent. The apparel sector, for example, accounts for about 90 percent of manufactured exports yet witnessed a 20 percent decline in exports and lost approximately 30,000 jobs (54 percent), with 15 companies ceasing operations between 2022 and 2024. In the tertiary sector, formal and informal trade and the hospitality industry experienced a decline in economic activity by 26 percent and 23 percent. • Governance: The crisis has exacerbated deficiencies in essential functions of human resource management. Public sector employment fell from 112,631 in September 2021 to 104,029 in June 2024, a 7.8 percent reduction in the workforce. More than half of the departing civil servants were technical staff. This situation has also greatly affected the personnel of local administrations in affected areas, where dozens of employees have left. In some places, such as Gressier, municipal offices have been closed and abandoned. AXIS 2 REHABILITATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND REDUCTION IN VULNERABILITY TO NATURAL AND CLIMATE SHOCKS • Transportation infrastructure: The transportation infra structure (roads, ports, airports) and associated services (drainage, waste management, transportation of people and goods) have suffered damages of US$220 million, with a loss of US$15 million for the ports of Port-au-Prince and an additional cost of US$6.5 million for securing the international airport. • Electric infrastructure: Between 2021 and 2024, six substations and twenty distribution lines have been damaged by gang violence, affecting 60 percent of the customer base in the ZMPP. The closure of the Martissant terminal has reduced energy storage capacity by 11 percent, and the transport of hydrocarbons has become extremely difficult, increasing prices by 15 to 20 percent. • Water and sanitation: Since 2022, gang violence further reduced the limited potable water coverage available, with 55 percent of sites of the National Directorate for Drinking Water and Sanitation damaged by gang violence. Damage is estimated at US$70 million, with revenue loss of US$3.6 million for the ZMPP and Croix des Bouquets technical operating centers. The crisis has also led to loss of human resources and made the only official landfill site inaccessible, affecting solid waste collection. • Telecommunications and digital infrastructure: Lack of access, high prices, and poor quality of broadband networks are major constraints on growth of the digital sector and expansion of digital payments. Armed groups threaten infrastructure, limiting maintenance and fuel supply. Between September and November 2023, 85 percent of Digicel (a mobile telephone service provider) sites in the capital and 40 to 60 percent in small towns were operational, but rural sites were almost all out of service. • Public buildings: Armed groups have targeted public buildings in conflict zones, vandalizing them and stealing equipment. Communal and national buildings have been looted and burned, totaling damages of US$9.2 million. Several entities have had to relocate operations. • Housing: The housing sector was deficient before the crisis, with most real estate transactions being informal and vulnerable populations living in high-risk areas. Since 2021, more than 700,000 people have left their residences, and 3.2 million people are in need of shelters. The crisis has led to abandonment of entire neighborhoods, reduction in the housing stock, and an increase in rents of up to 200 percent. AXIS 3 PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, EDUCATION, AND OTHER BASIC SERVICES; SOCIAL INCLUSION; AND FOOD SECURITY • Food security and nutrition: Gang violence has contributed to unprecedented levels of hunger. In the ZMPP alone, the number of people in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 3 crisis or higher has increased from 856,000 in 2019 to more than 1,118,000 in 2023. Overall, the IPC of September 2024 indicates a disastrous situation throughout the country, with 50 percent of the analyzed population, 5.4 million people, experiencing acute food insecurity, an increase of more than 600,000 people OCTOBER / 2024 / RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI 3 since August 2023 and more than 850,000 since the assassination of President Moïse in July 2021. • Displacement: The rise in violence, particularly in and around Port-au-Prince, has rendered entire neighborhoods uninhabitable. A significant proportion of the displaced population is from the ZMPP alone, with many residents fleeing to safer areas of the city or other regions of the country. As of September 2024, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded 702,973 internally displaced persons, a 22 percent increase from the previous assessment in June. • Access to basic services: Gang violence has left a large portion of educational and health care infrastructure damaged or destroyed. Of 93 health care institutions with beds in the ZMPP, 2 private hospitals have been destroyed, 11 hospitals partially damaged, 14 health centers with beds partially or totally damaged or looted, and 38 health care institutions closed. In terms of education, 233 of 6,774 schools were vandalized or damaged and 418 closed due to gang violence in the ZMPP, affecting more than 140,000 students. AXIS 4 RULE OF LAW, PUBLIC SECURITY, AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS • Rule of law and justice: The security crisis has weakened the judicial system, particularly in the ZMPP. Courts have been burned and looted, and gangs have threatened and killed judicial actors. Many judges have left the country, while many courts, including the tribunaux de première instance of Port-au-Prince and Croix-des-Bouquets, have had to be relocated to cramped, insecure premises, significantly affecting the judicial system’s ability to function. According to the Tribunal de Première Instance of Port-au-Prince, the volume of cases has decreased by 67 percent since 2020. • Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV): The level of violence has increased substantially in the ZMPP since 2021. Data from Kay Fanm, an SGBV service provider based in Port-au-Prince, indicates a 340 percent increase in the number of cases per year between 2020 and 2023. In some neighborhoods, up to 80 percent of women and young girls are survivors of SGBV. SGBV response services are also affected, facing institutional and systemic challenges that limit their capacity to address the problem. • Haitian National Police: Since 2021, the Haitian National Police (HNP) has lost a significant number of staff, as 86 police officers have died and many more have been injured, while more than 1,000 have left their posts. Infrastructure was heavily damaged as well. Of 412 HNP buildings, 76 are nonfunctional while 146 require major rehabilitation. In the first eight months of 2024 alone, 81 gang attacks destroyed 47 police stations and 2 prisons, and damaged 13 other buildings. • Prison system: Between 2022 and 2024, the Directorate of Penitentiary Administration (DAP) witnessed a reduction of more than 33 percent of its staff, from 1,224 to only 809 agents. Of these 809 agents, 787 are available for field duty, but only 262 are present simultaneously to oversee 11,273 detainees—a ratio of 43 detainees per agent. Most of the buildings are former military buildings that are unsuitable as prisons. • Community violence: Since 2023, armed groups have controlled approximately 80 percent of the ZMPP. Between April 1 and June 30, 2024, the Human Rights Service of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti documented 1,379 people murdered or injured and 428 kidnapped; 88 percent of the murders were in Port-au-Prince, often due to gang attacks. Investment Needs (2024–2026) The RCIA indicates the need for investment of approximately US$1.34 billion from 2024 to 2026: US$450 million (34 percent) for infrastructure, US$388 million (29 percent) for security and rule of law, US$386 million (29 percent) for social protection (of which US$150 million for essential recovery and social protection functions and US$118 million for access to basic services), and US$114 million (9 percent) for economic recovery and economic governance. Where possible, the RCIA includes provisions for the medium term (2026–30). The assessment recognizes that the investments needed for the transition period will require additional investments to consolidate the recovery and realize development gains. For 2026–30, the RCIA identifies provisional investment needs of US$2.3 billion: US$1.85 billion for infrastructure, US$270 million for security, US$153 million for social security and services, and US$24 million for economic recovery and governance. Crisis Recovery Framework Implementation of the RCIA will be based on the overarching vision for recovery as articulated in the April 2024 Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition “to put Haiti back on the road to dignity, 4 democratic legitimacy, stability, and sovereignty, and to ensure the proper functioning of the State’s institutions.”1 This vision is based on a dual approach to recovery: addressing the immediate impact of the crisis while advancing longer-term reforms and structural changes that address deep-rooted drivers of instability and fragility. For the first two years of RCIA implementation, the overarching goal is to support recovery of communities most affected by the 2021–24 security crisis. Prioritization and sequencing: The environment for im plementing recovery interventions will remain challenging over the short term, with enabling conditions emerging pro gressively over time as progress is made on the security and political fronts. This will require a flexible and agile ap proach to coordinating implementation of efforts across the strategic objectives and sectors of the RCIA. A three-stage approach to prioritization and sequencing of program im plementation will be developed as a basis for coordination between the sectors, comprising geographic and temporal prioritization and sequencing of interventions where secu rity conditions allow, operational phasing of interventions to account for variations in project delivery capacities and timelines, and prioritization of funding and resource alloca tions to ensure that the most urgent and essential interven tions are adequately financed in a timely manner. Transversal issues: The RCIA has followed an inclusive, participatory approach involving consultations with nation al and local authorities, international partners, civil socie ty, and the private sector. Factors such as gender and age have played a key role in understanding the needs and abilities of individuals and the risks they face in this crisis. Each priority axis reflects a range of cross-sectoral issues, including gender, children and youth, and climate. Imple mentation of identified investments will ensure that the tar geting mechanisms reach the most vulnerable populations. Institutional Framework Ensuring alignment of national and international efforts in implementing post-crisis recovery efforts requires adequate institutional capacity for recovery planning coordination and monitoring. Building on international best practice and experience, a three-level structure is proposed for the institutional framework for implementation of recovery efforts identified in the RCIA. This architecture, which will be further developed and agreed between the government and its partners at the start of RCIA implementation, will also provide the framework for managing future revisions, updates, and expansion of recovery efforts as conditions evolve. This framework will complement—and not duplicate— 1Article 16, Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition existing coordination arrangements in Haiti, including those related to humanitarian and security assistance, and will be linked accordingly. It is proposed that the government lead an institutional ar rangement supported by a dedicated intergovernmental body responsible for overall coordination of recovery ef forts. The proposed institutional framework for post-crisis recovery consists of the following groups: • A recovery steering committee should be established with overall responsibility for recovery efforts, including strategic oversight and decision-making on implementation and financing. As in other countries, it is proposed that the head of government lead this committee, which should be comprised of relevant line ministries, the four partner institutions, and international partners. • A recovery coordination group (RCG) should be estab lished with responsibility for programmatic and opera tional coordination, implementation, monitoring, review, and updating of the crisis recovery framework (CRF). It is proposed that the head of an operational monitoring unit (OMU) will chair the RCG, which will comprise technical representatives from relevant ministries and international partners. The RCG will constitute a forum for ensuring co ordination across the four priority axes of the RCIA. • Thematic groups, corresponding to each of the four RCIA strategic objectives, should be established with responsi bility for sectoral-level coordination, implementation, and monitoring. To support this institutional framework, the government proposes to establish an OMU to ensure coordination with international partners and enable effective mobilization and allocation of international financing. The proposed OMU will support the government ministries, organizations, and general directorates in the technical and financial planning, implementation, and monitoring of the RCIA. It is proposed that the World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and IADB support the OMU by providing technical advice and capacity-building support. • Monitoring arrangements: The RCIA monitoring frame work will be based on the RCIA program framework and will be used to measure progress against three main aspects of RCIA implementation: progress toward programmatic out puts, results, and outcomes during RCIA implementation; a set of milestones articulating actions that will serve as stepping stones for achieving the objectives; and transpar ent tracking of aid flows (pledges, commitments, disburse ments) and indicators for increasing aid effectiveness. OCTOBER / 2024 / RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI 5 I. Introduction 6 Background and Rationale 1. After having experienced several multidimensional crises for years, Haiti is at a critical juncture. The Kingston Declaration of March 11, 2024, concluded negotiations among various Haitian actors for an inclusive political transition and led to the April 3 Political Agreement for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition, bringing together a wide range of Haitian stakeholders and establishing a transitional institutional architecture that includes a bicameral executive with a Presidential Transition Council and a transitional government. After weeks of consultations, the Presidential Transition Council was officially established on April 25, 2024, a transitional prime minister was designated on May 28, 2024, and a cabinet was appointed to implement a program aimed at concluding the transition process (see Section II). After the escalation of political and social instability since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, this transition process presents a window of opportunity to end the cycle of violence and forge a path out of fragility. 2. Recognizing that improvements in infrastructure and services must accompany progress in the political pro cess, the government requested support for a rapid crisis impact assessment (RCIA). In May 2024, the government requested assistance from the World Bank, United Na tions, European Union, and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (the partner institutions) in assessing the im pact of the 2021–24 crisis and developing an investment plan to address immediate stabilization and recovery pri orities. The RCIA has been undertaken under the leader ship of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) with the participation of relevant government ministries and expert teams from the four partner institutions. It was conduct ed between July and October 2024 based on the 2008 Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recov ery Planning2 and follows the established methodology and global practice that has been used to support govern ments in similar post-crisis assessment and planning. 3. This report summarizes the findings and recommen dations of the RCIA. It evaluates the impact of the 2021– 24 crisis and defines urgent stabilization and recovery priorities, complementing broader security, political, and humanitarian efforts. In light of the dynamic nature of the situation, the RCIA identifies recovery priority interventions for 2024–26 with a focus on the Port-au-Prince metropol itan area (ZMPP) and establishes a recovery framework to guide the expansion of interventions to other parts of the country as security conditions improve. 2 The Joint Declaration seeks to mobilize the resources of the European Commission, the United Nations Development Group, and the World Bank to harmonize and coordinate post-crisis response frameworks to enhance Objectives 4. The RCIA will guide efforts to address immediate sta bilization and recovery priorities. The priorities are de signed to create conditions for a peaceful long-term tra jectory of development and growth. Building on the vision for transition and recovery articulated in the April 3 agree ment, as well as the transitional government’s roadmap, the RCIA has three objectives. • Assess the impact of the crisis (2021–24) in the most af fected regions, particularly the ZMPP, on the population, the economy and poverty, physical infrastructure, and ba sic services and institutions. • Define a recovery framework and investment plan for fis cal 2025 and 2026 aligned with the priorities outlined in the prime minister’s roadmap for the transition period. • Strengthen coordination of actions and interventions between the government and technical and financial partners with the support of the World Bank, United Nations, European Union, and IADB. 5. The RCIA is structured around four priority axes of intervention: economic recovery, infrastructure reha bilitation, social services, and rule of law. These priori ty axes, and corresponding sectors and subsectors, were identified in joint workshops under the leadership of the Government Haiti (GoH), reflecting government programs and priorities for the transition period (Figure 1). The rele vant government ministry and partner institution co-led the work under each axis, depending on their mandate and comparative advantage. Assessment Methodology 6. Development of the RCIA followed a three-phased approach: an initial preparatory phase to define the scope, objectives, and parameters of the assessment (June/July); an assessment phase to conduct the impact and needs assessment (August); and a consolidation phase to develop the RCIA reports, recovery framework, and investment plan (August/September). 7. The RCIA follows a rapid assessment methodology that draws from post-conflict and post-disaster approaches and builds on ongoing government programs and mobili zation of local expertise through projects and partners to develop estimates of damages and needs as a basis for country resilience to crises by meeting the recovery needs of vulnerable populations and increasing the capacity of national institutions for effective prevention, response, and recovery. OCTOBER / 2024 / RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI 7 FIGURE 1: Overview of Rapid Crisis Impact Assessment Priority Axes PRIORITY AXIS 1 PRIORITY AXIS 2 PRIORITY AXIS 3 PRIORITY AXIS 4 PRIORITY AXIS 1 Economic recovery and diversification and institutional Economic recovery strengthening and diversification and institutional Rehabilitation of infrastructure and reduction of vulnerabilities Promote access to basic social services, social inclusion and food security Rule of law, public security and institutional reforms LEADS: MTPTC - IADBLEADS: strengthening MEF - WBG/EU LEADS: MAST - IADB/WBGLEADS: MTPTC - UN 1 Private Sector 1 Transportation 1 Internal Displacement 1 Justice 2 Administrative Governance 2 Electricity 2 Social Protection 2 SGBV 3 Economic & Financial Governance 3 Water & Sanitation 3 Education 3 Police 4 Transparency /Accountability 4 Telecoms & Digital 4 Food Security 4 Prisons 5 Housing 5 Health 5 Community Violence Reduction 6 Public Buildings prioritizing investments in recovery and reconstruction. To arrive at these estimates, the RCIA differentiates direct from indirect impacts. Direct impacts are damage and losses to physical and human capital (e.g., destruction of infrastructure, death, population displacement, environmental risks), and indirect impacts encompass broader social and economic consequences (e.g., losses in access to markets, education, or employment; increases in malnutrition, mortality, and crime). 8. The RCIA methodology also draws on lessons learned from implementation of the 2004 Emergency Assistance Programs for Post-Conflict Crisis and from initiatives re lated to the 2010 and 2021 post-disaster needs assess ments. The RCIA identifies priority interventions, results, and investment requirements and provides the foundation for long-term recovery planning to ensure sustained sup port to security, governance, infrastructure, and social ser vices. 9. In addition to the analysis of crisis impact and associated recovery needs, the RCIA includes development of a crisis recovery framework that defines a set of priority actions and an associated investment plan for 2024–26. This recovery framework is designed to help operationalize the RCIA, facilitate operational alignment between national and international partners, and ensure that adequate financing is allocated. The assessments of damages and needs provided in this report are estimates that will be refined during the implementation stages, as the security crisis remains unresolved at the time of this writing. 10. The RCIA was undertaken on the basis of the following parameters (Box 1). • Rapid assessment approach: Recognizing the urgency of the situation, the RCIA has drawn on existing data and analyses as well as consultations with an extensive network of stakeholders. Given the paucity of existing primary data, targeted field assessments and primary data collection have been undertaken where critical information gaps persist. • Limited timeframe: The RCIA identifies and quantifies short-term priority needs for the transition period of 2024–26, although implementation of associated projects may extend beyond the first two years. Where possible, the assessment includes provisions for the medium term (2026–30) to identify investments necessary to consolidate recovery and development gains. • Prioritization of needs: Given the two-year investment planning period agreed upon for the RCIA, a set of standardized prioritization criteria were applied as part of the needs assessment. • Geographic focus: While recognizing that the security crisis extends beyond the ZMPP, the RCIA has prioritized the communes that the crisis has affected most (see map above and Section II). Wherever possible, given the constraints in time and access, the RCIA does cover the Artibonite Department (notably for Axes 2 and 3). The results and the associated recovery framework establish the basis upon which further assessments can be conducted, including in areas outside of Port-au-Prince. • Inclusive, agile coordination: The RCIA was conducted by government and partner institutions and involved technical teams drawn from across all relevant ministries 8 and sectors. With the government leading the process, the RCIA has included consultations with national and local authorities, international partners, civil society, and the private sector. • Complementarity: The RCIA programs complement and do not duplicate other assessment and planning processes such as the Humanitarian Action Plan. Implementation and funding appeals will be coordinated with these other processes. BOX 1: RCIA Prioritization Criteria Mandatory Criteria • The activity aligns with the five priority areas defined in the April 3, 2024 Agreement and the Transitional Government’s roadmap. • The activity will have an immediate and visible impact on the restarting of economic activity and public services. • The activity will have an immediate and visible impact on the poorest and most vulnerable groups or households in the population. • The activity can be feasibly implemented within the proposed timeline, considering the current security context, available implementation capacities, and financial constraints. Additional Criteria • The activity builds trust and momentum for the transition by restoring state authority and presence, improving security, reducing violence, and facilitating the return of displaced populations. • The activity lays the groundwork for long-term investments in recovery and development. 11. Constraints and limitations: The RCIA was conducted within a short time frame and in a context of ongoing violence in the ZMPP, with virtually no access to the geographic areas of focus. This placed significant constraints on the types, amount, and accuracy of data available to conduct the impact and needs assessment across a range of sectors. Where possible, the teams used geospatial technologies and modeling to complement existing data and analyses from the government and the partner institutions. As such, the results of the RCIA are estimates that require further development as data availability improves. Structure of the Report 12. This report has two main components. The first (Sections II and III) outlines context and summarizes the outcomes of the RCIA, and the second (Sections IV to VI) presents a recovery framework and investment plan for operationalizing the RCIA and ensuring a structured, coherent approach to the coordination, implementation, and financing of priority interventions for 2024–26 while establishing a process for expanding recovery efforts as conditions evolve. OCTOBER / 2024 / RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI 9 • Inclusive, agile coordination: The was conducted by government and partner institutions, involving technical teams drawn from across all relevant ministries and sectors. With the government leading the process, the RCIA has included consultations with national and local authorities, international partners, civil society, and the private sector. • Complementarity: The RCIA programs complement and do not duplicate other assessment and planning processes such as the Humanitarian Action Plan. Implementation and funding appeals will be coordinated with these other processes. BOX 1: RCIA Prioritization Criteria II. Context of 11. Constraints and limitations: The RCIA was conducted within a short time-frame and in a context of ongoing violence in the ZMPP, with virtually no access to the geographic areas the Crisis in Haiti of focus. This placed significant constraints on the types, amount, and accuracy of data available to conduct the impact and needs assessment across a range of sectors. Where possible, the teams used geospatial technologies and modeling to complement existing data and analyses from the government and the partner institutions. As such, the results of the RCIA are estimates that require further development as data availability improves. Structure 10 13. Haiti’s political transition provides a window of opportunity to exit the cycle of violence. After the resignation of the government under Prime Minister Ariel Henry in March 2024, political factions reached consensus on the provisions of the transition process and modalities for political decision-making during this process, including a transitional presidential council and a transitional government led by a prime minister. The transitional presidential council assumes the functions of the president and includes nine representatives from various political parties and civil society (seven voting members, two observers). A transitional government was inaugurated to create the conditions for improving security and preparing and implementing elections. During the transition period, retaining the integrity of government and the presidential council will remain critical to sustaining political stability and ensuring implementation of critical investments. 14. Transition authorities committed to the implementa tion of a roadmap, pursuing five objectives: public and national security; economic recovery, infrastructure reha bilitation, food and health security; constitutional issues; rule of law and justice; and elections for the renewal of po litical personnel. The last pillar highlights that the author ities have committed to conclude the transition in Febru ary 2026 by installing newly elected officials after general elections with the support of international partners. 15. While elections are supposed to conclude the transition period, the brevity of the transition requires swift action to improve livelihoods of violence-affected populations. With the last general elections held in 2015, parliament, the senate, and many local governments have exhausted their political mandates. In the present context, organizing of general elections requires a complex set of constitutional amendments and administrative preparations. Notably, a substantial improvement of security conditions remains a precondition to ensure an environment in which elections can be held that yield results that are widely accepted among political parties and will not be contested ex post. Past experiences indicate that gangs may be used to garner votes for candidates, which would undermine the credibility of the outcome. An improvement in the security environment will not only depend on advances in law enforcement but need to be complemented by progress in political processes. The living conditions of populations affected by violence need to be improved swiftly, notably in areas where state authority is reestablished, to sustain government control and strengthen the resilience of local communities against gang infiltration and violence. 16. International support for additional investments in Haiti’s social, economic, and physical infrastructure will be critical to generate confidence in the transition process and ensure improvements in service delivery and economic opportunities. Considering the economic contraction, the transition government has limited fiscal space to advance the necessary investments. On August 19, the council of ministers issued an amended budget decree for fiscal 2024 that reduced the overall budget available by 20.5 percent due to a shortfall in projected resources. Similarly, the execution rate of capital spending remains low (see Section III), highlighting that the ongoing multidimensional crisis has further limited institutional capacities due to brain drain that the upsurge in emigration has generated. In light of these constraints and the damage and losses due to the crisis, increased international support for the funding and implementation of investment priorities remains indispensable for the success of the transition period. Macroeconomic Context 17. Haiti’s economy has contracted by an estimated 8.5 percent over the past decade as longstanding structural challenges increased vulnerability to shocks.3 Structural challenges include state capture by vested interests, a non enabling business environment, underinvestment in human capital, and deficient infrastructure. Underdeveloped financial markets and limited market contestability have contributed to a large informal economy, limiting domestic resource mobilization and fiscal space. Disaster risk management and response systems are inadequate to address vulnerability to natural hazards and climate change, which disproportionately affects the poor. In this context, Haiti has been highly vulnerable to a series of significant shocks since 2018, including the COVID-19 pandemic, a surge in international commodity prices after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, earthquakes and storms, and most recently, escalation of violence and political instability. 18. The business environment deteriorated progressively since 2018 and then sharply beginning in 2021 because of a series of sociopolitical disturbances, creating a challenging operating environment for enterprises. Social unrest and waves of violence, including several episodes of complete paralysis of the economy, characterized 2018 and 2019. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic introduced shocks that led to economic contraction and layoffs. The increase in gang-related violence by the end of 2021 disrupted domestic supply chains, including fuel and food distribution. For firms, this resulted in a reduction in productive activities and profits because of partial or permanent closure of production sites or firms, increasing security costs, staff resignations due to emigration, and pillaging and vandalism that have resulted in losses and damage to capital stock (physical and human). 3Contraction in real gross domestic product (GDP) from 2015 to 2024, including estimates for 2023 and forecasted values for 2024. OCTOBER / 2024 / RAPID CRISIS IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR HAITI 11 FIGURE 2: Inflation, Annual Percentage Change 80 60 40 20 0 FIGURE 3: Share of Population Living Below Lower-Middle Income (US$3.65) and International (US$2.15) Poverty Lines 70 60 50 % 40 30 20 May ... Jan 20 Sep 20May ...May Jan 22Jan Sep 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 22 ... 24 CPI CPI–Local Products CPI–Imported Products Source: L’Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’Informatique. 3.65 US$ 2017 PPP Source: World Bank 2024a. 2.15 US$ 2017 PPP “Indice des Prix à la Consommation.” https://ihsi.gouv.ht/publications/publications_regulieres. Note: CPI, Consumer Price Index. 19. Inflation accelerated in 2020 and surged in 2022 as Haiti navigated shocks and logistical disruptions. Sharp depreciation of the Haitian gourde in 2020 led to higher import prices in local currency terms. Central Bank intervention briefly slowed inflation in 2021, before a commodity price shock led to monetization of the deficit, weaking the gourde. Inflation accelerated in late 2022 and early 2023 as food and fuel prices surged, following disruptions at the ports due to gang violence. Headline inflation is trending down, but food inflation remains high, affecting poor households the most (Figure 2). Living standards have deteriorated, with 36.4 percent of Haitians living in extreme poverty in 2024 (less than US$2.15/day FIGURE 4: Change in Nightime Light Intensity, 2018–2024, According to (a) Urban Area and (b) Department Note: PPP, purchasing power parity. 2017 purchasing power parity), up from 29.9 percent in 2020 (Figure 3). 20. Changes in nighttime light intensity reflect Haiti’s prolonged economic contraction, illustrating the particularly severe impact of insecurity on Port-au-Prince. Nighttime light intensity is strongly correlated with economic activity and is often used to assess GDP (Beyer, Hu, and Yao 2022; Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2012; Morris and Zhang 2019; Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2016). Nighttime light intensity in Haiti is highest in the urban centers of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitian, where economic activity is concentrated. Figures 4a and 4b illustrate the substantial a b 3 NIGHTTIME LIGHT INTENSITY Ouest –45.0% 2 1 0 Port-au-Prince Cap Hatien Autre L’Artibonite Centre Sud-Est Nord Sud Nord-Est Nord-Ouest Nippes –17.5% 24.8% 29.9% 40.5% 91.2% 129.7% 137% 167% 2018 Source: 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 –100% 0% 100% 200% Source: Román et al. 2018. Román et al. 2018. 12 and persistent decline in nighttime light intensity in Port-au Prince, which declined by an estimated 45.9 percent from January 2018 to August 2024. 21. Haiti’s trade deficit has widened, led by a decline in FIGURE 5: Trade Balance and Remittance Inflows 8 6 US$ BILLIONS exports since 2019. As in other countries, the COVID-19 pandemic dampened demand for exports in 2020, particularly in the apparel sector. Exports continued to decline in US dollar terms in 2023 and 2024, amidst widespread insecurity and disruptions to port operations (Figure 5). Imports also decreased during the pandemic but rapidly increased as global commodity prices rose in 2021 and 2022. Persistent economic contraction and depreciation 4 2 0 –2 –4 –6 2016 2017 2018 2019 2015 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 of the gourde have limited demand for imports. Remittance inflows have been an important external source of stability, helping finance an increasing trade deficit. Remittances have increased with more workers leaving the country. The current account balance has oscillated as a result of changes in the trade balance and remittances, moving from deficit in 2019 to a surplus in 2020 as imports contracted and back into a deficit as international commodity prices surged in 2022 and 2023, resulting in an increase in the import bill. Higher remittance inflows are expected to narrow the current acc